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1958-1960


VOLUME XIV

AFRICA



DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

Washington





Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960

Volume XIV

Africa

Editors Harriet Dashiell Schwar
Stanley Shaloff

General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. A statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Title IV of the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351 *et seq.*), which was added by Section 198 of Public Law 102-138, signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991.

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government, including facts which contributed to the formulation of policies and records providing supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The statute confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.

IV Preface

The volume presented here, which was compiled and prepared as a book manuscript in 1987, meets all the standards of selection and editing prevailing in the Department of State at that time and complies fully with the spirit of the standards of selection, editing, and range of sources established by the statute of October 28, 1991. This volume records policies and events of more than 30 years ago, but the statute allows the Department until 1996 to reach the 30-year line in the publication of the series.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a triennial subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the final 3 years (1958–1960) of the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This subseries comprises 18 print volumes totaling more than 16,000 pages and 7 microfiche supplements presenting more than 14,000 pages of original documents.

This particular volume presents documentation on U.S. policy toward and relations with the countries of Africa south of the Sahara. Material on North Africa, including the conflict in Algeria, is in Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The original research, compilation, and editing of this volume were done in 1981 and 1982 under the Department regulation derived from Secretary of State Kellogg's charter of 1925. This regulation prescribed that the *Foreign Relations* series include "a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities." The regulation further stipulated that the additional required records "needed to supplement the documentation in the Department" be obtained from other government agencies.

The Department of State's historians have had, for the series in general and for the particular volume published here, complete and unconditional access to all records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat which comprehended all the official papers created by or submitted to the Secretary of State; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division level; the files of all overseas diplomatic and consular posts and U.S. special missions; and all the official correspondence with foreign governments and with other Federal agencies. Any failure to include a complete Department of State record in the *Foreign Relations* series

cannot be attributed to constraints or limitations placed upon the Department historians in their access to Department records, information security regulations and practices notwithstanding.

Department of State historians preparing the *Foreign Relations* series, including the volume published here, have enjoyed full access to the papers of the Presidents and to all other White House foreign policy records. All of this documentation has been made available for use in the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series thanks to the exceptional cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration, its Office of Presidential Libraries, and the individual Presidential library. The Department of State owes particular thanks for the research of this volume to the staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

In addition to Presidential correspondence and records of Presidential meetings and conversations, the documentation in the White House files at the Eisenhower Library was the most important source for the preparation of the volume published here. Department editors had full and complete access at the Library to all the institutional documentation of the National Security Council (NSC) including the memoranda of discussion at NSC meetings, formal NSC documents, and related papers. There was also full access to the subject files of Presidential records (particularly the Whitman File), the files of other White House officials, and more informal policy documentation in other collections in the Eisenhower Library. It should be noted that the editors supplemented the NSC records from the Eisenhower Library with documents in the Department of State files.

The records preserved and maintained at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs documentation of other Federal agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Department of State historians, with the considerable cooperation of the various agencies, have obtained access to records requested for possible inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* volumes. Access to records of other agencies maintained at the Presidential libraries has been supplemented by special research visits to the historical files retained by these agencies or transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration. Department historians have enjoyed steadily broadened access to the records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The statute of October 28, 1991, requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of all the major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the United

States Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Although prepared in compliance with an earlier Department regulation, this volume was prepared in a manner fully consonant with the standards and mandates for compilation contained in the 1991 statute.

The List of Sources, pages XIII–XVII, identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume.

Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Volume XIV

In selecting documents for the volume published here, the editors have given primary consideration to those records that would most fully explain the formulation of U.S. Government policies toward Africa as a whole and the individual regions and states of Africa. The decisions of and recommendations to the President regarding these policies are fully documented as are the discussions and actions of the National Security Council. The policy options considered or adopted by the Secretary of State and the most important of his actions to implement Presidential decisions are also comprehensively documented.

Correspondence and other exchanges between the U.S. Government and the nations of Africa, nations with interests in Africa, and with the United Nations were included to document the main lines of policy implementation on major issues and to indicate the important items of information that attended Presidential decisions and policy recommendations by the Secretary of State. The editors also included selected intelligence reports and estimates and reports from diplomatic posts that had, or may have had, some impact on the making of major policies.

The editors have not attempted to document the wider range of day-to-day relationships, issues, and contacts between the United States and African nations nor have they sought to present the record of the establishment and conduct of diplomatic and consular posts or the appointments to these posts. The editors also have not researched the files of other Federal agencies in order to provide a comprehensive record of how those agencies contributed to formulation, execution, or support of economic, military, and cultural policies toward the African nations.

In selecting documents for this volume, the editors have concentrated exclusively on presenting previously classified or undisclosed records. Public statements and agreements have not been included, but previously released information has been appropriately identified to elucidate documents printed here for the first time.

The amount of documentation devoted to Sub-Saharan Africa is substantially larger than in previous volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series, reflecting the increased attention that U.S. policymakers had to give to the region as many African countries attained independence in the 1958–1960 period. To present U.S. policies toward Africa within one volume, the editors have focused on a selection of the most important issues.

The editors believe that the Congo crisis was the single most important issue in U.S. policy toward Africa in the period; more than half the volume is devoted to the crisis, which began in mid-1960. Another major portion of the volume provides key documentation on U.S. policies toward Africa in a regional context. Those sections include documentation concerning general policy toward Africa, the recognition of newly-independent states, and policy concerning the Horn of Africa. Separate compilations are devoted to Ghana, Guinea, and South Africa, each of which presented policy issues of broad significance. Guinea raised the problem of recognition of a country that had unilaterally chosen independence, when the former colonial power was discouraging international recognition. Delay in U.S. recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations troubled relations with Guinea and demonstrated the futility of such an approach. U.S. relations with Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea's President Sekou Touré posed the problem of dealing with left-leaning third-world governments. South Africa, with its system of apartheid, raised policy issues of long-term significance with implications for U.S. policy toward other regimes in southern Africa. Documentation on policies toward other African countries is included in the regional compilations.

A Special Note on Intelligence Documents

At the time the volume was originally compiled, the editors had access to National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. Other intelligence records in the Eisenhower Library collections and Department of State files were also consulted. These records did not, however, include material concerning the planning and preparation for the possible assassination of Patrice Lumumba described in the *Interim Report* of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which was based on interviews and on CIA documents that the Agency had made available to the Committee. The editors have identified in editorial notes and footnotes drawing upon documents quoted in the *Interim Report* the sources currently publicly available on the Lumumba episode.

Completion of the declassification of this volume and the final steps of its preparation for publication coincided with the development of procedures since early 1991 by the Central Intelligence Agency in cooperation with the Department of State that have expanded access by Department historians to high-level intelligence documents from among those records still in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency. Some of the documents made available to Department historians were among those quoted in the *Interim Report*. The editors concluded that locating and obtaining access to all the pertinent documentation and submitting it for declassification review would have necessitated considerable further delay in the publication of this volume. They chose not to postpone publication of the prepared manuscript. The Department is, however, using this expanded access, as arranged by the CIA's History Staff, for compilation of future volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Incoming telegrams from U.S. missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted. Washington has not been included in the dateline if a document originated there or if a conversation took place there.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. The amount of material omitted because it was unrelated, however, is not accounted for. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The unnumbered first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates if the President or his

major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts have been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

Declassification Review

The declassification review process for this volume resulted in the withholding from publication of .38 percent of the manuscript as originally compiled. Most of the excisions were of material pertaining to intelligence sources and methods. Others included information given in confidence by foreign officials and material that might be considered offensive.

The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; or
- 9) a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security and law. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State,

other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

Acknowledgements

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, especially David Haight, who assisted in the collection of documents from the Library's collections for this volume.

Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Stanley Shaloff compiled and edited the volume under the supervision of former Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Schwar and Shaloff prepared the Congo compilation, Shaloff the compilation on general U.S. policies toward Africa, and Schwar the remainder of the volume. Paul Claussen and David W. Mabon provided planning and direction. General Editor Glenn W. LaFantasie supervised the final steps in the editorial and publication process. Brett Bellamy assisted with the research. Gabrielle Mallon prepared the lists of sources, abbreviations, and persons. Rita M. Baker, Vicki E. Futscher, and Althea W. Robinson performed the technical editing. Barbara-Ann Bacon of the Publishing Services Division (Natalie H. Lee, Chief) oversaw the production of the volume. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

September 1992

Contents

	Page
Preface	III
List of Sources	XIII
List of Abbreviations	XIX
List of Persons	XXIII
General U.S. policy toward Africa	1
U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa and the Sudan; U.S. relations with Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan	173
U.S. recognition of and concern with newly-independent African states	212
 Congo	
U.S. policy regarding the Congo crisis: support of the U.N. intervention; concern with the possibility of Soviet intervention; concern with the political situation; policy regarding Katanga	251
 Ghana	
U.S. relations with Ghana; Prime Minister Nkrumah's visit to the United States	645

XII Contents

	Page
Guinea	
U.S. recognition of Guinea; U.S. relations with Guinea; President Touré's visit to the United States	670
 Union of South Africa	
U.S. relations with the Union of South Africa; the question of South West Africa	724
Index	763

List of Sources

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Indexed Central Files. The major regional Africa files are 611.70, 770.00, 770.56, and 870.00 and subfiles. Other useful files include 110.13-HE, 120.1471, 320, and 611.51.

The Congo: The major file for the Congo crisis is 770G.00. Additional material concerning U.N. intervention in the Congo is in files 325.70G, 332.70G, and 343.170G. Other useful files for the Congo include 033.70G00, 320, 330, 611.55, 611.70G, 655.70G, 755A.02, 770G.02, 770G.11, 770G.13, 770G.5, 770G.5-MSP, and 870G.00 and subfiles. The major files for the Congo before independence are 755A.00 and 855A.00 and subfiles.

Ethiopia: The major files are 611.75, 775.00, 775.5, 775.5-MSP and 875.00 and subfiles.

Ghana: The major files are 033.45J11, 611.45J, 645J.00, 745J.00, 745J.11, and 845J.00 and subfiles, especially 845J.2614.

Guinea: The major files are 601.70B11, 611.70B, 670B.00, 751T.02, 770B.00, 770B.02, 770B.11, 770B.5, 770B.5-MSP, and 870B.00 and subfiles, especially 870B.2614.

Somalia: The major files are 611.45U, 745U.00, 611.77, 777.00, 777.5-MSP, and 877.00 and subfiles.

Sudan: The major files are 611.45W, 745W.00, and 845W.00 and subfiles.

Union of South Africa: The major files are 320, 611.45A, 645A.00, 745A.00, 745A.56311 and 845A.00 and subfiles. The major files for the South West Africa issue are 320.5745X and 745X.021.

Lot Files. These are the special decentralized files of the policymaking level of the Department of State, including the Executive Secretariat, overseas Foreign Service posts, and U.S. special missions. A list of the lot files used or consulted for this volume follows.

AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 187

Economic subject files on the Congo for 1960-1963, maintained by the Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs.

AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 261

Political files for 1960-1963, including files of the Congo Working Group, maintained by the Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs.

AF/AFI Files: Lot 62 D 406

Political/military files for 1951-1960, maintained by the Politico-Military Adviser of the Office of African Affairs, later the Bureau of African Affairs.

XIV List of Sources

AF/AFI Files: Lot 63 D 92

Political/military files for 1957–1960, maintained by the Politico-Military Adviser of the Office of African Affairs, later the Bureau of African Affairs.

AF/AFW Files: Lot 63 D 148

Files of letters and memoranda for 1960–1961, maintained by the Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs.

AF/I Files: Lot 69 D 295

Files of Fred L. Hadsel, Planning Adviser in the Office of Inter-African Affairs, 1963–1964, and Director of that Office, 1964–1968, including some 1960–1963 files maintained by the regional planning adviser in the Bureau of African Affairs.

Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials and on major conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1956–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials and on major conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1955–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559; Lot 64 D 560

See entry under Washington National Records Center

EUR/WE Files: Lot 72 D 441

Files on U.S. relations with France for 1958–1967, maintained by the Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.

INR–NIE Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, containing copies of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates.

OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for 1953–1960, maintained in the Operations Staff.

OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548

Policy Planning Staff subject, country, and chronological files for 1957–1961.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 174

Correspondence between President Eisenhower and heads of foreign governments for 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and Secretary of State and heads of foreign governments and foreign ministers for 1953–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for 1948–1961, maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence, and related Department of State memoranda for 1947–1961, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for 1947–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S–S, CMS Files: Lot 69 D 150

Collections of documents on U.S.-European relations for 1958–1966, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top Secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 1951–1959, and selected problem files on the Middle East for 1954–1956, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328

Top Secret records of meetings between representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 1959–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

UNP Files: Lot 65 D 379

Files for 1956–1961, maintained by the Division of Dependent Area Affairs in the Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

Harriman Papers

Papers of W. Averell Harriman, who visited Africa in 1960 on a fact-finding mission for presidential candidate John F. Kennedy.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Herter Papers

Papers of Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State and then Secretary of State, 1957–1961.

XVI List of Sources

Staff Secretary's Records

Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, 1952–1961, including records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, Jr., and Christopher H. Russell.

White House Office Files

White House collections, including Project Clean Up.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, as maintained by his Personal Secretary, Ann Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: Name Series, Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, Administrative Series, Project Clean Up, and International File.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068

Lot 64 D 559: Collection on documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Lot 64 D 560: Collection on documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for 1959, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

Dulles Papers, Dulles Daily Appointment Book

Daily log of the meetings and appointments of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for 1953–1959.

Published Sources

Official Sources and Other Documentary Collections

Cordier, Andrew W. and Wilder Foote, eds. *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations*, volume V: *Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960–1961*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.

Gerard-Libois, J. and Benoit Verhaegen. *Congo 1960*. 2 volumes. Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, 1961.

Gott, Richard, John Major, and Geoffrey Warner, eds. *Documents on International Affairs, 1960*. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.

U.S. Congress. Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*. Senate Report No. 94–465, 94th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.

- U.S. Department of State. *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, 1959, 1960*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- _____. Department of State *Bulletin*. 1958, 1959, 1960. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- _____. *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*. 2 volumes. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957.
- U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, 1959, 1960-61*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Memoirs

Note: The following memoirs were consulted at the time this volume was prepared. The Department of State takes no responsibility for their accuracy nor endorses their interpretation of the events.

- Alexander, Major General H.T. *African Tightrope: My Two Years As Nkrumah's Chief of Staff*. New York: Praeger, 1966.
- Dayal, Rajeshwar. *Mission for Hammarskjold: The Congo Crisis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1965.
- Kanza, Thomas. *The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba: Conflict in the Congo*. London, R. Collings, 1978.
- Macmillan, Harold. *Pointing the Way, 1959-1961*. London: Macmillan, 1972.
- Murphy, Robert. *Diplomat Among Warriors*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964.
- Von Horn, Major General Carl C. *Soldiering for Peace*. New York: David McKay, 1967.

List of Abbreviations

- Abako**, Alliance des Ba-Kongo
AC, United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/AFC, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/AFI, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFE, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/N, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFP, Agence France Presse
AFS, Office of South African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/W, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AID, Agency for International Development
Amb, Ambassador
ANC, Armée Nationale Congolaise (Congo); African National Congress (South Africa)
AP, Associated Press
ASAF, Asian-African
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
AV, Aviation Division, Office of Transport and Communications, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
Balubakat, Association des Ba-Luba du Katanga
BCP, Belgian Communist Party
BOB, Bureau of the Budget
CA, circular airgram
CAC, United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo
CARE, Cooperative for American Remittances to Everywhere
CC, United Nations Conciliation Commission
CEREA, Centre de Regroupement Africain (Congo)
CFEP, Council on Foreign Economic Policy
ChiCom, Chinese Communist(s)
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIMCO, Congo International Management Corporation
CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Atlantic Fleet
CNA, Congolese National Army
CODEL, Congressional delegation
comite, committee
Conakat, Confédération des Associations Tribale du Katanga
Contel, Consulate telegram
CRITIC, indicator for emergency telegram
CSK, Comite Speciale du Katanga
CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
DAG, Development Assistance Group
DDE, Dwight David Eisenhower
Del, delegate, delegation
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the delegation at the United Nations General Assembly to the Department of State
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DLF, Development Loan Fund
DOD/ISA, Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EDT, Eastern Daylight Time

XX List of Abbreviations

- EE**, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EEC**, European Economic Community
- EmbDes**, Embassy despatch
- Embtel**, Embassy telegram
- ES**, Emergency Session of the United Nations
- ETA**, estimated time of arrival
- EUCOM**, European Command (U.S. Army)
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUR/WE**, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- EXIM**, Export-Import Bank
- FAMA**, Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara
- FBIS**, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
- FBO**, Office of Foreign Buildings, Department of State
- FE**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- FEPC**, Fair Employment Practices Commission
- FLN**, Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria)
- FM**, FonMin, Foreign Minister
- FP**, Force Publique (Congo)
- FY**, fiscal year
- FYI**, for your information
- G-2**, Army general staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional level or higher
- GA**, United Nations General Assembly
- GADel**, United Nations General Assembly Delegation
- GATT**, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
- GOB**, Government of Belgium
- GOC**, Government of the Congo; United Nations Good Offices Committee on South West Africa
- GOF**, Government of France
- GOG**, Government of Ghana; Government of Guinea
- GOI**, Government of Italy
- GOL**, Government of Liberia
- GRC**, Government of the Republic of China
- GSR**, Government of the Somali Republic
- HICOM**, High Commission, High Commissioner
- HMG**, Her (His) Majesty's Government
- HQ**, Headquarters
- IAC**, Intelligence Advisory Committee
- IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
- ICA**, International Cooperation Administration
- ICAO**, International Civil Aviation Organization
- ICJ**, International Court of Justice
- IDA**, International Development Association
- IES**, International Educational Exchange Service
- IMF**, International Monetary Fund
- INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JCSM**, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
- JFD**, John Foster Dulles
- kw**, kilowatt
- LA**, Latin America
- Leo**, Leopoldville
- ltr**, letter
- MAP**, Military Assistance Program
- MC**, MemCon, Memorandum of Conversation
- ME**, Middle East
- MEA**, Ministry of External Affairs
- MFN**, most favored nation
- MinDef**, Minister/Ministry of Defense
- MIT**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- MNC**, Mouvement National Congolais
- M/OP**, Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- MSA**, Mutual Security Agency/Act/Agreement
- MSP**, Mutual Security Program
- mtg**, meeting
- mytels**, my telegrams
- NAC**, North Atlantic Council
- NASA**, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

- NBC**, National Broadcasting Company
NEA/AF, Office of African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State
Niact, night action requiring immediate reply
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NSC, National Security Council
NY, New York
NZ, New Zealand
OCB, Operations Coordinating Board
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OFD/ED, Office of International Financial and Development Affairs, Economic Development Division, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
ONUC, Organisation des Nations-Unis au Congo (see UNOC)
OPEX, United Nations technical assistance program for providing operational, executive, and administrative personnel
ourtel, our telegram
P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PAA, Pan American Airways
PAFMECA, Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa
PDG, Parti Democratique Guinéen
PGAR, Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
P.L., Public Law
PM, Prime Minister
PNG, persona non grata
POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants
Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State
PPS, Policy Planning Staff
PriMin, Prime Minister
PSA, Parti Solidaire Africain (Congo)
RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
refdes, reference despatch
reftel, reference telegram
Res, resolution
RG, Record Group
SA, South Africa
SC, United Nations Security Council
SecDel, Secretary of State's Delegation
Secy, Secretary of State
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
S/P, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning; Policy Planning Staff
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
Stat., United States Statutes at Large
SUNFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development
SWA, South West Africa
SYG, United Nations Secretary-General
TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuz (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)
TC, Technical Cooperation
Topol, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the United States Permanent Representative at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
TSO, United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization
U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
UAR, United Arab Republic
U/CEA, Special Assistant for Communist Economic Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of State
UK, United Kingdom
UKDeI, United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations
UM, Union Minière (Congo mining company)
UMHK, Union Minière du Haut-Katanga
U/MSC, Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security, Office of the Under Secretary of State
UN, United Nations
UNDeI, United Nations Delegation
UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund
UNOC, United Nations Operations in the Congo (see ONUC)
UNOGIL, United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
urtel, your telegram
USAF, United States Air Force

XXII List of Abbreviations

USCINCEUR, United States Commander
in Chief, Europe
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USIS, United States Information Service
(overseas branches of USIA)
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USRO, United States Mission to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
European Regional Organizations

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST, United States Treaties and Other In-
ternational Agreements
USUN, United States Mission at the
United Nations
VIP, very important person
VOA, Voice of America
WE, Office of Western European Affairs,
Bureau of European Affairs, Depart-
ment of State

List of Persons

Allen, George V., Director, United States Information Agency

Alphand, Hervé, French Ambassador to the United States

Anderson, Robert B., Secretary of the Treasury

Balewa, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tatawa, Prime Minister of Nigeria

Boggs, Marion W., Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from 1959

Bomboko, Justin, Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Congo, June–September 1960; President of the Congolese College of Commissioners and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs from October 1960

Bourguiba, Habib, President of Tunisia

Bunche, Ralph J., U.N. Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs and Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo, July–August 1960

Burden, William A.M., Ambassador to Belgium from October 1959

Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., USN, Chief of Naval Operations

Byroade, Henry A., Ambassador to South Africa through January 1959

Caccia, Sir Harold A., British Ambassador to the United States

Canup, William C., Consul in Elisabethville from September 1959

Crowe, Philip K., Ambassador to South Africa from April 1959

Dayal, Rajeshwar, Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in the Congo from September 1960

De Gaulle, Charles, Prime Minister of France, June 1958–January 1959; thereafter President of France

Diallo, Telli Boubecar, Guinean Ambassador to the United States from April 1959

Dillon, C. Douglas, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until June 1958; Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, July 1958–June 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State

Douglas, James H., Jr., Secretary of the Air Force until December 1959; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State until April 1959

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States

Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr., Director, Office of South African Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Bureau of African Affairs after August 20, 1958), Department of State, until October 1960; thereafter Director, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs

Flake, Wilson C., Ambassador to Ghana until November 1960

Gates, Thomas S., Jr., Secretary of the Navy until June 1959; Deputy Secretary of Defense until December 1959; thereafter Secretary of Defense

XXIV List of Persons

- Gizenga, Antoine**, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, June–September 1960; Acting Prime Minister of self-proclaimed government of the Congo in Stanleyville, December 1960
- Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J.**, USA, Staff Secretary to the President
- Gray, Gordon**, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization until July 1958; thereafter Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Soviet Foreign Minister
- Haile Selassie I**, Emperor of Ethiopia
- Hammarškjøld, Dag**, Secretary-General of the United Nations
- Hare, Raymond A.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from January 1960
- Henderson, Loy W.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
- Herter, Christian A.**, Under Secretary of State and Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board until April 1959; thereafter Secretary of State
- Home, Lord (Alexander Frederick Douglas-Home)**, British Foreign Minister from July 1960
- Iléo, Joseph**, President of the Republic of the Congo Senate from June 1960
- Kasavubu, Joseph**, President of the Republic of the Congo from June 1960
- Khrushchev, Nikita S.**, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party; Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers from March 1958
- Lay, James S., Jr.**, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council until 1959
- Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.**, USA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army until July 1959; Chief of Staff, July 1959–September 1960; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Lodge, Henry Cabot**, Representative at the United Nations until September 1960
- Louw, Eric H.**, South African Minister of External Affairs
- Lumumba, Patrice**, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, June–September 1960; dismissed by President Kasavubu September 1960; arrested and imprisoned December 1960
- Macmillan, Harold**, British Prime Minister
- Merchant, Livingston T.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from October 1958; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Mobutu, Colonel Joseph**, Chief of Staff of the Congolese National Army; assumed power September 1960; established College of Commissioners October 1960
- Murphy, Robert D.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until August 1959; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, August–December 1959
- Nkrumah, Kwame**, Prime Minister of Ghana until July 1960; thereafter President
- Palmer, Joseph, 2d**, Ambassador to Nigeria from October 1960
- Penfield, James K.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from September 1958
- Satterthwaite, Joseph C.**, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from September 1958
- Scheyven, Baron Louis**, Belgian Ambassador to the United States from October 1959
- Silvercruys, Baron**, Belgian Ambassador to the United States until August 1959
- Slim, Mongi**, Tunisian Ambassador to the United States and Representative at the United Nations

Stans, Maurice, Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget to March 1958; thereafter Director

Timberlake, Clare H., Ambassador to the Congo from July 1960

Touré, Sékou, President of the Republic of Guinea from October 1958

Tshombé, Moïse, President of Katanga Province in the Republic of the Congo from June 1960; declared Katangan independence July 1960

Tubman, William V.S., President of Liberia

Twining, General Nathan F., USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until September 1960

Verwoerd, Hendrik F., Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa from September 1958

Wadsworth, James J., Deputy Representative at the United Nations until September 1960; thereafter Representative at the United Nations

White, General Thomas D., USAF, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force

Wigny, Pierre, Belgian Foreign Minister from June 1958

Wilcox, Francis O., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

GENERAL U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

1. **Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Holmes) to Secretary of State Dulles**

February 6, 1958.

SUBJECT

Report on Africa ¹

I have done my best to make this brief, but Africa is a large place. I have attempted to deal here with what I count as basic elements but I have covered the separate territories in extensive oral briefings both within and without the Department. These are impressions gained from one trip and limited prior study.

It is risky to generalize about Africa. Some overall observations may be made but their validity and applications vary. It is useful to bear in mind some of the broad divisions in which the Continent and its problems fall, even though these divisions are by no means precise. The first of these is the difference between the Arab-Berber area of the Mediterranean coast and the territory south of the Sahara. Another division is the differences between the colonial policies and administrations of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Portugal. A third category is represented by the two independent countries, Liberia and Ethiopia, which have never had the material benefit of colonial rule and where progress, in terms of human welfare, is at the lowest level. A fourth division is between the colonial territories where there is a large white population and those areas where there is not. In this connection, the Union of South Africa represents a separate problem.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/2-658. Confidential. Sent through the Executive Secretariat (S/S). A handwritten note on the source text by Dulles reads: "Read with interest."

¹ Holmes had embarked on a 10-week study tour of Africa in behalf of the Secretary on October 6, 1957.

On January 23, 1958, Mason Sears, U.S. Representative on the U.N. Trusteeship Council, sent a memorandum incorporating his estimate of developments in Africa over the next 5 years and his recommendations for action to Henry Cabot Lodge at the United Nations. Lodge passed his report on to Under Secretary of State Christian Herter. Sears, who had recently visited Africa, spoke strongly for a policy more responsive to the changes in Africa and less sensitive to the need to accommodate the European allies. (*Ibid.*, 770.00/1-2458)

By taking the foregoing into account, it is reasonably safe to record certain general impressions. The movement toward self-government and independence by Africans is a strong one and is accelerating. It is a real and powerful phenomenon that is not always well-reasoned but is daily gaining momentum. A few thoughtful African leaders are aware that there is too much haste and too little preparation, but their moderating influence is slight, and they are themselves often the captives of their own political actions, declarations, and ambitions.

A relatively advanced degree of self-government has been granted in the French and some of the British territories which in most cases seems to whet local appetites for faster progress and to stimulate confidence in African leaders in their ability to manage their own affairs. Resistance to the increasing pressures for self-rule is strong in the Belgian Congo and much stronger in the Portuguese territories and these colonial powers, in the order named, will probably be the last to acknowledge the inevitability of acceding to these pressures. I am convinced that in the long term all of the colonial and trust territories and in Africa will achieve either complete independence or independence qualified only by voluntary but equal association with the metropolitan powers. Everywhere I went in black Africa, I found varying expressions of "better the ragged shirt of independence than the warm blanket of colonial protection".

This movement toward self-government is being carried forward within the framework of Western Europe political systems and social and economic advances are based on concepts which Europeans have developed over the centuries and which are suited to them and expressive of them. There is grave doubt that these systems and concepts will turn out to be valid for Africa. It may be that eventually there will evolve political, social, and economic systems consistent with and expressive of the African personality which still preserve the essentials of democracy and individual liberty. But before such a happy result can be achieved, I foresee a very difficult and probably long period of uncertainty, bad management, retrogression and conflict with a strong chance of violence in some areas. There will be plenty of troubled waters for Communist fishing.

In my opinion the most difficult problem in the modernization of Africa, and the greatest factor making for instability, is detribalization. This vast, primitive population is largely illiterate, more than half Pagan, and is practically leaping from the Iron Age into the 20th Century. Africans are being pulled away from a long-accepted way of life toward a more complicated existence for which they are, in the mass, almost totally unprepared. The change to modernity involves the abrupt abandonment of ancient folk-ways which provided a sense of social, economic and even religious security and an attempt to take

on a new set of rules of life, little understood, and for which the African is not yet fitted by education or experience. This swift transition is uprooting him violently from the old, long before he is fitted to cope with the new. Even with the African elite of the most highly educated and most sophisticated, modernization has had limited success. This state of affairs will be bound to continue for a long time and will produce instability and upheaval with the accompanying danger that the population will be exploited by unscrupulous and little qualified African leaders from within, or by noxious influences from without, or both. By and large the Nationalist movements are in the hands of moderates and it behooves us, as well as the colonial powers, to be sympathetic to their desire for independence and to gain their confidence in order effectively to counsel continued moderation and patience. These moderate leaders will be expected by the people to produce tangible results in the form of economic and social improvement. By assisting in these fields, we can lend important support to their leaders. This can be done through our aid programmes and by the encouragement of investment and development by private enterprise.

The French Territories.

The *Loi-Cadre* of 1956² has been applied in French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa and Madagascar. In Cameroun and Togo separate administrative measures applied to this basic law granted these two Trust Territories an increased degree of self-government. Elections were held in all of these territories in the spring of 1957 and were followed by the formation of territorial legislative assemblies and Councils of Ministers. Most of the powers of local government are now in the hands of native authorities with French officials acting as advisers and with reserved powers being exercised by French High Commissioners. The more important of the reserved powers are those affecting foreign affairs, defense, and fiscal matters. The system seemed to be working well, especially in French West Africa for which, in fact, it was designed through the influence of African members of the French National Assembly led by Felix Houphouët-Boigny, an African of the Ivory Coast and a Minister in the present³ and recent French governments. It is working less well in the other territories where there are fewer native leaders qualified to cope with a sudden and substantial grant of power. The *Loi-Cadre* has been considered in

² The *loi-cadre* of June 23, 1956, and the decrees implementing it essentially conferred semi-responsible government on the individual African colonies.

³ He was Minister of Public Health in the government of Felix Gaillard.

Paris to be an organic act establishing the relationships between France and its African possessions for the indefinite future. In Africa, it is viewed only as a step toward complete self-government.

A serious problem in the political evolution of the French African territories is that neither the French nor the Africans can foresee the shape of their eventual relationship with the metropole. This is because no one really knows what the French Union is and much less what it is likely to become. The status of British territories after independence is clear; membership in the Commonwealth. Even though no one has been able to define the Commonwealth membership, it is an accepted goal.

African leaders in all the French territories were unanimous in their attitude that they wanted to arrive at a close relationship with France—a “Franco-African Community”, but one which would be determined by mutual agreement *between equals* and not by dispensation from Paris. The French West Africans would like to see the French Union changed into a “Confederation” in which the Republic would be one unit; French West Africa, a second; French Equatorial Africa, a third; Madagascar a fourth and probably Cameroun and Togo a fifth and sixth. There is also talk of eventually including Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. They foresee these territories as being all equal with the “Confederation” having only those powers arrogated to it by the constituent units. There is a good deal of dynamism behind this idea and we may see some interesting developments when it encounters ingrained French centralism and basic conservatism. It would be a remarkable political phenomenon if pressure from black Africa should bring about a revolutionary change in the French constitutional structure. I should not hazard a guess as to the outcome of this contest, but I am bold enough to state the opinion that either the French Union will be changed to permit substantially the same degree of autonomy for its African territories as that enjoyed by members of the Commonwealth or those territories will break away entirely and become separate, independent states. In either contingency, there is a strong likelihood of fragmentation of the eight territories of French West Africa and the four of French Equatorial Africa.

The British Territories.

It is less easy to generalize about British territories where there is no scheme of overall applicability such as the *Loi-Cadre*. However, there is the declared policy of HMG to lead dependent territories toward self-government as rapidly as they are capable of accepting that responsibility. Progress varies widely from that in Nigeria which will probably become independent in April 1960⁴ to the High Com-

⁴ The actual date was October 1, 1960.

mission territories of Swaziland, Basutoland and Bechuanaland where much remains to be done and where the situation is complicated by the fact that the first two are islands of British rule in the sea of the Union of South Africa and three-fourths of the boundary of the third is with the Union.

The presence in some British areas of white settlers in substantial numbers who sooner or later will become minorities in states possessing large African political majorities creates a situation of utmost seriousness. Although some progress has been made by the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nysaland in the plan of "Racial Partnership", this progress is very slow in comparison with African aspirations. Many expect that the Federation will become an independent member of the Commonwealth, soon after its constitution comes up for revision in 1960. If so it will be *white* independence and the racial problem will remain unsolved.

I found in all the British territories an enlightened, progressive attitude. There were a few individual exceptions but by and large there was a desire to improve the lot of the natives and to prepare them as rapidly as possible for self-government. There was a realistic recognition of the magnitude of the task and lack of funds to carry it forward was universally deplored. There was also a sense of urgency and fear that there is not enough time for orderly preparation. I share this concern and think that we must be prepared to deal with African states which will get independence long before they are qualified to govern themselves.

The Belgian Congo.

Belgian colonial policy has always been paternalistic beginning with the acquisition of the Congo as a personal domain by Leopold II. Authorities in the Congo have followed a programme of wide-spread elementary education, vocational training and improvement in the standard of living. They have gone in for a very limited amount of secondary education and none at the college level until a year ago.

I got the impression that the Belgians were being jolted a bit from the self-satisfaction that their programme was successful and that the Congo's population was politically docile. The virus of self-government has reached the Congo and there appeared to be a rather recent realization on the part of Belgian officials of its potential strength, coupled with a new sense of urgency to do something about it. There was substantial evidence of African self-assertion which will increase in volume and power in spite of anything the authorities may do.

The Congo has always been ruled from Brussels with all political power in the hands of the Governor General. The first move toward self-government, for either Belgians or Africans, was made in December when municipal advisory councils were elected from a common

roll for Leopoldville and Elisabethville, with elections in other cities to follow. This is a small concession to African political aspirations, but it is a beginning.

The Belgians will be slow to move but I believe that they will move in an effort to preserve their economic position and political influence. They will be stubborn, but Belgians have a way of looking out for their equities.

Portuguese Territories.

The Portuguese insist that their African territories are not colonies but overseas provinces of Portugal and the authoritarian political system of the metropole is applied with even a stricter degree of control. They have done little to improve the lot of Africans and forced labor is still openly practiced.

The Portuguese show adeptness in the exercise of their rigid control, somehow producing the appearance of lack of severity. They are very alert to any evidence of African self-assertion and quick to suppress it. There is constant vigilance to insulate the native population from outside influences but there is a break in the insulation in Mozambique resulting from Africans numbering into the hundreds of thousands returning from contracted labor in the mines of the South African Union. In Angola, the Congo district represents a similar but smaller breach of the insulation.

The Portuguese will probably be the last to give in to African self-rule but sooner or later they will have to do so.

The Union of South Africa.

There will be a general election in April which will return a parliament with a five year mandate. Everyone with whom I talked predicted that the Nationalist Party will remain in power probably with an increase in seats resulting from gerrymandering, but with a reduced, possibly minority, popular vote.⁵ The Nationalists, which include 80 to 85 percent of the Afrikaner population, are determined to carry out their policy of *apartheid*.

This is a dead-end policy. Lip service is given to the theory of generous but separate programmes of improvement for the Africans within their own reserves, but need for black labor in white areas and lack of appropriated funds have prevented progress.

In spite of harassment by the Government, there is growing confidence of the African, Asian and "colored" leaders. In this they are encouraged by the great surge for self-government outside the Union

⁵ The Nationalist Party increased its representation in the House of Assembly by 9 seats over the 1953 election results and its percentage of the popular vote from 45.51 percent to 48.90.

and unfortunately by Communists and pro-Communists within. There is being built up on the basis of envy and resentment a burning hatred for the whites; the atmosphere of sullen hostility was very apparent in Johannesburg. I am afraid that if there is no change in the present attitude of sitting firmly on the boiler it will one day explode and I saw little evidence of any disposition to alter present policies although I did hear some expressions of concern and fear for the future. No doubt the existing situation can be controlled and continued for some time to come, but one day a change will occur, probably through economic boycott and general strike but violent revolt in the Mau Mau⁶ pattern cannot be ruled out. Ten million Africans, 400,000 Asians and more than a million "colored" will not submit forever to discrimination, lack of opportunity and humiliation. I am not qualified to predict when the change will come but I am convinced that the European South Africans haven't as much time as they think. Some observers say not more than five to ten years.

Islam.

Islam has a natural appeal to black Africans: its permits polygamy; the brotherhood of Islam is real; it is something to join with a new kind of hat to wear; it is adaptable to African customs and even superstitions, and it is *not* the religion of white Europeans.

In West Africa there is a great band of Mohammedanism in the savannas and desert areas, back from the coast, from Mauritania in the north swinging in a broad arc down to the Belgian Congo. This population is largely composed of Hamitic, and Nilotic tribes, consciously differing in race, language, religion and mores from the Negroes of the coast. Mauritania, Senegal and the French Sudan are about 100% Moslem and the northern regions of the other territories are largely Mohammedan. In Nigeria, for example, there are approximately 16,000,000 Mohammedans in the Northern Provinces out of a country-wide population of 34,000,000. Increasing numbers of coast Negroes in the West African territories are being converted to Islam.

With the discretion imposed by my limited time in this area, I made inquiries about Egyptian influence. I found that it was less important than I had expected and the consensus of informed opinion was that there was no great danger that this black Moslem population would ever follow Nasser or any other Arab leader. One reason given was that the memory of Arab slave traders was too green. However, I think that we should be alert to the emergence of another black

⁶ A rebellion in Kenya largely involving the Kikuyu, which led the British to proclaim a state of emergency in that colony from late-1952 until 1960.

Mahdi⁷ whom they might follow in an Islamic nationalist movement. These are warlike folk, numbering 25 to 30 million, and if such a movement were to develop it might well upset the political structure all along the West Coast from Mauritania to the Congo.

On the East Coast there are large Islamic populations from Egypt south through Zanzibar and into Tanganyika. However, the situation here is different. The rate of conversion of Pagans to Mohammedanism is slower. There are rather stable non-African Islamic communities, especially in Tanganyika and Kenya, principally Ismailis.⁸ The Sudan, excepting the pagan South, the Somalias and somewhere near one-half of the Ethiopians are Moslem. Here the Egyptians through Radio Cairo (the Voice of Free Africa), school teachers, and other means have made some progress. However, there is evidence in both Somalia and the Sudan that their heavy-handedness has limited success. We shall be able to form a better opinion of the effectiveness of these Egyptian activities when we can assess the power of Mohammed Hussein, a Nasser disciple, who attended the recent Cairo Afro-Asian Conference⁹ and who has recently been elected President of the Somalia Youth League. There will be general elections in the Sudan next month, in which the Egyptians will meddle, and the results will allow us a better judgment of Egyptian influence there.

Black Versus White.

The black African's attitude toward the white man shades from universal envy through mistrust and fear to burning hate. That is a sweeping statement, but I believe it to be true and of such importance that we should have it constantly in mind as background to our actions and decisions as the evolution of Africa proceeds.

Communism.

The Soviets have diplomatic missions in Libya, Ethiopia and the Sudan with an additional one to be established in Ghana. Aside from these, Communist penetration of Africa has been through trade unions, youth organizations, the subversion of students in Paris and London and trade arrangements. A considerable number of African political leaders, especially in West Africa, have been avowed Communists or fellow travellers, some Moscow trained. Most of these have renounced their Communist affiliations and have switched their activities to Nationalist movements.

⁷ Reference is to Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abd Allah, who had proclaimed himself the Mahdi in June 1881 and whose followers subsequently captured Khartoum, killing British General Charles George "Chinese" Gordon in the process.

⁸ Followers of the Aga Khan.

⁹ The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference met December 26, 1957–January 1, 1958.

The permanent organization set up by the Cairo Afro-Asian Conference will be a new instrument for penetration and such penetration will be more difficult to combat as dependent territories become independent. Soviet money and management will make this instrument a formidable one. More formidable still if they use the Egyptians with skill, avoid the appearance of competition with Egypt and keep Communist objectives hidden under the cloak of Nationalism. I see no way to meet this threat except by concerted action with other Western powers, especially those having possession in Africa. This will require an understanding on their part of our objectives, and a higher degree of confidence in our motives in Africa, than now exists. The genuine danger with which we are all confronted should make this possible, for it is clear that if Africa is lost to the West, Europe will be so weakened and out-flanked as to make its defense impossible.

Libya, the Sudan and the Horn of Africa.

Next after Algeria these seem to me to be the immediately critical areas to which we should give special attention and where we should very substantially increase our political, economic, and military efforts. I consider that Libya, the Sudan, Ethiopia and emerging Somalia should be strengthened and secured in their ties to the West in order to protect Africa. These are all very primitive countries, much has to be done that will cost large sums, but I feel that the money would be well spent.

Relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan are excellent and their common interest in the Nile is a strong bond. The Sudan, and especially its able Prime Minister,¹⁰ ought to be used in bringing about settlement of the Ethiopian-Somalia border; a problem which we should make it our business to see settled before Somalia's independence on January 1, 1960.

Libya is weak, disunited, and very vulnerable to Egypt. The only element of political strength in that country today is the power and prestige of the king.¹¹ If he should die suddenly, there would be a breakdown of central authority, a possible separation of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and conflict between the two must not be ruled out. In any event, without strong intervention from the outside, Libya could under these circumstances fall easy prey to Egypt. British influence is very important here and we should do all we can to encourage the UK to continue its active support. This brings me to North Africa.

¹⁰ Abdullah Khalil.

¹¹ Idris I.

North Africa.

Behind Libya lies frightened Tunisia, war in Algeria and all the troubled relationships of France with these two and Morocco. It is not necessary to recite the dangers of the situation. But I want to express the opinion that France cannot win with present attitudes and methods. Unless there is a change and some form of negotiated settlement is reached, the French position in North Africa will be lost with the grave danger that the area will be lost to the West as well. I believe that before matters get worse we should attempt, with British concurrence, to persuade France to change its attitude and should that attempt fail, to serve notice that we propose to do what we can to save the North African littoral in the name of Western security.

Recommendations:

1. That the Sudan be included in the area for which the Bureau of African Affairs is to be responsible.

2. That a programme for strengthening our position in Libya, the Sudan and the Horn of Africa be developed without delay.

3. That the quality and quantity of our personnel in Africa be given a high priority, especially in those territories where we shall be obliged to establish Embassies in the near future. These will include Somalia, Nigeria, and possibly Cameroun and the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland by the end of 1960. We should anticipate Missions in Uganda, French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, Madagascar and Togo within the next three to five years.

4. That, because of climate, unhealthful conditions, remoteness of many posts, and lack of available facilities, a special buildings program for Africa be requested of Congress. (This proposal will be submitted separately.)

5. That AF together with the planning staff, and Mr. Dillon's office, study the advisability of developing a multilateral aid programme for Africa, taking into account the development fund of the European Common Market, the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (FAMA), and the possibilities of the Pella Plan.¹² There are many advantages to such a programme which should include African states. I understand that African Affairs will shortly submit a proposal in this sense.

¹² Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella had devised a plan for a Middle East Development Fund.

Final Recommendation

My final recommendation is the most important. Events are moving very rapidly in Africa and the pace will quicken. Let us plan ahead, anticipate problems, and avoid the need to engage in expensive and inefficient rescue operations.

I am sure that what Pliny wrote will be increasingly true over the next decades: "Ex Africa semper aliquid novi".

2. Editorial Note

The first Conference of Independent African States met at Accra, April 15–22. The text of a message of April 14 from Secretary of State Dulles to Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah, extending best wishes for the conference, and the text of the joint declaration issued at Accra on April 22 are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pages 1074–1075. Documentation relating to the conference is in Department of State, Central File 770.00.

3. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board

April 23, 1958.

OCB REPORT ON AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA (NSC 5719/1)¹

Mr. President, this is the first progress report on the first NSC policy paper on Africa South of the Sahara. It covers the period from August 1957 through March 1958. This map shows in color the three

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Secret. This report was a presentation made by the Vice Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board and Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination, Karl G. Harr, Jr., before the 363d Meeting of the National Security Council on April 24.

¹ For text of NSC 5719/1, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. xviii, pp. 75–76. An OCB Report on NSC 5719/1, March 21, covered the period from August 23, 1957, to March 19, 1958. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5719 Series)

independent nations and 24 dependent territories, comprising 3,900,000 whites and 150,000,000 non-whites, covered by the policy. The most notable aspects of the report are:

First, the widespread suspicion of the U.S. on the part of the metropolitan powers having dependencies in the area. It should be noted that the policy (paragraph 25–a) specifically prescribes “avoiding an impression in presently dependent areas that the U.S. is prepared to underwrite their eventual independence” and (paragraph 13–d) “cooperate with the metropolitan powers . . . ² making it clear that we are not trying to supplant the metropolises.” The importance of this admonition is borne out by the report which stresses the existence of metropolitan suspicion, in varying degree and form, throughout the area. In places such as Nigeria where there is no white settler problem, this suspicion is minimal; but in other British dependencies, such as Kenya and Tanganyika, where the white settler problem is acute, it is considerable. The French remain suspicious of all USIS activities, and the Belgians have become so suspicious of all U.S. activities in the Belgian Congo that it has been necessary to approach them at a high level and tell them frankly the reasons and need for increased U.S. activity in Africa. The Portuguese are most bitter and outspoken about their resentment of what they regard as American anti-colonialism.

Secondly, the report stresses the susceptibility of the racial nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments of indigenous peoples to political exploitation. The Communists have used the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, and its permanent follow-up, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Council, as their principal vehicle to exploit this susceptibility; however, their domination of this conference was so blatant that they may have overplayed their hand. The Communists have also used terrorist and guerrilla activities with effect in the French Camerouns trust territory, and continue to exercise potent influence in the African National Congress in the Union of South Africa.

They have also been able to appear effectively in some areas as champion of the oppressed colonies.

The final significant aspect of the report is the economic element of the Soviet and Western activities in the area. In 1957 the Soviets spectacularly increased their imports from Ghana over 1956, purchasing 11.4% (\$17.5 million) of Ghana’s total exports, as compared with 2.4% in 1956. A Soviet trade mission visited Ghana last November and Ghana trade missions are scheduled to visit both Communist China and the USSR in the near future. The West has also taken effective steps in the economic field, including (a) your well received reply to Prime Minister Nkrumah on the Volta River project,³ to which

² Ellipsis in the source text.

³ Not printed.

the government of Ghana attaches so much importance, and U.S. encouragement of private enterprise to participate in that project, (b) the setting up of the Foundation for Mutual Assistance of African countries South of the Sahara, which the U.S. has expressed its willingness to join, and which is designed to supply technical assistance to the region,⁴ and (c) the proposed establishment of the Economic Commission for Africa (under the UN)⁵ similar to those regional commissions which have been established for other areas (which the U.S. cannot join if it wishes to keep the Soviets out).

Liberia has shown increasing irritation at the U.S. and a desire to associate itself more closely to the Afro-Asian bloc, primarily because of competition with Ghana for international recognition, but also because of resentment against unfavorable American press treatment. Looking ahead, the U.S. has extended an official invitation to Prime Minister Nkrumah to visit the U.S. in July of this year (which has been accepted). ICA is now investigating a Ghana request that the U.S. explore other possible ways to implement the Volta River project, since its own negotiations for external financing have been unsuccessful so far, and the Development Loan Fund is in receipt of applications from Liberia and many of the U.K. dependencies.

No policy review is recommended.

⁴ Documentation on the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara, which was established by the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara in February 1958, is in Department of State, Central File 870.00.

⁵ Resolution 671 (XXV), adopted by the U.N. Economic and Social Council on April 29, 1958, established the Economic Commission for Africa.

4. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 365th Meeting of the National Security Council**

May 8, 1958.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Africa South of the Sahara*

Before Mr. Randall commenced to make his report, the President broke in to say that Mr. Randall's written report,¹ which he had recently read, was highly to be commended to all members of the Council. It was interesting, intriguing, and valuable. The President said that he was so impressed with the work of missionaries, as described by Mr. Randall, that he proposed to increase his contributions. In short, this was the best report that the President could remember reading for a very long time.

After thanking the President for his commendation, Mr. Randall stated that his visit to Africa had been a very stirring adventure. He listed briefly the many countries he had visited, and noted that he had had discussions with some 21 senior U.S. officials in these countries.

Mr. Randall expressed the opinion that it would be impossible to formulate a general U.S. policy covering the whole of Africa. The backgrounds of the several countries were simply too different. Policy-wise, we must look at Africa either country by country or area by area. It was also Mr. Randall's view that Africa South of the Sahara was one area in the world where, in general, military considerations took a distinctly second place to economic and political considerations in so far as the formulation of national security policy was concerned.

With respect to the economic life of Africa South of the Sahara, Mr. Randall stated that he was much struck, in nearly every country in Central Africa, by the problem of land tenure. There were no individual holdings in fee simple; land was almost universally tribally or communally owned. This lack of individual land ownership was a real drawback to economic progress in Africa South of the Sahara.

Mr. Randall pointed out that in natural resources Africa South of the Sahara was potentially very rich; but actually spotty or poor in terms of the current situation. After describing the specific resources in the various countries and areas, Mr. Randall made a plea that U.S. capital share in economic enterprises with indigenous capital. Indigenous capital was perhaps the best built-in safeguard against nationalization of enterprises.

¹ Reference is to "Report to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy on U.S. Foreign Economic Policy in Africa, South of the Sahara," dated April 1958. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.5-MSP/5-1958) Randall had visited five African countries and territories in March and April and had conferred with U.S. officials stationed in several others. He submitted recommendations to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy on June 13 (CFEP 568/2) for revisions in NSC 5719/1. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Project Clean Up, Council on Foreign Economic Policy) The recommendations, as amended by the CFEP on June 17, were transmitted to the NSC Planning Board with a covering memorandum of June 20 from Director of the Policy Coordinating Secretariat Marion W. Boggs. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5818 Series)

The greatest resource of Africa South of the Sahara consisted of hydroelectric power. Indeed, this was an unbelievably great potential source of power. Mr. Randall illustrated his point by listing the various dams in this great region which were either in operation or being built or planned. He added that in His infinite wisdom, Divine Providence had located large bauxite-producing areas adjacent to most of these dams.

The greatest problem confronting Central Africa was the human problem. The Spirit of 1776 was running wild throughout the area. The various states and colonies want independence now, whether they are ready for it or not. In some respects this phenomenon was rather terrifying, as one deduced from reading the biography of Nkrumah.²

Mr. Randall then made comments on the political systems and the economic development of the various regions of Africa South of the Sahara. He noted that the political spectrum from right to left ran from south to north geographically. All of us are familiar with the situation in the Union of South Africa. Ambassador Byroade took a very tragic view of the future of South Africa, the policies of whose government were certainly driving it to catastrophe.

The Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique were very badly governed and administered. The Portuguese authorities exploit the resources of these areas mercilessly, and put very little back for future development. They believe that the best way to manage the natives is to avoid educating them. Forced labor was very common.

Rhodesia, thought Mr. Randall, was a very bright spot in terms of development of the native African; or at least it had been until the last week or so. Much credit for the progress in Rhodesia should go to the U.S. copper companies situated there.

With respect to the Belgian Congo, Mr. Randall said that in a conversation with the Governor General,³ the latter had made the point that a man must eat before he can enjoy freedom. The Belgians have therefore concentrated on providing some economic opportunity for the natives of the colony. Having done fairly well in this field, the Belgians are now beginning to move cautiously toward greater political freedom and development for the natives.

Mr. Randall commented that for his money the French were doing the best job with the political development of the Africans. There was no race separation visible in French Equatorial Africa. As you move further up the coast, British influence has been very good in training the natives to political maturity, but the British were behind the French in this respect.

² Not further identified.

³ Leon Pétillion.

This great human problem in Africa South of the Sahara, continued Mr. Randall, presents the United States in general, and the NSC in particular, with a dilemma that we are pretty well aware of. The Metropoles do not want the United States to provide any assistance to their African colonies. On the other hand, the newly independent states insist on knowing where the United States stands on the problem of colonialism. So we are caught on the horns of the dilemma of NATO on the one hand and of a free, non-Communist Africa on the other. Mr. Randall felt the time was approaching when we would have to take a firm stand against colonialism.

Mr. Randall was about to conclude at this point, when General Cutler asked him if he had not some observations to make on Liberia. Mr. Randall replied that he had, but that this was a very sensitive situation, discussion of which should be kept within the walls of this room. We did face a very serious problem in Africa generally because of the segregationist practices of such U.S. companies as Firestone and Republic in Liberia itself. These companies have not developed the African worker as they should have. The situation has become so serious that the Liberian Government has passed an anti-segregation law. Mr. Randall indicated that he [is] going to talk to his old friend Harvey Firestone about this problem.

General Cutler inquired whether it was not true that in Liberia segregation was practiced even among blacks. Did not the descendants of the original slaves from the United States keep the Negroes of the bush strictly segregated? Mr. Randall replied in the affirmative, and said it was a quite extraordinary phenomenon.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

Noted and discussed an oral report by the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, on the highlights of his recent trip through the subject area.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

⁴ The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1904. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

5. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 75-58

June 17, 1958.

CONDITIONS AND TRENDS IN FRENCH TROPICAL AFRICA¹

The Problem

To assess current trends in French Tropical Africa, and to estimate their effects on the stability and orientation of the region over the next few years.

Conclusions

1. Relations between France and its Tropical African territories are entering a critical phase. Demands for political advances—stimulated in part by the grant or promise of independence to other African areas—have grown so rapidly since 1956 that a new French policy approach is now required if these territories are to be held in a long-term association with France. (Para. 8)

2. Pressures for self-government or semi-independent status have built up despite the uneven political and economic development of this vastly diverse region. From the economic point of view, few, if any, of the French African territories—which are highly dependent upon external assistance—can become self-sustaining in the foreseeable future. (Paras. 11, 17, 19, 26)

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIIEs) were interdepartmental reports drafted by officers from agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated to the President, the National Security Council, and other appropriate officers of cabinet level. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 17 June 1958. Concurring were, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of Army; The Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

¹ Consisting of: (a) the eight territories of the Federation of French West Africa (Senegal, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauritania, French Sudan, Upper Volta, and Niger); (b) the four territories of the Federation of French Equatorial Africa (Middle Congo, Gabon, Ubangi-Shari, and Chad); and (c) the UN trust territories of Togo (the French "Republic of Togo") and Cameroun (French Cameroons). These areas combined are roughly the size of the US and have a total population of about 28,000,000, including approximately 100,000 Europeans. See map attached. [Footnote in the source text. The maps are not reproduced.]

3. Radical student groups and labor leaders are forcing even the more moderate African leaders to make greater demands on the French. Such pressures are now strongest in the UN trust territories of Togo and Cameroun, and least advanced in the Federation of French Equatorial Africa, which lags behind the West African Federation. (Paras. 31–36)

4. The assumption of power by General de Gaulle could lead to a revision of the French constitution in a way which would accommodate African demands over at least the short term. If such a revision is accomplished, it would be favorable to the maintenance of a French-African community. Should there be no French constitutional reforms affecting Africa, the most likely French policy would be a temporizing one which in time might provoke considerable unrest, and possibly violence, in Tropical Africa. (Paras. 43–44)

5. In either case, we believe that an African nationalist drive toward eventual independence will be maintained. Within a year or so France will probably be forced either to recognize, or set a date for recognition of, the independence of both Togo and Cameroun. Within the next three or four years, it will probably be compelled to grant virtual independence to French West Africa, whether as a federation or as individual territories; French Equatorial Africa would probably obtain a similar status within a few additional years. (Paras. 45–46)

6. There is no organized Communist party and no Bloc consular representation, but Communist influence appears to be playing a minor and indirect role in the area. An exception is Cameroun, where a handful of hardcore Communists seem active in the outlawed terrorist UPC (Union of the Camerounian People), which had a few hundred partisans. Communist influence, mainly exercised through the African labor and student groups, will probably increase, although not to the point where local Communists will be able to gain a dominant position in the nationalist movement over the next few years. (Paras. 36–38)

7. We believe that present conditions and trends in French Tropical Africa are leading to a situation several years hence which could be inimical to Western interests. The region will probably witness the creation of a collection of weak and unstable African states, at odds with each other and with their neighbors, and highly vulnerable to both internal and external Communist influences. Even if close ties with the West are continued, the region is likely to adopt basically neutralist policies with regard to the conflict between the Soviet Bloc and the West. (Para. 52)

[Here follow the "Discussion" portion of the estimate (paragraphs 8–52), with sections headed "Introduction," "The Regional Background," "Economic Conditions," "Political Trends," "Future French Policies," and "Probable Developments;" an annex with statistics on population and exports; and two maps.]

6. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 375th Meeting of the National Security Council**

August 7, 1958.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-4.]

5. *U.S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960* (NSC 5719/1; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 29 and August 5 and 6, 1958)¹

Mr. Gray presented this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)²

Discussion was first centered on the Planning Board proposals for revision of the economic paragraphs of NSC 5719/1. Mr. Randall said the Planning Board paper was excellent and incorporated sound policy. The President asked why greater emphasis appeared to be given to assisting the British and French colonies, as against the Portuguese and Belgian colonies. Mr. Randall replied that the British and French colonies would achieve their independence earlier than the Portuguese and Belgian colonies; and that the new independent states emerging from British and French rule must be oriented toward the United States. The President asked how we coordinated our policies toward these colonial areas with the mother countries. Mr. Randall said this was a delicate problem. Assistance to the colonies was often less offensive if offered in the framework of a multilateral organization, so that it appeared as a mutual effort. The President remarked that it was often difficult to cultivate good relations with colonies. For example, there was great concern in Paris every time the United States spoke a

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on August 8.

¹ Regarding NSC 5719/1, see footnote 1, Document 3. The July 29 memorandum transmitted to the NSC the Planning Board's proposed revision of paragraphs 21-27 of NSC 5719/1, a revised Financial Appendix, and updated versions of Annexes B-E. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5818 Series) The August 5 memorandum transmitted the views of the JCS as revealed in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense McElroy dated August 1. (*Ibid.*) The August 6 memorandum conveyed Randall's August 5 reaction to the suggested changes. (*Ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, West African Documents—1960)

² Not printed. Gordon Gray's briefing note surveyed the steps leading up to the proposed changes and highlighted the most significant of the suggested revisions of NSC 5719/1. The minutes of all National Security Council meetings held during the Eisenhower administration are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.

friendly word to a French colony. In Africa South of the Sahara we must be careful not to get ourselves hated by both the colonies and the mother countries.

Secretary Herter said he agreed with the policy stated in the Planning Board paper. He added that under the Common Market Plan \$500 million had been pledged for the development of Africa; and some Europeans who were expecting to get raw materials from Africa wanted a slow-down of the independence movement. Mr. Randall said the current tendency toward a joint effort by U.S. and U.K. private capital in African development would help our relations with the metropolises. The President said that rather than slow down the independence movement, he would like to be on the side of the natives for once. Secretary Herter thought such a policy would raise delicate questions in our relations with our NATO partners, and Mr. Randall agreed.

Secretary Herter noted that there were great opportunities for educational work in Africa. The President was reminded of a recent movie which had stressed the theme that the black man, under the influence of religion, was taking a more realistic view of his problems. Mr. Randall believed a great reservoir of good will for the United States was being created by the missionary movement in Africa.

The President felt we must believe in the right of colonial peoples to achieve independence as we had, but agreed that if we emphasized this right too strongly, we created a crisis in our relations with the mother countries. Mr. Randall said the nationalist movement in Africa was strongest where education and religion flourished; we must recognize that to encourage education and religion is to foster independence. The President asked why we could not foster education and religion, leaving the mother country to prepare the colony for independence. He felt we must, however, go along with the trend toward independence. Mr. Randall felt that more emphasis should be placed on education *in* Africa; there were risks in bringing Africans to the United States to be educated.

Mr. Allen said that Africa was usually thought of in terms of the black man, but that one area in Africa—Rhodesia—was eminently suitable for white settlement and development. The Prime Minister of Rhodesia³ (who had once lived in the United States) was ready to open the country to immigration from all sources. Salisbury was a booming town. Among the impressive projects in Rhodesia was a tremendous dam on the Zambesi supplying power for copper extraction.⁴ In reply to a question by the President, Mr. Allen said Rhodesia's access to the sea was through Mozambique.

³ Sir Edgar Whitehead.

⁴ Reference is to the Kariba Dam.

Mr. Randall said that Rhodesia was undecided whether to adopt a racial policy similar to that of South Africa, or to continue its concept of racial partnership. U.S. capital invested in the copper mines was one favorable influence in Rhodesia.

Mr. Smith (ICA) said he had found it very difficult to recruit experienced competent officials for the ICA program in Africa. He had been trying for six months to recruit 26 officials for Ghana.

The President then remarked parenthetically that he was having a continuing protocol discussion with the State Department, which insisted that he invite half a dozen American negroes to any White House reception of a distinguished African visitor. The President feared the African visitors felt they were being patronized.

Mr. Gray then called attention to the Planning Board proposals for revising certain military paragraphs in NSC 5719/1, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff views on these paragraphs.

Secretary McElroy said he agreed with the JCS views.

General White said the strategic importance of Africa South of the Sahara had increased since NSC 5719/1 was written. The deterioration of the Western position in the Near East generally, in the Suez area, and in North Africa, enhanced the importance of Africa South of the Sahara, particularly for anti-submarine bases and air routes. Also, Africa was becoming less oriented to the West and more vulnerable to Soviet subversion. In the absence of countermeasures, the advance of the Soviets through the Near East and down through Africa was conceivable. General White felt that the military services might be helpful in these circumstances by preparing the way for the establishment in Africa South of the Sahara of naval bases, air routes, and guided missile sites, even though such activity would of course be expensive. In any case, we needed to anticipate the next Soviet moves.

The President said he agreed with General White's summary of the strategic importance of Africa South of the Sahara, but he disagreed with the idea that U.S. military activity in the area would be beneficial. Military activity is usually ineffective as the first step in establishing close relations with a country so that it will be on our side in an emergency. We should first work through education and cultural relations, and perhaps Africa will later invite our military to help with defense problems. Our military installations are useless if the people don't want them. We must win Africa, but we can't win it by military activity.

General White said he believed a statement on the increasing strategic importance of Africa South of the Sahara belonged in the paper.

The President said he too would like a statement on strategic importance put in the paper. He added that bases were of great value, but we couldn't win wars unless we won the people.

The Secretary of Defense believed that General White's references to military activity in the area had meant activity in a low key. Secretary McElroy then raised the question whether such assistance as the United States provides for civil airfield construction in Africa South of the Sahara should not prepare the way for possible conversion of these fields to military use.

The Vice President said we must work toward a continuation of independent national neutralism in Africa South of the Sahara. The President's remarks on the liabilities of military activity were in accord with his own observations in Africa. The Vice President felt we should take the initiative in encouraging neutralism, which the national independence movements favor, instead of assuming that a neutral is on the Soviet side. We should discourage open military ties with the West and encourage educational and cultural ties.

Mr. Gray said the Planning Board would revise the military paragraphs of NSC 5719/1 to reflect the discussion.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

a. Noted and discussed the proposed revision of paragraphs 21-27 and proposed changes to paragraphs 6, 19 and 20 of NSC 5719/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 29, 1958; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the comments of the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, transmitted by the reference memoranda of August 5 and 6, 1958, respectively.

b. Adopted the proposed revision of paragraphs 21-27 of NSC 5719/1.

c. Referred the proposed changes to paragraphs 6, 19 and 20 of NSC 5719/1 to the NSC Planning Board for revision and paragraph 11 of NSC 5719/1 for review, in the light of the above-mentioned views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the discussion at the meeting.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

⁵ Paragraphs a-c that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1961. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

7. Editorial Note

On August 20, the Department of State announced the establishment of a Bureau of African Affairs. Congress had authorized the appointment of an additional Assistant Secretary of State on July 18 in P. L. 85-524 (72 Stat. 363). The new Bureau consisted of the Offices of Northern African Affairs and Middle and Southern African Affairs. Responsibility for Egyptian and Sudanese affairs remained within the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, out of which the African Bureau was carved. Algeria continued within the purview of the Bureau of European Affairs.

Joseph C. Satterthwaite was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs on August 23.

8. National Security Council Report

NSC 5818

August 26, 1958.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA PRIOR TO CALENDAR YEAR 1960

REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5719/1¹
- B. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 29 and August 5, 6 and 12, 1958²
- C. NSC Actions Nos. 1961 and 1977³

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, at the 375th Council meeting on August 7, 1958,

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Africa, South of the Sahara, U.S. Policy Toward. Secret.

¹ See footnote 1, Document 3.

² Regarding the July 29 and August 5 and 6 memoranda, see footnote 1, Document 6. The August 12 memorandum transmitted the Planning Board's proposed revisions of paragraphs 6, 11, 19, and 20 of NSC 5719/1 together with a proposed new paragraph 25f. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5818 Series)

³ Regarding NSC Action No. 1961, see footnote 5, Document 6. NSC Action No. 1977 is in Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council.

adopted the proposed revision of paragraphs 21–27 of NSC 5719/1 prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 29, 1958 (NSC Action No. 1961–b).

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy, by Memorandum Action as of August 26, 1958, adopted the revision of paragraphs 6, 11, 19 and 20, and the proposed new subparagraph 25–f, of NSC 5719/1, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1961–c and transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 12, 1958 (NSC Action No. 1977).

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5719/1, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5818; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

Also enclosed for the information of the Council, are a Financial Appendix and Annexes A, B, C, D and E.⁴

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes NSC 5719/1.

S. Everett Gleason⁵

[Enclosure]

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA SOUTH OF THE
SAHARA PRIOR TO CALENDAR YEAR 1960

Prefatory Note

1. Many of the problems of Africa South of the Sahara are long-range in nature. Appreciable progress toward their resolution will in some instances require a generation or more. The policy guidance contained in this paper is addressed to those actions which the United States can usefully take in the immediate future. Moreover, the projection of specific policies beyond this period is not feasible because of the marked political changes probable in the area after 1960.

⁴ The Financial Appendix and Annexes A, "Areas Included in Africa South of the Sahara (For purposes of this paper);" B, "United States Exports to and Imports From Africa, By Country;" C, "Gold and Foreign Exchange Holdings of African Territories and Countries South of the Sahara;" D, "U.S. Policy With Respect to International Commodity Agreements;" and E, "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Bloc Economic Offensive," are not printed.

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

The Nature of U.S. Interests

General

2. There is a growing awareness in the world that Africa is emerging as an area which will have an increasingly important influence on the course of world events and that the political alignment of the present and future independent nations of the continent will be deeply affected by the policies which Western nations, including the United States, pursue in the future.

3. The United States is concerned that Africa South of the Sahara develop in an orderly manner toward self-government and independence in cooperation with the European powers now in control of large areas of the continent. We hope that this transition will take place in a manner which will preserve the essential ties which bind Europe and Africa—which are fundamentally complementary areas. Africa depends on Europe not only as a source of the normal imports of undeveloped countries but also as the major supplier of investment, both public and private. Europe in turn needs the African market, as well as Africa's minerals and agricultural products. The United States, therefore, believes it to be generally desirable that close and mutually advantageous economic relationships between the European powers and Africa should continue after the colonial period has passed.

4. We wish to avoid in Africa a situation where thwarted nationalist and self-determinist aspirations are turned to the advantage of extremist elements, particularly Communists. We also wish to avoid the deprivation of African markets and sources of supply to Western Europe, and the economic dislocations that could result from the termination of the social and economic development programs of the metropolitan governments in the dependent areas (which currently average \$300 million annually in excess of ordinary budget expenditures).

Specific

5. *Economic.* American economic interests in Africa are important although not to be compared with other areas. Total American investment in Africa South of the Sahara is now about \$500 million, the majority in the Union of South Africa. The area is a predominant source for the United States of such strategic materials as asbestos, cobalt, columbite, corundum, industrial diamonds, tantalum ore, palm kernel oil, and chemical chromite. The United States also imports many other agricultural and mineral products (including uranium) from the area. Our exports to the area, although limited in almost all parts of the area by governmental restrictions which discriminate in favor of the metropolitan powers, are important to the countries con-

cerned. Total U.S. trade with Africa South of the Sahara now equals more than \$1 billion annually. It is in our interest to promote and support as appropriate the sound economic development of the area, both as an end in itself and as an important factor contributing to democratic political evolution.

6. *Strategic.* The strategic value of Africa South of the Sahara stems principally from the area's geographic location athwart alternate air and sea routes to the Far East, and from its strategic materials. In the event of war or loss of Western access to sea and air routes through the Middle East, control of sea and air communication through Africa South of the Sahara would be extremely important. Recent events increasingly jeopardize our sea and air lanes through the Middle East, thereby increasing the strategic significance of Africa South of the Sahara. From bases in certain areas of Africa South of the Sahara, the Communists could pose a serious threat to communications in the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea, as well as to our important North African strategic facilities, the Mediterranean littoral, and the flank of NATO. Therefore, under these circumstances, our primary strategic interest is to deny Africa South of the Sahara to Communist control.

7. *Political.* Despite the remoteness of this area from the Soviet periphery, its political stability is important to the United States. Many African leaders look to us to support indigenous desires for self-government, and the colonial powers look to us to support their varying policies. Should serious disorders develop in the area, there might be a further military and economic drain on some of the more important NATO powers, such as has been the case in Algeria. Furthermore, our major European allies would be adversely affected both economically and strategically by the denial to them of Africa South of the Sahara. We have, therefore, a very real interest in orderly political evolution in Africa South of the Sahara.

8. *Social and Humanitarian.* The United States has a long record of humanitarian work in Africa through missionary and similar organizations. Much of the good reputation we enjoy results from this type of activity.

Broad Lines of Present Policy

9. Our present policies, which must by the size of the area and the differences in people and forms of government vary considerably from place to place, are designed to encourage an orderly development of the whole area based on a mutually advantageous accommodation between the forces of nationalism and the metropolitan powers. This policy manifestly has its limitations, but for the foreseeable future it will remain the only logical and correct course of action to follow. The United States has, of course, a very great interest in promoting, wher-

ever possible, the development and maintenance of the closest possible mutually-beneficial political and economic relationships between the emerging African peoples and the peoples of Western Europe.

10. Within this framework, we are attempting to bring our influence to bear through:

a. Welcoming and extending political support to new states, such as Ghana, as they emerge.

b. Technical and economical assistance.

c. Working directly with the metropolitan powers, through loans to them for specific projects in their African areas, participation in international conferences called by the powers in question, and informal exchanges of views.

d. Working through the United Nations, particularly where the Trust and other non-self-governing territories are concerned.

e. Supporting and encouraging constructive nationalism and reform movements in colonial areas in Africa, when convinced they are likely to become powerful and grow in influence; while publicly acknowledging steps taken by Western European powers toward indigenous self-government. Such support and encouragement can take the form of public statements by senior American officials, visits of prominent Americans to the area, an exchange of persons program, and general public and private sympathy in the United States for the desires of dependent peoples for a greater degree of self-government.

f. Opening new diplomatic and consular posts, strengthening the staffs of existing posts, and increasing leadership, educational exchange, informational and cultural programs.

11. Our future policy must be guided by the fact that in the long run the orientation of Africa South of the Sahara will depend on where the leaders and the peoples feel their best interests lie. To a considerable extent, the African is still immature and unsophisticated with respect to his attitudes towards the issues that divide the world today. The African's mind is not made up and he is being subjected to a number of contradictory forces. This pressure will increase in the future. The African is a target for the advocacy of Communism, old-fashioned colonialism, xenophobic nationalism, and Egyptian "Islamic" propaganda, as well as for the proponents of an orderly development of the various political entities in the area in question, closely tied to the West. The eventual political orientation of the emerging African states will probably be determined by what the leaders and peoples conceive best serves their own interests, measured primarily in terms of "independence" and of "equality" with the white man. Our policies therefore must be designed to convince the African that the United States wants to help him achieve his economic, political and cultural goals without insisting that he align himself in the East-West power struggle.

Major Problems and Issues

Nationalism vs. Colonialism

12. Nationalism vs. colonialism is the great issue in Africa today. At the moment, all others, no matter how important, are subordinate to it. Our policies in any field will be of little or no value if we ignore this issue. The problem is enormously complicated and no pat answers are possible. The colonial powers follow different policies, from the Portuguese to the British (in West Africa) extremes. Furthermore, the peoples themselves now under colonial direction are different in culture, history, race and degrees of development. But sentiment and pressures for self-government are everywhere increasing at an accelerated rate. Premature independence would be as harmful to our interests in Africa as would be a continuation of nineteenth century colonialism, and we must tailor our policies to the capabilities and needs of each particular area as well as to our over-all relations with the metropolitan power concerned. It should be noted that all of the metropolitan powers are associated with us in the NATO alliance or in military base agreements.

13. *Policy Guidance:*

a. Support the principle of self-determination (self-government or independence) consistently and in such a way as to assure that evolution toward this objective will be orderly; making clear, however, that self-government and independence impose important responsibilities which the peoples concerned must be ready and able to discharge.

b. Encourage those policies and actions of the metropolitan powers which lead the dependent peoples toward responsible self-government or independence.

c. Avoid U.S. identification with those policies of the metropolitan powers which are stagnant or repressive and, to the extent practicable, seek effective means of influencing the metropolitan powers to abandon or modify such policies.

d. As appropriate, cooperate with the metropolitan powers in the development programs of their dependent territories, making it clear that we are not trying to supplant the metropolises.

e. Emphasize through all appropriate media the colonial policies of the Soviet Union and particularly the fact that the Soviet colonial empire has continued to expand throughout the period when Western colonialism has been contracting.

Racialism

14. Racialism is, of course, closely allied to the colonial question but is most acute in the Union of South Africa and, to a lesser extent, in Central and East Africa.

15. U.S. influence is restricted by the extremely distorted picture Africans have been given concerning the race problem in the United States.

16. *Policy Guidance:*

- a. Emphasize U.S. progress in the field of race relations through all available media.
- b. Encourage, where practicable, a more liberal approach in the areas where extremism is now the order of the day.
- c. Point out on appropriate occasions the inevitability of violence as the result of rigid racial policies.
- d. Seek to influence any consideration in the UN along constructive lines.

The Communist Threat

17. By and large, Communism has not been a major problem in Africa South of the Sahara up to the present, but its potential influence is a matter of growing concern. There is a discernible Communist influence in African and Indian political groups in the Union of South Africa and penetration of labor unions in West Africa. African students in Europe, furthermore, are assiduously cultivated by local Communists and many have been subverted. Soviet pretensions to being anti-colonial and non-European tend to be effective in Liberia and Ghana, and these governments are flattered by Soviet attempts to cultivate them.

18. *Policy Guidance:*⁶

- a. Cooperate locally with security organizations to combat Communist subversive activities to the extent that this can be done without assisting in the repression of responsible non-Communist nationalist movements.
- b. Seek to prevent or at least curtail formal representation of Sino-Soviet Bloc countries in Africa.
- c. Give general support to constructive non-Communist, nationalist, and reform movements, balancing the nature and degree of such support, however, with consideration of our relations with our NATO allies.
- d. In areas where trade unionism develops, guide it toward Western models by working with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, by direct advice and assistance, and by an exchange of persons program.

Military and Strategic Value

19. The military and strategic value of the area arises from its strategic materials and geographical location, especially with reference to sea and air routes alternate to those through the Middle East.

⁶ See Annex E. [Footnote in the source text.]

20. *Policy Guidance*: The area should be kept under periodic survey to determine any changes in our strategic requirements. Moreover, the United States should, through economic, political and cultural means, develop a political climate which would facilitate early success if base rights are needed in the future.

Economic Potential and Economic Problems

21. *Economic Potential of the Independent States*. The Union of South Africa has the most highly developed economy of any nation in the area and its economy has been growing steadily. Ghana also has made more progress toward a monetary economy than most of the African areas. Ghana has aspirations for large-scale development to reduce its present dependence on the one crop, cocoa, which is the primary source of its present prosperity. In Liberia economic growth has been rather slow, largely because of the lack of education and the dependence on a subsistence economy, although substantial U.S. private investment has been of assistance. Ghana and Liberia, and other states as they become independent, may require investment capital and technical aid—in amounts varying with their several needs—which the metropolitan powers will no longer be either willing or able fully to provide. Successful U.S. programs in such countries can demonstrate to Africa the sincerity of our friendship and help to prevent them from falling under Communist influence.

22. *Economic Potential of the Dependent Areas and the Capabilities of the Metropolitan Powers*. There is wide variation in the economic potential of the dependent areas and in the capability of the metropolises for contributing to their economic development. Some of these territories apparently do not possess sufficient natural resources to permit substantial economic development, even if the necessary manpower and capital were available. Their lack of development potential may, in the future, create serious problems. Other territories have the natural resources but lack technical and managerial skills. The generally low level of per capita income is another factor hindering capital formation, but lack of capital is not in all cases a major obstacle. With respect to the ability of the metropolises to contribute to the economic development of their dependencies, the Belgians appear in the best position to continue the economic development of their dependent area, the Congo—a rich area in its own right. Portugal has financial resources to develop its territories as rapidly as the absorptive capacity of these territories will permit, but Portuguese colonial policy does not call for such development. British and French capabilities are limited by their internal financial difficulties. Both countries have invested large amounts in economic, social and educational programs in their dependent areas in Africa South of the Sahara. The extent to which they will be able or willing to maintain a flow of public capital to their

territories require further study, but on the basis of preliminary analysis it appears unlikely that a sufficient flow can be maintained. On the other hand the foreign exchange earnings of a number of British territories and the investment program of the European Common Market for French and Belgian dependent African territories may also prove substantial.⁷ However, the prospects for adequate economic development support from the metropolitan powers will be heavily influenced by factors other than their financial capabilities. One very important factor will necessarily be a metropolitan power's appraisal of the likelihood that it will be able to maintain close political and economic ties with a particular colonial territory. Thus our success in attaining the previously-stated U.S. objectives of preserving the essential ties between Europe and Africa, will probably have an important impact upon the rate of Africa's economic progress, and upon the extent of Africa's reliance on U.S. assistance. What happens to the movement of private capital, which has been a major factor in the economic development of many of these territories, seems likely to be determined less by the financial problems of the British and French governments than by the economic opportunities offered in the territories and the climate for private investment maintained by these areas as they achieve independence.

23. Specific Economic Problems of Africa South of the Sahara.

a. The lack of skills and proficiency of African manpower is a major limitation on productivity and economic growth. Colonial powers and private investors have made only limited attempts to meet these deficiencies by formal or in-service training. Provision of entrepreneurial and managerial skills will be most difficult to achieve. The African countries could be developed much more rapidly if a group of managers were trained for industrial establishments, Government agencies, and the other institutions which are essential to a developing economy. Disease and malnutrition further reduce the effectiveness of labor.

b. The problem of developing Africa is basically one of changing traditional and economically primitive societies to bring them within the compass of a modern economy—of increasing productivity and enlarging the exchange economy at the expense of the subsistence economy.

⁷ The European Common Market plan, agreed to in principle, but not yet organized or operating, calls for investment over a five-year period of approximately \$530 million in French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, French Togoland, Madagascar, the Belgian Congo and Ruanda Urundi.

It should also be noted that the International Bank, which has outstanding loans (guaranteed by the Metropole) of \$259 million to dependent territories in this area, can be expected to continue an active lending program. [Footnote in the source text.]

c. Most Africans depend upon agriculture for a livelihood. Small-scale subsistence farming is the general rule and the individual farmer ordinarily has no cash crop. Increased production, involving a shift from subsistence to cash-crop farming, and diversification of crops, are of immediate importance for the economic development of the area. The generally prevailing system of land tenure, which does not recognize individual ownership, also discourages agricultural development in many of these countries.

d. The economies of some of these countries are vulnerable because they depend basically upon one commodity for most of their foreign exchange. Because these commodity exports are often subject to wide fluctuations in price, export earnings are at times severely reduced, and because these exports are preponderantly to the Free World, Africans tend to hold Western industrial nations responsible for price declines.

e. While a great deal has been done to provide railroads between the main urban centers, a network of roads is required to reduce the dependence of these countries on subsistence agriculture, increase the labor supply, expand domestic markets, and otherwise increase the rate of economic development. Little has been done to develop adequate communications facilities.

f. Mineral exploration and development are in their infancy in parts of Africa. The minerals potential of several areas may far exceed what is presently known.

g. Discrimination against Africans retards development of badly needed technical skills, keeps literacy and productivity at a low level, and adversely affects the rate of economic growth.

24. *Multilateral Economic Organization.* The possibilities of a multilateral economic organization for Africa have been under discussion by the metropolitan powers, particularly the British. Such an organization might serve as a forum for the consideration (without binding commitment) of development programs and needs of African countries and of proposals for economic and technical assistance by donor participating nations. The great diversity in economic problems as well as in cultural backgrounds and political status among the African countries might limit the effectiveness of such an organization in actual practice. Moreover, the usefulness of such an organization to the United States might also be affected by its relationship to other international organizations and institutions, such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and by the extent of its membership (e.g., whether all the metropolitan powers were to participate and whether the North African countries, particularly Egypt, were to be included). However, such an organization might have the following advantages from the point of view of U.S. interests:

a. Make aid to a former colonial territory from the former metropolitan power as well as from other non-African nations more palatable to the recipient African nation.

b. Tend to stimulate aid from member nations other than the United States.

c. Permit the United States to provide bilateral assistance while at the same time associating itself with both the newly independent nation and the former metropolitan power.

d. Provide a basis for a more rational integration of various bilateral aid programs.

e. Provide a counter-force to efforts to forge a neutralist or Soviet-dominated Afro-Asian bloc.

25. *Policy Guidance.*

a. *Economic and Technical Assistance.* The United States should encourage Africa South of the Sahara to make the maximum contribution to its own economic development; to take measures capable of attracting maximum amounts of external private capital; and to continue to look to the extent possible to Western Europe and to international institutions and to private capital as the primary sources of external capital for development. However, the United States should expand its technical assistance programs for the area, should be prepared to extend development project loans which are consistent with relevant loan policy considerations, and should be prepared to extend limited amounts of special economic assistance.

(1) *Dependent Territories.* Although the provision by the United States of economic and technical assistance to dependent territories will necessarily be conditioned by the varying degree of acceptability thereof to the particular metropolitan power concerned, the fact that an area is dependent upon a metropolitan power should not itself serve to exclude that area from U.S. assistance programs. The priority accorded to the different dependent areas and the different types of assistance within U.S. aid programs will be affected by the needs of the particular area and the role being played by the metropolitan power concerned. In administering its aid programs in dependent areas the United States should avoid the impression that it is unqualifiedly prepared to meet the financial needs which may arise from their obtaining their independence.

(2) *Independent States.* The United States should:

(a) Continue and expand U.S. technical assistance to Ghana and be prepared to extend to Ghana development project loans which are consistent with relevant policy considerations, and to support proposals by international lending agencies for similar loans.

(b) Provide such amounts of technical and economic assistance to Liberia as may be necessary to assist in the promotion of a reasonable degree of economic stability and growth and as are within its capacity to absorb, bearing in mind that in the eyes of the rest of Africa, as well as in much of the rest of the world, the United States is frequently identified with the failure of Liberia to show greater economic progress.

(c) Be prepared to extend or to continue economic and technical assistance to other areas as they become independent.

b. *Emphasis Within U.S. Aid Programs.* In the provision of U.S. economic and technical assistance, special attention should be given to the following:

(1) Increasing agricultural productivity and, where necessary, encouraging diversification of crops.

(2) Establishment and improvement of educational facilities and raising standards of education.

(3) Combatting disease and malnutrition (stressing impact projects), and providing medical facilities.

(4) Development of additional sources of foreign exchange earnings such as tourism and new products.

(5) Encouraging the establishment by Africans of light manufacturing and processing industries.

(6) Development of roads.

(7) Development of communications systems, particularly on a regional basis.

Within the above categories, the United States should seek out projects which are of particular interest to the Africans or to which they attach special importance.

c. *Minerals Development.* The United States should stand ready to provide technical assistance in mineral development, and training for African specialists in this field.

d. *Land Tenure Systems.* As appropriate, the United States should encourage and stand ready to advise and assist in the modernization of land tenure systems.

e. *Local Capital.* The United States should encourage mobilization of local capital in this area for economic development and should be prepared to provide technical assistance to promote such mobilization.

f. *Civil Aviation.* If any economic assistance is given to civil aviation, such aid should take into account the possible future need for military airfields.

g. *Other Free World Assistance.* The United States should urge other Free World countries to increase economic and technical assistance to this area and support the European Common Market Plan for investment in dependent African areas if, when operative, it is consistent with U.S. interests.

h. *Multilateral Economic Organization.* After informal explorations with selected governments, the United States should take steps, in concert with appropriate African nations and other Western nations presently extending assistance to Africa or in a position so to contribute, to develop an organization to serve as a forum for the consideration (without binding commitments) of the development programs and needs of African countries and of proposals for economic and technical assistance by donor participating nations. Such steps should

cover the possibilities both of working through existing multilateral organizations (modified and strengthened as necessary) or of establishing a new organization if existing institutions are found to be inadequate to the task. U.S. participation in such an organization should not alter existing practices in extending its economic and technical assistance primarily on a bilateral basis.

i. *Trade Policies.* The United States should (1) send trade missions to appropriate countries and participate in trade fairs held by them; (2) encourage these countries, as they achieve independence, to become members of GATT; (3) while taking account of our general policy of strong support for the European Common Market, continue to encourage the countries concerned to seek, within the GATT framework, mutually acceptable solutions to any serious trade problems raised by implementation of the Common Market Treaty, including the overseas territories provisions; (4) be prepared to discuss commodity problems in accordance with U.S. policy on international commodity agreements.⁸

j. *Private Foreign Investment.* The United States should encourage the removal of obstacles to private foreign investment, and explore new means of encouraging the flow of U.S. and other Free World investment to the area, especially in small and medium-sized enterprises, making full use of available investment guaranties and tax incentives.

k. *Discrimination Against Africans.* The United States should encourage American companies to set an example in practicing non-discrimination in their operations to the maximum extent consistent with local laws, and to train Africans for managerial positions.

l. *Other Private Activities.* The United States should encourage private institutions and foundations to expand technical assistance activities in the area, including assistance in agriculture, health and public administration. The United States should also encourage increased missionary humanitarian activities in the area, including medical clinics.

m. *Soviet Economic Penetration.* Existing U.S. policy toward Soviet economic activities applies to Africa South of the Sahara.⁹

Education and Training

26. The most urgent need by far in Sub-Sahara Africa today is for increasing the facilities and raising the standards in education. More and better schools and teachers are everywhere required, and at every level. Of particular importance is the expansion of facilities for technical education at the secondary school level. American opportunities

⁸ See Annex D. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁹ See Annex E. [Footnote in the source text.]

for assistance vary with the policies of the metropolitan powers concerned and the resources of the independent countries. Without increased educational opportunities it is impossible to expect any early advancement of most African peoples to the point where they are capable of running their own affairs.

27. Policy Guidance:

a. Give special attention to education and training programs designed to develop Western-oriented leaders in the area.

b. Promote and assist surveys of the educational requirements of the area, including the possible desirability of an American university along the lines of the existing American institutions in the Near East.

c. Expand U.S. teacher training, vocational training, and training programs for public administrator, industrial managers and managerial technicians, and assist in the establishment of new teacher training institutions in the area.

d. Assist the educational institutions in the area with teachers, books, visual aid media, scholarships and the expansion of facilities, particularly for technical education at the secondary level and for higher education.

e. Encourage institutions of higher education to serve multi-nation, rather than national, needs and assist these institutions as feasible to that end; giving priority to the two African institutions presently using American methods. Encourage private U.S. foundations and educational institutions to support these projects.

f. Encourage expanded support by private American institutions and foundations in the field of education and encourage the further development of missionary schools in the area.

g. Encourage and assist in the development of training for Americans as experts in the African field.

Detribalization

28. Although detribalization remains one of the major problems of the area, little positive action by the United States is possible. The tribal and family traditions of the people in question are such that they remain, despite the many advances that are currently being made, extremely primitive in many of their social outlooks. These traditions, while breaking up at an accelerated pace, remain strong, and even the urban African looks for a source of authority to replace the head of the tribe or family. Until some new loyalty is provided, the detribalized African will be an easy target for elements eager to exploit his traditional need for leadership and guidance.

29. *Policy Guidance:* No immediate tangible action seems possible. In general, support the work of Western-oriented labor organizations, educational institutions and, in some cases, government leaders in a position to influence the African looking for a new source of allegiance.

Cooperation Within the Area and With the Metropolitan Powers

30. The Balkanization of Africa is undesirable even though full consideration must be given to the vast differences found in the area. Neither the metropolitan powers nor the independent states have shown any great desire to work together. The issuance of invitations by the Government of Ghana to the other independent African states, including those of North Africa, to attend a future conference may be a beginning. Periodic secret conversations between the metropolitan powers take place from time to time and are increasing in frequency, although no tangible achievements are yet visible.

31. *Policy Guidance:*

a. Encourage intra-area cooperation among all concerned in the economic, scientific and cultural fields. If inter-area conferences are held, consider what role the United States should play in connection with such conferences.

b. As an antidote to the blandishments of Egypt and the Soviets, encourage the North African states to exert influence in the area, without engaging in irresponsible irredentism, if practicable in the light of our relations with France.

Islam

32. Islam is spreading rapidly in Africa, although there is resistance to it in those areas where all Moslems are considered Arabs and all Arabs slavers. Up to the present, it has been reasonably free of anti-Western overtones, but its use by the Egyptians cannot be overlooked. Islam is more attractive to pagan Africans than Christianity since it is more adaptable to their traditional customs (e.g., polygamy) and way of life.

33. *Policy Guidance:*

a. No immediate action seems warranted. Islam is not necessarily hostile to the United States. On the contrary, in many areas it has proved to be a strong barrier to Communism. Unless its proselytizing forces are captured by hostile elements, no action by the United States would seem to be called for.

b. As noted above, encourage the Moslems of North Africa to exert an influence in the area as a counterweight to the Egyptians.

9. Editorial Note

On October 9, Assistant Secretary of State Satterthwaite spoke to the Western Regional Assembly at Lake Arrowhead, California, on the subject of "The United States and Africa: Challenge and Opportunity." He addressed the issue of nationalism, which was a major concern of U.S. policymakers:

"Having long recognized that traditional colonialism is coming to an end, the United States supports the principle of orderly transition to self-government and eventual self-determination in the interests of all parties and peoples involved. The speed of this evolution, we believe, should be determined by the capacity of the African populations concerned to assume and discharge the responsibilities of self-government."

The growing Communist threat remained another preoccupation of government leaders in Washington. To thwart "the insidious international Communist force, which would deny the area to the West and ensnare it into the political and socioeconomic slavery of communism," Satterthwaite stressed the need to understand and to help to meet African aspirations. He also emphasized the imperative of "adequate economic and technical assistance." For text of his address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 27, 1958, pages 641–648.

10. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board

January 14, 1959.

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT ON AFRICA
SOUTH OF THE SAHARA (NSC 5818)

(Approved by the President—August 26, 1958)

(Period Covered: From: March 20, 1958 Through: January 14, 1959)

A. Summary Evaluation

1. The rapid pace of political developments in the area, particularly in the dependent territories, has created a situation in which the United States often cannot perform a decisive role in view of its desire for orderly self-determination of dependent peoples on one hand and its commitments to its major European allies on the other. The United States, therefore, as seen in the case of Guinea¹ finds itself in the middle of a controversy between an emerging African state and a European power with each side looking to us to influence the other. U.S. programs and operations being undertaken are generally still modest in scope with the exception of technical and economic assistance to Liberia. USIS and ICA programs are increasing but there is still much to be done particularly in the light of increasing political and limited economic activities by the Soviet bloc and UAR in Africa. Basic development loans in areas where there is little or no African participation in government, while undoubtedly of economic advantage to the country concerned, are looked upon by numerous indigenous Africans, rightly or wrongly, as being of primary benefit to the European interests. DLF has to date issued two loans in Africa (both in Liberia)² and because of limited funds, and shortage of staff during the initial months of operation it has been severely limited in its effectiveness in this area. The British Government recently took steps which will contribute to the development of close and mutually advantageous economic relations between the UK and its African territories and former territories,³ and the European common market is establishing a large fund for economic assistance to African territories associated with

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5818 Series. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from the Executive Officer of the OCB, Bromley Smith, to the Executive Secretary of the NSC, dated January 20.

¹ In a referendum held in 14 French territories on September 28, 1958, only Guinea voted for independence and not to join the French Community.

² The sums were \$3 million and \$190,000.

³ These steps were spelled out by Great Britain in September 1958 at the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference held at Montreal.

common market members. There remains a need for more positive action in counteracting Communist penetration of African labor activities, youth groups and nationalist organizations.

2. The Operations Coordinating Board does not recommend a review of NSC 5818. It is noted that the present policy covers the period prior to Calendar Year 1960.

[Here follows the body of the report.]

11. Memorandum From the Representative at the Trusteeship Council (Sears) to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)

New York, January 29, 1959.

SUBJECT

U.S. Relationship With African Nationalism

Summary

This report concerns African Nationalism and the crisis which is developing in Africa South of the Sahara; the inability of European Settler Communities to adjust to Nationalist demands; the imminence of widespread and continuing disorder; and steps which the U.S. can take to counter the Soviet Union's campaign to gain control of African Nationalism.

The following conclusions are based on a visit to Africa in November and December. It began in East and Central Africa where I called on many African Nationalist leaders, European officials and "white settlers," and ended in Accra, Ghana, where I was present at the All-African People's (Pan African) Conference.¹ The purpose of this journey was to study African Nationalism and the political and racial unrest which is beginning to spread through colonial territories, such as Kenya, the Congo, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.

[Here follows the main text of the memorandum.]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/1-3059. Confidential. Enclosure to a letter from Ambassador Lodge to Secretary of State Dulles, January 30.

¹ This conference took place December 8-13, 1958.

Competition for Nationalist Goodwill

In any case the moment is near when the Soviet Union will be given its greatest opportunity to split the world in two, by gaining a controlling influence over Africa through its Nationalist movements. Secretary Dulles has frequently warned about this. But there is no reason why the U.S. should not also compete for Nationalist goodwill. The recommendations which follow will suggest how the U.S. can ride along with the Nationalist bandwagon without actually climbing on board, or without taking sides against its European allies.

These proposals may seem inadequate to meet the serious situations arising in Africa but they are only meant to meet the particular point which African Nationalism raises at this moment.

Here are the recommendations.

Recommendation 1—The State Department should encourage U.S. Embassies and Consulates to increase the number and the frequency of their contacts with Nationalist leaders. The importance of this could be far reaching for the U.S. Seldom have so many new states been coming to life at the same time, on the same continent, under the leadership of so few people. Because there is a scarcity as yet of experienced African leaders, it is easy to identify and to build goodwill among the actual individuals who are about to become the Prime Ministers, and the other prominent citizens of their respective countries. The establishment of friendly contacts with these leaders should be one of the principal duties of those who represent the U.S. in Africa. Such meetings should be for the important purpose of keeping up with African thinking and making friends for the U.S. There can be no valid objections to this by the Colonial authorities. Nevertheless, there may be a reluctance among some of our representatives to undertake this kind of activity, unless they are periodically prodded by the State Department.

Much valuable work in keeping direct contact with African leadership was being done by the Consulates I visited in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Salisbury, and Johannesburg. It was particularly true in the case of the Embassy in Pretoria, in spite of the suspicious and difficult attitude of the South African Government. I was told that our representatives in South Africa were ahead of all other foreign representatives in making African contacts.

Recommendation 2—The State Department should dispatch a representative to Africa periodically for the particular purpose of calling upon various African leaders. This would give "on the spot" emphasis to the State Department's direct interest in Nationalist thinking, which would be much appreciated by the Africans. It would also put regularity into the contact procedure and make it easier for the Consulates to

expand their contacts. Having recently called upon many of the leading Nationalists in East and Central Africa, I can report that this approach to the Nationalist movement contains a gold mine of goodwill for the U.S.

Recommendation 3—Congress should be requested to make additional appropriations for leader grants so that a much larger number of African political leaders may be invited to the U.S. This would be one of the cheapest and most effective ways to build goodwill. For less than one half the cost of one Sabre Jet, a large cross section of African political leaders could be invited for a short visit to the U.S., provided with suitable travel escorts, and returned to Africa with some understanding of American life. Under present appropriations it has not been possible to invite more than a handful of political leaders. Few if any of the Prime Ministers in the 12 Locally Autonomous Republics or territories of French West and Equatorial Africa have ever set foot in the U.S., although most of them have visited Paris. Likewise very few African leaders from the Congo or from the Rhodesias or Nyasaland have visited this country. An expanded U.S. program for African political visitors would compete effectively with the open house program which the Soviet Union and its satellites maintain for African visitors.

Recommendation 4—More forthright statements should be made by the U.S. Representatives in the U.N. which would unmistakably throw U.S. moral support behind legitimate Nationalist aspirations. During the 1958 session of the General Assembly, the U.S. made some very helpful moves toward a pro-African position on Algerian independence and on the South African race issue. It is hoped that these were only first steps which will be followed by further equally helpful steps in the next General Assembly. Because of the intense importance which Africans everywhere attach to these issues, the position of the U.S. on them has a vital bearing on American prestige from one end of the continent to the other.

The U.S. has so many critically urgent problems in Europe and Asia that one hesitates to emphasize others. But I believe that a dangerous crisis in Africa is so close at hand that there is no time to lose any opportunity, however small, to build goodwill among those who will be leading the independent Africa of tomorrow.²

² Dulles informed Lodge on February 3 that he had not yet had a chance to read Sears' report, but had passed it on to Satterthwaite and Wilcox. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/1-3059)

12. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, March 17, 1959, midnight.

770. Re: Developments in Africa.¹

Scarcely a day goes by without my contacts at UN vividly impressing me with rapidly evolving revolution in Africa. Troubles in Algeria, French Congo, Belgian Congo, Nyasaland and Kenya are out in the open, with rumors of trouble in Angola and Mozambique. Events seem to be moving faster than was thought likely six months ago. While British have an evolutionary spirit, events may go too fast even for British. The emotional and unrealistic attitude of French towards Algeria will add fuel to the flames.

Under these circumstances it behooves the US to think of its own interests in the African continent and the catastrophe which we would confront if Soviet Communism established itself there strongly. We should try to do what we can to: prevent this and to be in a position so that we will be regarded as the friends of those who are coming to power in the future. It is in the long range interests of our European friends that we be in this position.

I suggest therefore that Acting Secretary designate a special representative who would first visit the colonial offices and then travel throughout Africa, especially to the troubled areas. Algeria may well be a special case.² His directive would be to express American concern with existing troubles to the official and to see whether there is anything that US could do to be helpful.

Such a mission should put us in a better position in Africa and should get us valuable information on which to base our future policy.

I realize that US has over the years exerted quiet, but effective pressure on colonial powers. But we now need something more visible that the masses in Africa would regard as friendly even though the special representative would carry out his mission discreetly and

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/3-1759. Confidential. A notation on the source text indicates that the telegram was repeated for comment to 22 posts by EUR and AF on March 23.

¹ The Department had requested posts in Africa "to report promptly and fully circumstances surrounding all disturbances their areas with particular reference external stimulus and/or exploitation from Commie bloc, UAR or Nkrumah's Pan Africanism." Although the timing of the various outbreaks was considered coincidental, the Department believed Communist exploitation of the incidents to be inevitable. (Circular airgram G-441, March 3; *ibid.*, 770.00/3-359)

² Telegram 773 from USUN, March 17, instructed that the phrase "(Excluding, of course, Algeria)" be deleted in favor of ("Algeria may well be a special case"). (*Ibid.*, 770.00/3-1759)

would avoid steps in trust or non-self-governing territories to which the administering powers could take exception.³

Lodge

³ In a memorandum to the Acting Secretary, April 4, concurred in by representatives of EUR, IO, and by Robert Murphy, Satterthwaite advised that "all of our posts have replied to Ambassador Lodge's suggestion in a negative manner." (*Ibid.*) Acting Secretary Murphy advised Lodge that his suggestion would be held in abeyance. (Telegram 825 to USUN, April 17; *ibid.*)

13. Editorial Note

Almost from the outset of his return to power in France in June 1958, General Charles de Gaulle raised the issue of tripartite (U.S.–U.K.–French) consultation and action on a range of issues, including African affairs, outside the confines of NATO. (Memorandum from de Gaulle to Eisenhower and Macmillan, September 17; Department of State, EUR/WE Files: Lot 72 D 441, De Gaulle Memo, Sept. 25–Oct. 15, 1958) Ambassador Alphand informed Secretary Dulles on October 31 that France desired tripartite strategic military planning covering Africa and the Middle East, as well as political planning. (Telegram 1594 to Paris, October 31; *ibid.*, Central Files, 740.5/10–3158)

On December 15, Dulles conferred with de Gaulle while in Paris to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting. The Secretary "noted that Africa particularly was suited to such a tripartite study. Africa is vital to the West. If studied from a North-South viewpoint, Africa was the hinterland of Western Europe. Today Africa is being penetrated by Communist agents, and is caught up in the worldwide movement for premature independence. It presents grave problems if not in the fighting war, in the subversive war. France has great influence and interest in this continent, and it would be particularly an appropriate subject to be studied together." (Memorandum of conversation by Robert H. McBride; *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) On January 7, 1959, however, Dulles suggested to Ambassador Alphand that the Far East be the first subject of tripartite discussion. (Memorandum of conversation by L. Dean Brown; *ibid.*)

The second stage of the tripartite discussions, which was to focus on Africa, was scheduled for mid-April. Louis Joxe, Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed the French Delegation. On April 15, the day before formal consultations were to com-

mence, "Joxe said he contemplated that these talks should be the beginning of continuous study and consultations by the French and British Ambassadors, together with their military experts, and the US Government." (Memorandum of conversation by Matthew Loram, April 15; *ibid.*, Central Files, 770.00/4-1559) The agreed agenda was discarded at the last minute when the French proposed new items and different emphases. (Telegram 4052 to Paris, April 25; *ibid.*, 770.00/4-2359) Five sessions were held between April 16 and 21. At the second meeting on April 17, Joxe offered remarks on Algeria, the French Community, the Maghreb, and the Sahara. The third session on April 20 considered Algeria, Guinea, the North African states, a British paper on Africa, and arms. The final two meetings were convened on April 21. A discussion of military strategy carried over into the last session, which also turned to economic aid. (Memoranda of conversation by Leon Dorros, William N. Stokes, and William Canup; *ibid.*, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Africa—1959-1960)

14. Memorandum of Conversation

April 16, 1959.

SUBJECT

First Tripartite Talks on Africa

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Mr. Robert Murphy
Mr. Joseph Satterthwaite, AF
Major General D. V. Johnson

France

M. Louis Joxe
M. Hervé Alphand
General Gelée

British

Sir Harold Caccia
Lord Hood
Admiral Sir Michael Denny

At Mr. Murphy's suggestion the meeting first discussed the question of informing other interested Governments about the talks.

It was agreed that every effort should be made to avoid publicity. If, but only if, there were press enquiries we should say that we were taking advantage of M. Joxe's regular visits to Washington to hold

routine consultations. If further pressed we would refer correspondents to the original communiqué announcing the inauguration of the tripartite talks.¹ We would not identify Africa as the subject.

It was also agreed that we should consider at the end of the series of meetings what to tell NATO and other interested Governments.

Mr. Murphy opened with a general statement.² He referred to the vital political, economic and strategic importance of Africa to the free world. The loss of North Africa to the Soviet control would outflank Europe and it was doubtful whether the free world would survive such a disaster. This area contained Algeria and many of the newly independent countries of Africa. So long as the area remained politically stable and Western-oriented and so long as its economy could be developed on sound lines the Soviet task would be much more difficult. He also referred to the strategic importance of the area, mentioning the French and British bases there and the United States' own Strategic Air Force bases in Libya and Morocco. If we could secure the friendship and cooperation of the inhabitants of North Africa this would also have a favorable influence on the political position of the West in the Middle East and in Africa South of the Sahara. But, if existing tensions and disagreements became worse our whole position in Africa and the Middle East would correspondingly be threatened.

Africa South of the Sahara was of less immediate strategic importance but its vast resources could make a major contribution to the free world and its political alignment would have a definite bearing on the global balance of power. In fact, its influence was already felt in the United Nations where the Afro-Asian bloc often acted most irresponsibly. Ever-increasing pressure was building up from those forces which wished to disrupt the traditional links of Africa with the West.

There was also ever-increasing pressure for self-determination which unhappily sometimes led to violence. Self-determination had loomed large in all recent "Pan-African" conferences, e.g., at the African Peoples' Conference in Accra. Although it could not be said that the whole of Africa had been represented at Accra, the Conference undoubtedly reflected articulate African opinion in the continent.³ This drive towards self-rule presented the free world with a challenge to accommodate themselves to it and to ensure a continuing fruitful association between Africa and the West.

¹ See Document 13.

² Satterthwaite transmitted a talking paper to Murphy containing remarks prepared for his use in opening the proceedings. (Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 62 D 406, Tripartite)

³ This non-governmental assembly was attended by political and trade union leaders from 28 African countries and overseas observers.

The Soviet Union is well aware of this and has already gained a foothold. For example, there was the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Committee Secretariat in Cairo. This was a kind of African Cominform. The Soviet Union is also engaged in an orthodox diplomatic and economic offensive in Africa. The Soviets seek to establish relations with all independent states and have launched a program of economic and technical assistance. They had already concluded trade agreements with Ethiopia, Morocco and Guinea. They were paying particular attention to nationalism and "Pan-Africanism". Against this background, the efforts of the Western Powers to help the new developed areas to find themselves assumed a crucial urgency. Some great and imaginative steps forward had already been taken for example in the French community, Nigeria and the Belgian Congo.

Change was inevitable and it was essential that it should take place in an orderly manner and in the closest cooperation with the Western powers. Europe and Africa were complementary, and the closest ties must be preserved after the colonial period had passed. Above all, the United States wished to avoid African nationalism turning into a massive anti-European movement which the Communists could exploit. The Africans were on the whole immature and unsophisticated and were subject to many pressures—Communist, Pan-African, Islamic—all of which made it difficult for those African leaders who were Western-minded to keep their followers on the right path. In the long run the native Africans would take their decisions in the light of what they considered to be their own best interests and the prospect of achieving equality with the white race. The United States policy was to assist the native African race to attain their goals without attempting to attach political or military strings to their assistance. Western policies should be designed to convince the African that we want to help him without involving him in the East-West power struggle. The U.S. regards the European Powers as best equipped for the leading role, and is concentrating primarily on economic and technical assistance plus a modest amount of military assistance. We are most anxious to work in the closest cooperation with the former administering powers of the newly independent areas. As regards self-determination we support the process of orderly evolution. We do not wish to supplant the metropolitan powers and we do not approve of the headlong rush to independence. But this did not mean that we would necessarily refuse support or assistance to a newly independent territory especially when direct United States' interests were involved. We would like the metropolitan powers to play the primary role in those territories for which they had previously been responsible. This was unfortunately not always possible, and the U.S. is sometimes forced to play a larger part than it would wish to.

Mr. Murphy concluded with a reference to the importance of aid for Africa both bilateral and multilateral and said that he would explain United States policies in more detail at a later meeting. Service representatives would continue to attend the meetings when required. He hoped the exchanges would be free and frank.

M. Joxe then made a general statement. The tripartite talks had two main advantages. First they provided a forum for the exchange of information. In many cases the detailed exchanges could be left to the experts. Secondly, the talks provided a forum in which to define, insofar as possible, a joint political and strategic policy. Africa was of vital importance to France.

In the world-wide political and strategic contest, Africa was both a prize and a battlefield. We were not yet faced with a clear-cut plan of action on the part of the Russians and their allies but there were phenomena which must be studied now. The value of Africa as a prize was clear. If the Communists occupied or infiltrated into too many countries we would lose the Battle of the Atlantic, Europe would be in danger, our communications in the Far East would be cut, and we should lose a tremendous source of raw materials.

Africa was also a battlefield. We had all seen the recent NATO report on Soviet penetration into Africa and he did not propose to discuss the subject in detail.⁴ But there was no doubt that the drive for independence in Africa posed very dangerous problems. In 1950 there had been four independent countries in Africa. Soon there would be 11. The French authorities were in the throes of a revolution precipitated by the French Government itself. There was a continuing nationalist pressure attended by "phenomena" perhaps inevitable, which could easily mean that we were going to have serious trouble with the Communists. If Liberia was well-established and the transition in Nigeria was proving orderly, there were other countries where the omens were less favorable. Nkrumah's nationalist and Pan-African propaganda seemed to be aiming at Nigeria and Togoland. Even if Nkrumah could be contained, Guinea posed a formidable problem. Guinea had rushed headlong into independence. Politically, economically and intellectually it afforded a classic example of a country emerging from colonialism into an acute crisis of institutional growth. All the symptoms were there of a State which, if not actually Communist, was drifting towards Communism. There is, first, the trend to-

⁴ Reference is to a Report by the Committee on Africa dated March 20, 1959, entitled "Communist Penetration in Africa." (NATO doc. C-M(59)32; enclosure to a memorandum from Nes to Satterthwaite, May 19; Department of State, Central Files, 770.001/5-1959) [2 lines of text not declassified] The U.S. position had been to favor NAC consideration of the subject, but to resist any effort "to work toward any 'joint policy' approach." [1 line of text not declassified] (Paper prepared in the Department of State for the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 16-18, 1958; *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, Tab S)

wards authoritarianism. The African revolution contained a natural element of susceptibility to authoritarian regimes: democracy cannot be created overnight. Second, there is the tendency to internecine struggle between members of the ruling elite, once independence was won. Third, there is the concept of the "monolithic" state, of which Guinea afforded a crude example and Tunisia a subtle one. Fourth, there is the economic and social transformation which overtook these countries. Their idea invariably was to pass as rapidly as possible from an agricultural to an industrial economy. To this end they must appeal for foreign capital and technical assistance and they tended to turn to countries other than their "parent" for this. Equally they had a strong tendency to break what they regarded as monopolistic trade links with the former administering power. This made them vulnerable to the offers which the Russians, with the advantages of totalitarianism, were able to make while the Western Powers were still discussing among themselves.

The youth of Africa was easily tempted by "simple" ideologies. The vocabulary of African youth was becoming increasingly "Neo-Marxist" throughout Africa. He himself had recently been struck by this in Morocco. The vocabulary was not yet Communist but it contained Marxist injection. A study of the press and radio suggested that this vocabulary started in the Soviet Union and was relayed through Cairo and through the Indian Communist Party. In many areas, and especially in the Maghreb and in new countries such as Guinea, China was a subject of great interest at present.

The Communists and their associates were exploiting the atmosphere of *Sturm und Drang* throughout the Continent, as they were exploiting the economic and social aspirations of the Africans, the neutralist urge and the wish for independence.

Until 1953 the Russians did not appear to have attached more than a secondary importance to Africa, but even then Khrushchev had been conscious of the potential importance of "young countries". And in 1958 Khrushchev had publicly given an importance to Africa which we could not afford to ignore. All sorts of "African" institutions were now springing up in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the Communist bloc. And during the Youth Festival in Moscow⁵ particular attention had been paid to the Africans, both those who came from the continent and those who attended from European universities.

The African need for economic aid presented the Communists with a growing opportunity. In competing with the Communists in this field Western powers were handicapped by their "liberal" economic policies. Egyptian and Sudanese cotton was a case in point and now there was Guinea.

⁵ Held July 29–August 12, 1957.

Then there was the problem of Communist arms deliveries, first in the Middle East and now in West Africa, not to mention the smuggling of arms into Algeria, which was really a separate problem. Guinea had accepted massive gifts of arms from the Czechs. This is sinister because Guinea would need "instructors" in the use of these new arms. Morocco was another case in point. But the technique of subversion was not yet fully developed: it was still in the stage of exploration and exploitation.

For France, Africa was Europe in the sense that the defense of one was the defense of the other and that if we allowed this exploitation to continue Europe might ultimately have its flank turned and go under. NATO was perfectly and militarily effective insofar as it went. But it was limited and it was essential that we should seek to arrive at a common military, political and economic doctrine for Africa.

At M. Joxe's request, General Gelée (the French Representative on the Standing Group) then read a prepared statement of the French strategic interests in Africa. This is attached.⁶

Sir Harold Caccia said that he was in general agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Murphy and M. Joxe but the Communist threat was global, and in a sense it was pointless to speculate whether one area was more important than another. The real point was how were we to stop Russian expansion. He thought we were all agreed on this. The NATO paper on Soviet penetration, to which M. Joxe had referred, was an excellent document with which the U.K. is broadly in agreement. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Sir Harold Caccia then suggested we should be careful in the tripartite talks not to cut across other consultations. This might lead to confusion. Africa was being discussed constantly in many forums. In addition to NATO, for example, it had been discussed by Mr. Macmillan and M. Debré during the latter's recent visit to London. Sir Harold Caccia then gave a short account of this discussion.⁷ The UK is in favor of the coordination of African policies but when it came to coordination one had to take account of what other organizations and countries were involved. In addition to NATO there is the United Nations; there are the other powers with Colonial responsibilities in Africa, such as the Portuguese and Belgians; and in the field of aid there are the other possible donor countries. We would not be successful in coordinating unless we were able to carry our allies and friends with us.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Telegram 5385 from London, April 16, reported appraisal of the talks given the Embassy by the Head of the African Department at the British Foreign Office, John Hugh Adam Watson. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/4-1659) The British Embassy in Washington also gave the Department an account of the talks on April 15. (*Ibid.*, 770.00/4-1559)

Sir Harold Caccia suggested that before the meeting closed it should discuss its future program of work and what could be done in the tripartite forum to carry the work forward without risk of duplication. He added that Admiral Denny would be explaining the United Kingdom's strategic interests in Africa at a subsequent meeting.⁸

M. Alphanth repeated the French thesis that tripartite discussions should not cause complications elsewhere. On the contrary he argued, prior tripartite agreement in advance should facilitate general agreement later. As regards a program of work he suggested that there should first be a general discussion followed by a discussion of individual topics of interest, including strategy.

M. Joxe endorsed M. Alphanth's view and suggested that each participant should first expound on their particular problems and responsibilities in Africa. For his part he proposed to speak on:

- (1) Algeria
- (2) Maghreb
- (3) The Sahara
- (4) The French Community

Mr. Murphy said that this should prove most helpful to the United States as we are comparatively new in the field and do not have the same historic responsibilities in the area as the United Kingdom and France though our objectives were the same. He would welcome an exposé of French views and policies, especially on Algeria. This might make it easier for us to gear our policies more closely to those of the French. Quite frankly this had not always proved easy in the past as we have not always been clear as to what the French policy was.

Sir Harold Caccia agreed and suggested that the problem of education was one of the individual topics which might be considered later in addition to strategy. For example, it seemed important to clear our minds on whether our efforts should concentrate on education abroad or education on the spot. The economic problems of Africa should also be examined. There was already a multiplicity of organizations and it was doubtful whether more were needed. The real problem was whether the available resources were adequate to the task.

M. Alphanth suggested that examination of economic problems in detail should be done by experts.⁹

Sir Harold Caccia suggested that the experts should also examine the NATO paper on Soviet penetration to consider whether there were any significant points in it on which any of us were likely to disagree.

⁸ He did so at the fourth session.

⁹ Agreement was reached to establish experts groups to study Guinea, Western arms deliveries to Morocco and Tunisia, and economic assistance to Africa. (Telegram 4052 to Paris, April 25; Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/4-2359)

15. Editorial Note

On April 24, Ambassador Caccia met with Secretary Herter. Caccia termed the just-concluded tripartite talks as “unembarrassing” and not likely to complicate relations with de Gaulle. Herter noted the heavy French emphasis on strategic planning about which he would have to solicit the views of the JCS. (Memorandum of conversation by William D. Brewer, April 24; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) In a memorandum for the President, April 24, Herter commented that the French sought “military talks to cover both present activities in Africa of the three countries and contingency strategic planning. This demand is perhaps the crux of de Gaulle’s case and poses difficult problems for us.” He continued that it was “important in these talks to give the French representatives a feeling that we were trying to be responsive to their needs and not merely negative.” Herter expressed the belief that Joxe would report to de Gaulle that the United States had been forthcoming. (*Ibid.*, AF/AFI Files: Lot 62 D 406, Tripartite)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy D. Kohler stated in a memorandum to Murphy on April 29, that the French viewed military talks “as a test of the usefulness of the tripartite discussions themselves and of our responsiveness to what General de Gaulle is seeking.” Kohler urged Murphy to press the JCS to designate a representative to take part. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 770.5/4–2959) At a Department of State–JCS meeting on May 1, Murphy requested the JCS views “on what kind of support the Department of Defense should provide for these talks.” (*Ibid.*, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)

General Maxwell D. Taylor informed Murphy on May 20 of the continued JCS reluctance to become involved. Murphy replied that it was important to avoid driving de Gaulle into unilateral action by denying the French request and urged that exploratory talks, which would not constitute “military planning in the technical sense of the word,” be continued. Taylor revealed that the military was hesitant to become involved in talks that could result in the involvement of the military in foreign affairs. (Memorandum of conversation by Dwight J. Porter; *ibid.*, 770.5/5–2059) The formal JCS response, dated May 22, stipulated that in areas of the world not covered by security pacts involving the United States (such as Africa), tripartite military planning could be considered. “However,” the JCS memorandum continued, “it is impossible to undertake military planning in any area without first establishing the political framework in which to plan and a general determination of planning objectives.” After the formulation

of such guidance, the JCS, would participate in the political meetings. (JCSM-197-59; attachment to the memorandum on substance of discussion, May 29; *ibid.*, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)

At the State-JCS meeting on May 29, General Taylor repeated the JCS concern that the talks not depart from the military realm. The discussion concluded with agreement that the Joint Chiefs May 22 memorandum would provide the general basis for U.S. military participation in the talks; that the Department of State would develop a more specific terms of reference and political guidance for the talks; and that the United States would emphasize the area south of the Sahara with recognition that the French might desire to discuss other areas, e.g., Tunisia, Morocco, or Somaliland. (*Ibid.*, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)

On June 8, Murphy conveyed the requested guidance to General Taylor. The terms of reference emphasized the "exploratory, ad hoc" nature of the talks. (*Ibid.*, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Africa, 1959-1960)

On June 25, the JCS agreed to the terms of reference after a minor revision and designated Major General D. V. Johnson to take part in the exploratory military talks. (JCSM-245-59; *ibid.*, S/S-S: CMS Files: Lot 69 D 150, Documents on U.S. Relations with France, June 1958-February 1963) Though the United States advised the French of its willingness to participate in such talks, this offer was not taken up by the French. (Letter from Eisenhower to de Gaulle, August 2, 1960; *ibid.*, Documents on U.S. Relations with France, June 1958-Jan. 1963)

16. Editorial Note

An African Regional Conference of U.S. representatives concerned with the region of Africa extending from the Horn to the Cape met in Lourenco Marques, Mozambique, June 9-11, 1959. The conference was chaired by Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite and attended by chiefs of mission and principal officers of 10 U.S. diplomatic and consular missions in Africa; representatives of the U.S. Embassies in Lisbon, Brussels, and London; and representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the International Cooperation Administration, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Development Loan Fund. The report of the conference, entitled "African Regional Conference, Lourenco Marques, June 9-11, 1959," is in Department of State, Central Files, 120.1453C/11-2559.

17. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 70-59

June 16, 1959.

[Here follows a table of contents.]

THE OUTLOOK IN WEST AFRICA THROUGH 1960¹

The Problem

To analyze the political forces at work in West Africa, and to estimate through 1960 the prospects for political stability in the area and the probable orientation of the independent states.

Conclusions

1. In West Africa, British and French colonial rule is rapidly giving way before the rising demands of Africans for the recognition and dignity implicit in self-government and denied by colonial status. This process is facilitated by the fact that there are in West Africa no settled European communities such as complicate the problem in Algeria, Kenya, and Rhodesia. (Paras. 12, 14-15)

2. In most of West Africa there is no strong sense of distinct nationality related to the particular states of the area, all of which are characterized by great ethnic and cultural diversity. Such a sense of

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 16 June 1959. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

Annexes A, "Country Analyses," B, "Security Forces," and C, a table of statistics, and a map are not printed.

¹ For the purposes of this estimate, West Africa is defined as the area bounded by Spanish Sahara, Algeria, and Libya on the north and by Sudan and the Belgian Congo on the east and south. It includes the independent states of Liberia, Ghana, and Guinea; the 11 republics formerly federated in French West and French Equatorial Africa and now autonomous members of the French Community; the UN Trust Territories of Togo and Cameroun; the British colonies of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; Portuguese Guinea; and Spanish Guinea. Nigeria, Togo, and Cameroun are scheduled to achieve independence in 1960. [Footnote in the source text.]

nationality, however, has begun to develop in the more advanced states, helped by the growth of mass political parties. (Paras. 13, 15-17)

3. The pace of political change in West Africa is being set by the members of a very small educated elite, who have enlisted mass support through the organization of political parties and labor unions. An essential characteristic of most parties is personal loyalty to a leader; the trend is toward the domination of particular states by a single party. The result is a highly personal and authoritarian style of government, which is regarded by the leaders as necessary to achieve unity and development in the face of ethnic diversity and economic backwardness. We foresee little chance of a trend away from authoritarian methods; in fact, as their problems become more complex many leaders will probably become more vigorous in their use of these methods. (Paras. 13, 20-22)

4. African leaders generally realize that they will need external aid in order to achieve the economic development required to meet the rising expectations of their people. Many, however, expect that after independence economic aid will be forthcoming from a wide variety of sources. All wish to maintain economic ties with the former colonial powers, but on achieving independence will seek additional economic aid from both the US and the Sino-Soviet Bloc. (Paras. 18-19, 39-40, 42)

5. Within West Africa, there is a tendency toward interstate cooperation and a strong emotional attachment to African solidarity. The various schemes advanced to achieve these ends range in content from combinations to maintain common public services, through loose political alliances among like-minded leaders of separate states, to plans for federal union. The union of Senegal and Soudan in the Mali Federation² has real political substance. The Gharra-Guinea union is more in the nature of an alliance of independent states in the spirit of Pan-Africanism, which aspires to the liberation and unity of all Africa. This loose association of states may grow, but is not likely to become an organic union. (Paras. 26-31)

6. The outlook for internal political stability varies greatly from country to country. *Ghana* is likely to remain stable and relatively prosperous. *Guinea's* prospects are less certain: Sekou Touré is a popular leader and operates an effective political machine, but is in urgent need of technical and financial assistance. *Nigeria* may emerge as the strongest state in the area, but the extent to which it realizes this potential will depend on the ability of its leaders to overcome the divisive tendencies which hamper the development of national unity.

² Mali was the name of a kingdom which dominated much of West Africa during the 14th and 15th centuries. [Footnote in the source text.]

Both *Togo* and *Cameroun* will probably remain stable until independence is attained in 1960, but thereafter their prospects are uncertain. (Paras. 32–36)

7. Whether the territories of West Africa which have recently chosen to remain in the French Community³ continue to do so, will depend largely on French willingness to satisfy African aspirations for increased political stature, and on the leaders' own evaluation of the economic value of such relationship. The Mali Federation (Senegal and Soudan) is already pressing for greater autonomy within the Community. If it does not receive satisfaction, it will probably declare its independence. There is no strong drive for early independence on the part of the other states of the Community, but the secession of Mali would have an unsettling effect. The Community is not likely to endure unless the French permit it to evolve into an association of independent states. (Paras. 37–38; Annex 29)

8. Despite the socialistic and, in many respects, authoritarian outlook of many of the leaders in the area, communism has not become a strong force in West African internal politics. There are no known Communist parties in the area. Nevertheless, Communist influence is likely to grow as the Sino-Soviet Bloc establishes diplomatic and economic relations with the newly independent states of the area. Given the generally unproven character of the political institutions in the area, the situation in some countries, e.g., Guinea or Cameroun, could develop in such a way as to facilitate a substantial expansion of Communist influence. However, the West African leaders are now in effective control in their countries, are jealous of their new-found power, and would react strongly to prevent any element not under their control from gaining a position of political importance. Although Communist influence could increase significantly in one or more countries of the area, we believe it unlikely that the Communists will achieve a position from which they could control the policy of any West African state during the period of this estimate. (Paras. 23–25)

9. For the next few years at least, the main thrust of Sino-Soviet Bloc policy toward West Africa will probably be to establish a position as the disinterested supporter of West African independence against the "imperialist" powers. Accordingly, the Bloc will probably play down the internal subversion of independent African states. In general, we believe that the Bloc will make considerable progress in establishing its presence in an area from which, in effect, it has hitherto been barred. (Para. 40)

³ Mauritania, Senegal, Soudan, Ivory Coast, the Voltaic Republic, Dahomey, Niger, Chad, the Central African Republic, the Congo Republic, and Gabon. [Footnote in the source text.]

10. The West African leaders will continue to be preoccupied with local and African problems. They will react to the policies of other countries primarily in terms of the real or fancied repercussions of these policies on their own particular interests and on African aspirations in general. Their attitude in international political affairs will be one of nonalignment with either great power bloc. (Para. 43)

11. Beyond 1960, the West African countries are likely to be faced with developments which will jeopardize internal stability and enhance Communist opportunities for subversion. As the younger leaders begin to crowd the present political leadership, political discontent will build up. But because of the present leadership's intolerance of opposition, much of this political discontent will probably lead to conspiratorial activity—an environment in which Communist talents are most effectively applied. (Para. 44)

[Here follow the "Discussion" portion (paragraphs 12-37), with sections headed "Introduction," "Political Forces at Work in West Africa," and "The Outlook."]

18. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 76–59

October 20, 1959.

THE OUTLOOK IN EAST, CENTRAL, AND SOUTH AFRICA ¹

The Problem

To estimate political developments in the area during the next few years, especially with respect to the prospects for self-government or independence.

Conclusions

1. Most of the territories of East, Central, and South Africa have been caught up in the continent-wide process of postwar economic, social and political change, in which growing black African pressure for equality and self-government is a central element. In contrast to West Africa, however, accommodation to this pressure is complicated in many cases by the presence of a well-entrenched white settler element and of large, though as a rule politically less important, Asian or other minorities. (Paras. 9–10)

2. Over the next several years, Portugal will probably be able to control whatever African unrest and agitation may develop in *Angola* and *Mozambique*. For at least the next five years the whites of the *Union of South Africa* will almost certainly continue to dominate the nonwhite elements of the population—although the Nationalist government's policy of *apartheid* will lead to increasing nonwhite resort to

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 20 October 1959. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

Various annexes and a map are not printed.

¹ British East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar); the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; the Belgian Congo (including Ruanda-Urundi); the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique; the Union of South Africa (including South West Africa); and the British High Commission Territories (Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland). [Footnote in the source text.]

boycotts, strikes, and passive resistance, marked by sporadic violence, and will increase the likelihood of an eventual racial explosion. (Para. 23; Annex A, Paras. 28–37)

3. In most other parts of the area, the next few years will be marked by intensified political maneuver and negotiation and at least occasional disorder and violence. Prospects for reconciliation of African, white settler, and metropolitan interests vary greatly from territory to territory, with much likely to depend not only on a variety of local circumstances, but also on the resourcefulness and adaptability of individual leaders and officials. In general, however, it appears likely that at least one and perhaps as many as four or five of the presently dependent territories will become independent within the next five years. (Paras. 24–25)

4. *Tanganyika* is well on the way to self-rule under a strong African political movement which has obtained white and Asian support. Rapid progress toward self-rule is also likely in the *Belgian Congo*, where the white settler element has little influence, and in the tiny protectorate of *Zanzibar*, where some accommodation between the traditionally dominant Arab minority and the increasingly active African majority appears probable. There is no significant racial problem in *Uganda*; although the retention of great influence by the Kabaka (King) of Buganda² and lesser traditional leaders has perpetuated tribal and sectional divisions, it is likely that the territory will achieve self-government within five years. In the Belgian-administered Trust Territory of *Ruanda-Urundi*, and in the British-run *High Commission Territories*, development of local self-government will also take place, although at a slower pace. (Annex A, Paras. 2–5, 20–24, 13, 10–12, 25, 38)

5. The outlook in the remaining territories of the area is more uncertain. Because of the growing strength of African pressures, *Kenya* may emerge as an African-led state within five years, but white settler resistance and African reluctance to compromise will probably lead to further bloodshed before a solution is achieved. Controversy over the constitutional status and racial policies of the self-governing *Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* will not be finally resolved in the constitutional review scheduled by the UK for late 1960. Within the next five years, African pressures will probably result in Nyasaland's breaking away from the Federation. In any event, unless the dominant white element greatly liberalizes its "partnership" concept, the Federation will probably find itself eventually in a position similar to that of South Africa. (Annex A, Paras. 6–9, 14–19)

² Edward Frederick Mutesa, II.

6. Even in those territories where the transition to independence occurs without undue disruption, the outlook for stability and orderly development is generally unpromising. Grave problems of tribal disunity and backwardness will confront the new African leaders, who are few in number and have generally had less administrative experience than their counterparts in West Africa. Moreover, the adjustment of political, economic, and social relationships among the different racial groups will remain a major problem long after the constitutional formalities are agreed on. (Para. 26)

7. The economic outlook also furnishes grounds for pessimism. Most of the East and Central African territories are highly vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity prices. Economic growth at the rapid postwar rate is not likely to continue. As African rule approaches, several territories face the possibility of a decline in the rate of new investment and an exodus of white managers and technicians. The new governments of the area will almost certainly seek financial assistance from the US, as well as from their old colonial rulers and international lending agencies. (Paras. 27–28)

8. Communist and Bloc influences are thus far negligible in East and Central Africa and, at least over the next few years, we consider it unlikely that such influence will reach major proportions. Despite the increased opportunities for Communist political and economic penetration which are likely to arise, the African leaders who have emerged thus far—unlike many other Afro-Asian leaders—are essentially non-Marxist in their background and will probably look primarily to the West for sympathy and support. In the Union of South Africa, however, Communists already exercise a highly important influence among nonwhite political movements and will almost certainly continue to do so. (Paras. 29–31)

Discussion

*I. General*³

9. With native self-government in effect or impending throughout most of the northern and western portions of Africa, the diverse territories extending from Kenya, Uganda, and the Belgian Congo southward to the Cape of Good Hope constitute the last major area of white rule on the continent. Most of these territories have been caught up in the continent-wide process of economic, social, and political change. As elsewhere, growing pressure for economic and social equality and for an effective voice in government is being exercised on behalf of the black African majority by a small group of young Westernized leaders

³ See Annex A for a territory-by-territory assessment of the local situation and prospects. [Footnote in the source text.]

with increasing mass support. In contrast to West Africa, however, the situation is complicated by the presence, in most of the territories concerned, of a small but well entrenched white settler minority together with politically less significant Asian or other minorities.

10. There are in the area only 3.8 million whites (or Europeans)⁴ and 2.4 million other non-Africans, compared with more than 67 million Africans.⁵ The Union of South Africa accounts for 3 million of the whites and 1.8 million of the other non-Africans. Outside the Union the white population exceeds five percent of the total only in Southern Rhodesia. In most instances the proportion of whites is much smaller. Nevertheless, the whites occupy a dominant social and economic position, which is usually reinforced by various forms of racial discrimination. The result has been the creation of potentially dangerous racial tensions which complicate the process of evolution from colonial status. Particularly in the several territories under British control, the colonial authorities, in their efforts to insure orderly development, are caught between black African pressures for equality on the one hand and the efforts of the white settlers to maintain their privileged position on the other.

11. Even apart from the Union of South Africa—a modern nation of farms, mining, and industry lying almost entirely in the temperate zone—the area considered in this estimate is one of great geographic, ethnic, and economic diversity. Flanked by humid coastal plains, the high central plateau which forms the bulk of the central and southern African land mass includes tropical rain forests, the highlands which have attracted white settlers to Kenya and the Rhodesias, snow-covered mountains, and vast deserts. The African population itself includes hundreds of tribes with differing customs and ways of life. Although mostly of Bantu stock, the Africans differ in physical characteristics. In the economic sphere, modern towns, farms, and mining enterprises are springing up against a background of primitive agriculture, herding, and hunting.

12. The African population of this area is poorly prepared for self-government. Despite the spectacular postwar quickening of economic activity in such places as the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo, most Africans still live the primitive life of the hinterland. Tribal loyalties and jealousies continue to play a major political role throughout the area, thereby handicapping the efforts of African leaders to develop unified political movements and provoking sometimes violent intertribal conflicts. Historically, Africans of this area have had less sustained contact with outside civilizations than those of

⁴ Throughout the paper, the term "whites" is used to denote whites of European stock. The term "Europeans" is used in the same sense in much of the literature on Africa. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ See Annex C, Table of Population Statistics. [Footnote in the source text.]

West Africa and, with some notable exceptions, are less advanced culturally. More recently, the near-monopolization of trade by Asians and other non-Africans, and the repressive practices of the whites, have generally given the Africans less opportunity than their counterparts in other areas of the continent to develop the business, professional, and administrative experience which would prepare them for self-government. Although literacy is growing, the number of Africans with secondary level education is still small, the number with a university education minute.

13. Nevertheless, African pressure for political equality has now assumed major proportions through most of the area. In Angola and Mozambique, to be sure, the Portuguese have been able to stave off trouble by repressing political activity by either African or non-African residents and by some measures for cultural assimilation. In the independent Union of South Africa, African (and other nonwhite) agitation for political change has been severely restricted. In most other places, however, significant mass pressures, centering among the detribalized Africans of the towns and minefields but in some cases extending well back into the tribal hinterland, have already emerged. The British Government has long since realized that in Central and East Africa, as elsewhere, the end of the colonial era is fast approaching; over the past few years it has become deeply involved in efforts to work out transitional constitutional arrangements which would be acceptable to the various interest groups concerned. Even before the Leopoldville riots of January 1959, the Belgian Government had recognized that there was also urgent need to prepare for independence in the Congo.

II. Forces At Work

African Nationalism

14. African nationalists are pressing for the transfer of political power to Africans in most territories in the area. The strength and character of this pressure vary with local conditions and with the outlook of the individual leaders. A few are primarily tribal leaders intent on advancing tribal interests. The most prominent, however, are a small group of confident young men, some of them educated in Western Europe, who by dint of considerable organizing and oratorical ability have placed themselves at the head of mass movements and are regarded by their predominantly uneducated followers with something akin to reverence. These men look upon themselves as the molders of a modern Africa of nation-states, in which tribal divisions will disappear and the African slogan of "one man, one vote" will become a reality.

15. At present most nationalist leaders in this part of Africa are moderate in approach and well-disposed by education (and sometimes by religion) toward the West. They generally recognize that most of their followers are motivated primarily by the hope of ending real or imagined economic and social grievances rather than by any clearly perceived political goals and that evolution toward independence is a complicated process in which white cooperation could be valuable. Although they have pressed hard for early independence when feasible, they have adapted their tactics to circumstances. In the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, for example, the African leaders actually favor a continuation of British supervision as a protection against white settler dominance. Despite the extreme language of many of their demands, most of them have sought to avoid violence except as a last resort; except for certain South African leaders, none is a known Communist. Nevertheless, they are a determined group with a strong sense of mission. In the face of resistance to their demands, they will seek to increase the pressure.

16. The firmness of the East and Central African leaders is likely to be further strengthened by their growing ties both with other African leaders and with each other. A significant move in this direction was the establishment in September 1958 of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa by nationalist leaders from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Nyasaland. The official goal of the organization is "government of Africans by Africans, for Africans, on Pan-African lines."⁶ The election of Tom Mboya of Kenya as chairman of the All-African People's Conference at Accra in December 1958 symbolized the growing interest of other African leaders in this area. The Conference also established regular channels for cooperation between African leaders throughout tropical Africa and led to provision of limited but important material support to the East African independence movements.

White Settler Resistance

17. The white settler element is almost universally opposed to African nationalism and to social contacts between races. Many of the settlers are second or third generation residents—or in South Africa descendants of even earlier immigrants—and they have a strong attachment to the lands they hold. They usually feel that the hard work, skill, and capital which they have devoted to building up Africa gives them the right to retain a dominant position. Most of them consider the Africans manifestly incapable of shouldering full economic and

⁶ Nyerere and Mboya were the leading figures at the meeting at Mwanza, Tanganyika, which set up the PAFMECA, a regional grouping within the All African People's Conference.

political responsibility at present and are often skeptical about the African's ability ever to throw off his primitive heritage and earn full equality with the whites. Many feel that white supremacy and a strongly enforced social and economic color bar are the only ultimate barriers to miscegenation.

18. However, the solidarity of the white position has been weakened in recent years. In the independent Union of South Africa, to be sure, the large white minority, under Nationalist leadership, is stubbornly attempting to press ahead with a policy of *apartheid*—in effect, maximum social and residential segregation and preservation of the dominant white position in political and economic life. In the colonial areas, however, the white settler tactic is one of delay: to resist African nationalism where feasible but to concede to it where necessary.

19. The largely self-governing Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (and especially Southern Rhodesia, with its quarter of a million white settlers) rejects *apartheid* in favor of a vaguely defined "partnership." However, the white Federation leadership is removing racial restrictions very slowly and is accepting only a few carefully screened Africans as limited political partners. Indeed, the whites are seeking increased powers and early dominion status in order to deal with African pressures from a position of greater strength. Elsewhere—including even Kenya with its "white highlands" and memories of Mau Mau—there is growing realization that some concessions must be made. In some cases efforts are being made to develop multiracial parties. These tendencies toward accommodation may be strengthened by the existence, even in South Africa and the Federation, of small liberal groups who might serve as a bridge between the races, and by the presumed desire of mining companies and other economic interests to avoid serious unrest. In general, however, white willingness to accept greater African political participation remains grudging. White proposals for legislative and executive representation for the major racial groups fall far short of the African goal of "one man, one vote."

20. *Other Influences.* Various other political forces, local and external, exercise some limited influence on the situation. The Asian and other nonwhite minorities of East Africa have given some valuable support to African leaders, although they are often divided among themselves and primarily interested in preserving their position as shopkeepers and entrepreneurs in the face of African and white distrust. African nationalism is strengthened by the example, advice and material help provided by Nkrumah and other West African leaders, with whom contacts are increasing. UN pressure on behalf of the Africans, though flatly rejected by South Africa, is a factor the UK and Belgium must take into account. Nasser has achieved some limited influence in the area through propaganda and financial support to

certain groups, but this influence is probably declining. India's similar appeal as a champion of anticolonialism and as an Afro-Asian leader is reduced by its identification with local Asians, who are not held in high esteem. Communism is not now significant except among the nonwhites of South Africa.⁷

The Role of the Colonial Powers

21. The position of the British Government, forced to deal with these conflicting pressures over a broad range of local circumstances, is particularly difficult. The UK recognizes the basic legitimacy of African aspirations for political participation and, except for some reluctance to loosen its control over Kenya (which it wishes to use as a military staging area and an emergency naval base site), is attempting to prepare its territories for early independence through progressive enlargement of the African and other nonwhite role in local government. However, the Conservative government has clearly been reluctant to clash with the white leaders of Kenya and of the Federation, even at the cost of heavy attack from the more pro-African Labor and Liberal opposition. It has resisted demands that it provide timetables for independence.

22. Belgium has now abandoned its once vaunted program for avoiding political unrest by stressing African social and economic advancement and severely limiting local participation in administration by either blacks or whites. In January 1959 it promised to provide a gradual transfer of power to elected African representatives and eventual independence for the Congo. All the major Belgian parties contain groups favoring fairly rapid progress. However, there are also many who favor a relatively slow and methodical transfer of power.

23. Portugal has sought to insulate its African territories against unsettling political influences. Angola and Mozambique are legally provinces of Portugal, and Portuguese citizens there—including the some 35,000 African *assimilados* who have qualified for citizenship—theoretically have certain democratic rights. In practice, however, the centralization of power at the national level and the authoritarianism of the Salazar regime prevent any meaningful local political activity by either blacks or whites. In addition, Portugal's own poverty and its tendency to follow mercantilist economic policies have served to retard economic development and the training or education of the mass of Africans.

⁷ For further discussion of Communist potentials, see paragraphs 29–31 below. [Footnote in the source text.]

III. Outlook

24. The next few years are likely to be turbulent, marked by intensified political maneuver and negotiation and at least sporadic disorder and violence. Although security forces on the scene, or those readily available, will probably be able to localize and control most disturbances without great difficulty,⁸ violence may in some cases continue for fairly long periods.

25. Prospects for resolution of the struggle over independence and African self-government vary widely from one territory to another, not only because of the great variations in existing local circumstances but also because so much will depend on the resourcefulness and adaptability of the local leaders and colonial officials concerned. In general, however, it appears likely that at least Tanganyika and perhaps as many as three or four other territories will achieve their independence within the next five years.⁹ Advances in one territory will inevitably increase the pressure for change in others. Cooperation among the African nationalist movements of the area will continue but will probably not give rise to any significant moves toward federation, at least during the next few years.

26. Even if the transition to independent self-government occurs without bloodshed or upheaval, the outlook for stability and orderly development in East and Central Africa is generally unpromising. The adjustment of political, economic, and social differences among Africans, whites, and others cannot be accomplished by an agreement concerning independent self-rule. As elsewhere in Africa, the new governments will face staggering problems of overcoming disunity and backwardness. These will place heavy burdens on an African leadership which is unusually small in numbers and has had little or no administrative experience. Should there be an abrupt falling off of white participation in government and administration, the problems would be compounded. In view of these circumstances, the conduct of government is likely to become increasingly authoritarian, even though a facade of parliamentary forms is maintained.

27. The economic outlook also furnishes grounds for pessimism. The rapid economic development of the postwar period has only partially offset the backwardness of the area.¹⁰ Indeed, by bringing more and more Africans into the money economy, and thus making the welfare of larger portions of the population dependent on world market prices for a few primary products, this development has added a

⁸ See Annex B for an assessment of security forces. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁹ See Annex A for a territory-by-territory assessment of the local situation and prospects. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹⁰ See Annex D, Trade and Estimated Per Capita Income. [Footnote in the source text.]

new element of uncertainty to the situation. Cyclical and other economic fluctuations, such as the post-1955 fall in world copper prices, are almost certain to have serious economic and (in all probability) political repercussions. In general, moreover, it is unlikely that during the next 10 years the favorable terms of trade enjoyed by primary producing countries in the early 1950's will return.

28. At a time when the new governments concerned will need funds to construct roads, schools, and other basic improvements, there is likely to be a reduction of the financial assistance previously provided by the metropolises. There may be an even more serious decline in private domestic and foreign investment. In many cases, moreover, there is inadequate usable land and few known and readily exploitable mineral or other resources to attract investment. Under these circumstances, the emerging local governments of East and Central Africa are likely to expect economic assistance from the US and other foreign governments as well as from their former colonial rulers and from international agencies such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Like other emerging independent states, they will probably feel that the West is obliged to provide such assistance, without particular regard to the economic merits of the situation.

29. In the colonial portions of the area, where communism is thus far a negligible factor, the advance of African nationalism will almost certainly provide increased opportunity for Communist and Sino-Soviet Bloc penetration. Should the African drive for power lead to a protracted bitter struggle, the Bloc might be able to provide much-needed moral and material support to the nationalists. After independence is achieved, internal instability and the need for external economic assistance will almost certainly further openings.

30. At least over the next few years, however, we consider it unlikely that Communist and Bloc influence will reach major proportions in East and Central Africa. Wherever colonial and white settler rule persists, the authorities will almost certainly continue their present restraints on Communist activity. Moreover, the principal African leaders are Western-educated and Western-oriented men whose general background, unlike that of many other emerging Afro-Asian leaders, is primarily non-Marxist. At least during the period of transition to independence, they will probably tend to avoid actions which would jeopardize their chances of obtaining public and official support from the US or other Western countries, or which would provide the colonial authorities with additional reasons for delaying political concessions. Moreover, they will probably be anxious to avoid encouragement of political influences which might eventually compete with their own.

31. However, communism is likely to remain a highly important influence in the Union of South Africa, despite the recent development of a vocal anti-Communist opposition within the major African political movement. The Communists have already gained control of the national headquarters of this movement. They have less influence at the provincial and local levels but have achieved substantial penetration. They also dominate the most important Asian political group, and are active among the "colored" (or racially mixed) element. Despite the vigorous efforts of the government to crack down on communism and the inclination of many African leaders in the Union to reject communism as an alien philosophy, the government's repressive policies will force nonwhite political movements to continue to use conspiratorial methods and extremist pressure tactics and to make common cause with the Communists.

[Here follows the "Country Analyses" section.]

19. Memorandum of Conversation

November 12, 1959.

SUBJECT

The French Community and the West

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Mr. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Prime Minister of the Ivory Coast

Mr. Herve Alphand, French Ambassador

Mr. J.C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary, AF

Marcel Van Essen, AFS—Interpreter

After mutual greetings and welcome by the President, Mr. Houphouet-Boigny said that before his departure for New York (where he is acting head of the French Delegation to the U.N.), President de Gaulle and his African colleagues unanimously agreed that he should try to meet the President of the United States. He then described to the President the heavy responsibility he had had in the formation of the Community, since at the time the new French Consti-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Marcel Van Essen of the Office of Middle and Southern African Affairs. Enclosure to a memorandum of November 20 from John A. Calhoun, Director of the Executive Secretariat, to the President's Staff Assistant Andrew J. Goodpaster, which transmitted it to the White House.

tution was being drafted, General de Gaulle had invited him to be a member of the drafting Committee which eventually wrote the new French Constitution. He recalled that since 1956 he had been a Cabinet Minister in the various French Governments which succeeded one another until the proclamation of the Fifth Republic.

Mr. Houphouet-Boigny then explained in detail to the President the workings of the Community and the advantages it brought to the former French African Territories. One of the principal advantages of belonging to the Community, he said, was that it was under the protection of the French Army (in which the African states participate) and that, therefore, the African states' meager resources did not have to be tapped for defense purposes. Another great advantage was that in belonging to a larger entity its economic and social development would proceed within a Western framework. Communism is excluded from the Ivory Coast, said Mr. Houphouet-Boigny, and even badly-needed technicians sent by France are not admitted if they are Communists.

Mr. Houphouet-Boigny continued by saying that this evolution from colonialism to the Community had been achieved—and must continue to be achieved—by a gradual abolition of the French superiority complex together with a corresponding abolition of the African inferiority complex. If the French and the Germans are able to bury the hatchet and work together after a series of bloody wars, there is no reason why Africans and French cannot do the same thing.

With reference to Pan-Africanism, Mr. Houphouet-Boigny said that such a concept was utopian and only a useful propaganda device. He stated that his principal fears lay in the so-called Afro-Asian bloc because Asia has nothing tangible to offer Africa in its quest for social and economic improvement. The future of Africa is with the West, Mr. Houphouet-Boigny emphatically stated. Asia with its overpopulation is attempting to solve its economic problems by utilizing its masses. On the other hand, Africa, which is underpopulated, cannot follow this path and must rely on machines and tools. It is looking for the means to finance these needs and, therefore, turns to France, Europe and the West. Without them Africa would be isolated and the prey of economic and ideological submission to Asia. France has done and is still doing a great deal, but assistance must come from other areas of the West as well. Therefore, he and the other African members of the Community are looking to the United States to help keep Africa with the West.

The case of Guinea is an example of the meaning of his appeal, said Mr. Houphouet-Boigny. Communism is trying to get established in this country through Russia and the Satellites and thereby to make Guinea a showcase of communism in Africa. Although he completely understands the motives of the United States in granting aid to

Guinea, Mr. Houphouet-Boigny asked that the United States not lose sight of the larger aspects of the Community, which is Western-minded.

In replying to Mr. Houphouet-Boigny both during and at the end of the conversation, the President agreed wholeheartedly with him that the larger entities in Africa cooperating closely with the West were far preferable to a series of small independent states; the President also agreed that continent-wide federations could not be achieved at this time.

With regard to United States aid to Guinea, the President explained that we did not want to see that country entirely committed to the communist bloc and be made a showcase for communism. With regard to Western aid to Africa, the President recalled his conversations last July with President de Gaulle, Chancellor Adenauer and Prime Minister Macmillan¹ during which it had been agreed that one nation alone should not carry the burden to help develop newly independent countries. All must cooperate, the President said. The President said that although France has a direct interest in the Community and although America's interest in Africa is somewhat scattered, he wanted to assure Mr. Houphouet-Boigny that whenever feasible and practical the State Department would consider with the greatest sympathy any problems of the Community.

In closing, the President congratulated Mr. Houphouet-Boigny on his determination to keep communism out of Africa, his broad outlook in preferring a close association between Africa and the West, and for his inspired personal leadership. The President also recalled with appreciation the gift of the baby elephant which was presented to him some time ago in the name of the Community.²

¹ Reference is to conversations during Eisenhower's visits to the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom, and France between August 26 and September 4. Documentation is scheduled for publication in volumes with the compilations on relations with those countries.

² The President met with the Prime Ministers of the countries of the French Community during his visit to Paris in September.

20. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to Secretary of State Herter

December 4, 1959.

SUBJECT

U.S.-French Relations in Africa South of the Sahara

Discussion

In my memorandum to you dated November 30 (Tab A)¹ I outlined our problems vis-à-vis the French in North Africa. This memorandum is designed to complete the picture in highlighting a few of the problems we have with the French in Africa South of the Sahara. In this area the principal French complaint has been that we have been too friendly towards President Sekou Touré of Guinea who, they maintain, is a Communist and that we have turned "deaf ears" to Prime Minister Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Tsiranana of the Malgache Republic in their advocacy of the French Community.²

Traditionally, French policies in their areas of influence South of the Sahara have been notably more liberal and sympathetic than in North Africa, the Levant or the Far East. With the exception of the 1947 uprising in Madagascar and the 1950 Communist inspired riots in the Ivory Coast, there has been no violence of any importance in the relations of France with its African territories. The *ratissage* and similar acts of force are unknown in this part of Africa. France since the close of World War II has steadily advanced the African territories through a series of constitutional stages to the point where they are now self-governing and free to leave the Community whenever they wish.

Largely as a result of personality clashes between Sekou Touré and General De Gaulle, Guinea voted "No" in the last year's referendum and left the French Community. The French forthwith removed all traces of their former activities, including technicians, equipment, security forces, files and funds and left Guinea an easy target for Soviet Bloc penetration. The French have consistently maintained the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/11-459. Secret. Drafted by C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr.; sent via Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston T. Merchant.

¹ The tabs are not attached.

² On November 21, French Minister Claude Lebel presented the Department with a list of complaints about U.S. policy in Africa. Telegram 2234 to Paris, November 25, which summarized the conversation, stated that Lebel felt this indicated a "global U.S. policy of replacing France in North and Black Africa." (Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/11-2559)

position that Guinea should be treated as a pariah and that the United States should do nothing whatsoever to counter Communism in that country.

Although General De Gaulle's personal dislike of and pique at Sekou Touré remain factors in this policy, the basic French motivation arises from the fear that if Guinea makes a success of its independence, the present states of the Community will be tempted to follow suit. This is, of course, a valid argument and one which we have attempted to keep in mind in our dealings with both Guinea and the states of the Community.

With this in mind and under heavy French pressure, the United States delayed recognizing Guinea for a month following its independence. We also, at the request of the French, delayed opening an Embassy and sending an Ambassador until long after the Bloc had established itself. With such a slow start in Guinea, it appeared essential that we not let that country go by default. For this reason Sekou Touré was invited to pay a state visit which took place towards the end of October. The French feel that Touré was given a welcome more cordial than the circumstances warranted. This, of course, is not the case and he was given the normal treatment reserved for Chiefs of State. The fact that his visit aroused considerable public interest in this country is something beyond the control of the United States Government. We have so informed the French and have pointed out that Touré was accorded similar treatment in both the United Kingdom and in West Germany.

As regards the Community, we have on every appropriate occasion expressed our interest for it and the underlying concept behind it which to us represents a worthwhile attempt to reconcile African political aspirations with the economic facts of life. It is simply not true that we turned deaf ears to Messrs. Houphouet and Tsiranana although, as you will recall, it was almost impossible to get a word in edgewise in our talks with these gentlemen. (Tabs B and C)³ Frankly, however, it is not reasonable to expect the Community to last in its present form, and the Federation of Mali, comprising the Republics of Senegal and Soudan, is currently negotiating full independence with the French. We are hopeful that this can be arranged without hard feelings on either side and that Mali will sign the necessary agreements to continue its association with France. The basic difficulty at the moment arises from the French desire to avoid the Moroccan experience where Morocco was granted its independence subject to subsequent signatures of a number of other agreements tying the country closer to

³ Tabs B and C were memoranda of Herter's conversations with Houphouet-Boigny on November 12 and with Tsiranana on November 19. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

France in the economic, cultural and military fields. With independence, Morocco showed a reluctance to proceed with these agreements, and French desires for continued close association have never been fully realized. The French, therefore, wish the agreement with Mali for independence and the agreements for continued association would be simultaneous, whereas the Malians reportedly feel that this would cast doubts on the genuine nature of their independence and they prefer, therefore, to wait a period of time before signing the agreements of association.

It is clearly not in our interest to become involved in the present negotiations between France and Mali although we believe it highly desirable that the Moroccan experience be avoided and essential that there be no further episode along the lines of Guinea. The British are particularly concerned about this development and have informed us that they are raising the whole question of Mali with the French in Paris on December 7.

21. Memorandum of Discussion at the 432d Meeting of the National Security Council

January 14, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa* (NSC 5818; ¹ OCB Report on NSC 5818, dated September 30, 1959; ² NIE 76-59; ³ Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject dated January 11, 1960 ⁴)

Mr. Gray presented NSC 5920⁵ to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on March 31.

¹ Document 8.

² Not printed. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Africa South of the Sahara, I)

³ Document 18.

⁴ This memorandum to the NSC transmitted the views of the JCS as stated in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated January 8. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5920 & 6001)

⁵ NSC 5920 was transmitted to the NSC for consideration by the Planning Board on December 31, 1959. It was approved as NSC 6001. (*Ibid.*)

is attached to this Memorandum.)⁶ In the course of his briefing Mr. Gray referred to the difference of view as to U.S. objectives toward South, Central and East Africa. The majority of the Planning Board wished to establish three co-equal objectives:

“Maintenance of the Free World orientation of the area, denial of the area to Communist domination, and the minimization of Communist influence therein.” (Paragraph 8)

“Orderly economic development and political progress towards self-determination by the countries of the area in cooperation with the metropolises and other Free World countries.” (Paragraph 9)

“Access to such military rights and facilities and strategic resources as may be required in our national security interests.” (Paragraph 10)

The Treasury Representative on the Planning Board, on the other hand, believed that “maintenance of the Free World orientation of the area and denial of the area to Communist domination” should be primary and the other objectives secondary.

The President said that the wording proposed by the two sides appeared to be identical; it was simply a question of arrangement. He was inclined to agree with the Treasury position because he assumed that if we were unable to achieve our objective of maintaining the Free World orientation of the area and denying it to Communism, we would not want to proceed with our other objectives. In other words, it seemed to him that the two objectives he had just mentioned laid down the necessary pre-conditions for any attempts to realize our other objectives in this part of Africa. Mr. Gray said that the position just taken by the President had been taken in the Planning Board by the Treasury Representative and by Messrs. Gray, Lay and Boggs. Mr. Merchant said the Treasury position was acceptable to the State Department. However, Secretary Douglas believed that in the Cameroons, for example, the U.S. might want to promote economic development and political progress even if Communism did not appear there. The President agreed, but added that if the countries of this area oriented themselves toward Moscow, we would not wish to undertake programs for their orderly economic development and political progress. As he saw it, therefore, maintenance of the Free World orientation of the area and its denial to Communism was the precondition for the remainder of our objectives. He preferred the Treasury version of the objectives.

Mr. Dulles thought the chances of achieving orderly economic development and political progress towards self-determination by the countries of the area were just about nil. In his view there was no chance whatever for an orderly economic development. The President

⁶ Not printed.

agreed, saying that these countries would be independent long before they achieved orderly economic development or political progress. However, he felt that economic development and political progress in this part of the world must be a U.S. objective whether the countries concerned were independent or not. De Gaulle had told him that within two years there would be 30 independent nations in Africa.⁷ Mr. Dulles said none of the 30 independent nations referred to by De Gaulle would have the capability of governing themselves. The President agreed with Mr. Dulles' remark, if South Africa were excluded. The President said that the King of Morocco had told him that U.S. policy should be to help the countries of Africa to become independent and then assist in their development. The President had characterized this position as putting the cart before the horse.⁸ Bourguiba had a slightly different point of view; he was anxious about Algeria and angry with France about the boundaries at the southern end of Tunisia, but he wanted to resume close relations with France.⁹ The Vice President said the British had told him that Ghana, although the most viable nation in Africa, had only a 50 per cent chance for an orderly development. The British anticipated that in many countries of Africa such as Nigeria, a South American pattern of dictatorship would develop. The U.S. must avoid assuming that the struggle in Africa will be between Western-style democracy and Communism. We must recognize, although we cannot say it publicly, that we need the strong men of Africa on our side. It is important to understand that most of Africa will soon be independent and that it would be naive of the U.S. to hope that Africa will be democratic. The Vice President added that it was difficult to realize the problems faced by Africa without visiting the Continent. Some of the peoples of Africa have been out of the trees for only about fifty years. Since we must have the strong men of Africa on our side, perhaps we should in some cases develop military strong men as an offset to Communist development of the labor unions. The President agreed that it might be desirable for us to try to "reach" the strong men in Africa. Secretary Anderson felt it might be possible to try the same procedures in Africa that we had successfully used in the Philippines. In his view, an outstanding job had been performed by an American lieutenant colonel¹⁰ who was a counsellor to Magsaysay.¹¹ The Vice President said that Nkrumah was being

⁷ De Gaulle had so informed the President on December 19, 1959. (Cahto 14, December 21; Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/12-2159)

⁸ The President discussed this matter with King Mohammed V in Casablanca on December 22, 1959; see vol. XIII, pp. 796-800.

⁹ President Bourguiba met with President Eisenhower at La Marsa, Tunisia, on December 17, 1959; see *ibid.*, pp. 879-885.

¹⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Edward G. Lansdale.

¹¹ Ramón Magsaysay, President of the Philippines.

influenced by a former British laborite.¹² Most of the African leaders were incapable of exercising power when they obtained it; they needed a great deal of advice. Mr. Dulles said that attempts were being made all around the world to provide necessary advice to native leaders. However, if the advisors become conspicuous they soon lose their utility. The President said he had had a personal experience as an advisor to the Philippine Government. However, he had had good cover in this assignment because attention had been concentrated on the activities of General MacArthur. Mr. Dulles felt it was necessary to work out some method of rewarding the individuals who are assigned to give advice to native leaders. The President recalled that when he was assigned to Washington during World War II, Quezon¹³ as leader of the Philippine Government-in-exile had sought him out and insisted on giving him a monetary reward for his services in the Philippines. He had, of course, declined this reward. The point he wished to make was that the native governments felt a great need for honest and loyal advice and were generally loyal to those who advised them. The Vice President believed that the quality of U.S. diplomatic representation in Africa was of vital importance. If the quality of our diplomats in Africa were improved, if we sent politically sophisticated diplomats to that area, a tremendous job could be accomplished in orienting the African people toward the Free World.

Mr. Gray then resumed his briefing on NSC 5920. When he referred to Paragraph 25, which provided that the U.S. would discourage the development of an arms race in this portion of Africa, the President asked whether we had not had a similar policy in Latin America. Mr. Gray said our Latin American policy was somewhat different because of hemispheric defense requirements; and the President agreed there was a difference.

Mr. Gray referred to the Financial Appendix to NSC 5920 which showed that technical assistance to South, Central and East Africa would total about \$6 million for the period 1960–1963, while economic assistance would total about \$5 million for the same period. The Vice President asked whether \$6 million for technical assistance and \$5 million for economic assistance over three years was enough. Mr. Merchant said that a Special Africa Fund for special technical assistance on a regular basis was under consideration as part of the Mutual Security legislation for 1961. The President said he was very much in favor of the Africa Fund. Mr. Merchant wondered whether Paragraphs 26 and 27 of NSC 5920 would not to some extent impede the operation of the Africa Fund. Mr. Riddleberger said that it was anticipated that \$25 million would be requested for the Africa Fund for the next

¹² Geoffrey Bing, Attorney General of Ghana, September 1957–October 1, 1961.

¹³ Manuel Quezon.

fiscal year. The President believed we should encourage missionaries, teachers and doctors to go to Africa. Mr. Gray felt that the point raised by Mr. Merchant was covered in Paragraph 27, which provided that the U.S. would be prepared to provide U.S. technical and limited related assistance. The term "limited related assistance" was intended to cover the Africa Fund.

Mr. Gray then reported that at the last Planning Board meeting on NSC 5920 it had been agreed that in view of the rapidly developing situation in the Belgian Congo, the Council might find it necessary to update some portions of the draft statement of policy dealing with that area.¹⁴ He asked Mr. Merchant whether the paper as it stood dealt adequately with the Belgian Congo. Mr. Merchant replied that although the paper might be outdated in some minor details, he believed it was adequate. He added that the picture in the Congo, which was confused, difficult and fragmented, had been under study by the State Department. Our Ambassador in Belgium was about to begin discreet talks to see how we might cooperate with Belgium in achieving our aims, which are identical with those of Belgium, without suffering the stigma of supporting a colonial power.¹⁵ Mr. Merchant reported incidentally that the recent visit of the King of the Belgians to the Congo had not helped the situation there.¹⁶

The President asked Mr. Stans whether he was now an expert on Africa since his trip to that continent.¹⁷ Mr. Stans, while disclaiming any expertness, said he had formed the impression that many Africans still belonged in the trees. This was an area where agitators were able to prey on the superstitions of the people to an unbelievable extent. The President remarked that man's emotions still have control over his intelligence. Mr. Dulles reported that the imminence of independence in the Congo was causing many business men and officials to leave the area. It now appeared that the Congo would become independent this year. There was also some talk of the secession of certain areas of the Congo. Mr. Stans said the seceding parts wanted to form new states by annexing portions of other national areas in Africa.

¹⁴ This matter was considered at the December 30, 1959, meeting of the Planning Board. (Record of meeting; Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)

¹⁵ Telegram 867 from Brussels, February 5, reported that Ambassador William A.M. Burden had initiated the discussions. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 755A.00/2-560)

¹⁶ King Baudouin had visited the Congo on December 16, 1959.

¹⁷ Stans traveled to the Congo in late September 1959.

*The National Security Council:*¹⁸

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5920; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of January 11, 1960.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5920, subject to the following amendment:

Pages 4 and 5, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10: Include the Treasury version on the right as paragraph 8 (renumbering subsequent paragraphs accordingly), and delete the Majority version on the left.

c. Noted the Acting Secretary of State's understanding that the language of paragraph 27 of NSC 5920 would permit the operation in the area covered by this paper of the Special Program For Africa now under consideration, should the Program subsequently be authorized.

Note: NSC 5920, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6001 to supersede those portions of NSC 5818 which relate to South, Central and East Africa (a statement of policy toward West Africa is being prepared by the NSC Planning Board to supersede that portion of NSC 5818 relating to West Africa) for implementation by all appropriate departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹⁸ Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2175. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

22. National Security Council Report

NSC 6001

January 19, 1960.

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH, CENTRAL, AND EAST AFRICA¹

General Considerations

1. The primary importance of the area of South, Central and East Africa is its emerging political significance. There is a growing awareness in the world that Africa is an area which will have an increasingly important influence on the course of world events and that the political alignment of the present and future independent nations of the continent will be deeply affected by the policies which Western European nations and the United States pursue.

2. In contrast to West Africa, the situation in this area is complicated by the presence, in most of the territories concerned, of a well-entrenched white settler minority together with politically less significant Asian or other minorities. Despite spectacular post-war quickening of economic activity in certain areas, most Africans still live the primitive life of the hinterland and the African population generally is poorly prepared for self-government. Nevertheless, African pressure for political equality has now assumed major proportions throughout most of the area.

3. The principal problem affecting U.S. interests in this area is the development of the dependent territories, in an orderly manner and in cooperation with the European metropolises, toward ultimate self-determination. If this transition takes place in a way which preserves the essential ties which bind Western Europe and Africa, areas which are economically complementary, close and mutually advantageous relationships between the Western European powers and Africa can be maintained after the colonial period has passed.

4. The political stability of the area faces severe trials as many of the territories move more rapidly toward self-government and independence, frequently amidst the strains and tensions of multi-racial

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5920 & NSC 6001. Secret. Enclosure to a note from Lay to the NSC dated January 19. The Financial Appendix is not printed.

¹ Includes the Union of South Africa, South West Africa, and the High Commission territories (Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland), the Belgian Congo, the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and the Trust Territories of Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi. Madagascar will be dealt with in the policy paper on West Africa, inasmuch as the Malgache Republic is a part of the French Community. [Footnote in the source text.]

and rival tribal societies. During the transitional and independence periods, the opportunities for Communist penetration and influence are likely to increase and complicate the already difficult and complex problems of the area and make it more difficult to assure the area's identification with the West. There are indications that the Communist Bloc is paying more attention to this area and that the Bloc will increase its efforts to identify itself as anti-colonial. Communist influence in Central and East Africa is negligible, and the African leaders who have emerged thus far look primarily to the West for sympathy and support. Should they fail to receive such support, they may be expected to turn for it to the Communist Bloc or other countries not sympathetic to the metropolises or the United States. There is a discernible Communist influence in African and Indian political groups in the Union of South Africa. African students both in Western Europe and in the Soviet Bloc are assiduously cultivated by the Communists and many have been subverted.

5. African leaders seek the understanding and goodwill of the United States. Above all, they want to be accepted and to be treated as equals and with dignity and respect.

6. American economic interests in South, Central and East Africa are relatively modest. In 1958 this area accounted for only 2.2 per cent of U.S. trade (about \$650 million). American investment in the area is approximately \$450 million but the great bulk of it is in the Union of South Africa where most of the American economic interests lie. The area is a major source of the Free World for such strategic materials as diamonds, cobalt, chromite, manganese, copper and sisal. The United States is heavily dependent on the area for diamonds, cobalt and chromite. The area is also an important producer of many other minerals and agricultural products.

7. In the event of war or loss of Western access to sea and air routes through the Middle East, control of sea and air communications in this area of Africa would be extremely important. Under these circumstances, our primary strategic military interest is to deny the area to Communist control. In the future, moreover, there may be more significant requirements (military and other) for U.S. use of rights and facilities in the area. Installations in this area are already becoming increasingly important to U.S. research and development in, and exploitation of, the fields of outer space, missile weaponry, and world wide communications.

General Objectives

8. Maintenance of the Free World orientation of the area and denial of the area to Communist domination, including:

a. The minimization of Communist influence therein;

- b. Orderly economic development and political progress toward self-determination by the countries of the area in cooperation with the metropolises and other Free World countries; and
- c. Access to such military rights and facilities and strategic resources as may be required in our national security interests.

Regional Policy Guidance

9. In applying the policy guidance which follows to all parts of this area except the Union of South Africa, be guided by the basic policy of encouraging and, to the extent feasible, relying on Western European nations to influence and support their respective dependent and recently independent areas so long as such encouragement and reliance are consistent with U.S. national interests.

a. Until an area achieves independence conduct U.S. activities and programs in the area in full recognition of the responsibilities of the metropolitan power involved, and, to the extent feasible:

(1) Consult with the responsible metropolitan power on U.S. activities and programs in or relating to the area; and

(2) Avoid actions in the area or directly relating to the area likely to cause serious misunderstandings between the United States and the metropolitan power involved.

b. Should a situation arise in a dependent area or in an area having achieved independent status in which reliance on the European power concerned would not be in the U.S. interest, determine the independent U.S. course of action relating to such area by taking into account:

(1) The need for establishing friendly working relationships with the newly emerging state.

(2) The need to incline this state toward the Free World rather than the Communist world.

(3) The effect of our policies on other Free World states having a colonial heritage.

(4) The need for maintaining Free World harmony including friendly relationships and consultations as appropriate with the metropolitan powers.

Nationalism, Colonialism and Regionalism

10. Support the principle of self-determination consistently and in such a way as to assure that evolution toward this objective will be orderly; making clear that self-government and independence impose important responsibilities which the peoples concerned must be prepared to discharge.

11. Encourage those policies and actions of the metropolitan powers which help prepare the dependent peoples for self-determination and responsible self-government or independence. Avoid U.S. identification with those policies of the metropolitan powers and the Union

of South Africa which are stagnant or repressive and, to the extent practicable, seek to influence the metropolitan powers and the Union of South Africa to abandon or modify such policies.

12. As appropriate, encourage the formation of federation or other forms of association among newly emerging states of the area which will enhance their political and economic viability.

13. As feasible, support constructive, non-Communist nationalist and reform movements, balancing the nature and degree of such support, however, with consideration of our relations with our NATO allies.

14. Encourage participation of the moderate leaders in regional or Pan-African movements.

Racialism

15. Seek to correct distorted African views of U.S. race relations, emphasizing, where appropriate, progress made by the United States in the race relations field.

16. Encourage, where practicable, a more liberal approach in areas where extremism is now the order of the day, pointing out on appropriate occasions the likelihood that violence will result from continuation of rigid, repressive racial policies.

17. To the extent feasible, encourage the concept of a system of government and social relations which would be a middle way between the extremes of black nationalism and the inequities and tensions generated by *apartheid*.

18. Seek to influence any consideration in the UN of racial matters in Africa along constructive lines.

19. Encourage American companies to set an example in practicing non-discrimination in their operations to the maximum extent consistent with local laws, and to train Africans for managerial positions.

Communist Activities

20. Cooperate locally with security organizations to combat Communist subversive activities.

21. As areas become independent, encourage them to avoid or minimize formal Sino-Soviet Bloc representation, to avoid extensive use of Sino-Soviet Bloc technicians, and to limit other Sino-Soviet Bloc economic and cultural contacts. Alert the governments of such nations to the probability that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will attempt to utilize trade and assistance programs as a technique for political subversion. Nonetheless, maintain a flexible posture that would minimize the damage to U.S. prestige in the event that such nations accept diplomatic or economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Military and Strategic

22. Keep the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in the U.S. appraisal of its strategic value to the United States, bearing in mind that the United States may, in the future, require bases or facilities.

23. Discourage the development of an arms race in Africa and of the concept that the United States is prepared to provide military assistance to any nation which desires it. As countries in the area become independent, encourage them to maintain adequately equipped and trained internal security forces. In those cases where external assistance is required for this purpose, encourage the appropriate former metropole to provide such assistance. If this approach fails and if required to achieve U.S. objectives, consider providing U.S. assistance to meet minimum legitimate internal security requirements, including technical training in U.S. military institutions.

Economic

24. a. As areas achieve independence encourage them (1) to make the maximum contribution to their own economic development, (2) to eliminate barriers to trade and investment, (3) to take measures capable of attracting maximum amounts of external private capital, and (4) to look essentially to Western Europe, to the Free World international financial institutions, and to private investment to meet their needs for external capital so long as this is consistent with U.S. security interests.

b. Urge the United Kingdom, Belgium and Portugal to increase their economic assistance to their dependent or recently dependent territories of this area and, to the maximum extent feasible, rely on these metropolitan powers, the Free World international financial institutions, organizations such as the Common Market, and private capital to meet the needs of the territories and nations of the area for external capital.

c. Take steps as appropriate to improve the climate for private investment (domestic and foreign).

d. In the event that it does not prove feasible or consistent with U.S. security interests to rely wholly on the sources in paragraph b to meet the external capital needs of a particular territory or nation, be prepared on a case-by-case basis to extend economic development assistance or special economic assistance from the United States to such territory or nation (excluding the Union of South Africa).

e. Seek to avoid the creation of unrealistic African expectations of U.S. assistance.

25. Be prepared (except in the case of the Union of South Africa) to provide U.S. technical and limited related assistance to advance U.S. interests, and to negotiate surplus commodity sales under P.L. 480 when appropriate.

26. In cases where U.S. assistance is provided:

a. Attention should be given to those activities which especially (1) complement the efforts already undertaken by the governments of the area concerned; (2) improve, develop, or conserve human resources by programs of education, training, and health; (3) accelerate economic development by the selective application of skills to the resources available, with particular emphasis on the fields of agriculture, light manufacturing and processing industries and public administration; (4) encourage private investment, both domestic and foreign.

b. Within the categories in a above, accord priority to projects (1) which are of particular interest to the Africans or to which they attach special importance, (2) serve multi-national needs or are otherwise regional in scope.

c. In the priority area of education and training give special attention to: (1) surveys of the educational requirements of the area; (2) development of appropriate research activities, the establishment and extension of training facilities, and surveys of manpower requirements and availabilities; (3) those programs designed to develop Western-oriented leaders in the area.

27. Encourage U.S. and Free World business to participate more actively in the development of the economies of these countries by expanding trade and investment. Seek the denial or limitation of exports of strategic commodities from these areas to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in accordance with U.S. economic defense policy.

28. Encourage expanded efforts by private American institutions and foundations in the fields of education, training and research on Africa.

Policy Guidance on Individual Countries and Territories Supplemental to the "Regional Policy Guidance" Above²

Union of South Africa

29. Maintain as wide an area of mutual regard and communication as possible in official U.S. relations with the Union Government. At the same time continue to point out to the Union Government that the United States cannot accept the *apartheid* concept as valid.

30. Encourage and improve communication between the various racial groups in the Union.

² The General Considerations on which this Policy Guidance is based are contained in the Annex to this paper. [Footnote in the source text.]

31. In international forums:

a. Seek to put the racial problem in proper context in order to avoid intemperate or strongly condemnatory resolutions.

b. Make clear, however, U.S. regret and concern that discriminatory practice in the Union continues to be fortified and sanctified by law, and point out that the United States believes South Africa's best interests will be served by policies which will give all racial groups grounds for hope that their legitimate aspirations can be attained.

32. Encourage the Union to develop closer and mutually desirable cooperative relations with other African territories and nations.

33. Encourage the Union to respect its obligations in its administration of the Territory of South West Africa in accordance with the terms of the original mandate, and to seek with the United Nations a basis for an agreement which would continue to accord to the Territory an international status.

Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi

34. Encourage friendly relations between the Congo and the independent African countries.

35. Encourage the Belgians to fulfill their obligation as trustee for Ruanda-Urundi by improving economic conditions in that area and preparing it for eventual self-government or independence, preferably with ties to Belgium.

Angola and Mozambique

36. To the extent possible, urge on the Portuguese the long-range benefit to themselves of more enlightened policies in Africa, including liberal trade and investment policies.

37. Without indicating approbation of over-all Portuguese policy in Africa, do not publicly dispute the proposition that Angola and Mozambique are integral parts of Portugal.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

38. Encourage maintenance of the federal system of government and acceptance of the ideal of a multi-racial democracy. Urge on receptive local leaders the propriety and feasibility of the use of federal law in advancing social justice.

39. Impress upon the United Kingdom and Federation Governments the urgent need for accommodating the legitimate aspirations of all inhabitants in the Federation within the federal system of government.

40. Encourage the United Kingdom to recognize the need to advance Africans and to promote economic development in primarily African areas in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, where the United

Kingdom maintains ultimate responsibility, in order to regain African confidence in the United Kingdom and to win African consent to the continuation of the Federation.

41. Encourage friendly relations between the Federation and other independent African countries and close association with members of the Commonwealth.

Annex

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES OF SOUTH, CENTRAL AND EAST AFRICA³

The Union of South Africa

1. The Union of South Africa is the strongest and most industrialized nation in Africa. Of a total population of 14.4 million there is a permanent European population of slightly over 3 million. South Africa is the world's largest producer of gold, and ranks as a leading world producer of diamonds, uranium, platinum, chrome, manganese, iron ore, asbestos, antimony and monazite. Until World War I the South African economy was based principally on agricultural production and the mining of diamonds and gold. Since then, and particularly since World War II, there has been rapid development in manufacturing which now accounts for a larger proportion of the national income than either agriculture or mining. With extensive reserves of coal and iron, the Union is the leading steel producer in Africa. This steel production provides the base on which the country's industrial production, which embraces a wide range of products, is built.

2. The closing of the Suez Canal in 1956–57 demonstrated the importance of the sea routes around the Cape. The South African ports of Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London, together with the Mozambique ports of Lourenco Marques and Beira which handle the bulk of the cargo traffic for the Union and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland constitute strategic links with the rest of the world. These port installations in Southern Africa, containing repair and supply facilities, are linked technically and materially with the Union's own industrial capability.

3. Gold production, which reached a value of \$640 million in 1958, has traditionally enabled the Union to import goods and services at an exceedingly high rate, and has imparted to the economy generally a resiliency which, inter alia, has been important in attracting further investment capital. United States economic interests in the

³ Secret.

Union have increased considerably during recent years. At the present time, approximately one-half of United States private investment in the African continent is in the Union. There are approximately 160 American firms with direct investments in the Union, ranging in activity from processing and distribution to manufacturing and mining. As a result of expanded U.S. economic activities in the Union, two American banks recently established branches there.

4. The racial problem pervades every aspect of South African life and has severe repercussions on the Union's foreign relations. The race policy of the Government is based on the concept of continued white supremacy and *apartheid*, or separation, under which the African is considered to have merely a transient status in the "white" areas of the country (i.e., outside the Reserves and Bantustans⁴) and thus is restricted in his rights and activities in these "white" areas. While the establishment of Bantustans under the program of positive *apartheid* may slow the steady drift of the African to the Union's urban centers, the *apartheid* program does not have the support of the African population and appears doomed to failure. From an economic standpoint, the program is considered to be prohibitive in cost and, if carried to its doctrinaire conclusion, would be seriously disruptive to the country's economy.

5. In view of the intransigence of the Union Government on its *apartheid* policy, it is unlikely that repeated United Nation's consideration of this issue contributes to a solution.

6. The Union Government has refused to come to agreement with the UN regarding the status of the former League of Nations mandated territory of South West Africa. South Africa has argued that it is under no compulsion to place the Territory under the U.N. Trusteeship System since the United Nations is not the successor, in a legal sense, to the League of Nations. This matter has been the subject of considerable heated debate within the United Nations and the matter has been brought before the International Court of Justice. In substance, the latter has ruled that South Africa continues to have international obligations in its administration of South West Africa in accordance with the terms of the original mandate. Continued failure to reach an acceptable solution to this problem poses a further threat to South Africa's relations with the world community.

7. South Africa's military and security forces are organized primarily for internal security, and secondarily for the defense of the Cape Sea route. Internal security is the primary responsibility of the 28,000-man police force. In addition, reserve military organizations are available for quelling serious internal disorders. The Union Gov-

⁴ Bantustans are areas in which Africans enjoy a measure of local self-government. [Footnote in the source text.]

ernment outlawed the Communist Party under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, and has since that time rigorously banned many Communists from public activity, although Communist-line publications have continued to appear. However, the comparative literacy and sophistication of that part of the African population which has had a long contact with European culture makes these Africans highly sensitive to the inequities of their position and much more susceptible to extremist solutions. Organized African groups are a primary Communist target and a certain amount of penetration has taken place in all African political groups. In this situation a continuation of the present racial policies of the Union, by foreclosing moderate, evolutionary solutions, will increase the appeal of Communist and other extreme programs and, over the longer run, the chances of mounting violence between the black and white communities.

8. While the security forces in the Union appear to have the situation well in hand, there is an increasing possibility that African leadership may succeed in enlisting mass support for an action which could cripple the economy, such as a mass refusal to work or a boycott.

9. The Union of South Africa came into being on May 31, 1910, after the British Parliament passed the South Africa Act of 1909. This united the four self-governing British colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. However, the three contiguous High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland remained under the British Crown, and this has since been a point of antagonism between the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom. By the South Africa Act, the United Kingdom Government may approve transfer of the territories to the Union if and when the Union Parliament requests such transfer. The South African Government, particularly in recent years under the more extreme Afrikaner nationalism, has called for the incorporation of the High Commission Territories into the Union. On the other hand, the United Kingdom Government has maintained a discreet but firm insistence that any changes in the Territories must reflect the wishes of the indigenous inhabitants. In August 1959 the British Parliament approved a constitution for Basutoland which provides for a locally elected Legislative Council and autonomy in domestic affairs. A similar development in rule can be expected in Bechuanaland and Swaziland in the future.

Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi

10. The importance of the Belgian Congo derives from its size (900,000 square miles; 13 million population), its central location, and its substantial natural resources. The economy has undergone considerable development based on the substantial extraction or production

of industrial raw materials and coffee, cotton, and palm oil. Exports of all types of goods have been about \$450 million annually. There are prospects for extensive private foreign investment of a mutually beneficial nature in the Congo, provided the Belgian Government is willing to modify certain existing restrictions on non-Belgian capital.

11. The major causes of instability are the growing political agitation for independence and the intense tribal rivalries. The prospect of independence and the uncertainties as to the extent of continuing Belgian control create growing tensions which are breaking out in open conflict. Racial issues have not been a major cause of the instability in the Congo. There has been rioting and tribal fighting throughout the area since the Leopoldville riots in January 1959, just prior to the Belgian Government's declaration which promised that "Belgium intends to organize a democracy in the Congo which will be capable of exercising the prerogatives of sovereignty and of deciding upon its independence."⁵ A specific program has been outlined for establishing political institutions in which the Congolese would have an increasingly larger role to play. No date has been set for granting self-government or complete independence nor has the eventual relationship with Belgium been defined. However, the Congolese have been assured that this decision will be up to them, and it is contemplated that by 1964 Belgian-Congolese relations will be reviewed, at which time the Congo presumably could opt for independence. The presence of over 100,000 whites in the Congo will probably not seriously impede these reforms.

12. Some 50 political parties have developed in the Congo and several of the larger parties (particularly the ABAKO or Bakongo organization and the most important faction of the MNC or Mouvement National Congolais) have not only announced that they will boycott the provincial elections planned for December of this year, but also have demanded a completely independent Congolese government by not later than 1960. This is only one of the problems faced by the Belgians in dealing with political agitation against the background of divergent tribalism and superstition. For example, the Bakongo tribesmen of the Lower Congo, fearful of domination by the more numerous tribes of the interior, are demanding their own tribal state (including areas in the French Republic of Congo and in Angola) with only vaguely defined ties to a federal government. Tribal riots and clashes may be expected to continue.

13. The Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, with a total area of only 21,000 square miles, has a rapidly growing population of almost 5 million pressing against the limited resource capabilities of a pastoral

⁵ The rioting took place January 4-10, 1959, and the Belgian Government declaration was issued on January 13.

type economy. The reins of local power, held by the Watutsi who comprise only 15 percent of the population, are now being sought by the traditionally inferior Bahutu who account for almost 84 percent of the population. In addition to continuing tribal unrest, the economic problems of overpopulation can be expected to plague the area for some time to come. The area, which is administered as an autonomous province with loose ties to the Congo, is definitely unprepared for independence and in need of Belgian assistance to provide some semblance of both economic and political stability. Progress toward self-government will probably be slow.

Angola and Mozambique

14. Neither Angola nor Mozambique is of direct strategic, political or economic importance to the United States. However, Portuguese ports and rail connections in Angola and Mozambique are vital to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and important to the Union of South Africa and the Belgian Congo. Air routes through and over these provinces are strategically important to the area as well as to several Western nations which are now operating air routes over Angola and Mozambique. Both provinces furnish labor to surrounding areas; the Union and the Rhodesias draw on Mozambique, while Angola supplies part of the work force in the Belgian Congo.

15. Both provinces are undeveloped, and, while their full potential is as yet unknown, they now produce coffee, cotton, sisal, diamonds, sugar, and copra for export. Moderate quantities of oil have been discovered in Angola; explorations are continuing in Mozambique.

16. The politically and economically repressive policies of the Portuguese Government have thus far prevented in Angola and Mozambique most of the political unrest and racial tension characteristic of other colonial areas of Africa. However, despite Portuguese efforts to exclude unsettling influences, African political awareness is emerging and is bound to grow. Recent developments are likely to cause growing unrest.

17. Angola and Mozambique are legally provinces of the metropole. For this reason there are sharp limitations on the ability of the United States to influence developments in these territories.

18. In the northern region of Angola, where a portion of the vigorous Bakongo tribe resides, there is a distinct possibility that political agitation by the Bakongo in the Belgian Congo will have an unsettling effect, despite Portuguese determination to put down any African challenge to their authority.

19. In the remainder of Angola, there appears to be little possibility of effective African political organization in the near future. Little is known about the actual and potential strength of the underground

Angolan Liberation Movement, the only African political organization known to exist in the province. In Mozambique, there have been isolated incidents involving resistance to the Portuguese, but no organized African movement is known to exist.

20. In the short run, it is believed that internal threats to stability are minimal, but in the long run, especially as neighboring areas (e.g., the Belgian Congo) become African-controlled, the Portuguese can expect an increasing African challenge to rule from Lisbon. Moreover, in both Angola and Mozambique, dissatisfaction of the white settlers with the rigid controls of the Salazar regime might prove to be a source of political unrest. In anticipation of these developments, the Portuguese have strengthened their military forces in both Mozambique and Angola.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

21. The Federation has large mineral deposits and a small but growing industry.

22. The Federation makes an important contribution to the strategic military value of this area of Africa as described in paragraph 7 of the General Considerations of the policy paper. The Federal Government has stated its willingness to cooperate with the United Kingdom and the West in the defense of the Middle East and has sent small but well-trained air forces to participate in British exercises in the north-east Africa-Arabian Peninsula area.

23. The Federation was originally formed to link Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland politically and economically. It was also hoped that the Federation would provide the basis for a middle way between the extremes of black nationalism and the inequities and tensions generated by *apartheid* to the south. If the Federation can avoid both of these extremes, it will have great importance as a stabilizing factor (and a good example of racial cooperation) throughout Africa. However, in the Federation such a middle way has not yet been achieved.

24. The trend of events since 1953 has been marked by a growing African belief that Federation simply means continued white domination, despite real gains made by Africans in the economic and social fields. The mass of Africans, especially in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, are increasingly vehement in their demands to govern themselves as they see the advances made by Africans elsewhere on the continent. The response of the European administering authorities and the settlers to African demands has so far been too little and too late.

25. In this situation, unless efforts now under way achieve some accommodation, there is a strong probability that strikes, boycotts, intimidation of "moderate" Africans, and eventual general violence

may occur. The Nyasaland disturbances of February–March, 1959, in which 51 Africans were killed, have so far led only to mass arrests and detentions, and a token reorganization of the Nyasaland Legislative Council. The results of a constitutional conference to be held in October, 1960 will be crucial in determining whether there will be widespread civil strife. At the present time, there are no serious Communist-inspired or inter-tribal, threats to peace.

British East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar)

26. The strategic and military importance of the area lies in its geographic location and the presence there of important British military facilities. It contains port facilities (particularly at Mombasa) needed for the most effective defense of the Red Sea—Arabian Peninsula area. It also contains extensive air transport and telecommunications facilities, which are valuable if alternate routes through the Middle East are denied us. The British have announced that Kenya will be developed as a staging area for a mobile striking force that could be used in the Middle East. In view of Kenya's geographic position, port facilities, rail lines, and cantonments, it is the logical place for such a staging operation. Although leading African nationalists have opposed military development of Kenya, it is probable that at the present time they are principally concerned at the prospect of having such facilities used to ensure internal security before self-government is won.

27. The area produces raw materials (cotton, coffee, tea, sisal, diamonds) in quantities which make East African production a factor of some importance in world trade in those commodities.

28. The area's political importance stems from its strategic location. It is a region whose 21 million people are, with notable exceptions, generally backward, poor and fragmented into disparate and contending groups. Without British protection, the area would be a virtual power vacuum under present circumstances.

29. The greatest threat to peace arises from the determined drive for independence by the Africans and, in Kenya, from racial tension, primarily between Africans and Europeans, although Asians are also involved. As it becomes increasingly clear that Africans will control the government in other East African territories, the pressure on Kenya African leaders to keep pace with African advance elsewhere is growing. Despite a growing realization on the part of many Europeans that African rule in Kenya is inevitable, it is still probable that the Africans will feel compelled to resort to strikes, boycotts, and other measures in order more quickly to achieve their goals. In an atmosphere of high racial tensions, such tactics can easily lead to general violence.

30. There is strong and widespread African dislike of Asians, who control much of the commerce and industry of East Africa. To the extent that this dislike continues to be expressed in actions such as the 1959 boycott of Asian traders in Uganda, it may be expected to cause a flight of capital, with consequent economic disorganization.

31. The possibility of inter-tribal conflict is great, especially as British authority is withdrawn. Further, an effort by the Somalis to implement the "Greater Somalia" concept would certainly create difficulties in northern Kenya.

32. Penetrations by the UAR and the Soviet Union are potential threats to political stability, but the possibility of subversion by both countries, particularly the USSR, may become greater as the East African countries eventually become independent.

23. Memorandum of Discussion at the 438th Meeting of the National Security Council

March 24, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-2.]

3. *U.S. Policy Toward West Africa* (NSC 5818;¹ NIE 70-59;² NSC 6001;³ NSC 6005;⁴ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 15, 1960⁵)

Mr. Gray presented NSC 6005 to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)⁶

Secretary Herter said the divergence of views described by Mr. Gray and reflected in the split paragraphs of NSC 6005 was a difference of emphasis similar to the differences revealed in discussions on

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on March 24.

¹ Document 8.

² Document 17.

³ Document 22.

⁴ Enclosure to a memorandum from Lay to the NSC dated February 29. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 6005)

⁵ This memorandum transmitted the views of the JCS as set forth in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated March 14. (*Ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, West Africa Documents, 1960)

⁶ Not printed.

Libya and the West Indies.⁷ He read the following extract from Paragraph 2 of NSC 6005:

“West Africa is probably the fastest changing area in the world today. New countries are springing up with startling rapidity and the people of the area are determined that control of West Africa will be firmly in West African hands.”

Secretary Herter said he concurred completely in the statement he had just read. The happenings of the last eighteen months in Africa were quite startling. For instance, Belgium had agreed to grant independence to the Congo this June, a concession which would have been unthinkable a year ago. This concession had stimulated desires for independence among other countries of Africa. Africa thus presented a picture of a changing situation and a battleground of the first order. In fact, he would prefer that the countries of Africa not become independent quite so fast. Despite his wishes, however, in the next decade the membership of the UN would increase to 100 nations, 49 of which would be members of the Afro-Asian Bloc. Consequently, the Soviet Bloc and the Afro-Asian Bloc voting together could control the UN. If we continued to bank on the UN as we had in the past, we must make every effort to hold the emerging African nations on our side of the fence. He felt he must emphasize the uncertainties of the situation and insist that the U.S. not put itself in a straitjacket so far as assistance is concerned. He would like to try to get the former metropolises to give greater assistance to the new African nations. He felt this was a question of degree rather than one of basic substance; the Planning Board could work out the language for the paper. Mr. Gray said he shared Secretary Herter's view that this was a question of degree. Secretary Anderson also shared the view that the question was one of degree, but felt the language was also important because language was a guide to the operators. He said the two problems we had to worry most about in the future were the problems of farm prices here and our balance of payments abroad. Secretary Anderson felt the balance of payments problem was a world-wide problem in which the whole world had a stake. Our balance of payments situation had recently improved, but this did not mean that we could brush the problem aside for the future. We should insist that other countries do their share in providing assistance to the underdeveloped regions. Countries such as the U.K. were not interested in providing assistance to Latin America, which was regarded as a U.S. preserve, but the U.K.

⁷ The NSC considered “U.S. Policy Toward Libya” (NSC 6004) at its 436th Meeting on March 10, and “U.S. Policy Toward the West Indies” (NSC 6002, subsequently adopted as NSC 6002/1) at its 437th Meeting on March 17. (Memoranda of discussion by Boggs, March 14 and 17, respectively; Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1) NSC 6004/1 is printed in vol. XIII, pp. 740–749.

had great interest in Africa. Prime Minister Macmillan after his trip to Africa⁸ had said that the U.K. must contribute to economic assistance to that continent and a recent U.K. White Paper had emphasized British economic aid to Africa. If we want the metropolises to assume part of the burden of assistance, we must induce them to assume this burden in areas in which they are interested. Secretary Anderson was not proposing that the U.S. isolate itself from West Africa. He was willing to give assistance to Guinea and Liberia as special cases. The majority, however, wanted an overall exception from Basic Policy (NSC 5906/1),⁹ which had recognized this very problem. Secretary Anderson felt that the splits in NSC 6005 could be easily resolved on a basis of saying to the European countries, "This situation in Africa is your primary obligation." He did not want to subscribe to the idea that the interests of European countries in nations becoming free and independent were different from our interests. He did not want to agree to a blanket exception. He did want to indicate to the European countries what we felt they should do regarding assistance to Africa.

Secretary Herter said it appeared to him that there was no basic disagreement between the Departments of State and the Treasury. Admiral Burke felt that the words used by Secretaries Herter and Anderson in describing this problem were preferable to the words used in NSC 6005.

The President recalled that in conversations with him, European representatives had said that they must put all their efforts in matters of assistance into the areas of their former colonies or possessions. Both Macmillan and De Gaulle had made observations along these lines. If we were to get the cooperation of the European nations, we would have to get it with respect to areas where these nations have the biggest interests and the greatest obligations. While reserving our right to tender our assistance if necessary, we should put responsibility for assistance to Africa on the U.K. and France.

Mr. Dulles believed it was difficult to generalize because so much depended on circumstances. If an African nation achieves independence on the basis of cordial relations between it and the metropole, then the metropole can render effective assistance to the new nation. On the other hand, if independence is achieved under conditions of strain and bitterness, the newly independent nation will not wish the help of the metropole. Mr. Dulles felt the situation in the Congo might develop in either direction. He believed the paper should be flexible. Secretary Herter agreed that flexibility in our policy was needed. He

⁸ Macmillan visited Ghana, Nigeria, the Central African Federation, and South Africa, January 6–February 5.

⁹ NSC 5906/1, "Basic National Security Policy," approved August 5, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

added that the UN might help to cover the contingency where a new nation afraid of domination by the former metropole preferred assistance on a multilateral basis.

Mr. Gray said that he had felt in the preparation of this paper that the State representatives had made the assumption that whatever the metropolises did would be inadequate, while Treasury and Budget had thought this assumption was too sweeping. A revised paper might contain a statement of general principles followed by guidance providing that the U.S. should consult with the U.K. and France to ascertain what assistance is needed in Africa and what assistance it is possible for the U.K. and France on the one hand and the U.S. on the other to give. State representatives, however, had pointed out that there was a hazard in this consultation; conferring with other nations about assistance to Africa might be equivalent to inviting them to ask us to provide more assistance. The President said that the nations we consulted might ask us to provide funds to them which they could in turn give to the newly independent countries. Mr. Gray said this might be good grounds for not consulting the U.K. and France, but he was reminded of the discussion of Libya, during which the Council directed that we should consult with the U.K. regarding assistance to Libya. Perhaps we were making too many easy assumptions about the situation, while failing to communicate with other countries to find out what could be done. The President agreed that we must consult with other nations if we were to be successful in achieving a cooperative effort by the industrial nations to help the underdeveloped nations. Mr. Dillon said that discussions on this subject had been held with the U.K. and France last fall. These countries no longer want us to channel funds to the new nations through them. In other words, there had been a dramatic shift in the attitude of the British and the French. The French had indicated they would welcome a coordinated approach to the problem of assistance to African countries. Mr. Dillon said a meeting on this subject was now scheduled for April 15 in Washington.¹⁰ He agreed with Mr. Dulles that our policy should be flexible. We should obtain the maximum degree of assistance from the European nations, but we should tender assistance ourselves when necessary. The President felt the conference referred to by Mr. Dillon would be helpful. Mr. Dillon said that France had said it would maintain its assistance to Africa after independence on the same scale as before independence, but would need some aid from us in the form of Development Loan Fund assistance. The President said it was possible that the European countries could pour enough assistance into a single African country to make that country very prosperous and thus have a great effect on other African countries. He added that he did not

¹⁰ See Document 29.

believe the difference between the divergent views in this paper could be measured as exactly as the Financial Appendix to NSC 6005 seemed to indicate.

Secretary Anderson wished to make two more observations. In the first place, during the next decade there would be no such thing as an adequate amount of assistance. In the second place, it was more important to the Free World for the U.S. to maintain a sound position as the world's reserve banker than it was for the U.S. to give a billion or so more in assistance. We must avoid giving the world the impression that we are overstepping our capabilities. Secretary Herter said he could appreciate the anxiety that assistance to West Africa might become an additional burden on the U.S. However, he felt our total assistance burden was one problem, while the distribution of our total assistance was another problem. Secretary Anderson said the European nations would not help in Latin America or Japan. If we induced the European countries to provide assistance, such assistance would be provided only in the areas of their greatest interest.

Mr. Stans felt the differences of opinion reflected in NSC 6005 were greater than the differences of opinion expressed at the meeting. He read the language proposed by the majority on Page 6 to the effect that probable U.K. and French assistance will be far short of the reasonable needs of their former dependencies. He urged that the Council not adopt this conclusion.¹¹ In support of this view, he cited a recent article in *The New York Times*, which indicated that France and other countries were putting large sums of money into African territories.¹² Mr. Stans then read the split Paragraph 16 of NSC 6005 and suggested that the right-hand column be adopted. Mr. Gray suggested that NSC 6005 be referred back to the Planning Board for revision. He was not happy with the splits in the paper and believed the Planning Board could do a better job in the light of the discussion, although he would not promise that the Board would re-submit a paper which was agreed on in all respects. The President said he wished to press the U.K. and France as hard as possible to give as much assistance as they could; we would take up the slack. He felt that all parties to the discussion were trying to say the same thing. Mr. Gray said more peace and harmony existed at this level of discussion than at the Planning Board. The President said the Council must deal with the big picture.

Mr. Gray then noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed the insertion in NSC 6005 of a new paragraph as follows:

¹¹ The line objected to reads: "In any event, probable U.K. and French assistance will be far short of the needs for outside public assistance which many of the former dependencies feel they will require."

¹² Reference is to an article by Dana Adams Schmidt in *The New York Times*, February 3.

“Establish technically competent observers in African countries to keep abreast of military developments.”

The President said he hoped this provision did not mean that we would be sending out more Military Attachés. Mr. Gray said he was afraid the provision would mean more Military Attachés. A paragraph of this kind had been omitted from the policy statement on South, Central and East Africa because the Planning Board had considered the question an operational one and had noted that it was the subject of negotiations between the Departments of State and Defense. Admiral Burke said the proposed paragraph might result in more Military Attachés, but it was broader than this. For example, in Ecuador a tremendous job of technical assistance was being accomplished by one naval officer and five enlisted men. He felt assistance of this kind was more important than monetary assistance. [8 lines of source text not declassified] The President said perhaps Admiral Burke had been talking about obtaining information by sending out persons who rendered assistance to African countries. Secretary Herter said the proposal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was an operational rather than a policy matter. He added that it was difficult to find individuals who have any knowledge of Africa, as he had once discovered when he had tried to set up an African Institute in Washington. The State Department was now making an effort to train personnel for diplomatic posts in the countries of Africa about to become independent.

Ambassador Burgess said that attempts to reorganize the O.E.E.C. had been directed at inducing the European countries to do a better job of rendering assistance in the underdeveloped parts of the world.

Mr. Gray noted that the JCS proposal on military observers had been discussed by the Council and that Secretary Herter had indicated that it was an operational problem now under discussion between State and Defense.

*The National Security Council:*¹³

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6005; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 15, 1960.

b. Referred the statement of policy in NSC 6005 back to the NSC Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion at the meeting.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

¹³ Paragraphs a–b constitute NSC Action No. 2199. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

24. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)

March 30, 1960.

SUBJECT

United States Assistance to Sub-Sahara Africa

Discussion

There is general agreement in the Department that events in Africa have moved so rapidly as to have overtaken our ability to cope with them. The political evolution of Africa has indeed progressed to a point where, in my opinion, the Executive Branch must be prepared to treat the continent as a major policy area. My use of the phrase Executive Branch is deliberate, because the only major policy disagreement is our divergence with Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) currently epitomized in the pending National Security Council (NSC) policy paper for West Africa.¹

The fundamental split appears in the Economic Section of the paper, wherein Treasury and BOB suggest primary reliance on other free world sources of capital to meet the needs of West Africa. While we hope and expect that the European countries will provide substantial amounts of assistance, I believe we must depend to a larger extent than at present on our own resources to take whatever action may become necessary for our national interest. The political situation may change or relations worsen so quickly between metropole states and their dependencies or former dependencies that other Guineas may develop. Complete dependence on metropolises or former metropolises is dangerously unrealistic if we are determined to retain a Western-oriented African continent. The Treasury-BOB point of view would put the United States in the position of being able to take positive action only in order to counter Soviet moves and would condemn us to a negative, secondary role in Africa. I very much doubt that additional committee work, surveys or reviews would resolve this dispute. What is needed is a decision by the President.

Once such a decision was obtained we would be in a position rationally to consider problems of assistance. The main policy lines seem to be clear. However, intensive expert study on specific problems

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1. Confidential. Drafted by Dolgin and Penfield and sent through the Executive Secretariat. The attachments to the source text, not printed, were intended for a meeting which took place on April 7; see Document 26.

¹ See Document 27.

is needed. Much could be accomplished by your designation of Africa as an area to receive priority attention by all interested offices of the Department and associated agencies.

Pending such study and emergence of its results, we must decide immediately whether we should seek additional funds now for FY 1961. As a practical matter, I do not believe it would be wise to scrap our existing presentation this late in the legislative process. I believe we can get through FY 1961 with our presently requested levels of aid provided a number of recommended actions (discussed below) are taken. Whatever additional requirements develop during the year for new programs in emerging countries can, I trust, be covered by the Contingency Fund.

I would like to highlight a recommendation which I believe would substantially improve our position in African eyes without requiring an immediate increase in aid for Africa. A major speech by the Secretary, directed specifically toward the newly independent and emerging countries of Africa and expressing US interest in their development and willingness to help, would in my opinion, be of great help at the present time.

There is one additional requirement that I consider urgent: ways must be found to increase the rate of loan activity of the Development Loan Fund (DLF) and the Export-Import Bank. These institutions serve as symbols of the United States interest in Africa, thus partially compensating for the scarcity of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) funds programmed for FY 1961. I urge that DLF be instructed to give priority attention to Tropical Africa and to review its criteria and procedures in order to meet the special problems African loans present. DLF operations in Africa are hampered by the inability of newly-organized governments to prepare in proper form, the necessary feasibility surveys and project data needed to support applications, by the policies of DLF generally to cover foreign exchange costs only and by restricting procurement to the United States.

I do not believe that we can any longer avoid a forthright position that we are genuinely determined to help the peoples of Africa to cope with their problems and secure their newly won independence on solid economic foundations. Our posture must give Africans the impression that the United States regards Africa as an important region in world affairs in its own right and not just as an adjunct in the Cold War.

Although we are concerned with Communism we should not overemphasize it in our public statements on Africa. To imply by words or deeds that we are suddenly interested in Africa only because the Bloc has become interested will result in driving Africans into cynical neutralism or worse. To pledge our interest and intention to help, and then to fail to respond promptly and adequately when

requests materialize, would only tend to confirm an impression already unfortunately created by the contrasting actions of the Bloc and the West in Guinea, that only one side in the Cold War really understands and appreciates the problems of newly emergency [emerging] nations.

The following paragraphs discuss specific topics which I believe are of sufficient importance to warrant your attention.

I. Matters for Urgent Decision or Action

A. Speech by the Secretary.

I have been impressed by the fact that most of the African leaders, completely apart from any aid requests, want us to treat Africa with dignity, understanding and as an equal. CU in its attached paper (Tab B) states: "The greatest immediate problem is the lack of bold initiative in creating a new climate between the United States and the emerging nations of this vast continent. We are faced again with a situation not unlike that which confronted us at the time of the announcement of the Marshall Plan. . . . We need such a clear call again. Before Khrushchev visits Africa later this year, we need a speech addressed to all its people as co-equals in the task of creating peace with freedom and justice, a speech which sets the record straight to the whole world, on US intentions to strengthen in Africa and elsewhere, every democratic force in the free world."² Several other contributors, including S/P,³ have made a similar recommendation.

1. Recommendation:

That you urge the Secretary to make a major speech directed specifically toward Africa.

B. Overall Policy.

As discussed above, there is urgent need for a decision on whether we are to have a positive or negative policy on Africa. Although the issue is obscured by the compromises and hair-splitting phraseology which emerge from the NSC machinery, there is in fact a deep divergence within the Government. Until this is settled, I do not see how it is possible for us to pursue a positive, constructive or imaginative policy toward Africa.

² Ellipsis in the source text. The quote was taken from a memorandum prepared in the Bureau of International Cultural Relations, March 18. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Africa, 1959-1960)

³ The paper prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, "US Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara," maintained that in view of the African need for economic aid and technical assistance, "it is evident that as the African States gain their independence their demands for aid will increase. It is also evident that our past policy of looking to the former metropolitan powers as primary sources of aid will not suffice in the future, even allowing for some increase in UN technical assistance and other multilateral programs for Africa." (*Ibid.*)

2. Recommendation:

That you endeavor to obtain a Presidential decision that in order to keep Tropical Africa out of Soviet hands, the United States Government should actively demonstrate its sympathy for and desire to assist emerging countries there, and should make every effort to obtain the minimum appropriations necessary to do so.

C. Current Appropriations.

As discussed above, it appears to me impractical now to modify the FY 1961 budget requests. As pointed out in the attached ICA paper (Tab C),⁴ however, up to \$2.5 million in additional TC funds will be required if we are to make even a gesture in this field to several of the countries becoming independent this year. In certain special situations, (not now identifiable) there will also be extraordinary economic development and special assistance needs. It will therefore be necessary to re-program modest amounts from other areas, or to cover these requirements from the contingency fund. I concur with the ICA estimate of \$10-15 million for grant special assistance for projects not covered by the present definition and scope of the Special Program for Tropical Africa.

3. Recommendation:

That you be prepared to allocate, when requested, from the FY 1961 contingency, when available, up to \$2.5 million for additional Technical Cooperation requirements and up to \$15 million for grant special assistance.

D. Need for Increased Loan Activity.

This matter is discussed above. Most of the attached papers⁵ emphasize its importance.

4. Recommendation:

That you (a) declare Tropical Africa a priority area for DLF activity; (b) request the DLF Board to initiate a review of its policies and procedures in order to accommodate special problems of loans in Africa; and (c) discuss with Exim Bank the need to increase their loan activity in Africa.

⁴ Leonard J. Saccio, Deputy Director of ICA, transmitted this paper to Satterthwaite on March 25. (*Ibid.*)

⁵ The papers not already cited include: "Recapitulation of Recommendations;" "The Soviet Bloc Challenge in Sub-Sahara Africa and Certain Implications for U.S. Policy," prepared in U/CEA, March 22; "Policy Towards Economic Assistance to Tropical Africa," prepared in U/MSA and transmitted as an enclosure to a memorandum from John O. Bell to Satterthwaite, March 25; "Economic Development Policy in Africa," prepared in OFD/ED and transmitted as an attachment to a memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Satterthwaite, March 22; "Promoting U.S. Interests South of the Sahara through the U.N.," transmitted as a memorandum from Francis O. Wilcox to Satterthwaite, March 23; "EUR Interests and Points of View Regarding U.S. Assistance to Africa South of the Sahara," conveyed as a memorandum from Kohler to Satterthwaite, March 19; and "Support of Republic of China and Countering Chinese Communist Penetration in Black Africa," transmitted as an attachment to a memorandum from Edwin W. Martin to Dolgin, March 18. (*Ibid.*)

E. *Timely Preparation for Aid Programs.*

The foundation for future influence in Africa that is laid in the period immediately preceding and following independence is bound to be of decisive importance. This underlines the necessity for early action on the part of the US if strong ties and a favorable environment for future cooperation are to be established.

5. *Recommendation:*

That you (a) authorize ICA immediately to assign an officer to the consular office in each country which does not already have a US aid program and which is scheduled for independence, to undertake preliminary studies of priority needs, explain our aid procedures, do "pre-programming" of projects, request short term ICA study groups as appropriate, and possibly act as the nucleus of a USOM. And (b) authorize the dispatch to appropriate consulates of information outlining forms of assistance we are prepared to offer under MSP, PL 480 and DLF. This would serve as guidelines for responding to aid requests.

F. *Non-Governmental Efforts.*

It is a truism that Government by itself cannot do everything in erupting areas such as Tropical Africa and an equal effort is required on the part of private business, charitable organizations, educational foundations, church groups and individual Americans. Mr. Thayer,⁶ has recently made considerable progress in persuading the Foundations to work more closely together but by and large private activities in Africa are hit or miss, uncoordinate and, in many cases, shy and hesitant. Private investment fears political instability and the possibility that new African states will nationalize industry and commerce.

6. *Recommendation:*

That you suggest the inclusion in the speech to be made by the Secretary of (a) an appeal to all private organizations interested or actually working in Africa to meet together periodically to examine mutual problems and coordinate their general approach to Africa; and (b) a reference to the willingness of the United States Government to negotiate investment guarantee agreements with a new African state immediately upon its achievement of independence.

II. *Matters Requiring Further Study*

Several of the attached papers recommend high level Task Forces or surveys with rather broad charters. I do not believe such activities are desirable at the present time. We have available the results of numerous such studies conducted in the recent past such as the Vice President's Report to the President on his trip to Africa in 1957,⁷ the M.I.T. *Economic Survey of Africa South of the Sahara; Africa—the study,*

⁶ Robert H. Thayer, Special Assistant to the Secretary for the Coordination of International Educational and Cultural Relations.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. xviii, pp. 57-66.

prepared by Northwestern University for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;⁸ the National Academy of Sciences, *Recommendations for Strengthening Science and Technology in Africa South of the Sahara*.⁹ The main lines of policy are clear (assuming a decision on the basic question whether we are to have a positive or negative policy). What is needed now is detailed expert study of ways and means.

A. Arms Policy.

A group has been working on this subject for some weeks and it is making good progress. No further directives are necessary at the moment.

B. Problems of Single Commodity Countries.

One of the most dangerous weapons of Soviet economic infiltration in Africa is bloc willingness to buy all the export produce of single commodity countries. Until the West develops some way of assuring these countries a ready market for their exports at reasonable prices our policy is to a dangerous extent dependent on world commodity price fluctuations.

7. Recommendation:

That you ask Mr. Mann¹⁰ to designate and chair a committee to recommend ways and means of assuring friendly single commodity countries a ready market for their exports at reasonable and stable prices.

C. Aid Procedures.

Africa is not Europe nor is it even India. We must seek to develop tools for economic cooperation which are particularly suitable for Africa. New concepts of mutual security assistance and the application of existing concepts with greater flexibility are necessary. The terms of ICA technical assistance agreements may have to be altered to fit Africa's sensitivities and inexperience. Procedures which are suitable elsewhere in the world may not be acceptable because of inexperience and sensitivity and should not necessarily apply in Africa. Frustration and delay in US programs will jeopardize our position in Africa through failure of these programs, which, in most cases, are not costly and contribute greatly to the US presence.

8. Recommendation:

That you ask Mr. Riddleberger¹¹ to designate a committee to assess the effectiveness of our aid tools and methods as applied to

⁸ Committee Print No. 4, 86th Congress, 1st Session, October 23, 1959.

⁹ Prepared by the National Academy of Sciences for ICA on July 1, 1959. The Executive Director of the study was J. George Harrar, Vice President of the Rockefeller Fund, and the Chairman of the Steering Committee was Dr. W. Albert Noyes, Jr., Department of Chemistry, University of Rochester. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, West Africa—Documents—1960)

¹⁰ Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

¹¹ James W. Riddleberger, Director of the International Cooperation Administration.

Africa, review the terms of bilateral agreements and recommend changes or new procedures particularly suited to the conditions in that continent and our policies in regard thereto.

D. Multilateral Versus Bilateral Aid.

There is increasing discussion of the advantages of channeling more of our aid to Africa through the United Nations or an African multilateral agency.¹² This is a complicated and controversial subject on each side of which there are persuasive arguments. It is my feeling that a detailed study would be of great help in finding the right answers.

9. Recommendation:

That you authorize me to designate and chair a committee to recommend whether we should shift the emphasis in our aid to Africa from bilateral to multilateral and if so, to what extent and in what specific programs.

E. Identification of African Countries with Aid Efforts.

Although no African reaction to the recent DAG¹³ meeting has come to our attention, it will probably not be long before African countries will demand a voice in international organizations dealing with trade, aid and other economic matters directly affecting them. If the present Greek negotiations with the EEC are successful, a pattern will have been created which not only Tunisia but some sub-Saharan countries will want to follow. It is important that African desires for a voice in international economic bodies whose decisions directly affect them be worked out in a harmonious and mutually satisfactory way.

10. Recommendation:

That you (a) authorize discreet encouragement to African states to become members of the IMF, IBRD and IDA; and (b) designate a committee headed by a member of your staff to consider ways and means of facilitating African identification with Western economic organizations of direct interest to them, through direct association or through an indigenous organization of "aid receivers," or both.

F. Exchanges of Persons.

Most of our missions consistently emphasize the importance of student, leader and other exchange of persons programs to our long term position and influence in Africa. We have done some study on

¹² Francis O. Wilcox, who had visited Africa, January 21–February 19, advocated an expansion of U.N. activities and multilateral aid in Africa in an address at the University of Kentucky, Lexington, on March 25. For text of his remarks, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 18, 1960, pp. 589–597.

¹³ The first meeting of the Development Assistance Group had taken place in Washington, March 9–11, with representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Commission of the European Economic Community. For text of the communiqué issued on March 11, see *ibid.*, April 11, 1960, pp. 577–578.

this subject and have tentatively concluded that such programs should be expanded at a somewhat more rapid rate than they are and that procedures should be made more flexible.

11. Recommendation:

That you authorize me to designate and chair a committee to examine the content of and procedures governing all exchange of persons programs in Africa and make recommendations thereon.

Many of the attached papers prepared by interested offices for the meeting with you contain other valuable suggestions for possible implementation; others have raised very thoughtful policy issues which because of their fundamental nature require further study and consideration. I have tried to focus on issues which need your immediate decision.

I believe it would be desirable to meet with you in three months in order to present the findings and recommendations of the committees suggested above. Your decisions, at that time, will be required for proper guidance to the field for FY 1962 programming.

For your convenience and signature there is attached a Recapitulation of Recommendations (Tab A).

25. Memorandum of Discussion at the 440th Meeting of the National Security Council

April 7, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *U.S. Policy Toward West Africa* (NSC 5818; ¹ NIE 70-59; ² NSC 6001; ³ NSC 6005; ⁴ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 15, 1960; ⁵ Memo for All Holders of NSC 6005, dated March 22, 1960; NSC Action No. 2199; ⁶ Memo for All Holders of NSC 6005, dated March 30, 1960 ⁷)

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on April 7.

¹ Document 8.

² Document 17.

³ Document 22.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 23.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 23.

⁶ See footnote 13, Document 23.

⁷ The March 22 and 30 memoranda are not printed.

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on NSC 6005 as amended by the NSC Planning Board in the light of the Council discussion of March 24.⁸ (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).⁹ After completing the reading of his Briefing Note, Mr. Gray said he wished to raise one additional point. At the Council Meeting of March 24 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed the insertion of a new paragraph in NSC 6005 providing for technically competent observers in African countries to keep abreast of military developments. The Council had discussed this proposal and decided that the question was an operational one. Accordingly, the paragraph had not been included in the policy paper. General Cabell, however, was concerned over this problem and wanted to discuss it further.

General Cabell said the paragraph proposed by the JCS was of interest to CIA but was, in his view, too narrow. He suggested that the paragraph might be amended to provide that competent observers would be established in African countries to keep abreast of military or internal security developments. He also suggested that the title of this section of the paper (Page 14) be changed from "Military and Strategic" to "Military, Strategic and Internal Security." Mr. Gray said he understood General Cabell's suggestions were acceptable to Defense, but he wondered whether the Department of State still felt that the paragraph was of such an operational nature that it should not be included in the policy paper. Mr. Dillon said he had no objection to including the paragraph as amended in the paper.

Mr. Dillon then asked leave to discuss a broader aspect of NSC 6005. He noted that discussion of this paper at two meetings of the Council had been devoted primarily to the differences of opinion on financial assistance to the indigenous countries, on the share of assistance to be provided by the U.S. and the metropolises, respectively, and so on. After discussion, it appeared that there was really not much difference of opinion on these subjects. However, he desired to emphasize the overriding political significance of the area, the fate of which is now hanging in the balance. Mr. Dillon thought the fate of the area would depend on the actions taken by the U.S. and Western Europe (1) to solve the difficult problems which the newly-independent countries of West Africa were facing and (2) to meet the aggressive Soviet Bloc attack in the area. He considered West Africa a priority area from the political point of view and believed the U.S. would have to assume an active role to protect U.S. political interests there. Such an active role for the protection of our political interests would be a departure from the traditional U.S. position with respect to Africa.

⁸ Document 23.

⁹ Not printed.

The President said it seemed to him that Mr. Dillon was saying that the Operations Coordinating Board should do a very good job of implementing the policy in NSC 6005. Mr. Dillon agreed.

Mr. Dillon then remarked that Paragraph 18–B of NSC 6005 was technically deficient in that it referred to UN assistance “other than development financing.” This language did not take account of the fact that the World Bank was a Specialized Agency of the UN. Mr. Gray said the language of the paragraph could be adjusted to reflect the relationship of the World Bank to the UN. The phrase “other than development financing” in Paragraph 18–B was designed to preserve a provision which appears in Paragraph 32 of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1).¹⁰ Mr. Dillon felt it would not be difficult to adjust the language of Paragraph 18–B.

*The National Security Council:*¹¹

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6005, as amended by the enclosures to the reference Memos for All Holders of NSC 6005; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 15, 1960.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6005 as amended by the enclosures to the reference Memos for All Holders of NSC 6005, subject to the following further amendments:

(1) *Page 12, paragraph 18B:* Insert an asterisk after the words “(other than development financing)”, and insert the following footnote thereto:

“* This provision does not preclude the operations of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations.”

(2) *Page 14:* Revise the heading preceding paragraph 29 to read “*Military, Strategic and Internal Security*”.

(3) *Page 14:* Insert the following new paragraph after paragraph 30 (renumbering subsequent paragraphs accordingly):

“31. Establish technically competent observers in African countries to keep abreast of military or internal security developments, subject in each case to the approval of the Secretary of State.”

(4) *Page 16, old subparagraphs 31–c and –d:* Revise to read as follows (deleting the first two footnotes thereto):

“c. Wherever it is determined to be infeasible or inconsistent with U.S. national security interests to rely on the sources in subparagraph b to meet the external capital needs of a particular

¹⁰ See footnote 9, Document 23.

¹¹ Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2209. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

territory or nation, be prepared on the basis of case-by-case appraisal of country or major project requirements to extend economic development assistance or special assistance consistent with the foregoing guidance.*

“* Specific guidance for Guinea and Liberia is provided in paragraphs 38 and 44 below.”

“d. Be prepared to extend to independent nations and, in consultation with the metropolitan power concerned, to dependent territories (1) U.S. technical assistance and (2) U.S. special assistance for the improvement of education and training, with particular emphasis to be given to the meeting of the needs which are common to all of the countries of the area. Be prepared to negotiate surplus commodity sales under P.L.480 when appropriate.

c. Noted the statement by the Under Secretary of State that the area covered by this paper has taken on great political importance to the United States, and the statement by the President that the Operations Coordinating Board should make a special effort to ensure the effective implementation of the policy contained in NSC 6005.

Note: NSC 6005, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6005/1 to supersede those portions of NSC 5818 which relate to West Africa (a statement of policy toward South, Central and East Africa, NSC 6001, has been approved to supersede that portion of NSC 5818 relating to South, Central and East Africa) for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President, together with the action in c above.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

26. Memorandum of Conversation

April 7, 1960.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Under Secretary Dillon to Discuss U.S. Policy in Sub-Sahara Africa, Particularly U.S. Assistance

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/4-760. Confidential. Drafted by William L. Wight, Jr., and James R. Ruchti.

PARTICIPANTS

The Under Secretary

Mr. Raymond Hare, Deputy Under Secretary

Mr. Theodore C. Achilles, C

Mr. J. C. Satterthwaite, AF

Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, IO

Mr. James W. Riddleberger, ICA

Mr. Vance Brand, DLF

Mr. Edward Roberts, USIA

Mr. Saxton Bradford, CU

Mr. John O. Bell, U/MSC

Mr. Edwin Martin, E

Mr. Robert Terrill, U/CEA

Mr. Robert McBride, EUR

Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite set the scene and outlined the events leading to the present meeting; he said that AF's problem was epitomized by the situation in Guinea, which illustrates the numerous frustrations involved and the dangers of subordinating United States policy to that of the former mother country. He stressed the need to simplify our aid procedures, and noted the extreme difficulty in obtaining African countries' concurrence to ICA umbrella agreements when "the Chinese ask for no privileges for their people". This was one reason for the long delays in trying to carry out our modest offer of 150 scholarships to Guinea.

The most important policy question, Mr. Satterthwaite said, is whether or not we are to rely mainly on the metropolises to assist their former dependent areas in Africa. He indicated his own skepticism about the role of the metropolises and mentioned a recent telegram from Brussels in which the United States was asked to assume the burden of large-scale aid to the Congo.¹ On the other hand, he referred to the apparent decision of the French to continue aid to their formerly dependent areas in return for certain military and political concessions. He also referred to the split in the NSC Policy Paper on West Africa in which State and ICA opposed the Treasury on the role of the metropolises;² he feared that if Treasury's views prevailed, they would compel a negative policy on the part of the United States.

In the political and psychological sphere, Mr. Satterthwaite recommended that the Secretary make a major policy speech directed specifically toward Africa, to indicate our attention and interest in the area, and our desire to be of assistance. He urged this action only if the speech could be forthright.

¹ Telegram 1159 from Brussels, April 5. (*Ibid.*, 855A.00/4-560)

² See Document 23.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that among the sources of economic aid, the Development Loan Fund could play a very important role in Africa, especially in view of our difficulty in getting larger aid funds. Under its present regulations, however, the DLF does not meet the needs of Africa.

Under Secretary Dillon responded by saying he considered the meeting well worthwhile and that he appreciated the thought and effort put into the project. The papers submitted by the various bureaus and agencies contained a great many interesting and valuable ideas. He said that Africa is now getting priority attention, which is what it deserves.

As to the recommendations submitted by AF, Mr. Dillon said he wanted coordinated recommendations prior to definite action by himself. AF should take the lead in drawing up a paper or papers indicating areas of agreement; it should also point out divergencies of views if these existed. Mr. Dillon said this would provide further consultation before we "marched into action".

Mr. Dillon, who had attended both NSC sessions on West Africa,³ did not feel that serious policy differences existed on the West African paper. The Secretary of Treasury had urged that the United States seek maximum effort from the European countries to assist their former dependencies. If the European countries did not supply their needs or if the African territories were unwilling to accept aid from the former metropolises, and if additional aid were needed, Mr. Dillon felt all agencies in NSC were agreed that the U.S. should fill the gap. Mr. Dillon said that Treasury and Budget were not concerned in the operation of ICA and grant aid; they could, however, exert some influence on loans. Nevertheless, Mr. Dillon felt that DLF should not be worried by Treasury's attitudes but should be guided by the policy outlined in the State Department. Mr. Dillon said one could argue that Brussels' Telegram No. 1159 lent weight to Treasury's point of view—that the Belgians were always anxious to shift the burden to someone else.

Mr. Dillon mentioned his statement in the NSC meeting April 7 in which he drew attention to the basic significance of the NSC document. He had urged the NSC, in its concentration on language, not to overlook the great political importance of the African area and the vital challenge from the Soviet Bloc countries. Mr. Dillon had pointed out that the United States had to move rapidly and vigorously in this unusual situation. Treasury and Budget had expressed no disagreement with this statement of priorities.

On the specific AF recommendations, Mr. Dillon thought that a speech by Secretary Herter was well worth considering; such a speech would be no good without adequate content. The Secretary could not

³ See Documents 23 and 25.

make a decision until he had seen a draft or outline. Mr. Dillon, therefore, recommended that AF send a draft speech to the Secretary in order to crystallize what we had in mind.

In discussing appropriations, Mr. Dillon did not think we were far enough along to mention specific figures; but this was obviously a matter to be given priority attention.

Mr. Dillon felt it would be difficult for DLF to make fundamental changes in its policies for Africa, without agreeing to changes for the rest of the world. Mr. Dillon recommended further discussions between Mr. Brand of DLF and interested officers of the Department. This was particularly pertinent on use of local currency. For example, it had been found that Tanganyika was covering both foreign and local currency costs of a highway. It was believed that the DLF could handle foreign currency costs on the two sections of the highway and that Tanganyika could cover local currency expenses on both sections.

Mr. Dillon mentioned that difficulty in getting underdeveloped African nations to prepare projects according to U.S. standards and in accordance with all the opportunities available to them had been encountered in other parts of the world. This could best be solved through ICA technical assistance programs. Mr. Dillon said DLF and ICA should have further discussions to see what could be worked out.

Mr. Dillon also raised the question of what the Export-Import Bank had done in Africa. He considered that Mr. Waugh,⁴ with his knowledge of Africa, could be quite helpful. He asked for a report.

Mr. Dillon mentioned that ICA had set up a special group to work out a coordinated program for Africa, including the question of stationing ICA officers in consular posts in Africa.⁵ He indicated his readiness to agree after the problem had been thought out.

Mr. Dillon mentioned Recommendation 7 in Mr. Satterthwaite's memorandum of March 30, "Means of assuring friendly single community [*commodity*] countries a ready market for their exports at reasonable and stable prices". While not minimizing the difficulties, he thought we should look into this to see what could be done; he mentioned coffee as an example.

Mr. Dillon referred to multi-lateral vs. bi-lateral aid. He thought we needed them both. He thought we should study ways in which we could help the U.S. to expand its activities. He recognized two problems in this area; how to get the recipient nations together and how to get the recipient nations to participate in international organizations with contributor nations.

⁴ Samuel C. Waugh, President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank.

⁵ On March 31, the Temporary Advisory Group on Africa Aid Programs was established. Documentation is in Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 69 D 295, US Assistance to Tropical Africa.

Mr. Wilcox agreed we must supplement bi-lateral aid with multi-lateral, and stated that the U.N. was at the present carrying on at least 14 different kinds of assistance activities which might be expanded and better coordinated. Mr. Satterthwaite felt strongly that we must continue bi-lateral aid in addition to multi-lateral.

Mr. Dillon agreed with Recommendation 10 of Mr. Satterthwaite's paper, that we should encourage the African countries to become members of the IMF, IBRD, and IDA.

Mr. Dillon also concurred that the Exchange of Persons Program was very important; the subject should be discussed further with the various agencies concerned such as ICA, CU and IES.

As to the procedures to be used in following up this meeting, Mr. Dillon urged AF and the principal agencies concerned to draw up agreed papers, with agreed terms of reference before setting up committees. Such a paper or papers could be approved by Mr. Dillon at once, or he could resolve any differences. The group present today could meet again in three months to indicate the results of their efforts, but this might not be necessary.

Mr. Satterthwaite mentioned that U/MSC—Mr. Bell—had recommended a Marshall Plan-type task force operation. Mr. Satterthwaite said he would be agreeable to a small coordinating committee. Mr. Dillon said the agencies should work together to decide what kind of committee there should be; they should also decide what studies were necessary and should go ahead and make them. As to the scope of the efforts in the development of recommendations, Mr. Dillon agreed with Mr. Satterthwaite that a Marshall Plan-type task force was not appropriate this year. Mr. Dillon noted that the paper submitted by E contained many novel and interesting ideas which deserved careful study.

Mr. Riddleberger, ICA, said today's meeting had focused the attention of everyone on Africa; he hoped the case of Guinea would prove to be an exception. He favored "flexibility" but there was a problem on how far ICA could go. He felt that ICA should attempt to get umbrella agreements with African countries whenever possible. ICA had decided to establish a group and to move ahead on procedures. He agreed with Mr. Dillon that NSC decisions in the West African paper would not prevent ICA from moving ahead on the FY 1961 program. Mr. Riddleberger noted that the list of activities of the U.N., while numerous, were not very impressive as far as programs are concerned; the U.N. aid had to be supplemented. Mr. Wilcox agreed but believed that the U.N. might be in a position to exercise a unique influence in Africa.

Mr. Riddleberger was agreeable to assigning personnel to African consular posts; he could allocate people according to the circumstances which we faced. Mr. Riddleberger said it was too late to modify pro-

grams for FY '61 but that contingency money could be used to supplement FY 1961 efforts. Mr. Satterthwaite remarked that it was not practical to submit a request for supplemental funds for aid. Mr. Saccio noted that an allocation of \$40 to \$60 million from the Contingency Fund requested for FY '61 might be needed; Mr. Dillon said that we hoped that the Senate would restore the House cuts.

Mr. Riddleberger mentioned his conversation with the Belgian Ambassador regarding the Congo; the Congo's favorable balance of payments of about \$200 million had been more than offset by the flight of capital. The Belgian Ambassador reported that restrictions had been placed on transfers of funds from the Congo in order to halt this capital flight.

Mr. Riddleberger referred to ICA's very large Exchange of Persons Program. This program would be continued.

Mr. Riddleberger thought it might be possible to make some adjustment in funds, according to priorities. He felt that money in TC programs could be shifted on the basis of need; personnel and money for Africa might be obtained through this re-programming for the next fiscal year.

Mr. Vance Brand of DLF said that Africa was fully considered in DLF's planning. He saw no need to revise DLF's policies or procedures for Africa. DLF was prepared to send a mission to Africa to work out techniques and procedures which would be in harmony with DLF's existing policies. He noted that Tanganyika and Nigeria might be examples where, by revising the implementation of development programs, the foreign currency loans could be made by DLF. Mr. Brand assured the group that the Department could depend on DLF's cooperation but that, in accordance with current practice, State should provide guidance on priorities.

Deputy Under Secretary Hare pointed out that the basic question was whether we should only react to Soviet initiatives or whether we should try to "beat them to the punch". Mr. Dillon interjected that this was certainly our goal; we hoped to find ways to outguess and to surpass the Russians in this vital area. Mr. Satterthwaite emphasized that we must show the African countries we do not help them only to counteract Communist aid.

Mr. Bell of U/MSC thought the papers submitted for the meeting showed the extent of worry within agencies concerned about the situation in Africa. He was impressed by several factors: If we are thinking of actions which will require funds in FY '62, we must have a program by the autumn of this year. We must have a concrete plan which will stand up to attack, and not mere generalizations. Mr. Bell considered that we would need specific analysis of what United States' interests are in the area, what plans or problems exist in each country, and how these problems will develop. The analysis should state our objectives,

what we should do, and how to do it. He remarked also on the broad differences between various African territories. Mr. Bell emphasized that the African Bureau needed more personnel, in order to handle its increasing responsibilities. The staff of AF, already overworked, would not be able to develop the studies necessary. If nothing were done along this line, Mr. Bell thought the Department would be faced with attempting to react to one crisis after another. Mr. Dillon agreed that our objective must result in specific action on specific programs; we should, therefore, look into overall problems.

Mr. Martin of E strongly endorsed Mr. Bell's statement. He felt that the problems should be considered as divided into three stages: first, we had certain emergency problems; then that a task force should be set up (rather than a series of committees) to determine over the next 6 months what we wanted to do, country by country, and in time for 1962 MSP organizing; and that finally we need to examine thoroughly in this area, without too many previous commitments, the longer range organization and structure to channel aid to Africa. In stage three, we should consider both multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid, what role each should play, as well as how Africans could best be brought into the picture. We should also carry out studies of possible programs on a regional as well as country-by-country basis. Mr. Bell agreed with him that Africa represented one of the greatest opportunities which the United States had ever had.

Mr. Wilcox of IO emphasized the impact of so many new states emerging in a short period and with unexpected rapidity. At the beginning, the new states are wrapped up in immediate, constitutional problems. He thought it was vital that the United States should adjust its programs for this crucial period just before and just after independence when our efforts would make a maximum impact. He thought it was only slight exaggeration to consider the emergence of these new countries the most significant development of the century. He thought the United States had a great opportunity in Africa if we acted with imagination and courage.

Mr. Bradford of CU reported that the IES program in Africa was relatively small and highly selective. Mr. Thayer is the Secretary's Coordinator for all cultural exchanges. Mr. Bradford noted the extensive studies on that subject which the Bureau of International Cultural Relations had already made.

Mr. Roberts of USIA remarked that our impact on Africans depended 90% on what we did and only 10% on what we say. He said we need to know where we are going. Mr. Dillon fully concurred with these observations.

Mr. McBride of EUR warned that we should have no illusions about getting more aid for Africa from the European metropolises. The United States would be fortunate if we could encourage them to con-

tinue aid at present levels. He pointed out that France had agreed to keep up assistance to Mali and to Malagasy for the next several years at a relatively high level. Mr. Ferguson of AF noted, however, that French assistance was always conditional on political support by the French Community in the U.N. and elsewhere. If this support were not forthcoming, French aid would be withdrawn and other Guineas might develop. Mr. Dillon said that perhaps West Germany could provide some aid.

In summary, Mr. Dillon indicated his readiness to take any necessary action, as soon as papers are cleared, and to send letters or telegrams, if desired, to the field or to other agencies on a piecemeal basis as they are ready. He declared again that Africa is a high priority area. He would look to Mr. Satterthwaite and AF to guide and lead in carrying out decisions.

Mr. Satterthwaite agreed that AF would communicate with officials and agencies concerned, in accordance with Mr. Dillon's instructions, to see what actions were needed.

Mr. Dillon concluded the meeting by requesting all agencies to give their full cooperation and support in meeting the high-priority needs of the African area.

27. National Security Council Report

NSC 6005/1

April 9, 1960.

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD WEST AFRICA¹

General Considerations²

1. The primary importance of West Africa is its growing political significance. There is a developing awareness that Africa is an area which will have an increasingly important influence in the course of world events and that its political alignment will be deeply affected by the policies of Western European nations and the United States. This increasing influence may be expected to make itself felt primarily in the United Nations as a growing number of independent African nations take their seats and join in voting on many issues with the less-developed nations. African leaders seek the understanding and goodwill of the United States. Above all, they want to be accepted as equals and to be treated with dignity and respect. One of their criteria of success in this connection is membership in the United Nations.

2. West Africa is probably the fastest changing area in the world today. New countries are springing up with startling rapidity and the people of the area are determined that control of West Africa will be firmly in West African hands. Though many of the countries are sorely lacking in both human and economic resources, this fact does not and will not slow the drive toward self-government and independence. There are presently four independent countries in West Africa: Liberia, Ghana, Guinea and Cameroun. Independence is scheduled for Togo on April 27 and Nigeria on October 1, 1960. In addition Mali—an autonomous state, within the French community, formed by federation of the former colonies of Soudan and Senegal—is now negotiating with the French the terms under which it would attain

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Secret. Enclosure to a memorandum from Lay to the NSC dated April 9. The Annex, "General Considerations Relating to Individual Countries and Territories of West Africa," and the Financial Appendix are not printed.

¹ Includes the independent states of Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, and Cameroun; the republics formerly federated in French West and French Equatorial Africa and now autonomous members of the French Community (Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, the Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan, Niger, Voltaic Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and Gabon); the UN Trust Territory of Togo; the British colonies of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; Portuguese Guinea; and Spanish Guinea. The Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) is also included in this paper because it is a part of the French Community. [Footnote in the source text.]

² See attached Annex for General Considerations Relating to Individual Countries and Territories. [Footnote in the source text.]

independence, probably this summer, but with continued strong ties with France and with French assistance. The Malagasy Republic has effected an arrangement looking toward its independence this summer, and other states of the French Community such as Dahomey, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast and Mauritania may follow their example soon thereafter. Sierra Leone will shortly begin discussions with the British regarding terms for its independence.

3. The political stability of the area faces severe trials as the remaining territories achieve independence, frequently accompanied by the tribal rivalries and external political pressures. At present the pace of political change is being set by a very small educated elite. The trend in most countries is toward domination by a single party and growing authoritarianism in government. Communism has not yet become a strong force in West African politics, and, except in the Malagasy Republic, there are no known Communist parties in the area. However, during the early days of independence, the opportunities for Communist penetration and influence are likely to increase and complicate an already difficult situation and make more difficult the area's continuing identification with the West.

4. In this connection, the West will have to contend with a growing Communist Bloc effort to gain influence in West Africa and to exploit anti-colonial sentiments. The Bloc has already established diplomatic missions and established economic and trade links with both Ghana and Guinea, and we can expect a rising tempo of such activities, as well as offers of credits, in other newly independent countries. A concerted Communist effort is also being made with some degree of success to cultivate and subvert African students in Europe and the Bloc.

5. West African leaders are jealous of their new-found political power and are unlikely to surrender it to elements not under their control. In the longer run, however, the efforts of younger leaders to obtain increased political power at the expense of the present political leadership could create a situation favorable to the growth of Communism.

6. Most new West African countries will probably adopt more or less neutralist foreign policies and seek to avoid cold war entanglements, although their underlying orientation may in fact remain more pro-Western than their official pronouncements suggest. Most African leaders have indicated a preference for Western assistance. However, some may turn to the Communist Bloc for aid, not only if they feel the West has not been sufficiently responsive to their needs, but also as a means of emphasizing their neutrality. Many of the new West African nations will probably also succumb to the temptation to play off the West against the East.

7. Within West Africa there are various schemes directed toward preventing the further "balkanization" of the area. They range in content from combinations to maintain common public services, through loose political alliances, to plans for Federal union. With independence, however, the political benefits envisaged in most of these schemes have become considerably less attractive to many national leaders who regard such schemes as an infringement on their newly-won independence. Over the longer term, the less glamorous economic measures may provide a more solid basis for regional cooperation.

8. If an orderly development of the countries of West Africa with a Western orientation and in cooperation with their former European metropolises is to be assured, it is important that the traditional economic ties which bind Western Europe and Africa be maintained and that every effort be made to encourage the former Metropolitan powers to continue economic and technical assistance. On the other hand, strong anti-colonial sentiments will linger and will make certain of the new countries reluctant to remain exclusively dependent upon their former metropolises.

9. The policies of the former metropolises regarding their dependencies vary. The United Kingdom, which has provided economic assistance in the past, has explicitly acknowledged its willingness to continue public and private aid to less-developed members of the Commonwealth, and in September 1958 the U.K. Government announced new measures under which newly-independent members of the Commonwealth would continue to be eligible for development assistance loans from the U.K. Government. The British have also indicated a willingness to provide technical assistance grants to newly-independent Commonwealth countries. The French have said they are willing to continue helping independent members of the Community such as Mali which are willing to remain associated with France and who continue to support France in their foreign policies. However, former French colonies such as Guinea which choose to break with France, lose their claim on direct French development assistance, although some forms of indirect aid have continued. Such colonies also relinquish their claims on Common Market development funds. It is probable, therefore, that both the United Kingdom and France will continue to extend aid on a unilateral basis to their former colonies in Africa. It would be unrealistic, however, to look to the British and French Governments exclusively as sources of external assistance to their respective former dependencies in the area. In any event, probably U.K. and French assistance will be far short of the needs for outside public assistance which many of the former dependencies will

probably feel they will require. Moreover, for reasons of political prestige and to reinforce their position of independence, the independent African countries will seek to develop other sources of aid.

10. The West African economy is characterized by the predominance of subsistence agriculture of very low productivity. In some areas (almost entirely limited to certain of the countries along the coast), impressive gains have been made in such export crops as cocoa, coffee, palm products, peanuts and rubber. As a result, some areas have accumulated substantial foreign exchange holdings; notably, Nigeria and Ghana which have reserves of about \$600 million and \$500 million respectively. Throughout the area, efforts to increase the efficiency of food production have brought very slight results because of the lack of technical knowledge and capital, resistance to new methods, the system of communal land ownership, and unfavorable soil and climatic conditions.

11. The best prospects for long-term economic growth seem to lie in the further development of known mineral resources—iron in Mauritania, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Gabon; bauxite in Ghana and Guinea; scattered deposits of diamonds in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia; and manganese in Gabon. Modest oil deposits have been found in Nigeria and Gabon. The area's hydro-electric resources have so far been exploited only in Cameroun, but plans for major installations are in an advanced state in Ghana, Guinea, and the Congo Republic. However, the problem of financing remains largely unresolved.

12. American economic interests in West Africa are modest. In 1959 this area accounted for only about one per cent of U.S. trade (about \$276 million). American investment in the area is approximately \$225 million, but the greater bulk of it is in Liberia where until recently most of the American economic interest has focused.

13. Our primary strategic military interest in this area is to deny it to Communist control. We now have no significant military requirements in this area. However, control of sea and air communications in this and surrounding areas might become important to us in certain emergency situations, and U.S. requirements for installations, rights, and facilities in this area might develop with technological advances in weapons systems.

Objectives

14. Maintenance of the Free World orientation of the area and denial of the area to Communist domination, including:

- a. The minimization of Communist influences therein.
- b. Orderly economic development and political progress by the countries of the area in cooperation with the metropolises or former metropolises and other Free World countries.

- c. Access to such military rights and facilities and such strategic resources as may become necessary to our national security.
- d. Formation of federations or other larger political groupings of the nations of the area.

Regional Policy Guidance

15. Impress on the countries of Western Europe, including the metropolises or former metropolises, the continuing importance to them of a stable and prosperous West Africa and conduct all U.S. activities with a realization that a continued close Eur-African relationship is important to the United States itself. Similarly, impress on the West Africans the fact that their national well-being depends in large part on a continued close economic and cultural relationship with Western Europe.

16. In applying the policy guidance which follows to all parts of this area except Guinea and Liberia, urge the Western European nations to expand their efforts to influence and support their respective dependent and recently independent areas and, to the extent feasible, to exercise primary responsibility for providing such influence and support, so long as this policy is consistent with U.S. national security interests. Seek to reach an understanding along the above lines with appropriate Western European nations.

17. Until an area achieves independence conduct U.S. activities and programs in the area in full recognition of the responsibilities of the metropolitan power involved, and, to the extent feasible:

- a. Consult with the responsible metropolitan power on U.S. activities and programs in or relating to the area; and
- b. Avoid actions in the area or directly relating to the area likely to cause serious misunderstandings between the United States and the metropolitan power involved.

18. In the event it does not appear feasible or consistent with U.S. national security interests for the European power concerned to exercise primary responsibility in a dependent area or a newly-independent area, be prepared to provide influence and support for such an area, taking into account:

- a. The need for establishing friendly working relationships with the newly-emerging state.
- b. The need to incline this state toward the Free World rather than the Communist world.
- c. The effect of our policies on other Free World States having a colonial heritage.
- d. The need for maintaining Free World harmony including friendly relationships and consultations as appropriate with the present or former metropolitan powers.

19. Pursue actions which will assist newly-independent areas to maintain a Western orientation, mindful of the natural desires and intense sensitivities of the Africans, particularly with respect to their newly-acquired independence. Make clear wherever possible that self-government and independence impose increasing responsibilities which the people must assume.

20. Encourage expansion of those United Nations activities in the area and assistance (other than development financing)³ to the newly-emerging states which will assist in the constructive political and economic development of those states and will complement U.S. efforts to attain its objectives in the area.

Independence, Nationalism and Regionalism

21. Encourage those policies and actions of the former administering powers which assist the newly-independent nations to develop as a part of the Free World.

22. Encourage friendly relations between the nations and territories of West Africa and between those nations and territories and other African countries. Encourage friendly relations between West African nations and the United States.

23. As appropriate, encourage the formation of federations or other forms of association among the newly-emerged states which will enhance their political and economic viability.

24. As feasible, support constructive, non-Communist nationalist and reform movements, balancing the nature and degree of such support, however, with consideration of our relations with our NATO allies.

25. Discourage wherever possible, expansionist tendencies and ethnic xenophobia.

26. Recognizing the importance of non- and anti-Communist labor organizations, as well as farmer's, business and similar organizations to the political and economic development of Free World-oriented African societies, encourage such organizations to follow courses of action consistent with U.S. interests and the needs of the African people.

Racialism

27. Encourage American companies to set an example in practicing non-discrimination to the maximum extent and to train Africans in managerial positions.

³ This provision does not preclude the operations of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. [Footnote in the source text.]

28. Seek to correct distorted African views of U.S. race relations, emphasizing, where appropriate, progress made by the United States in the race relations field.

Communist Activities

29. Cooperate locally with security organizations to combat Communist subversive activities.

30. Encourage, in independent areas where practicable, a full appreciation of the dangers involved in formal Sino-Soviet Bloc representation, in extensive use of Sino-Soviet Bloc technicians and in other Sino-Soviet Bloc economic and cultural contacts. Alert the governments of such nations, without causing false suspicions of our own objectives, to the probability that the Sino-Soviet Bloc will attempt to utilize trade and assistance programs as a technique for political subversion. Nonetheless, maintain a flexible posture that would minimize the damage to U.S. prestige in the event that such nations accept diplomatic or economic relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Military, Strategic and Internal Security

31. Keep the area under periodic survey to determine any changes in the U.S. appraisal of the strategic value to the United States, bearing in mind that the United States may, in the future, require bases, rights or facilities.

32. Discourage the development of an arms race in Africa and of the concept that the United States is prepared to provide military assistance to any nation which requests it. As countries in the area become independent, encourage them to maintain adequately equipped and trained internal security forces. In those cases where external assistance is required for this purpose, encourage the appropriate former metropole to provide such assistance. If this approach fails and if required to achieve U.S. objectives, consider providing U.S. assistance to meet minimum legitimate internal security requirements, including technical training in U.S. military institutions.

33. Establish technically competent observers in African countries to keep abreast of military or internal security developments, subject in each case to the approval of the Secretary of State.

Economic

34. a. Encourage the independent countries and, as may be appropriate, those achieving independence: (1) to make the maximum contribution to their own economic development, (2) to eliminate barriers to trade and investment, (3) to take measures capable of attracting maximum amounts of external private capital, and (4) to look essen-

tially to Western Europe, to the Free World international financial institutions, and to private investment to meet their needs for external capital so long as this is consistent with U.S. security interests.

b. Urge the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and Spain as well as other Free World powers, the Free World international financial institutions, organizations such as the Common Market, and private capital to expand their efforts and, to the maximum extent feasible, rely on these sources to meet the need of the territories and nations of the area for external capital. In meeting the desires of the newly-independent nations for external assistance from sources other than the former metropolises, utilize the Free World international financial institutions to the maximum extent possible, consistent with relevant U.S. loan policies.⁴

c. Wherever it is determined to be infeasible or inconsistent with U.S. national security interests to rely on the sources in subparagraph b to meet the external capital needs of a particular territory or nation, be prepared on the basis of case-by-case appraisal of country of major project requirements to extend economic development assistance or special assistance consistent with the foregoing guidance.

d. Be prepared to extend to independent nations and, in consultation with the metropolitan power concerned, to dependent territories (1) U.S. technical assistance and (2) U.S. special assistance for the improvement of education and training, with particular emphasis to be given to the meeting of the needs which are common to all of the countries of the area. Be prepared to negotiate surplus commodity sales under P.L. 480 when appropriate.

e. Seek to avoid the creation of unrealistic African expectations of U.S. assistance. Accomplish this in part by conducting forthright discussions with the metropolises and countries concerned as to the probable limitations of U.S. assistance both as to type and amounts. Initiate such discussions prior to independence where possible; otherwise in close coordination with the former metropole.

35. In the provision of U.S. assistance, attention should be given to those activities which especially (1) complement the efforts already undertaken by and for the governments of the area concerned; (2) improve, develop or conserve human resources by programs of education, training, and health; (3) accelerate economic development by the selective application of skills to the resources available; (4) serve multi-national needs or are otherwise regional in scope.

⁴ Specific guidance for Guinea and Liberia is provided in paragraphs 41 and 47 below. [Footnote in the source text.]

36. Encourage U.S. and Free World business to participate more actively in the development of the economies of these countries by expanding trade and investment. Seek the denial or limitation of exports of strategic commodities from these areas to the Sino-Soviet Bloc in accordance with U.S. economic defense policy.

37. Encourage expanded efforts by private American institutions and foundations in the field of education, training and research on Africa.

38. Selectively increase educational exchanges between West Africa and the United States.

Policy Guidance On Individual Countries And Territories
Supplemental To The "General Policy Guidance" Above

Cameroun

39. Support the stated UN recommendation for early free elections throughout the country.

Malagasy Republic

40. Cooperate with the Malagasy Government in its efforts to combat the local Communist party.

Guinea

41. Be prepared to extend economic assistance to Guinea.

42. Discourage a pro-Soviet orientation on the part of the Government of Guinea and encourage the development of a neutral policy as the first step toward persuading Guinea to adopt a pro-Western attitude. Recognize that use of excessive pressure at this stage in Guinea's development may produce negative results.

43. Exploit any opportunities tending to weaken the influence of the Communist Bloc.

Liberia

44. Encourage the continuation of close and friendly relations between Liberia and the United States and the rest of the Free World, bearing in mind the desirability of countering the general view of Liberia as a U.S. dependency.

45. Encourage friendly relations with the other independent African countries with a view to facilitating Liberia's role as a force for political moderation in West Africa.

46. Encourage Liberian efforts to bring the hinterland tribal peoples into the economic and political life of the nation.

47. Be prepared to extend economic assistance to Liberia.

Ghana

48. Discourage, whenever possible, Ghana's current tendency to support extremist elements in neighboring African countries.

Nigeria

49. Encourage close and friendly relations with other independent African nations with a view to facilitating Nigeria's role as a potential force for political moderation.

28. Memorandum of Discussion at the 441st Meeting of the National Security Council

April 14, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting. The following remarks were made during the discussion of item 4, "Future NSC Agenda Items."]

Mr. Lay asked whether there were any other suggestions for new agenda items. The Vice President said he had an obsession about Africa. Nigeria, Togo and a host of other African countries would soon become independent. He asked whether the Council was satisfied that there was nothing more concerning Africa to be discussed prior to the end of the present Administration, recalling that the President had expressed the desire to leave a neat shop for the next administration. The Vice President said he believed Africa was potentially the most explosive area in the world today because the newly-independent countries there do not know how to administer their affairs effectively. He realized the Council had adopted two papers on Africa recently¹ but he felt some basic questions perhaps not covered in these papers, such as whether we would or would not support dictatorships in Africa, would form worthwhile questions for discussion by the Council. Mr. Dillon said the State Department felt that Africa was more important than the NSC papers indicated. He had made a statement emphasizing the political significance of Africa at the last Council meeting and the President had directed that OCB should keep a closer watch on the implementation of our policy toward Africa than it

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs.

¹ Documents 22 and 27.

normally kept on the implementation of a country paper.² The significance of Africa for the future was difficult to state succinctly in a paper. The Vice President believed the recommendations to be left by the President to the next administration as far as Africa was concerned should be in better shape than at present. Mr. Dulles said he too felt strongly about Africa and believed Africa should be added to the list of future NSC projects. The Vice President felt it might be desirable to devote an entire meeting to a discussion on Africa. Mr. Dillon believed the Council might hold the discussion on Africa without having before it a policy paper. The Vice President agreed that discussion should take place on the basis of four or five basic questions prepared by the Planning Board. Mr. Lay said such a paper might focus on long-range problems. The Vice President agreed, saying the long-range problems might include the future orientation of African countries, what countries would become independent, how subversion could be combated, etc. In his view a "battle plan" for Africa was needed.

The Vice President then said he believed it was vitally important that Africa be up-graded with respect to the assignment of U.S. personnel. There was a great tendency to consider that the best U.S. overseas positions were in Europe, Asia and Latin America. Africa was a horrible place but the Department of State, ICA, and USIA needed to send high-caliber personnel to Africa. He realized that State had made some progress in this direction; for example, had established the principle that it would not necessarily send black envoys to the black countries of Africa. Mr. Dillon thought personnel now being assigned to Africa by the State Department was high-caliber. He said the embassies being established in the newly-independent countries of Africa resulted in a requirement for a great many more Foreign Service officers. The Department of State had been unsuccessful in obtaining funds for this purpose from Congress. The Vice President agreed that some Congressional action, such as complaints about entertainment allowances for Foreign Service Officers, had been disgraceful and a false economy. Mr. Dillon said that politics was involved; the State Department had asked for only \$50,000 more but had been given only \$10,000 accompanied by a three-page dissertation on liquor. The Vice President believed that we must realize that our information officers and diplomats need to take three hours for lunch. Mr. Allen said one pressing need in Africa was more buildings for offices and living quarters. Mr. Gates said his knowledge of Africa was limited but he felt a Point Four type program was ideally suited to Africa. He believed the people of Africa would respond to programs emphasizing

² See Document 25.

human relations such as medical care, assistance in growing better crops, etc.³

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Marion W. Boggs

³ In NSC Action No. 2219-b (4), April 14, the NSC concurred, subject to Presidential consideration, in the proposal that a "Discussion Paper should be prepared analyzing the national security implications of long-range developments regarding Africa." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) NSC Action No. 2220, also April 14: "Noted the Vice President's statement of the continuing necessity for assigning high-caliber U.S. personnel to posts in Africa." (*Ibid.*)

29. Memorandum of Conversation

April 15, 1960.

SUBJECT

Exchange of Views on Africa

PARTICIPANTS

French Participants

M. Maurice Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister
M. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
M. Charles Lucet, Director-General, Political & Economic Affairs
M. Jean V. Sauvagnargues, Director, African-Levant Affairs
M. Jacques Basdevant, Director, North African Affairs
M. Claude Lebel, Minister-Counselor
M. Guy de Commines, Counselor for African Affairs

United States Participants

The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. J.C. Satterthwaite, Ass't Sec'y, AF
Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Ass't Sec'y, FE
Mr. C.V. Ferguson, Jr., Director, AFS
Mr. W. J. Porter, Director, AFN
Mr. R. H. McBride, Director, WE
Mr. L. J. Saccio, Deputy Dir., ICA

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70/4-1560. Secret. Drafted by Robert H. McBride, C. Vaughan Ferguson, and William J. Porter. Approved in U on April 29 and in S on May 9.

The Secretary opened the meeting by saying we had the general objective of exchanging views with the French on African problems in order that each of us might know what the other was doing in its various African programs so that there would be no lack of specific information on the part of both.¹ He said we had discussed this problem among ourselves and would cooperate to the fullest extent in our objective of consulting fully with the French. He suggested that there should be at least weekly Franco-American meetings on African matters in Washington. In response to Ambassador Alphand's inquiry as to the level of these meetings, the Secretary indicated that they could be at the Ambassadorial level when some policy matter was involved but that he would think of them as being normally at a lower level when it was primarily a question of exchanging information. He would envisage such exchanges as covering material which was made available from the African posts and as including material in a wide number of different fields. He noted this should be a mutual exchange. He added that we, for our part, intended to make known to all of the interested agencies of our Government that this program for consultation with the French on African problems existed in order that we might be kept fully informed and thus, in turn, keep the French informed. The Secretary emphasized the need for secrecy if these discussions were to succeed.

M. Couve de Murville said he thought the United States approach was a most helpful one. The Secretary added that of course contacts between our two Ambassadors in the various African posts in the field should continue. Couve thought this would also be helpful.

Couve then turned to a discussion of African problems per se noting there were two separate Africas and the French so bureaucratically divided them in Paris, though he knew Africa was handled as a single bureau by us.

He said that all of Africa South of the Sahara was in a state of great ferment with emphasis at the moment on the Union of South Africa but with the turn of the Portuguese areas coming next year. Couve pointed out that independence is the order of the day and although none of the African states are ready for it, it is a fact that the West must accept. He said that the Belgians were acting foolishly but he believed that they had no other choice under the circumstances. He said he expected early independence for the territories of East Africa such as Kenya and Tanganyika. The Foreign Minister went on to say that this radical transformation of Africa must not be opposed. While

¹ In January 1960, Prime Minister Debré had suggested that the United States and France coordinate their African policies more closely. In response, the United States suggested that informal consultations be held in Washington. (Telegram 3528 to Paris, February 23; *ibid.*, 611.51/2-2360)

the metropolitan powers cannot keep ahead of it, it is essential that they keep even and this is what the French are trying to do in the Community.

In describing the present concept of the Community, Couve said that the original concept became outmoded immediately after its adoption and the French are, therefore, engaged in a radical transformation of Community structure with no idea whatsoever of opposing African demands.

Couve then defined French policy towards these new states as being predicated around the necessity of defending vested French interests and preventing chaos and Communism. He said he believed that European influence would be extremely helpful in any defense against both chaos and Communism. Couve then mentioned the agreements just concluded with Mali and the Malagasy Republic in which the French recognized the full independence of these two states.² He said this independence would not be qualified and that the new states would be full members of the United Nations although remaining in the Community. He said that the Community would probably develop into a sort of commonwealth with the important difference that the President of the French Republic would automatically be President of the Community although without specific powers.

M. Couve de Murville said that the agreements would provide for the organization of diplomatic services for Mali and Malagasy although the French will represent them where they have no embassies. Mali and Malagasy have, he said, undertaken to consult with the French on important questions of foreign policy and defense in order to reach a common position. He said that each state will have a small national army of about 4,000 men for which the French will pay. Both Mali and Malagasy have asked the French to participate in their external defense although no formal alliance has been signed. Couve then mentioned that the French would either own or continue to use key strategic bases in both republics.

In the economic field, Couve said that Mali and the Malagasy Republic would stay in the franc zone and that France would continue to pay for essential requirements as in the past. French expenditures would be for economic development, budgetary support and technical assistance.

² These agreements were concluded, respectively, on April 2 and April 4, 1960. The French Constitution was shortly thereafter amended to permit continued membership within the Community subsequent to a declaration of independence. Mali, which was the name Senegal and the Sudan selected when they merged in April 1959, became independent on June 20, 1960, followed 6 days later by Madagascar or the Malagasy Republic.

The Foreign Minister went on to say that the French Government is now asking Parliament to ratify these agreements which means they will also have to amend the constitution since the latter document as it now stands does not provide for the Community's becoming an association of independent states. Couve said that similar arrangements are now open for the rest of the Community states. He pointed out that several of these states are undecided about the degree of association there should be among themselves. They are mostly, he explained, too small to survive alone but not yet ready to abandon newly won perquisites of power. He said they are still thinking it over although they understand they will have to amalgamate in one way or another. Couve said he envisaged this amalgamation as taking the form of the four states of former French Equatorial Africa getting together in some form of federation or confederation; some regroupment among the non-Mali states of former French West Africa not presently capable of being defined; and Mauritania going it alone, since Mauritania has little affinity with the Negro states of the south.

M. Couve de Murville then said that the emergence of these states raises problems in US-French relations similar to those in North Africa, particularly Morocco and Tunisia. He said that obviously these new states would have full relations with the United States thus creating a problem of competition between the two countries. He said that this is always a difficult problem with the differences in language, consciously or unconsciously, at the root of the trouble. Couve said that he thought some of our differences arose from United States policy of associating aid with over-all strategic policy. He said that he thought the best we could do at the moment was to keep each other informed and try to work together avoiding the impression that one state is taking the place of the other. Couve promised that France would continue to give all aid to the Community states sufficient for their needs and he called attention to the vast number of French Civil Servants not only in the Community but also in North Africa and even in Guinea. Couve recapitulated by saying that France would provide the Community's basic development needs through development loans, budgetary support and the common market.

The Secretary asked if in the agreements just signed with Mali and Malagasy the French had undertaken to furnish absolutely everything those states required. Couve replied that no long-term commitments had been made in advance and aid to these republics would be handled on a year to year basis. He said that France would provide all the two republics would need within reason but possibly not all they themselves might feel they need.

The Secretary said that he wished to assure the French that the last thing the United States wants to do is to remove the skills and culture which an African state has learned from the Mother Country.

He said that the principal concern of the United States was whether Africa is to become another battle ground between the West and the Communist world. The Secretary expressed particular concern over Chinese Communist influence as seen in Guinea. He went on to say that the African states themselves will try to see how much aid they can stimulate by playing with both worlds.

Couve replied that this was the main reason for the French attitude towards Guinea. Guinea, he said, is a Communist state. At the time Guinea refused to join the Community, the country was already under Communist leadership and, therefore, the French were obliged to cut all ties because of the impact of Guinea's neighbors. Couve said that French friends in Mali, etc., have become more and more conscious of the fact that Guinea is a danger to them and most Community leaders are well aware of the dangers of Communists, Russians as well as Chinese. He then described a meeting in Paris between Khrushchev and a number of the Community presidents in which the latter attacked Khrushchev hard and the peril to Africa imposed by Chinese expansionism.³ Couve said that both he and Khrushchev were very surprised at this approach. Couve said that this showed the degree of awareness of the Communist danger on the part of the Community leaders.

The Secretary asked Couve whether he could estimate how the Algerian situation is developing. Couve said it was difficult to respond, that basically it was a matter of the French cease-fire offer not having been accepted. On the military side, Couve said, the situation was better than a year ago, in fact it had been transformed in recent months. Couve added that this was not a solution to the political problem of Algeria, however, even though it helped to have a sounder military situation. He said that the FLN position had become more and more rigid recently on the non-acceptance of a cease-fire. He referred to the recent FLN call for volunteers and said that closer contacts between the FLN and the Red Chinese had probably been motivated by the desire to impress the United States. Couve said it was not desirable at all that the Algerian war should continue, but there was no effort by the FLN to end it. He thought there had been a real chance to end the war some months ago at the time of the cease-fire offer in September, but he noted that the FLN had never at any point made an attempt to enter into discussions with the French on that basis.

The Secretary asked if there was some change in the September program of General de Gaulle in the light of Prime Minister Debré's speech earlier in the week when he spoke of partition of Algeria. The Secretary thought this was the first time this concept had been referred

³ Khrushchev visited France, March 23–April 3, 1960.

to openly. Couve said that the idea of partition had been mentioned in de Gaulle's September 16 declaration and had been discussed at that time by the FLN.⁴

Couve then asked for the United States evaluation of the situation in South Africa. The Secretary replied that South Africa has been a volcano for many years and it is amazing that it has not exploded sooner. The Secretary said that he saw no sign of any amelioration of the situation and felt it would affect all of subsaharan Africa. Couve expressed the opinion that he did not believe events in South Africa would have any serious repercussions except in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and possibly in Kenya.

The Secretary then briefly mentioned the serious problem imposed by the sudden emergence of the Belgian Congo which finds itself with serious financial problems at the very moment of independence. Mr. Dillon added that costs in the Congo have risen sharply in the last few months. Couve replied that this was true but the Congo is a relatively rich territory. Couve said that the problem is compounded by the fact that with independence, governmental control often breaks down with many Africans assuming that there is no longer any need to pay taxes. He then asked whether the United States has any programs in mind for aid to the Belgian Congo or Mali. Mr. Dillon replied that the basic concern of the United States is to see the African territories develop in freedom and stay in the free world. He said that in view of the heavy responsibility which the United States has elsewhere, it does not wish to do anything it does not have to and, therefore, hopes that the rest of the free world, particularly the former metropolises, will continue to carry the major portion of the burden of aiding Africa. Nevertheless, Mr. Dillon said, the new African states clearly want some sort of connection with the United States as a symbol of their independence. In this connection, Mr. Dillon asked what the French attitude would be toward any American technical cooperation in economic development problems. He said he realized that the Belgian Congo was a different case, since the Belgians had specifically asked us to come in. He said Prime Minister Debré had told him that the Community states would want something from the United States and it would, therefore, be useful if we could coordinate our programs, although it appears to him that French plans were fairly inclusive and the United States did not wish to push in on them. Couve agreed that independence for African states involved consideration of United States aid programs but pointed out that there were existing organizations such as the common market which could also play a major role. Mr. Dillon said that he believed technical education should have first priority throughout Africa, to which Couve replied

⁴ Documentation on North Africa and Algeria is included in volume XIII.

that the problem of language was a very serious one. He asked that United States officials keep in touch with the French on any programs which might envisage this field.

The Secretary called attention to the contrast between the French policy and that of the Italians in Somalia and the Belgians in the Congo, where these two metropolises appear desirous of unloading everything on the United States. He said that he feared this might create a precedent which will impel the leaders of the Community states to feel they should be entitled to United States aid simply because other African countries are receiving it.

Mr. Saccio called attention to the Special Program for Tropical Africa for which money has been requested from Congress for raising technical skills throughout Africa. He pointed out that no decision has been taken as to how to divide this fund between English and French speaking areas.

Couve again called attention to the language difficulty and said it would not be easy for the United States to carry out educational programs in French speaking areas. Mr. Dillon replied that there is an intense desire to learn English throughout Africa and pointed out that because the United States had not been able to move quickly in Guinea, the latter had engaged Russian English teachers. Mr. Dillon said the United States is now prepared to send English teachers to Guinea without a technical cooperation agreement. Mr. Satterthwaite expressed the opinion that it was extremely important that English and French be maintained as the major languages in Africa South of the Sahara. He stressed the point that the United States does not wish to appear to compete with the French nor to displace the French language.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that in considering the Community, the United States hoped that France would encourage the various republics to stay in as large units as possible. He said that the United States realized that they probably all desired United Nations membership but that we hoped the French could encourage them to group themselves into a maximum of three units. Couve replied that the French agreed with Mr. Satterthwaite's point but that it was a very delicate question and one in which the French had lost their power to intervene directly. Mr. Satterthwaite asked concerning former French Equatorial Africa, wondering whether it would apply for UN membership as a single state. In reply, the Foreign Minister said that that is the idea of the Equatorial Africans at the moment, but that they may have some difficulty in obtaining acceptance by the United Nations if they do not actually represent a single government or a single state. He doubted that this area would become independent before next year in any event and said that the capital of whatever federation that they be would be located at Pointe Noire.

Mr. Satterthwaite referred to the question of arms control and said he assumed that France would only support internal security forces in the Community republics. Couve answered that this was indeed the case and that France had agreed to supply and equip an army of 4,000 men each in both Mali and Malagasy. Mr. Satterthwaite pointed out that the United States is not anxious to supply arms to this part of Africa. The Secretary said that the only alternative to the equipping of these forces by the former metropolises would be smuggling and Couve agreed that the latter was very hard to control.

M. Couve de Murville then expressed concern over developments in the horn of Africa particularly with regard to the concept of a greater Somalia and said that France was worried lest the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia come before the Security Council. The Secretary said he believed that this problem would soon arise. Couve said that the question of the boundary with Ethiopia was far from settled and that there could be trouble even in northern Kenya where there is a substantial Somali population.

The Secretary then said that before concluding the meeting, he wished Mr. Parsons to have the opportunity to express the Department's opinion concerning the problems of the new African states and the Chinese question. Mr. Parsons said that it is clear that France and the United States share a common concern regarding Communist China and that it is very useful to have talks such as this. He said the question is becoming particularly urgent in view of the appearance of the several new African states and said that the Chinese Communists would make an extra effort: (1) to be invited to the various independence ceremonies; (2) to claim diplomatic recognition; and (3) to obtain African support to vote against the moratorium in the United Nations.

Mr. Parsons went on to say that the African states are not fully informed concerning the moratorium and he believed it would be helpful if the opportunity could be seized to explain this issue to them well in advance of independence. On the question of recognition, Mr. Parsons found the attitude of the Cameroun excellent and said he felt that we had the opportunity to follow this most useful formula in Togo. He said that he hoped new African states would all understand that any premature decision with regards to recognizing Communist China may not be wise and might have repercussions on other states while not directly affecting the African states themselves. Couve replied that he understood Mr. Parsons' points and said that he doubted that the Community republics would establish embassies in either Peiping or Taipei. Mr. Satterthwaite asked whether the French believed that in the long run the Chinese Communists represented a greater danger in Africa than the Russians since they can claim to be non-white. Couve replied that he believed that this was in fact a real problem. Mr. Satterthwaite said that there was also a danger that

Chinese technicians in Africa would prove to be more competent than the Russians. In reply, Couve said that there was no question but that the Chinese Communists represented a very real danger to Africa.

30. Report of the Conference of Principal Diplomatic and Consular Officers of North and West Africa, Tangier, May 30–June 2, 1960

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Conference of Principal Diplomatic and Consular Officers of North and West Africa, meeting at Tangier from May 30 to June 2, 1960,¹ after discussing the policies and programs of the United States in the area, recorded the following conclusions and recommendations:

A. Political

1. It is imperative for the attainment of United States policy objectives, which involve the denial of the area to Sino-Soviet bloc domination, that the United States identify itself with the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Africa. Such identification involves in the first instance a clear demonstration of U.S. sympathetic interest in their problems and treatment of the new countries of Africa on a basis of equality. While conventional diplomacy through personal contacts and public positions plays an important role in establishing areas of common interest, economic aid will be an increasingly necessary instrument for the attainment of United States objectives in Africa.

2. The situation in Tropical Africa is distinguished by its special urgency and its rapid, often unpredictable evolution. The period immediately before and after the attainment of independence will be crucial for the establishment of friendly and cooperative relations between the U.S. and the new African nations. Early and effective action in responding to the needs of such countries can be more economical than action at a later time: one dollar spent now may well be as useful

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1471/6–260. Secret. The undated report is entitled “Conference of Principal Diplomatic and Consular Officers of North and West Africa: Record of Proceedings.”

¹ The conference was chaired by Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite and attended by chiefs of mission and principal officers of 19 diplomatic and consular missions in Africa, representatives of the Embassies in London and Paris, and representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, the International Cooperation Administration, the United States Information Agency, the Development Loan Fund, and the Bureau of the Budget.

to the U.S. interest as ten dollars spent two years from now. In general, the attitudes initially created in the new nations are likely to have a long-lasting influence on their positions and policies in the world at large and in the United Nations.

3. Regarding Algeria, the Conference noted with concern the unlikelihood of an early settlement of the war and the grave menace which the continuation of this conflict represents for the furtherance of U.S. interests throughout Africa. It also took note of the continuing effort of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and especially the Red Chinese, to acquire influence in the FLN. It considered this indicative of Sino-Soviet intention to ensure a Communist presence and influence in Algeria if and when a settlement of the Algerian problem is achieved. The Conference felt that while the U.S. had understandably refrained from becoming deeply involved in this delicate and difficult problem, we should nonetheless remain alert to the possibility of making a definite contribution toward a settlement. Such a contribution might bring about a change of current opinion in Africa, which seems to associate the United States closely with the French war effort. The Conference also felt that if prospects for a settlement improve, the United States should begin a careful examination of possible steps to influence the future orientation of the Algerian area of North Africa, bearing in mind that circumstances could so develop as to make speedy action imperative.

4. The Conference devoted much time to discussion of the problems posed for the West, and for the achievement of our objectives in Africa, by French policies and attitudes in Africa South of the Sahara. While recognizing the need to conciliate France in view of its staunch position in Europe, the conferees wished to record their view that this conciliation, if carried too far, will impair and might even jeopardize the effectiveness of our effort in Africa.

5. With respect to the creation or maintenance of larger African political groupings, the United States should continue to support the idea of greater African unity, recognizing, however, that this is not an immediate prospect and that the present trend in Africa is in a direction of national rather than supra-national aspirations. The United States should be careful not to endorse prematurely any specific proposals for African unity that may be put forth by African leaders. In this connection it was the view of the Conference that the Garvey-DuBois-Nkrumah classical Pan-African concept appears to be a declining force.

6. The entry into the United Nations of a sizable number of new African states will have an impact on U.S. participation in that organization. The Conference noted the importance of early discussions with

the leaders of the emerging states to provide them with essential background on key United Nations issues and to promote a sympathetic understanding of the United States approach to these problems.

7. There is no U.S. strategic requirement for the buildup of indigenous armed forces in Africa. The African states should be discreetly encouraged to agree among themselves on some form of regional arms limitation and control. The U.S. may, however, have to provide military assistance, limited as far as possible to internal security requirements, to forestall the Sino-Soviet bloc in some African countries.

B. Economic

1. With respect to United States aid policies in general, the Conference noted the recent shift in emphasis from grant aid to loans, which may reflect a reasonable adjustment to the great changes that have occurred in the world economy as a result of United States aid over a long period. The Conference expresses the belief, however, that the requirements of Africa, although uniquely African, correspond more to those which existed in Europe fifteen years ago or in South and Southeast Asia five years ago. If our aid is to be effective in Africa, our policies and aid instruments must be adjusted to the particular situation prevailing there. This may require departures from established present world-wide policies and aid patterns and a return, in the case of Africa, to patterns and practices that were applied successfully elsewhere at an earlier time.

2. Because the needs of the new African countries are very extensive and varied, an attempt to meet all of them would be self-defeating. Although some U.S. assistance to all the new countries is desirable and necessary, the U.S. must be selective in its approach, taking into account also the important aid programs of some of the former metropolitan powers which continue to have important interests in the new African countries. While the United States must continue to urge that aid from the metropolises be maintained and if possible increased, there is no assurance that such aid will in fact continue. Therefore a number of crisis situations may arise in Africa through the creation of vacuums into which Soviet and other Communist aid could flow on a massive scale.

3. It was the belief of the Conference that the greatest dangers appear to exist at the moment in Guinea, Cameroun, Togo and Mali (in addition to the Belgian Congo which was not in the area covered by this Conference and where, as in Guinea, we are already faced with such a crisis). In the case of Cameroun and Togo, which are now fully independent, the United States should inquire about the aid plans of the French Government and should urge France to continue its assistance. If it appears that France is preparing to exact political concessions from those countries in return for aid and that those concessions

are being refused, the United States should be prepared to step in with the aid programs required to avoid a repetition of the situation that arose in Guinea. Account should also be taken of cases where there is a lack of receptivity to aid from the former metropolises.

4. If the objectives of United States policy in the area are to be attained, American assistance must be timely and responsive not only to African economic and internal security needs and to U.S. security requirements but also to African political requirements which may well involve departures from aid patterns in less primitive or more stable countries. United States assistance should create a climate which will engage the expectations of the leadership in a Western direction so that the countries of the area will not be tempted to look upon Sino-Soviet bloc aid as essential for the solution of their problems.

5. The United States should seek strengthened multilateral aid programs including programs of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, but such programs can be no more than a modest supplement to United States bilateral programs. The United States should also explore the possibility of some coordinating mechanism for aid to Africa which could maximize resources available from the former metropolises and other potential donors while giving the African countries a forum in which to discuss and coordinate their aid requirements. Since the realization of such a plan involves many difficulties and since the situation requires both flexibility and speed, the United States should not permit consideration of such new patterns to delay the establishment and implementation of bilateral programs which would continue in any case even if a multilateral "umbrella" were erected over them.

6. The strong conviction was expressed that certain provisions of our standard bilateral agreements for technical and economic assistance represent definite liabilities. Reference was made especially to provisions dealing with diplomatic privileges and immunities for personnel of aid missions and for contract employees. Several participants from posts in North and West Africa declared that such provisions represent not only irritants but dangers for the reception of our aid programs and for our relations with those countries. It was also noted that in many countries special privileges for American technicians might upset relationships for thousands of technicians from former metropolises who do not enjoy similar privileges and whose continued presence in those countries is essential. (The same difficulties arise with respect to privileges and immunities for personnel of U.S. Government agencies other than ICA—e.g. Defense, VOA, FBIS.)

7. The United States should be prepared to waive certain formalities which are not absolutely necessary, especially when such formalities would involve delays in critical situations. African countries cannot be expected to analyze their needs or to submit detailed

justifications for aid requests because in many cases they do not know their real needs and do not know how to analyze them. In some cases ICA should be prepared to act promptly on obvious needs without waiting for formal written requests from recipient countries.

8. The Conference also expressed itself in favor of a relaxation of the formalities attending the initiation of DLF loan applications. These formalities represent a serious obstacle to the attainment of our objectives and reduce even further the utility of this aid instrument in the African context.

C. Cultural and Information

1. There is a need for greatly expanded information and cultural activities in Africa especially tailored for the various regions. The Conference expressed its hope that United States Information Service posts in the newly emerging countries will be fully manned, equipped and financed in the shortest possible time.

2. One element of primary importance for the achievement of American policy objectives in Africa is a wider dissemination of knowledge of the English language. As far as the former French dependencies are concerned, however, this encounters a special degree of sensitivity and resentment on the part of the French Government. It was concluded that the United States must, without renouncing its objective of creating a wider knowledge of English in the countries concerned, take into account the attitudes of the French Government; that, accordingly, it cannot be our policy or program to move forward on a broad front and with an intensive effort in all cases; but that, rather, an ad hoc approach is indicated, moving forward wherever French sensitivities appear less intense and stressing, in all cases, that it is not our purpose to displace or diminish the French cultural influence in the countries involved.

3. Better coordination and planning are required between the various programs that bring Africans on visits to the United States. Contract agencies should be particularly careful to so arrange grantee programs as to minimize the danger of racial incidents. It was noted that different treatment of grantees in various different categories can give rise to invidious comparisons which are harmful to the program. It was also noted that the effectiveness of visits to the United States is reduced when they involve many short visits in different parts of the country rather than fewer and more intensive visits. Grantees should be discouraged from making excessively ambitious plans for travel in the United States when the length of their visit will be limited.

D. Administrative

1. Unconventional situations require unconventional methods to deal with them. In African hardship posts we are sometimes confronted with such situations. Unusual requests from African posts must be viewed in this light and deserve more than reference to applicable procedures and regulations.

2. With respect to building operations, the situation in Africa requires a much greater degree of flexibility on the part of FBO. In many cases the need for housing is so pressing, and opportunities for rental are so limited or even non-existent, that FBO should be placed in a position to construct authorized housing on a crash basis in a period of months rather than years.

3. Recognizing that the present budgetary situation of FBO severely limits the initiation of new construction projects or the purchase of office and living quarters, the Conference felt that the attention of Congress should be directed to the fact that in many African countries annual rentals are designed to amortize a building in three or four years, and where we are left with no alternative, our payments of rent unavoidably result in a much larger expenditure of public funds over a period than would be involved if we constructed or purchased buildings.

4. With respect to tours of duty, it was felt that greater flexibility is needed at hardship posts especially in the case of clerical personnel after one year, even within the area, since the change alone would revive morale and stimulate new interest.

5. The Conference noted the utility of area training for Africa. It agreed, on the other hand, that there is little merit in training personnel in African languages since English and French are usually the official languages and are spoken by members of the elite and by significant elements of the populations; whereas African dialects are of limited utility not only geographically but even within particular communities. However, increased study of French by personnel proceeding to French-speaking African posts was found very desirable.

[Here follow the remainder of the report and two annexes: A, "U.S. Objectives in Africa," a statement by Satterthwaite, and B, a list of participants at the conference.]

31. Editorial Note

On May 17, the Department circulated the text of a proposed message addressed to Ethiopian Foreign Minister Yilma Deressa in his capacity as chairman of the Conference of Independent African States. The draft message reads as follows:

“On behalf of the United States Government I send greetings to the Second Conference of Independent African States, which is now meeting at Addis Ababa. The steady and orderly progress of the peoples of Africa toward self-government is most gratifying. In your efforts at this Conference to help bring peace and prosperity to your continent, you have the best wishes of the Government of the United States.”

The United States viewed the impending conference as “potentially the most effective mechanism for considering African problems and fostering African unity.” (CA-9562; Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/5-1760)

Comments were received from the Embassy in Guinea (telegram 557 from Conakry, May 30; *ibid.*, 770.00/5-3060) and the Embassy in the United Arab Republic (airgram G-271 from Cairo, May 28; *ibid.*, 770.00/5-2860).

The message that Herter sent to Deressa on June 10 reads:

“On behalf of the United States Government I send greetings to the Second Conference of Independent African States, which is now meeting at Addis Ababa. The political progress of the peoples of Africa is most gratifying. This progress represents the steady implementation of the principle of self-determination—a principle that our Government has endorsed throughout its history.

“In your efforts at this Conference to foster peace and prosperity in your Continent, as well as to enhance the contribution of Africa to the peaceful solution of world problems, you have the best wishes and support of the Government of the United States.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 4, 1960, page 23)

The Embassy in Ethiopia’s assessment of the Conference is in despatch 377 from Addis Ababa, June 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/6-3060)

32. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security (Bell)

June 30, 1960.

SUBJECT

Some Observations based on the Tangier Conference

I wish to thank you for the interest you have taken in our Conference at Tangier, for your attendance there and the contribution you made, and for the time and trouble you have taken in setting down your impressions in writing. At the same time, however, my impressions of the consensus of the Conference differ in important respects from those in your memorandum of June 2 which you sent me on June 16.¹

First of all, it is my conclusion that the Conference showed a clear consensus that we will *not* be able to prevent Communist economic penetration of the African continent but are setting as our objective to keep Communist contacts and influence within reasonable bounds, i.e., to prevent the penetration of sensitive sectors and to avoid conditions in which African nations will turn to the Bloc for massive aid. It seems to me that this was brought out quite clearly in my opening statement in which I interpreted the NSC objectives. While these objectives do not apparently seem sufficient to you, I think there was no uncertainty about them at the Conference.

You state in your memorandum that "Conceivably, if the Western powers were really determined to exclude the Soviet, and were prepared to meet all reasonable African desires for development (not always existent) quickly and painlessly, Soviet penetration might be confined or restricted if not prevented." Your memorandum, furthermore, seems to set up the alternatives of either having such a comprehensive and all-inclusive program or else accepting defeat in certain areas of Africa while concentrating on others where the prospects are more promising. I do not agree with such artificial alternatives, and wonder whether upon reflection you will not agree that we are not really caught up in such a dilemma.

Source: Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 69 D 295, Tangier—Chiefs of Mission Conference. Confidential. Drafted by Martin F. Herz, United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of African Affairs. Copies were sent to the Under Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, the Special Assistant for Communist Economic Affairs, the Deputy Director of ICA, the Policy Planning Staff, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary.

¹ Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

There is a tendency, I think, for some officers in the Department to feel that it is the task of the United States Government to create conditions in Africa where the Soviets will have no opportunities at all to give economic aid. However, the requirements of the African continent are so great that we are in my opinion bound to be defeated if we set for ourselves such an overly ambitious objective. If we tried to meet all African requirements we would only scatter our resources and encourage African countries to invite the Soviets and the West to the kind of competitive bidding in which we would soon find ourselves in the position of gamblers having to double the stakes in order to keep in the game. I do not believe this would be realistic or wise.

I think I detect a note of impatience, if not of irony, in your memorandum where you purport to summarize our discussions of French aid to African countries. ("Great uncertainty seemed to exist as to what should be done in any case." "It was not very clear how the anticipated erroneous French views would differ from ours . . . ")² Actually, I think the Conference brought out very clearly that our commitment to consult with the French about aid to their present or former dependencies constitutes a serious but unavoidable policy problem, but that the French have a right to ask for such consultations because they are at present pumping half a billion dollars a year into Africa and are extending the kind of massive assistance in personnel services which the United States would be quite unable to provide. The Conference noted that it would be a fatal mistake for us to jeopardize such assistance by trying to charge forward in spite of French objections. Our major problem, as was brought out again and again at the Conference, is to gear ourselves to move in quickly if the French permit a vacuum to be created as in Guinea. This is, of course, a contingency situation. I realize that such situations make your job more difficult, and perhaps the tone of your memorandum reflects some frustration that we have not been able to make it easier. However, there is no use fighting the problem: The French do have a large program of assistance in Africa and we must be concerned, first of all, with maintaining that program.

Your memorandum seems to reflect a certain disappointment that the Tangier Conference did not call for an especially large US aid program. It is true that we reached no such conclusion. At the same time, however, the Conference did express itself quite clearly that we are confronted with a crisis situation in Africa; that early US action to engage the expectations of the new countries in a Western direction would be of vital importance; that "ten million dollars spent now may well be worth one hundred million spent two years from now;" that action on our part should not wait for the creation of some concerted

² All ellipses are in the source text.

Western mechanism for assistance; that the present aid instruments are not suited to the situation in Africa and that we should be prepared to revert in some instances to instruments that have been used successfully in other parts of the world at earlier times (including grant aid and where necessary budgetary support); and that we should be alive to situations where Soviet actions would necessitate our pre-empting certain sensitive sectors.

You state that the "major impediment to further Bloc penetration appears to be only the lack of a firm Soviet decision to move in. Certainly opportunities for penetration are obvious, numerous, almost made to order . . ." I strongly believe that the same opportunities also exist for the United States. The trouble is, as I see it, that the United States Government seems to be unwilling to budget sufficient funds to enable us to pre-empt sensitive sectors and to fire at targets of opportunity, which is precisely what the Soviets seem to be preparing to do. Since we cannot occupy all positions, planning on a contingency basis seems essential—but it is just this principle which is being continuously denigrated.

Nor can I agree at all with your statement that "one gets the impression our people are, if not content with this limited pattern (reliance on technical cooperation, cultural exchange and old-fashioned diplomacy), at least not prepared to urge strongly a larger action program or to define their ideas as to what might be effective." The difficulty, rather, seems to be that you and others in the Department expect us to come up with concrete plans for aid on either a continent-wide or a country-to-country basis, failing which it is felt that we cannot go to Congress and ask for the necessary funds to counter the anticipated major Soviet effort in Africa. I do not believe it realistic to expect this kind of neat programming precision in a fast-moving situation when there are so many unknown and variable factors.

You state "no impression was given me that our representatives have very much information or assessment of the Soviet intentions in such matters." That is entirely correct, and it is the reason why we may be defeated in Africa if detailed information of this kind is a precondition for United States preparation for action. You also state that "The strategic significance or political importance of the area seemed to be viewed in low key, especially by the Washington AF representatives, who cannot be accused of encouraging grandiose schemes." I am afraid that such sentences convey an entirely inaccurate impression of the proceedings in Tangier. Surely, the encouragement of "grandiose schemes" is not the only measure of our seriousness in viewing the African situation.

I completely agree with you that we need better information, clearer analyses of the problems, prompt and effective programs of political and economic action, stronger staffs and clearer policy guid-

ance. However, if we are going to wait until all of these elements or conditions are met we will surely be defeated in Africa. The solution does not lie in waiting until we have larger staffs in Africa, have solved the problem of African technical education, have G-2'd Soviet intentions in great detail—or in throwing up our hands in despair and concentrating only on the most promising countries in Africa.

It seems to me that we have a real difference of basic approach. Your memorandum attempts to place on the Bureau of African Affairs and its field representatives the blame for the inability of the United States to move swiftly in a swift-moving situation in which not all the factors are known, in which the intentions of our opponents are not yet quite clear, and where neatly worked-out programs of the conventional kind cannot be prepared quickly. I think we can work out a different approach together, and I earnestly solicit your cooperation to that end. Perhaps you can think of ways in which the findings of the Tangier Conference could be used to document the urgent needs of the African area and the unique situation we have there, so as to justify what someone at Tangier called “unconventional solutions to unconventional problems” in Africa.

I greatly appreciate the comments you made about the personnel situation at some of our African posts, and the need to beef up some of our posts so that we can be better prepared for the emergencies that are sure to arise there in many places. I know that I can count on your support in carrying our requests to the highest levels in the Department if necessary.

Our report of the Tangier Conference, which sets forth its conclusions and summarizes the proceedings in some detail, has been circulated to the field and will be disseminated throughout the Department as soon as field comments have been received. Meanwhile, I would appreciate it if you could let me know to whom, in addition to Mr. Hare, your memorandum was disseminated, so that I may send copies of this memorandum to them also.³

³ Bell responded to Satterthwaite on July 5. He noted that the amount of aid did not concern him only that it advance the “attainment of U.S. policy objectives.” (Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 69 D 295, U.S. Aid)

33. Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the National Security Council

August 18, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *National Security Implications of Future Developments Regarding Africa* (NSC 6001;¹ NSC 6005/1;² NSC Action No. 2219-b-(4);³ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 12, 1960;⁴ Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 10⁵ and 16, 1960⁶)

Mr. Gray introduced the discussion by describing briefly the background of the preparation of the Discussion Paper on Africa. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).⁷ In the course of this introduction, Mr. Gray noted that the Vice President was unable to attend the Council Meeting and indicated that he would see that the Vice President was briefed on the Council discussion. He then introduced Secretary Dillon.

Secretary Dillon stated that the State Discussion Paper had been prepared as a talking paper. It indicated pretty well what the situation is now and what problems we faced in Africa. When the State paper had been discussed in the Planning Board, the Board had developed sixteen questions on the basis of it. It would take too long, Secretary Dillon stated, to deal with all of these questions in detail and some of them were somewhat repetitive, but he would attempt to deal with three or four of the principal questions. The main point to be made about Africa, Secretary Dillon said, was the fairly obvious one that the continent is in a state of extreme flux at present and that if the U.S. was to react properly to the situation, we required maximum flexibility. In all of our security operations—in military operations through the UN or otherwise, diplomatic actions, and in economic and other activities—we should emphasize doing what needs to be done in a particular case rather than what accords with our basic ideas as to the ideal way of handling the situation. Another thing that was different

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Robert H. Johnson on August 25.

¹ Document 22.

² Document 27.

³ See footnote 3, Document 28.

⁴ Not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351)

⁵ Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

⁶ This memorandum transmitted the views of the JCS as stated in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated July 28. (*Ibid.*)

⁷ Not printed.

in Africa as compared with other areas, Secretary Dillon suggested, was the need for and advantage of a multilateral approach. The U.S. had backed the UN in the development of its unique position in the Congo and we have to a large extent succeeded in keeping the Soviets out. Secretary Dillon thought the decision to provide aid to the Congo through the UN was the correct decision. As regards Africa generally, it was different from other underdeveloped areas in that the former colonial powers had a real interest in providing support. They are presently assisting the area to the extent of \$500 million per year and are ready to continue such assistance. The U.S. position in Africa therefore was different from that in other underdeveloped areas in that we were supporting other industrial countries rather than assuming the main role. Another unique problem in Africa was the lack of qualified U.S. personnel for service there.

With these general observations for background, Secretary Dillon stated he would now take up three or four of the Planning Board questions. He read the first part of Question No. 2: "Should the U.S. and the Free World seek competitive or cooperative relationships with the Soviet Union in Africa?" Secretary Dillon stated that in several areas of Africa, the Soviets were trying to break in. To cooperate with them would only cause them to get in earlier and easier. We had to compete, although not on every program, country, or thing. We should pick out those things that we could do best and concentrate on them, getting together with other Free World nations on those things. The achievement of Free World cooperation could be accomplished through the UN or through the new assistance group. We should seek to prevent the Soviets from gaining a major position in Africa although we will have to adjust to some Soviet presence there.

Secretary Dillon next read the second part of Question No. 2: "If the U.S. is to compete, will our present techniques satisfy the need to help the new African governments to limit and control their contacts with the Bloc, including their development of relations with Communist China, and especially to prevent their acceptance of Bloc assistance in the military and other sensitive fields?" Secretary Dillon stated that U.S. techniques are too cumbersome. This was partly because of the need to have the same policy everywhere in the world and partly because of Congressional and General Accounting Office requirements. We had to live up to these requirements, but we also had to find ways to act quickly.

Secretary Dillon then read the third part of Question No. 2: "Should the U.S., in anticipation of Bloc efforts to overthrow pro-Western regimes by subversive means, help the Africans to develop adequate internal security forces, perhaps by increased emphasis on

the NSC 1290-d type programs?"⁸ Answering this question, Secretary Dillon stated that 1290-d programs were desirable where they would work but that they should not be undertaken for all of Africa. They would work well in some countries, not in others. Moreover, Secretary Dillon indicated, it might be necessary in a few countries, as it had been in Ethiopia, to provide military assistance on a preclusive basis to keep the Soviets out.

Secretary Dillon then read the last part of Question No. 2: "Would it be feasible to apply the principles of a Free World 'Monroe Doctrine' for Africa as a means of curbing Communist Bloc influence?" The answer to this question, Secretary Dillon indicated, was "no". The African states would resent it very much if outsiders announced such a doctrine for Africa. Such action would promote the very things that we were against.

Secretary Dillon then proceeded to Question No. 3: "Is neutralism in this area necessarily undesirable from the point of view of U.S. interests?" Secretary Dillon stated that neutralism was not undesirable if the countries were genuinely neutral—that is, friendly to the West and to free enterprise. But if they went as far as Guinea, neutralism could be undesirable. In the UN the U.S. should seek the support of the African states on the majority of the issues in which we are interested. Secretary Dillon noted our success in obtaining African support for UN actions relating to the Congo. The African states believe that Lumumba has gone too far and are in this case supporting the UN against one of their own people. Concluding his discussion of this point, Secretary Dillon stated that neutralism was better than Communism.

Secretary Dillon turned next to Question No. 10: "It is U.S. policy to encourage and, to the extent feasible, rely on Western European nations to influence and support their respective dependent and recently independent areas so long as such encouragement and reliance are consistent with U.S. national interests. Is this an adequate, realistic policy and is it still feasible in the light of current developments in Africa?" Secretary Dillon said that the answer to the first part of this question, relating to the adequacy and realism of the policy, was "yes". The answer to the second part was less clear. When the policy had been developed, Guinea and Liberia were exceptions. Now we were faced by the same thing in the Congo where we could not rely on Belgium. It was still our objective to get the Belgians back into the Congo, but whether this was practical we do not know. It is not practical at the moment, however. We hope that the situation in the

⁸ These programs were intended to develop forces adequate to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion. For text of NSC Action No. 1290-d, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844.

Congo is a unique situation. The French have said that they can take care of their own ex-colonies. Whether these colonies, as they become independent, will continue friendly to France is a question. In particular, it is questionable whether they will consistently support France in the UN. If they do not, France may say that it will not support them. The U.S. was working with the French, trying to keep them in a position of supporting their ex-colonies; this was presently their own policy. The position with respect to the British areas was at present satisfactory. Nigeria was now independent and Sierra Leone would become independent early in 1961. This would leave only East Africa in a dependent status. Whether East African territories, as they become independent, will be as friendly to the British as West African territories was a real question, Secretary Dillon indicated. Summing up, Secretary Dillon stated that the answer to the Planning Board question therefore was that our present policy was the correct basic policy but that it might not work everywhere.

Secretary Dillon then read Question No. 12: "In view of the current use of the UN in the Congo crisis, should we now plan to give increased emphasis to multilateral economic aid and technical assistance throughout Africa? Is existing machinery adequate or are new agencies required?" Secretary Dillon stated that he agreed that increased emphasis should be given to a multilateral approach except with respect to development assistance. The expanded UN technical assistance program and OPEX were good programs. There were some real problems, Secretary Dillon noted, however, in having assistance to Africa going through the UN. For example, there was the 50–50 shipping problem.⁹ We might be able to work this out with the UN by getting them to use some of our shipping. However, we will have legislative problems if we provide more assistance through multilateral channels and new legislation will probably be required next year. The Africans have made proposals for new multilateral approaches to aid. If such approaches are developed and the Africans move ahead on them, State feels that we should support them. At present, however, we did not know whether these proposals would get off the ground. This last question and the question of personnel are of greatest importance. We needed, Secretary Dillon stated, to get together a list of people in the U.S. who are knowledgeable on Africa and available for service there. There are not too many people in this category and this is one of the reasons we have supported a multilateral approach.

⁹ Section 111 (A) (2) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 (P.L. 472), approved April 3, 1948, required that 50 percent of the matériel provided as assistance be shipped on U.S. vessels. This provision was carried forward in subsequent Mutual Security legislation.

Finally, Secretary Dillon turned to Question No. 1: "What should the U.S. be prepared to do in the event of anarchy or widespread rioting and bloodshed in other African states similar to that which has occurred in the Congo? If reliance is to be placed on UN emergency forces, are further preparatory steps required?" Answering this question, Secretary Dillon stated that we hoped this was not an immediate problem. We believe that the Congo represents a unique situation. However, in some of the British colonies (e.g. Rhodesia) and the Portuguese colonies, we might in the long run be faced with such unfavorable developments. There were two things, Secretary Dillon stated, on which we were taking action as a result of the Congo experience. That experience indicated that our emergency evacuation plan was inadequate. It was adequate for the immediate area of the Congo, but not in taking account of the problems created in surrounding areas into which the evacuees moved. A State-Defense team would go to Africa in October and develop a better regional evacuation plan. However, despite the strain that was placed upon the areas that received the evacuees, the evacuation had gone very well. The second matter that was under consideration was a Defense proposal that a small naval force with a few marines might visit the area and might be available in an emergency to assist with evacuation. This force would consist of four small naval vessels. Such a group might go sailing around the coast of Africa as an extension of the goodwill visit of the Commander, South Atlantic, to the area a year or so ago.¹⁰ State was circularizing its missions in the area for their views on this proposal. The Department thought it might be a good idea. Nothing further, Secretary Dillon indicated, was required in the way of general action in the UN. In particular, we did not favor the development of a special African military force although we have always favored the creation of a general UN Emergency Force. The creation of a special force for Africa would raise the question of white vs. non-white troops which had already been raised by Lumumba.

Secretary Dillon asked whether Mr. Gray wished to add anything to what he had said about the Planning Board questions. Mr. Gray responded that Secretary Dillon had generally covered them but that there were a couple of matters he would like to mention. There was a suggestion, Mr. Gray said, that the President might wish to consider the creation of an African Advisory Commission similar to the Inter-American Commission. He recognized, Mr. Gray stated, that this was a debatable proposition. Secondly, against the background of difficulties ICA had experienced in recruiting a few technicians for the Congo, should the U.S. institute a major program to develop and recruit peo-

¹⁰ Documentation on this subject is in Department of State, Central File 770.5811, and *ibid.*, AF/AFI Files: Lot 63 D 92, Visits 1960: Solant Amity.

ple for service in Africa? For example, would it be useful to make use of the services of retired army officers in the area? Such action would require legislation because retired army officers could not receive pay for such work without giving up their retirement pay. Secretary Dillon responded to this last point by stating that State was compiling a list of people available for service in Africa. Once this list had been compiled, we might find that something more was needed in the way of inducements; for example, income tax benefits. The President stated that he did not see anything wrong with such benefits. In a sense people working in Africa would be working for the UN and income tax benefits were extended to UN personnel. Secretary Anderson indicated that he would not object to tax benefits. Treasury was supporting Congressman Boggs' bill to extend tax benefits to those who brought capital into underdeveloped countries. Such measures were all right if they were limited in application to underdeveloped countries.

Secretary Dillon said that he agreed in general with Mr. Gray's point with respect to personnel but before we decided what we needed in the way of a program, we would need to make a thorough study of what was available in the way of human resources at present. He pointed out that MIT every year trained a class of about fifteen people for work in underdeveloped countries and that when the present class had been asked, eight had volunteered for service in Africa.

Secretary Dillon indicated that he was leery of proposals for creating a special commission on Africa. The situation in Africa was different from that in Latin America. In Latin America the U.S. has a very large number of contacts with labor, business and intellectuals. In Africa, on the other hand, our contacts were very limited. The number of people with direct knowledge of Africa or with business in Africa was very limited. State did work with the very few individuals who are knowledgeable about Africa. It worked with U.S. businessmen in Liberia and Olin-Mathieson in Guinea. Beyond these there was practically nobody. If you brought big business into such a commission, you would simply be giving the Soviets something to shoot at. They would say that we are exploiting Africans for our own business interests.

With respect to the problem of technicians, Mr. Gray said that he had heard a figure of 30,000 as the number of people required in the Congo. Whatever the U.S. did, we could obviously do no more than scratch the surface of such a problem. Mr. Riddleberger indicated that the figure 30,000 was too high; it was more like 10–15,000. However, the question of how many people were required depended upon on how far down in the hierarchy one went—for example, whether one included traders. Mr. Gray said that for this reason we clearly needed a multilateral approach—we could not do the job alone. Secretary Dillon stated that in the Congo the only way we could solve the problem was to find some way to bring the Belgians back in.

Secretary Anderson pointed out that the Canadians had a number of people with 25–30 years experience in Africa and that if they made a real effort they would be able to send some really able people. Secretary Anderson went on to say that when the Council had earlier discussed the sharing of UN costs in the Congo and the question of the U.S. share of those costs, it had been said that the Secretary-General would include the costs in the regular UN budget, to which the U.S. contributes 30 per cent. Now, however, we were apparently paying nearly half of the costs. Secretary Anderson wondered whether we had any idea as to the success the Secretary-General was likely to have in getting the costs put in the regular UN budget. In response Secretary Dillon pointed out that Hammarskjold had had no time to give further consideration to this matter since he had been fighting for his life, first against the Belgians and now against Lumumba. However, the U.S. was not paying anything now. We had asked Congress for \$100 million for the contingency fund as a sort of round figure. The best estimate was that total UN costs in the Congo for the year would be about \$200 million, but there was no agreement that the U.S. would pay half of these costs. If we got the \$100 million we had asked for, this would give us funds which could be used elsewhere in Africa if they were not required in the Congo.

Secretary Anderson stated that recent developments in the Congo had raised two interesting questions relating to the World Bank. At the time the Congo became independent, the World Bank had a \$140 million commitment to it of which one hundred million dollars had been disbursed. The Belgians had guaranteed the loan and would be liable for defaults. Lumumba had asked for the other \$40 million but the Bank had declined to disburse it until it knew that the money would be used appropriately. The Bank had also pointed out that a one million dollar repayment was due. The Congo had then promptly made this repayment. There was an interesting question as to whether now, with the change in sovereignty, Belgium would withdraw its guarantee of the undisbursed \$40 million. If it did, the Bank would not disburse this balance, but if it did not, the Bank would disburse it at an appropriate time. This sort of problem had never been presented to the Bank before. Turning to the second question, Secretary Anderson noted that another installment of the repayment of the loan to the Congo was due before the Bank meeting in September. A question might arise as to whether, if the Congo defaults on this repayment and at the same time asks for membership in the Bank, it should be accepted into membership. Both of these questions were rather novel.

Mr. Gray then called on Secretary Gates. Secretary Gates said that we were torn between the problem of not inexhaustible U.S. resources and the need to keep the Communists out of Africa. We could not do everything and people were hard to get, but there was a sense of

urgency about the problem of eventual Communist infiltration. Secretary Gates indicated that he was disturbed by the policy of relying upon the European metropolises. He recognized U.S. resource limitations but he doubted whether the Europeans would continue to be welcome. Also they might not be very willing to continue their assistance. The President said that he thought the whole theory of the French Community was to keep the ex-colonies of France closely bound to France economically and culturally. In talking with De Gaulle about French provision of assistance to underdeveloped countries, De Gaulle had said that the French responsibility in this regard was to the French Community. But De Gaulle had also hinted that he expected the U.S. to help in the French Community. Mr. Gray asked whether French ex-colonies would not be coming directly to the U.S. as they become independent and whether we would not have to deal with each of them individually. Secretary Dillon agreed that they would do this as a means of showing their independence.

Secretary Gates felt this was a most important question of policy. Our present policy was unworkable, he said, if it caused us to relax our sense of urgency; if it prevented imaginative, urgent thinking and getting good people to lead a federal or collective arrangement in Africa. He agreed, however, that we should rely as much as we could on Europe; hopefully the Europeans would maintain their assistance. The President indicated that in the case of the French Community, except for Guinea, we should get the countries to go first to Paris. The President indicated that when he had talked directly with the nine Prime Ministers of the Community, this was their whole notion. Some of these Prime Ministers were not even sure that they wanted independence except for the fact that it would give them a vote in the UN. To every one of them obtaining a UN vote was the most important thing because it would demonstrate their lack of dependence on France.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that one result of Council consideration of Africa at this time had been fuller agreement between State and Defense on the role of military assistance. A year or two ago, he said, when there had been discussion of the use of military aid for political as well as for military purposes, Defense had not shown much interest in aid for political purposes. However, the JCS comments on the present Discussion Paper emphasized the importance of military assistance for political purposes. Secretary Dillon then read from Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the JCS views.¹¹ Secretary Gates said that the problem was one of defending in Congress the provision of military assistance for political purposes.

¹¹ See footnote 6 above.

Mr. Gray then called on Mr. Stans who noted that he had been interested in Africa since 1948. He said that there were two matters that he wished to discuss. One was the question of political boundaries; the other was the economic aspects of anything that we undertake in Africa in relationship to the massive dimensions of African problems. Turning first to the boundary question, Mr. Stans noted that existing boundaries in Africa were highly artificial, cutting across tribal and racial divisions. This was true not only of national boundaries but also of provincial boundaries. The six provinces into which the Congo was divided gave no recognition to tribal lines. This situation, Mr. Stans said, foretells tremendous trouble in Africa. Members of a tribe move back and forth across national and provincial boundaries, raising questions of grazing and water rights, administration of justice, etc. Where the U.S. has the opportunity to use its influence on the boundary question, he felt that we should support recognition of the historical tribal boundaries.

The President asked Mr. Stans whether he would care to serve as a mediator on such a question with the Emperor of Ethiopia. In response Mr. Stans said he recognized that the problem was not an easy one to deal with. He said that the tribal situation was related to the kind of democracy that was appropriate for these countries. The Africans do not understand Western-style ballot box democracy. If the Congo were to be reorganized politically, the reorganization should start on the basis of tribal lines. Tribal federations like those formed by the American Indians would provide the best basis for political organization. We could not assume that Africans would accept our kind of democracy. Democracy in Africa did not extend beyond the village; beyond the village the people look to the chief of the tribe who is a kind of dictator. Mr. Stans said he had no solution to this problem but he felt that we should recognize it in everything that we plan in Africa.

Mr. Stans suggested that it was important to recognize the size of the economic problem. It was claimed that per capita income in the Congo was \$42 per year, but actual money income of many Congolese was less than one dollar per year. To build any kind of a viable economy would be a tremendous undertaking in most of these countries. In this connection the time span involved was important. If the job had to be done in a short time, it would cost much more than if it were done gradually with a greater amount of self-generated financing. The people of Africa now are impatient for economic growth and advancement. Their demands were insatiable. Through the years, Mr. Stans said, anything that the blacks had got had come from the whites and they are going to continue to look to the whites for assistance. Anything diverted to military uses would accentuate the tribal problem and the economic problem. This suggested that we should provide as little military assistance as possible except for assistance to police

forces. The more these countries could play the USSR off against the West, the higher would be the costs to us. This suggested that we should do almost everything multilaterally. No country is going to be satisfied with what it gets. It was sometimes tempting, therefore, to think of letting the USSR handle the problem alone for say 25 years because the Soviets could not possibly meet African demands. Mr. Stans recognized that this was not possible, but he expressed the view that direct competition with the USSR was not desirable.

Mr. Stans suggested that we should do some long-range thinking about what was really involved in building up the economies of African countries. We should examine how much it would cost, say, to build up the per capita income of a particular country to \$500 per year in ten to twenty-five years. Five hundred dollars per year would not satisfy the Africans any more than \$300 or \$2000 would. We were talking, Mr. Stans suggested, about so many billions of dollars that to start with \$100 million was illusory. If we knew how much was involved, it would help us answer such questions as the extent to which we relied upon a multilateral approach and whether we should cooperate with the USSR.

Responding to Mr. Stans' last observations, Secretary Dillon said that the U.S. could not consider any area of the world in a vacuum. We had to relate it to our total resources and priorities. Our thinking was that, so far as any major effort was concerned, black Africa should have a relatively low priority. This did not mean that we should not make an effort but rather that our efforts should be limited to technical assistance and some individual projects like Volta Dams. Latin America, where U.S. responsibility is greater and the possibility of success is also greater, should have a higher priority. The same thing was true of India where the prospects of success were also greater and where the country was willing to contribute to its own development. We could not get ourselves into a position where we were committed to vast contributions to Africa.

Secretary Gates suggested that modest help in agriculture and education would have the greatest impact on the people and that this was the best way in the long run to get at the problem of aid to Africa. It was better than pouring money into the pockets of people who could not handle it. In this connection, Mr. Stans told the Council of his conversation with a teacher of an elementary school in Africa who had asked if there was not some way to get money for pencils and blackboards so that he could really teach the children in his school rather than having them spend most of their time singing and marching. As another illustration of the problem Mr. Stans told of how the Basonge tribe in the Congo, having become conscious of a world larger than that of the tribe itself, had discussed how the tribe might make economic progress. As a result of this discussion, the tribe had estab-

lished an improvement fund based upon a one-dollar-per-year assessment of every member, with the thought that the tribe would then seek advice from the U.S. or elsewhere as to what kinds of things it could grow and what kind of things might have a market outside the tribe. The idea was excellent in concept, but not being successful in finding a way to use the funds collected, the chiefs of the tribe used them to buy fourteen Ford cars.

Secretary Dillon said that Secretary Gates' basic idea was the one that we had been following. In the presentation to Congress for Fiscal Year 1961 we had asked for a special fund for Africa which was intended primarily for educational facilities. In Africa you could not run technical assistance on the same basis as in other areas because people lacked the basic equipment which was necessary to make the technical assistance work. Therefore, you had to provide them with basic implements as an adjunct to the technical assistance program; this was the purpose of the special fund. Secretary Dillon said there would be some larger projects, mentioning in particular the aluminum complex on the west coast of Africa, where it was a question of either the U.S. doing it or the Soviets doing it. The President said this was the difficulty behind everything we did—the Free World-Soviet competition. He agreed that a UN approach was best, although the Russians would not do their part and would continue infiltration and similar activities. Secretary Dillon said that when a country becomes independent, the first thing that happens is that a Soviet ship arrives and we are "off to the races."

Secretary Mueller¹² stated that in Somalia, the only country in Africa with which he was somewhat familiar, the ICA team was doing an outstanding job. It was providing assistance in agriculture and drilling wells for irrigation. These were simple and minor things but their objective was to quadruple the agricultural surplus of Somaliland. The Somalis were very appreciative of these programs.

Mr. Dulles noted that information on U.S. human resources was scattered in various departments, universities and foundations. He suggested that a small group be established under State or the OCB to assess these resources. They were shallow enough at best. Secretary Dillon said this was exactly what he had meant. Secretary Mueller said that this was what Commerce was attempting to get the Committee of Economic Development to do; to determine what should be our responsibility in Africa. (The subsequent discussion indicated that Secretary Mueller was speaking of the Committee of Economic Development study of prospects for U.S. investment and trade previously discussed in the Planning Board.)

¹² Frederick H. Mueller, Secretary of Commerce.

The discussion then turned to development of the bauxite deposits in Guinea. In this connection Secretary Mueller pointed out that the cost of aluminum is the cost of power and that the U.S. Government might have to provide some sort of guarantee to the private group interested in aluminum development in Africa on the matter of the cost of power. The cost of power obtained from Ghana would be greater than the cost to Kaiser Aluminum of power obtained from the Bonneville Dam. Secretary Dillon pointed out that this was because Ghana had to pay six per cent interest to the World Bank on its loan while Bonneville had no similar interest costs. Secretary Mueller said that we would have to give these businessmen an even shake if we wanted to keep this great resource for the Free World. He thought we should find some way to do it. Secretary Dillon pointed out that we were now in the midst of negotiations with Ghana and the consortium interested in aluminum development and were close to agreement. Financing arrangements for the Volta Dam would make the difference on power rates. The present plan was to have Ghana provide \$85 million of the funds required; the World Bank \$40 million; and the U.S. \$30 million. We have committed ourselves to the \$30 million but the question of how we would divide this between the Development Loan Fund and the Export-Import Bank would have a good deal of effect on interest costs. If the whole loan were made by the Export-Import Bank at $5\frac{3}{4}$, per cent interest, the cost of power would be so high that there would be no development. We were presently thinking in terms of a \$20 million, $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent DLF loan and a \$10 million, $5\frac{3}{4}$ per cent Export-Import Bank Loan. Secretary Gates asked why this could not be done with venture money. Secretary Dillon pointed out that only the dam involved government financing; that private investors were putting up the funds for bauxite development, smelters and port development.

Secretary Anderson suggested that in talking with Ghana it was important to get a commitment to the aluminum project of 70 per cent of the power produced. In response Secretary Dillon pointed out that the problem at the moment was the other way around—Ghana wanted more than 70 per cent committed to the aluminum project. Secretary Anderson said that this was always the way it was at the beginning of such a project but later Ghana would want all the power itself. If we were going to put up much of the money for the project, we ought to have a lot to say about how the power is to be distributed.

Mr. Gray indicated that the Planning Board would take another look at the two policy papers to see whether they needed to be revised. There appeared to be one difference of view within the Council—on the question of providing arms to Africa. Mr. Stans did not take the same position on this question as did State and Defense. Secretary Dillon indicated that he agreed with Mr. Stans' view as to

the appropriate policy up to the point when the Soviets move in. General Lemnitzer said that he agreed that it was desirable to provide arms for internal security purposes only. We did not want to be in an arms competition. The whole continent, he observed, was not ready for independence.

Mr. Stans agreed that independence had come fifty years too soon. He suggested that the Planning Board should consider Item 6 and the last part of Item 2 in the list of Planning Board questions. He hoped we could develop a broad plan which would seek to guarantee free elections in Africa. If the Communists should then take over a country, free elections every four years would provide a means of throwing them out. While the phrase "Monroe Doctrine" might not be the right way to express it, we should develop a Free World position to prevent Communist take-overs. He indicated that he would think some more about these questions and talk to his Planning Board representative about them prior to the Planning Board discussion.¹³

*The National Security Council:*¹⁴

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral presentation by the Acting Secretary of State, in the light of the Discussion Paper prepared by the Department of State pursuant to NSC Action No. 2219-b-(4) (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 10, 1960); the list of questions thereon prepared by the NSC Planning Board; and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 16, 1960).

b. Noted that the NSC Planning Board would review "U.S. Policy toward South, Central and East Africa" (NSC 6001) and "U.S. Policy Toward West Africa" (NSC 6005/1), in the light of the discussion.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items. For the discussion of the Congo, see Document 180.]

Robert H. Johnson

¹³ On August 29, the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Ralph W. E. Reid, transmitted an amplification of Stans' remarks to Lay. Johnson transmitted Stans' views to the NSC Planning Board on August 30. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) Further Bureau of the Budget proposals relative to Africa policy were conveyed by Reid to Gerard Smith on September 9. (*Ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)

¹⁴ Paragraphs a-b constitute NSC Action No. 2286. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

34. Editorial Note

In his address before the U.N. General Assembly on September 22, President Eisenhower devoted considerable attention to Africa, concluding with the following proposal:

“These then are the five ingredients of the program I propose for Africa:

“Noninterference in the African countries’ internal affairs;

“Help in assuring their security without wasteful and dangerous competition in armaments;

“Emergency aid to the Congo;

“International assistance in shaping long-term African development programs;

“United Nations aid for education.” (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 60–70; see also Document 225)

On September 28, Ambassador James J. Wadsworth wrote to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld requesting inclusion of a new item entitled “Africa: A United Nations Program for Independence and Development” in the agenda of the Fifteenth Regular Session. Wadsworth’s letter was accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum as required by Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure. (U.N. doc. A/4515; *ibid.*, October 24, 1960, pages 657–659) The question was inscribed as item 88 on October 10, but it did not come up for discussion until the resumed 15th Session in 1961. In his welcoming remarks to the heads of the delegations of 15 new African states and Cyprus at the White House on October 14, President Eisenhower stated that his proposals might not have been “exactly those that you believe to be correct. All I was trying to point out was the kind of thing that the United States would be prepared to join with others in attempting to do through the United Nations.” (*Ibid.*, November 7, 1960, page 713)

On October 20, Ambassador Wadsworth conveyed to the Secretary-General for circulation to all Member States an illustrative draft resolution (Addendum 1 to U.N. doc. A/4515) “in Elaboration of the Views Presented by the United States in its Request for Inscription of an Item Entitled, Africa: A United Nations Program for Independence and Development.” Thereby the United States hoped to enhance its bargaining position, maintain the initiative, and preserve the total impact of the President’s proposals. Background information is in telegram 681 to USUN, October 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/10–1560) The text of the illustrative draft resolution adhered closely to the language of the President’s U.N. address.

35. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Gates

JCSM-466-60

October 17, 1960.

SUBJECT

U.S. Interest in Ghana and Guinea (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned about the threat to the security of the United States which has resulted from Sino-Soviet Bloc accelerated penetration of Ghana and Guinea during the past year and a half.

2. Bloc technical assistance and aid programs, designed to exploit the difficulties, desires and prejudices of these two struggling nations, have given the Bloc considerable influence in their internal affairs. Both nations have authoritarian governments under the leadership of strong personalities who are ambitious for a position of predominance on the African continent, who have Western education and background but with strong Marxist tendencies, and who admire the USSR as a nation which has grown in national power under a socialist system. Thus, both nations, but Guinea in particular, are increasingly following the path leading to domination by international communism. Indications are that Guinea is well on the way to becoming a Bloc satellite. Although Ghana at present maintains a Western orientation, the sharp rise in Bloc activity has serious future implications.

3. The political orientation of Ghana and Guinea is of significant strategic importance to the United States because of their location on the western bulge of Africa with coastlines on the South Atlantic. The air and maritime facilities of these two nations, both actual and potential, would constitute a serious threat to U.S. interests in the South Atlantic and in South America, as well as in Africa itself, if they were to fall under the political influence of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

4. Since national regimes in Africa subject to domination of Sino-Soviet imperialism would be unacceptable to U.S. national security, it is necessary that action be initiated now to prevent the situations in Ghana and Guinea from becoming a serious threat to the security of the United States.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70/10-3160. Secret. Enclosure to a letter of October 31 from Deputy Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas to Herter, which transmitted it and suggested early discussions between the State and Defense Departments "with a view toward moving forward rapidly with the development of agreed policies and programs for Africa."

5. U.S. military forces should participate in a coordinated political-economic-psychological-military program designed to increase U.S. influence and eliminate Sino-Soviet Bloc activities in the Ghana–Guinea area, as well as in other African nations. Possible military activities include, but are not limited to:

- a. Prompt establishment of military attachés.
- b. Visits of U.S. military units, with the timing of the visits coordinated with the political situation.
- c. Invitations for military leaders to visit the United States.
- d. Training of armed forces officers and technicians in U.S. Service schools, coordinating with other Western powers if appropriate.
- e. Participation of U.S. military medical personnel in local tropical medicine research.
- f. [1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

6. It is recommended that the substance of the above be discussed with the Secretary of State with a view to initiating more active and comprehensive U.S. interest in Ghana and Guinea as well as in other African nations subject to the threat of Sino-Soviet imperialism.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer¹

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

¹ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

36. Telegram From the Embassy in Senegal to the Department of State

Dakar, October 20, 1960, 5 p.m.

274. Department pass Defense. From Henderson.¹ On evening October 18 I made my call on President Tubman accompanied by Ferguson of State and Colonel Junkermann of Defense. After exchange amenities I told him I had come see him personally at request of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.76/10–2060. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Monrovia.

¹ Deputy Under Secretary for Administration Loy W. Henderson visited a number of west and central African countries between October 17 and November 21 to discuss arrangements for U.S. representation in the area; see Documents 82, 84, and 85.

President and Secretary of State.² Since Liberia was our old established friend and ally in African trip. [sic]

I then told him of President's determination equip one battalion LFF during FY 1961 by grant aid of up to one million dollars. Said this decision based in part on findings of recent US survey team and representations made by our Embassy Monrovia and by Padmore³ and Grimes and in part on desire US Government do more to strengthen Liberian security forces. When President failed react to my statement I invited comments or questions.

After some hesitation he launched into long history US-Liberian relations interspersed with frequent illustrations of what he considered to be US neglect of or at least lack of adequate attention to Liberia's needs and aspirations. He referred to Liberia's entrance into First World War even though defenseless at US request and Monrovia's consequent subjection to submarine attack; to EXIM Bank's insistence on accepting US bid on construction road despite 2.7 million lower bid by Vianinni; to US insistence that Liberia pay back lend lease investments in port and air field facilities even though Liberia pledged make them available US forces in time war; to his personal humiliation at way Department treated his Guinea arms request; etc. His main current grievance however was "insulting statement" in report internal security survey team which reflected "honor of Liberia" and very offensive to him and his government.

His general theme was that although for more than hundred years Liberia had looked to US as its mentor and protector; had in general followed US lead in international affairs; had entrusted to US private enterprise development of Liberian resources nevertheless US had not given Liberia assistance kind needed enable it keep up with its neighbors which although colonies were being developed culturally, economically, and militarily by their mother countries. He deeply ashamed that Liberia after more than hundred years freedom was now so far behind its neighbors. Particularly humiliating that Liberia's armed forces in such pitiful condition re discipline, equipment, number, etc., he amazed at suggestions in survey report that Liberia needed no militia; that Liberian frontier force could control frontier; that if Liberia should be attacked from without it should depend on UN for protection. He stated any self-respecting nation should have

² At a September 24 meeting between Liberian Secretary of State Rudolph Grimes and Herter, Grimes had complained of U.S. actions which "had tended to belittle and even humiliate Liberia," including "inaction on the U.S. military survey report on Liberia." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1766) Dillon had discussed this with the President on October 5; according to a memorandum of the discussion by John S.D. Eisenhower, the President and Dillon agreed that Henderson should visit Tubman in Zurich on his way to Africa. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

³ Liberian Ambassador to the United States George Padmore.

armed forces prepared to defend country; he was not making any exorbitant requests for assistance in strengthening security forces; two brigades militia and one brigade frontier force were his goal. This force to be built up gradually. He not asking for such expensive and complicated weapons as jets or nuclear weapons.

I did not undertake reply to his specific complaints although with assistance Ferguson and Junkermann we did attempt remove certain his suspicions and clarify various situations which he apparently had failed understand.

I told him I had not been sent see him in Zurich merely to tell him of decision to grant equipment for one battalion. My main purpose was to discuss status US-Liberian relations. We had heard that he unhappy at what he considered be our current attitude towards Liberia; we considered Liberia as a loyal and trusted friend and ally; we respected him and had no doubt re his basic friendliness to US. We therefore considered it important to discuss with him our attitude re Liberia in broad perspective and learn in some detail causes for his concern and unhappiness. I stated it our desire see Liberia develop into a leader among African states. We therefore anxious see Liberia surge ahead economically, culturally and socially and wanted to help. If our advice and suggestions sometimes seemed gratuitous he should bear in mind they were prompted by good intentions. We had however given more than advice; we had been contributing to Liberian development and were prepared continue do so. Recent decision equip battalion illustration our interest in Liberian military needs. I agreed that if any nation was to be self-respecting it should possess security forces prepared instantly to fight in defense country. Not always necessary such forces be large in size—but they should be adequately equipped, highly trained, and possess good morale. The size of the military forces should of course be regulated by economic strength of country. UN should be depended upon to assist in case of large scale aggression. Colonel Junkermann explained in more detail our ideas reequipping and training battalion which would be based upon mutual agreement and tailored to Liberia's needs.

President gradually thawed—and conversation became more relaxed and cordial. He registered his liking for and confidence in Ambassador Mathews and I expressed our confidence in Padmore. He also discussed some his more intimate problems and concerns re his own military people. In end he invited us partake with him of refreshments which he had at hand.

As we took our leave he asked us express his appreciation President and Secretary for sending us to see him. He said as result our discussion he felt much better and more hopeful re US-Liberian relations. He also grateful for decision equip and train battalion. He intimated, however, that additional battalions would be necessary in due

course. In addition to equipment and training for one battalion which US offered on grant basis, he also stated would like to buy, if found necessary, additional equipment for his military forces. I strongly recommend that military aid program be implemented promptly and if possible a token shipment of matériel be made available before end calendar year.

It is our considered belief that President's unhappiness re status US-Liberian relations not due merely personal pique. We think he really worried at his own personal position in Liberia as long-standing advocate of policy that Liberia support US internationally and at position Liberia among "neutralist" African states as ally and friend US. We believe that he fears that as rising tide of African nationalism makes impact on Liberia his position will become progressively weakened unless he can demonstrate it pays be ally of US. Similarly Liberia's prestige among new African states likely fade unless Liberia can show it also making progress. Such progress not possible without vigorous US aid.

I venture suggest in view of growing Liberian sensitivity we be extremely careful in phrasing our criticisms or suggestions; and that so far as possible those which we feel we must make be presented orally and informally.

McClelland

37. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas)

November 16, 1960.

DEAR JIM: The Secretary has referred to me your letter of October 31¹ calling attention to the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the trend of events in Guinea and Ghana. I have noted that General Lemnitzer has recommended discussions between our Departments with a view to initiating actions with respect to Guinea and Ghana and other African nations subject to the threat of Sino-Soviet imperialism.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70/10-3160. Secret. Drafted by Martin Herz.

¹ See source note, Document 35.

The judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any national regimes on the African continent subject to domination by the Sino-Soviet bloc would be unacceptable to United States national security is shared by us and will have an important bearing on the forthcoming reviews of our policies in Africa by the National Security Council. I, too, feel that more must be done to lessen the danger of Soviet encroachments in Africa, and we look forward to discussing this problem in the context of the next NSC review.

While we share the concern voiced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the problem appears to be at the present time primarily a political one. Certainly the situation is not encouraging, but we do not think that either Guinea or Ghana are hopelessly unredeemable. Efforts to balance Western against Eastern influence have in our judgment a chance of success in Guinea and a very good chance in Ghana. We are pursuing policies designed to bring this about.

It is our present judgment that despite an increasing drift in a pro-Communist direction, manifested most recently by a succession of votes in the United Nations where Communist and African nationalist and neutralist interests seemed to coincide, the governments of Guinea and Ghana certainly do not wish to be reduced to the status of Soviet satellites. The growing influence of Communist advisers, particularly in Guinea, shows, however, that a long-continued drift in the Communist direction could in the end result in virtual Communist control. Our present policies are designed to prevent such an outcome, and we have been heartened in this respect by the recent successful culmination of our efforts to obtain signature of a U.S.-Guinean agreement on technical assistance.

As for the specific actions in the military and politico-military fields listed in General Lemnitzer's memorandum, and other actions of a similar kind that may yet be proposed, the Department will be happy to discuss these with appropriate military authorities at any time.

Sincerely yours,

Livingston T. Merchant²

² Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

38. Instruction From the Department of State to Various Diplomatic Posts and Missions

CA-4735

November 25, 1960.

SUBJECT

U.S. Arms Policy for Africa

Reference is made to CA 8200 of April 6, 1960¹ and CA 9732 of May 23, 1960.²

The responses to the referenced circular instructions indicated that many posts in Africa felt that some sort of arms limitation agreement for Africa (or for West Africa only) might be feasible provided the initiative came from the Africans themselves.

At the Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa in June 1960, Secretary of State Grimes of Liberia stated that Africa needed to spend whatever resources it had on development and "cannot afford the luxury of an arms race." He suggested that the African states should therefore do whatever they could to settle disputes by peaceful means and that adequate machinery be established for this purpose. The Addis Ababa conference took no action on this suggestion.

President Eisenhower in his General Assembly speech on October [September] 22³ stated that the UN should be prepared to help the African countries maintain their security without wasteful and dangerous competition in armaments. He added that he hoped "that the African states (would) use existing or establish new regional machinery in order to avert an arms race in this area."

As a follow-up to this speech, USUN has been showing other delegations a draft resolution for illustrative purposes. Section I of the resolution "calls upon all states to refrain from generating disputes between the states of this area or from encouraging them to wasteful and dangerous competition in armaments." Section II "expresses the hope that the new African states will consider carefully ways and means to maintain their security without dangerous and wasteful com-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.56/11-2560. Confidential. Drafted by Edmund H. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Acting Deputy Director of the U.S. Disarmament Administration, Edmund A. Gullion, who approved it; and cleared with representatives of AF, S/P, RA, IO, S/S, and in draft with DOD/ISA. Sent to Abidjan, Bamako, Brazzaville, Conakry, Dakar, Freetown, Lagos, Leopoldville, Lomé, London, Paris, and Yaoundé, and repeated to Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Rabat, Tananarive, Tripoli, Tunis, and USUN.

¹ Not printed.

² CA-9732 dealt "with other actions available to the United States in seeking to reduce the danger of an arms build-up in Africa, whether or not an internal arms control system is instituted." (Department of State, Central Files, 770.56/5-2360)

³ See Document 34.

petition in armaments, which might include examination of the possibilities of the establishment of regional agreements or arrangements.”⁴

There has been little reaction so far to this aspect of the illustrative resolution. The French Delegation stated it has serious concern about it, as presently drafted, since it might preclude or be taken to be directed against defense arrangements among members of the French community. Ambassador Cooper of Liberia informed USUN he “objected” to Section II of the resolution and pointed out that this should apply to all states, not just to Africans. He indicated doubt that such a subject should be included in a resolution on Africa.⁵ An Ethiopian delegate also questioned the inclusion of the arms issue in the illustrative resolution. The Department has accordingly instructed USUN not to press for this part of the illustrative African resolution in view of the importance of not giving the impression of American pressure behind it.

Meanwhile, Ghana has announced its intention to submit a resolution embodying President Nkrumah’s suggestion for keeping Africa free of nuclear weapons and military bases. No resolution has yet been submitted to this effect during the disarmament discussions in the GA. The Upper Volta delegation has indicated that Africans are now working on a resolution which requests all states to abstain from nuclear or ballistic tests in Africa, from installing bases for experimentation, from stockpiling or transporting nuclear arms; and declaring Africa a neutral denuclearized zone. Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia have submitted a draft resolution banning the use anywhere of atomic weapons,⁶ which is unacceptable to the U.S. since there is no inspection provision and since its effect is to attack the Western nuclear deterrent without condemning or stemming Communist aggression through conventional armaments. These more recent proposals have tended to distract attention from the President’s original proposal.

The Department believes that some initial simple arms limitation arrangement might be desirable, at least as applied to West African nations. This might be brought about by the African states acting on their own, possibly through the Conference of Independent African States, without any UN action. The UN might, however, supply some supporting services; for example, a secretariat for any formal or informal organization which might be set up.

⁴ See Document 34.

⁵ Telegram 1255 from USUN, November 2, recounted Ambassador Barco’s conversation with the Liberian Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Ford Cooper. (Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/11–260)

⁶ For text of the draft resolution introduced on November 1, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1–3.

A general agreement might be reached among the states concerned to hold the level of their forces at approximately present levels or at levels raised sufficiently to cover internal security, or the requirements of national sovereignty or sensitivity. Such an arrangement, if it had the agreement of the African countries concerned, might be respected by the potential arms-supplying countries, including the former metropolises. The arrangement would involve only conventional arms since this would simplify the task of reaching an agreement.

The United States would hope that some sort of inspection system would be adopted which would be effective under the circumstances of the region, and which could at least begin to operate at the outset of the agreement. The United States does not favor the establishment of a precedent for wholly unverified arms limitation agreements.

The Department recognizes that it is neither possible nor desirable at this time to project an agreement or arrangement in detail. Moreover, an overt assumption of the initiative by the United States might defeat our purpose since it would give the impression of too great an American interest. It is therefore suggested that the matter not be discussed with the governments to which you are accredited. The Department would, however, appreciate the addressee Embassies' views as to (1) whether any African government might be willing to take the initiative toward an arrangement like that suggested above; (2) whether anything useful might emerge from it; and (3) what would be the best way of inducing such an initiative.

The Department points out that there are certain cautions with respect to the above schemes which should be borne in mind. Among these are the following:

Proposals for an atom-free zone in Africa might give rise to difficulties in connection with U.S. bases in Morocco and Libya. Moreover, the United States would strongly oppose any attempt to apply this precedent to certain other regions of the world. In addition, related proposals re foreign bases in Africa might create difficulties for the UK and France. However, the implications of these matters have not yet been fully explored and the Department has them under consideration.

Should discussion of the scheme become involved in African emotionalism in regard to Algeria or French nuclear testing in the Sahara it might be counter-productive.

Draft declarations banning, on a universal basis, the use of atomic weapons, such as the Ethiopian proposal referred to above, should be avoided.

For Embassy Lagos Only

It has been suggested that Nigeria might be the most suitable country to provide African initiative for the exploration of this possibility. However, the behavior of the Nigerian delegation in the current General Assembly now causes some doubt in this regard.⁷

Nevertheless, the Department would appreciate the views of the Embassy Lagos as to whether, despite these indications, the above suggestions on an African arms limitation agreement might usefully be discussed with the Nigerian Government with a view to its taking the initiative in carrying forward consultations with other African countries. (See Kaduna's G-4 of Nov. 3)⁸

For Embassies Paris, London and Lagos

The Department would also appreciate the comments of Embassies Paris⁹ and London as to what the reactions of the French and British governments would be to the above, and the comments of Embassies London¹⁰ and Lagos as to the possibility that a British approach to the Nigerian Government (if they agree) might be more effective than an American approach.

Herter

⁷ Nigeria had voted against U.S. positions regarding Chinese representation, the allocation of the Cuban complaint to the Political Committee, and the Ethiopian resolution against nuclear weapons. (Memorandum from Herz to Kellogg, November 7; Department of State, AF/AFI Files: Lot 69 D 295, Arms for Africa)

⁸ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 600.0012/11-360)

⁹ In despatch 794 from Paris, December 8, the Embassy indicated it was "inclined to doubt whether any African initiatives would take a constructive turn at this time." (*Ibid.*, 770.56/12-860)

¹⁰ Despatch 1101 from London, December 7, concluded that although the British Government's position would be similar to the Department's "it would not be inclined to take strong action in supporting the Department's proposals." The Embassy also thought the British would be reluctant to approach the Nigerian Government. (*Ibid.*, 770.56/12-760)

39. Memorandum From the Deputy Operations Coordinator (Rogers) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite)

December 7, 1960.

For your information or action, there is quoted below an excerpt from the informal notes of M/OP on the OCB luncheon meeting of December 7:

"Policy Guidance on Africa

"Mr. Gray noted that, as a result of the deadlock on policy in regard to the relationship of the Metropolises to the newly developing countries, there were no fully agreed basic NSC or OCB papers providing authoritative guidance for African affairs. He was concerned about the impression this would create in the minds of the incoming administration. It was agreed that a discussion paper should be developed regarding the above mentioned split which could be referred to the NSC with a view either to modifying or restating existing policy guidance. This would clear the way for the development of the necessary operational guidance papers which should be done on a crash basis."¹

CER

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Africa General—Overall. Secret.

¹ On December 21, Satterthwaite sent a memorandum to the Secretary recommending that S/P request from the National Security Council a clarification of the sections of NSC 6005 that dealt with the "U.S.-Metropole-Former Dependency" relationships. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.70/12-2160) Under cover of memoranda from Johnson to the NSC Planning Board dated January 3 and 12, the Department of State's draft revisions of NSC 6001 and NSC 6005/1 were transmitted for consideration. (*Ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1 (NSC 5920 & 6001), and (NSC 6005/1), respectively)

40. Editorial Note

A Task Force on Africa created at the request of President-elect John F. Kennedy presented its report on December 31. Robert Good of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University, served as the secretary of the task force, composed of 15 nongovernmental experts on Africa, with 22 consultants. The report, entitled "Report to the Honorable John F. Kennedy by the Task Force on Africa," consisting of six sections and nine appendices, is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.70/12-3160.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE SUDAN; U.S. RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, AND THE SUDAN

41. Editorial Note

A "Special Report on the Sudan," prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board Working Group on the Near East, dated August 18, 1958, stated that in a conversation on July 14 with Ambassador James S. Moose, Jr., and a later conversation with the British representative in Khartoum, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil asked what assistance he could count on from the United States and the United Kingdom in the event of direct or indirect Egyptian aggression against the Sudan. The report summarized discussions on this subject with the British and recommended assuring Khalil that in case of direct aggression, the United States and the United Kingdom would take every feasible step through the United Nations to extend assistance. Concerning indirect aggression, it recommended stressing the U.S. conviction that effective action against subversion was best taken by the country directly concerned. It also suggested possible steps to provide economic and military aid contingent on the Prime Minister's reaction and subsequent Sudanese actions. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Near East)

At the 377th meeting of the National Security Council on August 21, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray informed the Council of the special report and stated that some of its recommendations appeared to the Operations Coordinating Board to go beyond existing policy guidance. Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter agreed that the Department of State would prepare a policy paper on the Sudan for consideration by the NSC Planning Board and by the Council at its next meeting. (Memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary S. Everett Gleason, August 22; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

At the Council's next meeting on August 27, however, Acting Secretary Herter told the Council that the Department of State felt it could take necessary action within the terms of existing national security policy to meet current problems related to the Sudan, and that additional policy guidance was not immediately necessary. Gray asked whether the Planning Board should consider other policies related to the Sudan in connection with its current review of Near East policy,

and Herter replied in the affirmative. (Memorandum of discussion by Director of the NSC Secretariat Marion W. Boggs, August 28; *ibid.*) That NSC review culminated in the approval on November 4 of NSC 5820/1, "U.S. Policy Toward the Near East," which included a section on the Sudan. The text is scheduled for publication in volume XII.

Telegram 361 to Khartoum, September 18, instructed Ambassador Moose to discuss Prime Minister Khalil's request for assurances with him at the same time that he informed him of a newly-approved U.S. aid program. The telegram reads in part as follows:

"While stressing US conviction that most effective action against subversion can best be taken by country directly concerned, you should point out that, as PriMin knows, US role in UN in defense of independence of sovereign nations has been often and unmistakably demonstrated. US actions in Lebanon and Jordan are clear evidence US does not intend ignore appeals of legally constituted governments when independence and integrity of their nations are seriously threatened by acts of indirect aggression. This connection, PriMin's attention should be invited to President's speech before UNGA August 13 in which he said: 'I would be less than candid if I did not tell you that the US reserves, within the spirit of the Charter, the right to answer the legitimate appeal of any nation, particularly small nations.'

"You should make clear to PriMin and in subsequent conversations with SAR and such others as may be considered desirable, our continuing desire to assist Sudan in maintaining its independence and thus moving forward as constructive force for peace and stability in the area. You should point out, however, that practical US support, in terms of economic, military, internal security and other programs, in final analysis only justifiable if it in fact contributes to determination of Sudan Government to protect its independence. We know PriMin himself recognizes that, if Sudan Government does not take action in this direction along lines of which he himself best able judge, US support would then be meaningless and ineffective." (Department of State, Central Files, 745W.5/9-1858)

Ambassador Moose reported in telegram 414 from Khartoum, September 24, that when he met with Khalil on September 23, the Prime Minister expressed satisfaction with the projected aid program and told Moose that he considered the actions taken by the United States in Lebanon and Jordan in recent months "as assurance of U.S. support." He further stated that with such assurances and with Sudan's urgent financial needs met, he foresaw "no difficulty" in maintaining Sudan's independence and integrity. (*Ibid.*, 745W.5/9-2458)

42. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 76-58

November 12, 1958.

[Here follows a table of contents.]

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA¹

The Problem

To assess current trends in the Horn of Africa and to estimate their effect on the stability and orientation of the region over the next few years.

Conclusions

1. The Horn of Africa, one of the most backward areas in the world, is divided by ancient antagonisms, the most significant of which is that between the Coptic Christians who constitute the essential national component of the Ethiopian state and the Moslem populations which surround them. Among the latter the most important are the Somali tribes inhabiting the Ogaden province of Ethiopia as well as the three Somalilands (see Maps 2 and 3). (Paras. 8-10)

2. Ethiopia is ruled by the Christian Amharas (less than 15 percent of the population). The old Emperor is authoritarian, but is endeavoring to modernize the state through programs of gradual economic and political development in spite of opposition from powerful ecclesiastical and feudal elements. He has the internal situation rea-

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were interdepartmental reports drafted by officers from agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated to the President, the National Security Council, and other appropriate officers of cabinet level.

A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 12 November 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

¹ Ethiopia (including Eritrea), Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland, now a UN trust territory under Italian trusteeship), British Somaliland, and French Somaliland. [Footnote in the source text.]

sonably well in hand. However, his death or incapacitation is likely to precipitate a struggle for power at the center, possibly complicated by secession movements in Eritrea and in outlying provinces of the empire. (Paras. 13-30)

3. Somalia, the former Italian Somaliland, is scheduled to become an independent state in 1960. The outlook for such a state is extremely unpromising in view of the political inexperience of its people and the inadequacies of its economy. The tenure of the Western-oriented leaders of the Somali Youth League, who now control the government, is rendered precarious by their dependence on Western economic aid, the possibilities for intertribal conflict, and the challenge of the irredentist program of the Greater Somalia League. (Paras. 32-36)

4. The French are likely to be able to retain effective control in French Somaliland at least for the next few years, but the British position in British Somaliland will be difficult to maintain after Somalia attains its independence. The eventual union of that area with Somalia is likely. Such a union would tend to undermine the Ethiopian position in the Ogaden. (Paras. 37-40)

5. The inherent conflict between Ethiopia and growing Pan-Somali nationalism is intensified by virulent Egyptian propaganda directed toward subverting the non-Amhara subjects of Ethiopia and toward inciting the Somalis against the colonial powers and Ethiopia. Ethiopia, alarmed by the threat of hostile Moslem encirclement and subversion, calls on the US for political and military as well as economic support. Ethiopia is also making serious efforts to develop support elsewhere in Africa. The Western Powers will find it increasingly difficult to render aid to either Ethiopia or Somalia without offending the other. (Paras. 41-44)

6. The Soviet role in the area is flexible and subtle. There is no politically significant Communist party activity in the area. However, at the governmental level the USSR, already aiding the Yemen, has recently approached both Ethiopia and Somalia with ostensibly disinterested offers of aid, in accord with its general cultivation of Afro-Asian states. Its immediate objective is the promotion of neutralism. (Para. 43)

7. The British are deeply concerned regarding the political trends and prospects in the Horn of Africa because of their interest in the preservation of a strategic position in the region, including Aden and Kenya. They apparently consider that this interest can best be served by a coordinated Western policy of supporting and encouraging favorably disposed elements in the Sudan and Somalia, leaving it to the United States to prevent, through aid and reassurance, any Ethiopian reaction either toward neutralism or toward aggression against Somalia. (Para. 45)

[Here follow the "Discussion" portion of the estimate (paragraphs 8-45), with sections headed "Introduction," "The Situation in Ethiopia," "The Situation in the Somalilands," and "The Relation of Outside Powers to the Situation," and three maps.]

43. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 72.1-59

January 6, 1959.

OUTLOOK FOR THE SUDAN¹

The Problem

To assess the situation in the Sudan resulting from the recent coup, and to estimate the outlook for Sudanese internal stability and foreign relations.

Conclusions

1. The group of senior military officers under General Ibrahim Abboud which took over the Sudanese Government on 17 November will probably provide more effective leadership than its predecessors. In general, the junta leans toward conservatism in domestic affairs. It desires to avoid alignment with any regional or great power bloc, and appears determined to preserve Sudanese independence. (Paras. 5-11)

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 6 January 1959. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

¹ This estimate supersedes the political and foreign affairs sections of NIE 72.1-57, "Outlook for the Sudan," dated 6 August 1957. Much of the previous estimate's discussion of basic socio-political, religious and economic conditions in the Sudan remains valid and has not been repeated here. [Footnote in the source text.]

2. In the short run, at least, Abboud's regime can probably maintain its authority through its control of the army and through the support it now enjoys from conservative political and religious leaders, particularly those of the Umma Party and the powerful Ansar sect. In time, however, serious opposition may develop. The regime will find it difficult to satisfy both its conservative Umma/Ansar supporters and the pro-Nasser elements among the junior army officers and in the National Union Party. To the extent that it moves to placate one group, it is likely to antagonize the other. These tensions could lead to splits within the junta which might eventually result in the breakup of the Abboud government. (Paras. 15–21)

3. The new regime will probably make a sincere effort to improve relations with Nasser. In particular, both governments are more likely to undertake serious negotiations for an agreement on division of the Nile waters than Prime Minister Khalil and Nasser were prepared to do. At the same time, Abboud's government will be jealous of Sudanese interests and unlikely to let down its guard against the UAR. It will probably continue Khalil's policy of developing ties with other African states. It is likely to pursue a policy of benevolent neutrality in Arab affairs not directly affecting the Sudan and to avoid association with Ethiopia or Israel in an anti-UAR front. (Paras. 12, 23–25)

4. The regime will seek to continue good relations with the West, though it will almost certainly avoid the outspokenly pro-Western policies of Khalil. It will press for substantial and continuing US and UK aid, while remaining sensitive about any conditions attached to such assistance. At the same time, a gradual extension of Sudanese relations with the Bloc appears almost certain, particularly through Bloc barter deals for Sudanese cotton which the Sudan has trouble disposing of in the West. The government will probably also be more receptive than previous regimes to Soviet economic and technical aid offers. (Paras. 11, 26–29)

[Here follows the "Discussion" portion of the estimate (paragraphs 5–29), with sections headed "Present Situation and Character of the Regime," "Prospects for the Regime's Stability," and "Foreign Affairs."]

44. National Security Council Report

NSC 5903

February 4, 1959.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE HORN OF AFRICA

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5615/1¹

B. NIE 76-58²

C. OCB Report, July 9, 1958, on NSC 5615/1³

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board in response to the recommendation in paragraph 3 of the reference Operations Coordinating Board Report, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Monday, February 26, 1959.⁴

Two maps of the area, prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, are also enclosed for information. A Financial Appendix will be circulated subsequently for the information of the Council.⁵

The enclosed statement of policy, if adopted, is intended to supersede NSC 5615/1, "U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia".

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it; direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government; and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.⁶

James S. Lay, Jr.⁷

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1. Secret.

¹ "United States Policy Toward Ethiopia," approved November 19, 1956; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955-1957*, vol. xxiii, p. 334.

² Document 42.

³ Entitled "Report on Ethiopia (NSC 5615/1)." (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430)

⁴ See Document 45.

⁵ The maps and the appendix are attached but not printed.

⁶ A memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council, March 2, 1959, stated that the President had that day approved NSC 5903. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)

⁷ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

Enclosure

THE HORN OF AFRICA ⁸

General Considerations

[Here follow sections headed "Importance of the Area," "Threats to Peace and Stability in the Area," "Ethiopia," "Somalia," "British Somaliland," and "French Somaliland."]

Objectives

23. Denial of the Horn of Africa to Soviet domination and minimization of Soviet influence.

24. So far as consistent with the preceding paragraph, denial of the Horn of Africa to UAR domination and minimization of UAR influence.

25. Unhampered use of important Western sea and air communications in the general area of the Horn of Africa.

26. Access by the United States to such military facilities in the area as it may require.

Policy Guidance

27. Cooperate with friendly nations in (a) encouraging the resolution of conflicts and tensions in the area, (b) seeking to deny the area to Soviet domination and to minimize Soviet influence, and (c) so far as consistent with (b) seeking to deny the area to UAR domination and to minimize UAR influence.

28. Strengthen U.S. information and cultural exchange programs in the Horn of Africa, and encourage other friendly Free World nations to take similar action.

29. To strengthen Ethiopia's orientation toward the West, continue to provide Ethiopia with:

a. Technical assistance, with emphasis on education and training programs.

b. Limited economic assistance.

c. Minimum military equipment and training of a kind suitable for maintaining internal security and offering resistance to local aggression, making every effort to avoid a military build-up which would strain the Ethiopian economy, lead to commitments for indefinite U.S. support, or to increased tension within the area.

⁸ Ethiopia (including Eritrea), Somalia (formerly Italian Somaliland, now a UN trust territory under Italian trusteeship), British Somaliland, and French Somaliland. [Footnote in the source text.]

30. Consult with Ethiopia on Middle East and African matters of concern to it. Encourage Ethiopia to maintain an interest in Pan-African affairs and to exercise a moderating influence in such affairs.

31. a. Encourage the resolution of differences existing between Ethiopia and the Somalilands, including border disputes.

b. When feasible, encourage cooperation between Ethiopia and the Somalilands in the development of common economic resources.

c. As appropriate, encourage Ethiopia to accept a merger of British Somaliland and Somalia and to act in such a way as to enhance the possibility of closer Ethiopian-Somali political arrangements.

32. Encourage Italy to continue to exercise a major role in the maintenance of Somalia's stability and Free World orientation. Encourage Italy, the UK, and other friendly nations to provide economic and technical aid, including budgetary and police assistance, to assist Somali leaders favorable to the West to remain in power and to maintain stability in areas under their control. Be prepared to supplement these efforts by providing limited U.S. economic and technical assistance. Encourage the UN to provide technical assistance and to exercise a stabilizing influence on Somalia's internal situation and on its relations with other countries.

33. Study alternative consolidations of countries and territories of the Horn of Africa to determine which would best serve U.S. interest. In the meantime:

a. Encourage Somali leaders to be moderate in advancing the concept of a Greater Somaliland and, to the extent feasible, to consider as an ultimate end closer relationships with Ethiopia.

b. Be prepared to accept moves on the part of French Somaliland to join such a Greater Somaliland, provided this is acceptable to the peoples concerned and is not inconsistent with U.S. security interests.

45. Memorandum of Discussion at the 397th Meeting of the National Security Council

February 26, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-3.]

4. *U.S. Policy Toward the Horn of Africa* (NSC 5903; NSC 5615/1; OCB Report, July 9, 1958, on NSC 5615/1; NIE 76–58; ¹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 18, 1959²)

(Copies of the briefing note which Mr. Gray used in explaining NSC 5903 to the Council are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and are also attached to this Memorandum).³

At the conclusion of his briefing Mr. Gray called on Secretary Herter.

Secretary Herter said that he had only one comment to make with respect to U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa. This was to point out that we are now finding ourselves in real trouble with the Lion of Judah. On the proposition offered by the British of joining British Somaliland with Somalia when the latter area became an independent state in December 1960,⁴ the U.S. had supported the U.K. proposal. Haile Selassie had disliked both the British proposition and our support of it and we were now engaged in trying to cool him off and to rid him of the notion that the U.S. had ganged up against him with the former colonial powers, Britain and France.⁵

The President said that if the French still had the strength to hold French Somaliland with the important port of Djibouti, he was inclined to doubt if it was wise to ask them now to give up French Somaliland. That area could be very advantageous to us all from a geo-political point of view as a means of blocking Soviet access.

Agreeing with the President, Secretary Herter said that actually the U.S. had a greater interest in the Horn of Africa from a geo-political point of view than had been indicated in the paper. In response to this statement Mr. Gray called the attention of the Council to the many claims on our resources which came from competing areas throughout the world. The President said he thought Mr. Gray's point was correct and that he was not quarreling with the point of view

¹ See Document 44 and footnotes 2, 3, and 4 thereto.

² This memorandum transmitted a memorandum of February 16 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense stating that they found NSC 5903 acceptable from a military point of view. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5903 Series)

³ Not printed.

⁴ Reference is to a statement made by British Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd in Hargeisa on February 9 indicating British plans for increased self-government in British Somaliland and acceptance of eventual union between the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia and British Somaliland when the two areas became self-governing.

⁵ A "Note on Ethiopian-Somali Problem," drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs John A. Bovey, Jr., on February 25, summarized this matter. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5903 Series) Documentation concerning this matter is *ibid.*, Central File 645U.75. The French opposed both the Lennox-Boyd statement and the abortive U.S. proposal, although neither concerned French Somaliland.

expressed in NSC 5903 by the NSC Planning Board. He would, however, hate to see the Red Sea completely bottled up at both ends by people who might not necessarily be or remain our friends. Secretary Anderson then stated that he felt that the Council should face up squarely to a significant national security issue which was suggested by the present paper. In Secretary Anderson's view we were heading rapidly into a situation where a lot of little, newly independent countries were coming into being and would inevitably turn to the United States for support. All of these little countries wanted to act like great big countries. This would mean increased demands on the resources of the U.S. for assistance. He greatly feared that sooner or later the bulk of financial support for Somaliland and similar newly developing countries would be expected to come from the U.S. He doubted very much, in turn, whether we could persist much longer in letting the entire world believe that we can and will support all these newly independent countries. This meant to Secretary Anderson that as the U.S. became more reluctant to provide the desired assistance, these newly independent countries would turn to the United Nations instead. On the other hand, if the United States should get into development programs for such countries, this would mean that of course the Soviets would likewise become involved. The Soviets, of course, could afford to undertake kinds of trade and contributions in their currency that the U.S. could not afford to make in dollars. Furthermore, Soviet aid programs through the United Nations or otherwise would result in an infiltration of Soviet agents in the guise of technicians and engineers whose ultimate objectives would be to subvert the government of the countries they were professing to aid. This being the case, Secretary Anderson expressed the opinion that the best recourse for the U.S. was to be found within the framework of the World Bank. Accordingly we may have to go further than we have thus far in increasing the resources of the World Bank so that the Bank would constitute a source to which these small countries could turn in order to foster their desired economic growth. The World Bank was a stable institution and the Russians were not in it. Secretary Anderson believed this to be a very fundamental point.

The President said that he had never been in the area of the Somalilands and inquired what kind of an area it was. Did Somalia consist of wild jungle? Mr. Allen Dulles said that most of the Somaliland area was dry and desert. Some of it was pretty high in elevation. The President then inquired whether the Somalia people were primitive and aborigines. Mr. Dulles replied that a great many of them certainly fell in that category. Mr. Stans pointed out that in the course of his own travels he had encountered Somali natives in Kenya who

were probably much the same as their brethren in the actual Somali areas. They were certainly primitive. On the other hand, the Somali women were said to be the most beautiful in Africa.

The President, citing his experience with primitive peoples in the Philippines, expressed some wonder as to how the natives of Somalia could expect to run an independent nation and why they were so possessed as to try to do so. Mr. Allen Dulles confirmed the President's doubt as to the capability of the Somalis to organize and administer a modern civilized state.

Mr. George Allen called attention to the support which President Nasser was giving to those Somalis who were Moslem as opposed to the Ethiopians who were in many cases Christian. In turn Secretary Anderson called attention to the great importance of the port of Djibouti which he described as a place from which this whole area could be controlled. He added that he would very much like to see U.S. and other private capital go into the Somalilands. This might provide a way out of the dilemma we were encountering with respect to allocating our assistance resources. Apropos of a comment by Admiral Burke that at the present time the U.S. had only three or four destroyers based near the general area, the President said he was certainly getting very weary of watching the U.S. build bases which we were unable to abandon for fear the Russians would presently take them over.

Admiral Burke expressed considerable anxiety over the influence exerted in the Somalilands by Egyptian teachers and others who exerted influences in the area inimical to the interests of the U.S. Admiral Burke thought that a sustained effort should be made to bring to the U.S. young Somali natives who had displayed a potentiality for leadership in the area. He stated that such young leaders should be trained very carefully and at some length in the U.S. and he said that this was perhaps the most important single thing that the U.S. could do to advance its interests in the Horn of Africa area.

Secretary Herter commented that the suggestion made by Admiral Burke would apply equally well to other sections of the African Continent. The President likewise expressed sympathy with the point of view advanced by Admiral Burke.

With respect to the problem of nations about to become independent, Mr. Gray pointed out that the Planning Board would begin next week to discuss a paper on this subject.⁶

⁶ Between March and May, the Planning Board considered a series of draft discussion papers on the subject "New Independent Countries and U.S. Policy," the last of which was dated May 6, 1959, but none was sent to the National Security Council. The draft papers and records of the relevant Planning Board discussions are *ibid.*, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

*The National Security Council:*⁷

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5903; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 18, 1959.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5903.

Note: NSC 5903 approved by the President for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

S. Everett Gleason

⁷ Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2053, approved by the President on March 2. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

46. Editorial Note

At the 414th meeting of the National Security Council on July 23, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Ethiopia during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, July 23, reads as follows:

“In the course of his visit to Moscow, the Emperor of Ethiopia has signed an agreement for a loan of 100 million rubles. The loan was of the usual kind; that is, on a barter basis with low interest rates. It is also said that the Czechs are extending a line of credit to Haile Selassie of twenty million dollars. To these agreements there are rumors of secret protocols of whose content we know nothing. These moves may, however, be the first major attempt of the Communist Bloc to penetrate into the deeper parts of Africa. This could be extremely significant. It was also possible that the Ethiopian Emperor is, in a quiet way, attempting to blackmail the U.S. Some opposition to his agreements has already made itself apparent in Addis Ababa but the opposition groups, who have approached us with the idea of putting the Crown Prince on the throne, have very little popular backing. Mr. Dulles warned that this was a situation which must be followed very carefully by the U.S. because of its obvious implications for Africa as a whole. One unconfirmed report has it that Haile Selassie has ordered the abrogation of the agreement which established the U.S. Base at Asmara. This, if true, could be extremely serious.

“Secretary Gates underlined the great importance to the Navy and to other U.S. Services of the Asmara Base. Admiral Burke added that the Asmara Base would assume even greater importance if we were to lose our bases in Morocco.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The agreement under reference was signed at Washington on May 22, 1953; for text, see 5 UST 749.

**47. Preliminary Notes of a Meeting of the Operations
Coordinating Board**

January 20, 1960.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

*1. Operations Plan for the Horn of Africa*¹ (Secret)

Mr. John Root, Deputy Director, and Mr. John Beard of the Office of Northern African Affairs, were present for the OCB consideration of this paper. Mr. Root opened the discussion with a brief résumé of the current situation in Ethiopia with particular emphasis on anticipated Soviet moves as a result of the acceptance by Ethiopia of a four hundred million ruble loan. Mr. Root said the US assistance program to Ethiopia appeared to be basically well conceived and executed and that the US did not plan to outbid the Soviets but that we would move to block Soviet dominance over key sectors in Ethiopia. The Chairman, Mr. Gordon Gray (White House) alluded to paragraph 45e of the Basic National Security Policy² (general avoidance of moves to counter every Sino-Soviet bloc offensive action) and said the US plan for Ethiopia appeared to be the first application of that policy.

Mr. Allen (USIA) spoke at some length of his belief that it may be in the interest of the US to attempt to direct Soviet resources into foreign aid projects since once the Soviets began they would be forced to continue foreign aid or be confronted with the problems with which

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, OCB Preliminary Notes. Secret.

¹ Reference is to a draft OCB document, January 12, prepared by an interagency working group and approved by the Board Assistants as part of the Board's function of coordinating and overseeing the implementation of NSC policy papers. The final document, "Operations Plan for Horn of Africa," is dated January 27, 1960. (*Ibid.*, Horn of Africa)

² NSC 5906/1, "Basic National Security Policy," approved August 5, 1959, is scheduled for publication in volume III.

we are familiar. Mr. Allen was concerned at the public relations effect of the US posture opposing Soviet assistance to underdeveloped countries. Mr. Merchant commented that US countermoves to Soviet assistance to underdeveloped countries were premised on our interest in preventing the Soviets from (1) infiltrating key sectors and (2) bringing about undue dependency by, influencing the policies of and eventually taking over the recipient countries. Mr. Dulles (CIA) said it would be preferable for the underdeveloped nations to "take the apple but not the snake". Mr. Scribner (Treasury) opined that it was impossible for the US to counter the Soviets everywhere, and he counseled that we not undertake to resist Soviet efforts across the board. He said if the Ethiopians wished to go along with Soviet Union's aid proposals in spite of all our assistance, then there was nothing more we could do. Mr. Allen said that while he welcomed Treasury support he was not advocating that the US wash its hands and get out in those instances where underdeveloped nations accepted Soviet aid.

There followed a discussion of the specific problem in Ethiopia of the recently-made Soviet offer to furnish Ethiopia with its petroleum requirements. Mr. Scribner said that "pouring US money in an attempt at preemption was not the solution." In closing the discussion, Mr. Merchant said he wished to make two comments. One was that the State Department had the duty to protect US private as well as public interests abroad; and, two, that expenditures by the US to meet critical problems had by no means all been in vain and that frequently they had resulted in substantial and impressive successes for US interests. Mr. Scribner asked that the Board continue to follow the problem closely. The Plan was approved for implementation by the appropriate agencies.

Action: AF

Copies: AFN, U/CEA, E, P, IO, EE, CU

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters]

48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy

April 15, 1960, 8:18 p.m.

3120. Following based on uncleared memo conversation:¹

During conversation April 14 with Under Secretary, Italian Foreign Minister Segni raised problem of aid to Somalia. Segni stressed that distinction must be drawn between economic and political factors re Somalia aid. While undoubtedly necessary for West, including Italy, assist Somalia in post-independence period² factor of overriding importance was need to keep Ethiopia, "one of decisive areas of Africa" firmly linked with West. Actions which Emperor had taken vis-à-vis USSR disturbing and although Italy did not believe Ethiopia would orient itself toward Soviets, essential that Italy and US have consistent political line toward Ethiopia. Segni recalled that Italy's relations with Ethiopia, which on whole very good, had nonetheless been bothered by problems involving Somalia. Italy would try impede Greater Somalia, "for which no natural reason exists."

Re specific measures aid to Somalia, Segni said in recent conversation Rome with member Somalia government exorbitant requests had been made. Italy presently not prepared assist Somalia beyond 2 million dollars banana subsidy, and 2 million dollars other aid. Italy would not agree cover entire budget deficit since Somalia would never make efforts become self-supporting.

Under Secretary stated US interested in Somalia and believed desirable meet with Italian experts to reach joint conclusion on how much and what kind aid Somalia needed. Once such conclusion reached, then decision could be made re division between participating countries. Dillon stressed US could not significantly increase its aid to newly independent African countries in view heavy demands on

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5-MSP/4-1560. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Italian-Australian Affairs Wells Stabler, cleared by Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs William J. Porter, and approved by Director of the Office of Western European Affairs Robert H. McBride. Repeated to Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio.

¹ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-WA/4-1460)

² Italy and Somalia had agreed to advance the date of Somalia's independence to July 1, 1960. On December 5, 1959, the U.N. General Assembly approved the conclusion of the U.N. Trusteeship on that date in Resolution 1418 (XIV), cosponsored by the United States; for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 1139-1141.

our resources and European countries able to help should continue aid to their former territories on same scale as before. In our view proportion Italian to US aid to Somalia should be two to one.

Re Ethiopia Dillon said US shared view re its importance and we would be willing discuss Ethiopian questions, both political and economic, with Italy at same time we discussed Somalia. Re aid to Somalia and Ethiopia Dillon said division of effort unimportant as long as each did fair share. Dillon agreed that West could not indefinitely underwrite Somalia budget deficit. Important to assist in development projects so that Somalia could become self-supporting.

Segni expressed full agreement to hold early meetings at expert level to consider Somalia and Ethiopian questions and also agreed to Dillon's caveat that talks should be conducted without publicity to avoid difficulties with Ethiopia.

Herter

49. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 76-60

June 21, 1960.

PROBABLE TRENDS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Problem

To assess the outlook in Ethiopia, Somalia, and British and French Somaliland over the next few years, with particular reference to the Soviet-Ethiopian aid agreement and the "Greater Somalia" problem.

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 21 June 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

Conclusions

1. Over the next few years the Horn of Africa is likely to be an area of considerable tension and international maneuvering, with Bloc and UAR influences competing with those of the various interested Western powers, including the US. (Para. 12)

2. The emergence on 1 July 1960 of an independent Somalia, comprising both the present UN trust territory and British Somaliland, will add to the international scene an extremely weak and impoverished country. The outlook for political stability is unfavorable. Moreover, Somalia's extreme poverty will necessitate continuing external subsidies of the order of at least \$10–14 million a year for the foreseeable future. Although the Somalis probably continue to look to Western and UAR sources for their basic requirements, they will probably be receptive to Bloc offers as well. (Paras. 30–35)

3. We see no present threat to the Emperor's authority in the backward feudal state of Ethiopia. However, the death or incapacitation of the 68-year-old monarch would probably lead to a struggle for power, since the Crown Prince commands little respect. Any struggle for power might encourage secessionist movements in Eritrea, the Ogaden, or other outlying provinces. (Paras. 13–15)

4. The Emperor's acceptance of substantial development credits from the USSR and Czechoslovakia marks a significant shift toward neutralism. We do not believe that acceptance of such aid will result in early Bloc domination of Ethiopia, but it is likely to result in increased Bloc influence. (Paras. 17–22)

5. The creation of an independent and enlarged Somalia will almost certainly exacerbate tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali nationalists over the status of the roughly 350,000 Somali tribesmen now ruled by Ethiopia and the several hundred thousand others who regularly seek water and forage in Ethiopia in the course of their seasonal migrations. There are likely to be recurrent border incidents and appeals by both sides for diplomatic support from outside powers. The situation would become particularly acute in the likely event that the Ethiopians carry out their threat to deny access to wells and grazing areas in their territory. They might also take limited military action into the territory of the new Somali state. (Paras. 23–29)

6. The developing situation in the Horn of Africa will provide the Sino-Soviet Bloc with opportunities for expanding its presence and developing its influence in the area at the expense of the West. However, at least over the next few years it is unlikely that the Bloc will achieve a dominant position. (Paras. 36–37)

7. The UAR will probably retain a special position in Somalia, but it is unlikely to achieve a dominant position there. (Para. 39)

8. Although various other powers will remain active in the area, the US will remain the principal non-Bloc target of Ethiopian demands for support and will probably come under similar pressure from Somalia. In this situation, it will be confronted with the constant risk of offending one or both of the interested parties. In any case, the US communications base in Eritrea is increasingly likely to become an important pawn. (Paras. 38-41)

[Here follow the "Discussion" portion of the estimate (paragraphs 9-41), with sections headed "Introduction," "The Outlook for Ethiopia," "The 'Greater Somalia' Problem," "Somalia: Stability and Orientation," "The Role of Other Interested Powers," and "Implications for the U.S.;" three annexes, titled "Soviet and Czech Aid to Ethiopia," "Military and Security Forces," and "Tribal and Political Alignments in Somalia and British Somaliland;" and three maps.]

50. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to Secretary of State Herter

August 10, 1960.

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa: NSC Consideration of OCB Report dated July 13, 1960¹

The OCB Report dated July 13, 1960 on U.S. Policy Toward the Horn of Africa (NSC 5903) recommends that NSC 5903 (approved by the President March 2, 1959)² be reviewed at an appropriate time in the near future. This review is deemed necessary for two main reasons: (1) developments consequent to Ethiopia's acceptance in 1959 of a \$100 million Soviet credit, and (2) the changing situation in the Horn resulting from the independence on July 1, 1960 of the Somali Republic (a union of the former British Somaliland Protectorate and the former Italian Trust Territory of Somalia).³ A new government has just been formed in the Somali Republic, but numerous constitutional details remain to be worked out. The aggressiveness with which the Somalis will press their expansionist aims (involving French Somaliland, part of Kenya and a large part of Ethiopia) is not yet clear.

Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5903 Series. Secret. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Northeast Africa Affairs Arthur B. Allen.

¹ Entitled "Report on the Horn of Africa (NSC 5903)." (*Ibid.*, Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5903)

² Document 44.

³ See Document 62.

We are about to agree to increased military assistance to Ethiopia in an effort to improve Ethiopian attitudes, limit Soviet penetration and obtain agreement to additional military facilities. With a view to providing as great an impact as possible, Ambassador Richards' instructions (Tab A)⁴ also include authority to reveal economic aid already programmed for Ethiopia. Estimates of cost are contained in Mr. Penfield's memorandum to Under Secretary Dillon (Tab B) of July 27, 1960.⁵ On July 19, the President was given a brief report on the proposed instructions to Ambassador Richards (Tab C).⁶

The Ambassador's presentation of our response to Ethiopian requests is expected to be made shortly after his arrival on August 10. While we hope for improvement in our position in Ethiopia as a result of the Ambassador's presentation, it is unlikely that Ethiopian reaction can be accurately assessed before early September and it would therefore seem reasonable to commence the policy review in early October. By this time also the character and policies of the new Somali Republic should be discernible.

Recommendation:

That you outline to the NSC the status of our proposed additional aid to Ethiopia and recommend that the policy review be scheduled to begin in October with a view to NSC consideration in November or December 1960.⁷

⁴ Not printed. Airgram G-1 to Addis Ababa, July 28, authorized Ambassador-designate Arthur L. Richards to inform the Emperor in an early audience of the U.S. responses to his requests.

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ Tab C, a brief, unsigned memorandum, dated July 19, reads in part as follows: The President observed that it was in the US interest to do what we could promptly to meet within reason the Emperor's wishes, especially in view of the less stable situation in most of the rest of Africa. The importance of maintaining an atmosphere in Ethiopia which would assure continued unimpaired use of the key facilities at Kagnev was also remarked upon.

⁷ The National Security Council considered the OCB at its August 12 meeting. The brief discussion focused on Ethiopia's interest in engaging an American expert to assist in the operation of its banking system. (Memorandum of discussion by NSC staff member Charles A. Haskins, August 16; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) In NSC Action No. 2279, the Council noted that the NSC Planning Board would undertake a review of NSC 5903 at an early date. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95), Records of Action by the National Security Council)

51. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 72.1-60

August 30, 1960.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE SUDAN

The Problem

To estimate the outlook for the Sudan over the next few years.

Conclusions

1. The present Sudanese regime—or something very like it—will probably remain in power for the next few years. However, it will continue to be faced with: (a) pressure from the proscribed political parties for a return to civilian government; (b) an internal Communist potential which is likely to grow as Soviet and Chinese Communist activities in the country expand; (c) possible unrest in the South; and most importantly, (d) dissension and plotting within the military services on which its power rests. At present there is less external meddling in Sudanese politics than two years ago. We believe this situation is likely to obtain for the next few years. It is possible, however, that within the period of this estimate, the UAR, in particular, might make a more active effort to influence internal events. (Paras. 5-14)

2. In the economic field, we believe that the Sudan's present modest prosperity will continue. However, no comprehensive plan for economic development has yet been evolved and the country's relative prosperity will remain vulnerable to all dangers that face a one-crop economy. (Paras. 15-18)

3. The Sudanese Government's chief foreign policy concerns are to maintain its independence, to sell its cotton, and to get funds for economic development. Except where its own particular interests are at stake, it will tend to follow the lead of the UAR and the Arab League on foreign issues. The UK probably has more influence in the

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 30 August 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

Sudan than any other Western country. Sudanese relations with the US are likely to remain friendly, though not intimate. Thus far the Sudan has taken no assistance from the Bloc, but relations are likely to expand gradually. Yugoslav influence is likely to grow. The Sudan will seek above all to avoid becoming an active battleground between East and West. (Paras. 19, 21-26)

[Here follows the "Discussion" portion of the estimate (paragraphs 4-26, with sections headed "The Political Situation and Outlook," "Economic Prospects," and "Foreign Affairs.")]

52. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Calhoun) to the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)

September 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

Ethiopian Reaction to U.S. Aid Offers

On May 23 I sent you a memorandum concerning the request of the Emperor of Ethiopia for additional military assistance and our plans for dealing with it.¹ On May 25 we were informed of the President's interest and desire to be kept informed.² Accordingly, there is below a further status report.

Following a visit of senior Department of Defense officials to Addis Ababa in June to review the Ethiopian request with the Emperor,³ instructions were prepared for the new Ambassador, Arthur L. Richards, which authorized him to transmit our proposals for meeting the Emperor's request, to reveal our plans for economic assistance in Fiscal Year 1961 and to reaffirm our opposition to threats to Ethiopian territorial integrity. The cost of the additional military assistance was estimated at \$5 million in Fiscal Year 1961. The Ambassador was also instructed to seek agreement in principle to the acquisition of approxi-

Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Ethiopia. Secret. A handwritten note in the margin reads as follows: "Reported to Pres 12 Sep 1960. JSDE".

¹ Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

² In a memorandum of that date from John Eisenhower to Calhoun. (*Ibid.*)

³ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert H. Knight met with the Emperor on June 14 and 16. He reported the conversations in telegram 1143 from Addis Ababa, June 15, and telegram 3685 from Cairo, June 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 775.5/6-1560 and 775.5/6-1860, respectively)

mately 1500 acres to augment our key communications facilities in Eritrea. The Ambassador-designate gave the President a brief status report on the above proposals on July 19.

Both the British and French were informed of our plans for responding to the Emperor's request for additional assistance, and on August 29 Ambassador Richards presented our proposals to the Emperor.⁴ The Emperor's reaction was quite favorable. The Ethiopian Government issued on August 29 a communiqué (see enclosures)⁵ which should help improve the position of the United States in Ethiopia and the Emperor has already taken steps toward granting the additional facilities desired by the Department of Defense.

We expect an unfavorable reaction from the Somali Republic, which views our military aid to Ethiopia as endangering Somali security. We have already taken steps to try to reassure the Somali Government.

Emory C. Swank⁶

⁴ Richards reported the conversation in telegram 181 from Addis Ababa, August 29. (*Ibid.*, 775.5-MSP/8-2960)

⁵ The enclosures consisted of copies of telegrams 182 and 183 from Addis Ababa, August 29 and 30. (*Ibid.*, 775.5-MSP/8-2960 and 775.5-MSP/8-3060)

⁶ Signed for Calhoun by Deputy Director Emory C. Swank.

53. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

New York, September 27, 1960, 11:30 a.m.¹

OTHERS PRESENT

Deputy Prime Minister Aklilou
Ambassador Mikael Imru
Secretary Herter
Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite
Mr. E.S. Glenn (State Dept.)
Colonel Eisenhower

The President opened by congratulating Deputy Prime Minister Aklilou on the conduct of Ethiopian troops in the Congo. He expressed his appreciation for the Ethiopian gesture of sending these troops. Mr.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret.

¹ The meeting took place at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. The President was in New York attending the General Assembly. Another memorandum of the conversation by Satterthwaite is in Department of State, Central Files, 320/9-2760.

Aklilou thanked the President and remarked that sending troops in defense of collective security is a long-standing policy of Ethiopia. He pointed out the action of Ethiopian troops in Korea, as well as the Congo. He promised to transmit the President's good wishes, and gave those of Emperor Haile Selassie.

The President said he had tried to make a conciliatory speech to open the UN General Assembly² in the hope that the cold war might be kept out of Africa. He said he thinks the consortium of African nations, which would permit a lightening of the arms burden on all its member nations and develop a sense of solidarity among those nations, would be extremely beneficial, particularly in preventing domination by big powers. Mr. Aklilou said his government had appreciated the President's speech in the General Assembly very much. Important business faces this General Assembly. The speech had been cast at a high level, as befits that body. Ethiopia regrets others have not done the same.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

Mr. Aklilou then said he has two or three points of bilateral business which he would like to report and hopes, of course, that we always work together. These are:

(1) He wished to thank the President for the military and economic help which we have given to Ethiopia and also for our provision of emergency grain.

(2) Negotiations for a university to be located in Addis Ababa are going slowly. The estimated cost of the university would be some \$10 million. It would be desirable to speed up these negotiations since they have been under way since 1954.

(3) Ethiopia and the U.S. have agreed in principle on the provision of a Fourth Infantry Division for that country. Implementation, however, is proceeding slowly.

(4) Haile Selassie desires to retire some 8000 soldiers in the Ethiopian army due to age and ill health. He needs funds to establish these people on farms and cooperatives. The cost here would be some 15 million Ethiopian dollars. He hopes this can be provided under the heading of military support in order to put these people on the farm. It is most difficult for Ethiopia to establish a standard military retirement.

The President said that this last point regarding military retirement is a new one to him. He acknowledged knowing of the Fourth Infantry Division, recognizing that some sectors may need additional protection. He reminded Mr. Aklilou of our requirements that any MAP-supported forces be used for nonaggressive purposes. Mr. Aklilou agreed quickly.

² For text of the President's address to the General Assembly on September 22, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 60-70.

The President expressed great interest in the idea of the university. He feels strongly regarding the need for Africa to develop its own leaders at home. Human understanding is our greatest hope. He reiterated that the idea of a university intrigued him. The President said he is not too much on building of armaments. He feels the U.S. itself has too many although he cannot prove this thesis to his soldiers. The retirement project will pose many difficult problems. The President promised, however, that we will study this proposal.

Mr. Aklilou thanked the President for his sympathetic audience. After further amenities, the meeting adjourned.

John S. D. Eisenhower

54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Somali Republic

October 12, 1960, 8:35 p.m.

174. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:¹

Italian Foreign Minister Segni and Director General Political Affairs Straneo called on Merchant October 12. Straneo stated GOI feels it very important continuing effort be made keep Somali Republic economically and politically stable. Italy willing help but surprised at recent GSR claim for 37 million Somalos to cover pre-independence deficit. GSR also asking for considerable additional aid.

Straneo referred to US difficulty in connection budget support and asked whether, if UK and Italy shared budget deficit, US would be willing divide total aid burden equally with UK and Italy, each providing one-third.

Merchant referred to importance getting facts from three Ambassadors in Mogadiscio and then holding tri-partite discussions on aid. Mentioning Guinea as example decisive nature transition period immediately after independence, he said USG extremely disturbed by reports apparent financial condition GSR—not only bankrupt but with inheritance unpaid bills—and said we had received impression Italian

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 777.5-MSP/10-1260. Confidential. Drafted by Allen, cleared by Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs Edward T. Long and in draft by Samuel W. Lewis of the Office of Western European Affairs, and approved by Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs William Witman, II. Repeated to Rome and London.

¹ Not printed. (*Ibid.*)

aid to GSR being held up pending Somali signature bilateral agreements. Agreed we would talk further with UK and Italy after facts clearer.

Straneo stated definitely Italian aid continuing.

Merchant also asked status UK-Italian plans help Somali Army.

Straneo said UK and Italy agreed on sending military mission but provided no details on status matter with GSR. Goal is to satisfy Somalis but provide only defensive arms. Suggested tripartite talks include military aid as well as economic aid. Merchant made no comment.

Pointing out indirect aid also important, Segni stated banana monopoly had recently increased Somali quota.

Straneo asked that GOI be informed nature aid request by Abdullahi Issa (who visiting Department October 13)² and nature US response. Merchant agreed.

Dillon

² In a meeting with Acting Secretary Dillon on October 13, Somali Foreign Minister Issa stressed the urgency of the Somali need for foreign assistance. Dillon told him that U.S. assistance for development projects was more feasible than for budget support and suggested that the U.S., British, and Italian Ambassadors in Magadiscio might consult with Somali officials, in order to avoid wasteful duplication of effort. (Memorandum of conversation by Allen; *ibid.*, 777.5-MSP/10-1360) A memorandum of a conversation between Issa and Secretary Herter in New York on October 6 is *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

55. National Security Council Report

NSC 6028

December 30, 1960.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE HORN OF AFRICA

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5903

B. OCB report on NSC 5903, dated July 13, 1960¹

C. NSC Actions Nos. 2215-c and 2279²

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1. Secret.

¹ See footnote 1, Document 50.

² NSC Action No. 2215-c of April 7, provided that the Planning Board should submit for Memorandum Action by the Council revisions in NSC policy papers required for the purpose of bringing them up to date. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscella-

Continued

D. NIE 76-20³

E. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 30, 1960⁴

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to the recommendation of the Operation Coordination Board that NSC 5903 should be brought up to date (Reference B), is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council.

A revised Financial Appendix will be circulated at a later date.

If adopted and approved, the enclosed statement of policy is intended to supersede NSC 5903.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it; direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.⁵

James S. Lay, Jr.⁶

Enclosure

DRAFT

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON THE HORN OF AFRICA⁷

General Considerations

Importance of the Area

1. An area of geographical and cultural transition between Africa south of the Sahara and the Near East, the Horn of Africa, under friendly control, contributes to the security of Western sea and air communications and offers a strategic position for the defense of Western interests in the Red Sea and nearby African areas. The United

neous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding Action No. 2279, see footnote 7, Document 50.

³ Document 49.

⁴ Reference is to the covering memorandum that transmitted NSC 6028 to the Council and requested that members indicate their approval or disapproval by January 16, 1961.

⁵ A memorandum of January 18, 1961, from Lay to the NSC stated that the members had adopted the draft statement of policy in NSC 6028 by Memorandum Action and the President had that day approved it. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

⁷ Ethiopia (including Eritrea), the Somali Republic and French Somaliland. [Footnote in the source text.]

States has a military interest in the Horn of Africa, particularly in view of the presence of critically required U.S. communications facilities in Ethiopia which we are seeking to expand.⁸

Threats to Peace and Stability in the Area

2. Internally, the Horn of Africa presents a picture of political fragmentation, ethnic and religious cleavages and marked economic backwardness. The two principal political elements in this situation are: (a) the Ethiopian Empire (with its federated territory of Eritrea) with a population of about 18 million divided between Christian highland farmers and Moslem nomads in the lowland, and in which only the barest beginnings have been made toward national unity; (b) the Somali people, who are divided between the newly independent Somali Republic (population 2 million), French Somaliland (25 thousand Somalis, 40 thousand others), southeast Ethiopia (350 thousand Somalis) and Kenya (60 thousand Somalis). The conflicting aims and aspirations of Ethiopia and the Somalis are a major source of tension jeopardizing prospects for peaceful and orderly progress in the entire area.

3. One of Ethiopia's main objectives, since World War II, has been to ensure that the adjoining Red Sea or Indian Ocean coasts do not become bases for a future attack upon Ethiopia. It has, therefore, sought to acquire control of these regions and in 1952 succeeded through the UN in obtaining the incorporation of Eritrea as a federated territory. Since that time the autonomy of Eritrea has been gradually reduced. The growth of Nasser's influence and the resulting enhancement of the threat of hostile Moslem encirclements led the Emperor of Ethiopia in 1956 to suggest publicly, but without success, federation of the Somalilands with Ethiopia.

4. The development of national consciousness among the Somalis has been accompanied by demands for independence and political unification through the creation of a Greater Somaliland, uniting all the Somali people in one independent country. These aspirations have been partly achieved with the independence of former British Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and its subsequent union with the former Trust Territory of Somaliland when the latter became independent on July 1, 1960. The constitution of the new Somali Republic contains the proviso that the union of the Somali peoples is to be promoted by legal and peaceful means, as well as a repudiation of war as a means of

⁸ The Asmara communications complex in Eritrea consists of Army and Navy facilities. In addition, the U.S. is authorized to use the Ethiopian air base at Asmara for transport and air movement operations and to store POL. Massawa provides important sea support to the Asmara communications facilities. Djibouti, because of its geographic location and existing facilities, is strategically important to the control of the southern approaches to the Suez Canal. [Footnote in the source text.]

solving international disputes. Nevertheless, the Somali drive for unification, in considerable part at the expense of Ethiopia, constitutes an intrinsic threat to Ethiopia's security and territorial integrity.⁹ Especially when achievement of Somali expansionist aims by force is advocated by Somali extremists, Ethiopian fears are aroused and Ethiopian antagonism toward the Somalis is increased. For their part, the Somalis interpret earlier Ethiopian suggestions for federation as evidence of an Ethiopian plan to subjugate them, if necessary by force of arms, including those furnished by the United States under its Mutual Defense Assistance agreement with Ethiopia. The periodic use of force by the Ethiopians to maintain order in areas occupied by their Somali subjects as well as the restrictions on nomadic Somalis penetrating Ethiopian territory from the Somali Republic tend to confirm the Somalis in their fears.

5. Ethiopian and Somali leaders lend lip service to the fact that the long-term interests of the countries in the Horn of Africa would be advanced by an accommodation between the Ethiopians and the Somalis. However, the terms upon which each side proposes such an accommodation are not acceptable to the other and have increased the antagonism and suspicion between them. It is open to serious question whether the Ethiopian suggestion for federation, which would increase Ethiopia's internal difficulties through the accession of a very large additional Moslem element, would contribute to area stability. On the other hand, the Somali aspiration for a Greater Somaliland, if realized, would extend, through the acquisition of large increments of territory and population without corresponding gains in economic resources, the grave political and economic difficulties of a non-viable Somali State scarcely past the embryonic stage. Under these circumstances, the United States and other Western nations interested in the area have made little progress in their direct efforts to lessen tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic, but hope for some success in encouraging both Ethiopia and the Somali Republic to look to the UN as a source of their security. However, neither of the protagonists has been willing to accept a U.S. position of neutrality in this dispute.

6. In addition to the threat posed by the conflict between Ethiopia and the Somalis, and the marked reduction in direct Western influence in the Somali Republic, there is a threat to the peace and stability of the area stemming from efforts of the UAR, and USSR and the Chinese Communists to exploit existing antagonisms and weaknesses in order to undermine the Western position in the Horn of Africa and to

⁹ The Greater Somaliland concept envisages incorporation into the Somali Republic of approximately one-fourth of Ethiopia (which includes a grazing area the use of which is vital to the pastoral economy of the Somali Republic); French Somaliland (which controls the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad); and a small part of Kenya. [Footnote in the source text.]

expand their influence. In exploiting the Ethiopian-Somali conflict it is possible that the Chinese Communists will give priority to activities in the Somali Republic (either in cooperation with or in competition with the USSR), in view of the existing Soviet emphasis on activities in Ethiopia.

7. Of great concern to Ethiopia is the extension of UAR influence to Northeast Africa. UAR propaganda and subversive activity among the Moslems in the area and limited UAR support of Somali extremists as well as the likely increase of UAR influence in the Somali Republic are all regarded by Ethiopia as a danger. In fact, however, the UAR's support of Somali expansionism will probably continue to be moderated by a desire to avoid too direct a challenge to Ethiopia, at least so long as Haile Selassie remains in power, as well as by the relatively low priority of the Horn as a UAR target.

Ethiopia

8. Ethiopia occupies a commanding position in the Horn of Africa and is the only economically viable country in the area. Although internal stability has been achieved under the authoritarian rule of the Emperor, the feudal nature of the government, the fact that the central government does not exercise effective administrative control over outlying areas, the presence of a large Moslem minority susceptible to UAR and other blandishments and still-extant discontent in Eritrea are serious fundamental weaknesses. The Ethiopian Government has been following a policy of military modernization, economic development of the country's resources, and almost imperceptibly gradual political advancement. Economic stability has been maintained through careful use of internal resources, the long-term expansion of export revenues, and the availability of external financing. The long-range consequences of the attempted coup of December 1960 cannot as yet be predicted. It is unlikely, however, that the Emperor can, even if he wishes, accelerate appreciably the political advancement and economic development of Ethiopia with the human and economic resources available without resorting to forced mobilization of manpower and capital. The situation will probably be kept under control so long as Haile Selassie reigns, but his death or incapacitation is likely to precipitate a struggle for power at the center, possibly complicated by secession movements, especially in Eritrea and the Somali-inhabited areas. Crown Prince Asfa Wossen has suffered from the restraints placed on him by his father, and although publicly exonerated from culpability in connection with the December, 1960 coup attempt, he may be quietly removed from the line of succession. If, however, he remains the legally designated heir, he may be able to succeed to the throne, if only as a symbol, especially should he be supported by the Army.

9. There are no major difficulties between Ethiopia and its western neighbor, the Sudan, and relations between the two states are cordial. However, in the absence of an agreement on the use of the Nile's waters, any developments on the Nile River which might establish "beneficial use" rights for other powers to the detriment of Ethiopia's future use are a source of great concern to Ethiopia and will continue to have an important bearing on its relations not only with the Sudan and the UAR, but also with any other country participating in such projects through financial assistance or otherwise. The Ethiopian Government relies heavily upon the formal assurance in this connection which it received in 1956 from the United States Government "that no action in derogation of Ethiopia's legitimate rights should be taken without Ethiopia's consent."¹⁰

10. Following World War II Ethiopia adopted a policy of active cooperation with the United States. In 1950, it supported the United Nations in Korea and subsequently followed the U.S. position on many other major international issues. In 1959, however, Emperor Haile Selassie made a state visit to Moscow, accepted long-term credits of \$100 million from the USSR and \$10 million from Czechoslovakia, and embarked on a more neutralist foreign policy. These moves were almost certainly stimulated by the Emperor's discontent with the United States and Western responses to his demands for material aid and diplomatic support, particularly as related to the Somali issue. The Emperor's fear that the U.K., with U.S. assent, was pushing for a "Greater Somalia" had become and remains an obsession affecting Ethiopia's attitude on all other matters. More recently, difficulties and delays in the utilization of Soviet assistance (in part reflecting, as with previously initiated Western aid programs, the administrative and technical difficulties of doing business in Ethiopia), an increase in the U.S. aid program and developments in the Congo (where Ethiopian troops support the UN action) have all tended to disillusion Ethiopia with the USSR. There are indications that the Emperor is pleased that the drift away from the United States has been reduced. Nevertheless, Ethiopian acceptance of the Soviet and Czech aid represents an advance in the Bloc's efforts to undermine Western influence and to expand its own presence and prestige in Africa, provides a framework for further Bloc overtures to Ethiopia itself, and affords greater opportunities for Bloc subversion.

11. Ethiopian armed forces and constabulary total approximately 59,000 men of whom 28,000 are in the National Police, 24,000 are in the Army, and 6,000 in the Imperial Bodyguard. The army is capable

¹⁰ This assurance was contained in a letter dated May 26, 1956, from the Under Secretary of State to the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs. [Footnote in the source text.]

of maintaining internal security or repressing border incursions made by any of the military establishments existing in neighboring areas. The economic burden imposed by the maintenance of such an extensive military establishment—defense expenditures constitute 20 percent of budgetary allocations—is being partially offset by the U.S. Military Assistance Program initiated in 1953.¹¹

12. U.S. economic aid to Ethiopia under the Mutual Security Program has been granted at the level of \$5 million to \$6 million per year in recent years. The cumulative total of grant MSP economic aid from FY 1952 through FY 1960 was \$38 million. Of this total, \$27 million has been for technical assistance mainly in the fields of agriculture, education, health and surveys of natural resources. The balance has been given as Defense Support or Special Assistance for economic development projects. DLF loans of \$0.5 and \$2 million have been made in FY 1960–1961, mainly to provide lending capital for agricultural and industrial projects. Further loans have been requested primarily for financing improvements in airways and highways.

13. In spite of the expanded Soviet Bloc presence, the United States still occupies a leading position in Ethiopia and remains able to exert considerable influence on Ethiopia's orientation. While the Emperor desires to maintain a substantial Western presence in Ethiopia and to avoid heavy involvement with the Bloc, his aspirations to play an important role in African affairs will cause him to attempt to avoid antagonizing "neutrals" and thus becoming isolated. An example of this attitude was the Ethiopian voting record in the Fifteenth General Assembly (1960) where Ethiopia voted with the Afro-Asians (and against the United States) on numerous occasions.

14. As a result of the Emperor's growing interest in the development of Pan-African cooperation, Ethiopia has participated in Afro-Asian Conferences, although with increasing caution in view of the attempts of the USSR and the UAR to use such conferences to achieve their own objectives. The Emperor's desire to exert a leading influence in Africa is tempered by his fear of a rebuff, damaging to his prestige, from the newer, more radical, African leaders. He has, for instance, openly supported the UN effort to the Congo, without, however, being willing to play an aggressive part in African circles.

The Somali Republic

15. The independence of former British Somaliland on June 26, 1960, and its union with the former Trust Territory of Somaliland when the latter became independent on July 1, 1960, added to the international scene an extremely weak and impoverished country

¹¹ U.S. military assistance has gone to the Army and to the Imperial Bodyguard, and some limited assistance has gone to the police. [Footnote in the source text.]

faced, in addition to the problems of resolving tribal rivalries, by major administrative problems involved in combining two formerly separate governmental mechanisms established by the British and the Italians.

16. Post independence developments have to date resulted in a readjustment of internal political alignments and the installation of a government which has advanced a program based on moderation in the political sphere and economic austerity. Faced, however, with major economic and financial problems, the Government is under great pressure to produce tangible improvements in the domestic economic situation and also to obtain sizeable amounts of foreign aid. Moreover, in spite of the official attitude of the Somali Government,¹² Ethiopian actions against Somalis (whether Ethiopian subjects or not and whether within Ethiopian territory or not) and the popular appeal of the Greater Somalia issue are effectively exploited by opposition politicians and anti-Western propagandists. The net result is a strong tendency toward a politically neutralist position in international affairs and toward the acceptance of economic assistance from both Western and Bloc sources.

17. Economically, the Somali Republic faces an extremely difficult period that is expected to continue for some years to come. Lacking any known deposits of petroleum or mineral resources, its future economic growth must depend on economic development in the agricultural sector. Banana production and local handicrafts are virtually the only sources of monetary income. Improvements in agricultural methods and techniques could bring immediate but modest gains in production, particularly in meats and hides and skins. The recent completion of the Inter-River Economic Survey, conducted in the area between the Giuba and Uebi Scebeli Rivers, has provided data which indicate that over the long term economic growth could be obtained through expanding agricultural production and introducing related processing industries.

18. The present economy of the Somali Republic provides a very limited debt servicing capacity and the opportunities for financing economic development of the Republic through external private capital investments appear to be very limited. Accordingly, continuing external subsidies will be required for the foreseeable future both to meet ordinary budget deficits and to finance the limited economic growth which seems feasible.

19. Although the new government has proclaimed policies of reform and austerity, the requirements for external assistance in the period 1961-1965 have been estimated by the Somalis themselves, if somewhat generously, at \$150 million for economic development and

¹² Both the Constitution and the Government program advocate achievement of Greater Somaliland "by legal and peaceful means." [Footnote in the source text.]

\$50 million to meet deficits in the ordinary budget. These amounts are not based on any rigorous analysis and are clearly beyond the capability of the Somali Republic to absorb.¹³

20. Italy and the U.K. can be expected to continue to provide economic support to the Somali Republic.

a. In the nine and one half years that it administered the former Trust Territory, Italy in addition to providing an assured market for the Somali crop contributed to it an average equivalent of about \$10 million per year. As indicated by its commitment to provide some budgetary aid and to assure a continued banana market, Italy will probably continue a moderate level of economic and technical assistance to the Republic for reasons of prestige and to protect residual private interests.

b. The U.K. contributed the equivalent of \$5 to \$6 million annually to its Protectorate. The British probably hope to retain some leverage for countering Soviet and UAR influence and have promised an annual grant to the Somali Republic. However, they have little hope of occupying a preponderant position in the new state and will probably seek to induce Italy and especially the United States to assume more and more of the burden of support.

c. The United States has programmed economic and technical assistance to the area in recent years at an annual rate of \$1–3 million for a total of \$6.8 million through the end of FY 1960. As early as 1958, the United States gave the Somali Government an assurance that the United States would continue its interest in the area's economic future after independence and would be willing to help, by supplementing the aid provided by other Free World countries subject to the availability of funds.

Other potential sources of economic support for the Somali Republic include the European Common Market fund, from which the Republic is scheduled to receive \$5 million during the next five years; Free World financial institutions (when the Republic joins them); the UN Special Projects Fund; and the UAR, the USSR, and Communist China.

21. Because of the concern of the UN for the political and economic future of the Somali Republic and to provide a "UN presence" to discourage adventures by either the Somalis or the Ethiopians, the UN Secretary General contemplates assigning a personal representative to Mogadiscio. The Somali Government has requested that the UN provide, in addition, high-level experts in the fields of economics, finance, public administration and law. Should this UN group function as hoped, it could make a major contribution to the maintenance of stability in the area as well as providing disinterested expert advice to

¹³ Paragraph 31 of NIE 76–60 (June 21, 1960) states that "total minimum requirements for external assistance will amount to \$10–14 million annually for the foreseeable future." [Footnote in the source text.]

the Somalis on their internal problems. Such a group of experts would be particularly welcome to the Somalis because of the general lack of confidence in some of the Italian experts who occupied high positions in the Somali civil service before, and to some extent since, independence. It has been reported that the low caliber of a great many of these experts has caused great dissatisfaction on the part of the Somalis and has rendered it unlikely that they would agree to accept a corps of permanent Italian advisors.

22. Relations between the Somali Republic and the United States are generally good because of U.S. support for the Somali Republic's independence, past and prospective U.S. assistance, and Somali confidence that the United States has no territorial or other ambitions in the area. However, in spite of reiterated U.S. explanations and statements of support for the Somali Republic's independence, the close ties between the United States and Ethiopia give rise to Somali apprehension that the United States tends to favor Ethiopian designs on them, and through its military and economic assistance is increasing Ethiopia's capability to absorb the Somali Republic by force of arms or otherwise. The U.K. and Italy have agreed between themselves to provide assistance to the Somalis in the military field, including a joint training mission if the Somalis should so request.¹⁴ The UAR has also offered to assist with small arms and training. The United States has informed both the Somalis and the Ethiopians that, while it will continue to help the Somali police, it has no plans to aid the Somali Army. Because of the strong interests of the U.K. and Italy in the area, the United States has closely coordinated with both countries its own action in the Somali Republic, and relies on them to exercise a restraining influence on Somali desires for military expansion.

23. The UAR has made assiduous efforts to identify itself with Somali nationalist aspirations. It will probably retain a special position in the Somali Republic by virtue of its historic rivalry with Ethiopia, its appeal to religious ties, and its readiness to provide some educational, cultural, military and economic assistance. In addition, it will continue some covert meddling in Somali politics. However, most Somali leaders are probably too concerned with the problems of their own state and too much subject to the conflicting pull of Pan-Africanism for the country to fall under preponderant Pan-Arab influence as represented by the UAR.

¹⁴ The Somali armed forces consist of (1) the police numbering about 3,000 men, (2) the former Somaliland Scouts numbering about 1,000 men and an embryonic Army of about 3,500 men formed by the transfer of the Police Mobile Force to the Army and by recruitment. The stated Somali goal is an Army of 6,000 men. [Footnote in the source text.]

24. Even before independence, Somali representatives had attended Pan-African meetings and at the 1960 All-African Peoples Conference held in Tunis were able to obtain a resolution supporting Greater Somalia. The Somalis are anxious to be regarded as a full-fledged member of the emerging African Bloc and hope to obtain African support for their claims against Ethiopia.

25. Activity in the Somali Republic by the Sino-Soviet Bloc before independence was held to a minimum by the U.K. and Italy. Commencing with the independence ceremonies both the USSR and Communist China have increased their efforts to gain a foothold. The Chinese Communists appear to have made considerable headway with the leadership of the opposition Great Somalia League. The Somalis have agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Communist China. In the light of increased Soviet and Chinese Communist interest in Africa both may be expected to take advantage of any opportunities to establish a foothold in the Somali Republic, although the USSR and its European satellites will be inhibited by the need to avoid jeopardizing their position in Ethiopia.

Somali Areas in Kenya

26. One of the four areas inhabited by Somalis which is included in Somali aspirations for union is the eastern portion of Kenya's northern Frontier Province. Some efforts have been made by the Somali Republic to persuade the British to cede this area prior to Kenya's independence although the some 60,000 Somalis in Kenya have only recently shown any interest in this question and are divided in their reaction. The British position has been that the question of the secession of any part of Kenya is a matter to be decided when independence arrives, by the British and Kenya governments, who would consider the wishes of the inhabitants. Kenya African leaders do not yet seem to have focused on the problem to any extent.

French Somaliland

27. France has opposed Greater Somalia, particularly in view of the value of the port of Djibouti, which is the only city in French Somaliland and is considered by the French to be of strategic importance to them. Djibouti is also of great importance as the principal port of entry for Ethiopia and the terminus of the railroad to Addis Ababa. French policy has in the past been one of holding French Somaliland firmly within the Republic,¹⁵ basing this position on the plebiscite of 1958. More recently, however, the French have given the Somalis

¹⁵ As an overseas territory it is constitutionally an integral part of the French Republic. [Footnote in the source text.]

indications that greater freedom, perhaps even independence, may be possible at some future date. As European-controlled areas in Africa continue to become independent, France will be under increasing pressure to grant French Somaliland its independence. At the same time, Ethiopia will view with great suspicion any steps which might result in Somali control of its sole railway exit from Addis Ababa to the sea and may be goaded by its fear of this eventuality into taking unilateral action to protect its interests.

Objectives

28. Denial of the Horn of Africa to Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist domination and minimization of Soviet Bloc and Chinese Communist influence.

29. So far as consistent with the preceding paragraph, denial of the Horn of Africa to UAR domination and limitation of UAR influence to a moderate level.

30. Such military rights and facilities in the area as the United States may require, including the continued use of the Asmara communications facilities.

31. Orderly political, economic and social evolution along lines favorable to cooperation with other Free World countries.

32. Reduction of tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic.

Policy Guidance

General

33. Cooperating with friendly nations wherever pertinent and efficacious: (a) encourage the resolution of conflicts and tensions in the area; (b) seek to deny the area to Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist domination and to minimize Soviet Bloc or Chinese Communist influence; (c) so far as consistent with (b), seek to deny the area to UAR domination and to limit UAR influence to a moderate level; and (d) encourage orderly economic progress.

34. In view of the distinct possibility that the tensions between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic may be seriously exacerbated or result in armed conflict (going beyond border incidents), determine which courses of action by the United States would be feasible and would serve best the long-term interests of the United States in such an eventuality.

35. Strengthen U.S. information and cultural exchange programs in the Horn of Africa, and encourage other friendly Free World nations to take similar action.

Ethiopia

36. Consult with Ethiopia on Middle East and African matters of concern to it. Encourage Ethiopia to maintain an interest in Pan-African affairs and to exercise a moderating influence in such affairs.

37. Continue to provide Ethiopia with: (a) technical assistance, with emphasis on education and training programs; (b) to the extent necessary to meet our objectives, limited economic assistance and minimum military equipment and training of a kind suitable for maintaining internal security and offering resistance to local aggression, making every effort to avoid a military build-up which would strain the Ethiopian economy, lead to commitments for indefinite U.S. support, or to increased tension within the area.¹⁶

38. While recognizing the right of the Ethiopians to trade with and accept assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc, seek to meet the challenge posed by Bloc offers of economic and military aid and cultural ties by:

a. Vigorous implementation of the aggregate U.S. programs described above.

b. Seeking to dissuade the Ethiopian Government, wherever feasible and without creating antagonism toward the United States, from:

(1) Accepting assistance from the Sino-Soviet Bloc in particularly sensitive fields (such as the armed forces, internal security, communications and education) of a kind which would be damaging to Ethiopia's security.

(2) Accepting aid or engaging in trade with the Bloc at levels or on terms likely to create undue Ethiopian dependence on the Bloc.

(3) Extensive use of Bloc technicians.

c. To the ends specified in b above, be prepared in particular circumstances to provide further U.S. technical, economic and military assistance if required. Direct counter offers to specific Bloc offers should be considered only as a last resort.

39. Avoid U.S. involvement, insofar as possible, in negotiations on the Nile waters between Ethiopia and other riparian states and, above all, avoid U.S. identification with the position of any riparian state.

40. Consider steps which might be taken to ensure that French plans for the future of French Somaliland take into account the vital Ethiopian interest in maintenance of unhampered use of the Addis Ababa–Djibouti railroad or the provision of an acceptable alternative.

41. Keeping in mind the many advantages of an orderly succession by the legally designated heir, seek to identify and, to the extent feasible, foster, before the death or incapacitation of Emperor Haile

¹⁶ The Ethiopians consider military aid to be a quid pro quo for our military base. [Footnote in the source text.]

Selassie I, a successor who will prove acceptable to the nation (especially the Army), who will be able effectively to counter the subversive efforts of the Communist and who will be responsive to "modernist" aspirations and pressures.

The Somali Republic

42. Encourage Italy and the U.K. to continue to exercise the primary external responsibility for the maintenance of the Somali Republic's stability and Free World orientation.

43. a. Encourage Italy, the U.K. and other friendly nations to provide economic and technical aid, including budgetary, military and police assistance, to assist Somali leaders favorable to the West to remain in power and to maintain stability in areas under their control.

b. Encourage the UN to provide technical assistance.

c. Encourage the Somali Republic to join Free World financial institutions. If the Somali Republic becomes a member of these institutions, encourage efforts by the institutions to promote sound economic and financial policies in the Somali Republic and support loans to the Republic by these institutions where consistent with relevant U.S. policies governing such loans.

d. Be prepared to supplement these efforts as necessary by providing limited U.S. economic and technical assistance, including assistance for police-type units.

44. Encourage Somali leaders to be moderate in advancing the concept of a Greater Somaliland and emphasize to both Ethiopia and the Somali Republic the danger of attempting to alter the existing political situation by force.

45. Encourage the UN Secretary General to take an active role, through a personal representative in the Somali Republic, in attempting to reduce tensions in the area and to find solutions to various conflicts (including border disputes and the future of the Somalis in Kenya and French Somaliland) which are acceptable to the states and peoples concerned.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF AND CONCERN WITH NEWLY-INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES

56. Editorial Note

On October 2, 1958, the Republic of Guinea was established by proclamation of its National Assembly. The text of a letter of November 1, 1958, from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Sekou Touré extending formal U.S. recognition is in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, page 826. On February 16, 1959, the Department of State announced the opening on February 13 of an embassy at Conakry, with Robert W. Rinden as Chargé d'Affaires; see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 16, 1959, page 390. The first U.S. Ambassador to Guinea, John Howard Morrow, presented his credentials on July 30.

For further documentation on U.S. policy toward Guinea, see Documents 305-331.

57. Editorial Note

On January 1, 1960, the Republic of Cameroun became independent. For text of a message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ahmadou Ahidjo, December 31, 1959, see 2 Whiteman 144. The Department of State announced on January 5 that the consulate general at Yaoundé had been elevated to an embassy on January 1, with Consul General Bolard More as Chargé d'Affaires; for text of the announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1, 1960, page 174. For additional information, see 2 Whiteman 142-145. The first U.S. Ambassador to Cameroun, Leland Barrows, presented his credentials on June 9.

58. Editorial Note

On April 27, 1960, the Republic of Togo became independent. A message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio, April 18, extended U.S. greetings and congratulations, remarked on U.S. pride and satisfaction with the successful conclusion of another United Nations Trusteeship, and declared that the United States looked forward to close and friendly relations. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Project Clean Up, Africa—Republics) The message was delivered by Attorney General William P. Rogers, who represented the President at the independence ceremonies. (Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant to the President, April 16, 1960; *ibid.*) On April 27, the Department of State announced the elevation of the consulate at Lomé to an embassy, with Consul Jesse MacKnight as Chargé d’Affaires; for text of the announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 16, 1960, page 806. For further information, see 2 Whiteman 227–228. The first Ambassador to Togo, Leland Barrows, resident at Yaoundé, presented his credentials on August 22.

59. Editorial Note

On June 20, 1960, the Federation of Mali, composed of Senegal and Soudan, former autonomous republics of the French Community, became independent. A message of that date from President Eisenhower to President Modibo Keita extended U.S. greetings and congratulations, remarked that the Mali Federation’s achievement of independence in friendly cooperation with France was a source of pride and satisfaction to the United States, and declared that the United States looked forward to close and friendly relations. The message was transmitted to Consul General at Dakar Donald A. Dumont in telegram 510 to Dakar, June 17, 1960, for delivery on the occasion of his presentation of credentials as Chargé d’Affaires on June 20. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Project Clean Up, Africa—Republics) The Department of State announced on June 20 the elevation of the consulate general at Dakar to an embassy as of that date; see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1960, page 73. For further information, see 2 Whiteman 227–228.

60. Editorial Note

On June 26, 1960, the Malagasy Republic became independent. A message dated June 25 from President Eisenhower to President Philibert Tsiranana was delivered on June 26 by Consul General at Tananarive J. Roland Jacobs when he presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, page 526. On June 25, the Department of State announced the elevation of the consulate general at Tananarive to an embassy as of June 26; for text of the announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 11, 1960, page 74. The first Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic, Frederic P. Bartlett, presented his credentials on October 5.

61. Editorial Note

On June 30, 1960, the Republic of the Congo (capital at Léopoldville) became independent. For text of a message of that date from President Eisenhower to President Kasavubu, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, page 544. Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert D. Murphy, who represented the President at the independence ceremonies, delivered the message. The Department of State announced on June 29 the elevation of the consulate general at Léopoldville to an embassy on June 30, with Consul General John D. Tomlinson as Chargé d'Affaires; see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1960, page 118. The first Ambassador to the Congo, Clare H. Timberlake, presented his credentials on July 25.

For documentation concerning the Congo, see Documents 90–292.

62. Editorial Note

On July 1, 1960, the Somali Republic became independent, uniting the former U.N. trust territory of Somalia with the former British protectorate of Somaliland, which had become independent on June 26. For text of a message dated July 1 from President Eisenhower to President Aden Abdulla Osman, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, page 550. Secretary of Commerce Frederick H. Mueller, who represented President Eisenhower at the independence ceremonies, delivered the message. The Department of State announced on June 30 the elevation of the consulate general at Mogadiscio to an embassy on July 1, with Consul General Andrew G. Lynch as Chargé d'Affaires; see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1960, page 118. Lynch presented his credentials as the first Ambassador to Somalia on July 11.

The United States did not extend formal recognition to Somaliland, but Secretary of State Herter sent a congratulatory message dated June 26 to the Somaliland Council of Ministers; for text, see *ibid.*, page 87. An Operations Coordinating Board report of July 13, 1960, entitled "Report on the Horn of Africa (NSC 5903)," states that formal recognition was not extended because Somaliland's period of independence was to be of such short duration and was timed to permit it to unite immediately with Somalia when the latter became independent. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5903 file)

For further documentation concerning the Somali Republic, see Documents 41-55.

63. Editorial Note

On August 1, 1960, the Republic of Dahomey became independent. A message of that date from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Hubert Maga was delivered by Consul General at Abidjan Donald R. Norland; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, page 608. Telegram 45 from Abidjan, August 3, reported delivery of the message on August 2; the delay was due to the late arrival of the telegram authorizing delivery. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Project Clean Up, Africa—Republics) Norland presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires on August 1; see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 31, 1960, page 702. He was resident in Abidjan, as was the first Ambassador to Dahomey, J. Borden Reams, who presented his credentials on November 26.

64. Editorial Note

On August 3, 1960, the Republic of Niger became independent. For text of a message of that date from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Hamani Diori, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, page 610. The message was delivered by Consul General at Abidjan Donald R. Norland when he presented his credentials as Chargé d’Affaires on August 3; see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 31, 1960, page 702. Norland was resident in Abidjan, as was the first Ambassador to Niger, J. Borden Reams, who presented his credentials on November 26.

65. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

August 5, 1960.

SUBJECT

Aid to the Ivory Coast

I looked into the report from Consul General Norland¹ about which you wrote me on July 18² and had hoped to have an opportunity to talk to you about it earlier this week in Newport. However, since circumstances made it inconvenient to do so I thought you might like to have the following background on what we are doing in the Ivory Coast and the other three states associated with it in the *Conseil de l’Entente* (Dahomey, Niger and Upper Volta).

One of our basic problems in this and other former French territories has been the extreme reluctance of the French to let the United States or any other country operate aid programs. Even in cases where independence has been scheduled and sometimes after its achievement they have informed us they will oppose any outside attempts to

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Confidential.

¹ Telegram 24 from Abidjan, July 16, reported a conversation on July 15 between Consul General Donald R. Norland and Prime Minister Houphouet-Boigny, in which Houphouet argued for U.S. economic aid to the Ivory Coast in order to demonstrate that cooperation with the West was fruitful; he emphasized the Communist threat to Africa and affirmed his conviction that the trend of events in Guinea could be reversed and other states prevented “from plunging to chaos as in ex-Belgian Congo.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751T.13/7–1660)

² In a brief memorandum of that date, the President called Herter’s attention to Norland’s report and said he would like to discuss the matter with him in the next 2 or 3 weeks. (*Ibid.*, 870.00/7–3060)

enter the cultural field. Nonetheless, we have undertaken to survey the four countries to see where United States aid could be most effective. A representative of ICA will be in Abidjan this month to arrange for the three-man study team to spend approximately a month in the Entente countries in late August and September. We hope one member of this team may then remain in Abidjan to form the nucleus of what we expect to become a full-scale ICA mission.

At the same time I have approved Mr. Norland's recommendations³ that he suggest to Prime Minister Houphouet-Boigny that several economic experts from the Entente states accompany the Prime Minister to the United States for the United Nations General Assembly in September. We believe that these steps will give Houphouet-Boigny the assurance he needs that the United States will extend sympathetic understanding and material support to him personally and to the four associated states. We hope thereby to strengthen one of the most staunchly pro-Western African leaders and to permit him to continue his guiding influence on the future not only of these states but of others in this region.

Christian A. Herter

³ In airgram G-13, July 19. (*Ibid.*, 870.00/7-1960)

66. Editorial Note

On August 5, 1960, the Republic of Upper Volta became independent. For text of a message of that date from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Maurice Yameogo, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, page 611. The message was delivered by Consul General at Abidjan Donald R. Norland when he presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires on August 5; see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 31, 1960, page 702. Norland was resident in Abidjan, as was the first Ambassador to Upper Volta, J. Borden Reams, who presented his credentials on December 6.

67. Editorial Note

On August 7, 1960, the Republic of the Ivory Coast became independent. A message of August 7 from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Felix Houphouët-Boigny was delivered by Consul General at Abidjan Donald R. Norland on that date, when he presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, page 612. The consulate general at Abidjan was raised to an embassy on August 7; see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 15, 1960, page 262. The first Ambassador to the Ivory Coast, J. Borden Reams, presented his credentials on November 20.

68. Editorial Note

On August 11, 1960, the Republic of Chad became independent. For text of a message of that date from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister François Tombalbaye, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, page 612. Consul General at Brazzaville Alan W. Lukens presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires on August 11; see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 31, 1960, page 702. Lukens was resident at Brazzaville, as was the first Ambassador to Chad, W. Wendell Blancké, who presented his credentials on January 9, 1961.

69. Editorial Note

On August 13, 1960, the Central African Republic became independent. For text of a message of that date from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister David Dacko, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61*, pages 630–631. Consul General at Brazzaville Alan W. Lukens presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires on August 13; see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 31, 1960, page 702. Lukens was resident at Brazzaville, as was the first Ambassador to the Central African Republic, W. Wendell Blancké, who presented his credentials on January 6, 1961.

70. Editorial Note

On August 15, 1960, the Republic of Congo (capital at Brazzaville) became independent. For text of a message of that date from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Fulbert Youlou, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, page 631. Consul General at Brazzaville Alan W. Lukens presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires on August 15; see the Department of State announcement of October 13 in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 31, 1960, page 702. The first Ambassador to the Republic of Congo, W. Wendell Blancké, presented his credentials on December 23, 1960.

71. Editorial Note

On August 17, 1960, the Republic of Gabon became independent. For text of a message of that date from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Leon M'ba, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, page 644. Consul General at Brazzaville Alan W. Lukens presented his credentials as Chargé d'Affaires on August 17; see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 31, 1960, page 702. Lukens was resident at Brazzaville, as was the first Ambassador to Gabon, W. Wendell Blancké, who presented his credentials on January 13, 1961.

72. Telegram From the Consulate General at Lagos to the Department of State

Lagos, September 5, 1960, 11 p.m.

153. Personal for Dillon from Harriman.¹ Please repeat substance to Senator Kennedy confidentially. Third message.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/9-560. Confidential.

¹ Former Governor of New York W. Averell Harriman was in Africa on a fact-finding mission for Presidential candidate Senator John F. Kennedy.

Had several long talks with Houphouet-Boigny Prime Minister Ivory Coast. I found him much the most experienced and pro-western of French African leaders I have met. Now that Mali is broken up² he is working quietly to get Soudan to turn to Ivory Coast rather than Guinea. He refuses to have any traffic with the east. He believes China is of even greater danger to Africa than Russia because of her undeveloped areas. He stated that today Commie strategy is to detach Africa from Europe and US and everyone should recognize that aid is offered for this political objective. He said that Nkrumah believes he had "descended to earth to liberate the African masses" and is now making a mistake in accepting Soviet aid particularly as it is not necessary for Ghana as it has been for Sekou Toure. Although both have adopted policy of "positive neutrality", he believes he can have some tempering influence on each of them now that he is independent of France. He left me after dinner last Wednesday to go to border village to meet Sekou Toure and said he would point out to him the danger of the game he is playing with east. He does not think Sekou Toure is a Commie although some of his associates are. He does not consider Lumumba a "lost soul" but he depends too much on his left wing advisers. Lumumba has a "changeable personality" due largely to his lack of education and experience.

Houphouet-Boigny hopes Nkrumah will exert "restraining influence" on Lumumba. He intends to urge Nkrumah to act and point out how dangerous a Commie Congo would be to independent Africa. He expects to see Lumumba himself after Ivory Coast is admitted to UN. He considers Nigerian leaders "wise" and will be factor for stability when they become independent.

In Accra Nkrumah assured me unequivocally that he will give his full support to UN. This is of course a recent change in position. He expressed concern over the dangerous possibility of Commie Congo to Africa. The Congo he believes must be united but through negotiation in order to avoid civil war. He thought he could help as an intermediary since Tshombe had already appealed to him. Although he expressed suspicion of Soviet motives, he maintains policy of "positive neutrality". He expects to see Sekou Toure soon and will try to influence him against too much dependence on east. He intends to discuss possibility of joint Ghana and Guinea Central Bank.

He is counting on successful conclusion of Volta River negotiations. There is utmost danger that western position would be irreparably damaged if financing were permitted to fall through. The British whom I saw, including General Alexander,³ expressed this fear but believed Nkrumah would have strong ties to the west if the Volta

² Senegal seceded from the Federation of Mali on August 20.

³ Major General H.T. Alexander, Commander in Chief, Ghana forces.

project is consummated. General Alexander believes Nkrumah's change of heart on Congo is sincere. Both British High Commissioner and French Ambassador consider Russians have made spectacular gains in Ghana during last few months but feel that Nkrumah is beginning to swing back.

I am struck by fact that principal opposition to government policies in each of countries I have visited including Guinea comes from the left, either within or outside the ruling party; also that situation is constantly changing and will be much influenced by the effectiveness and flexibility of our policies and programs.

Emmerson

73. Telegram From the Consulate General at Lagos to the Department of State

Lagos, September 7, 1960, 3 p.m.

158. Personal for Dillon from Harriman. Please repeat substance to Senator Kennedy confidentially. Fourth message. Am impressed by stability of situation in Nigeria. Government officials I have met seem mature with clear concept of their policies after independence. Prime Minister Abubakar¹ was unequivocal in his determination to stick to democratic institutions and firm relations with west. He does not like the terms non alignment or neutrality as he considers himself committed to western ideals. "They are the same as those of Nigeria" he stated. He will not however join any power bloc "as matter of routine." He understands dangers from Communism and is concerned by increasing Russian and Commie influence in Congo. He is championing at the bit for independence and UN membership in order to exert counter influence in Congo. He has already selected strong Ambassador to send. As the largest and strongest country in West Africa, he feels responsibility to exert leadership towards stability in West African area. He is annoyed with Nkrumah because of his personal ambitions and therefore difficult to work with. He is also worried about Russian influence in Ghana. He expressed certain sympathy for Sekou Toure since French, British and US had turned our back on him. He believes he is not lost if we can give him some help. He has confidence in Houphouet-Boigny. He wants increased American aid and hopes

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770U.00/9-760. Limited Official Use.

¹ Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.

fact that Nigeria has no communism threat will not make this more difficult. He wants aid direct from US rather than through UN as he has confidence in America and wants to develop close relations. He values also close British ties. This same view was expressed by Akintola, Premier of Western region who said that poverty and disease are greater threat than commie activity. They consider aid in higher education first priority, then industrial development, expansion of power, transportation, and private investment. Ministers foresee movement from farms to cities as agricultural methods improve. Therefore planning for jobs and housing is essential.

Although differences between three regions will cause some internal strains in Nigeria, I feel more confident that West Africa can be held to west since my visit here. I have tried to get some indication of order of magnitude of aid desired over next five years but ministers decline to guess until plans now under way are completed. One long-range project is considered important, namely, upper Niger triple-purpose dam—power, navigation and irrigation—roughly estimated to cost around 150 million dollars. They hope steel mill will prove economically feasible to attract outside public and private financing to utilize the brown iron and coal deposits. Also oil refinery to process their increasing oil production. Otherwise they foresee need largely for smaller consumer food processing industries for which they want to interest foreign private capital.

I am impressed with value of potential leadership of Nigeria in West Africa providing we give adequate helping hand under present friendly atmosphere and favorable conditions.

I leave for Brazzaville and Leopoldville today. I will return via Paris for engagement with DeGaulle on September 15. I have also been asked by Heath to stop in London which I hope to do before going to Paris.

Emmerson

74. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

New York, September 23, 1960, 9 a.m.¹

OTHERS PRESENT

President Olympio
Foreign Minister Freitas
Director of Cabinet Trenou
Secretary Herter
Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite
Colonel Eisenhower

After amenities, the President congratulated Mr. Olympio on the recent economic union of Togo and Dahomey. He mentioned the fruitlessness of big armaments on which the U.S. spends \$41 billion a year. He stressed the mutual benefit of productive aid and trade and wished that military aid could be reduced. Mr. Olympio said that West Africa is doing well but wants to progress faster. He expressed admiration for the President's guarantees of the security of West African States in his speech of the day before. To the President's question, he said Togoland contains 52,000 square miles and 1.2 million people. Its highest elevation is a plateau 3000 to 5000 meters high. The President said this would allow for pleasant resort areas since high altitudes in the tropics usually afford very favorable climates.

The President asked about elementary schools in Togo and Mr. Olympio said that the first secondary schools had been created in 1948. Togo has primaries but they need more teachers for the training schools. Since 1948, Togoland has developed some 40 secondary schools and now their educational system is able to give a BS degree.

The President stressed the necessity for progress to fit into the readiness of the country. He cited examples in Iran where we had sent tractors and gang plows without the recipients knowing how to use them. As a result, they fell to disuse and rusted. What we should have sent were steel plows and mules. Mr. Olympio said that Togo was fortunate in that the Germans, between 1884 and 1918, began elementary technical schools, to include carpentry, etc.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by John S.D. Eisenhower.

¹ The conversation took place at the President's suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel; he was in New York attending the U.N. General Assembly. Another memorandum of the conversation by Satterthwaite is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

To the President's question, Mr. Olympio said his regular speech to the UN is not yet scheduled. He has spoken once already on the occasion of the admission of Togo to the UN.

The President said he hopes all Africans will speak with one voice and support UN actions in the Congo. Mr. Olympio pointed out the complication of many bloody tribal wars which are going on now. The solution to these problems presents a great opportunity for the UN, and the UN should not be inhibited by fears of meddling in internal affairs. The President pointed out that the UN needs an invitation to go into a country. It requires a vote of the General Assembly for the UN to send forces into a country without an invitation. Mr. Olympio said the invitation under which the UN went into the Congo is now in doubt.

The President expressed disapprobation of Lumumba. He went on to stress his belief in regional groupings within Africa, of which the Togo-Dahomey economic union is an example. Mr. Olympio said this was an agreeable fact to him since his father had been born in Dahomey.

The President expressed hope for Africa in the parallel between Africa and Latin America. When the Spanish left this region, the former colonies broke up into many small independent nations made up of Indians and Spaniards. For many years they fought each other, but this condition is lessening. The President hoped that Africa can avoid this transition period by means of regional groupings.

Mr. Olympio said the situation is further complicated by the fact that some territories speak French and some speak English. Mr. Olympio said the French grouping of nations can generally work together, Guinea being the outstanding exception. He would like to see Nigeria and Ghana, the English-speaking nations, integrated somehow with the rest. Mr. Olympio said that Togo was never a member of the French Community. By contrast, it was a trust territory. However, it can work closely with members of the French Community. The President said he would like to see national [*regional?*] groupings in the area without outside domination.

Mr. Olympio then asked why the U.S. has one Ambassador to cover both Togo and Cameroun. These two nations are far apart and when the Prime Minister desires to send for an Ambassador, he sometimes has to wait for a long time. The President promised to look into this question, and the Secretary mentioned that Congress had been a little tight with their appropriations for Embassies. The President said there would be no harm in a few of these Ambassadors living in tents. It would have a salutary effect if our Ambassadors would, in some of these regions, live in simple surroundings rather than luxurious surroundings. Mr. Satterthwaite added by way of explanation for the arrangement of Ambassadors the fact that Togo and Ghana were hav-

ing difficulties when the Ambassadorial arrangements were made. It was not well to have an Ambassador to two countries who are having difficulties. He trusted the matter was temporary. Mr. Olympio seemed to find this highly amusing and laughed out loud. He said that Togoland is no longer having much trouble with Ghana.

The President assured Mr. Olympio that any U.S. government will be honest in its desire to listen sympathetically to the problems of Africa. He himself will not be in his current position long, but any government will be ready to contribute. He feels that aid should come through the UN since bilaterals encourage power politics and trouble.

Mr. Olympio mentioned the special fund of the UN and the President mentioned the name of Paul Hoffman² who he described as one of our big men, anxious to push the special fund. The President agreed this is an important matter. Mr. Olympio said this is a great help to Togo since sometimes an African nation does not even know what it needs. As an example, when goods are unloaded in the port, the trans-shipment from freighter to barge is sometimes a difficult operation for unskilled hands. Togo needs breakwaters, housing and roads. It has no natural harbors. Roads are extremely important to Togo in order to get out their coffee, cotton and cocoa. The President asked humorously that Togo refrain from producing what the U.S. holds in excess. We produce too much cotton and coffee, our cotton running to a surplus annually of 9 million bales. Actually, our largest surpluses are in that commodity and in wheat. Mr. Olympio said that cotton is little problem since France always asks for more of it. Togo produces no wheat; corn provides their staple diet. Millet is grown in the north.

At this time, Mr. Olympio presented an album of Togo stamps to the President which had been prepared for each nation who was supposed to have participated in the May Summit meetings.

John S. D. Eisenhower

² Managing Director of the U.N. Special Fund.

75. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dillon to President Eisenhower

September 23, 1960.

SUBJECT

Recognition of the Republic of Mali and Letters to Chiefs of State of Senegal and Mali¹

As a result of the party conference held in Bamako yesterday, the Soudanese Government has decided to adopt the name of Republic of Mali and to withdraw the powers previously granted to the Federation of Mali. By tacitly admitting that the Federation no longer exists, the Soudanese have facilitated our recognition of the two separate countries. Since your previous recognition was extended to the Federation of Mali, it is now in our interest to extend recognition to the Republic of Mali. Accordingly I recommend that you authorize recognition of the Republic of Mali at the same time as recognition is extended to the Republic of Senegal.

I also suggest that you respond to previous communications from President Modibo Keita of Mali² and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia.³ Since at the time these were received we had not yet taken a position on recognition, these communications were merely acknowledged by the respective posts. I now recommend that you write to the Chiefs of State of the two countries. As far as Mali is concerned, we are particularly anxious to avoid a repetition of the Guinean experience. A letter from you to Modibo Keita assuring him of our desire to cooperate with Mali would be extremely helpful at this critical point. The text of a suggested letter is enclosed.⁴ Since we do not want to seem to favor one of the former members of the Mali Federation over the other, I am

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770E.02/9–2360. No classification marking. Drafted by Thomas A. Cassilly of the Office of West African Affairs.

¹ A memorandum of September 19 from Dillon to the President had recommended recognition of the Republic of Senegal; a marginal note indicates that John Eisenhower had informed the Department of the President's approval on September 20. The memorandum stated that the situation was complicated by the fact that the Soudanese Government claimed that the Mali Federation was still in existence. (*Ibid.*, 611.70T/9–1960)

² A message of August 25 from Keita to Eisenhower, urging against any recognition of Senegal, is filed with a covering memorandum of August 27 from Director of the Department of State Executive Secretariat John A. Calhoun to Goodpaster. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Project Clean Up, Africa—Republics)

³ A message of August 20 from Dia to Eisenhower, declaring Senegal's independence and requesting recognition, is filed with a covering memorandum of August 24 from Satterthwaite to Dillon. (Department of State, Central Files, 770E.02/8–2460)

⁴ The letter stated that the President had decided to announce U.S. recognition of the Republic of Mali and that it would serve no useful purpose to delay further recognition of Senegal. It assured Keita of U.S. interest in cordial relations with Mali and desire to cooperate in its future development, and stated that pending the arrival of an ambassador in Bamako, Consul John Gunther Dean would serve as Chargé d'Affaires.

also enclosing a suggested letter to President Senghor of Senegal (who has since replaced Mamadou Dia as Chief of State).⁵

If you agree, the Department will transmit the text of these letters by telegram to be delivered by our posts in Dakar and Bamako, if possible at the time they announce your decision.⁶ I do not recommend publication of this correspondence but suggest that the initiative on publication be left to the Africans.

Douglas Dillon⁷

⁵ The letter stated that the President had decided to announce U.S. recognition of the Republic of Senegal, and it assured Senghor of U.S. interest in cordial relations with Senegal and desire to cooperate in its future development. It stated that he proposed to appoint Henry Villard as Ambassador to Senegal and that, in the meantime, Roswell D. McClelland would serve as Chargé d'Affaires. (Villard had been appointed Ambassador to the Federation of Mali, but the Federation had broken up before his arrival at post.)

⁶ A marginal note on the memorandum indicates that John Eisenhower informed the Department of the President's approval on September 23. The messages to Keita and Senghor, both dated September 23, were transmitted in telegram 29 to Bamako and telegram 201 to Dakar, both dated September 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 770E.02/9-2360 and 770T.02/9-2360, respectively) The text of a White House press release of September 24 announcing U.S. recognition of the Republic of Mali and the Republic of Senegal is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 10, 1960, p. 567.

⁷ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

76. Editorial Note

On October 1, 1960, the Federation of Nigeria became independent. For text of a message of that date from President Eisenhower to the people of the Federation of Nigeria on their independence, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, page 741. For text of a message from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, delivered on October 2 by Governor Nelson Rockefeller, the President's personal representative at the independence ceremonies, see 2 *Whiteman* 209-210. The consulate general at Lagos was elevated to an embassy on October 1; see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 17, 1960, page 630. Ambassador Joseph Palmer II presented his credentials on October 4.

77. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

October 8, 1960, 9 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Prime Minister Balewa ¹
Minister of Commerce Dipcharima
Minister of Information Benson
Under Secretary Dillon
Deputy Under Secretary Hare
Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite
Ambassador Palmer
Colonel Eisenhower

After amenities, the President said he was delighted to have the Prime Minister here for this is the time when we have the greatest need for reason and sound thinking. Never before in history have we seen happenings such as the mass emergence of independent States in Africa. Capital investment on a large scale is necessary in Africa, but education and technical aid are even more important.

The Prime Minister said he was highly honored to be here, and that it is a privilege to meet the President, not only because of his high office, but because of his personal standing in the world. In particular, he is held in high esteem in Nigeria for his contribution in the winning of the last war.

The Prime Minister continued that we live in a difficult world. Here the small nations must look to the large ones to exercise patience. If the large nations do not exercise patience, they can cause catastrophe. Nigeria, fortunately, possesses a wealth of experience in governing itself in comparison to other nations of Black Africa. The British, no matter what we say about them, took great pains to train the Nigerians to administer themselves. As for himself, the Prime Minister said he had had thirty years' responsibility and had governed a district of 1½ million people before ever becoming a Minister of the Nigerian government.

The Prime Minister expressed the hope that out of the chaos of the moment may come a better world. In this evolution the small nations can only offer advice to the larger ones. He hopes that large nations recognize this advice as much as possible, and he assured the President that he appreciates the tremendous problems faced by the U.S.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by John S.D. Eisenhower.

¹ The Prime Minister also met with Secretary Herter in New York on October 6; a memorandum of that conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

He acknowledged that the U.S. cannot allow themselves to be run over by the Soviets. He pleaded, however, for an easing of tensions; for these tensions affect the small nations mentally as well as physically and cause them to act accordingly. This is aggravated by the spectacle of conflict between powerful nations being conducted every day in the UN.

The Prime Minister expressed warm admiration for the U.S. He said that whatever may be said of the U.S., she never fought an aggressive or expansionist war. Therefore, the whole burden of representing the West and standing up to the USSR falls on the U.S.

The Prime Minister said the U.S. is in a different position from the USSR. A journalist here the other day asked him to comment on the need to free all captive peoples from their colonial masters. He had said yes, this is so, but this would include the Eastern satellite nations held in bondage under the Russians.

In summary, the Prime Minister reiterated his happiness in meeting the President. He invited the President to visit Nigeria now that they are an independent country. Millions there would be glad to see him. The two foreigners whom the Nigerians hold most dear are the President himself and Sir Winston Churchill. The latter, unfortunately, will never be able to make the trip.

The President expressed his pleasure at having his own name coupled with Sir Winston's. He said he thought there would be a good chance sometime next year that he and his wife would take a trip. If this transpires, Central Africa will be high on the list. Other regions would be Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia. The President said he had pondered whether it would be possible for him to come to the Prime Minister's inauguration. With the world situation as it is, he had regretfully to decline and sent in his place his good friend Governor Rockefeller. He had thought this would be the best way to see some of the small nations that the U.S. is interested in but had had to give up the idea. He promised to try in the future.

Referring to the Prime Minister's words on the small nations, the President said he spoke the truth and spoke eloquently. He said the greatest usefulness of the UN is to the small nations, but it is useful also to the large ones since stability in the small nations is necessary to us. Turmoil in small nations forces the large nations into opposition. Therefore, the opportunity to make the UN work must not be lost. He expressed agreement with the Prime Minister's estimates regarding their uncomfortable position when the large nations glare at each other.

The President then said the U.S. is seeking today all practical measures to implement disarmament and the cessation of production of atomic fuel. If this can be commenced in a practical manner, things will be well. On our part, we are willing to open our nation to inspec-

tion from without. The Soviets, however, are unwilling to do the same. Apparently the Soviets are afraid for people to enter their borders for fear those people will be repelled by what they see or by their own influence to foment liberalism.

The problem, as the President sees it, is that everyone can make speeches. Khrushchev refers to himself as a "peace-loving democracy," at the same time threatening the use of force. In this atmosphere, we cannot give way or we will invite more of the same. The U.S. has the problem of convincing the world of its peaceful intentions. Actually we would rather put our money in helping underdeveloped nations than into the sterile "fire department" for which we are required to pay \$50 billion annually. This, unfortunately, is not practical since we cannot afford to look weak militarily, morally, or economically. Any man who witnesses the dead of a battlefield becomes the world's biggest practical pacifist. Force is unacceptable as an instrument of policy; we must reach a meeting of men's minds. At this time Communists refuse to believe that individuals have rights. They regard people as servants, a state which reduces them, in effect, to intelligent mules.

The Prime Minister said that, although Nigeria achieved independence only one week ago, they have had some experience with the Russians. He agreed that if you give in to them you are through. He cited an incident in Lagos when a delegation of Russians, including Malik, called on him at inauguration time and insisted on opening an Embassy in Lagos immediately. He himself had insisted on the submission of application in proper form. They had argued an hour, at the end of which the Soviets left in a huff with a statement that the Nigerians do not like them. He reiterated that if the U.S. gives in to the Soviets the world will fall to pieces.

The Prime Minister referred to the situation among the smaller nations. They are all in a great state of excitement over the prospects of independence. Some are not ready. They have a need for financial and human help without obligation. Guinea and Ghana have accepted help from the Soviets to the extent that the Prime Minister believes they have developed obligations to the Soviet bloc. Nigeria will not do this; but this fact does not reduce her need for the help. Nigeria needs capital investment of a private nature. This he would expect to come from the U.S., Britain, Germany, and to a lesser degree, France. He had referred to this in his speech at the UN and asked that placing Nigeria in a position of obligation be avoided.

The Prime Minister referred to the visit of Averell Harriman recently, who, he said, had come as the President's representative. Harriman had expressed the view that aid to Africa be through the UN, with bilaterals avoided. The President hastily informed the Prime Minister, much to the latter's surprise, that Mr. Harriman did not in any

way represent the President. The Prime Minister continued, however, that if Nigeria is stable, and if she recognizes the danger inherent in becoming dependent on other nations, then she should be allowed to receive bilateral aid. The President agreed with this and said that aid to Africa through the UN does not necessarily preclude bilaterals. He said we put great interest and stock in Nigeria. In this he says he is not just talking; we will be depending on Nigeria heavily. He said the UN Special Fund is particularly valuable for the type of situation which has arisen in the Congo. Here this fund would be of tremendous value for the development of rivers, dams, minerals and the like. The Prime Minister interjected that Nigeria has a river project in the offing. The President said he believes by and large it is better to handle aid on a loan basis rather than grant. This requires the recipient to be responsible, independent, and self-respecting. He recognizes grants are sometimes necessary, but that they connote some feeling of obligation.

The Prime Minister expressed the hope that Nigeria, as the largest and most heavily populated of the Black African nations, can do much to help the other nations if they are stable and progressive. Nigeria, however, has some way to go. Her living standards are low and technical know-how is lacking. However, Nigeria's standing is high, as evidenced by the fact that the French Community nations came to Nigeria in the UN and gave Balewa the mandate to speak for them.

The President said the immature nations figure that with enough money they can grow overnight. He said you cannot make a tree grow overnight, no matter how much water you pour on the seed. Stability is necessary to promote growth. He cited the expense of modern weapons and the burden which it is placing on Great Britain. By contrast, Germany, not permitted to re-arm to a large degree since the war, has been growing at an unparalleled rate economically.

Turning to a casual subject, the President asked as to the altitude of Lake Chad. The Prime Minister said it is actually at a low altitude, even below sea level. The highest mountains in Nigeria are 7000-9000 feet.

(The discussion of institutes for primary education then transpired, at which time I was absent arranging for photographs.)

The Prime Minister then very seriously asked the President his advice on the way Nigeria should vote in the UN on the seating of the Chinese Communists. Here is a nation of 650 million people without representation. Whatever happens, the Soviets and Chinese Communists will come to grips and conflict will result. Thus, the Prime Minister cannot understand why the U.S. opposes admission of Red China to the UN. He admitted that he himself is a layman and not too well informed. He derives his opinions from the competition which he has been able to observe between the Red Chinese and Russians in Africa. The President admitted this is an extremely tough problem. Condi-

tions have changed, and there are signs that the Sino-Soviet axis is not so strong as it was once upon a time. He pointed out the emotional bill of particulars that the U.S. holds against the Communist Chinese, particularly from their acts in the Korean war and from their holding of U.S. prisoners illegally. He pointed out that Red China has been branded an aggressor by the UN and this brand has not been removed. The President cited the fact that the charter of the UN insists that its members be peace-loving. He further cited the condition of U.S. prisoners when returned from North Korea, in a brainwashed condition. Two years ago the Chinese agreed to release some, but this had not transpired. The President continued with his bill of goods to mention the invasion of Viet-Nam by the North Chinese, plus the Chinese insistence that regardless of the attitude of the UN, they intended to take Formosa by force. He reiterated that the American people are emotional. They look at the list of actions, and say, "The hell with that." At a later date the Chinese Reds may be admitted, but this is not the time.

To the Prime Minister's question, the President said he had studied the idea of two Chinas in the UN a great deal. He feels that to recognize Red China would destroy Chiang Kai-Shek, our ally of long standing. There is no easy answer; the President realizes there are 650 million people involved and the government is operated without measurable resistance. He recognized that John Foster Dulles, in a book dated 1956, had said that after a certain length of time any nation of this sort would be automatically recognized.³

The President said he is hard put to advise the Prime Minister on this issue. He said that if Red China is admitted to the UN on a precipitant action right now, this would constitute such a repudiation of the U.S. that we would be in a hard fix indeed. He himself has always avoided the word "never" regarding Red China. Once they cease their aggressive intent, release our prisoners, and abandon their professed intention of taking Formosa by force, then the way will be open. The Prime Minister said that would provide a new situation.

Mr. Dillon told the Prime Minister that the Red Chinese have rejected any prospects of two Chinas in the UN. This surprised the Prime Minister considerably. He admitted that he had been ignorant of this fact, plus the fact that Red China was currently still branded an aggressor by the UN.

John S. D. Eisenhower

³ Reference is probably to Dulles' *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1950).

78. Editorial Note

A memorandum of October 5 by John S.D. Eisenhower of a meeting that day between the President and Under Secretary of State Dillon states that Dillon told the President that the Department of State was concerned about the status of its new posts in Africa and that Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Loy W. Henderson was thinking of making a tour of them. He would be accompanied by a military man. The President commented that he would like to see the military attachés in the area held to a minimum; he thought one attaché from any service "could cover a great deal of territory." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

A memorandum of October 10 from Secretary of State Herter's Special Assistant Max Krebs to Under Secretary Dillon's Special Assistant Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., states that in an October 6 conversation between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Maurice Dejean of the Central African Republic, the latter had expressed the hope that the United States would establish an embassy at Bangui. Herter had subsequently indicated to Krebs his sympathy with this. The memorandum continues:

"He feels that the role of these emerging States in international affairs, particularly at the United Nations, as well as the difficult problems they will be facing during their first years of existence, make it highly desirable if not virtually obligatory that the United States have a full time Ambassador in each capital." (*Ibid.*, Herter Papers, Personal Memoranda, 1960)

On October 13, the Department of State announced plans to open embassies in six newly-independent African countries: the Central African Republic, Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Niger, and Upper Volta. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 31, 1960, page 702) On October 14, the Department announced that Deputy Under Secretary Henderson would visit a number of west and central African countries between October 17 and November 21 to discuss with U.S. and local officials the problems and representational needs of existing and proposed U.S. posts in the area. (*Ibid.*, page 701)

79. **Telegram From the Embassy in Senegal to the Department of State**

Dakar, October 13, 1960, 11 a.m.

260. Reference: Rabat's 651 and Paris 1438 to Department.¹ While conclusion UNGA debate on Mauritania before November 28 would obviously be best solution, we concur Paris recommendation USG should not delay decision regarding attendance Nouakchott ceremonies and recognition Mauritanian independence.

From this vantage point, seems unlikely Morocco will receive much support for its position on Mauritania even from Afro-Asians. Indeed, in French-speaking parts black Africa, US failure promptly recognize independence Mauritania would in all likelihood have unfavorable effect.

Department will recall that ceremonies in Nouakchott at time independence is declared will be purely symbolic sincerity, which now consists of some fifty buildings, has no hotel and visitors cannot remain overnight except at small inn with very limited accommodations. Mauritanian Government plans full scale celebration on November 28, 1961.

Department may wish consider advisability of accrediting Ambassador Villard to Mauritania and having him represent US Government at ceremonies next November.²

McClelland

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751T.02/10-1360. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, Rabat, and London.

¹ Both telegrams concerned the question of recognition of Mauritania, at issue because Morocco claimed Mauritanian territory and opposed its independence. Morocco proposed U.N. discussion of the subject on August 20 (U.N. doc. A/4445) and Moroccan Ambassador El-Mehdi Ben Aboud set forth the Moroccan position to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Raymond A. Hare on August 30. (Memorandum of conversation by John F. Root, Deputy Director of the Office of North African Affairs; Department of State, Central Files, 751T.00/8-3060) Telegram 651 from Rabat, October 7, counseled delaying a decision on U.S. recognition until after the U.N. discussion. (*Ibid.*, 751T.02/10-760) Telegram 1438 from Paris, October 10, recommended accepting the invitation to the independence ceremonies on November 28 if more African states did so. (*Ibid.*, 771.022/10-1060)

² A message dated October 26 from President Eisenhower to Mauritanian Prime Minister Mocktar Ould Daddah, accepting the invitation to send a delegation to the independence ceremonies, was sent to Dakar in telegram 322, October 26, for delivery to the Prime Minister. (*Ibid.*, 751T.02/10-2660)

80. Telegram From the Embassy in the Ivory Coast to the Department of State

Abidjan, October 22, 1960, 9 p.m.

182. Department pouch Bamako Conakry unnumbered. Joint ICA/Embassy message. Ten-nation conference including eight chiefs of state opening Abidjan October 24 (Embtel 181)¹ generally regarded here as first step Houphouet's attempt establish African Front independent of Afro-Asian bloc, and Houphouet has indicated privately to Embassy this is his intention. It is also clear Houphouet gambling political future as leader ex-French black Africa on effort restrain these states from openly supporting PGAR against France in order keep open possibility for black African play role in bringing two parties Algerian conflict together.

Short of change of heart by protagonists, Embassy believes situation unrealistic expect decisive turning point in Algerian conflict as result any initiative African states may take. On other hand, leaders of African states face grave risks regardless of course they choose since attempt continue maintain neutral attitude in Algerian conflict may result in loss popular support to benefit of radical elements, while support PGAR increases threat France will cut off economic aid.

In view of above, we believe it is now urgent we strengthen existing moderate and pro-Western leadership these newly independent African nations by announcement making clear US intention provide economic and technical assistance *entente* states. Such announcement should make specific reference types of projects under consideration and stress regional aspects ICA survey recommendations with view promoting and enlarging scope regional cooperation. Also strongly recommend we be instructed consult with Houphouet along lines indicated Deptel 129.²

As noted Embtel 165,³ Soviets due make appearance here immediate future. Embassy also informed Czech trade mission has been granted visas visit Ivory Coast next week. Since further bloc activity can be expected, undue delay US announcement may result its being construed as reaction Communist initiative rather than positive demonstration US interest in well-being these countries.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/10-2260. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Paris and Dakar.

¹ Dated October 23. (*Ibid.*)

² Not found.

³ Dated October 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 461.7041/10-1760)

Embassy believes that for maximum impact announcement should be made (from White House if feasible) early this week.⁴

Lloyd

⁴ Letters of October 31 from Secretary Herter to leaders of the four states of the *Conseil de l'Entente* (Prime Ministers Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Maga of Dahomey, and Diori of Niger, and President Yameogo of Upper Volta) stated that the United States was prepared to make a significant contribution to the *Entente* states to help accelerate their economic development and strengthen regional cooperation. For text of the letter to Houphouet-Boigny, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 2, 1961, p. 19.

81. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

November 1, 1960.

OTHERS PRESENT

Messrs. Dillon, Satterthwaite, Bell, Stans, Dr. Reid, General Goodpaster

Mr. Dillon said the group had wanted to talk with the President because of a new policy question that has arisen concerning our aid to certain of the African states. We are at the point where we should give consideration in policy terms to the question of aid for Mali. This is the first time we have addressed the question of aid for one of the new, ex-French states. Mr. Dillon said the French interpose no objection to our giving aid to Mali. Houphouet-Boigny strongly favors such aid as a means for keeping Mali oriented to the West and associated with the Ivory Coast. If similar aid were given on the basis of need to all of the newly independent French states, the total would come to about \$35 million. He added that the French are continuing to give aid to Mali at the rate of about \$10 million per year. He stressed the importance of acting quickly if we are going to do this to avoid the possibility of close ties developing between Mali and Guinea. This aid would be in the form of commodities produced in the U.S., including cement and POL with the counterpart funds thus generated being used to improve a transport route through the Ivory Coast to Mali. Mr. Dillon recognized that Mr. Stans feels this kind of aid should be given through the UN. The difficulty is that the Russians and Czechs are pressing to give aid which would tie Mali to Guinea. The President asked whether our

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. Another memorandum of the meeting drafted by Satterthwaite is in Department of State, Central Files, 770E.5-MSP/11-160.

giving aid would result in an advantage to us in relation to the Russians and the Czechs. Mr. Dillon said that it would, adding that the Mali authorities look to us as the leader of the West. The hazard is that if we do not give aid, we will be closed out of the area, as they have attempted to do in Guinea. The great danger of a Mali-Guinea tie-up is that there would then be a route leading directly into Algeria. Mr. Stans commented that this aid is very close to straight budgetary assistance since we are not providing a single tangible product nor are we developing a specific project. The President commented that in general he prefers the UN approach, and would rather like to see a temporary type of action until the UN can be brought in.

Mr. Stans then voiced several considerations which give him concern. He did not feel that the action is in accord with NSC policy since that policy states that we would not do this until we see whether the Metropole or the UN would carry the burden.¹ He said he would like to see the proposal developed for further consideration. There are a number of aspects that need very careful study. Also he would like to avoid a precedent that would proliferate through all Africa. The President reverted to the idea of working through the United Nations. SUNFED has as its purpose the carrying out of pre-development surveys. He asked whether the World Bank and SUNFED have looked at Mali. Mr. Dillon said they have not as yet. He agreed that it is very important that they do this, but he pointed out that this type of survey takes a long time—a year or more—by which time the situation may have gone against us. The President said he thought the large number of small countries in this area did not make good sense. He wondered whether several of these could combine, such as Togo, Dahomey and Nigeria. Mr. Dillon said that Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta and the Ivory Coast are forming an entente, with Houphouet-Boigny the leader. He thought that perhaps Togo may join a little later.

Mr. Stans commented that he understood the French to say that we should sell trucks to the government of Mali rather than make a gift of them. Mr. Dillon showed the President a message proposing a consortium for the development of the transportation program. He said the Africans complain that we study everything to death, and reiterated the need for quick action. He said that PL 480 does not appear to be applicable in this case. Mr. Stans suggested a shift of emphasis toward technical training, but Mr. Dillon noted that such activity would be the function of the UN. The President asked whether this aid is simply a token to get the Mali Government on its feet and permit time for the development of a UN program. Mr. Dillon said that its purpose is to start immediate action. The President commented

¹ The relevant NSC papers were NSC 6001 (Document 22) and NSC 6005/1 (Document 27).

that if this proposal is one for a year or eighteen months, that would be fine. If we believe that, while a UN program is being organized, we should put \$35 million into all of Black Africa, he thought this would be a good gamble. He did not like the idea of putting up \$2½ million now and perhaps another \$3 million next month or in two months, and so on.

Mr. Stans said he would like to see this action, if taken, based upon a determination that the situation does not fit the NSC requirements, and does not constitute a precedent. The President thought the important thing is to determine what is the least to get the Mali authorities in the right frame of mind. He went on to say that the whole area is a mishmash of chopped-up geography. He would like to see emphasis continued on bringing the countries together.

He asked Mr. Dillon to work to develop as a basis for the determination the fact that we can do the job in no other way. He also said he wanted our Ambassadors instructed to see if they can generate interest on the part of the Africans in going to the UN. The President said that he thinks some of the Africans may be fearful that they will let the French Government “off the hook” as regards assurances that de Gaulle has given that he will aid them, should they turn to the UN. Mr. Dillon said that the State Department is planning that, when the President’s proposal for aid to Africa comes up in the United Nations, it will provide a basis for moving ahead.

The President said he would like to see us, and the UN, in placing the technical institutes in Africa, put them in the more friendly countries. Mr. Dillon said he would follow up on this suggestion. Mr. Satterthwaite observed in this connection that Houphouet-Boigny is emerging as the most able African leader, very pro-Western in outlook, and that his country is a point of strength in this area.

The President asked whether the assistance would be sent in kind, and was assured that it would be. Mr. Dillon asked whether the President approved going ahead on this basis, and the President said that he did. A written determination is to be sent over quickly.²

G

Brigadier General, USA

² A memorandum of November 1 from Dillon to the President requested an oral waiver pursuant to Section 451(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832), as amended, that the requirements of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 644) be waived with respect to the provision of up to \$2,500,000 in assistance to Mali, to consist of approximately \$2 million in commodities and \$300,000 in vehicles for internal security purposes. A marginal note states that the memorandum was approved orally by the President at the November 1 meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 770E.5–MSP/11–160) Telegram 84 to Bamako, November 1, authorized the Embassy to inform the Malians of the approval of commodity assistance and the supply of transport vehicles for internal security purposes and to announce that the United States was prepared to consider further economic and technical assistance on the

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State

Accra, November 6, 1960, noon.

551. From Henderson.¹ After becoming acquainted with problems faced by our skeleton or semi-skeleton staffs in Bamako, Freetown and Abidjan, and after looking at situation Ouagadougou and Niamey, I convinced no representation countries this area would be preferable to merely token embassy. Strains on skeleton staffs have been almost unbearable. These staffs deserve great credit for manner in which they have established good relations with local governments, but manifestly they cannot perform functions of modern embassy.

We must bear in mind that diplomatic missions in these areas no matter how small, must bear heavy burdens in field of administration, communications, et cetera. Housekeeping chores are usually more numerous and time consuming than in countries with long-established institutions.

Unless embassy has personnel and facilities enable it maintain constant exchange of communications with Washington and various other missions it will be operating in vacuum filled only by outdated newspapers and fragmentary broadcasts. In fast changing world situation Ambassador not kept abreast of international developments and fully informed re US attitudes toward such developments would be so severely handicapped that he would be ineffective and his mission would be disappointing to local governments who hope to obtain counsel from him. I therefore convinced we plan supply embassies established this area with adequate staff and facilities.

Not necessary, I believe stress here that developments in some of these small African states can influence trends in all of Africa and eventually affect our own security and future. For this reason we are suggesting in certain instances we move particularly fast and that we plan immediately make our presence felt in every African country in which we would be welcome.

conclusion of a bilateral agreement. (*Ibid.*) An agreement providing for economic and technical assistance was effected by an exchange of notes at Bamako, January 4, 1961; for text, see 12 UST 1.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.270/11-660. Confidential; Priority.

¹ Between October 19 and November 22, Henderson visited Cameroun, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, the Malagasy Republic, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta. En route to Africa, he met with President William V.S. Tubman of Liberia in Zurich; see Document 36. He also passed through the Congo (Léopoldville) on his way to the Malagasy Republic; see footnote 1, Document 270. Documentation on his trip, including memoranda of conversations with leaders in the countries he visited, is in Department of State, Central Files 110.13-HE and 120, but in some cases under country numbers; for example, see footnote 2 below and Document 83.

As result experiences obtained thus far on my trip I believe we shall find it necessary eventually to establish embassies with resident ambassadors in those newly independent countries which we have not yet visited.² We shall make firm recommendations with regard to composition of mission and timing after having visited them.

Department will note we not prepared at this time recommend resident ambassador to Mauritania. It likely, however, one will be needed within next few years.

Flake

² Telegram 358 from Lagos, November 8, reported that the Prime Ministers of Togo and Dahomey had urged the appointment of resident ambassadors to their countries as soon as possible. Henderson had informed them that the United States planned to do so in the near future but that it might not be possible to appoint a new ambassador before January 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.70D/11-860)

83. Telegram From the Embassy in Cameroun to the Department of State

Yaoundé, November 13, 1960, 1 p.m.

209. For Satterthwaite from Ferguson.¹ Following are a few brief impressions gathered this trip which may be helpful in your talks with British:

1. *Conseil de L'Entente* under Houphouet's leadership is going concern, thoroughly pro-western and entitled to priority support from the west. West in general and US in particular enjoy reservoir of goodwill which should be exploited.

2. Slippage of Mali and Guinea can be stabilized and in case Mali reversed if Modibo Keita can be strengthened. Anti-French feeling however is so strong in both countries as to be totally irrational and, while they both want US assistance, our potential influence is limited by our association with French. Under circumstances, it might be well to encourage Houphouet in his attempts reestablish his former close relationship with both Keita and Toure.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/11-1360. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London.

¹ Director of the Office of West African Affairs C. Vaughan Ferguson was traveling with Henderson; see footnote 1, Document 82.

3. Case of Ghana is more puzzling and probably more serious. Moderate elements in GOG such as Adedemah² are depressed and disheartened with extremists now having Nkrumah's ear. I feel British are not taking sufficiently serious view of situation or adequately using their still great prestige with Nkrumah to influence him on more moderate course. It is discouraging to hear British officers commanding Ghanaian troops advocating increasing Ghanaian armed forces to meet "aggression" on part *entente*. So long as Nkrumah is not directly attacking Great Britain, British seem to be mistakenly complacent.

4. US and UK both should do something about Liberia and Sierra Leone. We are often judged by appearances in areas where we are thought to be responsible and still greater effort seems imperative. Political leadership in both countries is old and younger elements are restive. The tawdry towns of Monrovia and Freetown are not helpful in showing US and UK support for small African countries.

5. Nigeria still looks good and best hope for west in West Africa. It cannot however be taken for granted and will require best efforts both US and UK to become real force for moderate African leadership.

6. One cannot tour West Africa without being impressed with extent French effort in past in bringing material benefits western civilization to Africa but at same time appalled at foolishness which allows situations such as those in Guinea and Mali to arise. Some French in Senegal seem to be behaving in manner to provoke similar situation there.

7. We have been a bit too cautious in past on question of American presence. In most countries, Americans are welcome and presence large numbers of Americans is encouraging to leaders of unviable new states who need visible signs of US interest. Too much too fast would be preferable to too little too late.

8. No matter what British and Americans might do in effort to keep former French West Africa oriented toward west, we likely fail unless solution Algerian problem can be reached in near future. Sympathy for Algerians sincerely strong in Moslem states such as Mali and Niger. Guinea and pro-Communist elements in other countries will not hesitate to use this issue to break down *entente* and try build new African unity under banner of neutrality but really oriented towards Moscow and Peking.

Barrows

² Reference is apparently to Ghanaian Finance Minister H.K. Gbedemah.

84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, November 17, 1960, 5 p.m.

1198. From Henderson. On basis conversations Yaounde we convinced we should move more quickly and affirmatively in meeting Cameroun requests U.S. assistance. Cameroun has potentiality playing important role in orientation of Equatorial Africa but this potentiality can be exploited only through prompt and sustained action on our part. We believe Cameroun Government sincerely desires be in Western camp but will find it difficult resist Afro-Asian pressure if remaining associated with West means continued dependence for aid on France alone.

While we were in Yaounde, Franco-Camerounian economic agreements were signed. On this occasion Prime Minister Assale made public statement to effect this agreement would be followed by similar accords with U.S. and West Germany. If his announcement turns out to be empty hope, his regime may be imperiled unless it looks other directions for aid.

Ambassador Barrows does not believe Camerounians want to expect any sort of elaborate program. He thinks not more than four key projects not exceeding total \$5,000,000 would meet situation. Camerounians although independent for nearly year have so far received no concrete evidence U.S. has any policy towards them except let French look after them. Continuation what appears be our present policy can lead to defeat of West in this politically strategic country.

Timberlake

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770C.5-MSP/11-1760. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Yaoundé and Paris.

85. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, November 19, 1960, 3 p.m.

1247. From Henderson. Since October 19 we have visited thirteen African countries which were formerly under some form French rule. In eleven of these countries (Mali and Guinea are exceptions) French continue play important roles; French officials in background and sometimes quite openly are giving guidance to constituted governments, helping government officials prepare documents for them, and frequently making decisions for them.

It is my impression that our decision to open or strengthen American Embassies in these countries has met with various reactions by French officialdom. In general I would say they regarded pending entrance of Americans on scene with mixed feelings of uncertainty, trepidation and to an extent relief. Uncertainty because they are not quite sure what attitude American diplomats placed in their midst will be towards them; trepidation because they have some concern lest American presence make their task maintain stability and respect for French culture, judgment and executive ability more difficult and relief because they are commencing to feel that task keeping these new countries steady and friendly to West becoming too much for them alone and they hope therefore that new American Embassies will share their responsibilities on basis cooperation. They feel that in course such cooperation Americans will give some heed their advice based on their long experience.

In general we were treated not only with courtesy but also with cordiality and real friendliness by French officials in most countries where they still play a role. They went out of their way to help us and when opportunities arose extended us warm hospitality. I thought, however, that behind their friendliness and hospitality I could detect at times a note of cynicism and puzzlement—as though they were thinking these American innocents have good intentions but what will be their reaction when they suffer disillusionment based on experience. There seemed also be some concern on their part lest members of various African governments with whom we talked would obtain impression that United States was preparing to give the new states so much aid that they could afford to take more independent attitude towards France on whom they are now dependent for economic

support. From words dropped here and there by French officials with whom we talked, I further obtained impression that they would welcome certain amount of American aid to these countries provided it would be granted after consultation with French authorities and would be supplementary rather than competitive with aid which France is giving.

As I have indicated in other telegrams my general conclusion is that if we do not extend some kind of aid to most of these countries their governments will be deeply disappointed; they are likely to feel that they must go elsewhere for aid, even to the Communist bloc. Although most of the responsible leaders these countries would like continue have Western orientation, they not prepared do so if price that orientation would mean that although technically independent they must remain completely dependent upon France for their viability.

Time is an important factor in any aid programs which we may undertake in these countries. I think we should move quickly but with delicacy and caution and without fanfare and ostentation. We should discuss aid matters frankly with French in order ascertain how we may best help without offending France or encouraging France to try to transfer to our shoulders portion or all of the burden which it is now carrying. On other hand we must be careful lest governments of these new states obtain impression we still look upon them as colonies or semi-colonies of France and therefore make no moves to extend aid without obtaining permission from France.

Timberlake

86. Editorial Note

On November 28, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania became independent. A message dated November 25 from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Moktar Ould Daddah was delivered on November 28 by Ambassador to Senegal Henry S. Villard, when he presented his credentials as the first Ambassador to Mauritania (resident at Dakar). For text of the message, see 2 Whiteman 204.

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

November 30, 1960, 2:10 p.m.

1007. USUN 1498.¹ We aware advisability moving quickly assist pro-Western African states and, in addition Mali, have given authority our Embassies in Togo, Cameroun and Nigeria open negotiations TC bilaterals. Will send similar authority other new Embassies soon.

Our Mali aid effort based calculation that by responding rapidly to what Malians regard as crisis situation we can strengthen hand moderate elements and help create internal political atmosphere conducive maintenance important Western and French influence Mali. If we stand aside, danger exists leftists would gain undisputed ascendancy Mali internal politics and take hasty ill-considered actions which would push Mali irreversibly down path taken by Guinea. Dept cannot lightly contemplate possibility two West African states almost exclusively dependent Soviet Bloc for technical and advisory personnel, economic assistance, export markets. Pro-West Africans criticized us for moving slowly doing too little help Guinea in 1958 and Houphouet believes US aid program Mali desirable.

Over longer term, we also hope moderate Mali foreign policy behavior somewhat. Modibo Keita and other Malians followed generally moderate course prior dissolution Mali Federation (e.g. Keita, as Fonmin Mali Federation agreed opening GRC Embassy Dakar). Hence no reason believe present pattern Mali foreign policy necessarily immutable.

Over short term, do not wish allow Mali immoderation go unnoticed. Our Chargé Bamako has expressed concern Mali voting record UNGA (see Deptel 58 to Bamako, pouched USUN unnumbered).² More recently Chargé on own initiative protested to Keita anti-American articles party newspaper with immediately favorable results. Dept intends continue watch Mali behavior carefully and register concern where appropriate.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.5-MSP/11-2360. Confidential. Drafted by Avra C. Floyd, Jr., of the Office of West African Affairs; cleared by Rene Tron of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs and Politico-Economic Adviser in the Bureau of African Affairs Oliver Troxel; and approved by Ferguson.

¹ In telegram 1498 from USUN, November 23, Representative at the United Nations James J. Wadsworth commented on the "unseemly haste with which we have provided economic assistance to Mali", which had opposed the U.S. position in the debate on the Congo. Noting that several pro-Western African states had commented bitterly on this, he continued, "I feel it desirable point out once more we moving in direction, this time in new area, which discourages friends and at best incites them to belief blackmail may be best tactic where we concerned." (*Ibid.*)

² Dated October 12. (*Ibid.*, 793B.00/10-1160)

Re Mali UN delegate's speech Nov 20 Congo credentials debate, which we presume prompted reftel, tentative review provisional verbatim record Aw's speech fails reveal useful peg on which hang approach Mali govt even though general tone speech quite distasteful. Little likelihood US-Malian identity views African issues this kind and probable Mali sincerely misunderstands our motives Congo and believes we intend set up "Western puppet" govt there. Approach based Aw's speech would probably involve our Chargé in detailed and probably fruitless discussion substance Congo issue. We should prefer register concern on unequivocally East-West issues.

If USUN does not concur foregoing, would welcome specific suggestions.³

Dillon

³ Wadsworth replied in telegram 1611 from USUN, December 2, that he did not question the necessity of providing aid to Mali but wanted to stress the importance of responding to the needs of the pro-Western African states. (*Ibid.*, 770.5-MSP/12-260)

88. Memorandum of Conversation

December 9, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation Between Prime Minister Mamadou Dia of the Republic of Senegal and Secretary Herter, December 9, 1960, at 2:30 p.m., in the Secretary's Office

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The Secretary
Mr. Penfield
Mr. Ferguson

Senegal
Prime Minister Dia
Ambassador Diop
Two aides

After a preliminary exchange of civilities, Prime Minister Dia said that he had been impressed by the simplicity and sincerity of President Eisenhower¹ and encouraged by his interest in African problems.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70E/12-1360. Confidential. Drafted by Floyd and interpreter Charles Sedgwick of the Office of Language Services on December 13.

¹ The Prime Minister had met with the President that morning. A memorandum of conversation by Satterthwaite is *ibid.*, 770T.00/12-960.

Prime Minister Dia added that his trip to Washington was not official, but that he had wished to pay a courtesy call here before leaving the United States.

He went on to say, in substance, that Senegal is resolved to have close relations with the United States. The Senegalese know that they do not run the risk of any kind of imperialism—political, economic, cultural or ideological—by having close dealings with the United States, with whose traditions they are familiar.

Independence was a good thing for Africa but could expose the continent to new forms of imperialism. Africa can play a role as an element of equilibrium in world affairs, but only so long as it remains truly independent. If it vacillates, however, this vacillation could have a decisive effect on the whole world.

With respect to cooperation, Prime Minister Dia said that the Senegalese had, of course, more to hope from the United States than the United States from Senegal and felt that a program of technical and economic assistance should be developed. Not here and now of course, but his technical and financial advisors would stay behind to follow up the economic and financial questions with the appropriate American offices and would present concrete proposals.

The Secretary assured Prime Minister Dia of the sympathy with which he and President Eisenhower viewed these problems, and of our desire to discuss concrete measures. He pointed out that we sent an ICA representative to Senegal before its independence and before sending such a representative to other African countries, apart from Guinea and Ghana which became independent earlier. Thus our aim was to discuss concrete steps at the earliest possible moment.

With regard to Mr. Dia's ideas for the future, the Secretary said there was complete agreement. Very often words that refer to ideologies—"imperialism," "domination," and sometimes also "colonialism"—have different meanings for different people and under different circumstances. He assured the Prime Minister that we have no territorial ambition and no desire for territorial domination. In our relations with other countries, the Secretary said, we do what we can to help them. We learn from them, and they from us. It is a free exchange, so that all may live independently and in peace.

The Prime Minister replied that he entirely agreed, that "we are on the same wave length." He had talked to President Eisenhower about the colonialism resolution now before the UN² and had pointed out that being anti-colonialist did not mean advocacy of immediate withdrawal by the metropolitan powers. One must try to make some

² A draft resolution, sponsored by 43 Asian and African states, declaring the necessity of a "speedy and unconditional end [to] colonialism in all its forms and manifestations" and calling for immediate steps to that end. (U.N. doc. A/L.323; also printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 110-111)

progress without leaving chaos behind. To understand otherwise would be a bad interpretation of the meaning of the resolution. Mr. Dia felt that time limits should be set within which the colonial people and the metropolitan power should prepare for independence.

The Secretary responded that the resolution is extremely troublesome. It is so badly worded, and subject to such different interpretations, that its essential aims with respect to independence and self-determination and a sound evolution from colonialism are wrapped in unfortunate phrases, which lend themselves to misinterpretations. It was unfortunate that the group of original sponsors of the resolution did not want to amend it. They were under pressure to amend it both from the USSR and from certain European and moderate countries, and therefore they finally decided to keep the original draft.

Prime Minister Dia said that there have been certain amendments. The amended version of the draft resolution is not perfect because it is vague, but is better than the first version because of its very vagueness. He added that one cannot, simply because of a UN resolution, oblige a country to choose independence even though it may need two or three years to prepare for it.

In response, the Secretary noted that there is a contradiction in the resolution itself because the operative paragraph refers to the UN Charter which provides for a period of transition if the country is not ready for independence.³

The Congo, said Prime Minister Dia, is an example of what he meant. There is reason to believe that Belgium's sudden grant of independence was responsible for current difficulties there. Nigeria had had an opportunity to prepare, as had Ghana. In the case of Senegal, the French had never set timetables, but it had been understood that autonomy would come first and independence two years later. As for the UN, it is a very fine institution which we should all seek to strengthen, but it will enjoy authority only to the extent that it plays a realistic and constructive role. It is now being used for propaganda purposes, which is extremely dangerous for its future. The Secretary noted that President Eisenhower's speech before the UN had emphasized the same point.

Continuing, Prime Minister Dia said that, as far as concrete problems are concerned, the Senegalese were in touch with U.S. representatives in Dakar. His technical advisors would stay behind to consult

³ According to a memorandum prepared in the Secretary's office of a telephone conversation between Herter and the President that evening, Herter told the President that he had asked Dia "whether if the U.S. abstained they would be able to abstain also." Dia had not answered directly, but the Secretary had subsequently learned that Senegal was one of the sponsors of the resolution. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) On December 14, the resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 1514 (XV) by a vote of 89 to 0 with 9 abstentions, including the United States.

with U.S. agencies, and the Senegalese would soon submit specific proposals with appropriate documentation. Until now, Prime Minister Dia added, we have not hurried because we wanted to be thorough. We had to set up a long-range plan first; that is finished, and in January we shall be able to present the plan and serious proposals.

89. Memorandum of Conversation

December 12, 1960.

SUBJECT

Conversation Between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Mocktar Ould Daddah, of Mauritania, at the White House, December 12, 1960¹

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>Mauritania</i>
President Eisenhower	Prime Minister Mocktar Ould Daddah
Mr. J.C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs	Vice President of the National Assembly of Mauritania,
Mr. Clement E. Conger, Deputy Chief of Protocol	Souleymane Ould Cheick Sidiya
Mr. E. S. Glenn, Interpreter	

The President congratulated the Prime Minister on the Soviet veto at the United Nations.² This, he said jokingly, proves that Mauritania has already gained the status of one of those powers on which the Soviets vent their ire. The President said that he was hopeful that the question of admission to the United Nations will be settled in spite of the Soviets.

The President asked whether the Prime Minister considered as serious the Moroccan pretensions to Mauritania.

The Prime Minister answered that he did not as Morocco had neither juridical nor political title and as the accession of Mauritania to independence settled the question in any case.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770V.13/12-1260. Confidential. Drafted by Glenn and Satterthwaite on December 19 and approved by the White House on January 4, 1961.

¹ The Prime Minister also met that day with Acting Secretary of State Henderson, who told him that Ambassador Villard would remain accredited to Mauritania for the time being but that the United States intended to establish an embassy in Nouakchott. (*Ibid.*, 611.70E/12-1260)

² The Soviet Union vetoed Mauritania's application to the United Nations on December 4.

The President asked about the population of Mauritania, and the Prime Minister replied that the census found 650,000 people. In reality, the number was closer to a million, since the greatest part of the population are nomads who are hard to account for. In addition, they often give the census takers less than the full count of their families, as mentioning the number of one's own children may bring the evil eye and even death to them. In response to a question by the President, the Prime Minister described the economic prospects of Mauritania, mentioning the very rich iron ore deposits at Fort Gouraud, the somewhat less rich copper deposits and the probability of finding oil in Mauritania. He stated in particular that the oil companies were probably past mere exploration and were certain that oil existed in Mauritania.

The President asked the Prime Minister his opinion of the sudden explosion of violence in Algeria and the Prime Minister indicated that he did not have any recent information about the situation in Algeria. The Algerian problem is of great concern to all of the African States. General de Gaulle is the only one capable of finding a solution; unfortunately he faces opposition on the part of many French politicians and of the French settlers in Algiers. In addition he cannot count on the army, the attitude of which is still uncertain. The solution must be found, however; otherwise France will not only lose Algeria, but the friendship of the other African nations.

The President asked the Prime Minister what he thought of the present situation, in which General de Gaulle was caught in the middle between the ultras and the FLN.

The Prime Minister repeated that he did not have any recent information on the situation in Algeria, but that he believed that the Moslem explosion was due to despair and to the fact that most Algerians are unaware of the difficulties inherent in independence. At the same time, he repeated, the solution must be found, as the Algerian situation is a festering wound for all of Africa and for the West.

Both the President and the Prime Minister expressed their belief in the sincerity of General de Gaulle. The Prime Minister reiterated that the continuation of Algerian difficulties can only play into the hands of the Communists, who are exploiting it to penetrate Africa. Success on their part would be a tragedy to the free world as well as to Africa.

With reference to Algeria, the President stated that he felt that the declaration in September, 1959, by General de Gaulle could provide a good basis for settlement.

The President assured the Prime Minister of the friendship of the United States, and the Prime Minister assured the President of the firm attachment of Mauritania to the principles of the free world.

CONGO

U.S. POLICY REGARDING THE CONGO CRISIS: SUPPORT OF THE U.N. INTERVENTION; CONCERN WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INTERVENTION; CONCERN WITH THE POLITICAL SITUATION; POLICY REGARDING KATANGA

90. Memorandum of Conversation

October 8, 1958.

SUBJECT

Belgian Congo

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Pierre Wigny, Foreign Minister of Belgium
Baron Silvercruys, Belgian Ambassador
Mr. Georges Carlier, Minister, Embassy of Belgium
Mr. Constant Schuurmans, Chef du Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
The Secretary
WE—Mr. Cameron
WE—Mr. Stabler

Mr. Wigny expressed appreciation for being received by the Secretary and said that Belgium had no real problems with respect to the United States or with respect to the principles of NATO or its membership therein. He said that Belgians had feelings of profound friendship for the United States and that they were very grateful for what the United States had done, not only for Belgium, but also for Europe.

Mr. Wigny said there were two specific points he would like to raise with the Secretary. The first one was with regard to overseas territories. He recalled that Belgium administered the Congo and also held a trusteeship over Ruanda-Urundi. He said that the present Belgian Government had decided last June to define a policy for the future of the Congo. This decision had been taken not only because of internal Belgian reasons but also because of developments in French Africa. Mr. Wigny said that Belgium had never believed that the colo-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 755A.00/10-858. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Swiss-Benelux Affairs Wells Stabler.

nial status of the Congo would be a lasting or definitive solution. Belgium believed that the success which it has had in administering the Congo and in promoting its political and economic development would prove to the Congolese that a continuing association with Belgium would be to their benefit. He said that Government plans called for industrialization of the Congo. He thought that the Congo continued to be satisfied with Belgian efforts and stressed that there was no political agitation. Mr. Wigny stressed that the trend of events in Africa could have most important effects on the balance of power between East and West. It was most important that European governments should retain good relations with the African states. Mr. Wigny said he hoped that the United States would show an understanding towards Belgian policies in the Congo and that we would not prejudice the results.

The Secretary replied that although the US believed in the basic proposition that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," this did not mean that wholly untrained people could exercise these powers until they were prepared to assume them. We recognized that the process of making people capable of self-government was a slow and difficult one. He said that today many of the new independent countries which had been basically unprepared for their independence had become targets for international Communism and that this often led to a dictatorship of the proletariat. We believed that the governing elements should be educated, moral and self-disciplined and that much time is required to achieve this degree of preparation. He recalled that the United States had spent 50 years preparing the Philippines for independence and there were times we believed that that had perhaps not been long enough. The Secretary said that there was no pressure by the United States to turn colonies into independent states until they were ready for their independence. He thought that recent French policy with respect to its African colonies had been drastic. The independence of Guinea could only be described as "premature." He said that the admission of these newly independent, but unprepared nations into the UN with the same vote as older and greater powers debased the concept of independent nations exercising self-responsibility in international affairs.

Mr. Wigny referred to the fact that today a new united Europe was being created where, although the states were independent, they recognized the necessity for interdependence. The Belgian Government hoped to prove to the Congo the advantages of continuing interdependence between Belgium and the Congo at the time the Congo gained its independence. The Secretary agreed with this concept and referred to his speech in Boston on September 27 when he had said: "It is coming more and more to be realized that independ-

ence, which each of our nations rightly cherishes, can only be preserved by the practice of interdependence."¹

Mr. Wigny expressed the view that it was necessary to create a larger framework of EurAfrica and to forge a link between Africa and the Common Market. The Secretary said he agreed and thought that the future greatness of Europe depended on the greater unity of continental Europe and on the greater unity between continental Europe and Africa. Africa was the hinterland of Europe.

¹ For text of the speech, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 13, 1958, pp. 571-574.

91. Memorandum of Conversation

May 13, 1959.

SUBJECT

Courtesy Call of Mr. Wigny

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Pierre Wigny, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Constant Schuurmans, Chef du Cabinet of the Minister
Mr. Jean de Bassompierre, Counselor, Embassy of Belgium
The Acting Secretary
WE—Mr. Cameron
WE—Mr. Chadbourn

The Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Wigny, paid a courtesy call on the Acting Secretary on May 13. He took the occasion to mention briefly a few of the matters foremost in his mind.

Mr. Wigny said that, while he hardly needed to reiterate Belgium's fidelity to NATO, he nonetheless thought that it was useful to the West to explore outstanding issues with the Soviets.

He briefly expressed some concern about recent developments in the institutional organizations of the Six.

Mr. Wigny then turned to the Congo and made these points:

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Swiss-Benelux Affairs Philip H. Chadbourn.

1. The Government's proclamation as well as the special message of the King announcing the new policy for the Congo¹ had been based on the results of the inquiry made by the multi-partisan Working Group on Congo Policy. The proclamation had been planned for some time and was not prompted in any way by the riots in Leopoldville.

2. The riots were caused principally by unemployment in Leopoldville and by tribal tensions. Further, the previous government in Brussels had unfortunately let matters drag with the result that there is now much wasted time to make up.

3. Economic development was going forward as scheduled, the principal project being the first stage of the Inga hydroelectric installation on the Congo.

4. The Government plans to push ahead as quickly as feasible in implementing its policy towards the Congo, the touchstone of which is "interdependence."

5. The Belgian Government hopes the U.S. will follow the implementation of the Belgian program with sympathetic understanding. In the event Belgium fails, it is only too obvious that the Soviets will try to fill the vacuum thus created.

Mr. Dillon replied that, as Secretary Dulles had told Mr. Wigny last October, the U.S. was following with great interest Belgian efforts in the Congo. We believe that the program has a real opportunity to succeed. This will depend to some extent, of course, on how it is carried out. If the Congo is to evolve in a way that will encourage the retention of its ties with the mother country, the manner in which assistance is provided will be extremely important. It will probably be necessary, for example, to make sure that the Congolese are presented with believable and realizable goals along each step of the way, rather than with a distant future promise that seems unattainable. Mr. Dillon said he was sure that Mr. Wigny appreciated this point, and added that he believed the Belgian Government was on the right road in its Congo program.

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

¹ Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens announced the government's program of reforms for the Congo on January 13. King Baudouin broadcast a radio message supporting the reforms on the same day.

92. Despatch From the Consulate General at Léopoldville to the Department of State

No. 404

Léopoldville, June 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

Interview of Mr. Joseph C. Satterthwaite with Joseph Kasa-Vubu ¹

At his request, Monsieur Joseph Kasa-Vubu called on Assistant Secretary of State Joseph C. Satterthwaite at the Consulate General on Saturday morning, June 20. Mr. Kasa-Vubu came to the office alone. The interview lasted approximately one hour.

M. Kasa-Vubu opened the discussion by stating that his people still desire immediate independence. In his opinion, the Government Declaration which was a unilateral Belgian action, properly recognized in its broad principles the basic right of the Congolese people to accede to independence. However, according to Kasa-Vubu, the document was too fuzzy and lacked the practical details for its implementation. In any event, Kasa-Vubu believes that the Declaration is now outmoded since it has been surpassed by events which have since taken place.

When reminded that the Belgian Government had already brought out a draft legislation dealing with the series of forthcoming elections, M. Kasa-Vubu indicated he had no faith in these proposed elections since he believed the Belgian authorities would rig them in their favor. In this connection, he protested against the nomination by Belgian officials of one-third of the members to be sent to the territorial and provincial councils.

M. Kasa-Vubu referred to the present Government General as being ineffectual and expressed his distrust of Belgian officials, with the notable exception of Minister Maurice Van Hemelrijck.² He added that prior to the latter's recent visit to the Bas-Congo, Governor Jan Baptist Bomans had dispatched Messrs. Gaston Diomi³ and Arthur Pinzi⁴ to that area in order to "arrange" the various public receptions. The two emissaries, according to Kasa-Vubu, had been instructed to prepare a warm reception for the Minister on the part of the natives, who were cautioned against mentioning publicly the word independence. Kasa-Vubu stated that this was done in order to keep from the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-AF/6-2359. Confidential. Also sent to Brussels, Brazzaville, and Elisabethville.

¹ Kasavubu headed the *Alliance des Bakongo* (Abako). Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite had attended the African Regional Conference in Lourenco Marques, June 9-11; see Document 16.

² Minister for the Congo.

³ Burgomaster of Ngiri-Ngiri.

⁴ Burgomaster of Léopoldville.

Minister the real desire of the population for immediate independence. However, Kasa-Vubu continued, the people were not deceived by these tactics since, during the Minister's visit, they shouted for independence and for their leader, Kasa-Vubu.

M. Kasa-Vubu also declared he had requested the local authorities to reinstate legally the Abako movement. Thus far, according to the leader, no action has been taken. He has, however, made it known to the appropriate Belgian officials that if no action is taken by the time the Minister leaves Leopoldville for Brussels, he will take it upon himself to announce publicly the reactivation of the Abako party.

M. Kasa-Vubu also reiterated his desire for the establishment of a federal rather than a centralized form of government. In this connection, he turned over to Mr. Satterthwaite a document, a copy of which is enclosed,⁵ which is to be handed the Minister during his visit to Leopoldville this week. The document, signed by Messrs. Simon Nzeza, Daniel Kanza and Kasa-Vubu, calls for the establishment by January 1, 1960, of the Republic of the Central Congo which is to replace the present Province of Leopoldville. The government of the new republic will have a President, Vice President, a Senate and a Chamber of Representatives. It will have three distinct branches, the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Senators and representatives are to be elected by universal suffrage. The executive branch is to be composed of fifteen ministries under a Prime Minister. The President of this autonomous state is to be elected on December 12 and 13 of this year. Finally, the document calls for electioneering to begin in July.

Throughout the interview Mr. Satterthwaite counselled patience and moderation and impressed upon Kasa-Vubu the necessity for following a policy of non-violence. On a number of occasions Mr. Satterthwaite expressed his faith in the Belgian Government to carry out its promise to lead the Congo to independence. He pointed to the steps which the Belgian Government had already taken in order to implement its Declaration. The Assistant Secretary also focussed attention on the dangers of dictatorship and communism to which a precipitate acquisition of independence might lead.

Comments:

Apparently Kasa-Vubu has decided to press now for the establishment of a separate Bas-Congo political entity. This policy can lead only to the fragmentation of the present geographic unity of the Congo. It should be borne in mind that Kasa-Vubu and his colleagues are demanding the establishment, not of a provincial government, but

⁵ The enclosures are not filed with the source text.

rather of a republic. Throughout his talk, Kasa-Vubu implied that the Bas-Congo with its ports and natural resources was a wealthy territory which could be economically viable.

The Abako leader appeared very confident both in his ideas and in his backing by the Bas-Congo population. In his present state of mind, it appears unlikely that he would be swayed by counsels advocating moderation or patience.

His proposed action in confronting the Minister during his forthcoming visit to Leopoldville with his plan for the establishment of the Central Congo Republic no doubt presages a period of intense political activity on the part of Kasa-Vubu and of his followers. At present, Leopoldville is rife with rumors that demonstrations are to break out this weekend. This may be based on Minister Van Hemelrijck's visit to the city from June 23 to 28 and on information contained in a tract which is now circulating, a copy of which is enclosed, to the effect that on June 26 the independence of the Bas-Congo is to be proclaimed.

Jerome R. Lavallee⁶

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

93. Editorial Note

At the 423d meeting of the National Security Council on November 5, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, dated November 5, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles said the last item he wished to report on concerned the Belgian Congo and the Cameroons. Recent riots in Stanleyville had been triggered by the arrest of nationalist leaders, while sporadic disorders in Leopoldville had been a reaction to the Schrijver Plan, which provides for independence of the Congo in four years. These disorders are led by organized agitators in the cities although apathy still exists in the countryside. Certificates of merit for revolutionists are being sold for sixty francs in the Congo. The President remarked that this was a new way to get money. Mr. Dulles said that Mr. Stans had just returned from a month in the area and had been very helpful in providing information. The President said he wondered how such areas as the Congo with no seaports could be economically viable unless they joined some sort of larger federation. Secretary Herter said

that fantastic language barriers existed in Central Africa. Mr. Stans noted that strong tribal animosities existed there also. If the authority of the central government were weakened, tribal violence would no doubt break out. Mr. Stans also noted that radio is now having a great influence on the natives, who listen mostly to Radio Cairo and Radio Brazzaville. So far as he could tell, no one listened to the Voice of America. There would probably be a great deal of bloodshed in the Congo before the political problems of the area were settled. The President asked what weapons were used in tribal warfare. Mr. Stans said the tribes used muzzle-loading rifles, knives and spears, because they had not been permitted to acquire more modern weapons. The U.S. and U.K. missionaries were very much concerned about the possibility of tribal warfare. However, the Belgians took a fatalistic attitude toward developments, with Belgian Government officials and businessmen wanting nothing so much as to get out of the area before trouble starts. The Congo has great manpower and natural resources, but enormous capital would be required to develop them. While the natives of the area shout for independence, their concept of independence is very vague and generally can be reduced to the hope of getting a handout from the government. Mr. Stans said he was forced to conclude that the best thing for the area would be a plan which did not grant independence for twenty-five years." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium

January 8, 1960, 7:09 p.m.

796. After consideration your excellent despatch 566¹ and in accordance with suggestions developed during Ambassador's consultation, Department has concluded it would be desirable for Ambassador (with subsequent assistance such other members of the Embassy staff as he may consider advisable) to undertake a series of discussions with appropriate Belgian officials in order obtain their assessment of developments in Congo. We would be particularly interested in Bel-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.55A/1-860. Confidential. Drafted by C. Vaughan Ferguson, Director of the Office of Middle and Southern African Affairs, and W.C. Sherman of the Office of Western European Affairs; cleared with the Director of that Office, Robert H. McBride; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs James K. Penfield. Pouched to Léopoldville and Elisabethville.

¹ In despatch 566, December 10, 1959, the Embassy warned that the U.S. policy of leaving responsibility for the Congo to Belgium risked the failure of the long-term U.S. objective of the emergence of a stable, Western-oriented Congo. It urged a more active U.S. role, suggested areas of possible U.S. assistance to the Congo, and recommended an approach to the Belgian Government as a first step. (*Ibid.*, 611.55A/12-1059)

gian views on timing of various phases Belgian program for granting Congolese independence, possibility of creation federal system of government in Congo rather than unitary state, relative strength and effectiveness various Congolese leaders and political groupings, and Belgian plans for continuing economic and technical assistance to Congo. We would hope that from these discussions would come a continuing exchange of views between US and Belgian authorities in Brussels and Leopoldville at various levels and in technical as well as policy field.

Department believes Ambassador's absence on leave during period of elections and King's Congo visit² would make such an approach entirely in order and not tend to generate Belgian suspicion or antagonism. Furthermore, developments over past months confirm Belgians much more ready to consult with US, if not to solicit our advice or assistance.

Since refdes was transmitted situation in Congo appears somewhat improved particularly in light realization by Congolese leaders at Kisantu Conference³ some sort of federal structure an economic necessity. However, Department fully cognizant inherently unstable pattern in Congo.

In course discussions, Belgians may well ask for US views concerning Belgium's Congo program. Ambassador authorized respond that US is of course interested in maintenance political stability in Congo and general alignment of area with Free World. We believe that the aims of present Belgian policy in the Congo are laudable and hope that they can be attained in harmonious cooperation. Should Belgians officially request public statement US views, Ambassador may state that he will explore feasibility such action with Department.

If Belgians should raise question of US economic or technical assistance in Congo, Ambassador should point out that funds available for such purposes extremely limited and established US policy permits US action in these fields only when metropole unable meet territory's requirements. We would be prepared examine any Belgian proposal, but could not make any commitment. We would also attempt make available information concerning private US funds which possibly could be drawn on.

Most pressing need would appear to be in field training for public administration and Embassy should discuss this with Belgians. Experience with other colonial and ex-colonial powers has shown however this is very sensitive area and US assistance not generally welcomed.

² King Baudouin departed on December 16 for a 2-week visit to the Congo.

³ A meeting of representatives of five Congolese parties, December 24-27, 1959; it called for a federal constitution.

FYI. Although Department realizes possible danger in becoming identified too closely with Belgian colonial policy, we nevertheless believe that cooperation with Belgians in pursuing common aims offers us best, if not only, means of influencing future independent Congo. We therefore envisage Ambassador and staff discussions with Belgians as first phase of exploratory operation designed identify areas of common interest in which US can be of assistance to Belgians in maintaining and promoting orderly progress toward Congolese autonomy.

We must also keep in mind repercussions elsewhere both in Europe and Africa of any vigorous US action in the Congo. For example, any substantial aid program would certainly result in US being faced with shopping list from any number of emerging African nations. Other metropolitan powers for different reasons might resent US attention to Congo and independent African states could if we were not careful interpret our actions as attempt preserve colonialism. These considerations may be of minor significance and need not inhibit Embassy in its discussion with Belgians but are mentioned to emphasize area wide implications of problem. End FYI. ⁴

Dillon

⁴ Despatch 817 from Brussels, February 2, reported that Ambassador Burden had met with Minister for the Congo Auguste de Schrijver on January 26 to initiate a series of discussions with Belgian officials concerning developments in the Congo. Burden indicated a wish to commence quiet meetings with Congolese leaders, but de Schrijver did not respond. (Department of State, Central Files, 755A.03/2-260)

95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium

February 12, 1960, 8:54 p.m.

941. Following based unclassified memorandum conversation: ¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 755A.00/2-1260. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Cameron; cleared with Ferguson and with S/S. Also sent to Léopoldville.

¹ Dated February 12. (*Ibid.*)

Belgian Ambassador² reviewed with Secretary February 12 developments of Round Table Conference on Congo,³ sessions of which he had attended during recent trip to Brussels. Emphasized that Belgian Govt had made decision highest political level that situation required grant of independence to Congo and that in cooperation Congolese leaders Belgians intended do everything possible make transition to independence orderly and effective. Ambassador specifically asked whether US thought Belgians were moving too fast. In this connection, he mentioned reported comment of Consul General in Leopoldville⁴ to effect he thought Belgians were in fact going too fast towards independence and said he assumed Consul General had spoken under instructions.

Secretary assured him that Consul General had not spoken under instructions. Secretary said that Department considered that Belgian Govt was handling difficult situation with great wisdom and flexibility. He added that from over-all point of view it would have been better if there had been more time to work out complicated process of setting up new independent state, but he realized that this time did not exist because of strength of forces pressing towards independence.

Ambassador said his Government earnestly hoped that American private interests would invest in Congo with of course necessary guarantees and safeguards. He suggested US Govt. might encourage such investments. He added his Govt. hoped that US would understand and support Belgian efforts. Secretary replied that we viewed Belgian efforts most sympathetically and that in deciding what we could do in present situation we wanted to consult with Belgian authorities. He recognized that this was preoccupying problem for Belgians and hoped that they would feel free to talk to us at any time. He considered that the Congolese would need to look to Belgium for assistance and support for some time.

Comment: We assume that comment of Consul General to which Ambassador referred might very well have been query designed elicit Belgian comments on developments towards independence.⁵ Brussels and Leopoldville should however find appropriate occasion allay any possible Belgian doubts this question by using line Secretary took with Ambassador.

Herter

² Louis Scheyven.

³ Representatives of the major Congolese political parties and the Belgian Government, who met in Brussels, January 20–February 20, had agreed on January 27 that the Congo would become independent on June 30, 1960.

⁴ John D. Tomlinson.

⁵ Tomlinson replied in telegram 184 from Léopoldville, February 16, that he had never made such a statement. (Department of State, Central Files, 755A.00/2-1660)

96. Editorial Note

On February 18, Ambassador William Burden, who was in Washington for consultations, met with Under Secretary Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary Raymond Hare, and 18 other Department officials to discuss steps the United States might take in light of the Congo's coming independence. Burden urged that the United States "avoid a repetition of the Guinean experience when the Soviet Bloc moved into a vacuum after the French had left." He recommended increasing the staff of the consulate general in Léopoldville so that it could begin to function as an embassy at the time of independence, with an experienced career officer as ambassador, and he suggested several possible steps to provide economic assistance to the Congo, arguing that as the third most populous African country with "a potentially explosive political situation," it required "unusual attention." There was some discussion of this, with Under Secretary Dillon observing that the Special Africa Fund, one of the possible sources of aid for the Congo, was part of the special assistance fund which had been reduced from the administration's original request. At the conclusion of the meeting, he asked Deputy Under Secretary Hare to coordinate action on the various problems associated with the Congo's coming independence.

97. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Ambassador in Belgium (Burden) and Patrice Lumumba

Brussels, February 25, 1960.

SUBJECT

Congolese Politics and Lumumba's Views on the Future of the Congo

Patrice Lumumba arrived about a half an hour late for the appointment (which had been postponed twice before), having left a meeting in the Congo Minister's office for the purpose. From the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 755A.00/3-860. Confidential. Enclosure to despatch 966 from Brussels, March 8. Drafted by First Secretary of Embassy Stanley M. Cleveland, who was also present. The source text identifies Lumumba as President of the *Mouvement National Congolais* (Lumumba Branch).

financial point of view, it is worth noting that Lumumba kept a taxi waiting in front of the Embassy for the forty minutes or so which was covered by our conversation.

Personally, Lumumba gave much the same impression in private conversation as he has in public appearances—a highly articulate, sophisticated, subtle and unprincipled intelligence. He seemed reasonably well aware of what his audience would be interested in hearing and of what would make a good impression on them, and showed considerable sophistication in general when discussing political aspects. On economics and more concrete subjects, however, he tended to deal more in clichés than in specific or consequent ideas. In short, he gives the impression of a man who would probably go far in spite of the fact that almost nobody trusts him; who is certainly for sale, but only on his own terms; and who would probably not meet the famous definition which was given a century ago of the honest politician as one who, when bought, stayed bought.

The following were the principal points of interest arising out of the conversation:

1) *Attitude Toward Belgians.* Lumumba maintained with us the public posture which he has taken up ever since he arrived at the Round Table—of a fundamental friendliness toward Belgium and a willingness or even desire to work with the Belgians in the period after independence. He pointed out to us that he had been among the first to take up a position against the Belgians and to insist on the need for immediate independence, at a time when Belgium was opposed to it. It had been necessary to fight until the Belgians had accepted this requirement. Now, however, that agreement had been reached on the date of independence, the important thing was to concentrate on what would happen once independence had arrived, and it was clear that during this period the Congo would have every need of Belgium's help, in terms of technicians and economic aid. Therefore, said Lumumba, the Congo must be prepared to work loyally with Belgium and he, for one, intended to preach this doctrine in his electoral campaign. He also believed it very important that now that the promise of the date of independence had been received, the Congolese political leaders do everything in their power to prevent disorders which might lead to a postponement of this date. This is why he was intending himself to make an immediate swing around the Congo on his return in order to preach moderation and a calming of spirits.

2) *Communism.* On this subject Lumumba talked a very good game indeed. He spoke of the intense activity of the Soviets and Czechs at the Round Table and the fact that they had persuaded a certain number of his Round Table colleagues to pay visits to Eastern Europe. He himself, he said, had been approached with offers to visit the Soviet Union and, I believe, Communist China, but he had turned

these down because he believed that these influences from the East were very bad from the point of view of the Congo. The Communists said they wanted to help the Congo, said Lumumba, but he was well aware that what they really wanted to do was to install a dictatorship there and thus substitute one form of imperialism for another. He had, therefore, turned down these invitations and had gone farther by attacking publicly at the Round Table the white advisers to certain of the Congolese groups (presumably in particular Jean Terfve, Belgian Communist Party member who was an official adviser to the CEREAL delegation), and insisting they be forced to leave the Conference room.

(*Comment:* Lumumba is a smart-enough cookie to have been well aware that he was giving a line which would not fall upon unfriendly ears in this conversation. Nevertheless, the completeness of his argument and statement of position was interesting, and the fact that not only Lumumba but also Ngalula¹ has spoken of Communist designs and activities in almost exactly the same terms shows that this problem has been a subject of discussion among the Congolese and that they are not quite as naive as might be expected. Nevertheless, Lumumba's own disclaimers are not necessarily inconsistent with other reports that he is receiving money and support from Eastern Europe; the more likely explanation or resolution of these apparently conflicting positions is that Lumumba's outside financial support has come largely from Accra and possibly from Conakry and that some of these funds in turn may originate in Soviet sources. In any case, it seems clear that if Lumumba is receiving any specific support from the East, he is perfectly prepared to betray these supporters to the fullest extent that suits his purposes.)

3) *Economic Ideas.* Lumumba's specific ideas on economic development of the Congo, which he, of course, said he believed was of primordial importance, were rather vague. He spoke in general terms for both industrial and agricultural development, but he talked largely in clichés and without seeming to have any precise proposals at this time nor any particularly coherent doctrine, except that the unity of the Congo, which is the central core of his political doctrine, was necessary among other things for economic reasons.

4) *Outside Assistance.* Lumumba's views on foreign aid follow roughly from his views on economic questions. He recognizes that considerable assistance will be necessary and talked in terms of technicians and financial assistance. He obviously looks primarily to Belgium, at least in the first stage, to provide this assistance, and his political campaign centers around this expectation. However, he clearly believes that the Congo will have to turn to other sources as well as time goes on. As to exactly what will be needed, however, he

¹ Joseph Ngalula of the *Mouvement National Congolais*.

seems to have no clear or specific ideas except that at one point in the conversation he was quite emphatic on the special need for vocational education at the secondary level in the Congo, and he thought that this was something that the US might be particularly able to help with.

5) *Foreign Investment*. On this subject Lumumba's ideas are considerably more clear and developed. In fact, he has been preaching ever since his visit to Brussels in April or May of 1959 the doctrine that the Congo would protect foreign investment, both Belgian and other, provided that an independent Congolese government were available for the purpose, and he has used this consistently as an argument for rapid movement toward independence. His basic line on this subject, then, is in terms of political guarantees for foreign investment, which is prepared to accept and work within the framework of Congolese independence. He gives the impression, however, that he is thinking essentially in terms of large industries such as Union Miniere and of the basic guarantees against expropriation and for the repatriation of profits, rather than in terms of specific investment in other realms. It would perhaps be natural that Lumumba should be primarily interested in working with the big companies which are already a political power in Congo, but he gave no particular indication one way or the other on this subject. The only specific investment which he mentioned in the course of the conversation was the INGA project,² which he emphasized was most important and should be pursued as rapidly as possible. He thought that this should be one of the principal tasks of the new, independent government after the first of July.

6) *The Image of America*. While Lumumba did not go into as much detail on this subject as did Ngalula (see separate memorandum of conversation with Ngalula),³ he tended to confirm Ngalula's statement that the Congolese have an "image" of the US which is very favorable and that this is due in no small measure to the feeling that the American Negroes come in important numbers originally from the Congo and are hence the "brothers" of the Congolese. Lumumba added one particular story in this connection—that people who had come to see him in jail in Stanleyville had told him on two occasions of the arrival of American planes in Stanleyville, which they believed had come to "liberate" him. This rumor, then, is not limited to Leopoldville alone.

7) *Lumumba's Plans*. Lumumba said that immediately after his return to Leopoldville on February 28, he intended to make a quick swing around the Congo to make contact again with the population, a contact of which he has been deprived for some months, and at the

² A planned hydroelectric power project.

³ A conversation between Cleveland and Ngalula prior to the latter's departure for the United States as a leader grantee is filed with despatch 967, March 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 755A.00/3-860)

same time to preach moderation and to prepare his political campaign. Although we opened the conversation by congratulating him on his appointment to the “Administrative Committee” attached to the Governor General, he had little or nothing to say on the subject, and gave the impression that he did not expect his membership on this committee to interfere severely with his travel in the interests of his political campaign. He made it very clear that he wanted an invitation to visit the US, that he would be able to go probably only for a week or a little more at most, and that it was possible for him to go only before the beginning of the political campaign—that is to say, in the course of the month of March. After that he would be involved in the campaign and after June 30 he expected to be too concerned with governmental affairs to do very much else. The matter of a possible invitation to Lumumba to visit the United States is dealt with in a separate communication to the Department.⁴

⁴ Telegram 985 from Brussels, March 1, recommended an invitation to Lumumba to visit the United States in March; telegram 216 to Léopoldville, March 3, approved the issuance of a visa to Lumumba. (Both *ibid.*, 511.55A3/3–160)

98. Letter From the Ambassador in Belgium (Burden) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)

Brussels, April 7, 1960.

DEAR DOUG: I returned from the Congo on April 1 to find your very helpful letter of March 15.¹

I am delighted that you can find a top notch Ambassador. My recent trip to the Congo and preliminary conversations upon my return here have served to strengthen my conviction that this is of the first importance.

On this subject and others, my trip to the Congo was of immense value to me. I had a long talk with Minister de Schrijver and Minister Scheyven² on my return, during which I discussed some of my conclusions with them, which has an important bearing on a number of points which I would like to report to you.

Source: Department of State, AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 261, Official–Informal Correspondence with Other Posts. Secret; Official–Informal.

¹ Not found in Department of State files.

² Raymond Scheyven, Minister without portfolio responsible for economic and financial affairs in the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.

1. *Ambassador for the Congo*

Minister de Schrijver informed me that the Russians will definitely have an Ambassador in Leopoldville July 1 and thinks it very desirable for the new American Ambassador to be there at the same time. This is reported in our telegram No. 1158 dated April 5, 1960.³ My own feeling is that this is very important, not simply as a question of competition with the East, but also because the problems facing the new Congolese State will be of such magnitude and difficulty that it will be very important for our Ambassador to be on the scene just as soon as he possibly can.

De Schrijver told me that if the elections go smoothly, in the sense that one coalition has a working majority, there should be a provisional Congolese Government in being by June 15, which could o.k. the agrément for our Ambassador. Whatever the possibility in this regard, I am convinced that we must proceed with our planning on this basis.

2. *Delegation for Independence Day*

I agree with you that Bob Murphy is an excellent choice for the head of the delegation and I do hope you can get him. De Schrijver said it has been definitely agreed by the Congolese Executive College in Leopoldville that the main Independence Day ceremonies will take place in Leopoldville. There may be a brief ceremonial visit to Luluabourg by the foreign delegations but this will not involve staying overnight. Independence Day ceremonies should last only two or three days, which will make it easy on the delegation.

3. *Economic Aid for the Congo*

I must say that I did not fully realize the difficulties involved, or the importance of, an economic aid program for the Congo until my trip.⁴ It seems to me this problem falls under three general headings:

³ Telegram 1158 reported a conversation with de Schrijver, who estimated that 30 Congolese students were in the Soviet Union, predicted that Lumumba might become the first Prime Minister, and asserted that Lumumba had contacts with Communist agents and was well supplied with funds. (Department of State, Central Files, 755A.00/4-560)

⁴ Ambassador Burden had met with Governor General Cornélis in Léopoldville on March 8. According to the memorandum of conversation by Cleveland, Cornélis "made it clear almost immediately that he was not enthusiastic about the US doing very much in the technical assistance field here." (Despatch 1196 from Brussels, April 29; *ibid.*, 755A.00/4-2960) The Department inquired in telegram 1076 to Brussels (240 to Léopoldville) as to Belgium's willingness to accept and cooperate with limited U.S. aid programs in the fields of education and public administration. (*Ibid.*, 755A.5-MSP/3-960)

a. It is very important that the United States demonstrate its interest in the Congo and its friendliness towards the new Congolese Government in a concrete way as soon as possible. This should be done by a few projects which are themselves economically sound and contribute to the well-being of the new Congolese state. My first suggestion in this line would be that the gift of one or more complete technical schools, with staff, would have an enormous impact, in addition to being very badly needed by the Congo. Everyone to whom we spoke on our trip, Congolese and Belgians alike, brought up the necessity for more and better technical education as their first point and asked for United States aid in this field.

Similarly, scholarships in the United States would meet a real Congolese desire and immediately demonstrate United States sympathy and interest without requiring lengthy project preparation or great cost. In the few meetings we had with groups of Africans, the most frequently asked question was "What is the United States going to do to provide scholarships for us to study in the United States?" I suspect that one explanation of this is the fact, which I discovered in Bukavu, that Radio Moscow's announcement of a "free university" for Africans in Moscow has received very broad currency even among the ordinary people in the eastern part of the Congo. The announcement of perhaps two hundred American scholarships at the June 30 celebrations would have an immediate and salutary impact throughout the Congo, with keen competition for every scholarship.

The Congo also desperately needs improved communications. This could take one of two possible lines: either aid to the present radio-broadcasting service, the power of which is now quite inadequate, or help in installing an improved telephone service. Technical and programming aid to the Congolese radio service would permit the presence of American advisors with obvious advantages. Some Congolese have already asked me for such aid. It seems significant to me that Russians are operating the Guinea radio system and Ghana is greatly strengthening its radio set-up. So far as the telephone service goes, the present Congolese system, which is by radio, is most unsatisfactory, being limited to a few hours every day and providing very poor service. My suggestion would be to pick up the proposal in the new Belgian ten-year plan for a coaxial cable linking the principal cities. A microwave system might be a better technical solution, but in either case improved telephone service would do much to tie the Congo together and reduce divisive influences.

While on this subject, I might mention that Voice of America broadcasts to the Congo, and I suspect most of Africa, appeared to be quite inadequate from a technical and content point of view. The only stations bringing international news clearly to the Congo are Brazza-

ville (twice as powerful as the Leopoldville radio), Radio Cairo and Radio Moscow. I will take this matter up with George Allen, but I am mentioning it here for the sake of completeness.

I do not know what the cost of the above projects would be. My thought is that the ICA Survey Team, which I am going to discuss below, should turn its attention to this type of project first because of the time factor involved, with the hope that an announcement of one or more American projects along these lines could be made at the Independence Day ceremonies on June 30.

Since time is very much of the essence I hope that funds for the above could be obtained from the President's Contingency Fund. Although I do not know the status of the Fund at this time, it is my impression that there is usually money available at the end of the fiscal year. I hope that you will keep our problem on this in mind, since there may be the danger of having whatever is now in the Fund obligated for other less urgent and perhaps less worthwhile projects. Can you see that around \$5 million is set aside for the Congo for such projects, pending justification by the ICA Study Team, so that we are sure of having an amount on hand?

b. In addition to the one or two projects for immediate announcement which I have discussed above, the main purpose of the ICA Study Team will be to discover, examine and approve various technical aid projects. On this subject the Governor General and the Congolese Executive College at Leopoldville should issue a formal invitation to the ICA Survey Team around April 11. De Schrijver and Scheyven emphasized to me the necessity of the team arriving just as soon as possible, thus abruptly adopting a position we have been trying to get them to agree to for quite some time now.

It is our hope that the team will leave Washington around April 15, spend several days in Brussels and arrive in Leopoldville around April 21. We hope that they will first examine and approve one or two projects of the type discussed in the previous section, which would give us time to make the necessary financial arrangements before Independence Day. In addition to these projects, we suggest that they go more thoroughly into the fields of technical training, teaching of English and agriculture.⁵

c. De Schrijver and Scheyven also told me, for the first time, that the general economic situation in the Congo is very much worse than we had had any reason to believe. Apparently, the situation has been growing more serious for some time and has now reached the point

⁵ A three-person ICA survey team visited the Congo, May 1-20. Telegram 395 from Léopoldville, May 21, summarized its recommendations, which emphasized educational and agricultural projects. The team estimated the cost of the recommended programs for fiscal year 1961 at about \$2.2 million. (*Ibid.*, 611.55A7/5-2160) The team's report is *ibid.*, AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 187, Summaries and Assessments—June 1961.

where the Belgians will be completely unable to meet the Congo extraordinary budget or even the deficit in the ordinary budget for the year 1960. In addition, there is a very real possibility that the Congo will start its life as an independent nation with a completely empty till and heavy debts. This aspect of my conversation is reported in considerable detail in our telegram No. 1159, dated April 5, 1960.⁶ Although I am not yet in a position to give you complete facts and figures, we are in the course of obtaining complete and honest documentation as rapidly as possible. The situation looks bad to me and I want to alert you to the fact that a long-range economic problem of considerable magnitude exists, which may call for American aid.

4. Vice President Nixon

I have heard it reported that Vice President Nixon is keenly interested in African economic and political problems. Is this true and has he been taking an active part?

5. Cleveland

Many thanks for your timely and successful help on this matter. He is invaluable here due to his detailed knowledge and contacts.⁷

Sincerely yours,

Bill

⁶ Telegram 1159 reported that Raymond Scheyven had made a strong plea for prompt and substantial U.S. economic assistance for the Congo to relieve a grave situation which might engender undesirable political repercussions. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 855A.00/4–560)

⁷ Hare discussed the matters raised in this letter with the Ambassador on April 28, when Burden was in Washington for consultations. Burden was told that Clare Timberlake, who was currently serving as Counselor in Bonn, had been selected to be Ambassador to the Congo. (Letter from Hare to Burden (not sent), April 28; *ibid.*, AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 261, Official–Informal Correspondence with Other Posts)

99. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana**

April 28, 1960, 7:39 p.m.

730. Re Leopoldville 323, repeated Accra 6.¹ FYI. Department shares concern voiced reftel extent Commie penetration Congo in confused period prior to independence. In considering means available to West counter this trend it occurs to Department Prime Minister Nkrumah can be most helpful and in fact we gather this is already the case as seen by his urging Congolese keep Belgian Civil Servants and avoid outside influence. In these circumstances Department wishes encourage Nkrumah and GOG generally in increasing their influence on Congolese even though this may mean expansion Nkrumah-type extreme anti-colonialism and Pan Africanism should his influence increase in the Congo. We believe on balance, however, increased interest on his part in Congo would be useful in attempting counter Commie penetration. End FYI.

Department believes it important these views be expressed to Prime Minister at early date but would prefer they not be presented as hard and fast US Government position but rather as attempt increase Nkrumah's existing concern present penetration of Guinea and fertile ground open to Commies in Congo. Department will leave to your discretion manner in which approach is made but it occurs to us you might raise matter in context US concern bloc will move rapidly to fill vacuum left by any precipitate Belgian withdrawal.

Would appreciate comment soonest of addressee posts repeated Accra. Reftel being repeated Paris and London separately, although Accra should not delay approaching PriMin if opportunity arises before all are received.²

Henderson

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 755A.00/4-2660. Secret. Drafted by Ferguson; cleared with Sherman and Hare's Special Assistant Francis E. Meloy, Jr.; and approved by Satterthwaite. Repeated to Brussels as telegram 1289 to Conakry, London, Paris, and Léopoldville.

¹ Telegram 323 to Léopoldville, April 26, reported that Communist contacts with the Congolese had increased since the Round-Table Conference. (*Ibid.*)

² Ambassador to Ghana Wilson C. Flake reported in telegram 849 from Accra, May 1, that he had asked Nkrumah on April 30 whether he shared the U.S. concern that the Congo, like Guinea, might become entangled with the Soviet bloc. Nkrumah had replied that he was doing all that he could to prevent it. (*Ibid.*, 755A.00/5-160) Flake emphasized in telegram 852 from Accra, May 2, that the thrust of the conversation had been the need to avoid a repetition of the Guinean experience and that he had been careful not to encourage Nkrumah to take sides in the Congolese election struggle or to promote a union with the Congo. (*Ibid.*, 755A.00/5-260)

100. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State

Brussels, May 1, 1960, noon.

1275. Deptel 1289.¹

1. Embassy believes it is inevitable Communists envisage Congo as fertile field activity since next to Guinea Congo appears to be country south of Sahara which approaches independence least prepared cope with host of inherent problems. Nevertheless, best method for us assist Congolese meet these problems would appear be through strengthening internal Congolese forces including ability combat subversion. Our own aid efforts are apt only be confused by urging participation other foreign influences—particularly in highly disturbed period between now and June 30.

2. This regard, and despite headway Communists may make with certain individual Congolese next few weeks, sources available this Embassy continue suggest bulk of Congolese elected all governmental levels forthcoming elections likely be moderates. Danger, therefore, arises from radical elements who will not be in first government but will be agitating from outside. Our best hope seems be in all-out attempt assist members first Congo Government arrive at well-considered (even if neutralist) attitude toward external problems and, by judicious but energetic application our aid resources, assist in creation internal stability.

3. Embassy concerned far-reaching implication approach Nkrumah suggested reference telegram. Reports from Accra have not revealed to us that Nkrumah essentially motivated by anti-communism but rather that he seeks strengthen his own position and make progress his visionary Pan-African movement.

4. Even Lumumba's response to Nkrumah's ideas as recorded by Belgian Ambassador Walravens² (Accra telegram 825)³ seems show he suspicious Nkrumah's motives and not enthusiastic prospect Ghana-Congo Union.

5. Therefore, even if no problems posed for US relations with its friends, seems on surface unwise encourage Nkrumah's initiative.

6. But extreme danger would appear exist that, no matter how approach made, news US démarche likely reach Belgians.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 755A.00/5-160. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Accra, Paris, Léopoldville, London, and Conakry.

¹ Document 99.

² Gérard A. J. Walravens.

³ Telegram 825 from Accra, April 23, indicated, in connection with Lumumba's visit to Accra, April 15-19, that Ghanaian Foreign Minister Ako Adjei had told the Belgian Ambassador that Ghana could be more effective than Belgium in pointing out the dangers of Soviet assistance. (Department of State, Central Files, 755A.00/4-2360)

7. Embassy policy past several months has been that US should be prepared take active role in Congo. Some elements in Belgian Government—particularly both Congo Ministers—more and more tending encourage our efforts this direction. Nevertheless, mere fact we are seeking play active role makes our relations with Belgium delicate. US starts with good reservoir of credit because of traditionally circumspect attitude toward Belgium's Congo possession. But we are treading narrow path and should not jeopardize our position by encouraging active intervention third country.

8. Rightly or wrongly (and despite what Walravens says), our best friends in GOB consider Nkrumah "bad" influence. We feel certain latent suspicion in Belgian minds would be aroused by revelation of US encouragement Nkrumah meddle internally in Congo affairs. Would not matter that what he would on surface be recommending is in best interests Belgium (and US); Belgians would inevitably deduce his motives were Machiavellian.

9. If we do in fact approach Nkrumah, however, we must be prepared be responsive his counter-requests for collaboration. He would undoubtedly ask US support his bid (Accra telegram 825 to Department) open Ghanaian Consulate in Leopoldville prior independence. Yet, as reported both from here and Washington, Belgians have adopted conscious policy refusing all requests new Consular establishments Leopoldville between now and June 30 despite pressures from both bloc and friendly countries. Does not seem in our best interest ask GOB reverse this policy.

10. Further, would appear to Embassy Ghanaian attitude toward Congo since Accra conference December 58⁴ has been specifically identified with fortunes Lumumba. Latter's own position in Congo politics specifically established by reason his attendance that meeting. While we want keep lines out to Lumumba because his potential political importance, we don't want give his opponents impression we supporting him. If our approach Nkrumah became known Congolese political circles—as seems entirely conceivable—would appear form of indirect US intervention in favor of Lumumba. In present mercurial atmosphere Congo, effect might be exact opposite of that desired.

11. As indicated Accra telegram 795 to Department,⁵ Ghanaians have gone "all out" convince Congolese they should retain Belgian civil servants and beware Soviet bloc. We see little further Nkrumah might reasonably be expected do.

⁴ The All-African People's Conference, December 8–13, 1958.

⁵ Dated April 12, telegram 795 suggested that Nkrumah sought to keep the Congolese free of entanglements because of eagerness to unite Ghana and the Congo. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.45J55A/4–1260)

12. Embassy can only conclude that dangers US policy vis-à-vis Congo from approach envisaged reference telegram appear outweigh possible advantages—at least during period prior Congo independence. Strongly urge therefore no approach be made Nkrumah until Department has had opportunity review matter further in light above considerations and comments other posts.⁶

Freeman

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 99. Comments from other posts are in Department of State, Central File 755A.00. The Department informed the posts concerned in circular telegram 1439, May 13, that it considered the risk involved in Flake's approach was warranted in view of the increasingly chaotic situation but it ruled out further approaches for the time being. (*Ibid.*, 755A.00/5–1360)

101. Editorial Note

At the 443d meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, May 5, reads as follows:

“Mr. Dulles said that the prospective independence of the Belgian Congo on June 30 of this year had led to frantic efforts by the Belgians to help the Congo develop a viable government. These efforts were handicapped by the fact that some 80-odd political parties existed in the Congo. The President said he did not know that many people in the Congo could read. Mr. Dulles said conflicts between tribes in the Congo would present one difficult problem. Lumumba would probably emerge as the leader of the Congo. He was irresponsible, had been charged with embezzlement, was now being offered bribes from various sources and was supported by the Belgian Communists. The Belgians were trying to get the U.S. to provide financial aid to meet the deficit in the Congo. Belgium believes that \$125–\$130 million in economic aid will be required before the Congo achieves its independence if chaos is to be avoided. The flight of capital from the Congo is being accelerated to such an extent that Belgium recently imposed controls on the export of capital. Finally, Mr. Dulles reported, there is some possibility that a movement might develop in the rich Katanga area for separation from the Congo and union with Rhodesia.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

102. Telegram From the Consulate General at Léopoldville to the Department of State

Léopoldville, June 14, 1960, 5 p.m.

469. On eve formation Congolese Government basic elements political instability and immaturity, lack of qualified or experienced leadership, superficial familiarity with inter-relationships between economic and political problems and role in family of nations, more painfully apparent than ever. Except for pious general statements of future well-being of Congo and need for European backstopping, there is too little solid evidence of serious effort or thought on part of Congolese leaders on how to hold country together. Initially, tribalism is predominant as Bakogos and Mongos seek detach themselves from presently constituted provincial authority when dominated by others or fair distribution of posts not agreed. This tendency though in part a political bargaining weapon could get out of hand (ourtels 452 and 463).¹

If Lumumba comes to power without a country-wide supporting coalition, forces of disintegration are likely to be strengthened with Bakongo under Kasavubu leading the way. In our view, there is imminent danger of widespread chaos if government of national unity, including Lumumba, cannot be formed. Advice of Belgian officials is usually suspect and that of private citizens, Belgian or other European *colons*, is often irresponsible and at variance. In meantime, Czech consul Virius and Guinean Councillor to PSA, Mme Blouin, who temporarily forced out of country, and other Communist or leftist influences are at work, though immediate aims not clear. PSA freeze-out of Abako in Provincial Council leading to latter's decision to form own government is example of divisiveness from which Communists can benefit.

In meantime, we have maintained hands-off policy in this confused political struggle. As Belgian influence declines and in absence any show of US interest in means for achieving greater political stability in this country, question arises as to whether we should not now attempt exert more positive influence despite risks involved. Basically, there is no large-scale pro-Communist sentiment but a large measure of goodwill exists toward US which we have not yet directly exploited. Many Belgians feel that we must come to the aid of the Congo, though

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 755A.02/6-1460. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels and Elisabethville.

¹ Dated June 9, telegram 452 reported that Abako representatives had decided to set up their own provincial government. (*Ibid.*, 755A.02/6-960) Telegram 43, June 13, reported that Abako representatives had petitioned Belgian authorities to create a seventh province which would be Abako-dominated. (*Ibid.*, 755A.02/6-1360)

chiefly on the economic side. On the political side, the retiring first Burgomaster of Leopoldville, M. Georges Depi, called June 11 in a private capacity to plead for a more active US political role, but without concrete suggestions as to how. He feels that the leaders, such as Gizenga, Lumumba, Kashamura, who are tarred with the Communist brush, cannot be considered as seriously committed to the Communist camp and believes we should attempt work on them as well as others. Secondly, he feels that the provisional fundamental law² is unworkable and will be quickly discarded because of its wholly democratic basis unsuited to the Congolese at this stage of their development. Pre-local authority and something approaching dictatorship at the national level is necessary to hold the country together. Governor Stenmans of Leopoldville Province, one of ablest and most confident of Belgian administrators, is still hopeful coalition will be formed but deeply disturbed by Bakongo separatism displaying itself before national government formed. But neither he nor any officials other than Department have suggested any US involvement in influencing Congolese on political side. We have no idea whether Belgians have any alternative plan of action in mind if chaotic situation develops as result of failure to form a temporarily stable government of premature break-up into tribal groupings.

Untrustworthy and unreliable as Lumumba is, and despite the fear of him by other leaders, we see no better alternative on the horizon than a government built around him, preferably a government embracing the other major parties, with an appropriate cut in the pie. If the wherewithal is immediately provided in the form of substantial financial aid by the Belgians and ourselves (ourtel 460)³ together with our ICA program there is as good a chance as any keeping such a government reasonably oriented toward the West.

In view of the foregoing we believe we should talk with Congolese leaders along following lines:

1. It is our hope that Congo will emerge as one free and independent state in which the Congolese peoples can win the confidence of the nations of the free world and contribute to their future well-being and prosperity, while at the same time developing their own internal institutions in such a manner as to satisfy regional aspirations of their peoples. While not discouraging federation we should counsel against balkanization and separatism as defeating opportunity for realization of greater economic and political benefits for the Congolese peoples as

² The *Loi Fondamentale* was promulgated by King Baudouin on May 19, 1960. For text, see *Documents Parlementaires, Chambres des Représentants*, no. 489, pp. 1–44.

³ Telegram 460, June 10, warned that financial burdens might lead the new government to repudiate its debt and to fire Belgian civil servants, and it recommended assuring the new government of substantial external assistance provided that it avoided taking those actions. (Department of State, Central Files, 855A.10/6–1060)

a whole and express US interest in extending assistance to a Congolese Government which is truly representative of all the Congolese peoples.

2. Encourage leaders in formation of government of national unity, without mentioning leadership or favoritism toward any one of them and suggesting such a government more auspicious from the standpoint of effective use of US aid after independence.

We believe talks along these lines will demonstrate sympathetic US interest and bolster confidence (and compromise) among Congolese leaders when it is desperately needed.

Unless Department instructs us otherwise, we propose following this course.

Tomlinson

103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Léopoldville

June 23, 1960, 8:23 p.m.

513. Re Leopoldville 499¹ Department desires Principal Officer Leopoldville or Elisabethville immediately contact Tshombe or other responsible Conakat leaders and inform them Department appreciates Tshombe's frankness in his conversation with Consul General Leopoldville and has carefully considered information he provided. He should be told it is our considered view that detachment of Katanga from Congo under present circumstances would lead to chain reaction in other areas which might very well result in disorder and bloodshed throughout Congo. There is definitely no possibility US troops will be sent Katanga in event attack by Lumumba forces. As is well known US Government feels that fragmentation of Africa highly undesirable. Therefore we would very much hope that Tshombe could find it possible to continue to work within framework of Congo Government.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 755A.02/6-2360. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Ferguson and revised by Dillon, who cleared in draft; also cleared by Hare in substance and by McBride and with S/S; and approved by Satterthwaite. Also sent to Elisabethville and Brussels and repeated to Salisbury.

¹ Dated June 22, telegram 499 reported that Katanga Provincial President Moise Tshombe and two Katanganese deputies to the National Assembly had called on Tomlinson and informed him of their intention to declare Katangan independence on June 30. When Tshombe inquired as to the U.S. attitude, Tomlinson told him the United States could give no advice, but "as friend to friend," he advised working within the framework of the future Congolese Government. (*Ibid.*, 755A.02/6-2260)

Embassy Brussels requested query Belgians as to their views this dangerous situation expressing US views as indicated above.²

Posts should comment on (1) probable Balubakat Cartel reaction, (2) possibility Union Miniere and local military backing Tshombe this move and (3) report Sendwe planning establish separate government Northeast Katanga. Report action taken.³

Herter

² Telegrams 1529 and 1538 from Brussels, June 24, reported Embassy approaches to the Belgian Foreign Office and Belgian assurances that Belgium favored a strong central government in the Congo and opposed Katangan separatism. (*Ibid.*, 755A.02/6–2460)

³ Telegram 65 from Elisabethville, June 25, reported that Consul William C. Canup informed Tshombe of the U.S. attitude. (*Ibid.*, 755A.02/6–2560)

104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Elisabethville

June 27, 1960, 3:10 p.m.

46. Elisabethville T-63.¹ Department seriously concerned that your presence Provincial Assembly session may be interpreted as evidence U.S. connivance plans of Conakat declare independence. Situation appears full of pitfalls for possible embarrassment of both Consul and U.S. Government. Department considers it would be most unwise for you to be present at Provincial Assembly June 28 and urges you therefore find convenient reason to be absent in order avoid any possibility of being “called forward from visitors’ gallery.”

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 755A.02/6–2360. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by William L. Wight, Jr., Deputy Director of the office of Middle and Southern African Affairs; cleared in substance with WE; and approved by Wight. Repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, and Salisbury.

¹ Dated June 23, it reported a conversation between Canup and Katanga Minister of the Interior Godefroid Munongo at the latter’s initiative. Munongo told Canup that Conakat leaders planned to declare Katangan independence; he said that at the June 28 session of the Provincial Assembly he would make a speech calling for independence and would then call Canup forward from the visitors’ gallery and hand him an official request for U.S. support, including the dispatch of U.S. armed forces to protect Katanga from attack by Lumumba forces. (*Ibid.*)

105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Elisabethville

June 28, 1960, 8:23 p.m.

47. Urtel 67.¹ Concur your suggestion have frank talk with Tshombe urging unity of Congo and impressing him with seriousness with which we regard this question. You should make every effort obtain assurances in advance from Tshombe that you will not be personally embarrassed by public request for U.S. aid during ceremony June 30.

If unable to obtain such assurances will leave decision your attendance to your judgment. If however you attend suggest inadvisability your walking out unless direct request for U.S. aid for independent Katanga is made in spite of your representations.²

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 755A.02/6-2860. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Wight and Arthur H. Woodruff of the Office of Middle and Southern African Affairs and approved by Satterthwaite. Repeated to Léopoldville and Brussels.

¹ In telegram 67, June 28, Canup stated that he would absent himself from the Assembly and suggested that he should warn Tshombe that he would have to walk out of the June 30 ceremony proclaiming Congo independence if a plea was made for U.S. aid to an independent Katanga. (*Ibid.*)

² Telegram 68 from Elisabethville, June 30, reported that Canup met with Tshombe, who claimed to have issued a statement denying that Katanga was about to secede. Canup did not attend the June 30 special session of the Assembly, which, contrary to expectation, did not consider the question of Katanga independence. (*Ibid.*, 755A.02/6-3060)

106. Editorial Note

On June 30, the Republic of the Congo became independent. For text of a congratulatory letter of that date from President Eisenhower to President Joseph Kasavubu, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, page 544. Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert D. Murphy, who headed the delegation at the independence ceremonies as the President's Personal Representative, announced the elevation of the consulate general in Léopoldville to an embassy and stated that the United States was prepared to discuss a program to provide scholarships and train-

ing grants for 300 qualified Congolese. Text of his report to the Secretary is in circular airgram 425, July 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.02/7–1560)

At a meeting of the National Security Council that day, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, June 30, reads as follows:

“General Cabell said that in the Congo, which is obtaining its independence today, Patrice Lumumba is emerging as the strong man. His government, however, is weak and will have a Leftist tinge with five out of his ten cabinet ministers being inclined toward communism. Lumumba himself appears to be neutralist in attitude, with a Leftist and opportunistic bent. He is reported to have solicited communist funds to help him obtain his present political position. President Kasavubu may check Lumumba’s activities to some extent. With its grave economic problems, the Congo will be susceptible to Sino-Soviet offers of economic assistance. The Chinese Communists have already recognized the Congo and the Tass News Agency reported last night that Soviet recognition had been accorded, with an offer to exchange ambassadors.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

107. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, July 4, 1960, 9 a.m.

9. Ambassador Murphy accompanied by Tomlinson called on Lumumba late yesterday.¹

Ambassador opened conversation by suggesting it would be helpful if Lumumba could outline his policies and programs, which he (Ambassador) could report to the President and Secretary of State.

Lumumba responded first with his (oft-repeated) political views—that the Congo to remain unified must have a unitary and not federal form of government. Federalism in Africa would soon become tribalism and cause break-up of Congo. Nevertheless the provinces should have substantial measure of autonomy for local affairs.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–460. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels.

¹ For Murphy’s published account of this conversation, see *Diplomat Among Warriors*, p. 409.

In international affairs Lumumba said the Congo would maintain a neutral position. Questioned by Ambassador as to what he meant by that term Lumumba quickly replied he did not wish the Congo, after having gained its independence to lose it through domination by other power. He then asserted that Communist ideology was not for the Congolese who were freedom-loving people and Christian. The Congolese looked to US, Belgium and other Western democracies for support and especially US which was known to favor emancipation of African peoples.

On economic side Lumumba stressed need for development capital and asserted guarantees would be given for protection private investments and property. Referred to urgent need for development in agricultural and industrial fields and exploitation of Congo's resources including INGA.

Psychologically it was important for US to provide aid immediately and to give training opportunities to Congolese in US. Ambassador reminded Lumumba our intention provide 300 study grants and initiate ICA program as soon as agreement concluded. Stressed our assistance was in mutual interests both countries.

Lumumba after regretting inability accept Ambassador Burden's invitation for US visit this spring expressed hope President Eisenhower could visit Congo. Psychologically it was important that he should be the first to make such a visit.

Comment: Lumumba's quick switch from neutrality to expression of seemingly pro-US, pro-Western sentiments is typical of his character in suiting his words to his audience. We do not consider that his bid for US and Western aid in any way implies he would not accept aid from Communist countries. Implication in our view is that if we are not here soon with enough aid the Communist will be. Same implication applies to suggestion concerning President's visit in view press reports of Khrushchev's proposed visit to Guinea and Ghana.

Tomlinson

108. **Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State**

Paris, July 8, 1960, 1 p.m.

118. Following is Lukens¹ Brazzaville telephonic report number 2, 12:30 p.m.

Situation much worse,² Embassy now stage three, burning documents. Americans confined houses, presents difficulty evacuation. Force Publique tried to break into Embassy in search photographer. Timberlake turned them away. Embassy now surrounded. Four boats under rebel command patrolling river preventing crossing. French from Brazzaville tried to get across to help but were turned back with bullets. Group French Congo Deputies and Ministers also tried to cross to plead with rebels but were told to turn back otherwise would be shot at.

In answer to inquiry as what Belgian troops were doing, Lukens reported he understood there were some 2,500 but he was unable to find out what role they were playing.

Lukens stated he had talked with Dufour French Diplomatic Counselor concerning possibility of using French troops Brazzaville to transit river and aid foreign evacuation but Dufour hesitant to use French troops this purpose. Lukens wondered whether some UN aspect might be employed. Lukens believed that some 50 French nationals have escaped to Brazzaville. He is still in walkie-talkie communication with Timberlake and this is only means of communication. Lyon³ conveyed Satterthwaite message. Lukens will continue to communicate hourly Embassy Paris.⁴

Houghton

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-860. Official Use Only; Niact. Repeated to Brussels.

¹ Consul at Brazzaville Alan W. Lukens.

² Mutiny had broken out in the Force Publique on July 5, and the disorders had spread to the capital.

³ Cecil B. Lyon, Minister at the Embassy in Paris.

⁴ According to a July 8 memorandum from Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF, Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, to the Joint Staff Director, communication was being carried on by radio between Brazzaville and Léopoldville, by short-wave radio between Brazzaville and Paris, and by telephone between Paris and Washington. Communications between Léopoldville and Washington had been severed. (National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, 9111/9108 (8 July 60), Sec. 1)

109. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of StateLéopoldville, July 9, 1960.¹

35. This is effort (at four am) to identify current problem, estimate possible developments ahead and contingent lines action.

Government is striving to maintain loyalty of Force Publique and its dedication to maintenance law and order. As Department aware certain demands have been met, i.e., sharp reduction Belgian officers, promotions. These may not prove sufficient if Force Publique does not actively and loyally support government, no other effective instrument available except foreign aid which I feel probably would not be requested until last minute, perhaps after balloon has gone up. From our own direct experience, at least some of Force Publique have deliberately and without provocation or even encountering effort self-defense (which might have been fatal error) severely roughed up Americans on streets, robbing one as well. This pattern makes for great uncertainty regarding whom to trust, or indeed for how long. Should Force Publique break down wholly or in substantial degree, Africans (already being harangued by some radio speeches re disparity wages and living standards) might start sacking and worse. According to very highly-placed government official this likely. That would require fast and strong action before too late.

Any such action however would entail obvious risks—would be likely make pot really boil over and immediately endanger many isolated people not so far known to be in trouble. This would more likely be case if Belgian troops used though I admit no other substantial force apparently now in neighborhood. Even some other force would have only slight advantage since so few Force Publique or Congolese would recognize difference or care.

I intend strongly recommend evacuation women, children, and non-essential Embassy personnel, preferably by boat. We were told by Chief State's secretary yesterday no permission would be given but if necessary I intend go to government this morning saying US Government would take very serious view denial inherent right all people be permitted evacuate especially if requested by diplomatic representative. French got off by boat and Sabena took off mixed planeload last night including few Americans.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-960. Unclassified; Niact. Repeated niact to Brussels.

¹ The time of transmission is not indicated. Received at 6:56 a.m.; a notation on the source text indicates that Ferguson was notified at 7:25 a.m.

While night calm and uneventful here and at other concentration points, and we hope day will be likewise, wave of last twenty-four hours may be followed by another day or so later. My considered opinion, we should try get out indicated Americans and recommend return only after we have reasonable assurance (1) Force Publique firmly established as reliable instrument and (2) effervescence has subsided for long enough to assure us bubbles all out at least in current bottle.

Use whirlybirds, except very outlying areas not likely to be very closely patrolled, would be counter productive without specific GOC approval and even then the word might not get to all Force Publique or even be understood.²

Following as of 8 am: curfew ceased 6 am and circulation, so far as known, returned to normal. Pan Am airport crew on way to field and Kimball will advise if plane service to be resumed. He also plans call in plane from Accra presumably [to] Brazzaville but if later developments recommend, might bring it in here.

Downtown business seems returning to normal.

Missionary radio net reports no trouble at any posts on net.

Will continue report developments. For moment contemplate no action other than recommendation mentioned and given.

Timberlake

² At a meeting of State and JCS representatives on July 8, Merchant asked the Department of Defense to take urgent action on a Department of State request that helicopters be sent to Brazzaville as soon as possible. (Memorandum on Substance of Discussion at State-JCS Meeting; Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, State-JCS Meetings)

110. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State

Brussels, July 9, 1960, 11 p.m.

78. Embtel 77.¹ After Penfield-Freund telecon this evening² referring to problems for West expected arise from planned Belgian military

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-960. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Paris and London.

¹ Dated July 9, telegram 77 reported that the Belgian Government informed the Embassy of its plan for military intervention in the Congo. It stated that the purposes of the plan "will be both to protect lives of Europeans and reestablish minimum of order. Once such order restored Belgians intend withdraw leaving Congo in governable condi-

intervention in Congo reported reference telegram, Ambassador attempted unsuccessfully see Foreign Minister Wigny tonight. He not available until early tomorrow morning but Embassy officer just returned from seeing Schuurmans. Ambassador still planning see Wigny in morning.

Embassy officer expressed Department's concern over problem widespread adverse world reaction (making clear we not asking reversal Belgian decisions) and said Ambassador would wish have Wigny's ideas for handling situation so as minimize adverse effects.

Schuurmans said action would not be contrary UN Charter but gave little reassuring argumentation to be used to combat accusations of aggression. Article VI of Belgo-Congolese Treaty signed at time of independence but not yet ratified states, according Schuurmans, Belgium may intervene to protect persons and property, restore order but only on request from Congo Government. Van Den Bosch has several times discussed with GOC possibility and desirability such a request. He has not been refused but GOC continues hesitate owing such ministers as Kashamura. Slight hope remaining GOC can be induced make request. Additional hope is offer of good offices just received from Government of Ghana which dispatching mission of ministers to arrive Leopoldville tomorrow.³ Mission may attempt convince GOC make request to Belgians. Katanga Government has already made request several times but GOB has maintained it will accept nothing less than central government request.

Schuurmans also said military operations will be kept to as few key centers as possible and on very limited scale.

If necessary to achieve objectives he admits more than limited operations might be undertaken. Intention is restore order under existing government rather than unseat it and establish one of Belgium's choosing.

Public statement will be made (timing still unstated) that will explain Belgian intentions and justify actions. Statement will not be made to UN to avoid justifying contention problem is matter between two completely disassociated states and therefore matter for Security Council. Embassy officer expressed skepticism that this would discourage any number governments from attempting place matter before Security Council.

tion. Intervention, however it may be interpreted, will be without slightest intention reestablish Colonial regime." (*Ibid.*)

² No record of the conversation between Penfield and Economic Counselor of Embassy Richard B. Freund has been found.

³ The Ghanaian mission, which was to examine what forms of aid the Congo required and how Ghana could be of assistance, arrived in Léopoldville on July 12.

Without openly indicating doubts as to adequacy Belgian arguments for countering expected attacks on their actions, Embassy officer re-emphasized keen interest Ambassador would have in hearing from Wigny tomorrow morning his further ideas on handling international reactions.

Burden

111. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State

Brussels, July 10, 1960, 3 p.m.

88. From Ambassador Burden. Eyes Only for the Secretary.¹ Geneva Eyes Only for Dillon. I received following from Timberlake on Telex this morning with request it be passed to Secretary and Dillon on eyes only basis:

“I am making urgent efforts to find Kasavubu, Congolese President, and talk to him at earliest moment today. Without, as you know, any instructions, I have already talked to Lumumbu [*Joseph Yumbu*] Vice President of Provincial Council Leopoldville along following lines:

Departure of Belgians, which would probably be followed by practically all Europeans, would convert modern Congo to jungle. Neither Congolese nor Belgians wish reestablish Belgian domination. Belgians agreed employ Belgian troops yesterday only under most extreme pressure and with greatest possible reluctance.

Fact is Force Publique not under effective command nor is its loyalty by any means assured. Command is not exercisable by negotiation nor is loyalty insured by sops.

I have suggested to Yumbu he find Kasavubu at earliest possible moment, repeat what I told Yumbu and ask Kasavubu make official request through Ralph Bunche² to United Nations for its intervention ‘as next friend of Congo to assist government reorganization Force

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1060. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Geneva.

¹ Secretary Herter was at Newport, Rhode Island, with the President.

² U.N. Under Secretary Ralph J. Bunche attended the Congolese independence ceremony as the Secretary-General’s personal representative and had stayed on thereafter. He was dependent for communications on U.S. facilities. Telegram 34 from USUN, July 9, contains a paraphrase of Bunche’s report to the Secretary-General assessing the situation. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–960)

Publique and police and to restore public order until such time as government of Congo and United Nations satisfied new organization fully able maintain law and order.' Have explained United Nations formula for Middle East action in past excluded principal powers and I suggest they ask for similar action in this case. This should keep bears out of the Congo caviar. I assume most Americans have not yet developed a great taste for it either.

Formula would involve sending immediately a commander-in-chief of United Nations forces who would take command of Belgian forces already there as part of United Nations force. Later Belgians might be gradually withdrawn as replacable by others. They would be principal force meanwhile.

Needless to say I think Kasavubu must do this at the earliest possible moment if he is to be believed around the world as acting on his own initiative and not with a Belgian pistol at this head. That's my thesis.

I talked at length with Bunche yesterday to discover how long it might reasonably take for Security Council to get effective forces moving. Bunche said in a matter of hours following Security Council decision and that required official government request.

Realize Soviets might decide to veto application Security Council but I believe they would make vast error in judging public opinion around the world by doing so. Furthermore, assume this could be taken up with Assembly on urgent basis if Security Council failed due to Russian veto".

Timberlake later added he had just seen Bunche again this morning "who agrees one hundred percent with thesis above and has been approached in same vein by Belgians".

Comment: I believe Timberlake should be commended for his initiative and that this approach to Kasavubu should be encouraged.³ Despite obstacles his proposal may encounter, it seems best way out of extraordinarily difficult situation:

1. Belgian troops already engaged in de facto intervention. As long as this intervention limited to its immediate humanitarian purpose of saving lives, even most rabid anti-colonialists will have difficulty attacking it.

2. Danger in proposed Belgian Government action described Embtels 77 and 78⁴ is from a public and unilateral assumption by Belgium of responsibility for maintaining order and reestablishing government structure in Congo, a responsibility Belgians can not carry out over longer term, especially in opposition to Congolese Government. If as Timberlake suggests suggests Belgian troops act as first contingent of

³ Telegram 68 to Brussels, July 10, instructed the Embassy to convey the Secretary's commendation to Timberlake for his initiative. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/7-1160)

⁴ Telegram 78 is printed as Document 110. Regarding telegram 77, see footnote 1 thereto.

United Nations force under United Nations responsibility requested by Congolese (whether government or Kasavubu himself) then there is perhaps a possibility of arresting anarchy and creating some foundation on which to rebuild an organized society in the Congo without creating permanent break between Belgians and Congolese or encountering adverse world reaction which we fear will greet present Belgian plan.

3. Belgian Government and people united in support any necessary use Belgian troops to protect and evacuate white population from Congo. Despite decisions it has taken, government appears confused and divided re measures beyond, and deathly afraid of popular reaction here which already beginning Brussels this morning. Conservative faction (Wigny and liberals) appears favor unilateral intervention already decided (Embtels 77 and 78) but some others apparently concerned at possible destruction long-range Belgian position by such a move. Latter group might support United Nations initiative as way out of dilemma. Do not know De Schrijver's position but from past performance expect he would approve of United Nations solution at least as second-best to Congo-requested Belgian intervention.

In summary, I believe Timberlake should be encouraged proceed on proposed lines and United States should prepare itself politically and practically to support Kasavubu request if forthcoming.

I am of course saying nothing of this to Wigny and will not unless otherwise instructed.

Burden

112. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State

Brussels, July 10, 1960, 5 p.m.

90. Department Eyes Only Herter; Geneva Eyes Only Dillon. Further to Embtel 88 also sent Geneva 5,¹ following just received from Leopoldville:

"For Burden from Timberlake.

Received word Noon Kasavubu and Lumumba enroute Matadito Leopoldville by plane. Went to airport arriving just in time to catch them leaving plane and had one hour conference with them alone and

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1060. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Geneva.

¹ Document 111.

Lavallee of Embassy.² Made pitch as given you this morning. Principal points they raised had to do with protest against violation of treaty by Belgians since paratroops request from GOC. I did not dispute their right lodge protest but urged, and I think successfully, that if they in fact insist on protesting that they do so after and not before they request United Nations assistance. Other question was who would bear expense of seeking and maintaining United Nations forces and what would become of defense budget. I suggested those questions be taken up after the first and crucial decision to ask United Nations assistance is decided.

Believe both impressed by force of argument. They said they would immediately hold Cabinet session and decide issue. They have asked Ralph Bunche to come to Lumumba's residence at 4 P.M. I am keeping Embassy sitting that one out. Bunche being advised now. Expect he will fill me in completely following seance with GOC."³

Burden

² A memorandum of the conversation by Lavallee is *ibid.*, AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 261, Congo Revolt—July–August/1960.

³ Telegram 36 from USUN, July 10, reported that in a three-way telephone conversation among Bunche in Léopoldville, Hammarskjöld in Geneva, and his Executive Assistant Andrew Cordier in New York, Bunche informed Hammarskjöld that the Congolese had decided to request U.N. assistance. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1060)

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State

Brussels, July 10, 1960, 6 p.m.

94. I saw Wigny at three forty-five p.m. immediately before he was to visit the King to discuss statement of Belgian position to be made by Government to Parliament at two p.m. tomorrow.

According to my instruction (in Freund–Penfield telecon Saturday night)¹ I expressed our concern over effect on Belgian and Western position of world reaction to general military intervention. I said I thought it was extremely important international public relations in this connection be handled with extreme care. I pointed out that no effective objection could be made by anyone to use of troops for

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1060. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris and London.

¹ July 9; see footnote 2, Document 110.

humanitarian purpose of saving lives in a situation of anarchy. However, maintenance of order in the general sense is a function of sovereignty and if Belgium makes public announcement that it is taking over this function in the Congo, without being asked by the Congolese Republic, it would, however unfairly, be widely accused of reimposing colonial status despite disclaimers. I therefore thought it most important that any public statement that be [*was*] made make very clear that military actions being taken were to save lives of Europeans and that no statement be made indicating that was Belgian intention to take over function of restoring and maintaining public order as a whole in Congo. These are my personal views and were so described to Wigny.

Wigny responded that he was fully aware of the importance of this distinction. He read me cables from Van Den Bosch in Leopoldville emphasizing danger of widespread intervention of paratroopers in Leopoldville. Van Den Bosch also suggested that statement be made saying that troop action was to save European lives and property with no political intent whatever. Once lives were safe troops would return to their bases.

Wigny said that as a result of our conversation he would be particularly careful to make this point clear.

I thanked him for help of Belgian troops in saving lives of Americans in Elisabethville. Asked him about relation of De Schrijver and Ganshof² trip to Leopoldville to statement of Belgian policy tomorrow at two p.m. Wigny replied De Schrijver and Ganshof would try to secure request from GOC for Belgian military support but even if they were unsuccessful statement of policy would have to be made at two p.m. Monday.³

Wigny said it would be much appreciated if space could be found on American airplanes returning to Brussels for Belgian refugees. Told him of two C-124's in Brazzaville. Also said there was extreme shortage of fuel at Kamina constituting serious problem to evacuation and was there anything we could do to help. Emphasized Congo developments constitute serious problem for stability of his government.

Burden

² Minister for General African Affairs Walter J. Ganshof.

³ July 11; the text of the Prime Minister's statement is in J. Gerard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen, *Congo 1960* (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, [1961]), vol. II, pp. 502–504.

114. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State

Brussels, July 11, 1960, 3 p.m.

108. Canup told us on telephone 1030 a.m. Moise Tshombe, President Katanga Provincial Government, told him this morning Katanga Government intends declare its independence today. (Tshombe announced this intention publicly yesterday according Belgian press, but qualified it that announcement would be made when "situation calm.")

Tshombe asked Canup whether US prepared recognize independent Katanga. Said he was asking same question of British and Belgians. Canup replied he had no new instructions but believed from previous indications US would not recognize. Tshombe apparently indicated Katanga Government intended act without waiting for answer above questions.

In answer Canup question, we told him every indication we had was US would not recognize or encourage Katanga independence. Canup saw Tshombe again between 11 and 12 and repeated this message, but received no further information on Tshombe's intentions.

Instructions received from Penfield 1145 a.m. ("under present conditions there is absolutely no possibility US would recognize") relayed Canup by telephone 1230 p.m.¹

Foreign Minister's chef cabinet Schuurmans, whom we informed of above, says GOB equally definite, and intends leave Belgian troops in Katanga to protect lives.

Burden

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1160. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, and Salisbury.

¹ Telegram 73 to Brussels, July 11, stated that if Canup was still in contact with Tshombe, he should inform him that given existing conditions in the Congo, the United States would not afford recognition. It concluded: "In general we wish Tshombe discouraged but do not wish to close door completely since detachment Katanga could conceivably be in interest West if rest of Congo continues in present status." (*Ibid.*) Telegram 114 from Brussels, July 11, reported that Canup had just telephoned that he had informed Tshombe of U.S. unwillingness to grant recognition under existing conditions. (*Ibid.*)

115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

July 11, 1960, 8:07 p.m.

19. Ref: New York 34, July 9;¹ 35, July 9;² Brussels 53, July 8;³ Leopoldville 38, July 10⁴ and 30, July 11.⁵ USUN should be guided by following in discussing Congo situation with SYG and Cordier.

1) Dept believes UN can play important role in connection restoration public order in Congo and maintenance its territorial integrity.

2) SYG should take lead in formulation and implementation UN actions in Congo. We intend assist and support him as possible and feasible. (FYI. ChiCom radio has already charged US imperialists using SC penetrate Congo.)

3) Assume SYG will wish consult with Belgians as well as with ASAFs. We have been in touch with Africans throughout crisis and believe that while they were first loath admit seriousness of situation, they may now be ready support UN measures save Congo from further anarchy.

4) SYG may wish consider desirability urge Belgian Govt issue public statement that they welcome UN presence and will cooperate fully with UN to restore law and order and that they will withdraw their forces as soon as this accomplished. We prepared support SYG suggestion for such Belgian statement in Brussels and Washington.

5) Most immediate problem is reimposition of discipline on Force Publique. In our view, this can be materially assisted by assignment appropriate officers and technical personnel, which should be African to extent possible, to train Congo Army. "Training" involves prompt reestablishment military discipline as well as longer-range creation

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-960. Confidential. Drafted by René Tron of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (UNP); cleared by Satterthwaite in draft and by William T. Nunley, United Nations Adviser in EUR; and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Francis O. Wilcox. Repeated to Accra, Brussels, Dakar, Léopoldville, and Rabat.

¹ Telegram 34 from USUN paraphrased a report from Bunche to Hammarskjöld assessing the Congo situation as virtually hopeless for the present, with the government lacking control. (*Ibid.*)

² Telegram 35 from USUN indicated that Hammarskjöld had cabled Bunche not to take risks for, in the absence of any government authority with which to work, little could be done to help the situation. (*Ibid.*)

³ Telegram 53 from Brussels conveyed the following message from Bunche to Hammarskjöld: "Using kindness US facilities this message. Work here interrupted by present situation. Holding on and all safe." (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/7-860)

⁴ Telegram 38 from Léopoldville revealed that Bunche had just transmitted to Hammarskjöld an official Congolese appeal for U.N. technical military assistance. Timberlake urged full support for this request. (*Ibid.*, 770G.5/7-1060)

⁵ Reference should be to telegram 40, July 11, which conveyed van den Bosch's view of the situation. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/7-1160)

apolitical, reliable military force. We suggest SYG consider assignment of person such as one of Mali Colonels Abdoulaye Somare or Mamadou Fall or Moroccan General Kettani. (Rabat, Dakar comments urgently requested.) Alternatively appointment Indian Commander of UNEF Gyani on temporary basis might be envisaged. Fact these are our suggestions should be held in strictest confidence by SYG, and he should also be advised seek Belgian views.

6) Anarchic Congo situation further complicated by Katanga separatist movement. We are urging Belgium use its influence head off this movement at this time, and believe SYG might usefully do likewise.

7) Re UN mechanics, we believe SYG has authority act under GA resolution 1415 (XIV)⁶ together with letter from Conference Independent African States pledging support UN measures safeguard territorial integrity Congo after independence. However, it politically essential that African States and Belgians agree with measures taken. If African States and Belgium in agreement SC meeting Wednesday,⁷ which we informed SYG tentatively planning to call, could be formality at which he informs Council of actions taken at request of Congo Government.

Addressee posts repeat messages this subject directly to USUN.

Herter

⁶ Adopted December 5, 1959, Resolution 1415 (XIV) invited the Secretary-General to consider requests from newly independent states for "high-level technical experts" and technical aid.

⁷ July 13.

116. Telegram From the President's Assistant Staff Secretary (Eisenhower) to the Staff Secretary (Goodpaster), at Newport, Rhode Island

July 12, 1960, 11:08 a.m.

CAP5380-60. The following is the substance of a telephone message received by Mr. Ferguson from Ambassador Timberlake at Leopoldville at approximately 10:00 am, July 12th.

Ambassador Timberlake has attended a Cabinet meeting of the Congolese Government, at which were present the Vice Prime

Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Congo. Confidential; Operational Immediate.

Minister,¹ the Minister of Foreign Affairs,² and the Minister of National Defense.³ He received from the Cabinet a written invitation for the United States to send troops to the Congo to maintain law and order.⁴ The situation is particularly serious in the Leopoldville area and there is no hope for collaboration between the Congolese and Belgian armies as a result of the incident at Matadi. The Congolese Government requested Ambassador Timberlake to transmit to the United States Government its request for a contingent of 2000 men⁵ to be sent to Leopoldville.

Ambassador Timberlake stated that the Force Publique had gotten hold of and distributed arms from Camp Leopold. There is less than one week's supply of flour in Leopoldville. There is no [sic] food problem in Leopoldville Province. There is urgent need for 100 tons of hard winter wheat flour. Because of the situation at Matadi, any supplies brought in by sea should come by way of Pointe Noire and Brazzaville. Ambassador Timberlake expects to receive from the Congolese Government today a request for P.L. 480⁶ flour.

Regardless of what decision is made in Washington with regard to the Congolese Government's request for the presence of American troops, Ambassador Timberlake feels that the two companies of the 24th Infantry now on stand-by basis in Germany should be flown down to Brazzaville. Their presence there would have a very desirable effect. This will require the concurrence of the French Government.

Ambassador Timberlake states that it would be much better if U.S. troops were under the UN banner. He would think that this could be arranged in connection with the recommendation from Ralph Bunche. Because of the shortage of food, he expects rioting if this situation is not relieved within a few days. He pointed this out to the Congolese Government and said that he did not wish to have American troops shooting Congolese. He told the Congolese Government that unless it would assure adequate food supplies, Ambassador Timberlake will recommend against the entry of American troops.

The Congolese Government has given permission for U.S. military aircraft to land anywhere in the Congo.

¹ Antoine Gizenga.

² Justin Bomboko.

³ Albert Nyembo.

⁴ Timberlake transmitted a translation in telegram 54 from Léopoldville, July 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1260)

⁵ In the version of the request published in *Congo 1960*, vol. II, pp. 542-543, the request was for 3,000 men. The figure in telegram 54 is 2,000.

⁶ The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, approved July 10, 1954. (68 Stat. (pt. 1) 454)

Present at the meeting of the Cabinet were de Schrijver, van der Meersch, and van den Bosch, Belgian Ambassador to the Congo. They all expressed their agreement with the request of the Congolese Government and stated that they would assure cooperation of the Belgian forces.

Ambassador Timberlake is keeping the telephone line open between Leopoldville and Washington for a reply.

**117. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter**

July 12, 1960, 11:50 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE
PRESIDENT IN NEWPORT

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

The President then asked if the Secretary had talked to the Canadians.

The Secretary said he had just talked to Howard Green¹ and explained that in view of the Congo situation he couldn't get away, and the Secretary said Green asked him about coming up tomorrow and the Secretary told him he would call Green tonight and let him know.

The President said this might be all right; that it is only an hour-and-a-half up there by jet.

The President then asked if we had gotten any ideas from Hammarskjold on the Congo request.

The Secretary said Mr. Wilcox had just spoken to Hammarskjold's assistant, Mr. Cordier, and that Hammarskjold is now meeting with the African Ambassadors at the UN and is hoping he can work it out through them rather than through the Whites.

The President asked what we had said to the Congo.

The Secretary said we have said nothing yet but we plan to say we are in consultation with the UN on this whole matter. The Secretary said he would be very adverse to sending in our troops in these circumstances.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Prepared in the Secretary's office.

¹ Canadian Foreign Secretary.

The President said that was right; that he didn't think any Western troops should go in; that he would rather see Turkish or Pakistani troops if they can't get African troops.

The Secretary said there has been a ticker report that our Ambassador gave agreement in principle to this request. The Secretary said there is no indication our Ambassador did anything of the sort and we will have to deny that he has given agreement in principle.

The President said we are always willing to do our duty through the UN but we are not going to unilaterally get into this.

The Secretary said our Ambassador also reported a possible serious food problem in Leopoldville and the Secretary said we are looking to see if we can help out in that regard.

The President said this was all right and commented that maybe after this situation some of these people won't want now to be independent.

The Secretary said he felt we should send something to Timberlake to say we can't undertake to send troops as U.S. troops but we are discussing the situation with the Secretary-General of the UN at the present time. The Secretary said Hammarskjöld wants to arrange for colored, French-speaking officers.

The President said there is nothing more we can do now except keep in touch with the UN. The President said we would be completely in error to go in unilaterally.

**118. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between
Secretary of State Herter and Secretary-General
Hammarskjöld**

July 12, 1960, 12:50 p.m.¹

**MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SECRETARY-GENERAL HAMMARSKJÖLD**

Mr. Hammarskjöld telephoned to say he had just finished his meeting with the whole African group regarding the Congolese request for technical assistance from the UN and this group was very much back of his line. The SYG said what is practical depends very much on the Congo Government. The SYG said so far so good and he

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Limited Official Use. Prepared in the Secretary's office.

¹ Herter was in Washington; Hammarskjöld was in New York.

could say he has tied it up there but is having a meeting of the members of the Security Council in the morning—not the Security Council itself, but the members of the Council. The SYG said there is one curiosity in this, i.e. they have not yet received the formal request, but SYG said he will go ahead anyway. The SYG said there is another side, i.e. the request to the U.S., but that in no way collides with the request to the UN. The Secretary said we do not want to do a single thing which we do not do under UN auspices. SYG said he hasn't yet found where to put this. SYG said he saw the Secy's point in keeping this neutral. SYG said this is one of those situations where we must innovate and we must find a formula. SYG said Lodge is coming this afternoon and they might see what formula is available. SYG said he took very definite stand we should not go into a new framework but that doesn't solve the Secy's problem or his. The Secretary said we have instructed our Ambassador that with the appeal having gone to the UN that this matter was within Hammarskjold's competence and that we are not going to make any independent move. SYG said let us then see what this afternoon brings.

The Secy said there was one matter he would like to mention confidentially. Some days ago as a matter of precaution we sent an aircraft carrier² to stand by out of sight outside with helicopters in case they were needed for rescue of people and Secy said there are some Marines aboard, but the ship will not arrive until the 21st. The Secy said we have kept this very secret. The Secretary said he personally had a strong feeling that white troops not speaking French should not go into that area. SYG said he agreed; that this would only aggravate the situation. SYG said we should continue working on line to put the responsibility on the Congo and then one can use some white troops. SYG said if they just used their police functions, he knew he didn't have to tell the Secy the repercussions. SYG said of course we can't help some cold-war overtones. The Secretary referred to Khrushchev's attack on the Belgian Government's actions.³ SYG said he had not seen this but could tell the Secy that the African Ambassadors in NY did not look at us in that light. The Secy said in what he was saying about troops, he didn't want the SYG to feel we wouldn't want to do our share. SYG said he understood. SYG said that of course our people could do the job, but with what consequences. SYG said that is a real snag and a similar snag is can we find new kind of formula where this can be done at the request of the Government. The Secretary said we will keep in touch and we will do nothing unilaterally.

² *The Wasp*.

³ Reference is to Khrushchev's remarks at a July 12 news conference in Moscow.

The Secretary said we may do something on food, with [which?] SYG said was, of course, an entirely different matter. The Secy said if we did something on food, SYG would not feel we were going beyond our competence in doing this and SYG said this is entirely different. SYG said one thing we might think about if we really do it is addressing our announcement on it to the UN. Secretary said we could work in conjunction with UN, and said actually the question of food has only come from our Ambassador and that we have no word from the Congo Government. Secy said it might also be helpful if it were decided to do this if the food were made available in Leopoldville to Bunche for UN distribution. SYG said that might be a very good thing but he would like to think about it a little. The Secretary said it was his feeling it would be very much better to do this through the UN. SYG said his first reaction is that it is a very good idea, but said he would like to give it a little thought. Secy suggested if SYG were talking to Bunche he might sound him out on this and SYG said he would.

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo

July 12, 1960, 9:34 p.m.

63. Following confirms message sent Timberlake via Brussels in reply his conversation with Ferguson this morning:¹

Congo proposal to send US troops has been fully discussed by Secretary with Defense. Our position is that we cannot undertake to send US troops to Congo under purely US auspices. We have however taken matter up with UNSYG who has it under consideration. We understand problem and will do all we can to help in framework of UN. We have doubts however of advisability of sending in US troops for many reasons principally among them being the question of language and color. We also feel it would be inadvisable to send the two companies of the 24th Infantry to Brazzaville on a standby basis. End message.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.5411/7-1260. Confidential; Niact. Drafted and approved by Satterthwaite and cleared in draft by Herter, Hare, Wilcox, and McBride and cleared by S/S. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, and USUN.

¹ See Document 116.

Shortly after Timberlake-Ferguson telecon we were shown copies of AP, AFP and Presse Belga telegrams stating you had agreed in principle to furnishing troops. On basis your telephone conversation we have denied this to press.

With reference your request for flour matter is under urgent consideration and separate cable follows.²

SYG has reported his meeting with Africans went well and that he has formula for original Bunche request in mind. This complicated of course by subsequent receipt of request from Kasavubu and Lumumba that UN forces intervene to halt "Belgian aggression"³ although this may be garbled version of message sent through Bunche from Brazzaville. In this connection do you know whereabouts Kasavubu and Lumumba and is there not danger they may disavow request from Vice Premier and Foreign and Defense Ministers? Furthermore telecon with AmEmbassy Brussels indicates Bomboko plans request Belgian intervention if US declines request for US troops. With Lumumba and Kasavubu on one hand denouncing Belgian aggression and Bomboko possibly requesting Belgian protection, we wonder who actually can speak with authority for GOC. Please endeavor clarify.

Herter

² Telegram 64 to Léopoldville, July 12, stated that efforts were being made to secure 100 tons of wheat flour from stocks at Lomé and instructed the Embassy to ascertain whether Bunche would accept U.N. responsibility for its distribution. (Department of State, Central Files, 870G.49/7-1260)

³ Reference is to a message cabled from Kasavubu and Lumumba to Hammarskjöld on July 12 requesting U.N. military assistance to protect the Congo against "the present external aggression." For text, see U.N. doc. S/4382 or *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 524.

**120. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter**

July 13, 1960, 1 p.m.

**MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE
PRESIDENT FROM NEWPORT**

The Secretary said there had been further developments since their earlier conversation.¹ The Secretary then read the text of the message which Hammarskjöld had received from Kasavubu and Lumumba.² The Secretary said this reached the SYG this morning and he is holding an informal luncheon with the Security Council members today. The Secretary said since 11:30 this morning, the SYG has been in touch with the Belgian and Soviet representatives at the UN. The Secretary said the SYG plans to announce this afternoon that he is calling a formal meeting of the Security Council tonight to consider this matter, and the SYG plans to say that the UN was taking responsibility for the maintenance of order in the Congo but the SYG is apparently going to ignore the part indicating they want the troops to act against Belgian aggression. The Secretary said the SYG hopes to do something like Suez of getting UN troops in to restore order and letting the Belgians phase out. The Secretary then read to the President the text of the latest telegram reporting on the deteriorating situation.³

The Secretary said he had talked to Cabot Lodge a couple of times and Lodge will report after the luncheon. The Secretary said in the meanwhile the SYG has offers of troops from Tunisia of one battalion, 300 from Ghana, and is hopeful of troops of Senegalese, Sudan and Yugoslavia, but SYG has to get vote by SC. The President asked if the Soviets won't veto this in the SC, and the Secretary said that was a real question; that in view of the fact that the offers have come from African States, the Soviets may hesitate to veto, but if they do veto we will have to take really serious look at the entire situation. The Secre-

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. No classification marking. Prepared in the Secretary's office.

¹ Reference is apparently to a conversation at 10:15 a.m. that morning; a memorandum of that conversation prepared in the Secretary's office does not record any discussion of the Congo. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

² Reference is to a message of July 13 from Kasavubu and Lumumba to Hammarskjöld. It stated that U.N. military assistance was requested not to restore order but to protect the Congo against Belgian aggression, that the request was for a U.N. force drawn from neutral countries and not from the United States, and that if assistance was not received without delay the Congo would appeal to the "Bandung Treaty Powers." For text, see U.N. doc. S/4382, printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 524. Lodge had read the message to Herter in a telephone conversation at 11:10 a.m. that morning. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

³ Not further identified.

tary said it would really be the beginning of something serious if the Chinese Communists were called in by the Congo.⁴ The Secretary said he thought we would know more during the course of the afternoon. The Secretary said the Soviet representative in New York refused to attend the informal meeting of the SC members if it were held in the regular conference room, which was the reason the SYG is having a luncheon meeting. The Secretary said the Belgians had asked the French to assist them to stave off a SC meeting, but things have been developing rapidly since then.

The President asked why Hammarskjold doesn't consider this an emergency and just accept the troop offers and himself go there and take charge. The Secretary said that is essentially what the SYG wants to do, but in terms of money for financing this he has to have a vote from a UN organ. The President said, on the other hand, in the case of an emergency we and the British and French could guarantee expenses up to a given amount. The Secretary said we did that before but it led to complications because it was on a voluntary contribution basis and if the SYG can do it without delay out of UN funds it is better.

The President asked if it would be all right if he called the Secretary about 6:00 this evening and the Secretary said he thought that would be fine since we should have better information by that time. The President asked if we have anybody of our own to evacuate from the Congo and the Secretary said we are in pretty good shape except for some missionaries scattered in areas where there is no way of getting in a plane or helicopter. The President said he thought some of the Africans foresaw this. The Secretary said the African Ambassadors at the UN had a meeting at the end of June with Hammarskjold before Congo independence but the trouble they foresaw was not with the Belgians but in terms of inter-tribal fights.

On food for the Congo, the President said we could get three or four C-130's and move this in. The Secretary said we are moving food from Lome. The Secretary said he had been talking to Brussels and they are trying to get a reasonable estimate of what is needed and for how long in consultation with Bunche.

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

⁴ Lodge told Herter in the telephone conversation cited in footnote 1 above that the Secretary-General thought the reference to the Bandung powers meant the Congo would turn to Communist China. The People's Republic of China had been a participant in the Conference of Afro-Asian Countries in Bandung, Indonesia, April 18-24, 1955; for text of the communiqué of April 24, 1955, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 2344-2352.

**121. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter**

July 13, 1960, 5:35 p.m.

**MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE
PRESIDENT FROM NEWPORT**

The President asked how we stood on the Congo. The Secretary said he had just finished talking with the French Ambassador¹ and that the French view was in complete accord with our own. The Secretary said he had a two-page instruction to Lodge, which he then read to the President (copy attached).² With regard to the reference in the instruction to the "US prepared to assist by means of transport, communications and other logistic support on reimbursable basis", the Secretary interpolated that he had been talking with Secy Douglas and Adm. Burke and they are ready to move on an airlift if we are asked to. The President then said with regard to reimbursement that in the interests of speed we might keep this question of reimbursement until after the action rather than have the SYG delay doing that; that we should go and do it and then we could put in our claim for reimbursement afterward. The Secretary said this was what we had done before and there had been some complications since the contributions were voluntary. The Secretary said the SYG himself would prefer to have this come out of the UN Fund and then apportion the cost later. The President said the instructions are all right then.

The Secretary said he had talked to Cabot Lodge and the SYG thinks he can get the Tunisians to introduce this sort of resolution. The President referred to all the ticker reports saying the Soviets are alleging the US is really the culprit in this plane incident³ and the President said he is glad they have done this because it shows the venom of their attitude. The President said he doesn't see why somebody doesn't point to Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, etc.

The President said he thought the Secretary was doing exactly right.

The Secretary said he didn't think he would be hearing anything tonight. Lodge thought the Congo SC meeting might have to go over until tomorrow morning.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Prepared in the Secretary's office.

¹ A memorandum of conversation with French Ambassador Hervé Alphand is *ibid.*, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1360.

² Not attached to the source text, but see Document 122.

³ Reference is to the shooting down of a U.S. RB-47 by the Soviet Union on July 1. The Soviets charged that the plane was in Soviet air space.

122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

July 13, 1960, 6:47 p.m.

33. Re SC Meeting on Congo. Following are principal elements our approach on SC consideration of Congo which are sent to you for guidance.

1. We are in agreement with SYG's plan to seek establishment on urgent basis of UN force for Congo drawn from smaller UN members.

2. Overall approach is for US not to take lead on this matter, but at same time to give every feasible support to SYG to establish UN Force in Congo. If so requested by SYG, US prepared to assist by means of transport, communications and other logistic support as in cases UNEF and UNOGIL. SYG may wish down play US involvement for obvious reasons and if this case, we understand it fully. We anxious that UN presence be established quickly. We believe that UN failure could mean intervention Bandung powers (Chinese Communists) consequence of which would be most serious. Importance earliest arrival of UN personnel stressed by both US Ambassador and Bunche in Leopoldville. This connection, we prepared air-lift Tunisian or other personnel if SYG desires.

3. We agree fully with SYG's intention to avoid recrimination and criticism re Belgian actions and his desire to formulate terms of reference describing mission of force in terms other than those in Congolese request. Belgians obviously have not committed aggression and US could not support any UN force on this basis. Given the inability of Congolese Government to maintain law and order, Belgian actions to protect lives and property and to assist and evacuate own citizens are clearly justified.

4. We agree with SYG concept of UN force: (a) that its purpose is to take over peace and security function; and (b) that it establish bridge for and provide basis for withdrawal of Belgian forces once UN presence effectively established.

5. Obviously, we are strongly opposed to Soviet bloc states providing any troops, and we know that SYG fully cognizant this point. We can appreciate SYG desire bring in some Yugoslavs, as he did in UNEF in order neutralize Soviets in this regard. This is acceptable to us provided proportion of Yugoslav troops kept to reasonable number and they not be given overall command, when such is established by SYG.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1360. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by UNP Director William I. Cargo and Deputy Director Joseph J. Sisco; cleared in draft by Herter, Satterthwaite, and Ferguson; cleared with S/S; and approved by Wilcox. Repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, London, Paris, and Moscow.

6. Re Council action, we believe res. along following lines might be desirable. We are indicating res. below only as illustrative and suggest approach in it be passed to SYG. SYG undoubtedly will have his own ideas both as to contents and sponsorship. We believe Tunisian and possibly Ceylonese sponsorship is best. We would not ourselves wish sponsor so that it will enhance chances that res. will get through SC without Soviet veto. To extent to which UN is responding to African desires and appeal possibility of res. passing is enhanced. However, we would be opposed to including anything in the res. which is recriminatory toward Belgium.

7. Following is resolution:

Having considered the serious situation in the Republic of the Congo and the request of the Republic of the Congo dated July 12 and July 13, 1960, for UN assistance

Requests the SYG urgently to create and to despatch with the consent of the nations concerned, an emergency international United Nations Force in response to the request of the Republic of the Congo to assist in establishing peace and tranquillity in that independent nation.

Urges the Republic of the Congo and its people to take every feasible step to protect the lives and property of all in the Congo and to cooperate fully with the United Nations Force in the implementation of this resolution.

Calls upon all members of the UN to render such assistance as may be requested by the Secretary-General.

Requests the Secretary General to exercise the authority vested in him by Res 1444 (XIV) and Res 1445 (XIV)¹ financing the Force from the Working Capital Fund until such time as further arrangements can be made.

FYI. Secretary informed Belgians today that UN action would be facilitated if they said that their troops are in Congo on stopgap basis and that as soon as UN presence becomes effective Belgians would withdraw. End FYI.

Herter

¹ Resolution 1444, December 5, 1959, authorized the Secretary-General, for the financial year 1960, "to enter into commitments to meet unforeseen and extraordinary expenses." Resolution 1445, passed by the General Assembly that same day, authorized the Secretary-General to advance such sums from the Working Capital Fund to finance commitments authorized under the provisions of Resolution 1444 (XIV). (U.N. doc. A/4354)

123. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, July 14, 1960, 3 a.m.

71. Reference: Congo. Just prior to opening of SC meeting tonight 7/13 Lodge ran into Loridan¹ in corridor. Loridan referred to their earlier conversation in which Lodge had urged Loridan make declaration before SC re Belgian willingness to withdraw troops as law and order restored by UN, and to which Loridan at that time had appeared sympathetic. Loridan immediately raised objections to what he seemed to think was US desire obtain statement about Belgian withdrawal of troops which would set stage, in his opinion, for Congo request that Belgium quit various bases, including one at Kamina. In elaborating this point, Loridan said this was NATO base and, in emotional tone, tried to convey impression US was seeking cut Belgium off and out from Congo entirely, and injuring NATO in bargain.

Lodge sought to clarify Loridan's misunderstanding and said this was first reference to NATO bases he had heard of in this case.

Lodge then sought to reach Secretary Herter aboard *Sequoia* and, when audible connection finally established, told him of Loridan's agitation and allegations, which were basically addressed to avoiding vote on Tunisian draft resolution² with its paragraph calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from Republic of Congo. Secretary told Lodge while Kamina had good airfield, it was not NATO base as such and not to worry too much about this point. As far as resolution concerned, while preferable to avoid calling on Belgians to withdraw, if necessary to obtain result tonight, Secretary felt Lodge should go right ahead and support Tunisian resolution even with difficult paragraph in it. Important thing in Secretary's judgment was to get UN force out into field at once.

Lodge

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1460. Confidential; Priority.

¹ Belgian Representative at the United Nations Walter Loridan.

² See footnote 2, Document 124.

124. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)

July 14, 1960, 9:05 a.m.

**MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
AMBASSADOR LODGE**

The Secretary telephoned Amb. Lodge to see how things stood on the S.C. meeting last night on the Congo. Lodge said he thought we did very well and got through about 3:45 this morning.¹ Lodge said there was a strong attempt to adjourn about 11:00 p.m. last night but Lodge said he resisted this and the upshot was that the resolution of Tunisia passed with 8 votes.² Lodge said we didn't like the paragraph about the Belgians but nevertheless SYG felt strongly this was the resolution the Africans there supported and it gave him the power to get moving and so Lodge said he voted for it. Lodge said the British and French abstained, along with two others. Lodge said the Belgian was in a very distressed situation but two things made him feel better. Lodge said he talked to Burden and the Secy said he had also talked to Burden last night as well as Wigny, although the Secy said the communication facilities from the *Sequoia* made it difficult. Lodge said the Soviet resolution to condemn the Belgians got defeated, and Lodge said the Belgians were better off to have this put up and defeated because then in effect they have not been condemned. Lodge said the Soviets then offered an amendment calling on Belgium to leave the Congo adding the word "immediately" and this was defeated.³ Lodge said then he made a statement in which he said we interpreted this language in the Resolution to mean the Belgians would withdraw only

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. No classification marking. Prepared in the Secretary's office.

¹ For the record of the meeting, see U.N. doc. S/PV.873. The texts of statements by Hammarskjöld and Lodge are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 525-528.

² The resolution called on the Belgian Government to withdraw its troops from the Congo, authorized the Secretary-General to take steps in consultation with the Congolese Government "to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks", and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate. For text, see U.N. doc. S/4387, printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 528. The resolution was adopted by 8 votes to 0, with China, France, and the United Kingdom abstaining.

³ The Soviet Union proposed three amendments which would have condemned Belgian "armed aggression," called for the "immediate" withdrawal of Belgian troops, and provided for a U.N. force drawn entirely from African member states. The first two were defeated by 7 votes to 2, with 2 abstentions; the third was defeated by 5 votes to 4, with 2 abstentions.

when UN got there so law and order could be carried out just as we did in the Gaza strip. Lodge said then he paid him a compliment and he was very pleased. Lodge said actually the Belgians haven't a thing to complain about. Lodge said we were up against passing that Resolution or where would we have been today. Lodge said Slim⁴ who is a Turk was in the position of trying to lead the Negro African countries and he had to have something in the Resolution against Belgium and because of Tunisia the Soviets supported it so we got a resolution supported by both the US and the Soviets. The Secy asked if the Resolution set forth how the force is to be made up and Lodge said the Soviets put in a resolution saying it should be made up only of Africans and this was defeated. Lodge said he thought it was well the Resolution did not include make-up of the force since Hammarskjold will have a hard time anyway in making this up and Lodge said he, Lodge, thinks the French suggestion of French-Canadian troops is good. Lodge said they beat three Soviet amendments and it came up really better than Lodge had thought. Lodge said the hard part was when he said he would not join with the British and French in getting the meeting put off, and Lodge said he read the telegram from Timberlake saying the situation could change in 48 hours.⁵ Lodge said the Belgian made a good speech but did it too late to modify Slim's language. Lodge said the Resolution is not perfect but it gives SYG what he wants. Lodge said SYG said within two hours he was going to be starting things. Lodge said the SC has done its part and now we don't need a special session of the GA and we really did much better than we had a right to expect. The Secy asked if SYG is going to call on us for help and Lodge said he will want planes and transport. Secy said equipment worried him, i.e., whether these troops have necessary rifles, machine guns, tanks, etc., or whether we might be requested to supply this sort of equipment. Lodge said he just didn't know, but we would be hearing something soon.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

⁴ Tunisian Representative Mongi Slim.

⁵ In telegram 58 from Léopoldville, Timberlake noted the French estimate that the situation would become critical enough within 48 hours to justify action to save European civilians. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1260)

125. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and the Ambassador in Belgium (Burden)

July 14, 1960, 11:55 a.m.

**MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
AMBASSADOR BURDEN FROM BRUSSELS**

Ambassador Burden telephoned to say he just wanted to underline the importance of getting moving on the shipment of food to the Congo.¹ Burden said they have a letter from the Belgian Government saying they will pay for all the food. The Secretary said in the meantime we have had an official UN request for food from Bunche and we are going to supply it gratis since we think it is better to channel it through Bunche who then becomes the responsible party for its distribution. The Secretary said it was a question of who receives the food and who is responsible for it. Burden said he agreed but hoped there would be no delay. Burden said he understood from a tactical point of view that EUCOM is all set to airlift. The Secretary said the nearest food is in Lome and the other in Germany. The Secretary said we thought we had the necessary airlift from Lome but there have been some hitches but that everybody is at work on this right now and we are hoping we will have it all cleared within a couple of hours. Burden said the request he talked to the Secy about last night has now come in, and the Secy said he thinks it is better now not to get into a wrangle over who pays and it is better to do it under our own disaster relief thing.

Burden asked if the Secy knew why the British and French abstained on the resolution last night. The Secy said they abstained because of the phrase asking for Belgian withdrawal but made it clear in their speeches they were in favor of this whole thing. Secy said Lodge made it clear in a statement and that the Belgian had also made a good statement, but too late to get this reference out of the resolution. Burden said he talked to Lodge after he talked to the Secy and Lodge told him about that. The Secy said he understand the Belgians have taken the position now that as soon as the UN force is there and

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Official Use Only. Prepared in the Secretary's office.

¹ General Goodpaster called the Secretary at 11:30 a.m. to tell him that the President approved of the proposal to provide food "under whatever may be the proper authority." (Memorandum of telephone conversation prepared in the Secretary's office; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

order restored they will pull out. The Secy said he thought it has ended up fairly amicably and Burden said much more so than he had thought possible.

Burden said there is also a problem of fuel and that Tony Freeman had talked to Mr. Merchant this morning. Burden said we may have to fly it all in and the Secy said that is really going to be a problem flying in drums of fuel. Burden said maybe we can get it off the *Wasp*, but the Secy said the *Wasp* will not be there until the 20th. Burden said he apparently had wrong information and thought the *Wasp* arrived Saturday.² Burden said another thing is light aircraft to lift out missionaries; that helicopters didn't have enough range. Secy said he didn't know what type but there are light aircraft on the *Wasp*. Burden said the food thing really is the most important, and the Secy said Mr. Merchant had just come into the room with papers for him to sign on this.

² July 9.

126. Memorandum of Discussion at the 451st Meeting of the National Security Council

July 15, 1960, 9 a.m.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting. Secretary of State Herter presided at the meeting.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

[Here follows Allen Dulles' briefing on unrelated subjects.]

Mr. Dulles then referred to a message he had just received indicating that Khrushchev had sent a message to the Congo leaders stating that the hand of the aggressors had been raised over the African people and that if the aggressors continued in their present actions, the Soviet Government would find it necessary to consider more serious countermeasures.¹ Mr. Dulles stated that the action of the Congo in

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson on July 18.

¹ Khrushchev's message of July 15 was sent in response to a July 14 message from Kasavubu and Lumumba stating that Soviet help might be required if the Western nations failed to stop their aggression. For texts of both messages, see *Congo 1960*, vol. II, pp. 555-556; extracts from Khrushchev's message are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1960, p. 530.

breaking relations with Belgium may create new problems.² After a day of relative calm, there had been further outbreaks the day before in the Congo. Much, he said, depended on the speed with which the UN presence could be established in the Congo.

There was some discussion of when the first UN units were to arrive and it was indicated by General Twining that they would arrive that afternoon. In this connection, Mr. Herter noted that there had been competition between Ghana and Tunisia³ over whose units would be the first into the Congo.

Mr. Dulles, resuming his briefing, pointed out that the Belgians had promised to withdraw their troops progressively to bases within the Congo as the UN troops arrived. Lumumba was unwilling to accept this kind of Belgian withdrawal. Another problem in the Congo was the failure of many Congolese recently to receive their salaries from the Belgian firms for which they worked. In addition, there were spotty but serious food shortages in the Congo, especially in the Leopoldville area.

The Lumumba Government continued to be characterized by ineptitude. Lumumba was especially anti-Western; his Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, was not. In a message to the UN Lumumba and Kasavubu had stated that the Congo had requested UN assistance, not to re-establish order, but to protect the Congo against Belgium. Other messages had disavowed the request by the Foreign Minister for U.S. aid. An envoy from Katanga, which had seceded from the Congo,⁴ was on his way to the UN to present Katanga's case. The secession of Katanga had placed the Belgians in a difficult position. The Belgian Government had recognized the Congo and was opposed to its fragmentation. However, it also wants to protect its large investment in Katanga which contains the largest Belgian investments.

[Here follows the conclusion of Dulles' briefing.]

2. *U.S. Policy Toward Cuba* [Here follow references to NSC papers and actions concerning Cuba.]
3. *U.S. Policy Toward the Congo* (NSC 6001)⁵
4. *The Recent RB-47 Incident in the Barents Sea*

Secretary Herter stated that the Belgian Government was split on the question of independence for Katanga. Seven Cabinet Ministers favor Katanga's secession. The provincial governor in Katanga, who is

² On July 14.

³ Telegrams 52 from Accra and 59 from Tunis, both dated July 14, reported requests from the Ghanaian and Tunisian Governments for U.S. aircraft to transport their troops to the Congo. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/7-1460)

⁴ On July 11.

⁵ Document 22.

pro-Belgian, is on his way to the UN. In actuality, the Belgians would like secession as a means of better preserving their investment in this richest of the Congo provinces, but they were still maintaining an official position that the integrity of the Congo must be preserved. The Belgian Consul in Elisabethville had been working strongly for secession. Secretary Herter felt that it was understating the matter to say that Lumumba was anti-West.

Secretary Herter then went on to point out that an interesting aspect of UN action on the Congo had gone largely unnoticed because it occurred too late to appear in the morning newspapers. The Russians had offered three amendments to the Tunisian resolution on the Congo. The first had called for immediate withdrawal of the Belgians. It had been defeated. The Secretary-General favored a phased withdrawal of the Belgian forces despite the unfortunate statement of Mr. Bunche that the UN Resolution called for immediate withdrawal.⁶ In this connection, Mr. Dulles pointed out that "withdrawal" was being used in two different senses—from the country and to barracks within the Congo. Secretary Herter then went on to state that additional Soviet amendments providing that nothing but African troops should be used and condemning the Belgians had also been defeated. On the whole, the Belgians were reasonably satisfied with the UN action. Secretary Herter noted that there was a divided situation in the Congo Government. Lumumba had moved to Stanleyville but the Cabinet was still in Leopoldville. Whether the Cabinet would move to Stanleyville was not clear. The rest of the Cabinet, Secretary Herter indicated, was more reasonable than Lumumba. In answer to an inquiry by Secretary Anderson, Mr. Amory indicated that Lumumba was 34 years old. Secretary Herter noted that Lumumba had assumed the position of Minister of Defense. The Secretary indicated his amazement at the speed with which the U.S. lift for the UN force had been organized. Secretary Douglas confirmed that the first aircraft would arrive in the Congo that afternoon. Secretary Herter inquired how many planes were involved in the lift. Secretary Douglas replied that almost fifty had been committed and about the same number would be used for re-support. In this connection, General Twining pointed out that in order to handle the turn-around of U.S. aircraft, we would need to get one officer and 25 men into Brazzaville. He said that he

⁶ Telegram 83 from USUN, July 14, reported that Lodge had discussed with Hammarskjöld the news report imputing to Bunche the statement that the withdrawal of Belgian troops was a precondition for the introduction of U.N. forces. Hammarskjöld "said in his conception Belgian withdrawal and arrival of UN forces not simply matter of the first action making possible the other—but two events are related; to be sure, withdrawal should take place as UN troops provided alternative to Belgian troops, thus making their withdrawal possible. Relationship between them was 'subtle one for historical and political reasons'. He would interpret resolution as a totality." (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1460)

was afraid that if we did not get our own people into the area, the lift operation might bog down. Secretary Herter thought there would not be too much trouble about arranging this. He went on to point out that communications up the Congo River had been disrupted because Matadi was held by the rebels. [2 lines of source text not declassified] General Twining also noted that special communications equipment had been requested by the U.S. Embassy and had been sent in by the military.

Secretary Anderson inquired as to what we would do if the independence of Katanga became an issue—for example, could UN forces be used in Katanga? Secretary Herter acknowledged that this would pose a difficult problem. He pointed out that Lumumba had attempted to go to Elisabethville but that the provincial governor had kept him out and that instead he had gone to Luluaburg. Mr. Stans inquired as to the possibility of uniting Kivu with Katanga. Secretary Herter noted that in the Katanga there was a split situation. Some of the people were pro-Belgian and some were anti-Belgian.

Mr. Gray suggested that the present situation raised a question as to existing policy. Although that policy contains an escape clause, it provides in general that the U.S. should reply upon the former metropole.⁷ Mr. Gray also noted that a Discussion Paper on Africa had been circulated to the Council⁸ and concluded by stating that no policy review appeared to be required now. Secretary Herter agreed that it would be foolish to undertake a review at this time.

[Here follows discussion concerning Cuba and the RB-47 incident.]

The National Security Council:

[Here follows numbered paragraph 2.]

3. Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in the Congo.⁹

[Here follows numbered paragraph 4.]

[Here follow agenda items 5–7.]

Robert H. Johnson

⁷ Reference is to NSC 6001.

⁸ On July 12; see footnote 4, Document 33.

⁹ Paragraph 3 constituted NSC Action No. 2262. There is no paragraph 1. Paragraphs 2 and 4 constituted NSC Actions No. 2261 and 2263, concerning Cuba and the RB-47 incident, respectively. All were approved by the President on July 19. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

127. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, July 15, 1960, 10 p.m.

106. Last night Major General Alexander arrived Leopoldville¹ and called on me to request run down on situation. This British Commander-in-Chief, Ghana forces, level-headed and broad gauged. He said Nkrumah had agreed send two battalions troops, all under British officers and thoroughly reliable, under UN banner in response appeal from GOC. He told Nkrumah he wanted to investigate situation personally before advising Nkrumah to send them.

After discussion he telegraphed that the two battalions would be welcome help and he expects them to arrive tomorrow or Sunday.

I also asked van den Bosch and Rothschild² in to discuss situation created by demand Belgian Paratroop Commander to Force Publique now at Camp Leopold to deliver arms to paratroops by midnight last night or face assault. Bunche, Alexander and I persuaded van den Bosch to call Paratroop Commander and convince him it would be better wait until today when negotiating team of representative commander, Alexander, a member of UN group and a representative of Belgian Embassy would try obtain agreement Force Publique turn over arms to neutral control at least on temporary basis. During course these discussions, Bomboko arrived. I told him in my estimation situation called for statesmanship, that decisions taken in anger, however justifiable, can often be wrong, and asked him prevail on Kasavubu and Lumumba delay break in diplomatic relations with Belgium at least until today and hopefully for indefinite time. Explained Congo would suffer more than it perhaps realizes by such action and remedy for alleged violation treaty lies in complaint already lodged in UN. Bomboko assured me he would do his best and left hastily for airport where Kasavubu and Lumumba were due arrive.

I also endeavored line up further Congolese support for Federation in this matter through Ileo, President, Senate who is very favorable, Yumbu, Vice President, Provincial Council and close to Kasavubu, and others.

I sent Lavallee and Devlin to airport to seek Kasavubu and Lumumba and express similar thoughts. They met the two as they left plane and gave message. The reception was polite but frigid—both

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.5841/7-1560. Official Use Only; Priority.

¹ For Major General H. T. Alexander's account of his service in the Congo, see *African Tightrope*, pp. 33-87.

² Robert Rothschild held ambassadorial rank and served as van den Bosch's deputy.

men being under great strain and obviously very angry with Belgians. Lavallee and Devlin had to find them transportation which was not laid on.

As they descended plane ramp Belgian troops and civilians booted and called them "macaque", about the worst possible, violently until they finally got away. Parenthetically, Belgian troops and civilians are behaving similarly and worse in Leopoldville streets. One Congolese civilian was killed by white civilian on street near Meling Hotel this morning without any provocation.

At this morning's Cabinet meeting, I understand Bomboko was trying limit break diplomatic relations to recall Ambassadors but outcome not yet known.

See next following telegram for Embassy comment.³

Timberlake

³ In telegram 107 from Léopoldville, Timberlake commented that Kasavubu seemed to be under Lumumba's thumb and that the hatred growing between the Congolese and Belgians was likely to induce rash actions by both sides. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1560)

128. Memorandum of Conversation

July 15, 1960.

SUBJECT

Congo

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Louis Scheyven, Embassy of Belgium

Mr. J. C. Satterthwaite, AF

Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

After thanking the Secretary for his telephone message to the Belgian Foreign Minister, Ambassador Scheyven reported that the three western Ambassadors had met with Wigny in Brussels this

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1560. Secret. Drafted by McBride.

morning¹ and would meet again tomorrow.² He said the principal point he had been instructed to make was that it was now clear that Lumumba was operating under Soviet guidance. The Secretary said we had remarked at the change in his attitude prior to his recent trip when he was refused landing facilities in Elizabethville and his attitude thereafter. Ambassador Scheyven said that these changes of attitude had occurred before and noted his very disagreeable speech in front of the King of Belgium at the time of independence and his very friendly statement a few hours thereafter.³ He said that since their return to Leopoldville Kasavubu and Lumumba had avoided Belgian representatives there. He said that, furthermore, they were not consulting with the Foreign Minister who was taking quite a different line.

Ambassador Scheyven continued saying that the Soviet hand in Lumumba's activities was becoming clearer and clearer. He noted the threatening statement of Khrushchev to the effect that the Soviets would take further steps if the Belgians did not cease their present activities in the Congo. He said that this could even lead to armed Soviet intervention. He then handed the Secretary the text of a telegram from Lumumba to Khrushchev. He said the Foreign Minister had asked him to give this text to the Secretary. He said that now that we had one statement from the Soviets on this subject they would probably continue their menaces and might indeed take further actions. In the light of this situation, the Belgian Government thought that perhaps the time had now come for the United States to make a statement with regard to the Soviet menace in the Congo, along the lines that they would have to face the U.S. should they intervene in the Congo. He said the Foreign Minister felt personally that there should be such a statement at the present time. Ambassador Scheyven continued saying that the situation in the Congo could even lead to World War III. He noted that the first U.N. groups have begun to arrive today and that this might ameliorate the situation. However, he continued that if the Soviet statement on their intentions with regard to the Congo were not counteracted by any U.S. reply, this would mark a net gain for the Soviets throughout Africa. He said the Belgian Government was extremely worried by this development.

The Secretary concurred that this was a serious situation. He wondered how physically the Soviets would move if they were to accept a possible invitation for intervention from the Congolese. He noted it would be a difficult and lengthy move by air and that if the

¹ Telegram 200 from Brussels, July 15, reported that Wigny called Lumumba "a source of trouble and an instrument for a Soviet take-over" and argued that it was necessary to act rapidly to "undermine Lumumba's position and pave way for other, better people to take his place." (*Ibid.*)

² Reported in telegram 206 from Brussels, July 15. (*Ibid.*, 655.70G/7-1660)

³ Both on June 30; for texts, see *Congo 1960*, vol. I, pp. 323-326.

Soviets were to move by sea, the U.S. carrier would be off the Congo coast before the Soviets could be there. Ambassador Scheyven noted that the Soviets seem to feel that they were the protectors of the Congo. The Secretary recommended strongly that the message which Wigny had directed be given to him should also be given urgently to Hammarskjold. He said that the U.N. Secretary-General had taken hold of the situation quite firmly and he thought it would make him extremely angry that one country, i.e., the Soviets were intervening in this situation. The Secretary noted that the Secretary-General interpreted the UNSC resolution in the same fashion that we do, i.e., that there should be no Belgian withdrawal from the Congo until the U.N. force was firmly in control.

The Secretary then inquired how Soviet technicians would be introduced into the Congo. Ambassador Scheyven said doubtless by air and noted that there were many airfields in the Congo, though the two bases of Kamina and Kitona were fortunately firmly in Belgian hands. He continued, saying that the task of the U.N. force would be enormous and that he hoped that they would initially concentrate on areas where there was widespread lawlessness and not on those regions which the Belgian troops controlled and where they had re-established order. If the U.N. units attempted to force the Belgians to withdraw from areas where they were in control the effect would be very bad. He said that if law and order were not re-established promptly in the Congo the entire structure of the country, both Belgian and Congolese, would collapse.

Ambassador Scheyven then discussed the situation in Katanga. He said that obviously the Katanga government had not taken all of the necessary juridical steps to make its position clear. Ambassador Scheyven said that it was not the present intention of the Belgian Government to recognize the Tshombe regime, but that the Belgians feared that this might soon be the only part of the Congo which was connected with the Free World. Therefore, the Belgians hoped we would not press hard against the present Katanga regime. He said that Tshombe was planning to present his case to the United Nations one way or another and he believed that this Katanga movement should not be suppressed at too early a stage as it might be the last stronghold we have. Furthermore, it was economically, of course, the most important part of the Congo. Finally, if the rest of the country fell under Moscow domination, we might wish to reconsider our present attitude.

The Secretary inquired if the relationship between Kasavubu and Lumumba was still close. Ambassador Scheyven thought that they distrusted each other and therefore were sticking close together to watch each other. He reverted to his suggestion that the United States Government should make a statement with regard to the Congo along

the lines outlined above, i.e., in the nature of a warning to the Soviets regarding moving into the area. The Secretary said we would give consideration to the matter, but that was all he could say now.⁴ He reiterated his view that the Belgians should discuss this problem with Mr. Hammarskjold and wondered whether this was the moment for a U.S.-Soviet conflict over the Congo. He concluded, noting that the first responsibility in the affair rested with the U.N. If the U.N. failed to meet this responsibility, then perhaps we should reconsider.

Ambassador Scheyven concluded noting the menacing nature of the present Soviet attitude.

⁴ Telegram 148 to Brussels, July 16, stated that the Department had issued a statement which termed the Soviet message "intemperate, misleading, irresponsible." (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1660)

129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Elisabethville

July 16, 1960, 1:40 p.m.

17. You should inform Tshombe Dept has received his message transmitted through you¹ but regrets it still does not find itself in position consider question Katanga independence. You may also wish express to Tshombe personal view he might be well advised concentrate on maintenance law and order which fortunately now has been restored in Katanga. Moreover, adoption public posture by Tshombe against cooperation with UN will not serve his interests, and in fact could aggravate an already serious situation. You should also tell him we hope he will feel free continue discuss problems with you on frank and friendly basis and that inability recognize does not constitute any hostility toward Tshombe or his Government.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.02/7-1660. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Ferguson; cleared by Satterthwaite, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Horace E. Henderson, and McBride; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Brussels, Léopoldville, Salisbury, and USUN.

¹ Telegram 10 from Elisabethville, July 15, transmitted a message from Tshombe formally requesting U.S. recognition and reported that Tshombe told Canup his government was opposed to U.N. intervention in Katanga and would refuse any U.N. force permission to enter Katanga. Canup commented that while he realized the Department was weighing many factors, he had no hesitation in recommending recognition "from point of view of well-being Katanga". (*Ibid.*, 770G.02/7-1560)

FYI. While Dept fully appreciative arguments from strictly local point of view favoring US recognition Katanga, situation must be considered in over-all African context. Recognition Government which would be widely regarded as artificial creation by vested Belgian interests would put US in most invidious position vis-à-vis other African states many of whom are principal contributors UN Forces now arriving in Congo. Furthermore recognition in absence any sort of plebiscite to determine wishes of all the people of Katanga would be hazardous undertaking. Should other states recognize Katanga it is possible that US might reconsider its position but under no circumstances will we take the lead. End FYI.

For Brussels: Department would appreciate your expressing sense first paragraph to GOB. Department informing Belgian Embassy Washington likewise.

Herter

130. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, July 17, 1960, noon.

125. For the Secretary and Dillon. We face immediately ahead the need to make a major policy decision which is complex, full of imponderables and charged with fateful portent not only for the Congo but for Africa. It is intimately, if unhappily a part of the great-power struggle.

The Congo may be in its death throes as a modern nation. The Congo itself was never such a nation and no Congolese has any real comprehension of what makes such a nation live. They consequently do not understand that it may be dying. The 100,000 Europeans were the ones who did know but they never managed to communicate either their knowledge or their higher skills to enough Congolese to make any significant difference.

The flood of refugees now going and gone will reduce the European population to something nearer 10,000 if the worst fears of some non-Belgian observers are realized. The brutal fact is that this great and expensive infrastructure faces potential deterioration which cannot yet be predicted but might well become almost total. The next

operation is strictly salvage. There must be an identification of what is vital, and it will be an Herculean task to save that. The less vital cannot be saved.

The present government and any that is foreseeable, has not the slightest idea of what is happening let alone what might be done about it. That has been clearly established by all who are on the scene. It does not, consequently, even know what it should ask for.

It is violently anti-Belgian. As an example of the latter and the former, members of the Congolese Cabinet are doing everything they can to convince the government that all Belgian money must be burned because it is Belgian. This is fact not fiction. Some Belgians on the other hand, particularly the military, have become completely irrational and in many instances have behaved worse than the worst Congolese.

No one Western country in its right mind would ever undertake the task of rehabilitation here nor could it possibly do it. The best we can most optimistically expect from the UN effort will be only the saving of the most essential—and the inevitable inability of any one to maintain present standards will soon make even that unpopular.

There is just an outside chance that after the present tide of panic has run out, there will be a backflow of enough Belgians to reduce the task to more manageable proportions. This will depend first upon the firm establishment of law and order not just temporarily but for the long pull. Second, it will be aided by the fact that jobs have been scarce in Belgium and will be even scarcer for those who have just gone and are now going. Third, it will require the re-establishment of some satisfactory rapport between the Congolese and the Belgians.

I do not believe the problems and the prospects are or could be at this time appreciated in Washington, London or Paris. They might be in part in Brussels. Now that this first phase of simple survival and security in Leopoldville is ending, I strongly urge that I be ordered home on two or three days consultation¹ to discuss the problem as I see it before we are faced with a decision which seems to me will resolve into one of the following:

1. Go along with present UN plans and programs which will barely, if that, maintain order in the principal centers of population and will not touch the problem of preserving the infrastructure, particularly in the public and private sectors in the interior.

2. Urge and support an enormously greater economic plan which might preserve more of the infrastructure but cost many hundreds of millions of dollars and extend over years.

¹ The Secretary informed Ambassador Timberlake that he agreed with him about the wisdom of early consultations, but thought Timberlake's departure at that time might be misconstrued. (Telegram 154 to Léopoldville, July 18; *ibid.*, Personnel Files)

3. Permit the Katanga, which is viable and has emerged so far practically unscathed, to become independent and face the fragmentation of the country which might well continue.

I think I now know enough to be helpful in discussions in Washington. I think it is of the utmost importance to understand the flavor of what is happening not just the bald historic facts.

I can perhaps illustrate by saying this is comparable with the problem faced in Germany after the war and at the same time the opposite. In Germany, we had to replace the infrastructure which could and was operable by the people; here we have the infrastructure but the operators are evaporating.

The situation is ugly and imperative. The historians will assess the blame and the merit. We must now decide how to meet the present problem.

Timberlake

131. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, July 18, 1960, midnight.

121. Re: Congo. Following are points SYG made to us during conversations Saturday.¹

1. SYG concerned with danger that request for assistance from Lumumba sent out in all directions might result in attempts by Soviet bloc to move in with technicians. He believes most effective means prevent this is for UN move in as quickly as possible to prevent any vacuum developing as Belgians move out. He has therefore requested specialized agencies urgently to begin planning to supply technical assistance as soon as political situation stabilizes enough for them to be used. He observed this is first time UN has had to assist country where it had no government and whole UN program is going ahead without Govt of Congo approval in any clear-cut form. (SYG did not seem daunted by that and in fact appears intrigued by creative role thrust upon UN. He nevertheless carefully protects himself by consultations with other Africans, and, in differing degrees, with big powers.)

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1860. Confidential.

¹ July 16.

2. SYG said his approach in requesting troops had been first to issue general request for battalions to all independent African states (except, of course, South Africa). He said in reality he hoped avoid taking either Mali or Guinea forces at outset. He did not want Guinean troops for obvious reasons and if he took troops from Mali, he felt in politics of Africa he would have to take Guinean troops. SYG therefore relieved when Mali replied they could not supply troops before July 21 because of army reorganization now in progress. This, SYG felt, strengthened his hand in telling Sekou Toure he did not need Guinean troops since he already had as many as he could handle now, but he did need specialists, and therefore would like police company. (While SYG's reply to Guinea still being processed, he received formal Guinean offer of 2 battalions. However, he ordered his original reply to be sent as if formal offer had not come to his attention in time.)

SYG said he felt it imperative that he make clear to independent African states he considered they had main responsibility for UN's effort in Congo. In his view, this will stop in advance any argument that UN operation is disguised imperialism. At same time SYG said he is emphasizing to Africans that UN operation must have "universal" character and for that reason in his "second phase" (ourtel 107)² he is seeking recruit troops outside Africa.

3. Katanga. SYG said he hopes avoid problem of Katanga until "middle of week" by which time he believes UN will be in strong position in rest of Congo. He then intends to send emissary (not going through Leopoldville) to Tshombe to make arrangements for UN troops to go into Katanga. His general tactic will be that he will deal directly with Tshombe and by implication recognize his importance and at same time trade that recognition for permission have troops enter Katanga. Once UN forces successfully in Katanga, Tshombe's efforts secede likely lose their footing and Tshombe probably make overtures to GOC in Leopoldville to salvage some degree of authority for himself by collaborating with GOC. (SYG emphasized he does not wish UN action to have effect of artificially bolstering Lumumba who, SYG implied, not very strong and probably will not last.)

4. UN command. SYG said Moroccans sending General Kettani and Ethiopians also sending General. In order avoid question of command and rivalry among officers, he decided to select Von Horn³ as commander. (He said he may have to ask Swedish Govt for temporary promotion for Von Horn in order assure him sufficient rank in view other Generals present.) He said he thought there many advantages in

² Telegram 107 from USUN, July 17, reported Hammarskjöld's plans for recruiting the U.N. force in the Congo. (Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/7-1760)

³ Major General Carl C. Von Horn of Sweden had been serving as Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine. For his account of his service in the Congo, see *Soldiering for Peace*, pp. 140-252.

having neutral European as commanding officer, and he had received no complaint in any way from Africans on this score. (Von Horn's staff at start will also be "European," since this will be initial use to which TSO officers arriving with Von Horn to be put.)

5. SYG said Tunisia and Guinea have each offered to send "political advisers" to assist Congo Govt. He said while Tunisians might be all right, Guineans would be impossible, and he said he taking very strong line in saying "no" to all such offers.

6. SYG reported Sobolev (USSR) came to see him about Congo request for technical assistance. SYG said he considered it significant that Sobolev had done this since if Russians intended to respond to request, they would not have discussed question with SYG.

7. SYG reports that at this stage Bunche so over-worked he cannot personally continue with food distribution responsibility. Pate (UNICEF Director) and staff of six left Saturday night for Congo to take over responsibility for this operation on UN's behalf.

8. In answer our question regarding status plans for his trip to Africa, he said he thinking in terms direct flight to Leopoldville, soon as ONUC fully in place, for purposes personal check. Then 3 days in South Africa pursuant original trip plans. Return to NY via Leopoldville would give him second chance review operation on ground.

Lodge

132. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Leopoldville, July 18, 1960, 1 p.m.

133. Department pass UNSYG. Plane with General Alexander and Carlucci¹ of Embassy aboard together with refugees returned from Stanleyville 2030 17th. Alexander radioed me from plane asking me, Ralph Bunche and General Gheysen² meet him on arrival.

Bomboko and Kanza³ were with Bunche and asked for ride to airport expecting see Kasavubu and Lumumba. Just before departing

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1860. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris and Brussels.

¹ Second Secretary Frank C. Carlucci, III.

² General Roger A. Gheysen, Commander of Belgian metropolitan troops in the Congo.

³ Thomas Kanza, Minister Delegate from the Congo to the United Nations. For his account of these events, see *The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba*.

had message from plane that neither was aboard. At airport Alexander handed Bunche letter signed by Kasavubu and Lumumba, Embassy's translation of which follows in our telegram 139.⁴ I have thermofax copies original letter. Bomboko and Kanza seemed stunned by letter which Bunche showed them and he explained that UN has never before been served with ultimatum and does not accept ultimatums.

Alexander told us situation in Stanleyville tense but Force Publique has so far limited itself to roughing up Europeans and no known serious injuries or outrages in Orientale. In conversation with Lumumba some time after arriving in Stanleyville Alexander said former demanded all Belgian troops be out by Monday or could not vouch for actions of Force Publique. Alexander told him that was physically impossible. Following meeting Lumbala, Chef d'Etat of the Presidency, told Alexander UN was involved in imperialism and intentionally delaying sending in troops. After an hour Lumumba handed Alexander letter to Bunche. They decided remain Stanleyville and Alexander is sending transportation for them today.

Alexander feels Kasavubu not happy with direction being taken by Lumumba but seems to be weak and under latter's thumb. Alexander feels Lumumba is irrational and so does Bunche. I think at very least we are dealing with man who is temporarily irrational.

I talked at length with Bomboko and Kanza who said they would call Cabinet meeting to be held on arrival Kasavubu and Lumumba and would meanwhile line up Cabinet members they know or might persuade to go against any such ultimatum. Bomboko considers it illegal since it has neither Cabinet nor Parliamentary approval.

Timberlake

⁴ The letter, dated July 17, concluded: "If by July 19, 1960, the United Nations is unable to discharge the mission which we have entrusted to it, regretfully we may be obliged to call upon the Soviet Union to intervene." (Telegram 139 from Léopoldville, July 18; Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1860)

133. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, July 18, 1960, 8 p.m.

126. Re: Congo. In conversation this afternoon with me, Slim (Tunisia):

1. Urgently requested US insist that Belgians announce they are withdrawing their troops from Congo, at least on one-to-one basis as UN troops arrive.

2. He urged that I make statement in SC at Congo mtg that Belgian forces should be withdrawn speedily now that UN troops are arriving. He assumed I would not be able call for their withdrawal by a certain date.

3. Slim said Congo Deputy FonMin will be in New York Wednesday afternoon. Slim told Sobolev he was therefore requesting SC mtg, now scheduled Tuesday¹ afternoon at Soviet request, be put off until Wednesday afternoon. Slim said he asked Sobolev if Soviets intend send troops to Congo; Sobolev replied they would not send troops. Soviet objective is to establish date by which Belgian troops will have been withdrawn.

4. Slim urged that we not let Soviets take initiative. He realized we cannot go as far as Soviets demanding Belgian withdrawal by specific date, but believes we should openly favor speedy withdrawal.

5. Slim said he was very discouraged by continued rumors of new arrivals in Congo of Belgian troops. He said Congo is weakest area in Africa and it clear Soviets are concentrating on it. He urged we take above action soonest.

6. Believe our strategy of backing Slim has proved its prudence thus far. If we had not supported him last Wednesday there would undoubtedly have been Soviet veto and situation in Congo would be worse than it is. Recommend I be authorized to support his request and keep initiative in matter of so much meaning to Africa out of Soviet hands. Am confident too that speedy Belgian withdrawal is also in best interests of Belgians.

Lodge

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1860. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Tunis.

¹ July 19.

134. Memorandum of Conversation

July 19, 1960.

SUBJECT

Congo Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

M. Camille Gutt, Minister of State of Belgium

Ambassador Louis Scheyven, Belgian Ambassador

Mr. James K. Penfield, AF

Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, UNP

Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

M. Gutt thanked the Secretary for receiving him and said that he was here originally in connection with private business matters. However, he knew the Congo question would be raised with him so he had seen Foreign Minister Wigny before leaving Brussels. He said that M. Wigny had asked him to explain to the Secretary and to Mr. Hammarskjold the position of the Belgian Government on the Congo crisis. He said M. Wigny had also asked him to discuss this at length with the Belgian Ambassadors in New York and here. He said he could sum up M. Wigny's views on repercussions of the Congo situation in Belgium under three headings: first, the sentimental reaction in Belgium; second, the political reaction; and third, the military reaction.

In connection with the first factor M. Gutt said that everyone in Belgium from the King down was indignant regarding the shocking atrocities which had been committed by the Congolese. He said the reaction in Belgium was one of astonishment that the whole world did not share Belgium's indignation. He said the Belgian attitude on the entire question could be explained by the profound reaction against the events which had taken place.

Passing to the political repercussions M. Gutt said that whether or not the Soviets in fact prepared the disturbances in the Congo, they have exploited them extremely cleverly since they broke out. Soviet policy here was the same as everywhere, an effort to divide the West. Following the recent mutiny the Congolese Force Publique apparently was being Sovietized. The Soviet policy, which was being carried out by the Force Publique, was to create an atmosphere of fear and violence which would empty the Congo of its needed technicians and create a vacuum for the Soviets to move into. M. Gutt said that the present crisis far transcends a dispute between Belgium and the

Congo. This was in fact a crucial test between the Soviets and the West like the Korean crisis had been in its day. He said that Belgium was very much concerned and realized what was at stake. Central Africa had become an East-West battleground and the Belgian Government and people trusted that the United States would react as firmly as in the case of Korea.

M. Gutt touched briefly on the military aspects of the Congo crisis and then said that Foreign Minister Wigny hoped that there would be a U.S. declaration which would serve as a deterrent to the Soviets and would be in effect a hands off declaration covering Central Africa. M. Gutt said he did not know precisely how M. Wigny envisaged such a statement being made or how we would implement it but he thought that it was essential that the Soviets be made aware of the firm U.S. position on this subject.

Passing to the situation in New York, M. Gutt said that he hoped when the Congo question came up again in the Security Council, the United States would support the Belgian position. He described the Belgian military presence in the Congo as clearly to protect Belgian civilians. Belgian forces intervened only after the first horrors had been committed. They would clearly stay as long as necessary to restore order. When the UN has in fact restored law and order, the Belgian forces would withdraw but until that time it was impossible for them to do so. M. Gutt said he had conveyed the foregoing to Mr. Hammarskjold and Mr. Hammarskjold said that the UN troops could clearly not act in collaboration with the Belgian forces since the former received their orders from the United Nations. However, in fact, he said, satisfactory liaison existed. He repeated that the Belgian intervention was only to protect white residents of the Congo.

M. Gutt then said that the Belgian position also was to the effect that UN troops were there to restore order and therefore they should intervene only where there were disorders and not where peace and quiet already existed as in Katanga. There was a widespread need for UN forces throughout much of the Congo and therefore it would be unfortunate if they were to intervene in areas where Belgian forces were already assuring tranquillity.

The Secretary said that he would like to have M. Gutt's views on the UN presence in Katanga consisting of one or two UN representatives. M. Gutt said he had discussed this matter with Mr. Hammarskjold and believed that the Secretary-General did not wish to have UN troops in Katanga at the present time. He said Hammarskjold had mentioned to him confidentially this idea of having one or two UN civilians to constitute a presence in Katanga. He thought that this would be agreeable to the Belgian government.

M. Gutt continued saying he realized that what the Belgians wished us to do was not easy. However, he thought we should give serious consideration to their viewpoint because the external concerns of Belgium and the United States with regard to the Congo were identical and this had now become a focal point in the cold war. The Secretary then discussed UN procedures. He said he thought it would be most helpful if the Belgian Government could give further statements of amplification regarding troop withdrawals as order was restored in various parts of the Congo. He thought it would be particularly useful if this could occur in advance of the further UN discussion of this matter. M. Gutt said that he was sure the Belgian Government would reaffirm its willingness to withdraw forces as UN troops began to come into the Congo. The Secretary referred to an agreement between Mr. Bunche and the Belgian Commanding General in the Congo on this subject.¹ M. Gutt stressed that the Belgian Government's relations with Mr. Bunche have been excellent from the beginning. Ambassador Scheyven noted that certain Belgian units had already been removed from Leopoldville. M. Gutt thought that full implementation of the withdrawal policy could not be achieved at the moment since UN forces were too limited thus far.

The Secretary referred to the action of the Congolese parliament in rejecting the suggestion of Lumumba that there should be an appeal for Soviet assistance. M. Gutt said that Lumumba was pinning his actions vis-à-vis the Soviets on alleged failure of the UN effort. M. Gutt said that the Belgians hoped that the African Chiefs of State would call the attention of Lumumba to the fact that they had sent their own forces there and that these forces and not the Soviets should restore order in the Congo. He then said that in the Belgian view there was virtually no Congolese Government at the present time and merely two men running around, out of touch with the situation.

The Secretary said that he hoped the UN debate tomorrow would proceed satisfactorily. He noted that the Congolese were sending a representative over who was supposed to be a moderate. M. Gutt said that he was one of the few rather good men and was probably in disagreement with Lumumba. He said the Congolese Government had never been more than a conglomeration of disparate individuals and that these men were not capable of restoring order.

The Secretary then inquired as to approximately how many Belgians had left the Congo since the outbreak of disturbances there. The Belgian Ambassador and M. Gutt agreed that there had originally been

¹ Bunche reported this in a message of July 19 to Hammarskjöld; for text, see U.N. doc. S/4389/Add. 1, printed in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations*, vol. V: *Dag Hammarskjöld, 1960-1961* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975; hereafter cited as *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. V), pp. 38-39.

some 85,000 in the Congo and that probably there were now about 30 or 35,000 left. The Secretary assured M. Gutt that Ambassador Lodge would be prepared to make a strong statement regarding Soviet activities in the Congo. He thought we would be in a relatively good position if the Belgians would indicate their intentions with regard to phased withdrawals of their forces as the UN took over. The Secretary also said that we would stress that there should not be introduced into the Congo any troops other than those requested by the United Nations. M. Gutt stressed that the Belgians believe that UN troops should proceed primarily to areas where there are disorders. The Secretary said that the purpose of sending them indeed was precisely to restore order.

135. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Newport, Rhode Island, July 19, 1960, 3:15 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Herter, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Kohler, Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Hagerty, General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. Herter then went on to report on the situation in the Congo. He said the Defense Department has done a superb job in bringing in food, troops, communications, etc.¹ He showed the President a list of the UN troops that have been brought into the Congo, and those now coming in. The President said the speed of action was most impressive. He commented on the fact that no combat aircraft are apparently being brought in. Mr. Herter confirmed this, and said that the UN forces are there in a "peace preservation role." Secretary Herter said the carrier *Wasp* will be lying off shore beginning the same evening. It carries eight helicopters as well as other aircraft. In addition a fleet oiler will reach the Congo at the same time. Besides oil it is carrying medical and other supplies.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

¹ Documentation on this subject, Situation Reports prepared by the Operations Directorate Joint Staff for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is *ibid.*, Miscellaneous Records.

Mr. Herter said there had been a study of the legal aspects of our assistance.² The UN Participation Act of 1946 [1945]³ authorizes the President to provide aid short of combat troops on request of the UN. President Truman in 1951 delegated to the Secretary of State the authority to take action under this Act.⁴ Mr. Herter thought we should be reimbursed by the UN for part of our contribution, but felt we should furnish free of charge the transportation which we have been providing. He recommended seeking an appropriation from the Congress to defray these costs. The President appeared to agree with this.

Mr. Herter said the Congo question will be up in the Security Council again on Wednesday.⁵ There has been a request from the Soviets for a report by the Secretary General on this subject. The President commented that there might be some advantage in moving Belgian troops out of the Congo by our returning airlift. Mr. Herter said the Belgians do not want to leave until the UN provides security. He said they had worked out with Mr. Bunche agreements under which they will use their troops only to protect Belgians from violence. Mr. Herter said there had been one very recent untoward and, in fact, dangerous development. There is some evidence the Belgians are supporting the effort of the Katanga Province to achieve independence. He noted that the UN is supporting the Congo as an entity. He commented that the troops of the other African nations now in the Congo will be enraged if the Katanga Province is made independent, with Belgian collaboration. The President commented that if the Soviets tried to send in combat forces without a UN request, we should try to get Hammarskjold to say that no troops other than those requested by the United Nations will be allowed to come in. Mr. Herter commented that one measure of control that is being sought by the UN is to set up a staging area in Nigeria through which all incoming forces would have to pass. The President said he was concerned that the UN was getting into something that it could not bring to a conclusion, and asked where this operation would end in terms of the running

² Reference is to a memorandum of July 19 from Department of State Legal Adviser Eric H. Hager to the Secretary. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1960)

³ P.L. 264, approved December 20, 1945 (59 Stat. 619), as amended by P.L. 341, approved October 10, 1949 (63 Stat. 734).

⁴ Executive Order 10206, January 19, 1951, authorized the Secretary of State to request the Secretary of Defense to furnish assistance to the United Nations. (*Federal Register*, vol. 16, p. 529) Herter made the request in a letter of July 20 to Gates. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2060)

⁵ July 20.

of the country. Mr. Herter said that the UN is sending in technicians and administrative people to move into the government and help provide the administration of the country.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

G

136. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State

Brussels, July 19, 1960, 8 p.m.

258. While Deptel 147¹ addressed Leopoldville and problem dealing with Lumumba is Leopoldville's responsibility, Department and Leopoldville may wish consider following Embassy views based on numerous discussions with Belgians. Specific suggestions may be rapidly overtaken by fast-moving developments, but Embassy believes situation calls for urgent measures on various levels if even reasonable degree stability and Western entree into Congo to be salvaged from present anarchic situation.

1. Whatever circumstances and motivations may have led to present situation, Lumumba has now maneuvered himself into position of opposition to West, resistance to United Nations and increasing dependence on Soviet Union and on Congolese supporters (Kashamura,² Gizenga) who are pursuing Soviet's ends. Only prudent, therefore, to plan on basis that Lumumba government threatens our vital interests in Congo and Africa generally. A principal objective of our political and diplomatic action must therefore be to destroy Lumumba government as now constituted, but at same time we must find or develop another horse to back which would be acceptable in rest of Africa and defensible against Soviet political attack.

2. Lumumba's present strength (which may now be at lowest ebb) depends on:

(A) His "legitimacy" in eyes Congo and rest of Africa as duly appointed Prime Minister;

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1960. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville.

¹ Telegram 122 to Leopoldville, July 16, repeated to Brussels as telegram 147, stated that Lumumba's attitude concerning the Soviet Union and the United States appeared to be a "matter for serious concern" and requested the Embassy's views. (*Ibid.*, 770G.13/7-1660)

² Minister of Information Anicet Kashamura.

(B) His adroitness as a politician and propagandist, reinforced by Kashamura's control of Congolese Radio;

(C) His apparent dominance over Congolese Chamber (but not Senate) which helps protect him from legal coup d'état; and

(D) Fact Kasavubu has gone along with him and may really share his present viewpoint, especially because of presence Belgian troops.

His principal weakness is absence any instrument or structure through which to exercise power. Elimination Force Publique as effective instrument and massive departure White administrators serves Communist purposes, but from Lumumba's viewpoint these facts make it extremely difficult to establish his authority outside range his oratory.

3. Political action in support objective paragraph 1 must be internal and external, and might include following courses of action among others:

(A) Desirable that with minimum United States direct action, public image be created among politicians and people of Congo and leaders and populations of independent African states that Lumumba is witting or unwitting instrument of Soviet intervention in Central Africa, and will thus bring to Africa a new and worse form of White imperialism.

(B) Most immediate hope of dropping Lumumba would of course reside in his repudiation by Congolese Parliament which would eliminate his constitutional "legitimacy" and permit him retain power only by open coup d'état for which he may not have necessary naked force, especially in Leopoldville. Cannot judge from here whether someone now attempting such a maneuver or its chances of success, although appears Ileo is attempting to move Senate in that direction.

(C) Alternative or perhaps simultaneous approach would be seek to build up provincial governments as de facto authority, attempt have them adopt position of "no confidence" toward central government which would weaken Lumumba in face his political enemies, and then build back toward some central authority exclusive of Lumumba. Problem of Katanga is of course related and Embassy feels it should be dealt with within this conceptual framework of dealing with "de facto" provincial authority. We should not discourage Tshombe from building any relationship he can with other provinces leading toward "confederation", but should continue for now to discourage Katanga legal "independence" and any recognition of it in the international field.

(D) Parallel to internal action, United States and others should point out privately as appropriate to leaders neutral countries, especially African, fact Lumumba is serving Soviet ends as suggested above. In individual African countries point could be made that Lumumba appears be instrument which will bring Soviet bloc fully into "their continent", thus defeating dream of Nkrumah and others for creation of neutral pan-African bloc and causing inevitable clash of East and West on African continent which all have sought to prevent. For this purpose important persuade United Nations authorities and representatives see situation in Congo as we do, remembering that

Security Council has approved Congo membership³ but it not yet voted by General Assembly and therefore question of membership and credentials of Congo Government still unsettled.

4. We can claim no particular prescience—especially from this distance—re subsequent steps to facilitate creation stable, responsible and friendly Congo Government following possible discrediting or removal of Lumumba. Everything will depend on circumstances at time. Continue hope, however, that once removed from Lumumba's malignant influence, Kasavubu might well prove to be rallying point for more moderate and constructive elements. Our focus might well be directed at encouraging and strengthening constructive individual leaders and provincial governments and authorities without recognizing independent status of any, at least for time being, in hope that Kasavubu might eventually develop into centripetal force based on common interests of all provinces. As President, Kasavubu has constitutional tenure which Lumumba, as Prime Minister, lacks and weak as former has shown himself to be, he would seem to be best bet for immediate future.

5. Embassy realizes internal aspects of this problem are responsibility Embassy Leopoldville. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Brussels reporting separately some specific suggestions. Because of transcendent necessity for information and action during this fluid period, Embassy suggests Department may wish instruct posts in countries surrounding Congo (Brazzaville, Khartoum, Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Salisbury and Luanda) make every effort obtain all possible information on internal Congo situation from evacuees and local authorities to be fed into Department and led [*used?*] for guidance in possible courses of action to be adopted. Facade might be used in all surrounding countries of necessity visit border areas to check on problems of evacuees of American nationality. Further suggestion this connection re desirability immediately send American representative to Usumbura has already been put forward in Embtel 224⁴ to Department.

Burden

³ On July 7.

⁴ Telegram 224 from Brussels, July 18, recommended establishment of a consulate at Usumbura which could report on developments in the northern and eastern portions of the Congo. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.270G/7-1860)

137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

July 19, 1960, 9:27 p.m.

309. Following based on uncleared Memorandum of Conversation:

French Ambassador called on Merchant today to discuss coordination of positions prior SC Meeting on the Congo.

Alphand said there would undoubtedly be new attempt by Soviets at tomorrow's meeting to force immediate withdrawal Belgian forces. He said French position on this matter unchanged, i.e., if proved U.N. forces can assure order and protection lives, Belgian troops should withdraw. He said we should understand between us that this means withdraw to Congo bases, fate of which should be decided subsequently. On Katanga Alphand said French do not wish to recognize now but do not wish to close door. He said French were opposed to entry of U.N. forces into any area of Congo where no disorder existed and it would be unwise to send them in. He expressed approval SYG proposal send civilian emissary to Tshombe to head off his trip to Brussels and New York.

Merchant replied U.S. agreed in general and was opposed to precipitate withdrawal of Belgian forces before U.N. troops are in place. However we believed it would be helpful if there could at least be some symbolic withdrawal before SC Meeting. As regards bases Merchant pointed out situation highly confused since Belgian-Congolese Treaty never ratified.¹ He agreed however without prejudice to eventual settlement fate of bases, withdrawal of Belgian troops to them would be a logical first step. On Katanga Merchant said he felt we were in general but not complete agreement with French since consistent U.S. position has been to support unity of Congo. We had therefore replied to Tshombe's request for recognition that it was out of question now though we had not closed door. Merchant said he believed it would be great mistake if anyone should recognize Katanga now. He believed for time being emissary suggested by Hammarskjold should be sufficient to establish U.N. presence in Katanga but U.S. does not wish to prejudge now question of entry of U.N. forces. He

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-1960. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Ferguson and cleared by McBride and Executive Secretariat Deputy Director Walter J. Stoessel. Also sent to Brussels, London, and USUN, and pouched to Léopoldville.

¹ Reference is to a Treaty of Friendship signed at Léopoldville, June 29, 1960; for text, see *Congo 1960*, vol. I, pp. 313-314.

said we could visualize situation where such entry might be useful since strange situation might be created with U.N. successful in establishing order in five provinces, with sixth remaining policed exclusively by Belgians in absence of United Nations.

Alphand emphasized Belgians did not wish U.N. forces where there are no disorders but he agreed this was not urgent problem at moment.

Alphand expressed opinion Congo mutiny could be plot establish Soviet presence Central Africa, making tripartite consultation as well as consultation with Belgians of even greater importance than heretofore. Merchant replied circumstances suspicious but evidence was not conclusive. French also expressed concern presence Guinean troops in U.N. force, particularly Guinean police who they thought would be agitators, thus creating still another problem. In reply to Alphand's question whether U.S. anticipated Soviet military intervention, Merchant said U.S. would be extremely surprised.

Herter

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

July 20, 1960, 6:38 p.m.

92. Security Council Meeting on Congo. We assume Soviets will press hard at Security Council meeting tonight for withdrawal of forces within specified time limit (perhaps 72 hours as reported earlier). In view agreement between Bunche and Belgians providing for Belgian withdrawal from Leopoldville to its bases by Saturday,¹ we believe Council situation should be manageable. Department of course continues to believe that West would be in even stronger position if Belgians are able to go somewhat further than Bunche-Belgian agreement and state before Council meeting or at an early stage of SC meeting that "withdrawal of Belgian forces out of the Congo has begun". Alternatively, statement to the effect that "Belgium will begin withdrawal of its forces from the Congo by July 23, assuming the United Nations can assure the safety of Europeans and Africans by

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2060. Official Use Only; Niact. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Herter, Merchant, and McBride and with S/S; and approved by Wilcox. Repeated to Brussels, Léopoldville, and Paris.

¹ July 23.

then", might be more acceptable to Belgium though clearly not as effective in terms of situation confronting us in SC. You requested to continue to point out advantages of making such statement to Wigny and Belgian UN Representative. What we have in mind of course is merely a small token withdrawal from the Congo for symbolic purposes at the moment since we agree fully with Bunche assessment that UN is not yet in a position to assure protection both to Africans and Europeans, though it is our hope that UN will be able to do so by end of week, as indicated in Bunche announcement of yesterday.

In foregoing circumstances we would hope that Council proceedings can be concluded without need for any resolution and limited to receipt of SYG's report and such statements as Council members may wish to make. We realize, however, that odds are against this sort of a meeting and there is likely to be great deal of pressure for some kind of resolution. If it appears that Soviets will submit resolution calling for immediate withdrawal Belgian forces within 72 hours, you may wish consider at your discretion having LA's or possibly Tunisians preempt situation and submit resolution along following lines. This resolution would avoid any specific time limit but would provide appropriate basis for phased withdrawal of Belgian forces as rapidly as possible in light of UN take-over of responsibility for maintenance of public order in Congo. Moreover, third operative paragraph is designed to meet problem of Lumumba off-again-on-again requests to Soviets and Bandung powers to intervene directly.² Resolution follows:

Verbatim Text.

The Security Council,

Noting with satisfaction the report of the Secretary General regarding the steps which have been taken in implementation of Security Council resolution S/4387 of 13 July 1960,³

Noting also that the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Leopoldville area has begun, and is scheduled to be completed by July 23,

[*Noting* further the statement of the Government of Belgium that withdrawal of its forces from the Congo has begun]⁴

1. *Urges* the SYG to continue his efforts to carry out SC resolution S/4387.

² The Congolese Cabinet issued a statement on July 19 appealing for assistance from the Soviet Union or the Afro-Asian bloc; for text, see *Congo 1960*, vol. II, pp. 610-611.

³ See footnote 2, Document 124.

⁴ Brackets in the source text.

2. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops as provided for in SC resolution 4387 as soon as possible.⁵

3. *Requests* all states to refrain from any actions which will make the carrying out of resolutions S/4387 of July 13 and this resolution more difficult, and in particular to refrain from introduction of any troops other than those requested by the Secretary General pursuant to the Security Council resolution of July 13.

4. *Requests* the SYG to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

End Verbatim Text.

We assume that you will concert closely with SYG on this matter in first instance as well as other SC members.

Herter

⁵ According to a memorandum prepared in the Secretary's office of a telephone conversation between Herter and Wilcox at 1:05 p.m. that afternoon, Wilcox said Merchant wanted to remove language from the draft resolution which, like the previous resolution, called upon the Belgians to "withdraw their troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo." Wilcox said he thought this would cause trouble "both in getting someone to peddle this and also in the ensuing discussions because the language difference will be noticed." Herter suggested "withdrawal as contemplated in the previous resolution." Wilcox was not sure this would be acceptable but agreed to try it. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

139. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, July 21, 1960, 3 a.m.

166. Re: Congo. Lodge requested appointment with Kanza (Congo) during course of morning July 20. Because of meetings with Afro-Asians and SYG and lunching with Ghanaians, Kanza had no time to see individual delegates until afternoon. We met with him and his two associates at 2:30 in our small offices in UN.

Lodge welcomed him, informed him our desire he go to Washington for conversations in Dept of State and offered him any possible assistance in our capacity as host govt. Kanza expressed appreciation these offers. He said unfortunately he expected return to Congo at beginning of week and would have remain in NY during interim. He

planned return NY beginning of Sept in preparation for establishing Congo Mission to UN and for GA. He hoped take advantage of invitation come to State Dept at that time.

Kanza is young, serious and intelligent African who impressed us, and others, favorably. He is soft-spoken, mild-mannered and poised. He obviously comprehends fact this is historic moment for his country, full of vital decisions for them to make. He seemed neither daunted nor overwhelmed by this but, rather, confident of capacity his people and their country to face future.

Substance of Kanza's conversation was in essence same as his statement before SC later in evening which is available elsewhere.¹ He spoke of Congo desire to maintain friendly and close relations with Belgium but at same time could not help taking note of obstacles which Belgium seemed be placing in their way. He suggested one way Belgians could have improved and might still improve relationships would be have person other than van den Bosch as Amb. His closeness to situation somehow prevented comprehension of new realities and change might have salutary effect.

After receipt Deptel 92,² Lodge made appointment with FonMin Wigny in order present views contained therein, as conveyed Belgian Amb Wash and by US Amb Brussels. Wigny too was shuttled from meeting to meeting and Lodge saw him only after SYG did, just before SC began.

Wigny presented his case to us in fol terms: As Belgium sees it. there are three issues involved. First is conflict over withdrawal of troops. Belgium stands ready to withdraw all its forces of intervention in Congo soon as law and order, etc. re-established. Wigny prepared state to us their willingness withdraw all Belgian troops. However, Wigny said, they interpreted establishment of law and order as applying not only to absence of civil disorder but restoration of public services and technical facilities. In this connection Wigny expressed concern lest UN be unable assure such situation and "technicians of Czech nationality and other Communist satellites" flow in at Moscow's bid to overrun Congo.

Second issue for Belgians was question of bases which Wigny regarded as important not for Belgium herself but for entire Western world. He said they could serve as bastion of freedom in heart of Africa if they remain in Belgian hands and at disposition of West. In other hands they could be turned against free world. This did not mean Belgium insisted on retaining control of these bases forever. Wigny referred to provisions of Treaty of Friendship signed June 29 between Congo and Belgium, which provided among other things for

¹ For the record of the meeting, see U.N. doc. S/PV.877.

² Document 138.

possibility of disposition these bases by turning them over to Congo. However, Wigny felt this was matter which could only be dealt with sensibly in fullness of time. Therefore SC, and UN forces, must not take decisions or actions which would prejudice situation re bases.

Third point related to Katanga. Belgian Govt had not changed its position that Katanga was part of Congo. It made no sense to think of Katanga, which had 90 percent of wealth of entire country, as independent with rest of Congo down the drain. Nevertheless in Katanga there was an order of stability and Belgian forces were present there at request of local authorities where they were maintaining law and order. To introduce UN troops into Katanga could only cause problem and tend to exaggerate otherwise relatively satisfactory situation. Therefore while not wishing exclude possibility of secession, Wigny said he felt whole issue should be held in suspense, and not prejudged by calling for UN troops to go there.

In response to Lodge's presentation of views in Deptel 92, Wigny said these points were completely consistent with Belgian policy.

Lodge

140. Memorandum of Discussion at the 452d Meeting of the National Security Council

July 21, 1960, 9 a.m.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-3. Secretary of State Herter presided at the meeting.]

4. U.S. Policy Toward the Congo (NSC 6001; NSC Action No. 2262)¹

[Here follows Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles' briefing on unrelated subjects.]

Turning to the Congo, Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a person who was a Castro or worse. CIA had been studying his background; we know that he has received a large payment from Egypt. We believe that he is in the pay of the Soviets either directly or through the UAR. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson on July 21.

¹ NSC 6001 is printed as Document 22; regarding NSC Action No. 2262, see footnote 9, Document 126.

The USSR is apparently attempting to use Egypt as a spearhead in the Congo and in Africa generally. If they manage to do so, it will give them another lever in Africa. The fact that the port of Matadi was now held by UN troops would be helpful to the general situation in the Congo. Mr. Dulles went on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he characterized as "harrowing". In 1956 Lumumba had been convicted of embezzling 100,000 francs and had received a two-year jail term. There were strong Leftist and Communist trends in his background. He had attended a Communist youth meeting in 1959. Lumumba has clearly been promised assistance by the Communist Party of Belgium. We do not know how much assistance they are giving but it is clear that the Belgian Communist Party is being used as a channel. It is safe to go on the assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Communists; this also, however, fits with his own orientation. Secretary Herter noted that the first man off the first Soviet plane to arrive in the Congo, which was bringing sugar to the Congo, was a member of a Soviet trade mission.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. Gray asked Secretary Herter whether he wished to say anything about the situation in the Congo. In response Secretary Herter read off figures as to the numbers and nationality of the UN forces that were being provided for the Congo. The Secretary General had asked for a force of 7500-odd. The UN force in the Congo as of six o'clock the night before totalled 3300. By Thursday night² it would total 4485 and the expected grand total would be approximately 11,000. Secretary Herter said that his hat was off to the U.S. Air Force for its splendid work in lifting these forces into the Congo so quickly. General Twining stated that the principal problem was the route problem rather than the lack of aircraft. There were limits to the numbers of aircraft that terminals could take and that a given route could carry. The UN would like more airlift and if we were satisfied they could use it over the existing route we would provide it. But we might have to delay the airlift somewhat because of route problems. In any event, the military would keep State informed of what it planned to do. Secretary Herter, again expressing his admiration for the work of the Air Force, pointed out that the first shipment of food had been landed within 24 hours and the first forces within 48. General Twining noted that the aircraft carrier *Wasp* was now in the area.³ He said that it had no fighting planes aboard. Secretary Herter said that he thought that the *Wasp* did have fighting planes on it but General Twining assured

² July 21.

³ Telegram 205 to Léopoldville, July 20, informed the Embassy that the *Wasp* had been ordered to "stay out of sight of land and do not operate aircraft over land or territorial waters Congo unless otherwise instructed American Ambassador Leopoldville or CINCLANTFLT." (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.5811/7-2060)

him that it did not; that it carried food, medical supplies, etc; and that this was entirely a relief operation. Mr. Gray pointed out that the OCB on Wednesday had talked about the possibility of increasing the U.S. visibility and credit for the magnificent job that had been done.⁴ It was possible that the Secretary General might make some kind of statement. We seldom get credit for what we do.

Secretary Mueller⁵ inquired as to whether all Belgians were being removed. Secretary Herter said that that was the big issue. The Belgians refused to leave their bases in the Congo. They had concluded a treaty with the Congo before independence which had not yet been ratified by either side. It provided for withdrawal of Belgian forces except in two areas. The Belgians are willing to make a phased withdrawal from the rest of the Congo. This whole problem was complicated by the secession of Katanga. Secretary Herter noted that there was a report that Katanga would unite with Kivu and Ruanda-Urundi. He also noted an item received that morning indicating that some of the Belgian forces were being withdrawn to Ruanda-Urundi which is a UN mandate territory.

Mr. Gray inquired as to how the cost of the U.S. operation was to be met; whether it would be necessary to ask Congress for supplemental funds for the initial operation and for continuing expenses. Secretary Herter stated that under the UN Participation Act of 1945, the President has broad authority, implementation of which was delegated to the Secretary of State in 1951. The Act provides for automatic reimbursement for expenses incurred in such an operation without special authorization by Congress. The arrangement for the present operation was that the U.S. would contribute the transport and the 400 tons of food. Any additional U.S. expenditures—for example, for helicopters and rations—were on a reimbursable basis. If food were again required in large quantities, we would have to look at the problem. ICA had some leeway but a problem existed because Congressionally-approved interim arrangements on funds did not permit the undertaking of new projects. It was the view of the State Department General Counsel, however, that provision of additional food would be a relief activity and that such activities did not constitute new projects. Mr. Staats indicated that this was also the Budget view. Secretary Gates then inquired as to who would reimburse the U.S. Secretary Herter said that the UN would do so and that Hammarskjold had decided to handle the expenses as a regular budget item rather than on a voluntary contribution basis. Secretary Gates inquired as to whether we had

⁴ A record of the meeting on July 20 is *ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, OCB Preliminary Notes.

⁵ Secretary of Commerce Frederick H. Mueller.

been reimbursed by the UN in the past. Secretary Herter assured him that we had operated under the same sort of arrangement in Palestine and that we had been reimbursed at that time.

Mr. Gray then stated that it was probably not reasonable to suppose that the Soviets would actually send troops to the Congo—even if they had a clear request to do so which they apparently did not have at present. He wondered what we would do, however, if they did send troops. In response Secretary Herter said he would like to obtain the views of the military as to the Soviet logistics problem in any such operation. We refueled our planes now in Rome, Cairo, and Morocco. Their problem, however, would be greater. Also there was the problem of movement in the Congo. Matadi was now in UN hands. Would the Russians lay siege to it? In response General Twining stated that the JCS had produced a paper dealing with this subject which contained proposed actions to forestall or to impede the introduction of Soviet forces and other actions to deal with the situation if they did get in or are about to get in.⁶ He would like, he said, to send this paper to the State Department. He noted that the Secretary of Defense had not yet approved it however. Secretary Herter asked how the Russians would get into the Congo. General Twining said that they would get in by air; this would involve overflights of other African areas. Secretary Herter asked whether they would refuel in Cairo. Secretary Gates noted that two of the Soviet planes that had already come into the Congo had come non-stop from the USSR. General Twining stated that the JCS paper contained proposed courses of action for dealing with different situations; for example, an embargo on arms, a blockade, and action to get other countries to agree not to let the Soviets overfly them. Mr. Dulles inquired whether airfields in the Congo would take the TU-114; if so, the Russians would be able to fly in non-stop. General Twining said that there was only one field that could take such aircraft—the field at Leopoldville. But, he said, most of the Soviet equipment for carrying troops consisted of small, short-range aircraft. They would therefore be subject to route and range limitations. General Twining then described a possible Soviet routing from Odessa via, among other stops, Khartoum and Stanleyville. He concluded by stating that we should look at this problem now in order to see if there were not things which should be done in advance.

Secretary Herter then referred to the meeting of the UN Security Council the night before and stated that we hoped that there would be no resolution other than one which would simply accept the Secretary General's report. The Russians had called the meeting to hear the Secretary General's report, but either they or the Tunisians would file a resolution requesting immediate Belgian withdrawal. We favor

⁶ Document 145.

phased withdrawal but there were two sticky points. One was the matter of the Belgian demand that they be permitted to stay in their two so-called bases in the Congo and the other was the question of Katanga.

Secretary Gates, referring to Mr. Dulles' comments on the orientation of Lumumba, said he understood there were indications—besides evidence that Lumumba had been bought off—that recent developments in the Congo were Communist-inspired. For example, interviews with missionaries seemed to indicate that persons had been sent to the tribes in advance of independence with instructions. The revolt appeared to have been synchronized. It was important, Secretary Gates felt, to step up our efforts to prove that the revolt was Communist-inspired. Mr. Dulles agreed. He stated that we had interviewed the missionaries. Lumumba may have sent out instructions and these instructions may have been under a Communist directive. The insurrection had been simultaneous in many areas and it was therefore difficult to find any other explanation. The Czech Consulate had been the center of Communist intrigue in the Congo since 1955 or 1956. There was evidence that orders had come from a central point. Mr. Dulles said we were working very hard to establish the facts.

The National Security Council:

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 2 and 3; there was no paragraph 1.]

4. Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in the Congo, with specific reference to:

a. The number and nationality of UN troops which are being provided for the Congo.

b. The desirability of calling world-wide attention to the magnificent contribution of the U.S. Air Force in transporting UN troops and food to the Congo.

c. Arrangements for funding U.S. activities related to the Congo, including both U.S. contributions and reimbursable assistance to the United Nations.

d. Consideration to be given by the Departments of State and Defense to a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding possible courses of action which might be taken to preclude the entry of Soviet forces into the Congo or in the event that such entry is imminent or occurs.⁷

Robert H. Johnson

⁷ Paragraph 4 constitutes NSC Action No. 2270, approved by the President on July 25. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

141. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Herter opened a news conference on July 21 by reading a statement on the situation in the Congo. He charged that Soviet threats of intervention in the Congo were "recklessly irresponsible" and declared that the United States would "continue to back with all its moral force and material resources the action of the United Nations to restore peace and order." The text of the statement is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 536-537.

The Secretary then read a statement replying to a Soviet statement of July 19 protesting the presence of 20 U.S. military personnel in Léopoldville. He stated that the U.S. personnel were not part of the U.N. force in the Congo but were engaged, with U.N. approval, in assisting with the airlift of U.N. supplies, food, troops, and equipment and that they would remain in Léopoldville only as long as U.S. assistance in the airlift was required. The Soviet statement had been made on July 19 in Moscow by Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to Chargé Edward L. Freers. The U.S. statement was made formally on July 21 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard H. Davis to Soviet Chargé Mikhail N. Smirnovsky. The texts of both are *ibid.*, pages 531 and 537-538, respectively. For the complete transcript of the Secretary's new conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1960, pages 205-209.

142. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)

July 21, 1960, 6:45 p.m.¹

Mr. Merchant telephoned with regard to a conversation he had just had with Ambassador Burden requesting approval as a result of Burden's talk with Timberlake on two items: 1) authorization to use US Airforce aircraft to ferry Belgian troops from Leopoldville to their base at Kitona. Mr. Merchant said Lumumba has given his approval

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Prepared by the Secretary's staff, this document also includes memoranda of some of his other telephone conversations that day.

¹ The Secretary was in New York; Merchant was in Washington.

and Bunche has talked to Timberlake, who has determined that it is feasible. The Secretary approved if it is done at the request of the UN. 2) Lumumba wants to fly to NY to address the SC and Timberlake and Bunche both feel it is important he arrive on an American aircraft, either Pan American or military. Mr. Merchant said he, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Penfield had discussed this and feel there is nothing in it for us and it would be more to our advantage if he came by Soviet plane. The Secretary agreed we should not facilitate Lumumba travel; that if he can get his own seat on a Pan American plane without US Government intervention with PanAm that is all right. The Secretary said we should take the line that we have no authority to do anything about commercial airlines, and that to make it possible on anything else would make us not be doing our UN job in getting troops airlifted into the Congo. Mr. Merchant said he would call Amb. Burden back and advise him of the decisions.

143. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

July 21, 1960, 8:47 p.m.

129. Eyes only Principal Officer. Department aware that declaration independence Katanga, Tshombe refusal admit UN troops and presence Belgian troops Katanga pose complex policy problem. Adverse reaction African states including present Congo Government, to Belgian presence in Katanga inevitable and will become stronger if Belgian troops remain for some time. It also likely that Congo, divested of principal source income, could ultimately represent for USG, UN and others much greater funding and development problem after present unrest has been settled. Against this must be balanced advantage of maintaining pro-Western orientation of at least part of Congo and protection of its industries. At very least, denial of Katanga assets to Soviet influence through Communist-oriented central government extremely important. Much depends on eventual political outcome of UN intervention, and character of Congo leadership which might emerge during intervention and after withdrawal of Belgian and UN troops. Department sees as distinct possibility emergence of sev-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2160. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Woodruff; cleared by Sisco, McBride, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ivan B. White; and approved by Merchant. Sent to 15 embassies and 7 consulates in Africa and to Brussels, Paris, and USUN.

eral regional centers of political strength, each dominated by local leaders with tribal backing and perhaps linked in loose federal structure with few important powers left for central government. The relationship of Katanga to such possible federation and role of Belgian influence in it is obscure at moment. In any case Dept continues opposed any fragmentation of Congo and continues to hope that with UN military and technical assistance, degree of economic recovery can be initiated and government stabilized thus precluding definitive independence Katanga.

Department hopes that visible Belgian political and military presence in Katanga can be minimized. However, US should avoid giving impression it fostering extinction Belgian interests there or attempting supplant those interests. Such position on part US would undoubtedly seriously offend Belgians as well as other metropolitan powers, which probably would support Belgium's desire salvage what it can in Katanga. This could cause serious split among NATO powers. Recognize also that question independent Katanga closely linked in Belgian minds with future status enormous Belgian mining interests and Kamina base, which Belgians will strive hard to retain.

Dept hopes that, if Katanga is to continue as independent, reliable local security force with African officers can be trained and African administrators worked into posts with real responsibility. UN technical assistance in these fields would ensure such training would in fact be carried out and would remove some of stigma Katanga independence from viewpoint African states. In any case Tshombe's blatant opposition to UN not helpful anyone now. It may be possible present these points to GOB officials, Katanga Government and SYG UN at later date.

Meantime Department suggests that public statements on Katanga question be limited to position that (1) at present time we do not recognize Katanga, (2) issue quite complex and receiving close study by USG, and (3) US recognizes Congo Government and hopes stable, unified Congo Government can be developed once present crisis over.

To assist Department, views of addressee posts are solicited on all aspects this problem.¹ In addition Brussels and Congo posts are asked to report as information available on character of Tshombe, whether he apt show any independence of Belgian advisors, likelihood African opposition to secession, nature of possible role for Jason Sendwe as opposition leader, plans for disposition of Belgian troops in Katanga and pressures from Belgian industrial interests.

Herter

¹ See Documents 146 and 150. Additional responses to this telegram are in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00 and 655.70G/7-2360.

144. Editorial Note

The U.N. Security Council continued its discussion of the crisis in the Congo at its 878th meeting on July 21 and its 879th meeting, July 21-22. At the former, Tunisian Representative Mongi Slim introduced draft Resolution S/4404, cosponsored by Ceylon, which, after minor amendments by its sponsors, was unanimously adopted by the Council on July 22 as Resolution S/4405. It called upon Belgium to "implement speedily" the Security Council's July 14 resolution on the withdrawal of its troops and authorized the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect, and it requested all states to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the Congo Government's exercise of its authority or which might undermine the Congo's territorial integrity and political independence. For text, see U.N. doc. S/4405; for the records of the meetings, see U.N. docs. S/PV.878 and 879. The text of the resolution is also printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 538-539; text of a statement made by Lodge is printed *ibid.*, pages 532-535.

145. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Gates

JCSM-321-60

July 22, 1960.

SUBJECT

Possible U.S. Courses of Action Relative to the Contingency of Unilateral Sino-Soviet Bloc Military Intervention in the Republic of the Congo (S)

1. Officials of the Republic of the Congo have indicated an inclination to invite Soviet military intervention in the present unstable internal security situation in the Republic of the Congo, if the government of Belgium fails immediately to withdraw its military forces from the area. USSR has asserted its readiness to respond favorably to such an invitation. Such action on the part of the Republic of the Congo and the Soviet Union is inconsistent with the Resolution of the Security

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5920 & 6001. Secret; Special Limited Distribution. Enclosure to a memorandum from Lay to the NSC, dated July 29. The Department of Defense sent a copy to the Secretary of State on July 23. (*Ibid.*, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Congo)

Council of the United Nations relating to providing U.N. military forces to restore order in the Congo. The Soviet Union voted affirmatively on this resolution.

2. The introduction of Sino-Soviet Bloc military forces into the Congo may in effect militate against the effectiveness of U.N. forces now being provided to restore order, could give rise to serious conflict with Belgian forces present in the area, and could result in Soviet domination of the Republic of the Congo thereby facilitating the spread of Communism among African states.

3. There is urgent need for the United States to seize the initiative and create circumstances which tend to forestall a Soviet decision to intervene in the Congo, and, in the event they, nonetheless, should elect to do so, create circumstances which will embarrass them and frustrate their aims.

4. Soviet military intervention in the Congo poses great practical difficulties for the Soviets. Essentially they are limited to airlifting forces into the area or sealifting them. The former is the most expeditious means but the latter is the most feasible. There are general measures that the United States can undertake to aggravate the Soviet problem and consequences of their action as well as certain specific measures which tend to forestall the possible success of either an airlift or a sealift. Moreover, there are measures that the United States should take in the event of a Soviet attempt to intervene or if actual intervention by them becomes a fact.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:

a. To forestall or impede the successful introduction of Sino-Soviet Bloc military elements into the Congo the following courses of action should be considered by the United States:

(1) *General:*

(a) Acknowledging the fact that the aggregate troop level of Belgian forces now in the Congo and U.N. forces now present or enroute, is adequate to restore order and that further Belgian reinforcement or the introduction of other non-U.N. sponsored foreign military forces will only further aggravate the situation, recommend the United Nations urgently now declare a blockade to preclude the introduction of further non-U.N. sponsored military forces.

(b) Foster general and especially U.N. objection to the further introduction of non-U.N. sponsored military forces into the Congo. Cause the United Nations to exhort the Soviet Union to restrain themselves from interference in the Congo situation.

(c) In order to ease tensions and forestall complication of the task of the U.N. forces recommend the United Nations now declare an arms embargo to the Republic of the Congo for a period to be determined.

(d) Encourage the United Nations to operate and administer immediately river and harbor facilities and pipeline in the lower Congo using Western technicians. Such action could be vital to prevent Soviet bloc technicians from gaining control of this vital and only entrance to the Congo from the sea.

(2) To forestall a successful airlift:

(a) Bring pressure on countries which might be subject to overflight, through the United Nations and directly, to both deny overflight authority and, if feasible, militarily oppose such overflight if undertaken.

(b) Bring pressure, through the United Nations and directly, on nations along possible air routes to deny air staging facilities and POL support to all elements of a Soviet military airlift.

(c) Cause the United Nations to close all Congo airports to elements of a Soviet airlift.

(d) Make representations to the United Nations to cause their military elements in the Congo to plan, organize, and be ready to physically obstruct all suitable landing fields in the Congo from Soviet use by passively blocking runways.

(3) To forestall a successful sealift:

(a) Implement the measure cited in subparagraph 5a(1)(a) relative to establishing a U.N. blockade.

(b) Make representation to the United Nations to plan, organize, and be ready to physically restrict ship passage into the mouth of lower Congo.

6. In the event that Sino-Soviet Bloc military intervention in the Congo is attempted or becomes a fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the United States should:

a. Make strong representation in the United Nations against such Sino-Soviet action as being contrary to the previous resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council and further as being unilateral imperialistic interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo.

b. Unilaterally with the Belgians and within the United Nations and NATO, encourage the Belgians to expedite the withdrawal of all their military forces from the Congo.

c. In addition to United Nations actions, effective or otherwise, the United States must be prepared at any time to take appropriate military action as necessary to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo. Multilateral action would be preferable but unilateral action may be necessary. In the present Soviet belligerent mood, the USSR could estimate that the United States would not oppose them. We must be prepared to oppose and defeat them. In order to prevent their making such a rash move, they must be made to understand that we will not tolerate a Soviet military takeover of the Congo.

d. After the Sino-Soviet military forces have intervened in the Congo take action within the United Nations to insist that the Sino-Soviet forces withdraw from the Congo immediately after internal order has been secured; thereafter internal security in the Congo can be maintained as long as necessary by the U.N. forces.

e. Directly and through the United Nations bring pressure to bear on the Republic of the Congo to recognize that early re-establishment of a viable republic requires restoration of world confidence through whole-hearted cooperation with the United Nations and that the presence of non-United Nations sponsored military forces in the area militates against this objective. Therefore, the Republic of the Congo should request the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arleigh Burke²

Chief of Naval Operations

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

146. Telegram From the Consulate at Elisabethville to the Department of State

Elisabethville, July 23, 1960, 9 a.m.

19. Reference: Circular 129¹ and Contel 13.² In considering problem as set forth in circular telegram, consulate wonders at omission from argument of primary preoccupation Katanga leaders, namely prospect Soviet Union might intervene in Congo if Katanga becomes independent and turn area into major east-west battleground. While post believes this remote possibility, it is nevertheless credited by leaders Katanga Government and Belgian forces as being one important deterrent to recognition by western powers.

Leaving aside this consideration, consulate believes cardinal issue is Department's appraisal of Lumumba and probable course his regime will take. If he were overthrown as result present chaotic situation

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2360. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only.

¹ Document 143.

² Telegram 13, July 20, reported that the European community in Katanga intended to run the province from behind the scenes with Tshombe's consent and to transfer the head offices of all important Congo firms from Léopoldville to Katanga. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2060)

Congo, I believe western powers, perhaps with aid of UN, could bring Tshombe into agreement on loose confederation Congo provinces under presidency Kasavubu or another moderate leader. Katanga could retain trappings of statehood while surrendering much of the substance. However, if Lumumba remains as Premier, believe Tshombe and Conakat have gone too far in opposing him to fit into any scheme where Lumumba has ultimate control of army.

Utter disorganization Congo at this point leads me to conclude strong central government can be established only if Lumumba able set up ruthless authoritarian regime and impose rule of force on provinces. If Lumumba succeeds in dominating Katanga, any promise rapid economic recovery and prospect political liberalism in this area would be sacrificed in interest maintaining what are basically artificial Colonial frontiers. If he fails in this, Katanga probably destined to drift away from Leopoldville in any event.

Foremost argument for Katanga independence is likelihood that a moderate government located in this strategic region of Africa will maintain pro-western orientation. Effect on NATO alliance of preservation Belgian interests here also important, although I believe GOB conscious of headaches inherent in remaining here and is primarily concerned with redeeming national honor by securing area of influence for Belgian interests and residents who appear completely washed up in remainder of Congo.

Weaknesses Katanga regime are evident. Tshombe and ministers incapable governing now and appear willing front for white technicians until they can learn art of statecraft. Sooner or later African population will demand changes in this arrangement but meanwhile European business interests may have worked out satisfactory accommodation with emerging leaders. Another weakness is poor quality of majority of white settlers backing Tshombe, which may have been major consideration in hesitation important Belgian economic interests to espouse cause of separatists. Finally, heavy leaning by Katanga on Belgium might even totally embarrass latter and even involve Belgian troops in incidents with other Congo provinces.

While opposition within Katanga to independence exists and may be expected increase, it appears inarticulate for moment for reasons given in reference Contel.² Although no public announcement yet made, Jason Sendwe and his lieutenants reported willing (but obvi-

² Telegram 13 reported that Tshombe's support had increased due to the disorganization of the opposition, the absence of Jason Sendwe, who represented Elisabethville in the Congo Chamber of Representatives, and the lack of clear alternatives for Katanga. It predicted, however, that a strong reaction would set in against the concept of an "independent Katanga serving interests western business in central Africa."

ously not eager) join Tshombe Government. Belgian brigade officers strongly desire remain here and now occupy 18 strategic centers with some 1,800 troops.

If Department believes Lumumba regime likely become Communist, Katanga offers golden opportunity for US. If it believes some good can result from its support of Lumumba's authority, then sacrifice of Katanga's interests might be justified on ground of greatest good for greatest number Congolese. However, I think it important we have clear understanding of objectives for which we are willing to sacrifice Katanga.

Canup

147. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, July 25, 1960, 1 a.m.

210. Re: Congo.

1. Lumumba arrived Idlewild Sunday¹ morning and was met by UN reps of African countries except Morocco and Sudan, plus Roberts,² escort officer assigned by Dept, plus USUN officer.

2. We are trying to get decision from Lumumba re his visiting Washington and will report as soon as we get information. From speaking to various members of party, we believe Lumumba does not have much idea of what he wants to do during trip nor when he wants to do it. His party was pulled together at last minute and came with no advance preparation (and no money). We believe US will have to take charge of arrangements for Lumumba starting about Tuesday morning. We understand UN SYG planning to spend Monday and Tuesday laying out UNGA program. Since this may be too dull to hold Lumumba for two solid days, believe he will start looking for things to do about Tuesday, if not earlier. In any event, Tuesday night SYG will be through with Lumumba. Beyond that, Secretariat has no plans for him.

3. Originally we had impression UN SYG going to act as host during visit, this changed Saturday afternoon. At airport and during

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.11/7-2560. Confidential; Priority.

¹ July 24.

² Owen W. Roberts, former Consul at Léopoldville.

day Sunday Ghana and Guinea took charge de facto. Quaison-Sackey³ (Ghana) and Barnes⁴ (Liberia) were first to greet Lumumba at airport and stayed closest to him during very brief reception and press conference. Marof (Guinea) also much in evidence and acted as interpreter during press conference. Lunch Sunday took place at Ghana Embassy Residence, New Rochelle. Only part of party went, others stayed behind at Barclay Hotel and rested. At 4 p.m. Lumumba and selected advisors had meeting with SYG; after meeting much picture taking and press conference.

4. Saturday afternoon Cordier (Secretariat) implied Secretariat would take charge of Lumumba and party during their New York visit. Cordier said he had told Richard Patterson (N.Y. official hospitality) that no NY hospitality required. Little later Wieschhoff⁵ (Secretariat) gave very different impression. He said SYG, through Bunche, had tried to discourage Lumumba from coming; SYG's attitude now was that Lumumba had decided to make himself "available" for discussions. Wieschhoff said Secretariat had no idea how long Lumumba would stay, whom he wished to see or where he wished to go. Secretariat "assumed" Lumumba would want to go to Washington.

5. Kanza Saturday went to see SYG after having heard Lumumba definitely coming. Kanza did not have any precise information on Lumumba's plans or hopes, but did have exploratory talk with SYG as to what Lumumba might do at UN. SYG tried to plant idea with Kanza that Lumumba should return to Leopoldville and be there when SYG visits. However, Wieschhoff doubted this feasible since to do this he would have to leave Wednesday night and Wieschhoff had impression Lumumba intended to stay one week.

6. Kanza told SYG he hoped Lumumba might have opportunity to address SC but SYG discouraged that and instead suggested SC lunch Monday to which African UN reps would also be invited. That would provide opportunity for Lumumba to talk with SC members informally (lunch now officially announced and invitations sent). As already reported, Kanza also suggested to SYG that State Department should assign someone to accompany Lumumba all during trip and be able to give him counsel as to whom he should see as well as provide channel to US Government.

7. Following our talk with Wieschhoff Saturday, and our getting report on Kanza-SYG meeting, we telephoned Ferguson, AF, and suggested Dept be prepared to step in and take over planning of Lumumba's visit to US. Otherwise there would be little planning or

³ Alex Quaison-Sackey, Ghana's Representative at the United Nations.

⁴ Nathan Barnes, Liberia's Representative at the United Nations.

⁵ Heinrich Wieschhoff.

arrangements and visit could become shambles or, worse still, might be taken over by people who would not act in interests of US foreign policy.

8. Saturday Dadzie (Ghana) called to say he hoped arrangement could be made for Lumumba to visit President Eisenhower while in US. We gave Dadzie no encouragement but agreed to report his suggestion. Sunday morning at airport, Quaison-Sackey again urged arrangement be made for visit to President. Lumumba party carrying (a) carved ivory lamp and (b) wooden statue which they say for presentation to "someone" if meeting takes place. We believe they may hope give presents to President. Congolese themselves have not yet themselves mentioned wish to see President.

9. Re Detwiler,⁶ Cordier (Secretariat) says Barnes (Liberia) plans to tell Lumumba about Detwiler's activities in Liberia which Cordier understands were not at all satisfactory to Liberia.

Lodge

⁶ American promoter Edgar Detwiler had signed an agreement with Lumumba providing for development of aspects of the Congo economy by the Congo International Management Corporation (CIMCO). The agreement required approval by the Congo legislature.

148. Editorial Note

At the 453d meeting of the National Security Council, held at Newport on July 25, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Marion W. Boggs, July 28, reads as follows:

"The situation in the Congo, Mr. Dulles continued, had been temporarily eased. Half of the 12,000 man UN force had arrived on the scene and reinforcements were coming in hourly. The Belgian troops had pulled back to two Congo bases everywhere except in Katanga. The Prime Minister of Katanga having failed to secure recognition of his province as an independent state, was now proposing a loose federation of Katanga and other adjacent provinces. Katanga was the richest part of the Congo, supplying two-thirds of the Congo's mineral production. Mr. McCone said we no longer considered the Congo an important source of uranium for the U.S.

"Continuing, Mr. Dulles noted that the Congo needs technicians and administrators but does not want white technicians. Accordingly, the Congo may approach the other African Governments with a re-

quest for technicians even though these other governments have no technicians or administrators to spare. The President said perhaps an FEPC (Fair Employment Practices Commission) was needed in the Congo. Mr. Dulles said unemployment and a shortage of food had created a serious situation in the Congo. Another serious problem was Lumumba himself, who had been described by Ralph Bunche as 'crazy.' It had been reported that Lumumba would visit the USSR after completing his visit to the U.S. and Canada. Mr. Dulles said that a Russian mission to the Congo conferred with Lumumba, after which Lumumba withdrew his threat to request the intervention of Soviet troops in the Congo. Mr. Dulles believed that it was a reasonable inference that the USSR had felt it was getting too involved in the Congo and had induced Lumumba to abandon his idea of calling for Soviet forces.

"Secretary Herter said it was difficult to understand why Lumumba was in the U.S. He had not asked to come to Washington. He arrived in New York without any funds and without anyone knowing who was responsible for providing him with funds. It was not known what he had to do after being entertained by the UN at lunch today. Lumumba had said he was coming to the U.S. to obtain technical assistance. Secretary Herter thought that if he stayed away from the Congo long enough, he would find he had no government when he returned. Secretary Anderson said if it was to our advantage to keep Lumumba away from the Congo, then we ought to arrange for him to stay in the U.S. for awhile. The President said that we might provide Lumumba with a three weeks tour of the U.S. on a modest basis.

"Mr. Dulles said he was worried about the Detwiler activities in the Congo. Detwiler has a reputation of beginning many things but of not finishing anything. Secretary Gates said Detwiler was a fabulous promoter who has not really promoted anything. Mr. Gray said it had been reported that Mr. Max Rabb was associated with Detwiler. Secretary Herter said he had checked on this report and discovered that Mr. Rabb had never answered Detwiler's letter. Secretary Gates said Detwiler was a notorious name-dropper. Mr. Allen remarked that Detwiler, however, some eight years ago obtained a contract for an iron ore concession in Liberia. This concession is now operative with U.S. and Swedish money. Apparently one Detwiler project actually became operative. Mr. Dulles said the Detwiler operations in the Congo would arouse the antagonism of the French, who will say that the U.S. is in Africa for the purpose of obtaining concessions. Mr. Gray said that Secretary Herter's checking on Mr. Rabb's association with Detwiler showed that not all the persons mentioned in the press as Detwiler's supporters are actually behind him." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

149. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to Secretary of State Herter

July 25, 1960.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: Communist Influence in the Congo

Direct Communist involvement in the Congo disorders has been suggested or implied by a number of sources, both official and private. While the army mutiny responsible for the disorders may have had some central organization or leadership, we have no evidence, beyond rumors, that would link the mutiny to a Communist plot. While we do not doubt that the Soviet Bloc will continue to attempt to exploit the disorders in the Congo, we have no substantial or convincing proof of direct Communist involvement with the possible exception of one incident. This is a report that a Belgian known to be a Communist was arrested in the Katanga for broadcasting false radio messages to confuse local Belgian Army units.

The Communists do not have an efficient and well-established apparatus in the Congo that would permit them to manipulate existing forces, judging from available intelligence. They were effectively excluded from the Congo throughout virtually the whole period of Belgian colonial administration and thus were not able to recruit and build up local Communist Party organizations.

[3½ lines of source text not declassified] the following picture of limited Communist assets emerges:

1. diffuse good will of many radical nationalist leaders attributable to the active moral support received during recent months from the Bloc and from the Belgian Communist Party (BCP);

2. personal contacts that several important Congolese politicians have made with BCP officials and, to a lesser extent, with Bloc officials during the course of short pre-independence trips to Moscow and satellite capitals (two of these politicians—Antoine Gizenga and Anicet Kashamura—hold top positions in the Lumumba Government, but we doubt that they are subservient to the Bloc or could be counted upon to follow Communist directives);

3. closer working arrangements developed during the last year with two Congolese leaders of the second rank [4½ lines of source text not declassified];

4. possibly, a small group of informers built up during recent months by the Czech Consul in Leopoldville [3½ lines of source text not declassified].

Despite charges by the Belgians and his Congolese opponents that Lumumba is a Communist or Communist sympathizer, we have nothing to substantiate this allegation. The most accurate summary of his views is probably his own declaration of July 5, 1960, "We are not Communists, Catholics, or Socialists. We are African nationalists. We reserve the right to be friendly with anybody we like according to the principles of positive neutrality."

150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, July 26, 1960, 7 p.m.

259. Re Deptel circular 129.¹ Embassy agrees that if forced make any statements at this time Department should limit itself to continued support unity of Congo and UN effort.² However, in view present highly fluid situation in Congo and many complex problems Department should during present crisis attempt reserve its public judgment.

1. Lumumba is an opportunist and not a Communist. His final decision as to which camp he will eventually belong will not be made by him but rather will be imposed upon him by outside forces. Lumumba, who from very beginning has stood for unity of Congo, would be sorely tempted have recourse to Russia or bloc countries if we or Belgians were to recognize Katanga and thus help bring about fragmentation of Congo. Such a move by Belgians would also fly in face UN policy with predictable reaction other African countries. Indeed same reaction can be expected if Belgians refuse admit UN troops or fail get theirs out after UN arrival. *Comment:* UN, There are unconfirmed reports that Belgians, if forced to give way to UN, will evacuate every Belgian citizen and movable piece property. US journalists returning today from Elisabethville report an Algerian type *colon* atmosphere that may well be already beyond control of GOB moderates.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2660. Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Brussels and Elisabethville.

¹ Document 143.

² Telegram 178 from USUN, July 22, reported Bunche's suggestion, passed on by Hammarskjöld, for a U.S. statement supporting Congolese unity. The Department replied in telegram 119 to USUN, July 22, that it did not consider such a statement appropriate at that time, although it did not rule out the possibility. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2260)

2. Historically, Katanga has resented power which former Government General and now GOC has and is wielding from Leopoldville. Province has always believed it supporting rest of Congo by making major contributions to country's revenue. In political sphere, Tshombe appears believe sincerely Lumumba to be dominated by Communists and by desire become dictator. It is most unlikely he would ever place himself or Katanga under Lumumba's authority.

3. There has been increasing talk particularly among anti-Lumumba politicians regarding creation separate states in various parts of Congo including Bas-Congo, Equateur, Kasai and Kivu, not to mention Katanga, which would substitute present authority Central Government with loose confederation. Now that Government General has been abolished and base of power of GOC has, with collapse Force Publique, almost totally disappeared, force for unifying country has been seriously impaired. In fact, most effective force left to bring about unity of Congo appears to be UN. Embassy firmly believes we should continue support action and developing policy of UN in Congo.

4. Fact that few days ago Jason Sendwe's appointment as official representative (Commissaire d'Etat au Katanga) of Central Government in Katanga was approved by Senate and in view of his many public statements opposition secession, one must assume that he will continue oppose independence of Katanga and support position of Lumumba.

McIlvaine

151. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, July 26, 1960, midnight.

235. Re Congo. Lodge called on Lumumba (Congo PM) this morning¹ at his hotel at latter's request. He began by outlining US attitude toward Congo as stated both in SC and in private talks with Belgians. Lumumba replied by describing pre-independence hopes for Belgian cooperation and assistance. Instead, he said, Belgium had left

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2660. Confidential; Priority.

¹ July 26.

Congolese (a) without treasury, gold having been taken to Brussels just prior to independence and (b) with insufficient trained Congolese to run country.

As to atrocities of which Belgians have complained in Security Council, he said entire police and court system was in Belgian hands even after independence, there being only one Congolese lawyer in entire country, and yet no Belgian had ever formally brought charges against Congolese for molesting women or other alleged atrocities. They had refused try use regular means which they themselves administered. Lumumba said he had ordered strict enforcement of the laws to protect all, but his orders had not been carried out by Belgian officials.

Lumumba said Belgians had long taught them there no difference fundamentally between Russians and Americans since both would come to Congo to exploit it. However, he said Congolese had great faith in America; its missionaries had done good work and Congolese people had great faith in our willingness help.

Lumumba added Belgians had tried make Congo "island" isolated from its neighbors.

Lumumba said Congolese financial position desperate. There not even enough money to pay salaries of government officials. He referred again to fact Belgians had shifted all reserves to Brussels. Lumumba and Kanza (Congo) both expressed hope US could provide loan urgently to assist them during present critical period. Lumumba referred to experience of Guinea in which French had suddenly ended all assistance with result that Guinea had face problems in any way it could. He saw parallel in Congo experiences with Belgians.

Lumumba reiterated faith in UN SYG and emphasized Congo problems could not be dealt with effectively until Belgian troops leave.

Lumumba seemed pleased when Lodge told him USG would welcome him in Washington and would make all arrangements for his visit there.

Referring to contract he had signed with Detwiler, Lumumba showed Lodge carbon of letter dated July 11 in which Detwiler said State Department knows of his (Detwiler's) endeavors and had instructed Embassy Leopoldville cooperate with him. Lumumba said Detwiler also showed Congolese two letters from State Department officials (Kanza promised make copies of these available). From this Lumumba said he concluded Detwiler had State Department support.

Lodge explained to Lumumba there were all kinds of Americans, good and bad, and suggested Lumumba talk with Ambassador Timberlake when he wished find out our official attitude toward individual Americans.

Following conversation Lodge talked with Secretary,² recommended Lumumba be received at highest levels in Washington and that Department make complete arrangements for his visit beginning tomorrow.

Lodge

² A memorandum of this conversation, dated July 26, prepared in the Secretary's office, reads in part as follows:

"Lodge said Lumumba is certainly not crazy; that he wasn't getting anywhere so he threatened to call in the Chinese Communists which put the necessary heat on the U.N. to get quick action. Lodge says he knows exactly what he is doing and the only question is whether he can stay in office. Lodge said Lumumba is not a bad man to deal with; that he is a little flighty and erratic in some respects; but he knows exactly what he is doing." Lodge also stated that he found Lumumba "interesting and on the whole encouraging" and that if the Secretary gave him a little time, it could pay "big dividends." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

152. Memorandum of Conversation

July 27, 1960.

SUBJECT

Conversation Between the Secretary and Prime Minister Lumumba of The Republic of The Congo¹

PARTICIPANTS

<i>United States</i> The Secretary The Under Secretary Mr. James K. Penfield, Acting Assistant Secretary, AF Mr. C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., Director, AFS	<i>Congo</i> Prime Minister Lumumba Mr. Kasongo, President of the Chamber of Deputies Mr. Kiwewe, Min. of State, Ministry of For. Commerce Mr. Okito, Vice President of the Senate
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The Secretary opened the conversation by telling Mr. Lumumba that it was a pleasure to have him here and by thanking him for the kind statement he had made at the airport.² The Secretary added that

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Ferguson and approved by Herter. The drafting date on the source text is August 2. Charles Sedgwick of the Division of Language Services served as interpreter. His notes of the meeting, which he sent to Ferguson on July 29, are *ibid.*, AF/AFW Files: Lot 63 D 148, Memoranda to AFW—1960.

¹ Lumumba visited Washington, July 27–29.

² The texts of the statements made by Herter and Lumumba at the welcoming ceremony at the airport on July 27 are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 15, 1960, p. 245.

he would be glad to discuss any problems confronting the government of the Congo.

The Prime Minister replied by expressing the emotion which he and all members of his delegation had felt in response to the welcome afforded them at the airport. This gave them, he said, the impression that the United States recognized the Congo on the same footing as any other sovereign state and that among the various difficulties the Congo faces, they know that they will find the aid they desire from the United States. He said that the people of the Congo have enormous confidence in the United States even in the most remote villages, and they know that the United States is anti-colonialist. The Prime Minister went on to say that the struggling of the Congolese had been only against a particular regime and that all who struggle for liberation are treated like bandits. The colonizers are able to present their version of the anti-colonial stories in the international press, leaving the other side silent. He remarked that the Congo can only build its independence with the help of the civilized world but that in so doing should be careful to ask themselves exactly what the aims are of the various countries offering assistance. He said that the Congo must be vigilant in consolidating its independence.

Mr. Lumumba went on to say that the first condition of the Congo is for peace and order. If there is permanent political unrest, no one will have confidence in the country and the foreign capital the Congolese need and want will stay away. In this connection the Prime Minister said that his Government would provide all guarantees necessary for the security of foreign investments. The Prime Minister pointed out that with independence there had been a complete break with Belgium insofar as the latter's handling of Congolese affairs was concerned and the Congo could not accept any arrangement whereby they would deal with third countries through intermediaries. He said that the Congolese must learn to run things themselves.

Turning to the recent troubles in the Congo, Mr. Lumumba pointed out that Article Six of the Treaty of Friendship signed between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo gave the Belgians the right to intervene only if specifically requested to do so by the Congolese Government. He said no request was ever made. He then described the events leading up to the revolt of the Force Publique, pointing out that after the Round Table conference the Executive College, which was set up as a temporary government, tried to have a plan approved to Africanize the army, but that this was rejected three times by General Janssens. He said when he became Prime Minister he also assumed the Portfolio of Minister of Defense, with General Janssens subject to his orders. He told the General to obtain some African officers, but the General baldly refused, telling the army there would be no change. In the days following independence, the Force Publique

thereupon revolted. The Prime Minister said that he and Chief of State Kasavubu studied the situation in order to seek its cause. They then toured the country trying to calm the army down.

The Prime Minister then went on to describe the serious emotional impact on the Congolese population when Belgium intervened with armed forces. He said that the Congolese population in many areas panicked under the impression that the Belgian troops were going to kill them. He said that many Belgian civil servants had fled needlessly from the country and that the reports of atrocities by the Force Publique were largely Belgian propaganda. Since there were no Congolese magistrates or lawyers, Mr. Lumumba said he asked the Belgian magistrates to bring all guilty persons to trial and to punish them, his aim being to protect everyone whether white or black. The magistrates, however, held no trials and condemned no one, although soldiers were placed at their disposal. The Prime Minister denied that there had been any molestation of white women.

The Prime Minister then remarked that the populace remained very excited and that Congolese soldiers were being killed daily. He said that he had called for calm and decided to appeal to the United Nations. Belgium, however, he said, still refuses to withdraw her troops although requested to do so by the Security Council and both houses of the Congolese Parliament. He said the situation had been aggravated by a letter from the Belgian Ambassador in Leopoldville³ to the effect that there would be no withdrawal of Belgian troops until such time as the United Nations had the situation in hand and that the United States, which stands for liberty and independence, was supporting Belgium in her desire to maintain her troops in the Congo, contrary to the wishes of the Security Council. Mr. Lumumba said that on receipt of this letter he and Mr. Kasavubu decided to study the situation and that if the United States did not wish to help, they would appeal to the United Nations, to the Soviet Union, and to any other country that would. He said that the Congolese Government had explained its position accordingly. Mr. Lumumba then said, in order to dissipate these misunderstandings he decided to go to the United States and establish contact with the Department. He then said that he subsequently learned from the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the statement in the Belgian letter had been incorrect and that the Security Council, including the United States, had voted unanimously to request the withdrawal of Belgian troops. Mr. Lumumba then read the letter in question, giving the Belgian interpretation of the Security Council resolution as permitting them to remain

³ According to Sedgwick's notes, the letter was dated July 14.

as long as 3 to 6 months. He said that if the United States had, in fact, supported this position, there would have been a rupture between it and the Congo.

The Prime Minister then went on to say there is in the Congo a glad feeling of friendship for Belgium and that there is no wish to break these ties. The Congolese, he said, wish the Belgians to know that they have everything to gain and nothing to lose by continuing this friendship. He added, however, that the continued killing of Congolese soldiers by Belgians makes the situation extremely difficult and the Congo still might be forced to appeal to all outside powers for assistance. Mr. Lumumba said that 5 minutes after the Belgian troops leave, order will be restored. He maintained that the secession of Katanga does not represent the will of the people of that territory and that Tshombe is being used as a Belgian tool. The Congo, he said, with its 6 provinces, forms a single state and is so recognized by all countries, including the United States. Tshombe is simply an instrument of the Belgians, and there is no Katanga state, according to the Prime Minister. Mr. Lumumba added that if Belgian troops remain in the Congo, there may be general riots. He said that if the United Nations does not provide satisfaction, the United States or some other country will have to help. He added that there is no further danger to any Belgian citizens and no reason, therefore, why the Belgian troops cannot be withdrawn.

The Prime Minister said that he desired the immediate restoration of order so that the capital may flow in in order to enable the country to carry out its plan of industrialization. He said it is his aim to seek a flow of American capital and technicians of all kinds so that the Congo, which has great natural resources, may be able to develop them. He pointed out that Belgium had impounded the Congo's gold reserves and refused to permit the transfer of the seat of the Banque Centrale from Brussels to Leopoldville. He said the Congolese could not understand, and it appears that their entire patrimony has been confiscated by Belgium. As a result, the Government has no money of [with] which to pay its officials and workers; there is unemployment; a great shortage of doctors, etc. He said that absence of technicians created a serious situation. The Prime Minister said that the Belgian Government is doing everything in its power to devalue the Congolese franc and that he planned, therefore, to have conversations with the International Bank and [International] Monetary Fund. He will ask these agencies to send fiscal and customs experts and probably persons to control river traffic.

The Prime Minister said that he did not wish the Congo to emerge from a colonial status only to fall under the domination of some other form of dictatorship or ideological influence. We are, he said, Africans and wish to remain so and [with] our policy being one of positive

neutralism. He remarked that he knew that the Congo had a friend in the United States because it, too, struggled to obtain its independence. He said that he sincerely wanted the United States to help. The Congo, he said, does not wish to be exploited and that if any conditions are attached to assistance it will not be accepted. He said that the United States needs Congolese resources such as uranium, and the Congo needs American products. He said he hoped the United States would use its influence with the Belgian Government [so] that the latter might understand that its actions are contrary to its own best interests and contrary to the interests of the West in general. He said that Belgium is trying to foster animosity between the Congo and the United States, even though the Congo desires reconciliation with Belgium.

For all of these reasons, the Prime Minister said, it is essential that Belgian troops leave the Congo, and he earnestly solicited United States assistance in persuading the Belgians to do so.⁴

The Secretary replied that he appreciated the Prime Minister's frankness, and he hoped he could talk of the role the United States could play in assisting the Congo. He pointed out that following the Security Council's resolution,⁵ the United States volunteered all possible assistance to the Secretary-General, although making it clear that troops should be from small nations, particularly African. The United States is, however, the Secretary said, providing every logistical support at the express request of the Secretary-General. He added the United States did not plan to inject itself into the situation except where agreeable to the Secretary-General. The Secretary stated that he understood the Secretary-General was currently studying the Congo's requirements and that Mr. Dillon has talked with him on this subject.

Mr. Dillon said that he had talked with the Secretary-General the day before, explaining that the United States was prepared to give the Congo full support through the United Nations during the emergency period while the United Nations remains responsible. He said that Mr. Hammarskjold had told him that the United Nations was going to take the responsibility for some time, not only for technical assistance but also for such financial aid as might be necessary. He reported that the Secretary-General felt that it might be better to channel all aid through the United Nations so that there would be one central group aware of our problems. Mr. Dillon said that he agreed with this and that he told the Secretary-General that the United States would be prepared to extend assistance at his request.

⁴ According to Sedgwick's notes, Lumumba asked the United States to mediate between Belgium and the Congo. He also specified that the Belgian troops should leave immediately.

⁵ Of July 14.

Prime Minister Lumumba expressed his appreciation for the above remarks and said he believed that there remained only a few questions of detail to be worked out with the Secretary-General. He repeated, however, the urgent financial requirements of the Congolese Government in order to meet current obligations and payrolls. He said he was optimistic about the future of his country since it is inherently rich, with the emergency being only of a temporary nature. He said that he wished to express his sincere gratitude, as well as that of the Chief of State of the Congo, who will be very happy when they learn of these discussions. Mr. Lumumba reiterated his concern over the status of the Congolese franc, and he said again that he would discuss it with the IMF.

The Secretary then said that he understood that Mr. Hammarskjold was asking a high-ranking member of his staff who was a specialist in IBRD and IMF matters, to go to Leopoldville to advise the Government of the Congo on this subject. Mr. Lumumba replied that perhaps if this were the case it would not be necessary for him to see the Fund in Washington. Mr. Dillon answered by saying that he believed it would still be most advisable that the Prime Minister establish contacts with both the Fund and the Bank.⁶

The Prime Minister then said he hoped to obtain an official loan from the United States, as well as private loans, during his visit. Mr. Dillon expressed his feeling that during the present period of emergency, with the United Nations willing to take the responsibility for improving the situation, the United States believed it would be more helpful if it operated through the Secretary-General. This would not, he said, be the case beyond the period of which the United Nations was willing to maintain responsibility and that at a later date it would be practical for the two countries to have direct financial relations. For the time being, however, Mr. Dillon said, the United States Government funds would be available through the United Nations. He said this was not, of course, the case with respect to loans from private sources.

Mr. Dillon then said that he wished to raise the question of the American businessman, Mr. Detwiler, who had signed a contract with the Congolese Government, claiming the moral support of the State Department. Mr. Dillon said that he wished to point out that this man had no connection with the United States Government and no access to the United States Government funds. He said that he wished to make this very clear and suggested that the Prime Minister make any

⁶ Lumumba met with Eugene R. Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, on July 28. A memorandum of a telephone conversation between Black and Herter on that date prior to the meeting, discussing the Congo's financial situation, is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

inquiries he wanted to in this country concerning Mr. Detwiler's ability to carry out his commitments. Mr. Dillon went on to say that there was one matter in which the United States could be of direct assistance outside of the United Nations, namely through the 300 scholarships which had been offered on the occasion of the Congo's independence. He said that he thought these scholarships would be helpful in beginning a substantial program of technical cooperation.

The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the above and said that the Detwiler affair had been a complete misunderstanding. He said that the Congolese Government has not concluded any agreement with Mr. Detwiler and that any such agreement will require the approval of both the Administerial Commission [*Council of Ministers?*] and the Congolese Parliament. He said that Detwiler would never set foot in the Congo again.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of the INGA project, pointing out that all the necessary technical studies had been completed and the file submitted by Belgium to the IBRD. After independence the Belgians had proposed that the two governments share the project, but the Government of the Congo had refused, saying they would deal directly with the Bank, as was their sovereign right. He said that he wished the work on the INGA project to begin at once, since it is vital to the Congolese economy. Through it, he said, unemployment could be eliminated, the labor force put to work and the country's resources developed. He therefore wished to ask the United States Government or private sources of financing, to give assistance as soon as possible. Mr. Dillon replied that the United States Government had known about the project in a general way, since the IBRD is interested. He said that the United States has encouraged the Bank to study the project and to be prepared to assist. He said that he believed that the Bank thought the project a good one. He pointed out, however, that the Bank only makes loans to members and it would be advisable, therefore, for the Congo to join the Bank. To do so, he pointed out, they must also join the Fund.

The Prime Minister said that he believed that he had now touched on all problems of particular concern to him but wished to repeat his request for United States intervention to effect a withdrawal of Belgian troops. The Secretary replied that the Department is in contact with Mr. Hammarskjold and that our understanding of the situation is the same as his. He said that the United States realized the difficulties of the situation and would do what it could to be of assistance. The Secretary added that he understood that the Secretary-General was trying to be of assistance in meeting the August 1 payroll of the Congolese Government. He said that Mr. Dillon had been discussing this matter with United Nations officials and that he hoped that their discussions would bear fruit.

The Prime Minister then said that there was one thing which he had forgotten to mention, namely civil aviation. He said that Sabena is already operating in the Congo, the Belgian company in which there has been considerable Congolese participation. He said that the suggestion has been made that the corporate stock of Sabena be modified, but that the Government of the Congo prefers the creation of its own national airline. He asked the advice of the Department on this matter which he described as very urgent. The Prime Minister then stressed his own need for a small aircraft for himself and the Chief of State.

Mr. Dillon replied that the United States would be happy to study with the appropriate United Nations agencies the best way to solve the airline question. He pointed out the United States has assisted other countries in developing their civil aviation, such as Ethiopia. He said that he was sure that something could be done. With respect to the small aircraft for the Government, Mr. Dillon said he would be glad to look into it. The Secretary pointed out that the United States had placed at the disposal of the United Nations several small military aircraft without pilots. Mr. Dillon suggested that the Prime Minister discuss this matter with Dr. Bunche on his return to Leopoldville, to see if one of these aircraft might not be made available.

Mr. Lumumba returned to the general situation by saying that it is not up to any foreign country to make charges. The Congo is the only one entitled to make charges if they are justified. Referring to charges made by the Soviet Union, he said he did not suspect the intentions of the United States. If he did so, he should not have gone to this country but gone elsewhere.

The Secretary said he appreciated all of the Prime Minister's remarks and was sorry that the President could not be in Washington during the time of the Prime Minister's visit. He wished to assure him, however, of our willingness to assist him to see anyone in Washington or elsewhere in the United States, if the Congolese delegation so desired. The Prime Minister replied that he had been wondering if he might not pay his respects to the President and also to the Vice President and Senator Kennedy. The Secretary said that, unfortunately, he did not know what the President's itinerary was but that he would discuss this matter with other officials of the Department. He said it would be impossible to make an appointment at that time but the matter could be re-examined when the Prime Minister's travel plans became definite.⁷

⁷ According to a memorandum of a conversation between Ferguson and Basompierre on July 28, Ferguson said that Lumumba had made a good impression on U.S. officials in that he appeared intelligent and there was no evidence that he was "crazy." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.70G/7-2860)

153. Memorandum of Conversation

July 28, 1960.

SUBJECT

Congo

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Louis Scheyven, Belgian Embassy

Mr. C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., AFS

Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

Ambassador Scheyven said that he had been instructed to call to express the amazement of the Belgian Government at the reception which Lumumba had received in Washington. He said the official invitation extended to Lumumba, the fact that he stayed in Blair House and the honors which he had received had all made a great and very painful impression on the Belgian Government and the Belgian people. He said the Belgian Government thought that the US had made a choice in favor of the viewpoint of Mr. Lumumba as against that of the Belgians. He said the big reception which the Congolese leader had received here would strengthen his position in the Congo and would weaken that of Belgium as well as that of anti-Lumumba forces in the Congo.

Ambassador Scheyven said that the Belgian Government had also been pained to see that on the first Security Council vote in the UN the United States had voted in favor of the resolution presented and had not abstained as had the British and the French. He said there had been a lack of support for Belgium in the UN by the United States. He said that the Belgian Government was very distressed at the events of yesterday in connection with the reception of Lumumba. He said he thought the reaction was somewhat similar to that which would occur in the United States if the Belgian Government were to invite Fidel Castro to visit Brussels and accord him a great reception. He repeated that there had been a strong and unfavorable reaction in Belgium to the reception of Lumumba in Washington. In this context he said that

On September 2, 1975, Dillon testified before the Senate Select Committee To Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities that Lumumba had given the impression that he was "just not a rational being", that he was "impossible to deal with", and that as a consequence, the U.S. attitude "sharpened very considerably". See Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, Senate Report No. 94-465, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1975; hereafter cited as Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Interim Report*), p. 53.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/7-2860. Secret. Drafted by McBride. Approved in S on August 1.

Belgium had remained firmly loyal to the United States and a devoted ally. In the past there had not been any problems between Belgium and the United States. Belgium had wished to limit political consultation in the Community of Six in order to avoid there being any creation of a bloc position against the United States. Similarly the Belgians had sought to have the Sixes and Sevens problem evolve in a way that would not be unfavorable to US interests.

The Secretary in replying said that we had of course heard more or less the same thing from Belgium directly with regard to Belgian reactions to the Lumumba visit to Washington.¹ He said he was sorry that yesterday's events had caused so much trouble in Belgium. He said that on July 26 we had sought to explain the problem which the Lumumba visit posed for us.² He said any other reception of Lumumba would have been a refusal of normal courtesies. There was a protocol problem involved for us. However, we regretted the very bad effect which our reception of Lumumba had had in Belgium and he hoped it would be realized that the position we had taken was mandatory for us. The Secretary noted that we had not selected Lumumba as Prime Minister of the Congo but had inherited him along with independence. In the light of the circumstances we felt we had no choice in the way we had received him. However, the Secretary did wish to express regret and indicate that we were fully conscious of all the things which the Ambassador had said regarding Belgian-American friendship. He said that we had not intended to give the impression we were choosing up sides against Belgium on Congolese issues.

The Secretary continued saying he did not believe that Mr. Lumumba had been very happy with his talks here. He said that the U.S. had taken the line that we would not proffer any aid independently but would operate through the UN insofar as Congo aid was concerned. Our posture was to operate through and at the request of the UN. The Secretary said he had talked with Mr. Green, the Minister of External Affairs in Ottawa,³ and Mr. Green had agreed to take the same line when he saw Lumumba later in the week.

¹ Burden termed the U.S. reception of Lumumba "catastrophic" in a July 27 telephone conversation with Herter, in which he urged that a message be sent to Hammarskjöld suggesting that he delay sending U.N. troops into Katanga and into the Belgian bases in the Congo. He told Herter that the Belgians knew the United States had not sent such a message although the British and French had done so. (Memorandum of telephone conversation prepared in the Secretary's office; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

² Penfield informed Ambassador Scheyven of the plans for Lumumba's visit in a conversation on July 26 in which Scheyven conveyed Belgian concern over issues relating to the withdrawal of Belgian troops. (Memorandum of conversation by Chadbourn; Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2660)

³ On July 28. According to a memorandum of telephone conversation prepared in the Secretary's office, Herter told Green that "we felt Lumumba may be on a shopping expedition in which he might try to play us off against the Soviets" and that channelling

Ambassador Scheyven next inquired as to what our position was on the outstanding issues of the Belgian bases and the Katanga. The Ambassador said that the Belgian talks with Hammarskjold in Brussels had been unsatisfactory. He referred to previous conversations with the Secretary and said he thought that previously there had been agreement that there was no urgency in sending troops to Katanga where order prevailed. He added that if UN troops were to go to Katanga now there would be a renewed flight of Belgian technicians, who had returned to the area, to Rhodesia. Ambassador Scheyven said that he hoped we still shared Belgian views on this point and would so inform Hammarskjold. He noted Hammarskjold had said he thought it was necessary to send troops to Katanga. In this event Belgian forces would be obliged to withdraw. Therefore he thought that we needed to buy time on this issue, particularly since Tshombe appears to have altered his own position. Ambassador Scheyven stated that Belgium had originally believed a unitary government was desirable for the Congo but was not sure that this was any longer possible. The Belgian position continued strongly in favor of collaboration with the Congolese and Belgium still wished to do what it could in the technical field. Therefore it was essential to have some time to arrange evacuation of the bases. Belgium hoped that her allies would tell Hammarskjold now that he should not force the issue of the evacuation of the bases or the Katanga problem.

Ambassador Scheyven continued, saying that the Belgians realized they would have to evacuate the bases eventually since their treaty only called for them to remain if the Congolese wished and it was quite clear that Lumumba now wished them to depart. He said Belgium would be ready to withdraw when the time was ripe but that if the issue were forced now Belgian technicians would leave the Congo even though the Belgian Government wished them to remain and had indeed ordered many back to their jobs in order to assist with the maintenance of the Congolese economy. He said he thought the job of replacing all of the Belgian technicians and civil servants in the Congo was too great for the UN. If the UN were to enter Katanga and force the Belgians out of their bases the result would be chaos, he concluded.

Ambassador Scheyven asked again if the United States agreed with this position and would use its influence with Hammarskjold to this end. It was the Belgian impression that Hammarskjold's position had hardened recently and that the trend of his thinking is to force the Belgians out now. He said he had no doubts that Lumumba was also pressing in this direction.

aid through the United Nations would undercut this. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

In reply, the Secretary said that he could tell the Ambassador for his Government's information only that we had sent word to Hammarskjöld that we did not think it would be advisable for him to send troops to the Katanga until he himself had visited the area or sent a principal assistant there.⁴ The thrust of our recommendation to Hammarskjöld was that he should go slow and not move hastily on inserting troops into Katanga. Of course we did not know that he would take our advice.

The Secretary said that we did not wish the sense of our instructions known publicly because our position was that individual nations should not be active in connection with the Congo crisis and that should it be known we were giving advice and recommendations to Hammarskjöld there might be an effect on possible Soviet intentions. In this connection the Secretary noted that we would not for example move troops internally in the Congo. In fact our entire posture was that the UN was the responsible agency. He said he thought that when Hammarskjöld was on the spot and saw the situation he would act realistically.

Finally the Ambassador inquired again with regard to our position on the Belgian bases in the Congo to which the Secretary replied that the principal one was in Katanga anyway.

The Secretary concluded saying we hoped the situation would evolve satisfactorily and repeating that we were sorry our reception of Lumumba had caused problems and had been misunderstood in Belgium. The Secretary said that if we had not given the normal reception to Lumumba it would appear that we were indicating we would have nothing to do with him and his government.

⁴ Telegram 282 to Léopoldville, July 27, instructed McIlvaine to convey this message to Hammarskjöld, who was en route to the Congo. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2760)

**154. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the
Department of State**

Léopoldville, July 28, 1960, 5 p.m.

279. Reference: Deptel 282.¹ Have just seen Hammarskjold who made following points:

1. He has not yet taken decision on Katanga and won't until he has had chance confer at length with Bunche (Bunche, Von Horn, et al).

2. In any case he will not make move with troops until "way has been cleared diplomatically". This he has told Belgians.

3. He felt his discussions Brussels yesterday went relatively well and described Belgian attitude as "not unhappy". Added it would be too much expect them be happy at this particular juncture.

4. Said he and Belgians still disagree over bases (Kamina and Kitona) but he felt they tacitly recognized inevitability of their eventual departure.

5. Felt Belgians had not appreciated repercussions whole Katanga situation in other African countries and explained this at some length.

6. Said problem now one of timing and while he hoped be able delay to let Belgians tempers cool he also had to keep firm hand on Congolese and African pulse. In all events could assure us he was well aware of pitfalls and would proceed judiciously.

Have arranged keep in touch and will report developments.

McIlvaine

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7-2860. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, and USUN.

¹ See footnote 4, Document 153.

155. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, July 29, 1960, noon.

282. Senate President Joseph Ileo has advised Embassy officer it is imperative Lumumba not be permitted return empty-handed to Congo from US. He stated at least some type of commitment or promise be made Lumumba for assistance to Congo in public or private sectors. According Ileo if Lumumba returns to Congo empty-handed he will state that although he tried obtain assistance in order care for the unemployed and for helping economy of country US turned him down. Ileo who claims to know Lumumba "a fond" is certain Prime Minister will then turn for assistance to Soviet and bloc countries.

Embassy officer pointed out to Ileo such agreement cannot be drawn up overnight, that Lumumba's original intention was to go only to UN but that he has apparently converted visit into semi-official state visit to US. Embassy, however, is of opinion there is much truth to Ileo's statement and while we do not wish build up Lumumba we should nonetheless do everything possible to ensure he does not return to Congo with sort of negative ammunition for approaches elsewhere that Ileo feared.¹

McIlvaine

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.5–MSP/7–2960. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Brussels.

¹ Telegram 301 to Léopoldville, July 29, suggested that Ileo be told what the Department had told Lumumba, and what he appeared to have understood, namely that all aid would be channeled through the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, 770G.5–MSP/7–2960)

156. Memorandum of Discussion at the 454th Meeting of the National Security Council

Newport, Rhode Island, August 1, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on August 4.

3. *U.S. Policy Toward the Congo* (NSC 6001;¹ NSC Actions Nos. 2262 and 2270;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 29, 1960³)

Mr. Gray noted that Ambassador Timberlake was present for a discussion of this subject. He said he would like to pose one question before asking Secretary Herter to present Ambassador Timberlake. The question was—What action would the U.S. take if the USSR sought to intervene militarily in the Congo? Secretary Herter thought that the answer to this question was contained in the report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Memorandum for NSC dated July 29, 1960) General Twining asked whether the Secretary of State agreed with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as contained in this report. Secretary Herter said he generally agreed with the JCS views although these views were vague in places and would have to be made more specific before they could form the basis for concrete action. Mr. Gray then read what he called the key section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff study, i.e. paragraph 6-c, page 4:

“In addition to United Nations actions, effective or otherwise, the United States must be prepared at any time to take appropriate military action as necessary to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo. Multilateral action would be preferable but unilateral action may be necessary. In the present Soviet belligerent mood, the USSR could estimate that the United States would not oppose them. We must be prepared to oppose and defeat them. In order to prevent their making such a rash move, they must be made to understand that we will not tolerate a Soviet military takeover of the Congo.”

Secretary Herter said he assumed that if the Soviets intervened in the Congo they would do so in opposition to the UN force. The President said if the Soviets intervened in such circumstances, we would all be in the fight.

Mr. Gray then called upon Secretary Herter who said that Ambassador Timberlake had gone to the Congo on July 1 and since that time had had the most active job of any U.S. ambassador.

Ambassador Timberlake said the situation in the Congo had resulted from the fact that the basic assumptions about the Government of the Congo had not been realized. It had been assumed that Belgians would remain as advisers to the new republic but they did not do so. It had been assumed that the Force Publique would remain loyal to the government but instead the Belgian officers of the Force Publique were dismissed so that a former native sergeant became the commanding

¹ Document 22.

² See footnote 9, Document 126, and footnote 7, Document 140.

³ See source note, Document 145.

general of the Force. The problem now is to attempt to find substitutes for Belgian administrators and technicians who are no longer in the Congo. No one, literally no one, in the Congo knows how to run a government department. The level of education is of course very low. If the problems of the Congo are to be solved, the UN has undertaken the largest job in history. One of the difficulties is the fact that the Congo covers a great deal of territory and has very poor communications facilities. Lumumba is not anxious to see the UN succeed in the Congo. The President asked how many UN troops had arrived on the scene. Ambassador Timberlake replied 11,000 UN troops were now in the Congo. The President thought this force should be large enough to maintain order. Ambassador Timberlake agreed but noted that some time would be required for the restoration of order. The UN troops were presently engaged in a "mop up" operation; they were attempting to get the Congolese troops to behave properly. The President said that when sergeants get to be generals, they are being promoted even faster than he was.

General Twining believed that the Commander of the UN force was in an extremely difficult position since he could receive his directives only from the Secretary-General of the UN. Secretary Dillon agreed that the UN Commander was in a difficult position and said it would not be easy for him to decide at times whether to carry out the wishes of the Congo Government or of the UN. Secretary Douglas asked whether there was a clear policy as to the disposition of the Force Publique. Ambassador Timberlake replied that an effort was being made to bring as many Force Publique troops as possible back into service. It was thought that about 60 per cent of the Force could be rehabilitated. The President thought perhaps the UN should have a training mission in the Congo for the purpose of rehabilitating the Force Publique. Ambassador Timberlake agreed but pointed out that relations between the Government of the Congo and the UN were far from clear. The UN had been invited in by the Government of the Congo and presumably could be invited out.

Mr. Gray referred to Basic National Security Policy which provided that economic development aid, as distinct from technical assistance, would not be provided through the UN. He asked whether economic development assistance to the Congo was contemplated. Secretary Herter said no economic development aid was contemplated at the present time. We were planning only technical assistance. Secretary Dillon added that we intend to give budgetary assistance through the UN in order that the Congo could pay the technicians which it badly needs. Secretary Dillon said that the adequacy of this year's Contingency Funds had been raised and he would like to talk to the President about this question after the meeting.

Mr. Allen,⁴ noting that the Soviets had announced the dispatch of a second shipload of assistance to the Congo, asked whether this was another occasion when the Soviets would render a small amount of aid, say 100 trucks, but would receive the greatest amount of publicity. He hoped that U.S. aid going to the Congo via the UN would be identifiable as U.S. aid in some way. The President said we might paint our vehicles red, white and blue. Secretary Herter said that so far our airlift had been our big contribution. Ambassador Timberlake said the Soviet assistance so far had been mostly in the form of food, which had been added to the UN food pool. He added that the food problem in the Congo was easing so that it was not now considered critical in the short-range.

At this point the President left the meeting.

General Twining said he was concerned about the possibility that the Soviets would introduce a great many technicians into the Congo. Ambassador Timberlake said there were not many Soviet technicians there at the time he left.

Secretary Dillon wished to make two further remarks about the Congo. First, we have suggested to the UN that it should make an agreement with the Congo giving it the exclusive right to furnish all necessary technicians. The UN had agreed to try this plan and we had agreed to provide all our technicians through the UN. Second, a group working in the State Department had spotted all the key places in the Government of the Congo in which we would prefer not to have Soviet technicians placed. We will try to have our own technicians in these positions or at least prevent their being filled by Soviet technicians. [1 line of source text not declassified]

*The National Security Council:*⁵

a. Discussed the subject in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 29, 1960), and in the light of an oral briefing by Ambassador Timberlake.

b. Concurred in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in addition to United Nations actions, the United States must be prepared at any time to take appropriate military action as necessary to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo.

4. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

Mr. Dulles said he would like to discuss the Congo briefly before Ambassador Timberlake left the meeting. He noted that the UN force now in the Congo was not a well integrated and dependable force. For

⁴ George V. Allen, Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

⁵ Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 2276, approved by the President on August 12. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

example, the Guinea troops had been told that they were going to the Congo for the purpose of shooting Belgians. They were also told that the UN effort in the Congo was an example of multilateral colonialism. In response to a question, Mr. Dulles said it was the Government of Guinea which had told the Guinean troops they were to shoot Belgians in the Congo. Secretary Dillon thought this episode was probably the result of the large number of communists in the Government of Guinea.

Mr. Dulles asked Ambassador Timberlake whether unemployment would not be a serious problem in the Congo. Ambassador Timberlake said it would. At this point Ambassador Timberlake left the meeting.

Mr. Dulles reported that the Government of the Union of South Africa was consulting the Portuguese and perhaps Southern Rhodesia in an effort to build up a buffer belt across the southern part of Africa. If the Union could build strong points in Angola, Rhodesia, and Mozambique, it could create a *cordon sanitaire* against events such as those taking place in the Congo. The Portuguese, however, are not particularly enthusiastic about this scheme because they are reluctant to cooperate with South Africa.

Secretary Herter said he had heard that there was a great deal of dissension in the Congolese delegation to the UN, dissension which had been triggered by an interview with Lumumba published by TASS. Secretary Dillon said a TASS correspondent presented Lumumba with three written questions. Lumumba went into the next room and scribbled the answers in about three minutes. TASS, however, published a report much longer than Lumumba could have written out in three minutes.⁶ Obviously, TASS had considerably embellished Lumumba's answers. The main point of Lumumba's answers was that only the USSR had properly met the desires of the Government of the Congo in the present situation.

Mr. Gray asked about the cost of the operation in the Congo and wondered whether we would have to ask Congress for more funds in order to pay our share of the UN operation. Mr. Dillon said he expected to take this matter up with the President later.⁷

[Here follows the remainder of Dulles' briefing.]

Marion W. Boggs

⁶ The interview took place on July 28. A translation of the TASS report was attached to an August 1 memorandum from Penfield to Dillon. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 770G.00/8-160)

⁷ See Document 157.

157. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower

Newport, Rhode Island, August 1, 1960, 5 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretaries Herter, Dillon, Anderson, Dr. Ralph Reid,¹ General Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. Herter then raised the question of need for funds for operations in the Congo. He said it is anybody's guess as to what the total need will be. Mr. Dillon said these funds apparently must come from the contingency fund, which is now set by the Congress at \$150 million for the year, of which \$20 million has already been committed for Chile. A very broad estimate of overall expenditures would be in the order of \$200 million for the total operations in the Congo, including troop pay, technicians, and other activities. Our share may be somewhere in the neighborhood of \$100 million. The President said he saw nothing to do but to go to the Congress and ask to have the contingency fund increased by \$100 million, earmarking it for the Congo, so as not to invite others to try to get these funds. Mr. Reid said this is a concern which Budget has—that if the funds were not used for the Congo, others would try to get them. At the same time we do not want to give the Congo Government any claim that the money is "theirs." The President thought that a provision that the President must find the expenditures necessary in the U.S. interest in each case would be helpful. He would support a request for the \$100 million for special needs (not necessarily limited to the Congo, although privately intended almost entirely therefor). He does not simply want to raise the ante of requests all around.

The President observed that in the last twelve months the world has developed a kind of ferment greater than he could remember in recent times. The Communists are trying to take control of this, and have succeeded to the extent that students in many cases are now saying that the Communists are thinking of the common man while the United States is dedicated to supporting outmoded regimes.

Secretary Anderson, referring to the anticipated costs of operations in the Congo, said that we want to push the Soviets very hard to make them carry a fair and full share of the burden. The President said he would like to see the Soviets called on to put in just as much as we do. Mr. Herter said that Hammarskjold is trying to keep the Congo expenditures within the structure of his regular budget system and

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 10.

¹ Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

allocation of national contributions. Mr. Dillon observed that the Soviets are getting themselves into the position where they are obstructing and opposing the United Nations with regard to activity in the Congo.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

G

158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana

August 1, 1960, 9:05 p.m.

113. Guinean Ambassador Diallo,¹ leaving with Lumumba August 2, informs Congolese party stopping London, Tunis, Rabat, Conakry and Accra before returning Congo. Guineans to represent Congo here and possibly elsewhere. Diallo strongly hinted announcement as result trip some form association between Guinea, Ghana and Congo.

When Department requested Guinean backing for plan channel all aid through U.N. and thereby avoid extension cold war to Africa, Diallo firmly opposed since this might be taken as indication Congo considered U.N. Trust Territory. Said Lumumba also opposed to aid through U.N. and would almost certainly accept Soviet offers bilateral aid. Urged Department approach Lumumba soonest make bilateral aid offer before he leaves U.S. as "only chance" influence him favorably towards West.

Department subsequently discussed question exclusive U.N. aid with Ghanaian, Liberian, Tunisian and Moroccan Ambassadors.² Liberian Ambassador said he endorsed suggestion largely without qualification. Ghanaian Ambassador said while he agreed U.N. proper vehicle for channel all assistance, immediate problems of Belgian troops and Katanga outweighed all considerations and nothing could be settled in Congo in absence of settlement. Moroccan Ambassador and

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.70G00/8-160. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Thomas Cassilly of the Office of Middle and Southern African Affairs, Ferguson, and Peter Chase of the Office of Northern African Affairs; cleared by Sisco; and approved by Penfield. Also sent to Brussels, Conakry, Léopoldville, London, Moscow, Paris, Rabat, Tunis, and USUN.

¹ Telli Diallo.

² Penfield and Ferguson met on August 1 with Liberian Ambassador George A. Padmore and Ghanaian Ambassador William M.Q. Halm, and Penfield met the same day with Moroccan Ambassador El-Mehdi Ben Aboud and Tunisian Minister Salaheddine El Goulli. Memoranda of the two conversations are in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-160.

Tunisian Minister underlined importance of creating less emotional climate and persuading Congolese focus on magnitude of internal problems they faced. They agreed Congo should not use subject cold war competition but observed Congolese sensitive to limitations on sovereignty such as exclusive aid arranged even with U.N. might imply. Nevertheless they felt African states should do everything possible convince Congo overcome this sensitivity since obviously Africans themselves had insufficient resources meet Congo's needs. They thought African success this venture likely depend on speedy Belgian implementation evacuation and restoration of Congo's territorial integrity.

Herter

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana

August 2, 1960, 6:22 p.m.

117. Please deliver following personal and confidential message from President to Nkrumah as soon as possible.

"As Ambassador Halm has doubtless reported to you, the State Department has been keeping in touch with African Ambassadors here on the rapidly changing situation in the Congo. We are agreed that this situation is unique and that, while it presents grave dangers to world peace, it is also a great challenge to statesmanship and an opportunity for the UN in general and African states in particular. If this challenge can be successfully met I feel that the world may be able to enter on a new stage of interdependence and healthy development.

We are also agreed that the immediate problem is the speedy resolution of the Belgian troop and Katanga questions. I am convinced that SYG Hammarskjold, though hampered by strong conflicting pressures and passions, is doing his best to carry out his SC mandate. In this effort the US is backing and supporting him to the hilt, not only because we believe that the SC resolution is the right one, but also because we feel that if the UN were unsuccessful or discredited in the Congo, the results for world peace and cooperation would be disastrously tragic.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-260. Secret; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Penfield; cleared by Goodpaster, Stoessel, and with IO; and approved by Herter.

Important as are these immediate problems, I believe we should start looking beyond them to the situation which will exist after they are solved. The Congo will, I fear, have almost no trained experienced personnel to administer the country and operate the economy. This puts the Congo, it seems to us, in a position unique amongst all newly independent countries. It will be forced for a period of a few years at least, to entrust the country's essential services to outsiders. In this situation it seems vital to me that the Congo be effectively protected against conflicting power politics or other pressures which could not but have an unfortunate effect on its healthy, harmonious and independent development. Our first thought was that this protection might be provided by means of a contract between the UN and the Congolese Government under which the former would be the exclusive agent for the supply of administrative, technical and financial assistance to the latter. As Secretary Herter told Prime Minister Lumumba last week, the US is prepared to contribute its fair share to this common effort.

In these circumstances Secretary Herter and I would greatly appreciate the benefit of an exchange of views with you. I am therefore asking my Ambassador to the Congo, The Honorable Clare H. Timberlake, to stop at Accra to see you, probably on August 5. He has been back in Washington on consultation for a few days during which Secretary Herter and I have discussed the Congo situation with him fully. He has my full confidence and I hope you will be able to see him and share with him quite frankly your thoughts on this urgent problem."¹

Herter

¹ Telegram 164 from Accra, August 3, reported that the message had been delivered to President Nkrumah, who agreed to receive Timberlake and added that he shared the views expressed in the message and would so inform Lumumba. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/8-360)

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium

August 2, 1960, 7:14 p.m.

317. Ref: Embtel 346,¹ Polto 210,² and Deptel 313.³ Following U.S. position has been developed for Ambassador's use with Belgian Government on his return. (For USRO: Position may be used in your discussions only after Ambassador Burden reports results his presentation to Belgian Government.)

1. *U.S. views on Belgian position.* Regret Belgium believes U.S. has not supported Belgium in UN to any reasonable degree. In SC discussion on first resolution U.S. clearly made statement against accusation that Belgium "aggressor" in Congo. Affirmative U.S. vote on first SC resolution made because of U.S. conviction UN role vital to solution Congo problem. Moreover, Belgians should be reminded that we made important statement, largely on their behalf, in interpreting paragraph on withdrawal of forces in first SC resolution to mean phased withdrawal of Belgian forces as UN forces assured [*assumed?*] effective control and brought about public order. In discussion second SC resolution, U.S. played key role in defeating Soviet resolution specifying three-day deadline for total Belgian withdrawal.⁴ Moreover, pursuant to specific Belgian request, we made very strong statement in SC telling Soviets *keep out* of Congo. U.S. continues in firm belief Belgium not aggressor and that Belgium will continue to sincerely cooperate with UN in implementation both SC resolutions. U.S. has put out

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-260. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Robert H. Miller of the Office of Western European Affairs; cleared by White, Penfield, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Woodruff Wallner, and Executive Secretariat Director John A. Calhoun; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Léopoldville, Paris, USUN, and London.

¹ Telegram 346 from Brussels, July 28, reported that Wigny had telephoned Burden on July 27 to complain of lack of U.S. support for Belgium in the Security Council and slowness in U.S. public opposition to unilateral Soviet intervention in the Congo. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/7-2860)

² Polto 210 from Paris, July 27, reported that at a meeting of NATO representatives, the Belgians had expressed extreme dismay with U.S. policy concerning the Congo and had warned that this might compel a future Belgian Government to adopt a neutralist policy. (*Ibid.*)

³ Telegram 313 to Brussels, August 2, informed the Embassy of a message which the Belgian Government intended to send to Hammarskjöld; see the first sentence of numbered paragraph 3 of this telegram. (*Ibid.*) Hammarskjöld had appealed to Brussels for a public declaration of its intention to withdraw all Belgian troops from the Congo, including Katanga.

⁴ The Soviet draft resolution, submitted on July 20, was not put to a vote; for text, see U.N. doc. S/4402.

public statement this sense.⁵ U.S. fully supports UN role as best hope for solution extremely complex Congo problem, and feels its confidence justified by success UN effort so far.

2. *Troop withdrawal.* U.S. convinced Congolese will continue insist on complete Belgian troop withdrawal from Congo, including from bases and from Katanga, and that therefore Belgium must be prepared accept such withdrawal as fact of life. Moreover, U.S. believes Belgium must demonstrate concretely that it withdrawing troops rapidly to Congo bases and, as soon as possible, to Belgium. Recent Belgian statement regarding withdrawal to Belgium of 1500 troops invaluable in this connection. Nevertheless, pressure clearly building upon Hammarskjold to show more rapid implementation of SC resolution. Possibility can not be discounted that Soviets, Congolese or Afro-Asians will call another SC meeting and table another resolution condemning Belgium for not implementing SC resolutions and calling for withdrawal of forces within short time limit of two or three days. Such eventuality could only be seriously detrimental to Western position. Consequently, U.S. sincerely believes Belgium must give most urgent consideration to further, measurable evidence its compliance with SC resolutions.

U.S. assumes Belgian long-term interest in Congo is to restore and maintain Belgian economic presence there and deny it to Communists. If this correct, believes troop and base issues must be subordinated economic issue. Lumumba has frequently asserted his recognition of Congo's need to maintain Belgian economic presence and U.S. would hope Belgians could exert influence on technicians to remain or return Congo with UN forces maintaining internal security. At same time, U.S. willing approach Hammarskjold, providing GOB agreeable, in order point out desirability of maintaining and returning as many Belgian technicians in Congo as possible. U.S. would point out complexity Congo situation, stating that only long Belgian experience in Congo can hope restore economic and technical situation in short term. U.S. would urge Hammarskjold to use his influence with Congolese to give early public assurances re security technicians both in terms Congolese attitudes and intentions and in terms UN force presence.

3. *Katanga.* U.S. notes with satisfaction Belgian reply to Hammarskjold that Belgium interprets SC resolutions as covering withdrawal from Katanga and that Hammarskjold might use this confiden-

⁵ Reference is to a statement issued by the Department of State on July 30; for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 540-541.

tial information in negotiations with Congolese. U.S. hopes Belgium will find it possible make public statement this effect in near future.⁶

4. *Bases.* As stated above, U.S. convinced Belgium must be prepared give up bases in view Congolese firm position. If Belgium wishes to approach Hammarskjöld, offering bases to UN for length UN stay in Congo so that abandonment of bases will not give them over to Force Publique or, in worst eventuality, to Soviets, U.S. would support this solution. Such step would seem desirable in view fact neither U.S. nor NATO military considers Belgian retention these bases of strategic value. Moreover, step would provide further concrete evidence Belgian intentions in Congo.

5. *Lumumba.* Belgium has already received U.S. explanation reception Lumumba. U.S. believes West must deal with Lumumba as Prime Minister Congolese Government, although his reliability open to serious question. Lumumba's intentions and sympathies unclear, and evidence exists that he will not prove satisfactory. U.S. will therefore continue search for more trustworthy elements in Congo who might be susceptible to support as part of program of reinsurance against Lumumba.

6. *African States.* As Embassy is aware, forceful UN action in using troops from African states has so far effectively blocked dangerous Soviet meddling in Congo. Department considers it most important African states continue take lead and Department must keep their sensitivities in mind to certain extent, particularly in public statements.⁷

Herter

⁶ Hammarskjöld appealed to the United States on August 2 to urge the Belgian Government to support his request for a Belgian public statement (see footnote 3 above). Memoranda of several telephone conversations that day between Herter and Burden (in New York), Houghton (in Paris), and Ambassador to the United Kingdom John Hay Whitney (in London) are in the Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. Telegram 319 to Brussels, August 2, informed the Embassy of a meeting that evening on the subject between Herter and the British and French Chargés. It stated that a Belgian public statement would be very desirable but gave Burden discretion on this point in view of a Belgian statement issued that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-260) For text of the Belgian statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, p. 543.

⁷ Telegrams 394 and 395 from Brussels, August 4, reported Burden's conversation with Wigny that morning. Telegram 394 reported Wigny's comments; it stated that he took no issue with any of the points made. Telegram 395 transmitted the talking paper which Burden used for the conversation. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-460)

161. Letter From the Ambassador in Belgium (Burden) to Secretary of State Herter

Brussels, August 4, 1960.

DEAR CHRIS: I returned to Brussels yesterday and hasten to thank you for all the time and trouble you took to consider Belgian problems during my visit to Washington.

I know what a difficult position you have, to be in charge of United States foreign policy, in endeavoring to build a position for the West in Africa, keep the Russians out of key African countries, and at the same time not do too much damage to our relationship with our NATO allies and to the NATO structure itself.

It is inevitable in a situation like the present that the emergency nature of the Congo crisis should cause most problems to be considered primarily from the Congo point of view. I took this position myself during the early months of my service in Brussels and devoted a very large part of my time, as you know to developing plans to anticipate some of the critical problems which we thought likely to emerge, particularly financial ones. However, I think the pendulum has now swung too much in the Congo direction and we must give full consideration to the very serious damage which our actions are causing to Belgo-American relations and to NATO as a whole. I am sure Larry Norstad¹ has talked to you about the latter.

I am of course prepared to take any action here which is necessary to United States policy, no matter how unpalatable it is to the Belgians but I do want to be sure that the possible effect on Belgium and on NATO has been fully considered before it is taken, and I will, of course, always draw such possible effects to your attention. I am sure that continued problems of this nature will arise because of the inevitable dichotomy of trying to do as much as possible in Africa without too much damage in Europe.

Specifically, I think there is much too much of a tendency to meet all Hammarskjold's demands, no matter how unreasonable, and for the United States to be willing to make unilateral representations with the Belgians and elsewhere in Europe without any assurance that we will be backed up by the British and French. This has already happened twice and I hope it won't happen again. When it does, the British and French either back the Belgians or abstain, and the blame all falls on us. Nor do I think that we will achieve success by meeting *all* of the demands of the Congolese rapidly and at the cost of our

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G/8-460. Confidential; Personal.

¹ General Lauris Norstad, USAF, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

friends. Such a policy, as I explained in Washington, will only result in more and more unreasonable demands, and there are limits to what we should do.

I know that no one is more fully aware of the importance of our European relationships than you, and that you have a special soft spot in your heart for Brussels, because of your prior service here.² I do hope you will keep these elements of the problem very much in mind.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Bill

² As an attaché, December 1916–July 1917.

162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Elisabethville

August 4, 1960, 7:45 p.m.

37. Dept suggests in talks with local officials, residents and consuls you take line previously suggested that USG continues to support unified Congo and does not recognize independent Katanga. We supported two SC resolutions each dealing with Congo as unit. Further Dept continues feel best hope for Congo is UN military presence and economic reconstruction in the entire Congo with Katanga contributing full share to government revenue. UN presence in Congo will, in our view, objectively and effectively discharge its mandate to maintain order and thereby contribute to preserving investments and restricting communist penetration of Congo. Dept hopes UN troop arrival Katanga will not be opposed and considers that Europeans should be able to repose same confidence in UN military as in Belgians. (We informed only Irish Moroccan Swedish and Tunisian troops will be used.) UN effort should be presented as not prejudicial Katangan political interests and does not mean UN taking sides internal matter. If in fact Tshombe commands significant support and loyalty for his policies, there is no reason why admission UN troops should prevent

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/8–460. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Woodruff; cleared with Satterthwaite, Penfield, Wallner, and Robert M. Beaudry of EUR; and approved by Herter. Repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, London, and Paris.

him from continuing efforts to work for increased autonomy or federation with other provinces as desired. UN is on record as stating it does not take orders from central government.

You should extend all possible assistance to Bunche including communications if he has need therefor.¹

Herter

¹ In telegram 41 from Elisabethville, August 6, Canup maintained that if he pursued the points contained in telegram 37, it would possibly trigger the accusation from Tshombe that the United States was engaged in a behind-the-back campaign against him. Tshombe did not count on U.S. aid and was unlikely to be influenced by U.S. views. Canup recommended, therefore, presentation of the U.S. viewpoint directly on the basis of instructions. (*Ibid.*, 332.70G/8-660)

163. Memorandum of Conversation

August 5, 1960.

SUBJECT

Congo

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Ambassador Louis Scheyven, Belgian Embassy
Mr. Woodruff Wallner, IO
Mr. C. Vaughn Ferguson, AFS
Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

Ambassador Scheyven said that he wished to outline in detail the agreement which had been reached between the Belgian Government and Secretary General Hammarskjold in Brussels. He said that the Belgian Government had informed the Secretary General again that they were prepared to implement the Security Council resolution including the withdrawal of forces from Katanga. The Belgians had added that Hammarskjold could use this information in his negotiations with Tshombe. Furthermore Hammarskjold had undertaken to negotiate with the Belgians regarding assurances to the white population of the Katanga. The Belgian Government felt that it had carried out its understanding with Hammarskjold in every detail but that the latter had violated this agreement by issuing a statement regarding Mr.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-560. Secret. Drafted by McBride. Approved in S on August 9.

Bunche's visit to Katanga and the sending of troops into that Province on Saturday, August 6.¹ Ambassador Scheyven said that the Belgians feel they have been abused and Hammarskjöld had not acted properly. The schedule which he had set up did not provide any time for meaningful negotiations between Mr. Bunche and the Katanga authorities and indicated he would send troops in regardless of the outcome of these negotiations.

Ambassador Scheyven continued, saying that the effect of Hammarskjöld's action had been extremely bad on the 23,000 whites who lived in the Katanga and who held its economy together. Eighty percent of the white population had been at work until the receipt of Hammarskjöld's statement but it was feared that this would change the situation. He continued, saying that the Secretary General had not respected the deal which he had made in Brussels. He added it was realized that the Secretary General was under strong pressure from extremists in the Congo and from the left-wing elements in the Lumumba Government. The Belgians had concluded that Hammarskjöld was following the line of least resistance in order to make his mission a success. He concurred that this mission must succeed but was concerned by the growth of Communist influence in Leopoldville.

Ambassador Scheyven then said that Hammarskjöld had apparently taken stock of the situation and had concluded that Belgium would be forced to cooperate by events. However, he had not carried out the spirit of the agreement reached. The Belgians feel that the way the Secretary General has acted and has appeared to succumb to leftist pressure in Leopoldville in fact is consolidating Lumumba's position. The Belgians feel that Mr. Bunche should go immediately (in fact he had already departed) to the Katanga.

Ambassador Scheyven added that the Belgian position was that the UN should not by its operations give advantage to any one party in the political dispute in the Congo. He said it was realized that Hammarskjöld said that the position of the Katanga Government was nonexistent and that they did not have a right to secede. He said under these ground rules Belgium would have never been born at all since Belgium had similarly seceded from the Netherlands in 1830. A juridical approach by the Secretary General might be politically wrong. The UN should not be any party to the internal conflict in the Congo.

¹ At a meeting on August 2 with the Congolese Cabinet Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations, Hammarskjöld stated that he would send Bunche to Katanga on August 5 to begin negotiations concerning the withdrawal of Belgian troops to their bases, that the first U.N. military units would arrive in Katanga on August 6, and that the withdrawal of Belgian troops was to commence immediately. For text, see Hammarskjöld's report of August 6 to the Security Council; U.N. doc. S/4417, also printed in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. V, pp. 57-66.

Ambassador Scheyven said that the dispatch of UN troops to Katanga might lead to disturbances and might also provide a facade for leftist agitators from Leopoldville to proceed to that Province. He stressed again that the Katanga was actually a going concern and that there was no famine there as elsewhere. With regard to Belgian technicians, Ambassador Scheyven noted, the Secretary-General said their maintenance in Congo was a Belgian responsibility but that Belgium cannot accept this responsibility if the UN troops go into Katanga without satisfactory guarantees having been provided for the 23,000 whites in the Province. He said that Belgium had appealed to these men to remain but the memories of the earlier atrocities were fresh in their minds so that it was difficult to convince them that they should stay. He admitted that the mobilization of Katanga forces might not amount to much and repeated the Belgian troops would certainly not oppose UN forces on their arrival. He also mentioned the tribal problem in the area.

Ambassador Scheyven went on, saying that the Belgian Government wished to underline the dangers existing in the situation and the importance of developing Western counterpressures on Hammarskjold to counterbalance the left-wing element influences exerted through the Congolese Government. There should be influence from Belgium's friends on Hammarskjold to keep out agitators from Leopoldville in Katanga. He said it would be extremely difficult to solve this problem in 48 hours and that we could only hope that the entry of UN forces would be peaceful. He said that Belgium hoped that white troops would be sent to the area by the UN but noted that the Congolese wanted black troops so the result would probably be that they would be mixed. The Secretary said that he understood the forces would in fact be Irish, Swedish, Tunisian and Moroccan.

Ambassador Scheyven repeated that the UN should not become involved in any way in the internal politics of the Congo since this would be beyond the mandate of the Security Council. He thought that Hammarskjold agreed with the Belgian interpretation of the Security Council resolution in this respect but might give in to Congolese pressure. He said that he hoped the United States would tell Hammarskjold that we felt he should not interfere in internal Congolese politics. With regard to the 23,000 whites in the area the Belgians hoped that we would express concern regarding their security. He thought this was of paramount importance and he noted that Katanga produced at least 60 percent of the riches of the Congo and if this area went to pieces like the rest of the country and the whites should leave the results would be catastrophic. He noted that only some 100 out of 5,000 whites were left in Stanleyville.

The Secretary asked if there were dangers of tribal war in Katanga. The Ambassador said that thus far there had been no outbreaks of this nature but there had been some in the Kasai province. However Tshombe might stir up difficulties and he thought that most of the tribes in Katanga were on his side.

Ambassador Scheyven repeated that it was his view that the Western powers should now adopt a strong position. There might be actual hostilities within 48 hours in the only province where order had reigned. There might be fights also between Katanga and Congolese Government forces. Ambassador Scheyven then passed to the question of the motives of the Ghana and Guinea Governments. He said that Ghana had, on August 1, said in the UN that Belgium should be treated as an aggressor and Guinea had taken a similar line. The Secretary said we had sent our Ambassador to Ghana on his way back to Leopoldville to attempt to get the Ghanaians off of this line and also to ask them to exert their influence in the right way with Lumumba. The Secretary did not think we could have much influence with Guinea but thought that perhaps President Tubman might be able to exert some moderating influence on Sekou Toure and that we were planning to approach President Tubman in this sense.²

Ambassador Scheyven said that the Lodge statement regarding Soviet attitudes in Congo made in the Security Council³ had been very good and he hoped that we could make a similar approach to Ghana and Guinea.

The Secretary repeated that we were indeed planning to do what we could with these two countries. Ambassador Scheyven said would this be in the sense of asking them to exert a restraining influence on Lumumba? The Secretary replied in the affirmative.

Ambassador Scheyven continued saying that this was a crucial moment. He said that either the Western powers would have to take a firm position or the UN mission would fail and the result would be catastrophic and chaos favorable to Communist infiltration.

The Secretary said that Hammarskjold's decision regarding sending troops to Katanga had been taken in the atmosphere of Leopoldville. He thought with Bunche having gone to Elisabethville he might now have a different appreciation of the situation after having been on the spot. He was convinced that the UN authorities would wish to avoid extreme positions. The Secretary agreed that there would be chaos if the whites were to leave Katanga. He repeated that it was difficult to take firm positions when we were so far away from the situation. The Secretary repeated that it was his understanding Ham-

² Telegram 52 from Monrovia, August 6, reported a meeting among Ambassador Elbert G. Mathews, Timberlake, and Tubman, at which Tubman promised to write to Touré. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-660)

³ See Document 144.

marksjold was keeping hands off politically in the Congo. He agreed also that Hammarskjold should not take any firm position on the final determination of the Congo state as to whether it should be a centralized state or a looser federation. On the other hand he wondered if we wanted Hammarskjold to stay out of Congo politics entirely. For example, it might be helpful if he were to take what steps he could to strengthen moderate elements in Leopoldville. Ambassador Scheyven said would we approach Hammarskjold in the sense of asking him to remain outside of Congolese politics? The Secretary said we would have to think about that and in any case we did not wish to do anything which would weaken Hammarskjold in carrying out his mission. Ambassador Scheyven asked if we would approach Hammarskjold on his other point of expressing concern regarding the safety of the white population of Katanga. The Secretary said we would be delighted to do this and he did not see any problem in expressing our concern for the safety and security of the white population.

Ambassador Scheyven finally asked if we would make a *démarche* to the Congolese regarding their declaration that they would seize Belgian businesses, which had been closed, unless they were reopened within eight days. The Secretary said he thought it would be difficult for the Congolese to seize Belgian interests in Katanga especially in view of the presence of Belgian troops and asked what the Congolese would do with these businesses anyway. The Ambassador said they would keep them permanently. The Secretary said he would consider the Ambassador's request and let him know.

164. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State

Accra, August 6, 1960, 3 p.m.

176. Deptel 117.¹ President Nkrumah asked me August 6 to transmit letter to President Eisenhower as follows:

Begin letter: (verbatim text)

President.

5th August 1960.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-660. Confidential; Niact; Presidential Handling.

¹ Document 159.

Dear President Eisenhower, I am happy to receive your letter through Ambassador Flake. I appreciate the way in which the State Department has been keeping in touch with the Ambassadors of the independent African states in regard to the situation in Congo. I agree with you when you say that though the present situation presents dangers to world peace, it is also a great challenge to statesmanship and an opportunity for the United Nations in general and African states in particular.

Like you I believe that the most immediate problem is the speedy withdrawal of Belgian troops from the whole of the Congo, including Katanga. So far as Katanga is concerned, any attempt to detach it from the Congo state in anybody's interest will have the most disastrous consequences not only upon African opinion, but upon the whole balance of political forces in the world. This is a point which I have tried to emphasize both in public and in private.

It is quite clear that the separatist movement in Katanga has not got popular support but is the product of Belgian manoeuvres in the Congo. What worries me most is the failure to act quickly in the implementation of the United Nations resolution. I must say that if any power was not clearly to oppose Belgium in her present conduct, the position of that power on the African continent would be fatally compromised.

It seems to me therefore, that the first step is to establish the authority of the United Nations.

There is a suspicion, which I would like to believe is quite unfounded, that the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom are not giving their full support to the United Nations decision that all Belgian troops should be withdrawn from the whole of the Congo. The view which is being taken by some African states is that these powers are deliberately delaying on this issue in the hope that a Katanga state can be created and that the Belgian military occupation can continue and be ultimately justified on a *de facto* basis.

I am glad indeed to note your proposal that Congo should be protected against conflicting power politics and other pressures. However, the first task before any other issue can be considered is the withdrawal of all Belgian troops.

Nevertheless, in order that the matter of technical assistance can be discussed concurrently with the question of the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, my Government is addressing a note to your Ambassador here on this aspect of the matter.² I have pur-

² Telegram 177 from Accra, August 6, reported that when Ambassador Wilson C. Flake and Timberlake met with Nkrumah that day, the latter agreed that all technical and financial assistance to the Congo should be provided through the United Nations. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-660)

posely not dealt with this in my letter to you as I consider that any other issue is of little importance so long as Belgian troops remain in the Congo.

Yours sincerely, (signed) Kwame Nkrumah.

End letter.

Flake

165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

August 6, 1960, 8:53 p.m.

196. Re: SC Meeting on Congo. Following represents preliminary thinking of Department re SYG's report¹ and SC meeting which you authorized use as guidance in your consultations with SYG and other SC Members.

1. *SYG's Report.* As we analyze report, SYG seeking have SC strengthen his hand with view bringing about implementation SC resolution in entire Congo, including Katanga, without resort to force while at same time leaving Katanga as constitutional question to be worked out internally between Tshombe and Lumumba. Our assessment is that report should be satisfactory to Belgians and Tshombe for three reasons: (a) SYG's report says Belgian attitude toward question of Katanga not root of problem; (b) report leaves Katanga free work out future status with Congolese Government; and (c) report clearly assures Tshombe of UN impartial role and that UN force will not take sides in conflict.

SC action in effect endorsing SYG's "suggestions" would arm Hammarskjöld with appropriate assurances for Tshombe which we believe would soften Tshombe's attitude re introduction of UN forces in Katanga. We believe Africans will be unhappy with SYG report, and Lumumba and Soviets even more so.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-660. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Cargo, Sisco, Tron, and Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs William B. Buffum; cleared by Wallner, Penfield, Ferguson, and Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs William L. Blue; and approved by Merchant. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, Léopoldville, Tunis, Quito, Buenos Aires, and Colombo.

¹ Hammarskjöld's report of August 6, cited in footnote 1, Document 163, stated that he had dropped the plan to introduce U.N. troops into Katanga on August 6 because it was apparent they would be forcibly opposed by the Katangans. It requested instructions from the Council.

Principal key to situation in SC, as we see it, is question of Belgian withdrawal from entire Congo, including Katanga and bases. We believe that forthright statement of intentions by Wigny before or early in SC proceedings would pull rug out from Soviets and Lumumba. Two principal ways in which this could be achieved: (a) paragraph in resolution calling for withdrawal of Belgian forces from entire Congo, including Katanga bases, within specific time limit; (b) paragraph in resolution taking note of whatever statement Wigny makes re withdrawal of forces. Latter is clearly best way since it avoids appearance of SC pressuring Belgians. Belgian initiative in this regard would clearly improve their posture, it would be added evidence of their cooperation with UN, and it would indicate willingness to carry out SC resolution as UN takes control of Congo. In our judgment, for maximum effectiveness, Belgian withdrawal statement must clearly apply to both Katanga and bases. With respect to latter, we have already put to Belgians suggestion that they turn over bases to UN. Should Belgium be able to make forthright statement which would be reflected in SC res, we believe it would be much more difficult for USSR to veto resolution or justify veto.²

2. *Hearing of Representatives of Katanga*

We would hope that representatives of Katanga would not request hearing before SC in view fact that hearing them tends to accord Katanga added legal status and likely cause serious and acrimonious procedural dispute in SC. We hope SYG could work it out so Katanga representatives would not seek hearing. If, nevertheless, Katanga representatives insist, you authorized accept hearing them under Rule 39 which would help avoid legal issue. We would hope you could avoid getting out in front on this procedural issue.

3. *SC Resolution*

Following is illustrative resolution we have in mind as constituting reasonable SC action. Our hope would be that Tunisia, Ceylon, Argentina, and Ecuador could be urged to sponsor.

"The Security Council

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the Congo contained in Document _____,

Noting with appreciation the efforts of the SYG pursuant to SC resolutions of 14 July and 22 July and the support given him by Member states,

Noting, however, that SC resolutions S/4387 and S/4404 have not yet been fully implemented,

² Telegram 354 to Brussels, August 6, informed the Embassy that the Department had called in Ambassador Scheyven to make this point. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-660) Telegram 347 from USUN, August 7, reported that Lodge had spoken along the same lines to Wigny, calling Belgian withdrawal the key to the situation. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/8-760)

Recognizing the urgent need for complete and rapid fulfillment of the aforementioned resolutions,

[*Notes* the statement of the Government of Belgium that its troops will be entirely withdrawn from the Congo, that the withdrawal has already begun and that it will be completed by _____ on the assumption that the UN will assure order and security in the territory,]³

Requests the full cooperation of all authorities in the Congo so that the UN may exercise its mandate peacefully throughout the country,

Reaffirms its resolution of 22 July which stressed that the Republic of the Congo had been recommended for admission to membership in the UN as a unit,

Recognizes at the same time that the constitutional development of the Congo is an internal political problem to be resolved by the people of the Congo by peaceful means and that the UN cannot take sides in this,

Declares, therefore, that the presence of UN forces in the Congo pursuant to Security Council resolutions of 14 and 22 of July and this resolution shall be without prejudice to peaceful and democratic development in the constitutional field,

Reiterates its request to all states to refrain from any action which might tend to hamper the UN in the effective discharge of its mandate,

Requests the SYG to continue his efforts to secure full implementation of this resolution and SC resolutions of 14 and 22 of July and to report to the Security Council further as appropriate."

Re bracketed portion of resolution, you should discuss it with the Belgians in the first instance and refrain from doing so with others. Dept aware serious objections of Belgian to idea of deadline and strongly prefers to avoid specific date being included in resolution if it is at all possible. It is included in the bracketed [portion] above on the assumption that Sovs and others will be pressing for specific date.

You may wish point out to Belgians that idea of date for completion of phased withdrawal with escape clause stating assumption law and order prevails is probably least objectionable way of handling time element.

Merchant

³ Brackets in the source text.

166. Message From President Touré to President Eisenhower

Conakry, August 7, 1960.

In view of the gravity of the situation in the Congo and the unified, effective support by all the African peoples of our brothers in the Congo, we consider it our duty, in the spirit of loyal cooperation between our peoples for the sake of peace and friendship, to appeal to you personally, as well as to the Government and Congress of the United States, to take vigorous action to obtain immediate and full implementation of the Security Council resolution calling for evacuation without delay of all Belgian troops from the Congo and respect for the territorial integrity of that State.

We are certain that if you will contribute your support, only a few hours will be needed to save the peace, which will benefit the African peoples and the entire world.

Considering this appeal to be a cry of alarm from Africa, humiliated and under attack by its enemies, we firmly hope to be accorded the complete support of the American Government and people, particularly in view of their determining role in world affairs.

You may be assured, Excellency, of our desire to cooperate with, and our steadfast friendship for, the American people.

My very high consideration.¹

Sékou Touré²

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-860. Official Use Only. The source text, a translation, was attached to a memorandum of conversation by Cassilly, dated August 8. The message was delivered by Guinean Chargé Sylla Lamine.

¹ Telegram 67 from Conakry, August 8, reported that Diallo reiterated this message to Flake, saying that if the United States failed to act, its position and prestige in Africa "would be finished." (*Ibid.*)

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

167. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, August 7, 1960, 11 p.m.

349. Re: Congo.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-760. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Brussels.

1. Lodge saw Hammarskjold late this afternoon (our first direct communication with SYG since his arrival from Leopoldville). After listening to SYG's description of situation in Congo and especially Katanga, it was clear he saying presence Belgian troops Katanga was real issue. We asked him if this was case. He affirmed it emphatically and specifically, although in his written report he had decided play it differently.

2. As for res to be passed at next SC meeting, SYG said Belgian troops must leave Katanga and UN must enter to assure safety of lives and property. To do these things Tshombe must allow UN entry. Tshombe concerned for his personal safety and position if Belgian troops withdraw and UN moves in. This line of reasoning, SYG said, leads him to conclude res text must contain fol four points: (a) affirm SC's two previous res's; (b) specifically call for UN troops to go into Katanga (Cordier commented UK had suggested this as necessary element); (c) provide some elemental protection for Tshombe, not only for his own sake but for sake of all other provincial leaders, against Lumumba; (d) contain appeal to Belgium to assist UN entry into Katanga (rather than work strongly to contrary as has been case).

3. SYG read from several cables, first one having just come in from Bunche. In it Bunche said he had concluded situation could only be saved, if at all, by immediate withdrawal of all Belgian troops, with emphasis on immediate. Bunche acknowledged this would run risk of panic exodus by Belgians from Katanga and produce disorder there; but he expressed view such a risk must be taken in order pull rug out from under extremists among Congolese political leaders. Bunche said otherwise UN force could not hang on in Congo. It would soon incur hostility of local population and would disintegrate, some elements withdrawing and some, in effect, going into service of Congo Govt against Belgium.

4. SYG agreed with necessity for Belgian withdrawal but said it must be combined with arrival UN troops in order prevent violence and loss of life. SYG commented Bunche's report was symptomatic of situation in Congo and fit with his own experience there last Tues and Fri.¹ He said he had felt impelled act last Tuesday in order forestall Guinea, Ghana, Soviets, Lumumba and Gizenga. All these working to stymie elements favorable to UN. (SYG mentioned Bomboko and Kanza as well as Congolese rep in Brussels as favorable to UN.) SYG commented extremists could start an uprising against UN "in one day" if they undertook all-out campaign on Leopoldville radio. SYG observed there would be "outside aid" for [from?] those units of UN who would then help Govt of Congo against Belgian troops.

¹ August 2 and 5.

5. SYG said his move on Friday to call SC was again taken to undercut extremists. (He expressed view Soviet Union itself was "trapped" as long as SC meeting and could not move on its own.)

6. Reverting to his decision on August 2 to move into Katanga, SYG reported Lumumba had ordered Gizenga fire Bomboko and Kanza from cabinet and threatened open political attack on UN if no movement made to Katanga. SYG said he therefore had no way in which to maneuver to play for time. Moreover, he said, moderates and radicals in cabinet, for different reasons, all took line opposing delay by UN. He added that moderates (Bomboko and Kanza) did however see need for negotiations with Belgians concerning modalities of UN entry into Katanga.

7. SYG said that as of last Tuesday he foresaw danger of explosion Wednesday from Gizenga. Lumumba had been scheduled to arrive on Thursday. SYG believed Gizenga would try steal Lumumba's fire by moving before he arrived. SYG then made comment very unusual for him: he said his decision also influenced by news which reached him of "systematic action by Soviet agents to sabotage UN operation". He concluded by saying he felt he had act in order avoid "a kind of Korea".

8. SYG then turned to Katanga. He read from highly confidential report from Linner² (SYG's Rep for Economic Affairs in Leopoldville) who had gone to Katanga with Bunche as emissary to Katanga business community. August 4 Linner met with 25 officials of business community, including head of Union Miniere. This group greeted him with "curses, spat upon him and called him a criminal". They said arrival of UN troops would signal departure by whites as well as Congolese business personnel and economic collapse would come. They claimed "UN trying to take Katanga" for other Western interests. Linner reported he told them UN technical assistance would not mean replacement of Belgians. In fact, UN anxious that Belgians remain to keep economy going. Linner also explained general basis on which UN operated. This first meeting lasted 4 hours.

9. Later during night Linner said all but four of group with whom he had met came to him in private to say that they were under orders from Belgian Govt Rep d'Aspremont,³ who had instructed them to sabotage UN effort or they would all lose their jobs and be put in jail. They reported also that Tshombe was not politically strong but was maintained by money he received. They reported that several days earlier arrangements had been made to blow up some of mining properties when UN arrived.

² Sture Linner, chief of U.N. civilian operations in the Congo.

³ Count Harold d'Aspremont-Lynden, head of the Belgian technical assistance mission to Katanga.

10. Linner said at subsequent meetings *colons* had come around to acquiescence in UN arrival; however, on August 5 when UN plane approached airport carrying, among others, four UN military officers in plain clothes which Belgians themselves had requested, Belgian officer manned machine guns on airport roof to prevent aircraft from landing. When through Bunche's efforts plane was allowed to land, passengers were kept inside plane. (SYG commented that keeping men closed up in plane on ground without ventilation threatened their lives.) Linner reported he had remarked to Belgian officer that 25 lives were at stake if plane had been shot down or if they died from sitting in closed airplane on airfield; Belgian's reaction had been, so what!

11. SYG gives weight and credence to report of Linner whom he has known for long time and whom he considered particularly acceptable to Belgian mining interests in Katanga since Linner is Swede who has worked for large mining interests in Liberia. He does not consider Linner to be sensationalist in his reporting. SYG distressed and appalled at misinformation Belgians had spread in Katanga and at systematic effort, led by Belgian official, to support Tshombe and keep UN out.

12. SYG then told story of Bunche's activity at time UN plane arrived at Elisabethville airport Friday morning. His account fit with that in press, Bunche being confronted with obstacles at airport and arranging only at last minute to get permission for plane to land.

13. SYG said he had confronted Wigny this morning with as much as he thought he could repeat of report by Linner as well as of Bunche's experience. He said he emphasized that Belgian civilians on spot badly misinformed about UN and Belgian officers in Force Publique accepting orders from Katanga authorities against UN and in apparent disregard of official Belgian policy. He told Wigny he believed Belgium was not responsible for instigating what had been done in Katanga. But he did hold Belgium responsible for not preventing what had been done by local people. He told Wigny "You have the power to change the views" in Katanga.

14. SYG summarized by referring to Bunche's recommendation for immediate total Belgian withdrawal as "next step". SYG reaffirmed that it was desperately necessary to get UN troops into Katanga at once along with urgent Belgian withdrawal. Steps must be taken to break Tshombe's resistance to arrival of UN troops. For that reason, and also because Tshombe understandably did not want to be under dictation of Lumumba, Hammarskjold had reached conclusion necessary for UN to find way to guarantee Tshombe's right to speak and escape imprisonment or assassination. In response to our query, SYG said he thought this could be accomplished through some kind of provision in res to be passed by SC. Such provision should provide

“cover” for UN to provide guarantees and stand up against Lumumba when he tries to insist on “getting” Tshombe.⁴

Lodge

⁴ Before he left the Congo, Hammarskjöld told the U.S. Chargé that the Katanga situation was “brutal.” He considered the situation in the Congo disheartening and thought there was a grave danger it might become another “China.” (Memorandum prepared by John S. D. Eisenhower, August 10; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)

168. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, August 9, 1960, 1 a.m.

357. Re: Congo.

1. During dinner recess of SC (August 8), Lodge met at their request with Congolese Ministers Gizenga, Kanza, Bomboko, Mwamba and Mpolo.¹

2. Bomboko began by expressing his appreciation for US clear-cut position as expressed in Lodge’s speech.² Discussion then followed of events during days preceding and immediately following arrival of UN forces. Main points all stressed were that Congo had no desire for Belgians to leave, but cycle of fear and panic had started during which Belgians fled even when they were not in any danger. In this connection Mpolo referred to case Coquilhatville when Congolese civilian went to airport as Belgians leaving, asking why they were going. Impression of Congolese was Belgians acting under orders.

3. Most significant and hopeful part of conversation began when Kanza said military aspect of Congolese problem soon be passed. However, it was necessary begin at once to deal with financial and technical problems.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-960. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels and Léopoldville.

¹ Minister of Justice Rémy Mwamba and Minister for Youth and Sports Maurice Mpolo.

² Lodge had declared at the Security Council meeting that afternoon that the time had come for Belgian withdrawal from Katanga “at the earliest moment under arrangements to be worked out by the Secretary-General for the preservation of law and order.” For text of his statement, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 546-547.

Bomboko and Kanza both urged us try to convince Belgians they should counteract "mauvaise propagande" which threatened in Katanga. Belgians were in best position dispel fear which Europeans in Katanga felt for their future once Belgian troops left. They said Belgians in Katanga must be made realize that arrival of UN is solely to preserve order, and will not result in persecuting whites. Both stressed dependence of Katanga economy on Belgians and strong desire of Congolese that Belgian administrators and technicians remain. If propaganda now believed by Belgians there was not counteracted, economy of province would be destroyed.

4. Bomboko then referred to economic conditions in Leopoldville. He stressed need to get economic life in Leopoldville going again. He said Belgians who have fled should return to their economic affairs. Those remaining should open their shops and their businesses again. He drew distinction between Congolese attitude toward particular Belgian Govt now in office and individual Belgians. He said present Belgian actions in Leopoldville amount to kind of economic sanction and seemed to be taken from spirit of vengeance. They have taken the control of central banking to Brussels along with gold, and now refuse to open their places of business so that economic life can return to normal.

5. Both Bomboko and Kanza, with apparent acquiescence of all but impassive Gizenga, stressed that paralysis of economic life was in no one's interest. They made official request: Soon as order is established, Congolese want to work with Belgians on economic matters. They asked us to tell Belgians they should start conversations now rather than take funds to Belgium, which could only create bitterness. They also asked that we make appeal to Belgium that they support UN in its efforts.

Lodge

169. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, August 9, 1960, 1 a.m.

360. Re: Congo.

1. FonMin Wigny called me out of SC about 10:30 tonight to say Prime Minister Eyskens had telephoned him "in middle of night" to say he was horrified there was no reference to maintenance of law and order in latest Tunisia-Ceylon res (S/4424).¹ Eyskens said it was unthinkable that res with this defect could be passed; it either had to be amended or res had to be defeated.

2. I told Wigny that those in positions of responsibility in Belgium would have to think carefully and search their consciences on this point because consequences of misstep could bring about another Korea and make present state of affairs in Congo look like tea party. It was dangerous, irresponsible and unthinkable to make res fail.

3. I said that reference to law and order in pending res was superfluous. I called Wigny's attention to operative para 1 which confirms authority given SYG by SC res of 22 July. I pointed out that in res of 22 July restoration of law and order is mentioned twice and therefore this principle was clearly established in mandate given SYG and UN force and that operative para 3 by stipulating "full implementation" in effect reenacted res of July 22. I stated that operative para 2 spoke of "modalities determined by SYG" which obviously referred to law and order.

4. Wigny commented that radio reports had not made this clear in Brussels. I told Wigny that he could make point clear to Belgian public. [5½ lines of source text not declassified]

5. I ended conversation by asking Wigny to consider carefully what I had said to him and I repeated my admonition that Belgium carried heavy responsibility for success or failure of this res. I agreed to consider carefully what he said.

6. A few minutes later Beeley (UK) informed us Wigny (Belgium) had taken same position with Dixon on necessity to cause Ceylonese-Tunisian res to fail as Wigny had taken with Lodge. Beeley said Belgians were attempting to cause res to fail by trying to organize sufficient abstentions or by trying to obtain French veto. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-960. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Brussels.

¹ Introduced at the second Security Council meeting on August 8.

7. Beeley said he did not believe they could obtain enough abstentions and they could not obtain French veto. Asked if UK would abstain, Beeley said he did not think they would in the last analysis.

8. Beeley said in order to get over this problem Dixon had decided to ask question of SYG on how he foresaw working out of "modalities" as referred to in res and SYG would make reply referring to law and order which would be satisfactory. He thought this might solve problem.

9. Beeley said failure of res and consequent failure of UN effort would result in consequences which would be so serious that everything had to be done to avoid this outcome.

10. *Comment:* Belgian complaint appears to be based on Belgian internal politics. It cannot be based on true need for added language to provide for safety of Belgian nationals in Congo since res and SYG's statements made wholly adequate provision for them. Risk of second Korea is high price to pay for Belgian political crisis.

Lodge

170. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, August 10, 1960, 10 p.m.

377. Re: Congo. We met with Wieschhoff and subsequently with Hammarskjöld at our request this evening. Following is account of developments since SC meeting:

1. SYG sent cable to Tshombe transmitting text of SC res¹ and indicating need for Tshombe to comply with SC decision. Before receiving any answer to this cable, Hammarskjöld sent second and lengthy cable which eventually will become UN document.² In it he proposed plan of action for Katanga. Making clear there was no question of SYG accepting conditions or coming to any agreements, SYG

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1060. Confidential; Priority.

¹ The resolution introduced on August 8 by Tunisia and Ceylon was adopted without change on August 9 by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (France and Italy). For text, see U.N. doc. S/4426; also printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 547-548.

² For text of Hammarskjöld's August 10 message to Tshombe and the latter's reply, see U.N. doc. S/4417/Add.4; also printed in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. V, pp. 83-84.

said he personally would come to Elisabethville for *pourparlers* and exchange of views with regard to deployment of UN forces in Katanga. He would arrive Friday, August 12, accompanied by Deputy Commander in Chief UNOC, General Kittani (Morocco), SYG's military adviser, Brigadier Rikhye, some civilian advisers, and two Swedish companies of about 125 men each, uniformed and armed "only for self-defense". This evening Tshombe replied, welcoming meeting for exchange of views with SYG. In response to comment in SYG's second cable, Tshombe said he and his group could arrive in safety and would be received "with highest courtesy." There were no conditions stated in Tshombe's brief telegram which will also become SC document. (Note that despite many press stories, this was only cable from Tshombe since SC res 8 [9] August.)

2. At same time SYG also sent cable (similar to first one to Tshombe) to Lumumba. He advised Lumumba re SC res, pointing out obligation under Art 49³ to comply with SC decisions. Bunche told Hammarskjold Lumumba had "rushed around" to hand him reply accepting situation as explained by SYG. This exchange will also be made public in SC document⁴ as added help in keeping Lumumba "tied down".

3. Yesterday SYG called in Belgians. He gave Fon Min Wigny letter in which he proposed, if there were any difficulties or gap before he could introduce UN troops into Katanga, to incorporate Belgian troops Katanga into UN force as temporary measure to maintain law and order pending arrival other UN forces. Wigny said he could not give Hammarskjold answer without referring whole question to cabinet for decision. Wieschhoff described Wigny's mood as "very mel-low". (Dutch Del today confirmed this assessment Belgian temperament, saying they understood, without knowing any details, that Belgians were extremely satisfied with way situation developed since SC meeting.)

4. This morning Hammarskjold called in Congolese Del and told them of his intention, as set out in his second cable to Tshombe, to go on to Katanga. He did not give them details. He did make it very clear that he regarded Katanga as special problem which was so recognized by SC and that he would brook no interference in this regard. He intended deal with Tshombe directly and would not take rep of central government with him on Friday when he goes in. Congolese Vice Premier Gizenga, according to Hammarskjold, "swallowed hard" but took this without protest.

³ Article 49 stated that "The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council."

⁴ See U.N. doc. S/4417/Add.3.

5. Hammarskjold thus has completed, with Congolese and Belgians, preparations for next step. He realizes that his next problem will be Lumumba. Wieschhoff expressed personal view that in long run it would not be harmful if Lumumba were to try to interfere with SYG's plan for Katanga, thus precipitating test of strength with those who oppose him. (Wieschhoff mentioned Ileo, Bolikango, Kalonji,⁵ Kasavubu and by implication SYG.) Wieschhoff believes Lumumba would now lose such struggle and it would have result of weakening or destroying his role in govt.

6. In order to keep Nkrumah (Ghana) in line, Hammarskjold has sent him cable indicating his (SYG's) trip to Leopoldville includes 15 minute refueling stop Accra. He has asked Nkrumah if it would be possible to come to airport for brief "exchange of views" on current situation while plane being refueled. In fact, plane will be spending much longer time in Accra according to present schedule, but if Nkrumah knew this he would try to have Hammarskjold come into city for meeting at Presidential Palace. Hammarskjold feels psychology would be all wrong if that were to take place, hence his subterfuge on time available. (Wieschhoff said SYG originally dictated telegram to Nkrumah suggesting meeting "to discuss our differences". Wieschhoff said he felt this too strong and proposed phrase "exchange of views" on situation. SYG accepted this suggestion.)

7. Hammarskjold due to arrive Leopoldville Thursday night. After breakfast Friday morning he plans to fly on to Elisabethville according schedule set out above. He anticipates "talks" with Tshombe will only last one day. By Sunday Hammarskjold expects to be able to call in first large complement troops for Katanga. (He regards 250 Swedes in first group as "token" only.) These will consist of Irish, Moroccan, and more Swedish troops. Perhaps later he will bring in Ethiopians.

8. Hammarskjold plans return Leopoldville Monday, August 15 to begin negotiation on disposition of bases, pursuant provisions in Friendship Treaty. To do this he intends be party to negotiations between Belgians and Congolese and to initial eventual agreement on disposition. He hopes according to Wieschhoff to be third party to agreement, with outcome being delegation of authority for control of bases from Belgians and Congolese to UN. He proposes that these negotiations be carried out in Leopoldville and that Belgian diplomatic and military representatives come there for that purpose. He has already informed both Belgians and Congolese of intention have negotiations there. SYG anticipates these negotiations will take approximately one week.

⁵ Jean Bolikango, leader of the *Parti de l'Unité Nationale* (Puna) and Albert Kalonji, leader of the Kalonji branch of the *Mouvement National Congolais*. On August 9, Kalonji declared an independent state in South Kasai province.

Hammarskjold will then fly to Pretoria for his talks with South African Govt beginning August 20. Prime Minister Verwoerd has now agreed to meet with him and has invited him to lunch and/or dinner. Hammarskjold will return to Leopoldville approximately 24 August, and come back to NY just before end of month. While in Leopoldville he may have to do more with bases.

9. Kuznetsov⁶ also called on Hammarskjold today re Congo. During course of conversation Kuznetsov told Hammarskjold Soviet Union would make all its technicians for Congo available through UN. He also agreed that UN would set specifications for these technicians and only those would be supplied which were requested. During conversation Kuznetsov also sought to dispel any doubts SYG might have as to Soviet support for his efforts. They merely wished to reserve right to express difference of opinion publicly, he said. Hammarskjold indicated he prepared to concede them that much.

10. In discussing his civilian assistance establishment in Congo, Hammarskjold said he hopes when he returns to NY at end of month to bring Bunche with him. To replace Bunche as his personal representative he has asked New Delhi for services of former Indian Amb to UN and later to Belgrade, Rajeshwar Dayal⁷ who also served SYG in 1958 as member 3 man council.

11. It may be useful at this point to add that SYG, during recent days, has been busily pulling various recalcitrants back into UN line. With Guinea this revealed in exchange of cables with Sekou Toure set out in doc S/4417/Add.1/Rev.1.⁸ With Soviets it has taken many turns including his extremely forthright rebuttal statement during SC and his conversation with Kuznetsov reported above. With Ghana it has included cable exchanges with Nkrumah and now SYG's plan to stop in Accra. Re Lumumba, of course, SYG has taken many steps of which Dept aware from variety of sources.

Barco

⁶ Vasili Vasilievich Kuznetsov, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, was representing the Soviet Union in the Security Council discussions on the Congo.

⁷ For Dayal's perception of events, see his *Mission for Hammarskjold: The Congo Crisis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

⁸ Dated August 6 and 7; also printed in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. V, pp. 67-68.

171. Memorandum of Discussion at the 455th Meeting of the National Security Council

Newport, Rhode Island, August 12, 1960, 8:30 a.m.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–6.]

7. U.S. Policy Toward the Congo (NSC 6001; NSC Actions Nos. 2262, 2270 and 2276¹)

Secretary Herter said that as far as the Congo was concerned, almost everything has been reported in the press. He said that he had had a telephone call from Mr. Hammarskjold just before he left the U.S. in which he expressed his thanks to the Secretary of Defense for expediting his own transportation and for the troop airlift. Mr. Herter said that we had got over one hurdle in the Congo for the time being but that the trouble was not over by any means.

The Vice President observed that there had been a superb handling of the Congo situation.

The President remarked that the only trouble is De Gaulle who seems to object to the use of African troops and UN troops, and who seems to feel that U.S. and British troops should deal with the situation.

Secretary Herter said that there had been no less than eleven meetings with the French and they had no positive suggestions to offer with respect to the Congo situation.²

The President suggested that de Murville³ should be informed that we are tired of the talk of no consultation with the French.

Secretary Herter mentioned the question which had been considered previously of sending U.S. troops and the decision against sending our troops because of the danger of a possible clash with the Soviet troops. He said that the same problem was present in the case of U.S. technicians who might be competing with Soviet technicians with a possible conflict resulting and explained that that reasoning lay behind the decision to use the medium of the UN. He also observed that Lumumba will want direct assistance from the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia has offered to print currency for the Congo Government, he added.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Charles A. Haskins of the NSC staff on August 16.

¹ Regarding NSC Action No. 2276, see footnote 5, Document 156.

² The meetings were held June 1–August 22.

³ French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.

Mr. Gray pointed out that there was one exception to use of the UN for channeling assistance to the Congo and that was the matter of scholarships where the U.S. had made a unilateral offer. He said that 300 scholarships had been offered and that so far 800 applications had been received—not necessarily all from qualified students.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in the Congo.

[Here follows agenda item 8.]

Charles A. Haskins

⁴ The sentence that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 2284, approved by the President on August 17. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

172. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, August 12, 1960, 7 p.m.

401. Events of past week lead me to believe there will shortly be political showdown between Lumumba and his followers and elements in the opposition to him. Regional groups have been talking more insistently in favor of decentralization of authority and several of outright secession. We believe that the principal motive behind them is opposition to Lumumba's policies and fear that he is moving toward a dictatorship which will submerge their interests.

Thus far such opposition is inchoate and has expended its energies in relatively fruitless pursuits such as issuing manifestoes and directing appeals to the UN to support their regional causes. In discussions with leaders who have approached Embassy Officers we have emphasized:

1. Provisional constitution provides legal remedies if they are dissatisfied with present government;
2. UN is not a world government which could or would act to change the government of the Congo or any other government;

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1260. Secret; Priority; Noform. Repeated to Brussels and Paris.

3. World opinion and the UN would find it difficult if not impossible to accept a change of government brought about by violent means as some have suggested.

We have added that in democratic countries if the opposition to a government is united and determined, it can vote that government out of office which is one of the greatest advantages of the democratic form.

The arrest yesterday of Makoso, editor of the *Courier d'Afrique* and President of the Congolese Press Association, the announcement of a state of emergency and the reported drafting of three decrees (Embtel 400)¹ which would in effect set up courts-martial, require the short-term licensing of Congolese periodicals and imports of foreign periodicals and limit the right of public assembly are rather clear indications that Lumumba is moving steadily toward a very strong dictatorship. None of us doubt that he will establish a dictatorship if he can get away with it.

I feel certain world opinion, which is still in sharp focus on the Congo, will be a strong deterrent. UN presence here will inevitably be involved and the SC will very likely be seized one way or the other with such an issue.

Soviet policy, so far as we can measure it here, seems to support Lumumba and the unity of the Congo largely because they believe he can be at least manipulated by them in the service of their own objective of obtaining a prominent influence in the management of the Congo. It is quite possible that should Lumumba fail and more moderate elements win out, the Soviets might well change their present policy and work toward the fragmentation of the Congo in the hope they might obtain control of one or more of the fragments.

Belgian policy seems to have favored the separation of the Katanga and quite possibly of other regions and we have some evidence, albeit not conclusive, that this is still being pushed by some Belgian elements.

I believe our general policy of support of the UN effort and the legitimate government of the Congo is correct. As I understand it, it would of course permit the legitimate change of the form of the constitution and government provided this were to be accomplished by legal means as provided in the present constitution and represents the will of the people of the Congo. I have grave doubts however whether this possibility is not being seriously compromised by the direction which Lumumba is taking. If he is able within the near future to weld together enough fragments of the FP, as he is now trying to do, this could become an important personal weapon to intimidate his opponents and support his bid for dictatorship.

¹ Dated August 12. (*Ibid.*)

I feel therefore that we should be particularly careful to avoid public expressions which might strengthen Lumumba's position or the announcement of policies which might help him to achieve his apparent ambition. Where we can do so discreetly, it would seem to me good policy to strengthen those moderates who might be a restraining influence at the least and might be expected to replace him, under the most favorable circumstances, with a government much nearer the middle of the road.

It is quite possible for the showdown to come within the next week. The Senate is scheduled to reconvene Tuesday August 16 and the Abako, now even more opposed to Lumumba since the FP sacked its national headquarters day before yesterday, has scheduled a Congress of its leaders for August 13. Much will of course depend upon the degree to which the diverse elements in the Congo can join forces in the pursuit of this one common objective. Their performance and instincts to date do not persuade me to express optimism at this juncture.

Timberlake

173. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo

August 12, 1960, 6:39 p.m.

438. For Ambassador. To assist our thinking re Lumumba would appreciate your views on following and other pertinent considerations which may occur to you.¹

1) Lumumba is moving to left but is probably not firmly Communist-oriented and believes he can play East and West off against each other. In any event it appears doubtful that Soviets, any more than US, could, under present conditions in Congo, establish reliable continuing influence.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1260. Top Secret. Drafted by Penfield, cleared in draft by Wight, and approved by Satterthwaite.

¹ Telegram 458 to Léopoldville, August 15, for Timberlake from Satterthwaite, reads as follows: "Although we assume you understand purpose Deptel 438 we desire to make clear it intended elicit your thinking and does not represent Department policy decisions." (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/8-1560)

2) Lumumba has demonstrated strength and ability to outmaneuver or intimidate all other Congolese politicians. It is therefore likely that, regardless his titular position, he will continue to play key role in Congolese political life at least over near term.

3) Unless checked in near future he is likely progressively to concentrate under his control all effective elements of authority and thus solidify his position as authoritarian strong man. Thus it may follow that as time goes on it will be increasingly difficult for his opponents to overthrow him.

4) Important element in deciding whether change of government would be in our interest is consideration of alternatives to Lumumba. In addition to absence any apparently effective successor, strengths and abilities Congolese politicians seem to fluctuate, e.g. Kasavubu, regarded few months ago as possible rival, seems to have faded from ranks of contenders. Although there is opposition to Lumumba it appears uncoordinated and disorganized both in Parliament and on the street. Moreover it appears unanimously in favor of political structure of confederation, i.e. loosely associated independent states rather than federation of autonomous provinces or states. Such a confederation has many disadvantages, such as vulnerability to Soviet penetration, potentiality for internecine friction or warfare, etc. In addition it is strongly opposed by other Africans who fear for integrity their own states. Therefore if other elements, such as Lumumba's erratic and unreliable character, are not overriding, he can probably count on support of other African states. We believe a situation in which we found ourselves out of sympathy with both Lumumba and most other African states acceptable only in most exigent circumstances.

5) Above considerations lead to undesirably negative conclusion that best U.S. course for time being might be to take more or less neutral position toward Lumumba. This does not seem to us however to mean that we must be inactive. We can carry on re-insurance program of cultivating and strengthening potentially effective and friendly rival politicians, attempt to isolate or reform undesirables such as Gizenga and Kashamura and make efforts to mobilize other African opinion and action along constructive lines.

Herter

174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea

August 15, 1960, 7:50 p.m.

105. Deliver following to Sekou Toure. Advise Department date time delivery:

"August 15, 1960.

Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your telegram of August seventh¹ outlining the views of your Government on the troubled Congo situation which has caused us all such concern.

The United States Government and people fully share your desire to see the problems of the Congo settled as rapidly as possible. As you know, we have been requested on several occasions to assist the Government of the Republic of the Congo unilaterally. I believe very strongly, however, that the present crisis in the Congo can be surmounted only through the united efforts of all countries which believe in human freedom and justice, with these efforts coordinated through the United Nations under the effective leadership of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold. The United States is proud of its role in responding to the appeal from the Secretary General and I am especially gratified that among the troops flown by American planes was the entire Guinean contingent.

I believe that the August ninth resolution in the Security Council² will prove to be a great step toward calming the situation in the Congo as a whole. As you know, this resolution called upon the Government of Belgium for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga under 'speedy modalities to be determined by the Secretary General.' The United States voted for this resolution as it has for the others on the same problem, and will continue to support the United Nations effort to the limit of its ability.

In view of your prominent position in Africa, it would be a great contribution to peace if you were able to use your influence to encourage the fullest possible support for the United Nations effort in the Congo.

I deeply appreciate your warm expression of friendship which is wholeheartedly reciprocated by the United States Government and me personally.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1660. Official Use Only; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Cassily, cleared with John Eisenhower, and approved by Calhoun. Herter sent the President a draft of the letter on August 13 with a covering memorandum stating that while he did not wish to encourage Touré to continue the correspondence, it seemed worthwhile to take advantage of the occasion to stress the need to support the United Nations in the Congo. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/8-1360)

¹ Document 166.

² See footnote 1, Document 170.

Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower."

White House does not intend release this message in line with its long standing policy of maintaining confidential character of such communications between heads of state. Signed original being pouched.

Dillon

175. Editorial Note

On August 12, U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld submitted to the Security Council a memorandum with his interpretation of operative paragraph 4 of the Council's August 9 resolution, which reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo would "not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise." The Secretary-General's interpretation concluded that "the United Nations Force cannot be used on behalf of the central government to subdue or to force the provincial government to a specific line of action", nor could it be used to assist the central government in subduing the provincial government. For text, see U.N. doc. S/4417/Add.6; also printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 549-551.

Secretary-General Hammarskjöld left a copy of the memorandum in Léopoldville for transmission to the Congolese Government. He passed through Léopoldville on August 12 on his way to Elisabethville, where he and Moïse Tshombé agreed on arrangements for the deployment of U.N. troops to Katanga; the text of a communiqué issued at Elisabethville on August 13 is *ibid.*, pages 551-552.

The Secretary-General returned to Léopoldville on August 14, planning to discuss his talks in Elisabethville with the Congolese Government, but a letter of August 14 from Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba to Hammarskjöld rejected his interpretation of the Security Council resolution, accused him of intervening in the conflict between Katanga and the central government, and made a series of demands. Citing the Security Council resolution of July 14, which had authorized the Secretary-General to provide the Congolese Government with military assistance and to do so in consultation with it, Lumumba declared: "It is therefore clear that in its intervention in the Congo the United Nations is not to act as a neutral organization but rather that the Security Council is to place all its resources at the disposal of my

Government." He requested that Congolese troops take over the task of guarding all airfields in the Congo from U.N. troops, that Congolese troops and troops from the various African contingents in the Congo should be sent immediately to Katanga, that aircraft should be provided to the Congo Government for the purpose of restoring order, that arms and ammunition should be seized from the rebel partisans in Katanga and put at the disposal of the Congo Government, and that all non-African troops should be withdrawn from Katanga. He declared in conclusion that if his government did not "receive satisfaction," it would be "obliged to take other steps." For text, see U.N. doc. S/4417/Add.7; also printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 552-554.

In further exchanges of letters between Hammarskjöld and Lumumba on August 15, the latter declared that the Congo Government had lost confidence in the Secretary-General and requested that the Security Council send observers representing Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, Sudan, Ceylon, Liberia, Mali, Burma, India, Afghanistan, and Lebanon to the Congo to ensure the immediate and entire application of the three resolutions. Hammarskjöld declared that the dispute over the interpretation of the resolution would be submitted to the Security Council. For texts of these communications, see U.N. doc. S/4417/Add.7; for extracts, see *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, volume V, pages 97-98.

176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

August 16, 1960, 8:44 p.m.

228. Following are preliminary views Department re forthcoming SC session on Congo:

1. Successful outcome this session likely prove of crucial importance for US and UN. We believe UN withdrawal from Congo would prove calamitous. Certain result would be chaos in Congo with Lumumba probably turning to USSR for help. Further result would be intense cold war struggle for control of area with potential danger of conflict spreading beyond Congo. Thus, in our view, issue is much

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1660. Confidential. Drafted by Buffum; cleared by Hare, Wilcox, White, Calhoun, and by an aide for Satterthwaite; and approved by Dillon. Repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, London, Paris, Tunis, Colombo, and to San José for the Secretary.

broader than fate of Congo alone. Accordingly Dept considers our main objective in SC must be assure continuation effective UN presence in Congo.

2. We believe key to satisfactory outcome lies in SC members, particularly A-A representatives, giving fullest possible support to SYG.

3. Under circumstances we do not think it appropriate for US to take lead in directing course SC session but should be guided by views of SYG as they develop in consultations with Africans.

4. Accordingly, Dept believes best posture for USUN is one of quiet but complete support of SYG. In this regard, we agree entirely with Hammarskjöld's interpretation of SC res of August 9 that UN force cannot be party to or used to influence outcome of internal conflict in Congo. Lumumba's demands re use UN force and facilities clearly unacceptable and contrary to spirit operative para 4 of SC res 4426.

5. Dept also agrees with Hammarskjöld's opposition to withdrawal of non-African contingents from UN force. We accept reasoning outlined to you by Cordier (urtel 415)¹ on this point and you authorized make clear in all conversations we believe that under existing circumstances this force should continue consist of multi-national elements along present lines.

6. It impossible forecast now precisely what type resolution likely emerge. This will only become clear after SYG's consultations. In general, however, we would hope see resolution which reaffirms confidence in SYG and accepts his interpretation of UN mandate. We would also like to see resolution which clearly implies SC disapproval Lumumba's attitude. Moderate African delegations, particularly Tunisia, will be best indicator of how much traffic likely to bear in this regard.

7. Dept hopes question Belgian troops will receive minimum attention and that discussion will focus on crux of issue, which has now become dispute between Lumumba and SYG re future of UN role in Congo.

¹ Telegram 415 from USUN, August 15, reported that Cordier had shown the Hammarskjöld-Lumumba messages summarized in Document 175 to members of the U.S. Mission. According to Cordier, Hammarskjöld felt that if the non-African contingents were withdrawn, the entire force should be removed; to do otherwise would be to affirm "isolationist regionalism," which contradicted the whole concept of the United Nations, and to endorse "inverted racism." (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1560)

8. Assume you will keep in close personal touch with SYG, UK, France, Belgium and Tunisia. Believe would also be useful for USUN to pay special attention to those states which are furnishing contingents to UN force in Congo.

Dillon

177. Memorandum of Conversation

August 17, 1960.

SUBJECT

Congo

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary
Ambassador Alphand, French Embassy
M. Jean-Claude Winckler, Counselor, French Embassy

Mr. Woodruff Wallner, IO
Mr. L. Dean Brown, WE

The Ambassador said that the three heads of state and the three foreign ministers had discussed the possibility of problems in the Congo long before it became independent. The French had said that the three must concert their policies. When the troubles arose, he had told the Secretary that the three plus Belgium would have to work closely together here in Washington, in New York, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, this had not worked out. The effect in Western Europe has been bad.

The Acting Secretary replied that we have had close consultation all along even if we had voted differently in the SC. As for votes, there are occasions in which it is not necessarily bad that our votes differ so far as world opinion is concerned.

The Ambassador said that it must be more than consultation. We must coordinate our policies and our votes. In the future this should be easier given the direction Lumumba has taken. Admittedly, he said, the press has played up too much our differences. But on the whole the differences have been bad for public opinion. He believed that the US delegation should be instructed to work more closely with the

French, British and Belgians and work towards a common line. So far as Lumumba is concerned we cannot compromise with his pretensions. There must be a showdown.

The Acting Secretary said that our objectives have been communicated to our delegation which has been asked to talk to the French and other interested members of the SC. He had just talked with the Belgian Ambassador¹ and wanted to give Ambassador Alphanth our views. We consider this a very important moment. The UN cannot fail in the Congo. There would be great danger for the whole world if this happened. We must support the UN and the Secretary-General. We agree completely with his position on entry into the Katanga and with his view that there can be no racial distinctions in the force. In view of the exchange of letters between Lumumba and the Secretary-General we believe that the latter is on trial. We have to find out what he wants to do and what sort of resolution he wishes. We have not yet seen him. We have sent no definite instructions to our delegation pending this discussion with the Ambassador. While we agree that basic principles cannot be compromised, there are many ways to bring the debate to a close. We want to carry the Africans along with us. Of course we do not know what the Soviets will do.

The Ambassador said that Berard had seen Hammarskjöld. The latter was sure of himself. He said that this is a showdown and that the UN cannot yield. Afro-Asians do not like Lumumba as they believe that his attitude could affect adversely their interests. On the other hand, the Soviets do not like Hammarskjöld. The latter believes that the West should not put up a resolution but let the Soviets do so if they want to. The rest can vote against or abstain.

The Acting Secretary said that this line sounded good.

Mr. Wallner said that he understood that Hammarskjöld might say that he believes that he has carried out the Security Council's instructions correctly and rest on that.

The Acting Secretary said this could lead to no resolution at all.

The Ambassador reverted to SC votes. He said that the fact that we differ in our votes could lead people to question the value of the Atlantic alliance. This possibility should be borne in mind at the UN.

The Ambassador then said he wanted to discuss another point relating to the Congo. This was the Acting Secretary's statement to the Congress in which he said that the US would extend aid through the UN and believed that other countries, including France, would do the

¹ Ambassador Scheyven had asked that U.S. influence be used to forestall any changes in the Security Council resolutions under which Hammarskjöld had been operating in the Congo. He and Dillon had agreed that Lumumba's demands were ridiculous and that it was necessary to support Hammarskjöld's rejection of them. (*Ibid.*, 332.70G/8-1760)

same.² The French Government has informed the US through the Embassy in Paris that France does not believe that the UN should be the exclusive channel. The UN cannot find all the experts needed to run the Congo. Some day the Belgians will have to return. This should be arranged bilaterally.

The Acting Secretary said he was addressing himself primarily to US aid. We agree that the Congo cannot be settled satisfactorily without a return of Belgian technicians. There may have to be special arrangements for this. What we do not want to see is a whole series of bilateral programs with Lumumba trading one country off against another. This makes it too easy for the Soviets and Chinese Communists. It may be that a UN program cannot prevent bilateral offers by the Soviets but it puts them in a more difficult propaganda position. We also think that our assistance may not be limited to technical help alone. The Congo needs money to run itself. The UN could tailor requests and prevent a series of approaches to different countries for budgetary support. We understand the French position and hope that France understands ours. We are not really apart on objectives.

The Ambassador said France favors: return of Belgian technicians, no Katanga secession, and confederation. He then mentioned Nasser's launching of an idea of the creation of an African army ready to fight anywhere.

The Acting Secretary said this idea originally came from Nkrumah and been supported by Nasser. He doubted that Nkrumah would look favorably on Nasser's idea of taking over such an army.

² Reference is apparently to a statement made by Dillon before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 15; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1960, pp. 367-372.

178. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, August 17, 1960, 3 p.m.

432. As Department will have observed from Embtel 401¹ answer to each of first three assumptions Deptel 438² is yes.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1760. Secret. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, and Elisabethville.

¹ Document 172.

² Document 173.

Re point 4, there is no one with national stature in opposition to Lumumba. We are now satisfied Kasa-Vubu will continue to be a political zero so long as Lumumba is active; in my opinion he is naive, not very bright, lazy, enjoying his new found plush living and content to appear occasionally in his new general's uniform.

Joseph Ileo seems most likely successor if Lumumba Government unseated by legal means. He is President Senate where greatest chance lies to obtain vote no confidence in Lumumba. Although we have been in frequent contact with Ileo and he believes he has necessary two-thirds vote, we are not persuaded they will be delivered when the Senators have to stand up and be counted. In fact I am fairly certain Lumumba will prevent any such Senate action and would have time to do so since motion of no confidence has to be before Senate for 48 hours before vote can be taken. If he unable buy and control enough votes to defeat motion he quite capable of stationing FP troops at Senate chamber to prevent session. This he would probably justify under state of martial law which he unilaterally declared last night at press conference and defend as necessary to save Congo Government from Belgian plot take over through subversion some members of Senate. In light of foregoing, I have suggested to some of Ileo's supporters that they must be prepared for such countermeasures, adding that they might consider going into first session (if allowed) with enough sandwiches to last full course of 48 hours. That should at least force Lumumba into taking more extreme measure of ejecting them bodily.

Foreign Minister Bomboko is another moderate who might well come to fore in successor government. He has displayed courage on number of occasions and has more than once been on verge of being ousted by Lumumba.

Both Bolikango and Kalonji have considerable regional backing and would probably be moderates in a government favoring loose confederation. Yumbu, Vice Premier of Leopoldville province, is another moderate who opposes Lumumba.

These are all, I believe, reasonable men who would work for constructive solutions to the problems of the Congo. They are woefully untutored in parliamentary tactics, only feel really secure in the familiar warmth of their own regions and show no hopeful signs of being able to organize a successful fire brigade. I would not, accordingly, be surprised if an attempt is made on Lumumba's life. These people have more experience in the latter field than in the other. While Lumumba's elimination would remove one problem, it might well create many more. Gizenga would presumably succeed him and is under same influence of Communist advisors. More color would be given to the Belgian plot thesis and more reason for martial law. UN would also be accused at least of negligence, if not of complicity.

I could not more heartily agree we must not allow ourselves to get into the apparent position of being out of sympathy with most of the African states and Lumumba at the same time. The Soviets, of course, feel very comfortable in this regard. It seems clear that Guinea is going straight down the Communist line and will continue that way. Ghana is at least giving aid and comfort to Lumumba and the Communists but for reasons peculiar to Nkrumah, as I see it. We should therefore count on the strong possibility that these two would oppose any change in the GOC and any action of the UN which would reduce Lumumba's power or change his political course.

We should, in my opinion, now make a quick and strong effort to convince the rest of the African states of the real state of affairs in the Congo and what defiance of the UN and/or its withdrawal would mean. I would hope that most if not all of the rest could be persuaded support a strong UN policy re which see my next following telegram.³

Re point 5. We have been trying educate and encourage selected individuals and hope some progress being made. We feel whip hand is Lumumba's and unless he is stopped he will very shortly neutralize or eliminate the opposition near him. He will have a much harder job in extending his influence to other parts of country, excepting perhaps Luluabourg and Stanleyville where his position is strong.

Our best bet is to keep as many African states on our side as possible. The West in general should support a stronger UN hand.

Timberlake

³ Document 179.

179. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, August 17, 1960, 4 p.m.

433. I have become increasingly unhappy over failure of UN so far to adopt a strong enough policy to ensure real control over public order. At the outset, it was the leaderless FP which was the sole disturber of order and there was no pattern of directed effort. I said repeatedly after UN decided to come in that it should in the shortest possible time reduce the FP elements to discipline or disarm them,

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1760. Secret. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, and Elisabethville.

retrain those elements who wash clean after investigation and insist the bad hats be punished. I also said an officer corps of Congolese should be trained as soon as possible. This was based on assumption that GOC genuinely wished to restore order and would loyally support UN effort.

Today there are still thousands of FP with their arms in remote parts of the country as well as in many of the principal cities over which the UN has not asserted authoritative control. It is true in Leopoldville the potential for real trouble is, however, much worse since Lumumba has greatly increased his personal authority over the local FP and they have, in the last few days, again made arbitrary detentions, including UN personnel, civilian and military, and broken into hotels and apartments. They now show unmistakable signs of being directed. Their actions follow Lumumba's frequent public statements and the line he takes in them; i.e., he claimed yesterday there were Belgian paratroops in UN uniforms and wearing UN armbands and the detentions of UN personnel followed immediately.

This force has already shown its lack responsibility and under Lumumba's direction could be incited to action against UN troops and even whites in general. He has already shown direction of next step which is attempt secure withdrawal Swedes. If that successful, expect Irish and Canadians will be next on the list. He would probably be happy if all but a few Guineans and Ghanaians (without white officers) were withdrawn.

I can assure Department that if UN does not immediately act to take FP out of GOC control and if FP continues to get away with current conduct, most of the handful of Europeans still in Leopoldville will leave and the remainder would be some foreign Embassy personnel, Communist agents and carpetbaggers.

We are convinced that foregoing is the Communist plan. Lumumba, Kashamura, Ghanaian Ambassador Djin and Madame Blouin are all anti-white and latter Communist. So are Momo Toure, Yansan Sekou, and Louis Behanzin, Guinean advisers. Our latest arrival, Serge Michel¹ of the FLN is even more in the Commie camp and anti-western. They seem to be having no trouble in urging Lumumba further down roads which his own instincts direct him at least part way. The objective seems clear: Remove the bulk of Europeans and you eliminate effective western influence. Once Europeans have gone, nationalize their property on simple theory that business and industry must run to keep Congolese employed and if Europeans will not run them Congolese Government must. Finally GOC would invite Comie bloc experts in to keep business and industry going.

¹ Michel had been lent to Lumumba as press attaché by the Algerian Provisional Government.

It seems to me clear Lumumba is playing this game wittingly or unwittingly. I would hate to stand here and watch this gambit played out under the noses of an impotent UN military force. In fact many of latter are already furious at indignities they have suffered and at UN for keeping them under such wraps that they cannot be effective.

I quite understand the difficulties facing the SYG and the SC in applying effective military control. I suppose the USSR would at this stage veto any resolution with teeth in it and there would be a first-class hassle in the Assembly if taken there. However I feel the risk must be taken and the sooner the better. This situation is rapidly getting worse and the Commie design now seems suddenly clear. It is already late.²

Timberlake

² Telegram 541 to Léopoldville, August 23, stated that while the Department agreed basically with Timberlake's analysis of the situation, it did not believe it was time to urge stronger action against the Force Publique. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1760)

180. Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the National Security Council

Newport, Rhode Island, August 18, 1960, 9 a.m.¹

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1. For discussion of agenda item 1, see Document 33.]

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson on August 25.

¹ This is apparently the NSC meeting concerning which Johnson testified on June 18, 1975, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He stated his recollection that at an NSC meeting during the summer of 1960, "President Eisenhower said something—I can no longer remember his words—that came across to me as an order for the assassination of Lumumba who was then at the center of political conflict and controversy in the Congo." Johnson stated that this was his impression at the time but that, in retrospect, he was uncertain whether it was an accurate reading of the President's meaning; both Dillon and Boggs testified before the Committee that they did not recall such a statement by the President. See Senate Select Committee, *Interim Report*, pp. 55-60. Neither this nor any other memorandum of NSC discussion in the Whitman File records such a statement by the President. The only other NSC meeting during the summer of 1960 at which the Congo was discussed and at which both Eisenhower and Johnson were present was on September 7, but Johnson's memorandum of that meeting records no comment by the President concerning the Congo; see Document 199.

2. U.S. Policy Toward the Congo (NSC 6001; NSC Actions Nos. 2262, 2270, 2276 and 2284²)

Mr. Gray called on Secretary Dillon to introduce the discussion. Secretary Dillon said that the disagreement between Lumumba and Hammarskjold could create a grave situation. The Security Council meeting had been delayed to permit the Congolese delegation to get to New York. The delegation would be headed by Vice President Gizenga who is as bad or worse than Lumumba. The U.S. had suggested a further delay in the Security Council meeting and Hammarskjold had agreed. All the Africans in New York are opposed to Lumumba and we wanted the Congolese delegation to have time to learn this. It might calm them down somewhat.

We believe, Secretary Dillon indicated, that the Soviet Union is behind the Congolese move. *Pravda* had made a strong attack on the UN and the Soviet representative had told Hammarskjold on Wednesday that he disagreed with Hammarskjold's interpretation and agreed with Lumumba's interpretation of the Security Council resolutions. It was clear that Lumumba's letters to Hammarskjold had not been written by Lumumba. The interchange took place too rapidly and there was too much evidence of knowledge of UN procedures for this to have been possible. Hammarskjold believes that they were written by a Belgian Communist who is Lumumba's chief of cabinet. Others, however, think that a Soviet attaché in the Congo, who has had extensive UN experience, may have been the author.³

It was Hammarskjold's idea, Secretary Dillon continued, to present his interpretation of the Security Council's resolutions and to say that he would follow out this interpretation unless he was otherwise requested by the Security Council. This would put the ball in the Soviets' court. If the Soviets moved a resolution against Hammarskjold, we would speak in support of him. The Soviets would then get two votes for their resolution and nine abstentions. This would mean that the original resolution and Hammarskjold's interpretation of it would stand. Nothing positive saying that Hammarskjold was right would be offered because such a resolution could be vetoed by the Soviet Union. This seemed to be an intelligent way to handle the matter and Hammarskjold was confident of success. Hammarskjold considers Lumumba an impossible person and has suggested that an explanation of his up and down behavior may be that he takes dope. Hammarskjold is worried about Nkrumah, who continues, in Hammarskjold's view, to have ambitions for leading a large African state. Hammarskjold believes that he may be working with Lumumba in the hope of taking him over.

² Regarding NSC Action No. 2284, see footnote 4, Document 171.

³ Reference is presumably to Soviet Chargé Andrei A. Fomin.

There was no immediate danger to Hammarskjold's position in the current situation but there was real danger if Lumumba carried out his threats. If the Security Council backed Hammarskjold and Lumumba carried out his threat to force the UN out, he might then offer to accept help from anyone. It was Hammarskjold's view that it would be difficult for the UN to remain in the Congo if the Congolese Government actively opposed it. Also, the countries that have contributed troops to the UN force would probably not want their troops to remain if the Congo actively opposed their presence. The elimination of the UN would be a disaster which, Secretary Dillon stated, we should do everything we could to prevent. If the UN were forced out, we might be faced by a situation where the Soviets intervened by invitation of the Congo after the UN had been forced out. This would be a different situation from the one foreseen earlier and would be a very difficult one.

It was Mr. Hammarskjold's view, Secretary Dillon indicated, that the only way that the Congo can be kept going is for the UN to run it as a UN trusteeship, although it would not be called that. The only reason that Katanga continues to operate is that Belgian civilians there are still running the government and business. U.S. Ambassador Timberlake is concerned that the UN has not been forceful enough in dealing with the Force Publique. The Force Publique is armed and Lumumba could use it to terrorize the whites. He might force all the whites out except for the Soviet technicians. Summing up, Secretary Dillon stated that how to deal with the problem in the UN Security Council was fairly clear but what came after the Security Council debate was not so clear.

Mr. Stans said that it was the consensus of people who know the Congo that it was the objective of Lumumba to drive the whites out and to take over their property; that Lumumba had no concept of the implications of such action for his country. Secretary Dillon said that he was working to serve the purposes of the Soviets and Mr. Dulles pointed out that Lumumba was in Soviet pay. Mr. Stans asked whether the situation in the Congo did not call for quiet recognition of Tshombe's efforts to pick up other areas of the Congo. Secretary Dillon agreed that this might be appropriate. He pointed out that if the Congo was to be a viable state, it would need the resources of Katanga. He said that there was a lot of interest in the idea of a loose confederation of the sort favored by Tshombe. We could not support Tshombe while Belgian troops were in Katanga because then Tshombe had been simply a Belgian puppet. But now that the Belgians were largely out and were beginning the evacuation of their bases, something may be possible.

The President said that the possibility that the UN would be forced out was simply inconceivable. We should keep the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European troops to do it. We should do so even if such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight. Mr. Dillon indicated that this was State's feeling but that the Secretary General and Mr. Lodge doubted whether, if the Congo put up really determined opposition to the UN, the UN could stay in. In response, the President stated that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this extent—we were talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumumba supported by the Soviets. There was no indication, the President stated, that the Congolese did not want UN support and the maintenance of order. Secretary Dillon reiterated that this was State's feeling about the matter. The situation that would be created by a UN withdrawal was altogether too ghastly to contemplate.

Mr. Dulles suggested that if the assets of Katanga could be retained, the economy of the Congo could be throttled. The Soviets would have to throw a lot of money into the rest of the Congo to keep it viable in such a case. It was important to preserve Katanga as a separate viable asset. The President suggested that the UN might recognize Katanga. Mr. Stans suggested that we might base ourselves on Tshombe and Kasavubu and throw out Lumumba by peaceful means. Secretary Dillon stated that Kasavubu was like spaghetti and that he was strong only when Lumumba was away.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

a. Discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in the Congo, on the basis of comments by the Acting Secretary of State.

b. Noted the President's view that a United Nations presence should be maintained in the Congo in the interests both of the Free World and the United Nations, despite Lumumba's efforts, supported by the Soviet Bloc, to expel UN forces.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action.

[Here follows agenda item 3.]

Robert H. Johnson

⁴ Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2287, approved by the President on August 24. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

181. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Twining) to Secretary of Defense Gates

JCSM-363-60

August 18, 1960.

SUBJECT

The Kitona-Banana and Kamina Bases in the Congo

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that the airfield at Kitona, and the port of Banana, and the Kamina base complex, Republic of Congo, remain in friendly hands, and further, that these facilities be denied to the military forces of the Soviet Bloc.

2. Mr. Lumumba's repudiation of the unratified Treaty of friendship, assistance and technical cooperation between the Republic of Congo and Belgium exposes Congolese bases to occupancy by outside forces. The collapse of the Belgian military position and withdrawal of Belgian technicians create the need for foreign technical assistance to operate the base facilities. Even with the bases under their national control, the possibility exists that the Congolese would request Soviet assistance or request assistance from Communists of the Western World.

3. The continued availability of the Kitona-Banana complex to the Free World is strategically important as a base for maritime patrol aircraft in support of ASW in the South Atlantic, for the control of ocean shipping, and as a major point of access to the Congo and Africa south of the Sahara. The flow of shipping around South Africa would be increased significantly should the use of the Suez Canal be denied to the West. Protection of this shipping is a major task for Allied Forces and vital to any war effort. The dearth of suitable harbors on the West African coast further increases the importance of these port facilities.

4. The covert activities of just a few Communists infiltrating such essential facilities in Banana as river piloting, river dredging, stevedoring or harbor control could result in the denial of these facilities to the West and Soviet domination of the economic lifeline to the Congo and Central Africa. A similar encroachment into the communications or control functions of the Kitona airfield could provide the Soviets with

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.56300/8-2960. Secret. Enclosed with a letter of August 29 from Douglas to Herter. The Department of State was informed of the memorandum by telephone on August 18 in a call from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The caller indicated that the Department of Defense wished to repudiate a statement in telegram 395 from Brussels to the effect that U.S. military authorities did not consider the Belgian bases of strategic value to the West. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Joseph Sweeney of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, August 18; *ibid.*, 770G.56355/8-1860) Telegram 395 from Brussels, August 4, is *ibid.*, 770G.00/4-60; the statement was based on Document 160.

a readily available airfield to facilitate rapid military expansion into West Africa. Only a few Communist civilian technicians would be required to develop a ship repair facility in Banana, which could suddenly become a base capable of supporting Soviet-Bloc submarines. These strategically significant military gains would then have been accomplished with minimum and imperceptible Soviet action.

5. With Soviet occupancy or control of the facilities in the Kitona–Banana complex, either overt or covert, their military forces could then threaten the Free World's essential South Atlantic sea routes. In order to offset this capability it would be necessary to redeploy our already over-committed naval forces or establish a requirement for increased force levels to meet this new threat.

6. The Kamina base complex is strategically located in the heart of sub-Saharan Africa, where the potential for a breakdown in law and order in both established and emerging nations is high. Since future developments in sub-Saharan Africa will probably require the stabilizing presence of U.S., Western or U.N. military forces, the availability to the Free World or the U.N. of the Kamina base, as a staging area for military operations in times of crises, would be of significant advantage. In addition, the importance of maintaining overflight privileges in sub-Saharan Africa for the movement of Western combat forces to potential trouble spots in the Middle East and Asia is increasing in view of the present negative attitude of many of the nations in the Middle East and North Africa on overflight privileges by Western combat forces. Viewed in this light, Western overflight privileges in the Congo and the Kamina base air facilities take on increasing importance. Of even greater significance, however, is the importance of denying the Kamina base to the Soviet Bloc. In peacetime, Soviet Bloc control of Kamina would provide a focal point for Communist subversive operations and a ready source of military assistance in support of indirect aggressions to facilitate Communist coups in neighboring African nations, many of which are extremely susceptible. In wartime, Soviet Bloc control of the Kamina base would seriously jeopardize Free World air and sea communications in this area of the world and would require the employment of military forces to eliminate this Soviet Bloc base.

7. In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you reaffirm to the Secretary of State the Defense Department's concern that the Kitona–Banana and Kamina bases remain under friendly control and that all possible steps be taken to deny these facilities to the Soviet Bloc. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that action be initiated to accomplish the following:

a. Ensure that the U.N. assumes timely control of the area to preclude unilateral control by unfriendly forces;

b. That the U.S. and/or other friendly governments initiate military assistance programs to provide for the continuing adequate maintenance and operation of these facilities;

c. A program be initiated to provide Congolese personnel with Western training in base operations and maintenance;

d. That covert action, including the introduction of agents, be taken in all of the above to ensure pro-Western orientation.¹

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. Twining²

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

¹ Dillon replied in a letter of September 16 to Douglas that the Department of State recognized the necessity of keeping the bases out of Soviet hands and endorsed the first JCS recommendation, but that it considered that the other recommendations would not be practical. He commented that the JCS memorandum marked the first time, to his knowledge, that the Department of Defense had indicated that the United States had "any specific strategic interests in Africa south of the Sahara." (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.56300/8-2960) Irwin replied in a letter of September 23 to Dillon that the other three recommendations were considered essential components of a long-term policy to assure that the bases remained in friendly hands. (*Ibid.*, 770G.563/9-2360)

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

182. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, August 18, 1960, 8 p.m.

450. Yesterday I requested appointment to see Prime Minister which was arranged for 10:00 this morning. On arriving Prime Minister front gate I and Carlucci were stopped by armed guard who refused understand or accept laissez-passer or accept our explanation who we were and our business. He would not permit us enter grounds. After considerable argument we persuaded him take us inside where office staff spent confused ten minutes debating what should be done after which I was escorted across street and left standing on curb for 15 minutes. Having thus consumed half an hour, I returned to Embassy. Within minutes I had had two calls from his Chef de Cabinet, Grootaert, offering apologies and saying Prime Minister would see me immediately if I could return.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1860. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Brussels.

I did so at 11:00 and was ushered in, with Lavallee, to see Lumumba. Grootaert was the only other person present. Lumumba offered profuse apologies and explained that guards and staff were unfamiliar with simple problems such as visits of this nature. If I had set stage myself, I could not have contrived a better environment for tackling the Prime Minister on a number of problems which I might not have raised had visit gone off smoothly on the first round.

I told him I understood the earlier contretemps and then suggested he make certain in the future his staff took care of arrangements at the gate and in the waiting room so that visitors with appointments to see the Prime Minister would not be arbitrarily stopped and prevented from entering. Lumumba agreed that this must be done.

I went on to say that six members our plane-handling crew at airport had been stopped and surrounded by members Force Publique yesterday at airfield and their identification papers taken away from them temporarily. They were released and permitted to proceed only after members Ghanaian forces had interceded on their behalf. I pointed out how unnecessary and how bad, point of view public relations, such action was.

2.¹ I stated members of foreign press had been molested by Force Publique yesterday when gathered in front his office for press conference he had called. I told Lumumba I had never known US and Free World press to have carried story such as the one on the Congo so sympathetically, so fully and so much on their front pages. I said this was of primary importance to the Congo and to efforts being made to meet the needs of his government and his people. I told him that he should assist the press in all possible ways. He replied by giving instructions over the telephone to one of his assistants to see that this was done.

At that point one of Lumumba's aides brought in the passport and other identifying documents of *Los Angeles Times* correspondent Drake, who had apparently been detained. Lumumba asked me whether he was bona fide and whether he should be permitted to stay in Congo despite fact Drake had arrived without a visa. I said I know him personally and could vouch for him adding that he should be permitted to remain. The aide was dispatched with the documents and I am sure they were returned to Drake at once.

I pointed out he or his services could always check bona fides of any American newsman or businessman with Embassy. Without naming Detwiler, I made broad reference to persons who were interested only in making money fast and by any means, legal or otherwise. I stated such persons were bad for Prime Minister, the Congo and if Americans, for US. I said we are at his disposal to provide him and his

¹ There is no numbered paragraph 1.

government with information regarding Americans who might wish to do business with Congo. Lumumba stated a Van Der Meersch had telephoned 3 times from New York regarding a business proposition but in view of his "Detwiler" experience had refused to talk to him. He was under impression this Van Der Meersch had formerly worked with Dillon Read. I told him I would query Department re any information it could give regarding Van Der Meersch and his present connections. Please advise.

I then gave Prime Minister letter from Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton² and stated this was a well-known, respectable and solid business firm. I also handed him a letter from Coolidge³ regarding the Preservation of Wildlife in the Congo National Parks. Both were sent through me since I had talked with Bryant of Tippetts et al. and Coolidge during last visit Washington.

3. Prime Minister declared everyone could see he was not Communist since he had first called upon an American businessman to help exploit riches of country. He had also asked his various ministers to furnish him with names candidates who could proceed to US on some of 300 scholarships, which we had offered Congo. Lumumba pointed out he wished first students go to US and not Moscow or Prague. Also in this connection, Prime Minister stated he had decided yesterday to send Joseph Mbuyi to Washington as Ambassador. Therefore first GOC Ambassador to be sent anywhere in world would go to US. He declared that in few days Foreign Minister Bomboko would come to Embassy with new Ambassador-designate in order obtain assistance on housing and information on clerical situation in US. I told him we would be very glad offer all assistance possible.

4. I stated there were many persons who were trying to operate in this new country and that Prime Minister should be extremely careful regarding the choice of his advisers and to consider carefully their counsel since some might be taking the Congo down the wrong road. Prime Minister declared that the one overriding thought of his government was to rid the country of Belgian troops. He said he and his colleagues were not anti-Belgian. In fact, they wanted Belgian technicians and experts to stay on in order help this new country. I informed Prime Minister I had pointed that fact out to our President and to National Security Council as well as in Department.

5. Prime Minister declared he appreciated all UN had done here, but severely criticized Hammarskjold for not having complied with resolutions of Security Council, for not having consulted his government prior to his visit to Elisabethville where he "negotiated" with Tshombe. He also expressed anger at SYG for having refused wait for

² An engineering consulting firm.

³ Zoologist Harold Jefferson Coolidge.

Congolese Delegation which was proceeding to New York and Prime Minister declared that no doubt Hammarskjold wished to talk first to Afro-Asian group and to Security Council before arrival Congolese representatives.

After my talk with Prime Minister I accompanied Grootaert who had been present and who is one of Lumumba's Chefs de Cabinet, although a Belgian, to his office. Grootaert, formerly judge in Katanga and who apparently has been advising Lumumba regarding interpretation Security Council resolutions, made following points:

1. There is apparently honest difference of opinion between SYG and GOC re interpretation Security Council resolutions. GOC which bases itself on Roman law interprets letter of law while SYG, basing himself on common law, is guided by precedents such as Lebanese and Korean cases.

2. To understand Lumumba one must realize he was "raised" in Belgian-type liberal circles.

3. Reverting to my remarks to Prime Minister that he should be careful re choice of advisers, Grootaert stated he was very much disturbed by type of Communist advisers who now surround Lumumba. He referred particularly to the Guineans and to the Press Attaché, Serge Michel, who according to him was placed at disposal Lumumba by FLN and Ferhat Abbas⁴ while Prime Minister was in Tunis. Grootaert did not believe Prime Minister had fully understood import of my remarks and my caveat concerning his advisers. Grootaert said he would spell out my meaning to Lumumba. I asked him what he thought of a proposal we had in mind to invite Kashamura to visit US. He thought it was excellent, since the Information Minister could very well profit from a first-hand contact with US.

4. Grootaert did not understand why UN troops had refused prevent killings between warring Luluas and Balubas in Luluabourg area. He said it was one of functions of UN forces to restore law and order in country.

5. Chef de Cabinet stated it was desire of Prime Minister to have Moroccan General Kettani together with assistance Ghanaian troops train National Army. In his opinion, army must be thoroughly reformed, regrouped, and members be given new-type uniforms. There must be complete break between new army and old Force Publique. Although on number of occasions, Prime Minister and Grootaert had asked talk with Kettani, Bunche thus far had not sent Moroccan General to them. I said I would talk to Bunche.

6. Grootaert stated that few days ago 40 Belgian soldiers had been found in Leopoldville and that radio equipment had been seized in building formerly occupied by Belgian Embassy.

⁴ Prime Minister of the Algerian Provisional Government.

I was with Prime Minister for one and one quarter hours and with Grootaert for nearly an hour.

Timberlake

183. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, August 19, 1960, 5 p.m.

455. Reference Deptel 495.¹ Believe your reference to Embtel 434² must be garble as that does not mention Hammarskjöld and he never made such statement to anyone here. In fact, I believe Lumumba perfectly capable of demanding withdrawal UN troops and is probably getting just such advice (see Embtel 453).³

Agree 100 percent with Department's estimate contained with paragraphs (a) and (b) reftel.⁴ Paragraph (c)⁵ is more difficult estimate. There is some evidence Lumumba's recent flouting of UN—arrests, roughing ups, etc.—has enhanced his prestige on group. Congolese impressed when he gets away with such treatment great international organization. On other hand many Congolese disturbed over outbreaks of trouble again and believe majority would support firm line, provided it adequately explained. (Local UN public relations effort to date is totally ineffective.)

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1960. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN and Tunis.

¹ Telegram 495 to Léopoldville, August 18, set forth the Department's preliminary views on possible courses of action in the Security Council if Lumumba insisted on the withdrawal of U.N. forces; it requested the Embassy's comments. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/8-1860)

² Telegram 495, also sent to USUN as telegram 239, referred to "Hammarskjöld's belief contained your tel 434 that Lumumba will not demand withdrawal UN forces from Congo." Telegram 434 from USUN, August 17, reported a conversation with Hammarskjöld that afternoon. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/8-1760)

³ Dated August 19, telegram 453 reported on Lumumba's press conference that day. (*Ibid.*, 770G.13/8-1960)

⁴ They stated (a) that the U.S. objective should be to retain the U.N. force as a stabilizing element in the Congo, even if Lumumba requested its withdrawal, and (b) that the attitude of the African states would be of key importance.

⁵ Paragraph (c) reads as follows:

"Solidity of Lumumba's position in Congo likewise of major importance. If his leadership is challenged in significant way, his request for withdrawal of UN force will be easier deal with. On other hand, if such request by Lumumba should have continued backing of Congo Government and evidence popular support in Congo, practical problems of maintaining UN forces there over any long period of time are obvious."

Believe first consideration in handling a possible Lumumba request for withdrawal of UN will be solidarity African States participating. As I see it, all would stand firm except Guinea and possibly Ghana. However, if Nkrumah listens at all to General Alexander or his own officers here he must be well aware chaotic conditions.

Secondly, in such an event believe action on this end should be taken to persuade Kasavubu that such a step calls for careful GOC consideration and that Parliament should be called in extraordinary session to consider. I confess I have not yet learned secret of spurring Kasavubu to action.

Any or all delaying tactics contained last four paragraphs reftel have possibilities depending on circumstances at time. For example, Lumumba himself has frequently asked for neutral observers. However, Department should bear in mind UN invited in by handful of cabinet and presumably [could] be logically disinvented same way unless local opposition could be assured as per paragraph immediately above.

Timberlake

184. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, August 19, 1960, 9 p.m.

454. Re: Congo; Deptel 239.¹ Fol are my preliminary views in response Dept's cable:

1. UN must stay in Congo, and must do so vigorously.
2. If Lumumba govt asks UN to leave, situation would become very awkward.
3. Fol ways out of this occur to me:

- a) Find means to get rid of Lumumba;
- b) Find means of temporizing on Congo request to leave, such as maintaining Lumumba does not constitute Congo Govt for this purpose. It could be argued UN, having decided go into Congo, cannot leave except with consent of both sides, i.e., UN must agree to leave. This could provide opening to send SC subcom as suggested Deptel.²

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-1960. Secret; Priority.

¹ See footnotes 1 and 2, Document 183.

² The suggestion was to send a subcommittee to the Congo to report on the situation.

c) Change basis of UN presence in Congo by contending Lumumba was threat to peace. This would probably need action in GA eventually.

d) Finally, try to get to Nkrumah who is reported to be man who is steering Lumumba.

Lodge

185. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

August 20, 1960, 5:22 p.m.

277. Although attitude African group at UN seems in general agreement US position in Congo, Department wishes make sure participants in African states meeting Leopoldville August 25¹ are all aware extremely serious consequences which could arise if Lumumba's attitude toward UN continues in present form. Wish stress however following talking points to be used selectively in local discussion where circumstances indicate this would be useful. With this reservation, following points should be stressed: USG has supported unity Congo and has not supported Katanga secession. Last SC resolution specifically prohibited UN intervention in internal political conflict and spirit of resolution clearly implied UN force not be used support Lumumba against Tshombe or be placed at disposition central government. Any use of UN forces in internal political and constitutional disputes would set extremely dangerous precedent for all small states. Should also mention Belgian troop withdrawal proceeding as rapidly as physically possible, and UN has in fact demonstrated its concern for unity and integrity of Congo.

May also point out Lumumba is in fact challenging authority, prestige and usefulness of United Nations. UN remains unique force for safeguarding interests small nations and keeping cold war out of Africa. Flouting its authority by one government of a newly independent African state cannot help but damage the cause of all African

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/8-2060. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ferguson; cleared by Satterthwaite, White, Brown, and Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs A. Guy Hope, and in substance by Wallner and Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Nicholas G. Thatcher; and approved by Hare. Sent to 14 embassies in Africa and repeated to Léopoldville, Brussels, London, Paris, and USUN.

¹ A special session of the Conference of Independent African States met in Léopoldville, August 25-30.

states. Failure of UN operation in Congo would almost inevitably result in chaos that country with all this situation would imply for Africa as whole and international peace and security and might well have disastrous effects on United Nations itself. Might thus greatly retard efforts attain world peace through multinational approach collective security. We would therefore hope African states in manner they deem most appropriate can convince Congolese best interest of all Africa will be served by close cooperation UN effort in Congo under leadership SYG whose devotion to interests of Africa and cause world peace unquestioned. In all conversations with authorities of country to which you accredited you should overlook no step to emphasize gravity situation and opportunity for Africans make constructive contribution world peace.

At posts where criticism Lumumba personally might be counter-productive you should generalize, i.e. refer to attitude Congo Govt. rather than indulge in comment on personalities.

Dillon

186. Editorial Note

The U.N. Security Council discussed the situation in the Congo at its 887th through 889th meetings, August 21-22. A telegram dated August 20 from Prime Minister Lumumba to the President of the Security Council had, inter alia, requested that the Council recommend to the Secretary-General that he should "make contact and conduct negotiations exclusively" with the Congo Government, urged "that all United Nations action in the Congo should take place in exclusive, continuous and permanent collaboration with the Government and that the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo should regularly report to it on the activities of United Nations troops," and urged the immediate and total withdrawal of all Belgian troops from the Congo. (U.N. doc. S/4448; printed in part in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, page 556)

Secretary-General Hammarskjöld presented his interpretation of the Security Council resolutions and the U.N. operations in the Congo in an opening statement on August 21, which he enlarged upon in subsequent statements. He declared that he was not requesting "a confirmation by the Security Council of the obvious" but that his aim in asking the Council to convene had been solely to clarify the Council's attitude. (U.N. doc. S/PV.887) In the discussion, the majority of

Council members supported the Secretary-General, and the Council adjourned on August 22 without passing any resolutions. A Soviet draft resolution to establish a group of representatives to act in conjunction with the Secretary-General in daily consultation with the Congo Government was not put to a vote. (U.N. doc. S/4453) For the record of the August 21–22 meetings, see U.N. docs. S/PV.886–888. For extracts from Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's statements and the text of a statement on August 22 by Ambassador Lodge, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 557–563.

On August 23, the U.N. Secretariat announced the establishment of an Advisory Committee on U.N. operations in the Congo representing the countries contributing units to the U.N. Force. Hammarskjöld had stated his intention of establishing such a committee in his opening statement on August 21. The text of the announcement is *ibid.*, page 563.

187. Memorandum From the Board of National Estimates to the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)

August 22, 1960.

SUBJECT

Implications of the Congo Crisis

Introduction

1. The breakdown of civil order in the Congo and the confused period of struggle, invective, and improvisation which has followed have deeply affected a wide range of elements and interests outside

Source: Department of State, AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 261, U.S. Intelligence Board. Secret. A covering memorandum from Chester L. Cooper, Acting Assistant Director of National Estimates, indicated that the memorandum was intended for the U.S. Intelligence Board and had been prepared pursuant to its directives. The text printed here was sent to Ferguson by Robert D. Baum, Chief of the Africa Division in the Office of Research and Analysis for Mid-East and Africa, Department of State, with attached comments, stating that the CIA had resisted efforts by other agencies to amend the document and make it a USIB document. The proposed amendments included the replacement of the first sentence of paragraph 6 by the following:

"Although there have been reports of plots to assassinate Lumumba, it is improbable he will be killed. The practice of political assassination, which exists north of the Sahara, has not yet developed to the south, and no major African leader has yet been killed by fellow Africans. It is much more probable that Lumumba will not be removed by force, and that the internal Congolese political struggle will continue unresolved for some time."

Continued

the Congo itself. The crisis has raised serious problems and emotions not only with Belgium, whose citizens, pride, and property have been directly threatened, but with other European NATO members, and has raised once again divisive questions about the direction and unity of Western policy in dealing with rampant anti-colonialist nationalism. The Bloc has been presented with substantial opportunities for fomenting trouble and extending its opportunities at the expense of the West.

2. Among other Afro-Asian states, particularly those of West Africa, the crisis has revived anti-colonialist emotions, aroused fears regarding their own unity and freedom from cold war tensions, and created hopes of extending their own influence. Meanwhile it has added to tensions in nearby areas still under white rule. For the UN and particularly Secretary-General Hammarskjold, the crisis has brought unprecedented responsibilities, involving risks of damaging UN cohesiveness and prestige as well as the possibility of enhancing the UN's overall role in world affairs. Behind the conflict of external interests in the Congo, finally, lurks the possibility of a major East-West confrontation.

3. The situation is still too fluid to permit a useful estimate of the future course of events; indeed it is difficult to describe such a swiftly moving state of affairs. Three main elements, each of them complex enough by itself, exist and interact. First are the internal political struggles in the Congo, between Lumumba and his domestic foes, between the ideas of centralism and federalism, between Elisabethville and Leopoldville, between order and chaos. Second is the pressure of various external interests on the situation—the interests of Belgium, of the Western world generally, of the Bloc, and of the other African states. Finally there is the UN itself, desperately trying to reconcile these various pressures and interests, and in the process becoming itself a factor of power of the first importance.

The Immediate Future

4. Should there be sufficiently broad international support for a continuing active UN role in the Congo, the intensity of the internal Congolese political struggle and its repercussions elsewhere would soon be reduced, at least to some degree. On the other hand, should the UN be forced to withdraw, or should there be a serious split in the non-Communist world about the desirability of its remaining, Lumumba's efforts to establish and consolidate his power would be

The following was proposed as a replacement for the first sentence of paragraph 13a:

"The adoption of some form of federal government, as proposed by Lumumba's opponents, would strengthen the provinces. This would probably be coupled with a diminution of Lumumba's power or possibly by his downfall as prime minister."

more unrestrained, and the other interests involved—notably Belgium, the Bloc, and such African states as Ghana and Guinea—would probably be forced to choose between accepting increasing involvement or backing down as best they could.

5. One possibility is that Lumumba might be assassinated, or that his external support might fall away and effective internal opposition to his policies crystallize. The USSR on the one hand and the leaders of Guinea and to a lesser extent Ghana on the other appear to be developing a considerable stake in Lumumba. The USSR regard him as useful in cleaning out the Belgians and see him as a potential client. Guinea and Ghana oppose any beginnings of regional separatism and hope that Lumumba can be tied to their Pan-Africanist leading strings. However, even they may develop misgivings about overcommitting themselves to a man of Lumumba's volatility and unreliability, especially in the face of the growing reservations of many other African and Asian states about him.

6. Assuming that Lumumba continues in office, however—and this still appears likely—the internal Congolese political struggle will probably continue unresolved for some time. Even though UN forces remain in the country, Lumumba will probably retain the initiative, since he has the only Congolese military forces outside the Katanga and is evidently willing to move ruthlessly to beat down and intimidate those opposing or restraining him, including as necessary the UN. These factors, together with the apparent absence of any other Congolese leader with comparable energy, prominence, and willingness to do battle at the national level, give him substantial advantages.

7. Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that he will swiftly be able to establish and consolidate anything more than a skeletonized government, holding power of a sort at the center but with its control over the rest of the country at least initially tenuous. The Congolese army lacks trained officers and equipment and has still to establish its unquestioned loyalty to him. His political organization is strong only in comparison to those of other, more locally based leaders. If some *modus vivendi* is worked out with the UN, help will be available from that quarter in averting a total breakdown of basic governmental and economic functions, but probably only at the expense of placing restraints on the pace of his consolidation of power. On the other hand, forcing out the UN, while probably increasing Lumumba's freedom of action, would place new burdens on his own overworked security forces and threaten the loss of Western and UN technical and financial support. Under these circumstances, the USSR would probably supply economic and technical help promptly (perhaps including military instructors) and some troops would probably be forthcoming from

Guinea and perhaps one or two other countries. But even if these moves were not countered by the West, the actual consolidation of Lumumba's power would take time.

8. At least until the basic political problem is resolved, the danger of new riots and clashes will remain. Another wholesale breakdown of authority is possible, and would indeed be almost certain if UN troops are withdrawn. Lumumba seems intent on continuing his harassment of whites, possibly involving clashes between Congolese and UN forces. With the economy and administration in disarray and both Lumumba and his opponents likely to play on tribal rivalries in their efforts to gain support, new inter-tribal battles could readily develop.

9. The explosive Katanga issue also remains. It is possible that the issue will eventually be resolved without open hostilities. As part of a successful drive to consolidate his position, Lumumba may in time succeed through international pressure, subversion, or perhaps assassination in isolating and toppling the Katanga government. Alternatively, the central government (though probably not under Lumumba) may become willing to reach a compromise. For the present, however, there is growing danger of an armed clash. Lumumba appears intent on building up his forces for this purpose, while Tshombe, thanks in part to some remaining Belgian advisors, has a fairly substantial defense force. Unless convinced that armed resistance would be futile or internationally disastrous, Belgium and other European NATO members would probably back Katanga and place strong pressure on the US to do likewise. Lumumba, in turn, would probably have some military support from at least Guinea among the African powers, and diplomatic and moral support (and perhaps arms) from the USSR. Although we consider it unlikely that either the USSR or Belgium and its friends would actually send troops to the scene, the result could be a major East-West confrontation in which the emotions of many Afro-Asian states would be deeply involved and the capacity of the UN to mediate might have been seriously prejudiced.

10. Katanga is not the only province where separatist sentiment exists. Some steps toward autonomy have been taken by local political leaders in three other provinces as well, and the "independent" Mining State of Kasai has already been proclaimed. Such developments will further complicate the confusion.

Further Prospects

11. As we see it at present, four possible outcomes of the present political struggle warrant attention: (a) the establishment of central authority under Lumumba; (b) the establishment of a federal type of government, most probably *not* under Lumumba; (c) a fragmented Congo; and (d) UN control. As indicated above, we cannot confidently predict at this early stage precisely what one solution as against the

other would mean for the Congo and the various interested outside parties. However, the following projections would appear to be reasonable.

12. *Central Authority under Lumumba*

a. The establishment of effective central authority, for which Lumumba alone appears to have the drive and ability, would certainly involve the extensive use of authoritarian measures, supplemented by efforts to broaden the geographical and popular base of Lumumba's political movement. Given the depth of the Congo's tribal and regional differences, the government's control over the hinterland would rest on its ability to discourage or repress serious resistance to its wishes rather than on genuine acceptance of central authority. It would be tenuous in many more remote areas.

b. Any Congolese government will require extensive technical and economic assistance to keep its economy and administration going. Lumumba is probably quite capable of turning again to Belgium, the UN, and the US once he has established that he is the man to deal with. The Belgians in particular will be bitter, and reluctant to do further business with Lumumba. However, the Western countries will generally be concerned to retain a UN tie with the Congo, rather than cut Lumumba totally adrift.

b.1. In the absence of UN assistance, Lumumba will turn elsewhere, possibly first to a group of Afro-Asian countries, which would almost certainly be unable to fulfill the Congo's needs. At the same time, he will recognize that major assistance must come from the major powers, and the Bloc is likely to be less inhibited than the West in taking over from the UN. If Congolese dependence on the Bloc became substantial, it would facilitate the expulsion or flight of Western economic interests, pave the way for establishment of Communist-type economic institutions, and generally facilitate a politico-economic development similar to that in Guinea.

c. Lumumba's foreign policy would probably be opportunistic and quixotic. His probable dependence for support and advice on the Bloc and on such African countries as Ghana and Guinea, coupled with his underlying anti-Belgian, anti-white feelings, would make him a left neutralist, but he would probably be hard to keep pinned down. He would probably be a disruptive element among other African and Asian states. He is an obvious target for competitive efforts to exert influence over him and by his wild behavior would probably irritate the older line neutralists and pro-Western governments. Although his establishment of a dominant position would discourage separatists in other African states and reinforce the fears of white elements still dominant in other areas, his Congo state would probably long remain too weak to exert significant pressures of its own in such areas. However, under Lumumba the Congo might become a base for Bloc operations in the area, e.g., the running of arms into Angola and Northern Rhodesia.

13. *Federal Type of Government*

a. The abandonment of the present unitary state in favor of a federal arrangement, with more power returned to the provinces, would probably be coupled with the downfall of Lumumba, who is bitterly opposed to regionalism. This may prove to be the only practical arrangement for the present in a country as disunited as the Congo and lacking political leaders with other than a local following. However, it would involve a revamping of such elements of the Belgian administrative structure as remain in which coordination of activities on a national basis would be more difficult and efficiency lost.

b. The leading political figures in a federation would probably be disposed to rely on the UN and the West for technical assistance and economic aid, at least at the outset. They might even be willing to come to some agreement by which a substantial number of the Belgian technicians might return. As time goes on, however, these essentially opportunistic leaders would probably cast around for assistance from any outside source including the Bloc.

c. The federal solution would be a bitter disappointment to some influential African leaders who would see it as the opening wedge leading to secessionist moves elsewhere. With a weak central government the Congo would become a natural battle ground for a variety of conflicting interests including Pan-Africanists, white settlers in the Rhodesias and Kenya, and the Bloc. Because of its encouragement of regional ambitions, a federal arrangement would also stimulate agitation for new political groupings, linking tribal elements in Angola and the former French Congo with their tribal brethren in the Congo.

14. *A Fragmented Congo.* A fragmented Congo—i.e., a complete separation of Katanga from the rest of the Congo, or a further division into separate and independent states—would almost certainly be a source of weakness and contention in the area. It is strongly opposed not only by the Africans but by most European powers, who fear the impact of regional separatism elsewhere. Even the present Katanga leadership is seeking autonomy, not independence. Thus the persistence of an independent Katanga would represent the continuation of an unresolved battle rather than any viable solution and would be a continuing source of political if not military skirmishing.

15. *UN Control.* The question has frequently arisen whether the Congo might not be best served by a further period of tutelage under the UN pending the development of an adequate corps of political leaders and administrators. Such an arrangement would probably involve a UN administration set up under the Secretariat or under a group of UN trustee countries rather than under the single trustee nation arrangement inherited from the old League of Nations mandate system. It might involve de facto UN control of a nominally independent Congo government through extensive use of UN administrators and advisers.

a. An attempt at such a solution might prove unavoidable in the event of another drastic breakdown of civil authority within the Congolese republic, and moves toward de facto UN administrative control might take place under any moderate successor to Lumumba. If the Belgian link is in fact broken beyond repair, this might prove the only way (other than resort to the Bloc) of providing the thousands of administrators needed to replace Belgians in the government.

b. Over and above the managerial problems of recruiting and organizing a large-scale UN administrative team, however, the venture would involve difficult political problems and would be hard to sustain for more than a brief period in which little real preparation of Congolese leaders could take place. In time virtually all Congolese leaders would become increasingly restive over outside domination, even on an international basis, and in this they would be supported by the other African states. The problem of financial relations would be a serious one. Finally, the arrangement would be conditioned on a long-sustained consensus in the UN, involving the Bloc and the Afro-Asian group, that such a solution was the best for all concerned. This would be certainly difficult to maintain. Even if UN control was not directly attacked, the UN would have to cope with a wide range of attempted political manipulation and proselytization within the Congo.

16. *General Comments.* In addition to the foregoing, certain general conclusions can probably be advanced on the probable effects of the Congo crisis:

a. The Belgian future in the Congo is bleak. The Belgian presence—administrators, economic enterprises, etc.—is eventually likely to become minimal or nonexistent if Lumumba continues in power. Although his replacement by a more moderate leadership would probably open the way for a formulation of new arrangements for continued Belgian-Congolese cooperation in administrative, financial, and economic matters, too much fear and bitterness has been aroused on both sides for such arrangements to persist for very long.

b. Thus, the crisis will achieve one of the important Soviet objectives in the area, to end the political and economic dominance of the Western powers over what is in terms of resources one of the richest areas in Africa. The USSR will also have substantial opportunities for developing its own influence and moulding the state and economy along radical lines, particularly if Lumumba remains in power. Given the primitive level of political development in the Congo, however, we consider it unlikely that the Congo would become an actual Communist state at any early date. Moreover, the crisis might result in the USSR becoming heavily committed to Lumumba's success but unable or unwilling to provide the necessary support.

c. These prospects will almost certainly be a source of deep uneasiness not only to Belgium but also to France, Portugal, and other European NATO members. We are not prepared to say that this would adversely affect NATO military posture. However, it will almost certainly stimulate further European pressure—directed primarily at the US—for the development of coordinated policies for meeting the joint challenge of nationalism and communism in Africa and other underdeveloped areas.

d. For the UN, the crisis provides unprecedented opportunities and risks. It may emerge with a much enlarged role in preserving peace and stability in the underdeveloped world. If it succeeds, this would probably involve welcome indication that on this issue at least, the USSR was willing to cooperate in limiting the risks of East-West competition. The UN organization may, on the other hand, become overextended and discredited, with Hammarskjold perhaps forced to resign. An additional danger is of critical cleavages within the UN between the Bloc and the non-Communist world, or between the Afro-Asian group and the West.

For the Board of National Estimates
Abbot Smith
Acting Chairman

188. Editorial Note

At the 457th meeting of the National Security Council on August 25, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, August 25, reads as follows:

“Mr. Dulles reported that Lumumba had receded from his extremist position as a result of the UN Security Council meeting on the Congo. It is possible that Lumumba is only beating a tactical retreat, however; he may resume the offensive at any time. The next issue to arise in the Congo may concern the Belgian insistence that a complete relinquishment of the Belgian air bases must await negotiations. Belgium is planning a ‘presence’ in Katanga in the form of technicians even though Belgian troops are scheduled to be withdrawn by August 30. Training a Congo armed force will prove to be a difficult task in view of the disintegration of the Force Publique which has already taken place. It is unlikely that a large force of trained Congo troops can be assembled in the near future. Mr. Dulles displayed a map of the Congo and pointed out the Kasai province to which Lumumba was attempting to airlift troops in order to prevent another attempted secession. Mr. Dulles explained that the southern part of Kasai was threatening to join the Katanga secessionist movement. To provide for his airlift, Lumumba seized part of the Sabena airlines although some of these planes still bore UN markings. Mr. Dulles reported that a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] engineer recently in the Congo said that there are sixty Soviet satellite technicians in the area, many of whom had previously been in Iraq. On August 22 a Soviet vessel with a number of Soviet technicians and one hundred trucks arrived in the

Congo. Czech teachers for the Congo secondary schools are reported to be on the way. Several prominent Belgian Communists have arrived in the Congo to lay the foundations for a Congolese Communist Party. Finally, Mr. Dulles reported that as an aftermath of the break-up of the Mali Federation, it appeared that the 566-man Mali contingent of UN forces in the Congo was also splitting along Senegalese-Soudanese lines." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Earlier in the briefing, Dulles had noted that the Mali Federation was apparently breaking up; Senegal had declared its independence on August 20. For the U.S. response, see Document 59.

189. Editorial Note

On August 25, the Special Group, a National Security Council subcommittee responsible for planning covert operations, met to discuss plans for an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. For extracts from the minutes of the meeting and testimony by the participants before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1975, see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Interim Report*, pages 60–61. A telegram from Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles to the Léopoldville Station Officer the next day, as quoted on page 15 of the *Interim Report*, reads in part as follows:

"In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if (Lumumba) continues to hold high office, the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way to Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of the UN and for the interests of the free world generally. Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action. (CIA Cable, Dulles to Station Officer, 8/26/60)"

190. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, August 26, 1960, 7 p.m.

517. Re: Congo.

1. In accordance Deptel 271¹ Lodge saw SYG today and read substance of Leopoldville 496² to him.

2. SYG's observations on telegram were: (a) he thought comment that "all UN military contingents bear witness to humiliations, etc.," was slightly exaggerated, (b) he agreed with essential idea behind telegram that situation in Congo would not be straightened out until Lumumba was dealt with, (c) he did not feel he now had authority to disarm Force Publique as Timberlake suggests, and (d) he thought situation in Congo had not yet gotten to "China" stage.

3. SYG thinks issue in Congo must come to crisis shortly and that Lumumba must be "broken". (He apparently has in mind that new crisis between Lumumba and UN, in which UN victorious, will undercut Lumumba's political power in Congo sufficiently that Kasavubu or Ileo will be able to assume effective control.) He believes this crisis will develop after end of current meeting of African leaders in Congo.

4. One way for crisis to develop would be effort by Lumumba to take Leopoldville airport. He showed Lodge draft letter he plans send Lumumba in case Lumumba again demands to take over control of airport. Substance of letter is that control of airport by UN is necessary to facilitate UN responsibilities and that UN will take "all necessary measures" to protect its position there. (SYG believes that one way or another there will have to be some casualties in Congo before situation cleared up. He is prepared to face this and believes this is best way of preserving situation in long run.)

5. Other way crisis might develop, which he seemed this morning to consider more likely in light of Lumumba's press statement today, would be Lumumba demand for immediate withdrawal UN troops when Belgians were out. SYG said he would treat this as "formal request", although he had information showing other Congo leaders

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-2660. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville.

¹ Dated August 25, telegram 271 instructed Lodge to express U.S. concern about the deteriorating public security situation in Léopoldville to Hammarskjöld. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/8-2560)

² In telegram 496, August 24, Timberlake declared that security conditions in Léopoldville were growing steadily worse and urged that the only way to restore law and order would be disarmament or disbandment of the Force Publique by the U.N. forces. He declared that the pattern noted in telegram 433 (Document 179) was even more evident and that "if Lumumba and his wired-in Communist advisors are not stopped by a policy of strength we think this country is headed toward another China by way of technicians instead of bayonets." (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-2460)

would not favor it, and he would have SC meeting. After Lumumba presented his demand SYG would say in SC that Force Publique could in no circumstances maintain peace and order in Congo and that withdrawal of UN troops would undoubtedly lead to foreign intervention and therefore to breach of peace. In order to avoid contributing itself to breach of international peace UN must therefore stay in Congo in fulfillment responsibilities under Article 42 of Charter (which provides for air, sea or land force action by SC to maintain or restore international peace and security). He would plan to phrase his remarks in such a way that in absence SC resolution calling for UN withdrawal, retention of UN troops in Congo would have been endorsed. He is confident that only USSR would introduce resolution calling for withdrawal and that it would be defeated with only two favorable votes. He then would hope that other members of SC would refer to Article 42 in explaining their reasons for rejecting Soviet motion.

6. SYG believes that if USSR attempted to take issue to GA it would be defeated by vote of 70 to 12 and that they would therefore not attempt it. He also believes USSR could not intervene militarily in Congo because other African states would be opposed to it. He said he thought he was worth "five Lumumbas" to Russians. (He said until recently he thought he had been worth ten Lumumbas to them.) Only way for USSR to interfere with continued UN operation in Congo would therefore be through "flag of convenience". This would only be Guinea or Ghana. He said Guinean troops had been so placed in Congo that they could not move and could do no damage. He observed Guinea had only one other battalion and that with current difficulties in Mali, Guinea would be unable to take this out of country. Re Ghana, he saw signs it was beginning to sober up and he noted that Nkrumah himself believed Force Publique should be disarmed.

7. SYG said that after SC session of this sort UN would in effect be taking over control of Congo and that he would then be in position to disarm Force Publique by force if necessary. (SYG said disarming of some Force Publique units when UN first arrived had come as result Congolese Government order but that government had itself rearmed Force Publique units in Leopoldville area.)

8. He thought Katanga problem could and must be resolved once Lumumba was out of way and this crisis had been passed. He said there was no Katanga problem between Tshombe and Kasavubu or Ileo but only with Lumumba.

9. He is sending Cordier and General Rikhye (India) to Congo tonight and Galo Plaza³ (Ecuador) tomorrow and bringing Bunche back September 1 so that SYG, Bunche and Dayal (India) can confer

³ Former President of Ecuador Lasso Galo Plaza headed a U.N. committee to study what should be done with the Belgian military bases at Kamina and Kitona.

here before Dayal goes to Congo. Cordier will cover period between departure Bunche and arrival Dayal. He will be SYG's personal representative, with Rikhye second ranking of group. He described Rikhye as very much "our" (UN) man and said Dayal would be same. He said Dayal would have same orientation as Bunche and would be even more forceful.

10. Commenting on other aspects of situation he said Bunche was now totally unable to obtain appointment with Lumumba, that Bourguiba (Tunisia) had unsuccessfully tried to see Lumumba for five days and was about to leave, that Tunisian representatives were unable to get into opening session of African leaders' meeting and that Quaison-Sackey (Ghanaian Ambassador to UN) was incommunicado in Brazzaville.

11. SYG commented he had never worked so hard or enjoyed himself so much since he came here. He is clearly looking forward to forcing issue with Lumumba, but wants latter create the situation. He is confident that he can win with backing of substantially entire UN except Communists.

Lodge

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

August 27, 1960, 12:35 p.m.

283. Department greatly reassured by Hammarskjold's assessment of Congo situation as outlined USUN's 517¹ (being repeated Leopoldville and Brussels). However we are seriously disturbed by increasing number of reports of importation into Congo of arms or other subversive material on Soviet ships and aircraft purportedly transporting food and other peaceful goods (USUN's 507,² Athens

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-2660. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Cargo and by Robert H. Miller of the Office of Western European Affairs; cleared by Blue, Ferguson, Buffum, Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs John M. McSweeney, and in substance with the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs; and approved by Wilcox. Also sent to Léopoldville, Athens, Rome, and Ankara and repeated to Brussels and Paris.

¹ Document 190.

² Dated August 25, telegram 507 reported concern about this possibility. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-2560)

469,³ Paris Polto 279⁴). Request you indicate Dept's concern to SYG soonest, ascertaining procedure for inspection and control of shipments which is followed in Leopoldville airport and other points of entry under UN control. You should also seek SYG's views on steps which might be taken to tighten up controls or otherwise reduce dangers inherent in this situation. Urgency of problem indicated by imminent arrival in Congo of ten Soviet planes mentioned reftel from Athens. Believe UN could seek justify inspection and control on grounds it coordinating aid and rehabilitation (UN has contributed \$5 million obtained from US, to finance essential imports) as well as being responsible for maintenance law and order.⁵

For Leopoldville: Request your views this matter and any recommendations you may have.

For Athens: Request you approach Greeks soonest to express concern over reported Soviet flights and to compliment them on their handling of Soviet request. Greek initiative fully justified and useful in discouraging unilateral Soviet move. You should express hope they will continue stand firm.⁶

For Rome and Ankara: Request you inform Italians and Turks of approach being made to Greeks, as Soviets may approach them also.⁷

Dillon

³ Dated August 25, telegram 469 reported that the Soviet Union had requested permission for 10 Soviet planes carrying "food" to the Congo to overfly Greece or land for refueling and that the Greek Government had granted permission with several provisos, including its right to inspect the cargo. (*Ibid.*, 781.5461/8-2650)

⁴ Dated August 26, Polto 279 reported a Belgian surmise that Lumumba wanted the planes to carry his forces to Katanga. (*Ibid.*, 781.5461/8-2660)

⁵ Telegram 524 from USUN, August 27, reported that Lodge had conferred with Weischhoff that day and had asked him to convey the Department's concerns to the Secretary-General. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/8-2760)

⁶ Telegrams 491 and 492 from Athens, August 28, reported that the Soviet planes were expected to refuel in Athens on August 29 and that their cargoes would be inspected on a random basis. (Both *ibid.*, 781.5461/8-2860)

⁷ Telegram 859 from Rome, August 29, and telegram 413 from Ankara, September 1, reported that the messages were conveyed to the Italian and Turkish Governments but that neither had been approached by the Soviets. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/8-2960 and 781.5461/9-160, respectively)

192. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, August 29, 1960, 5 p.m.

545. Contemplating Soviet strategy from Leopoldville perspective, it seems to me there is two-pronged attack. In view strong African states backing UN agreed respond to GOC appeal and Russia went along. In two subsequent SC meetings Soviets made usual violent noises and offered disruptive resolutions possibly hoping find wide enough crack for entering wedge. I have feeling they primarily rattling resolutions to make SC apprehensive and therefore heave sigh relief when eventually withdrawn as I believe they intended all along. That tactic so designed inspire SYG and Bunche walk softly in Congo and leave them more scope here.

Most serious effort is centered in Leopoldville where they well on way completely capturing Lumumba and followers like they took Castro¹ in Cuba. Believe pattern very similar but this one is easier in some ways; Congolese are totally disorganized, they are political children and only pitiful few have faintest idea where Lumumba is taking them. In fact I feel sure even Lumumba fails realize where he is being led. Hence, I would expect Cuba time could be cut by 50 percent [garble] Congo course.

Hope Stanleyville incident² has removed any lingering trace of the fiction that we are dealing with [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] or a responsible government in the Congo. The first condition which a [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] country must satisfy to qualify for recognition is that it has de facto control over the country. This government, since early July, has had no such control. The principal instrument with which to assert it has broken up into independent groups of armed savage bandits.

Thousands of Congolese watched the beating of our air crew. Lumumba arriving minutes after this event, did not even refer to it in his speech to the crowd at the field. Every such outrage, with the perpetrators going scot free, encourages them to go further. Unless they are stopped and guilty persons punished, the Congo can be in for a blood bath of frightening proportions. The present strength of the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–2960. Confidential. Also sent to USUN and Ottawa and repeated to Brussels.

¹ Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

² Telegram 533 from Léopoldville, August 29, reported the beating of eight USAF crewmen and two Canadian technicians when a U.S. aircraft carrying equipment for the U.N. force landed at Stanleyville. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8–2960) For text of a note protesting the attack which Timberlake presented that day to Bomboko, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 19, 1960, p. 440.

UN would suffice to keep order in principal cities and towns but not in the interior. The longer the present flabby posture of the UN is continued, the greater the potential disorder becomes.

The UN has suffered several Lumumba attacks already, and I feel he is quite capable of demanding seriously that UN troops leave the Congo. Unless their present wraps are removed, I would favor the immediate acceptance of an invitation to start sending some troops home, starting, I suggest, with Guineans. I think such action might just shock even Lumumba into a recognition of what his and the Congo's prospects would be and cause him to do an about-face. UN could then demand, and I think obtain, certain levers without which the economic and social programs being planned cannot be carried out. One is mandate to officer and command police and army until retrained and officered by competent Congolese. Another would be the establishment of a judiciary of competent, preferably African, judges and intensive training of Congolese replacements at earliest time.

At same time, we are receiving more and more reports that the people are turning against Lumumba. He may just be on his last spectacular lap and it could not end too soon for me. His only demonstrated skill is in attack and incitement. These tactics destroy; what this country needs is reconstruction. Many more people will soon be hungry. They will blame Lumumba who can be expected to blame UN.

In other words I think showdown with UN near and I hope they are ready for it. From this perspective I am bearish.

Timberlake

193. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Hare) to Secretary of State Herter

August 30, 1960.

SUBJECT

Status Report on Congo Contingency Planning

You may be interested to know that during your absence in San Jose¹ we have been giving intensive and urgent attention to contin-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-3060. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Meloy.

¹ Herter had been in Costa Rica for the Sixth and Seventh Meetings of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, August 16-29.

gency planning on the Congo. This planning has fallen into four phases:

1. There has been close consultation between the Department and New York and between USUN and Hammarskjold on detailed planning for action in the UN framework on both immediate and long-term aspects of the Congo problem.

2. As a result of the NSC decision of August 1, approved by the President, that the U.S. must be prepared to take appropriate military action as necessary to prevent or defeat Soviet military intervention in the Congo,² a State–Defense working group has been formed, chaired by AF, and on which ISA and the JCS are represented along with other interested areas of the Department and CIA, to work on contingency planning in this eventuality.

3. [*Paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified*].

4. A working group, also chaired by AF, is giving attention to contingency planning for actions, short of military action, which might be undertaken outside the UN framework in support of the UN or in the event of a breakdown of the UN effort.³

Mr. Wilcox, Mr. Satterthwaite and I will be glad to fill you in on any aspect of contingency planning activity on which you may want further information.

² See Document 156.

³ A memorandum of September 9 from Satterthwaite to Hare outlined several alternative courses of action, developed jointly by AF, EUR, and IO, for the contingency of a breakdown of the U.N. effort. The alternatives were: (1) maintaining U.N. economic and technical assistance to the Congo, (2) encouraging the African countries to establish a new framework for international assistance, (3) U.S. bilateral assistance to the Congo, and (4) U.S. assistance to separate provinces of the Congo, notably Katanga, with support for a federal solution. The memorandum concluded that all the alternatives were highly unattractive; it considered the first alternative preferable and the fourth alternative the least attractive. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–960)

194. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)

August 30, 1960.

DEAR MR. DILLON: The recent beating of an unarmed U.S. Air Force airplane crew by armed members of the Force Publique at the Stanleyville Airport is a matter of grave concern to the Department of Defense. This latest, and most aggravated, of a series of such acts of

irresponsible violence emphasizes that positive steps must be taken quickly to restore order in the Congo.¹

The immediate concern of the Department of Defense is for the safety of the members of the U.S. forces, who are engaged in providing and supporting the airlift of United Nations forces and equipment. I urge that strong representation be made immediately to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, looking to the proper security of airfields and related facilities in the Congo. If assurances of adequate security cannot be provided, it may become necessary to revamp our method of providing operational support in the country, one example of which might be to limit airlift operations to the Leopoldville area.

A few U.S. personnel who are engaged in support operations within the Congo have small arms available, but have been instructed not to display these weapons openly. Aircrews and other operational support personnel heretofore have not had weapons available. Aircrews are being authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have small arms in their aircraft for the purpose of protecting themselves. A portion of the governing instructions will stress the necessity for prudence and caution in the display and use of these arms.²

The larger problem of restoring security and stability throughout the Congo is a matter of equally grave concern. In this connection, we urge that the U.S. Government should advocate that the United Nations take immediate and positive steps to bring the Force Publique to an acceptable state of discipline and control, and to establish effective United Nations control over the fields, bases, ports and support facilities within the country. If necessary, the Force Publique should be disarmed, reorganized and retrained by the United Nations forces, utilizing whatever degree of force may be required to accomplish this task. In this connection, we are in complete agreement with the assessment of Ambassador Timberlake that if the Force Publique is not at once brought under control, the situation will continue to deteriorate.

¹ President Eisenhower raised this subject with Secretary Herter on August 30. The relevant portion of the memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster, September 7, reads as follows:

"The President first referred to the situation in the Congo. He thought that the UN must take the position that when it puts troops into an area, these troops must have the authority and instructions to defend themselves against mob violence. He asked the Secretary to have Ambassador Lodge take this proposal up with Hammarskjold at once. He thought it is absolutely inherent in official responsibility to have the right to protect one's self." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

² Instructions along these lines were sent in JCS telegram 982157 to USCINCEUR, September 3. (*Ibid.*, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Congo)

It appears that the original purpose of the United Nations in entering the Congo, viz., to restore public order, has become obscured, with the result that the United Nations may, to borrow the burden of Ambassador Timberlake's assessment, conclude in presiding over disorder.

Sincerely yours,

John N. Irwin II

195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium

September 1, 1960, 10:14 p.m.

501. Following based on uncleared memcon.

Belgian Ambassador called on Merchant August 31 at his request to discuss evacuation Belgian troops, Soviet activities in Congo, and future of Katanga. Ambassador explained that there were still 337 troops at Kamina awaiting evacuation to Belgium and explained the delay as partially due inadequacy facilities offered by USAF. He demonstrated keen resentment of Secretary General's protest on delay.¹ He bespoke our understanding of delay and again requested assistance to facilitate airlift. Mr. Merchant assured him we already in touch with Defense and Air Force and he could count on full cooperation.

Ambassador expressed his concern over the continuing reports of Soviet activities in Congo, mentioning particularly heavy material unloaded from Soviet planes at Luluabourg, unusual activities of members of Soviet medical mission at Stanleyville, and arrival in Congo of ten Ilyushin aircraft and asked if we had talked to SYG about controls. Mr. Merchant said that we had had similar information and were very disturbed about it. He also indicated our mission in New York was at the very moment talking to the Secretary General about problem.

Ambassador said main purpose of call was to discuss future of Katanga. He said if Katanga invaded, all Belgian civilians and technicians would leave. He stressed the importance of loss not only to Belgium, but to entire free world. He asked the US to use its influence

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-160. Secret. Drafted and approved by Blue and cleared by Buffum, Wight, and Calhoun. Repeated to Léopoldville, USUN, and Paris.

¹ For text of a note verbale of August 30 from Hammarskjöld to Loidan, see U.N. doc. S/4475, Annex 5; printed in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. V, pp. 146-147.

with the Secretary General to maintain UN in Katanga. Mr. Merchant said US aware of vital role which Katanga plays in economy of Congo and of importance its production to Belgium, US and Free World. He also indicated he hoped Belgian businessmen and technicians would be able to stay in Congo under secure conditions. He mentioned that US of course was not now prepared to recognize independence of Katanga. He said that he believed the Ambassador would appreciate the difficulties in coping with covert methods used by Soviets but that we could use our influence in two ways: first on the SYG to be sure that he would not agree to withdrawal of UN at the unilateral request of Congo government; to reiterate position that UN was not there to interfere in internal affairs; and to urge that law and order be maintained so that technicians and others could live securely and free from attack. He said secondly that we could use influence on African states, particularly those contributing troops, in an effort to have them exert a moderating influence on Congo government. He added that basically he felt we must rely on judgment and efforts of Secretary General in handling this matter. He agreed with Ambassador that we should make effort to prevent introduction into Congo of war materials. In conclusion he paid tribute to loyalty with which Belgian government had carried out its responsibilities in Congo in complying with UN resolutions and said that this had been a most honorable thing.

Herter

196. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Gates

JCSM-395-60

September 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

The Deteriorating Situation in the Republic of the Congo

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned over the steadily deteriorating situation in the Congo which had culminated in the attack on an unarmed U.S. Air Force crew at Stanleyville on 27 August by armed troops of the Congo Force Publique. They consider that unless

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-260. Secret. Enclosed with a letter of the same date from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert H. Knight to Herter, which stated that Gates had reviewed an earlier draft and generally concurred with the JCS recommendations.

immediate forceful action is taken by the United States to maintain U.S. and U.N. prestige, to safeguard U.S. and U.N. personnel, and to insure the success of U.S. activities in support of the U.N. in the Congo, a situation could develop which not only might be ruinous to the United Nations but might result in the Congo being taken over by Communist advisors and technicians. Moreover, such a Communist take-over could appear to be under U.N. sanction.

2. Efforts have been made without success to obtain directives which have been issued by the Secretary General to Commander, U.N. Forces in the Congo. In any event, it appears from reports made by the Secretary General to the Security Council that the directives to U.N. forces are negative or passive in nature resulting in U.N. forces accepting, in most cases, situations conducive to public disorder. In contrast, it is noted that in Coquilhatville the U.N. Moroccan Troops disarmed the Force Publique and have been firm but kind to them and have given them appropriate direction; the Ethiopians have taken similar action in Bunia and Paulis.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urgently recommend the following courses of action be proposed to the Secretary of State for immediate implementation:

a. Actions that should be taken by the U.N.:

(1) Issue to the U.N. Commander in the Congo a definite political and military directive defining his mission and responsibilities so as to require him to take positive action, rather than passive action, to restore law and order and to maintain public safety.

(2) Take immediate effective control of all Congo air fields and harbor facilities which are now being utilized or may be needed directly or indirectly for the support of U.N. forces.

(3) Permit aid (material and personnel) to the Congolese Government only through U.N. channels.

(4) Search all ships and planes upon arrival in the Congo to assure that no arms, ammunition or unauthorized personnel are introduced into the Congo.

(5) Assure the protection of all personnel and equipment being used by members of the U.N. in support of U.N. operations in the Congo. This should extend to the disarming of those members of the Force Publique not cooperating with U.N. forces.

(6) Issue a strong protest to the Congolese Government for the attack on the unarmed U.S. Air Force crew at Stanleyville on 27 August, and demand guarantees against future incidents.

b. Actions that should be taken by the United States:

(1) Assist, to the extent necessary, the U.N. operation in the Congo to assure its ultimate success.

(2) Take necessary action through friendly governments to cause all Soviet Bloc ships and planes enroute to the Congo to be searched in order to inhibit introduction of arms and unauthorized personnel into the Congo.

(3) Take necessary steps, overtly and covertly, to identify unauthorized foreign agents, particularly Communist Bloc personnel, currently in the Congo and effect their expulsion from that country.

(4) Demand that the Congolese Government make compensation for injuries suffered by U.S. personnel in the attack on the unarmed U.S. Air Force crew at Stanleyville on 27 August.

(5) Take all feasible means to discredit and/or eliminate Lumumba as an effective political force in the Congo and seek to support leaders responsive to U.N. guidance in the establishment of an effective and acceptable Congolese Government.

(6) Send notes to other governments currently providing U.N. forces, and all other friendly U.N. members, informing them of the above U.S. action, and requesting that they also protest to the Congo Government, and take action in the United Nations, in support of the U.S. position.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arleigh Burke²

Chief of Naval Operations

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

197. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

September 3, 1960, 4:19 p.m.

317. 1. Dept concludes from your extensive and excellent reporting SYG's objectives re Congo are parallel with our own, e.g., keep UN in Congo even over objection Lumumba; Katanga problem to be resolved peacefully and not to West's disadvantage; Force Publique to be brought under control; UN to obtain progressive control airports and ports; and Soviet influence in Congo to be minimized.

Previously we had considered, and SYG apparently agreed, main test of strength would come if Lumumba asked UN to leave. While such threat not completely eliminated, in light outcome recent conference African states which stressed GOC should cooperate with UN,¹ it does not now appear first test will come on this issue. Primary prob-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-2260. Secret. Drafted by Buffum and Ferguson; cleared by Kohler, White, and Satterthwaite; and approved by Wilcox. Repeated to Brussels, Léopoldville, Moscow, Paris, and London.

¹ The special session of the Conference of Independent African States met at Léopoldville August 25-30. For texts of three resolutions concerning the Congo, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 565-566.

lems as we see them are to bring FP under control, nullify Soviet penetration and prevent loss Katanga to Lumumba. We believe we have same objectives as SYG but are concerned at means for carrying them out. If UN fails meet these tasks successfully we will be faced with situation where regime in which there is increasing Communist influence will solidify control over large part of Congo. US believes this must be prevented and counting heavily on SYG. However, we need to know more regarding his plans if our support to be fully effective.

Dept pleased to note in urtel 471² SYG has been making efforts work out arrangements with GOC so that reform of Force Publique could be undertaken. In light continuing reports disorder, and particularly in view reprehensible attacks on American crewmen Stanleyville, would be interested in learning from SYG what further immediate steps are to be taken to bring FP under control and to strengthen general security situation.

While we realize UN forces under SC resolutions have no specific authority disarm GOC troops and it would in fact undoubtedly be dangerous to attempt it, some greater show of strength on part UN when Force Publique gets out of hand would, we believe, have a salutary effect since leaderless Congolese troops have shown no signs willingness resist firm display of authority. In this connection their panic when Belgian paratroops intervened in July might be recalled.

In long run, ideal solution would be for UN to undertake reorganization, re-training of GOC forces including provision UN officer corps. In this connection, has any progress been made in securing agreement have Kettani serve as head FP?

Moreover, new element has been injected in Lumumba power position with Soviets placing aircraft at his disposal. His military capability clearly enhanced as result, and we greatly concerned at implication this may have for his ability take over Katanga. Dept strongly hopes SYG will do everything possible to frustrate such moves and considers this highlights need to bring airports and ports of entry in Congo under UN control to maximum possible degree as soon as possible.

We realize there is point beyond which SYG cannot go without legitimately being accused interfering in internal Congolese affairs, but we would hope that broad scope UN operation would be considered by him as sufficient grounds for obtaining effective control of airports in Congo. Dept believes control of airports in Katanga particularly crucial. It appears to us that since Elisabethville airport under Tshombe's control and Kamina under UN control, with orders restricting use Kamina base to planes on UN business, that major question

² Dated August 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/8-2260)

will be how to handle possible landings of Lumumba forces elsewhere in Katanga. Accordingly request you explore with SYG what steps UN can take to frustrate any such landings. Would be highly desirable if UN can control airports so as to minimize military activities. We believe in light circumstances surrounding UN entry into Katanga, accomplished on basis of assurances which in essence meant UN presence would not be permitted to upset status quo, special case can be made for UN insisting that Lumumba troops shall be denied permission land in Katanga. Military operation on land poses somewhat different problem, but even here we believe Bunche may have interpreted SC mandate too narrowly in announcing to press (urtel 567)³ that "UN force would not intervene in event serious fighting developed between Lumumba's and Tshombe's forces."

Herter

³ Dated September 1. (*Ibid.*, 306/9-160)

198. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, September 5, 1960, midnight.

586. Re Congo.

1. Hammarskjold asked to see me at 6 p.m. tonight. As background for what he wanted to put to us, he showed or told me in rapid succession following:

a. Text Kasavubu speech on Radio Congo¹ declaring Lumumba traitor and revoking government's mandate; appointing instead Joseph Ileo as Prime Minister; and, inter alia, asking UN be responsible for maintenance law and order. He commented this action proper in terms fundamental law of Congo.

b. AP and UPI press reports of Lumumba speech, also on Congo Radio,² saying he was still in command. (Later information brought in the Hammarskjold brought forth his comment "Someone else must have read Lumumba's speech for him.")

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-560. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

¹ For text of Kasavubu's speech of September 5, see *Congo 1960*, vol. II, pp. 818-819.

² Texts of two radio speeches by Lumumba on September 5 are *ibid.*, pp. 820-821.

c. Note verbale to USSR re presence Soviet crews, planes, etc.,³ making pointed inquiry as to status these individuals and equipment in view SC and SYG decisions and directives against big power representation in Congo. This text handed Soviets today. SYG commented Kuznetsov (USSR) readily understood that SYG's inquiry was disguised protest.

d. Note verbale to Belgians,⁴ delivered Saturday, intentionally cast in same terms of "pointed inquiry" re Belgian officers serving in Katanga forces, questioning their status, etc.

2. SYG then produced cable from Cordier stamped "top secret" (UN usage) and read selected sentences aloud. Congo Prime Minister-designate, Ileo, had called on Cordier Sunday night to discuss situation. In course their conversation Ileo apparently demonstrated astonishing naivete re game Russians are playing in Congo and Cordier had to assume professorial role. Moreover, Cordier gained impression US impact in Congolese eyes suffered by comparison with Soviet.

3. Main point for US in Cordier's cable was his "urgent recommendation" that US send someone "not too high level, not too junior" to Leopoldville to arrive with certain amount of fanfare. He would be able observe local scene, see what Soviets are up to, and make first-hand report to Washington. Hammarskjold stressed this was Cordier's recommendation, based on close touch with local scene, and he (SYG) passed it along without making any recommendation himself, although he said he felt Cordier had good judgment in matters this kind.

4. We then briefly discussed SYG's ideas as to future steps. He said his primary objective now is to "explode" what Soviets are up to. To do this he feels UN's hands must be "absolutely clean". He said Soviets "know what Belgians are doing in Katanga," and will probably cite that to him in response his veiled protest re their planes and crews.

5. He characterized Soviet plan in following terms: To play their role they needed a Katanga problem and a "bad boy." UN had, therefore, to try to remove these justifications. Fact unfortunately was that Belgians were playing too many "childish tricks", which made clear Katanga was not simply an "internal" matter. He showed me further exchanges with Belgian Del and with FonMin Wigny indicating 650 paratroopers still at Kitona, as well as two gun boats at Matadi, despite assurances total withdrawal would, and later, had taken place. He renews his protest to Belgian Government for this. These exchanges

³ Dated September 5; for text, see U.N. doc. S/4503; also printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 567–568.

⁴ Dated September 4; for text, see U.N. doc. S/4482/Add.3; also printed in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. V, pp. 148–149.

are soon to be published as further addenda to SYG's report to SC on status Belgian withdrawal.⁶

6. In this connection I referred to facts and figures provided by Defense in its memo re USAF airlifting departing Belgian troops (Deptel 308).⁷ He said he would be pleased to have these "for the record." He pointed out in latest Belgian letter US Air Force fares better, and blame for delay now placed (totally unjustifiably) onto UN's shoulders.

7. With regard to SYG's approach to Belgians re their officers in Katanga forces, I mentioned Department's concern for "security implications" should these Belgian elements, by leaving, precipitate new wave of flights by remaining European population. In reply SYG indicated doubts Belgian officers in Katanga would actually be withdrawn as result his approach. However, he thought 4,000-man UN force in Katanga provided more basic security for non-African population of Katanga than did Tshombe's five hundred-man army. He said if Belgians and other Europeans did flee Katanga, gap they created could well be filled by Russians and their friends, which would be something Soviets might really like to have. Hammarskjöld stressed in this, as in all things relative to Congo, matters are excessively delicate, and every step he takes is by choosing lesser risk.

8. As I was leaving, further cable arrived from Cordier containing texts of three notes to Cordier from Kasavubu, asking UN to guard his (Kasavubu) office and residence, to be responsible for law and order, and to close all airfields throughout Congo. Hammarskjöld then showed me only instruction he had thus far sent to Cordier since new developments, which said simply that UN forces already responsible for law and order in Congo.

9. Later at Department's suggestion I put two questions to SYG re Cordier recommendation:

a. How did he relate Cordier's recommendation to later developments, as far as urgency, etc. concerned?

b. How could he relate sending of US official, at this time, to whatever action he is planning to take?

SYG said he would like "chew" over these, and called me back late tonight. He said he was sure Cordier had, as result his conversation with Ileo, anticipated something going to happen, but it probably developed more broadly than expected. Things still being "touch and go" at moment, SYG felt question of whether US should do this needed further consideration, particularly because of timing. "Be

⁶ For text of the report, dated August 30, see U.N. doc. S/4475. For texts of Hammarskjöld's telegram of September 4 to Wigny and the latter's reply of September 9, see U.N. doc. S/4475/Add. 2 and 3.

⁷ Dated September 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.5445/8-3160)

damn careful on the timing; you don't want to kill off a good, new man who is at least anti-East if not pro-West." As example of what not to do, he referred to quoted comment on Kasavubu today by Belgian FonMin Wigny, to effect "We hail him." Should US Government decide to act upon Cordier's recommendation, Hammarskjold expressed strong desire to be in the picture, and in effect to be consulted on timing. He suggested no action be taken until tomorrow, and most which then should happen would be announcement Mr. X would arrive in Congo in couple of days.

10. Please instruct.

Cook

199. Memorandum of Discussion at the 458th Meeting of the National Security Council

September 7, 1960, 2:30 p.m.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*
2. *U.S. Policy Toward the Congo* (NSC 6001; NSC Actions Nos. 2262, 2270, 2276, 2284 and 2287¹)

[Here follows the first portion of Allen Dulles' briefing on unrelated subjects.]

Mr. Dulles began his briefing on the Congo by noting the difficulties involved in keeping up to date on the situation there. He stated that Kasavubu's move to throw out Lumumba had been undertaken without adequate planning. Kasavubu's move had produced consternation among his aides and advisers who had planned it for two days later. Mr. Dulles observed that it was not easy to run a coup in the Congo. As an indication of the lack of planning, Mr. Dulles pointed out that for a time Kasavubu had controlled the radio in Leopoldville, but that when he left the radio station it was left unguarded. As a result Lumumba was able to enter the station and to make an impas-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson on September 12.

¹ Regarding NSC Action No. 2287, see footnote 4, Document 180.

sioned appeal to the people. Lumumba's ability to influence the Congolese people, Mr. Dulles observed, was greater than that of Kasavubu.

Senate President Ileo, whom Kasavubu had selected to replace Lumumba, is Western-oriented. At last report, Ileo was in Kasavubu's house with a UN guard protecting him. There was a report that some pro-Kasavubu troops were moving into Leopoldville. This, Mr. Dulles indicated, might change the picture. There was also a report that morning that the Congo's Minister of Foreign Affairs had gone to the U.S. Embassy to seek asylum. At last report, the U.S. Ambassador had engaged him in a conversation but it was not clear whether he had been given asylum. Secretary Herter interjected to say that we had appealed for UN troops to protect the Foreign Minister.² Mr. Dulles stated that the Foreign Minister was opposed to Lumumba. Lumumba did not trust him and therefore had not taken him along to the UN.

Mr. Dulles referred to the savage tribal warfare raging in Kasai Province. He went on to say that Tshombe was strengthening his army, increasing it from 1100 to 3000 men. Tshombe, he also indicated, had a fair amount of Belgian matériel. He noted that ten IL-14 Soviet transports were being used to bring Lumumba's forces to Kasai Province. He noted that the UN had taken over the airport at Leopoldville, but that it was not in effective control of other airfields in the country. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] five large Soviet transports were presently on their way to Stanleyville. These transports had by-passed Athens and had gone by way of the UAR. The UAR Consulate had issued visas for 83 persons but more might be aboard. Mr. Dulles stated that two merchant ships had unloaded 100 trucks, food and other supplies at Matadi. Two hundred Bloc personnel were now in the Congo, exclusive of air crews. There were fifteen Bloc physicians and five Bloc nurses. Other offers of personnel had been made. Concluding this part of his briefing, Mr. Dulles stated that Lumumba always seemed to come out on top in each of these struggles.

Mr. Gray noted that the Congo was scheduled as an item on the Council agenda and asked Secretary Herter whether he wished to say anything on the subject. Secretary Herter said he had very little to add. Hammarskjöld, he noted, had made a formal protest to the Soviets. Hammarskjöld was disturbed by the possibility that the Soviet fliers

² Timberlake reported this in an unnumbered CRITIC (emergency) telegram from Léopoldville, September 7, which requested that Hammarskjöld send instructions to Cordier to provide protection for Bomboko and other legitimate members of the government and Parliament. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-760) A memorandum for the record of the same date by Wallner indicates that the substance of the message had been conveyed to Hammarskjöld, who had immediately cabled Cordier authorizing him to provide protection for Bomboko. (*Ibid.*)

were military personnel engaged in military operations. If this were the case, the UN could move against them. If these were peaceful operations, however, the UN could not move. Mr. Gray asked whether Hammarskjöld was prepared to move. Secretary Herter said he thought so. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Soviets were engaged in carrying troops into the Congo. Secretary Douglas asked whether the Soviets were bringing arms into the Congo by plane. Secretary Herter said that we did not know.

[Here follows the remainder of the briefing.]

*The National Security Council:*³

1. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to developments in the Soviet anti-ballistic missiles program; Sino-Soviet relations; Khrushchev's plans to attend the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations General Assembly; and the situations in the Congo and Laos.

2. Discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in the Congo.

[Here follow agenda items 3–5.]

Robert H. Johnson

³ Paragraphs 1 and 2 constitute NSC Actions No. 2294 and 2295, approved by the President on September 13. (Department of State, S/S/-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

200. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, September 7, 1960, 4 p.m.

640. 06/2100 was called urgently to Lumumba's office. In course hour and half session we were joined by Deputy Prime Minister Gizenga (who like dormouse, slept through most of meeting), Minister Justice Mwamba, Minister Education Mulele, Minister Information Kashamura and a few assistants.

Lumumba said he had previously called in Russian, Moroccan and "several other Ambassadors in order to explain his position". Made following points.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-760. Official Use Only; Niact. Repeated to Paris, London, USUN, and Brussels.

1. Kasavubu's action completely unexpected. They had met only last Saturday¹ discuss certain matters and Chief of State had given no indication lack of confidence.

2. In any case action quite illegal. Then followed long exposé his version fundamental law particularly article 20, requiring such an action be signed by responsible Minister. Prime Minister said only written notice of action he had yet received was signed original of Kasavubu's radio speech which he, Lumumba, had by chance found at the radio station. (*Note: Kasavubu has claimed he has signature two Ministers but not clear what he has done with document.*)

3. He was forced to conclusion this was Belgian-French plot (because Kasavubu has a Belgian and a French advisor) but more important UN was in it from beginning. When I asked him if he had any proof of this he said only circumstantial, viz (A) fact Ghanaian troops led by white officer had tried prevent him from speaking on radio night before, (B) UN had closed all airports preventing central government from carrying out functions; in fact General Lundula who was en route from Stanleyville may well have crashed owing UN refusal let him land here. (Have since learned Lundula's IL-14 made it to Brazzaville and Lundula now Leopoldville.)

This led to long discussion US, USSR and UN role in Congo during which I pointed out US felt UN best guarantor new country's integrity therefore US had given UN massive financial support, assistance whereas Russians had attempted to sabotage by acting bilaterally and that this could only result in involving Congo in East-West struggle to country's detriment. He said he had asked both US and UN for planes but had been turned down so was forced to accept them from Russians. It was obvious that he obsessed with idea of airplanes and that nothing that has been done by US or UN has made much impression.

4. He expressed confidence that the great majority of the peoples and the troops supported him and said Kasavubu had only been made President with his support. The matter would have to be considered by the Parliament and meanwhile the Council of Ministers had assumed the prerogatives of the Chief of State.

5. I told him that I had always conceived it my duty to speak to him frankly and reiterated my view that accepting unilateral assistance from Soviets not in long-run interest of Congo which had already been pledged support of entire world through UN [and] promised transmit his views to my government.

Timberlake

¹ September 3.

201. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, September 7, 1960, 9 p.m.

602. Re: Congo.

1. Wieschhoff (Secretariat) late this afternoon reviewed recent events in Congo and told us SYG's intention to issue report to SC tonight¹ and request SC mtg probably for Friday.²

2. Wieschhoff confirmed ticker reports that Lumumba back as PM and Kasavubu as Pres. He said he understood negotiations behind scenes had taken place between two and resulted in agreement on part Lumumba not to call in outside aid. He also reported FonMin Bomboko had resigned. In response our characterization of these events as Lumumba victory, Wieschhoff expressed opinion it "not necessarily outright victory" for Lumumba; it still too early to tell what effects of recent events would be.

3. Wieschhoff said Kasavubu, after making radio address dismissing Lumumba, went home and went to bed and could not be reached by Rikhye and Liu³ (UN) whom Cordier (UN) sent to talk with him concerning "next steps." Wieschhoff questioned rhetorically, "How can you make a revolution with such material?"

4. We pressed Wieschhoff as to why UN troops had not been used to keep pro-Lumumba members of Force Publique off streets and away from Parliament. Wieschhoff replied there were limits as to how far UN could stretch its authority. Such action by UN force would have been too clearly intervention in internal affairs. We said it was our understanding that UN had recognized Kasavubu's constitutional right to dismiss his PM; Kasavubu was therefore GOC and had right to request UN keep Force Publique off streets as part of its assistance in maintenance of law and order.

5. Wieschhoff said he could understand this line of argument but repeated difficulty of acting effectively when Kasavubu "went to bed" and Ileo took no action. We expressed view UN should not have gone half-way against Lumumba; seemed to produce disadvantages of interference without desired results. Wieschhoff said UN had planned mount massive display of UN force at Parliament during its deliberation. He did not know how this had turned out. (Later Wieschhoff called back to say Force Publique has been welcomed by "both sides." There was no occasion for UN to act against it.)

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-760. Secret; Priority.

¹ See U.N. doc. S/4482 and Add.1-4.

² September 9.

³ F.T. Liu served as a political adviser to the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo.

6. Wieschhoff then told us of SYG's intention to issue report to SC about midnight for distribution tomorrow morning. He said it will stress great need in Congo for financial aid (Wieschhoff mentioned figure of \$200 million) and contain suggested draft res appealing to all members to contribute to UN fund. Res would also reaffirm UN mandate in Congo, making it "little stronger" than previously. Res would make point that financial aid cannot, standing by itself, be effective; along with [*sic*] provisions against introduction of outside force. Finally res will state UN cannot stand by while civil rights violated. Wieschhoff expressed view such res if pushed would be difficult to veto and if vetoed responsibility would be clear. He said SYG probably ask for SC mtg to be Friday. SYG is seeing Slim (Tunisia) tonight to discuss situation.

7. In response our personal estimation that situation looked very bleak, Wieschhoff said there was one bright note in picture—10 Soviet Ilyushin planes now effectively grounded Stanleyville. He said Cordier had reported that plan to block planes now effective, 18 hours after it ordered into effect; Ethiopian troops being concentrated at Stanleyville from outlying areas in order strengthen UN control. He said if UN's airport control can be maintained, that will be one important gain.

Cook

202. **Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, September 7, 1960, 9 p.m.

605. Re: Congo.

1. From recent conversations with SYG and his assistants pattern of SYG's political operation has emerged insofar as there can be pattern in as shifting situation as he faces in Congo. In his conversation with Wallner yesterday, SYG admitted at end that what he was trying to do was get rid of Lumumba without compromising UN position and himself through extra-constitutional actions. (He compared his activities to "gamesmanship—how to win without actually cheating.")¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-760. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

¹ Reference is to *Theory and Practice of Gamesmanship: Or the Art of Winning Games Without Actually Cheating* by Stephen Potter (New York: Holt, 1947).

Several times during conversation Hammarskjold referred to acts which he had just authorized which he characterized as "extra-constitutional." He is clearly concerned about this aspect of his operation though he seemed determined to act effectively to utmost extent he considers possible.

2. SYG told Wallner while he would recognize, deal with, and by implication strongly support Kasavubu in his struggle with Lumumba, possibility had to be borne in mind that Lumumba might win the fight. In that eventuality SYG would have be able explain and justify his actions to SC and possibly GA. SYG made it clear if Lumumba should survive and request immediate UN withdrawal, SYG would not accept request but would take matter immediately to SC. At that point he would, of course, have to be able to justify his actions.

3. This attitude on part of SYG helps to explain his impatience with what he considers extreme Belgian shortsightedness in not completing withdrawal their troops as they have said they would do and as they have even on occasion said was already done. He and Wieschhoff have both emphasized importance of taking away Belgian troop issue from Lumumba and Soviets. This has been fundamental point in SYG's strategy from start. In his conversation with Wallner Hammarskjold referred to problem he presented to us Monday night (ourtel 586),² problem of Belgian troops not only at Kamina but also and even more embarrassingly, at Kitona. Paratroop battalion at Kitona, SYG emphasized, had not previously been reported at all, in contradiction to Belgian declarations of complete withdrawal. Hammarskjold said he believed (he and Wieschhoff have repeated this on many occasions) Belgian Foreign Office is not responsible for "Belgian lies" on withdrawal. He believes this is doing of Belgian Defense Department, local commanders and "local interests." But, he observed, situation has gotten to point where no one believes anything that is said about troop withdrawal unless UN says it.

4. SYG feels failure of Belgians to complete withdrawal as promised has greatly weakened his position in combatting intervention of Soviets. He noted to Wallner that SC decisions are specifically directed against presence of Belgian troops and he has specific mandate in that regard. However, nothing in resolutions themselves forbids Soviet Union supplying airplanes at request of GOC. (In this connection SYG said his approach to Russians had dealt solely with matter of Russian crews and personnel, not with planes themselves.) He feels he is prevented from taking as strong action as he would like against Russian intervention because of what he considers to be Belgian double-dealing in keeping military personnel in Congo.

² Document 198.

5. Wallner drew attention of SYG to danger that removing all Belgian military personnel from Katanga might lead to exodus of Belgian civilian technical personnel. SYG's reply was Belgians using this threat as kind of blackmail as they have all along. He referred to Belgian claim that whites would flee if UN troops came into Katanga; SYG noted 170 women and children out of 20,000 whites had left. SYG said threat of whites leaving had recently been put to one of his aides in Katanga. Reply given was, "in that case, UN would have to operate [garble]". SYG commented this had been just right reply.

6. Wallner expressed to SYG our desire to be helpful and avoid any action which might complicate SYG's efforts. At same time we were very concerned at growing Soviet infiltration with both men and airplanes. In response to question from Wallner, SYG expressed view US should not protest directly to Soviets nor by ltr to UN against Soviet actions in Congo beyond that contained in text he gave us (tel'd to IO last night)³ in view his inquiry to Soviets. He commented if he had not sent note, US ltr might be desirable, but not at this stage.

7. Yesterday (reported by telephone to Sisco—UNP), Wieschhoff reported on first UN actions following Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba, i.e. closing of radio station and blocking of airports. Wieschhoff also reported that Cordier was treating Lumumba as a private citizen following his dismissal by Kasavubu and was even refusing to see him. Wieschhoff said 4,000 members of Force Publique at Camp Leopold agreed to have their arms locked up in return for Kasavubu's promise of food and pay.

8. *Comment:* SYG not in our opinion correct in saying he has no authority (para 4 above) to oppose introduction Soviet planes as distinguished from personnel. Res of July 21 [22] requested "all states to refrain from any action which might impede the restoration of law and order" and authorized SYG to take "such action as may be necessary . . ." ⁴ by this res." Soviets attempted behind scenes to alter wording

³ Hammarskjöld had provided a draft statement for possible use by President Eisenhower at his September 7 press conference after Herter sought his advice as to what the President could say about the Congo without adding to Hammarskjöld's difficulties. Hammarskjöld's text was not used, however; a statement drafted in the Department was sent to the White House instead. (Memoranda of telephone conversations on September 6 and 7 between Herter and Eisenhower's press secretary James Hagerty and between Herter and Wilcox; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) The text of a statement read by the President at his September 7 press conference, deploring the Soviet Union's unilateral action in supplying aircraft and other equipment to the Congo for military purposes, is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 568-569.

⁴ Ellipsis in the source text.

this para of res, and it was clearly understood by Tunisia and Ceylon (the sponsors) to apply to Soviet unilateral action. Arguments against military personnel applies just as logically to military equipment.

Cook

**203. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the
Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting**

September 9, 1960, 11:30 a.m.¹

[Here follows a list of 31 persons present, including General Twining, Army Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White, Admiral Burke, Marine Corps Commandant General David M. Shoup, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Irwin. Department of State representatives included Merchant and Satterthwaite. Agenda item I concerned an unrelated subject.]

II Congo (State Initiative)

Mr. Merchant opened the discussion on the Congo by stating he wished to flag Soudan as a new possible African trouble spot. Ambassador Alphanh had told him that the French were going to recognize Senegal and that the Soudanese had told us if the French did this they would cut all ties with France. Mr. Merchant said that this might make Soudan another Guinea. As to the latest word from the Congo, the head of the Guinean military element in the Congo had announced his intention to recommend the withdrawal of 750 Guinean troops from the UN forces, Kasavubu had announced a new government with Ileo as Prime Minister and 300 Lumumba troops had invaded Katanga. Also, the Katanga police had momentary control of the Elisabethville airport.

Mr. Merchant said that we had read with interest and appreciation the JCS paper of September 2 on the Congo. He pointed out that we have been supporting Hammarskjold's efforts to work in the direction recommended by the JCS. He observed that we had to give the Secretary-General full marks on his initiative, clarity of views and efforts to

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328. Top Secret. The memorandum was a Department of State draft, not cleared with the Department of Defense. No other drafting information appears on the source text.

¹ The discussion took place at the Department of Defense.

keep the Russians out of the Congo. He said as a result of the Congo it could be that we were moving into a serious crisis in the UN which might conceivably result in a blow-up of that organization.

Admiral Burke asked what happened if the UN votes to dissolve its forces in the Congo. Does this mean we would move in?

Mr. Merchant said that was planned.

General Twining said that the Chiefs were puzzled over who should supervise contingency planning for the Congo. They wondered whether this should be done by USCINCEUR, CINCLANT or in Washington. He said there have been some political repercussions on CINCEUR's activities in the UN ferrying operations in the Congo but that after all he was the unified commander for the African area. General Twining wondered whether it would be feasible to do this planning in Paris.

Mr. Merchant said his immediate reaction was there was a great difference between the CINCEUR ferrying operation for the UN and unilateral military operations. [2 lines of source text not declassified] He was inclined to feel that planning should be done on this side of the ocean.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that in the African mind NATO and colonialism are synonymous.

General Twining observed that CINCEUR would have information on the entire African area.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that the most important element in the UN forces was the Ghanaian army and he pointed out that a number of African countries continued to be affected by the Algerian situation.

General Shoup referred to the Indonesian troops which were on their way to the Congo and wondered how we could keep them under the UN. He expressed the fear that they would be for Lumumba.

Mr. Merchant admitted that this was a risk but that Hammarskjöld had picked his governments carefully and that we would have to rely on Hammarskjöld's efforts to keep these troops loyal to the UN.

Mr. Smith observed that the Indonesian army was the strongest anti-communist force in that country.

General Lemnitzer wondered how it would be possible to keep the Russians from getting into the Congo. He questioned the optimism expressed in the meeting on the Congo's future. He asked whether UN troops have orders to keep the Russians out.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that was the purpose of the Security Council meeting.² He pointed out that the shipment of Belgian arms had made the West's position much more difficult.

² The Security Council was meeting on the evening of September 9 at Hammarskjöld's request.

General White said the most important element in his mind was the necessity for UN control of the airports and harbors.

General Twining agreed and said that if UN port commanders had more explicit orders they could help calm the situation. For example, with explicit orders the port commanders could stop Russian airplanes and ships.

General White said the important thing was to make this all an issue with the UN on the one hand and the USSR on the other.

General Twining said UN operations in Korea had been most successful and he hoped the lessons learned there could be applied in the Congo.

General White said we should make sure that all aid to the Congo was channeled through UN machinery.

Mr. Merchant said this would be impossible to get through the UN because the other African nations would object to this precedent being established.

General White said he just didn't understand how the UN operated. He said there didn't seem to be any central direction. The UN cannot be effective until all members recognized it as a supra-national body.

Mr. Merchant said the UN couldn't be genuinely effective as long as the USSR was in the organization.

General Lemnitzer said the nations ought to agree that all aid to the Congo should go through the UN.

Mr. Satterthwaite said we could take all steps to encourage this concept but that it would be difficult.

General Lemnitzer said in Korea we did not let arms come in unilaterally. In the Congo a Swedish general is in charge and so why couldn't he be authorized to search the Russian planes and ships for arms.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that Hammarskjold would like to have this authority.

Mr. Merchant observed that Hammarskjold was walking simultaneously on half a dozen tightropes. He said that Hammarskjold didn't want to force some of these issues and that he wanted a broad resolution giving him freedom of action.

General Lemnitzer thought the whole operation was inefficient.

Mr. Merchant said it wasn't only a problem of Russia but also of Belgium.

General Twining wondered why that was, to which Mr. Merchant replied that the Belgians hadn't told Hammarskjold that they still had troops in the Congo. Hammarskjold was quite upset to learn that there were 650 paratroops there when the Belgians said they had departed. He said the only pressure we could exercise on the USSR was by Hammarskjold keeping the general support of the African members.

Admiral Burke wondered what USIA was doing in the Congo.

Mr. Merchant said he would check with what the VOA was doing there. It was his impression that they were carrying the African story as straight news.

After a few more extraneous comments from the others Mr. Merchant concluded the Congo discussion by saying we must continue to support as firmly as possible the UN Secretary-General.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items III-VI.]

204. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, September 9, 1960, 3 p.m.

659. In a conversation which lasted more than one hour, Chief of State made following points to Averell Harriman¹ and myself:

1. He was sure decision he had taken dismiss Lumumba was correct and he was going to stick to his guns. He knew population was behind him. When pressed as to how he planned to impose his authority, Kasavubu was vague and could only state right was on his side and eventually country would support him openly.

2. Governor stated he was surprised by Lumumba victory obtained in Chamber and particularly in Senate.² He declared anti-Lumumba forces had to have courage to stand up and be counted and not collapse as they appeared to have done in Senate where voting was so heavily pro-Lumumba. Kasavubu agreed his forces were afraid since Lumumba had control major portion military and police. Senators had been afraid to vote against Lumumba. Harriman made point that such parliamentary victory indicated to outside world that Lumumba was being supported by government.

3. Kasavubu declared Force Publique should be disarmed by UN. He stated although many soldiers loyal to him, Lumumba had succeeded converting army into political weapon by placing his friends in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-960. Confidential. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Brussels.

¹ Former Governor of New York W. Averell Harriman was on a fact-finding mission in Africa for Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy. Records of many of his conversations, including this one, are in the Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Kennedy-Johnson Administration, Subject Files, Box 430, Africa Visit, 1960.

² The Chamber of Deputies had voted on September 7 and the Senate on September 8 to overrule Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba; for information concerning the debate, see *Congo 1960*, vol. II, pp. 827-850.

key positions. Once disarmed it should be reorganized by General Kettani through whom he believed he could successfully reorient the army.

4. Chief of State believes UN should protest and take countermeasures against unilateral military aid which Soviets are bringing into Congo. He was glad that by closing down airfields, UN had prevented Soviet planes from operating in country during past few days.

5. He declared Lumumba was surrounded by Communist advisers and that Prime Minister was in frequent contact with both Czech and Russian advisers.

6. Following his Monday night declaration dismissing Lumumba, he had received messages of support from Tshombe, Kalonji and Bolikango as well as other political leaders.

7. Harriman pointed out events last few days indicated Lumumba was getting stronger and asked Kasavubu what his plans were to counter-attack Lumumba. Kasavubu was nonplussed and asked for advice. I pointed out Congolese themselves and not outsiders had to resolve their own internal struggle for power. UN and friendly foreign countries could help only up to a point and that essence of independence was resolution of own governmental problems.

8. Kasavubu believed Tshombe could successfully defend Katanga against central government force who are not organized and who, in attacking Katanga and Kasai, would be spread thin.

9. He declared Lumumba was evil influence on country and Prime Minister was responsible for malaise and agitation which had happened since independence. So long as Lumumba remained in power such perturbation would continue thereby causing country to flounder deeper into political and economic anarchy.

10. Kasavubu agreed with my analysis that in order bring about peace and security, FP and police should be disarmed and courts should be set up and organized. These three elements at present time are major contributors to atmosphere of anarchy throughout country.

Timberlake

205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

September 9, 1960, 9:17 p.m.

Topol 311. Paris for USRO and Embassy. Ref: Polto 295.¹ Suggest you convey to De Staercke Department's appreciation for conveying points reftel to US privately rather than in NAC meeting. As Department has indicated previously, US sympathetic to Belgian reactions to past developments in Congo crisis, but believes it in no one's interest to continue recriminations in NATO forum.

Believe Wigny-De Staercke approach offers opportunity for another general presentation of current US thinking on Congo problem. You therefore should draw on following material for discussion with De Staercke.

US policy on Congo remains essentially as presented to Wigny by Ambassador Burden in early August (Brussels 395 rptd Paris 176).² Subsequent events have demonstrated soundness this position and in particular have justified our faith in SYG's ability deal with situation. US has been increasingly concerned at Lumumba's actions and at growing Soviet influence in Congo. We have brought our concern to SYG's attention on numerous occasions and have been gratified to see concrete steps he has recently taken in Congo to counter this influence.

On bases, US believes Belgian-SYG agreement covers present situation. Agree with Belgium that UN control of bases should in no way prejudice eventual disposition. Obviously in West's interests to deny bases to unfriendly elements. US hopes eventual bilateral solution between Belgium and Congo on disposition bases will be successful in this regard.

Regarding Katanga, US continues believe thrust UN activities should not be directed to undermining Tshombe's or Katanga's position or, conversely, to facilitate Lumumba's entry into Katanga. Recent

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-160. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Miller and Chadbourn; cleared by Ferguson, Sisco, Blue, Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs Russell Fessenden, and McBride; and approved by White. Repeated to Brussels, London, and the Embassy in Paris.

¹ Polto 295 from Paris, September 1, reported that Belgian Representative André de Staercke had conveyed Wigny's views to U.S. Representative W. Randolph Burgess. Wigny was critical of the positions taken in the crisis by Belgium's NATO allies, which he viewed as a lack of solidarity. He argued that the only way to restore a pro-Western Congo was through Katanga and that if civil war was not prevented, there would be a "tragic loss" for the West in the center of Africa, with the Soviets and their allies moving in. (*Ibid.*)

² See footnote 7, Document 160.

UN actions to gain control airports should be effective in this regard. On other hand, Tshombe's recent reported criticism of UN for taking control of base in Katanga not helpful to UN's or Katanga's cause.

Moreover, we must point out unfortunate effects press announcements re Belgian arms shipments to Katanga and we have already mentioned to Belgian Embassy here. This, coupled with reported continued presence Belgian paratroopers Kitona, makes it more difficult to take away club of troop issue from Lumumba and Soviets. Lastly, we hope Lumumba situation will somehow unfold so that general Congolese agreement to establish looser federal structure might become possible.

We continue hope Belgian civilians will have major role to play in Congo future and that Belgian contribution to economic life there can be maintained. We have spoken to Secretary General along these lines and he has indicated his agreement.

Finally, U.S. has been deeply concerned at strains in U.S.-Belgian bonds friendship as well as indications Belgian disappointment with NATO as result unfortunate events in Congo. We trust Belgium shares our desire to repair damage and to maintain traditional close friendly relations with U.S. as well as to support fully NATO objectives. We are certain that, despite Belgian disappointment at certain positions U.S. has taken, Belgium, like ourselves, believes overriding goal must be to keep Congo from falling under bloc influence. Keeping in mind delicacy of UN role, as well as importance not losing support other African states, this has been throughout underlying U.S. motivation.

For Brussels: You may draw on foregoing in any forthcoming discussions with GOB.

For London and Paris: You may draw on above as appropriate in discussions with British and French.

Herter

206. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, September 10, 1960, 1 a.m.

632. Verbatim text. Re: Congo. Following are papers from which I read to SYG (mytel 631):¹

I. Action in Congo

a. U.S. Govt continues stand behind you in supporting Kasavubu's effort to oust Lumumba and, in spite setback of last few days, hopes you can take further action to reinforce his position.

b. UN position would obviously have to be in support Congolese constitution. Our lawyers have concluded Kasavubu's action to remove Lumumba govt was taken in accordance with constitution, while later Chamber and Senate actions were extra-constitutional. Lumumba's attempt to usurp office of Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of army provides strong constitutional justification for counter action. We hope you can proceed on basis of Kasavubu action and on basis Lumumba legally removed from office.

c. Normal procedure would now be for Kasavubu to propose another cabinet for parliamentary approval. We think he would stand excellent chance of obtaining this approval after some time for maneuver if you can give following instructions to ONUC:

1) Kasavubu, Ileo, Bolikango and others to be afforded UN protection.

(2) Parliament building security to be taken over by UN forces.

(3) Leopoldville police and FP to be disarmed (immobilized in some other way, or shifted in allegiance). The Congolese Chief of Staff Mobutu has kept contact with others in Kasavubu's camp and may be favorable to such approach.

d. We think Lumumba's demand for UN withdrawal offers suitable opportunity to you to act.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-1060. Secret.

¹ Dated September 10, telegram 631 from USUN reported a conversation with Hammarskjöld in which Wadsworth read the papers transmitted in this telegram and the Secretary-General commented on them. The telegram stated in part: "He still convinced he must break Lumumba and believes he will be able to do it. He commented it was extremely difficult 'to break Hitlers when alternatives were Hindenbergs.'" (*Ibid.*) The conversation took place prior to the Security Council meeting of September 9/10. For text of Hammarskjöld's statement at the meeting, in which he asked the Council to declare explicitly that all assistance to the Congo should be channeled through the United Nations, see U.N. doc. S/PV.896 or *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. V, pp. 162-170.

e. Subsequently we think constituent assembly should be convened with protection assured all participants. This might solve Katanga problem also on basis acceptable to govt, Tshombe and African states. Tshombe's recent expressions of desire for reunited but federal state should help.

f. If you are willing take action along these lines we will exert all practicable influence on Kasavubu and other Congolese leaders.

II. Action in SC

On current SC action, U.S. views are:

a. We hope you will say in SC, as you told us earlier you were planning to, that Force Publique is obviously unable maintain peace and order in Congo and withdrawal of UN troops would undoubtedly lead to foreign intervention and breach of peace.

b. We continue think best course of action is to phrase your remarks and handling of situation so, in absence of resolution calling for withdrawal, retention of UN troops will be endorsed. Final key, of course, is whether African troops will remain. We are prepared give you any support you feel is required on this.

c. While we think retention of UN force in Congo is primary objective, we would also like see further results as follows:

(1) Reiteration of call to states against steps which would impede law and order, as you have already included in your draft resolution of yesterday. We would prefer it even be more pointed. (We want to strengthen your hand against Soviet intervention and will give strong statement on this at appropriate point.)

(2) We would like paragraph calling on you to intensify efforts to restore law and order in Congo and take such further steps as you may deem necessary.

(3) If you think resolution incorporating these points would be vetoed, we would think resolution approving your report and requesting you intensify your efforts and take further steps implement your recommendations would be good idea.

d. We hope you will keep close touch with UK and France about Belgian problem so as avoid situation where they might have to vote "no".

Wadsworth

207. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, September 10, 1960, 9 a.m.

665. Governor Harriman accompanied by Embassy Officer had interview with Lumumba for approximately one hour and a half. He reiterated points made to me September 6 reported our telegram 640.¹

In addition Prime Minister stated:

1. Despite obstructions by Belgians, he had won resounding victory at polls last May. If elections were held today he would obtain support 80 percent population.

2. He was not communist and was not surrounded by Russian or communist advisers. To him communist dictatorship was as bad as colonialism. As he had previously stated numerous occasions he wished Congo to steer policy of neutralism between East and West blocs.

3. Kasavubu had been egged on by Belgian and French advisers when he tried dismiss Lumumba as Prime Minister. Now that he had received overwhelming support from population and parliament, Prime Minister was soon going to take steps resolve Kasavubu question. He stated country had never desired establishment of country with Chief of State, rather it preferred type of government headed by working President.

4. He did not like idea of all countries channeling their aid through UN. This would make Congo subservient to UN. As sovereign nation Congo should be able negotiate bilateral treaties with various nations.

5. He was not happy with action taken by UN in closing down airfields and radio station. Also he had been informed by Cordier he was no longer legal Prime Minister after his dismissal by Kasavubu.

6. His country needed such financial and technical assistance from US even he was planning to lead Congolese delegation to forthcoming session UNGA. Governor asked Prime Minister to be patient and try understand action UN which had come to bring assistance to Congo. He told Prime Minister US trying keep cold war out of Congo but by asking direct aid Soviets Prime Minister was pushing country between

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-1060. Official Use Only. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, and USUN.

¹ Document 200.

two blocs. Governor declared all African leaders with whom he had spoken desired Lumumba work closely with UN.²

Timberlake

² In telegram 662 from Léopoldville, September 9, Timberlake concluded that Harriman's conversations with Kasavubu, Lumumba, and Dayal reinforced Harriman's opinion that effective parliamentary opposition to Lumumba was unlikely. Timberlake forecast a Lumumba victory unless the Secretary-General secured a tougher mandate in regard to law and order or, more probably, the opposition resorted to violence. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-960)

**208. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between
Secretary of State Herter and Secretary-General
Hammar skjöld**

September 10, 1960, 1:30 p.m.

The Secretary telephoned Secretary General Hammar skjöld that we were with him 1000% and Hammar skjöld said he was very grateful for this. The Secretary asked where we could be the most useful¹ and Hammar skjöld said for the moment it was very difficult to say. Hammar skjöld said the most curious thing of the day was the reported voluntary disarming of the Congolese. He said he had not yet had a full report on it but it was a fact. He also said there was a one-sided truce in Kasai. He said they were in the middle of the stream and found it very difficult to know how to play it. He felt they should go ahead with the discussions so they could get out in the clear. On this point he had had a talk with Slim and his view was that we should go ahead and that we could get a kind of stand-still agreement. Hammar skjöld said if he could get in touch with the Secretary later he might have something to discuss with him. Hammar skjöld said that he was going to mention in a restrained way the manner in which the other side was playing it. The Sec. said he didn't want the impression

Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Prepared by Mildred Asbjornson of the Secretary's staff.

¹ In a conversation with Wadsworth 10 minutes earlier, Herter had suggested having a resolution introduced censuring Hammar skjöld for the closure of the airports and radio stations by the U.N. force in the Congo (which the Yugoslav Representative at the Security Council meeting had criticized) in order to have a vote on the issue. When Wadsworth objected that he couldn't visualize who would propose such a resolution, Herter suggested that the United States might do it. Both Wadsworth and Wilcox, who was also on the line, expressed doubts about this tactic, which they thought would be perceived as an effort to censure Hammar skjöld. (*Ibid.*)

to go out that there was any vacillation in the UN and Hammarskjold said that would be extremely dangerous. He said there was no weakening so far. The situation had never been tougher than yesterday. The Secretary referred to the Soviet statements that Hammarskjold had done the wrong thing on the radio stations and airports. Hammarskjold said that the whole issue might be put before a special session of the UNGA, and that he would not be afraid of that because he felt he would get 60 or 70 votes which would be enough.

209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

September 12, 1960, 5:52 p.m.

362. Subject: Hearing Congo Delegates in SC.

1. First major question next SC session on Congo likely be hearing Congo representatives since both Kasavubu and Lumumba are sending spokesman. We believe line to be taken publicly in any such debate is that Kasavubu is unquestionably head of state, and outside world looks to him for authoritative information as to identity of Government. Kasavubu has made clear his position on this and that Bomboko is Congo's representative before Security Council. Draft statement on this point being sent separately.¹ While it is desirable to avoid being drawn into detail on Congolese constitutional issues in debate, following is Department's tentative analysis of situation:

Kasavubu has clearly superior position. In this regard, we consider SYG laid excellent foundation in his statement September 9² when he pointed out that Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba was valid and that Prime Minister could not under any circumstances dismiss Chief of State. Kasavubu's position further improved by fact Bomboko was Foreign Minister in original GOC approved by Congolese Parliament and remains FM designate in Ileo's new cabinet.³ Since according to Art. 22 of Congo Fundamental Law "Chief of State appoints and dismisses Prime Minister and Ministers", Bomboko has never legally been deposed.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-1260. Drafted by Satterthwaite, Wilcox, and Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Leonard C. Meeker and approved by Herter. Repeated to Léopoldville.

¹ In telegram 361 to USUN, September 12. (*Ibid.*, 330/9-1260)

² See footnote 1, Document 206.

³ Ileo announced his cabinet on September 10.

With regard to question legality present government, Department holds view that since Lumumba was legally dismissed and Chief of State has announced formation new government under Ileo, latter government constitutes legal GOC pending its approval by Parliament. We believe that Lumumba's claim to continued competence his government clearly invalid. In situation where Chief of State has constitutionally dismissed PM, and appointed new government, it is clearly beyond letter and intent Fundamental Law for outgoing PM to claim he continues direct government. We note Lumumba alleges on basis Art. 51⁴ that authority to interpret law belongs to Parliament; however, in present circumstances, resolutions passed last week by Lower House and Senate clearly extra-constitutional. Any vote by Parliament which purported overrule Chief of State's dismissal of PM would be tantamount to amending constitution, and would obviously distort Art. 51. Only way in which Parliament could in effect disapprove Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba and his government would be if it refused to approve Kasavubu's newly designated government.

2. In light foregoing, and since it clearly in our interest support Kasavubu over Lumumba, we would strongly prefer have SC agree hear Bomboko as legal representative GOC. However, in view tendency in SC to wish to give both parties a hearing, we would have no objection to having Kanza⁵ heard as private individual. We do not believe it desirable to hear both on basis equality, since this would tend undermine our position and that of SYG that Kasavubu has acted legally. Therefore, you should consult urgently with SYG and Slim to see if agreement can be reached hear Bomboko as legal representative GOC and Kanza as private individual. You should press forward on this line if Tunisia will support or acquiesce in this as reasonable, but not over strong objection of Tunisia and SYG.

Credentials of representatives clearly procedural matter and we assume seven affirmative votes can be mustered in favor above course even if Tunisia did not feel it could vote affirmatively for Bomboko in preferential position to Kanza. We naturally prefer not to put SYG and Slim in unduly awkward position. If they object strongly to foregoing course, then next preferable alternative would be to hear neither party. We prefer first course because it would tend further enhance status Kasavubu but since Bomboko and Kanza would presumably make about equally effective presentation their respective cases, probably not much would be lost in substance of debate if neither party heard.

⁴ For text of Article 51, see *Congo 1960*, vol. I, p. 113.

⁵ Kanza was Lumumba's designated representative to the United Nations.

3. If Slim is unwilling go along with either of above courses, and insists strongly that both Bomboko and Kanza should be heard without prejudice to constitutional issue, you should reluctantly agree, making clear in your statement to the SC that US has no doubt re validity of Bomboko's claim.

4. Under no circumstances would we agree hear only representative of Lumumba.

Herter

210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

September 12, 1960, 8:29 p.m.

363. Re Congo. On basis of behind scenes consultations that you have reported telephonically to Dept, we have impression that there is danger that Council will begin to drift primarily because of variety and gradation of views among Africans, SC members and SYG. We agree with your assessment, as communicated to us telephonically, on need for US take steps at appropriate time to bring about crystallization of SC on desirable course of action.

Our objectives are three-fold: (a) To have Council take action which would help Kasavubu vis-à-vis Lumumba, or at least to avoid steps which could affect situation adversely in this regard; (b) To strengthen SYG's mandate so that UN can take further vigorous steps in Congo; and (c) To focus on Soviet activities outside of framework with a view to mobilizing opinion against them and reinforcing existing SC resolutions this subject.

To this end, we believe you should press Slim to agree to or acquiesce in course of action number one contained Deptel [362]¹ on question of hearing of Congolese representative. We are strongly opposed to three nation committee proposal which would put Kasavubu and Lumumba representatives on equal basis. More important such committee apt to get bogged down in detailed legalities and in long-run likely to make watered-down compromise proposal rather than come out decisively in favor of seating and hearing Bomboko, which

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-1260. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Ferguson, and approved by Wilcox. Repeated to Léopoldville.

¹ Document 209.

we favor. Danger thus that SC might fall behind actual developments in Congo. If Slim agreement or acquiescence not obtainable on first course of action, you authorized to fall back to other courses of action described Deptel 362 repeated Leopoldville 763.

We also understand from USUN that Africans now discussing res which from our point of view is not as satisfactory as res reported urtel 612.² We agree with you that Slim should be stiffened in this regard. We believe you should take line with Slim that draft contained urtel 612 is absolute minimum. While we accept res as it stands, you authorized at your discretion for tactical purposes with Slim, SYG and others to indicate we believe res needs to be strengthened. To this end, you can suggest any of following which you find helpful tactically: (1) res include specific recommendation that UN disarm Force Publique; (2) that specific reference be made to need for UN retention of airports and radio station; (3) that res, in addition to operative para 3, contains specific injunction against USSR, along lines of last operative para of short res USUN telephoned to Dept this morning, i.e. calling on states to refrain from sending personnel, supplies or equipment of military nature into Congo other than through UN; (4) res call on UN to take over courts and administration of justice in Congo; and (5) that phrase "while not being entitled to intervene or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict" be deleted from operative para 4 of Tunisian draft res. We realize attempt include some or all of foregoing would run serious risk Soviet veto, and consider key to avoiding this is Slim's attitude, i.e. any res which Slim can support affirmatively will be very difficult for USSR to veto. Therefore, in last analysis, question of what traffic will bear depends in large degree on Tunisian position. It occurs to us one way to strengthen present UN mandate with Slim's support and minimum risk Soviet veto would be to approve latest SYG report to SC.

We hope substantive res can be put forward at appropriate time so that SYG's hand can be strengthened and Council can reaffirm clearly its decision to keep outside powers from intervening in Congo in a manner contrary to SC resolutions. In this connection, we believe idea presently being discussed in New York calling for establishment of a good offices committee should be strongly discouraged. While such a proposal might be desirable in future depending on developments, we believe there is no need for additional UN instrumentality at this time

² Dated September 8, telegram 612 reported a conversation with Wieschhoff and transmitted the text of a suggested draft resolution which Hammarskjöld had given to Slim. The draft resolution reaffirmed the Council's request that all states should refrain from actions that might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and a peaceful solution to the Congo's internal conflicts, and it reaffirmed that the U.N. force should act to restore and maintain law and order and protect civilian lives but should not intervene in internal conflicts. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-860)

other than UN group under SYG operating on basis of SC resolutions. As long as developments on ground are progressing reasonably satisfactorily on basis of present UN instrumentality, there is no need to inject good offices committee which inevitably would seek to find some mid-point compromise between Lumumba, Kasavubu, and Tshombe. This would tend strengthen Lumumba rather than advance our objective of increasing UN control and consolidating Kasavubu's position. We strongly prefer guidance for next steps on Congo question to remain in hands of SC exclusively, rather than resort to three or four member group which would treat the respective parties on basis of equality. We urge therefore you actively discourage this idea.

In addition foregoing substantive considerations, timing of SC meeting also important. If Kasavubu remains in lead in power struggle, then it might be advantageous delay next SC sessions for few days. Would appreciate your recommendations re timing based on results your consultations.

Herter

211. Memorandum of Conversation

September 13, 1960.

SUBJECT

Congo

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary

Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy

M. Claude Lebel, Minister, French Embassy

Mr. Hugh G. Appling, M

Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

Ambassador Alphand referred to the statement which the Secretary had made to him that the Secretary-General could call on the five permanent members of the Security Council for assistance if he so desired. Ambassador Alphand said that the French assume this would not be done unless the Soviets had given unilateral assistance. He

wondered if the Soviets continued their unilateral penetration of the Congo, whether the U.S. would feel free to act. He said it appeared that Soviet intervention was becoming more and more open.

Mr. Merchant said that we had not yet reached this point and that for the present we were giving fullest possible support to the Secretary-General. We were disturbed that Hammarskjold appeared to be losing some African support. We thought that the UAR might withdraw its forces from the UN command and according to ticker reports, Ghana might also take this step. Ambassador Alphand noted that the Africans in general had heretofore been reasonable and that the French were concerned that they now appeared to be changing their position. He thought the chaos existing in the Congo presented Hammarskjold with a most intricate problem.

Mr. Merchant said that it was our view that if Lumumba should disappear, all of the other Congolese leaders including Tshombe would be willing to enter into negotiations and re-write the Congolese constitution. If Lumumba should disappear the Force Publique could be retrained in some months into an effective national army. However, everything appeared hopeless so long as Lumumba was on the scene.

Ambassador Alphand said that the French felt it was important to keep in close touch with us on this subject, especially since the Soviet actions were becoming more and more overt, and we might want to act together in the Congo.

212. Paper Prepared by the President's Assistant Staff Secretary (Eisenhower)

September 13, 1960.

**SYNOPSIS OF STATE AND INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL
REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT**

[Here follows material concerning unrelated subjects.]

Congo

The UN command is making an effort to establish the authority of Congo's President Kasavubu and set the stage for an early attempt to remove Lumumba from power. The UN apparently arranged the surrender of arms on September 10th by the bulk of the 3000 Congolese

troops stationed in Leopoldville. In addition, the UN provided the troops their first pay in two months, and announced an order attributed to the Congolese army for a cease-fire throughout the Congo. The cease-fire order has been cautiously welcomed by Tshombe but has been denounced by Lumumba. The UN team has been dispatched to the Katanga border.

Hammarskjold received a cable from Kasavubu on Saturday¹ announcing the appointment of a new government headed by Ileo. On learning of this cable, the USSR changed its tactics and demanded continuing substantive discussion rather than suspension. Wadsworth told Hammarskjold that we continue to stand behind them in supporting Kasavubu's efforts to oust Lumumba. Hammarskjold commented he still believes we can break Lumumba. Hammarskjold has called for \$100 million in economic aid for the Congo and the State Department feels that an announcement of our willingness to contribute up to \$40 million would have a substantial impact at the UN, in the Congo, and throughout Africa. The Russians intend to demand (1) release of airfields and radio to Lumumba, (2) freedom of action to Lumumba, and (3) dismissal of the UN command.

Finally, yesterday, on our motion, the Security Council voted 9 to 2 to adjourn and reconvene when the Council President considers it advisable. This was done because the Council felt it to be heading in no clear direction and all proposals seemed disadvantageous to Kasavubu.² Our objectives are to aid Kasavubu, vis-à-vis Lumumba, to strengthen Hammarskjold's mandate and to focus on Soviet activities outside the Council framework. Wadsworth has been instructed to take the line publicly that Kasavubu is unquestionably Head of State and that the outside world looks to the head for authoritative information as to the identity of his government.

Meanwhile, the army arrested Lumumba for three hours yesterday, and on his release, he proceeded to the radio station in a loud speaker car, attempting without success to rally the population on the way. At the station a Ghana major in charge refused to allow him to use it. Following this, there is a report that Lumumba planned to seize the airport to execute an escape to Stanleyville. Also, he is reportedly trying to rally soldiers to his side without indication of success up to this moment.

¹ September 10.

² Telegram 662 from USUN, September 12, reported:

"We postponed SC this afternoon after discovering that again there was no clear direction in which SC was heading, while all proposals which were under consideration seemed disadvantageous to Kasavubu." (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-1260)

Cairo has indicated support for Lumumba by announcing withdrawal of its force of 515 men on the basis that the UN had violated Congo sovereignty. Harriman has been visiting the Congo and Kasavubu has assured Harriman and Timberlake of determination to stick to his guns in removing Lumumba. Kasavubu agreed that his forces were afraid during Thursday's vote. He also agreed that the Force Publique and the police should be disarmed and courts set up. Harriman's talks with Congolese leaders convince him that we can expect little if anything to be done in parliamentary form against Lumumba.

Meanwhile, Embassy Brazzaville reports that President Youlou is supporting Kasavubu by every means possible.³

John S.D. Eisenhower

³ Telegram 66 from Brazzaville, September 10, reported that when Harriman met with Youlou on September 8, Youlou urged stronger U.S. support for Kasavubu, including a public statement of support, and told Harriman "he could not hold up western position single-handed much longer." Harriman replied that the United States was "obliged work thru UN and unable use same underhanded tactics as Soviets." (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/9–1060)

213. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, September 13, 1960, 6 p.m.

1305. Fifth message from Harriman. Personal for the Secretary and Dillon. Please give substance confidentially to Senator Kennedy.

Lumumba will continue to cause difficulties in the Congo whether he is in control of the government, in jail or released. He is a rabble-rousing speaker, a shrewd maneuverer with clever left-wing advisers, aided and encouraged by Soviet and Czech Ambassadors. He is obsessed with his mission to unify the Congo, believes he is the only man who speaks for 80 percent of the Congolese people. If the UN does not do his bidding, he considers it a new form of colonialism. He thinks if he can get his troops into Katanga and the Belgians removed that the people will give him their support. He is confident he can be successful in a civil war if UN keeps hands off. He is of course counting on full support from Soviets.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 755A.00/9–1360. Confidential. Stamped Eyes Only after receipt in the Department of State.

I feel our best hope is strongest support by Security Council for continued backing of Hammarskjold and Dayal, and insistence Russians and Belgians or others desist from giving aid outside UN. It is of utmost importance that African opinion be exerted. Although Nkrumah is at the moment being difficult, British pressure may bring him into line again. Nigeria when independent will loyally support every effort to prevent Russian influence in Congo. Except for Sekou Toure and perhaps Sudanese, former French African leaders can be counted on to oppose Communist designs in Congo. Bourguiba influence is considerable among West Africans.

In Leopoldville members in Parliament will be afraid to vote against Lumumba unless UN can get control of Force Publique. Lumumba knows how to use even a few squads of soldiers to terrorize those who oppose him.

If Russians fail to agree to channel their aid through UN, other means must be adopted to stop it. In this, support of other new African states would be important.

It is conceivable that if Lumumba is confronted with no aid from Soviets and firm stand by other West African leaders, he might temporarily change his position.

Kanza told me some deputies were urging on Lumumba that he request UN to call a round table conference of Congolese leaders including Tshombe [and] Kalonji to work out solution.

Situation today has been aggravated by early weakness in United Nations action. Best hope today is in firmness, particularly against Soviet intervention. I doubt that Khrushchev will want to face strong UN opposition to his actions in Congo when he addresses the Assembly.¹

Whitney

¹ Khrushchev was en route to New York to attend the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly, which was to begin on September 20.

214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana

September 13, 1960, 7:29 p.m.

264. Ambassador should approach Nkrumah expressing hope President will take no precipitate action Congo until situation clarified. Following may be used as talking points: (1) Withdrawal Ghana troops from UN and/or unilateral military assistance to Congo outside UN framework could seriously jeopardize internal security Leopoldville and would threaten success entire UN operation in Congo and future of UN as effective organization. Might also be useful point out excellent job done so far by Ghana troops in maintaining order; without their help, crisis of last few days might well have resulted in serious bloodshed. (2) Stature of Nkrumah as African leader would seem to indicate moderation and exercise of due deliberation after situation clarified and facts known and can be weighed. Precipitate action would not seem consonant with role of leadership. (3) Whatever the merits of the Kasavubu-Lumumba dispute, all Congo leaders except Lumumba have expressed willingness to discuss future unified Congo government structure. This must represent good share Congo public opinion and we would hope that all countries supporting UN can support what seems to us to be proper constitutional procedure and expression of major segment Congo opinion.

Please report soonest outcome your representation. ¹

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-1360. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Woodruff, cleared by Cargo, and approved by Ferguson. Repeated to Léopoldville and USUN.

¹ Flake reported in telegram 348 from Accra, September 14, that he had seen Nkrumah that day. Nkrumah told Flake he would support a meeting of all Congo leaders and that he had urged Lumumba to participate in such a meeting, and he indicated that Ghanaian troops would continue to participate in the U.N. force. He told Flake he had received many messages from Lumumba and implied that they were requests for support of Lumumba personally; Flake's impression was that he was tiring of Lumumba's appeals. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/9-1460)

215. Editorial Note

On September 14, the U.N. Security Council met three times to discuss the situation in the Congo. The first two sessions were occupied with the problem of the two rival Congolese delegations. Ambassador James J. Wadsworth argued that President Kasavubu's representative, Justin Bomboko, was the proper Congolese representative but that a debate on the subject would not be useful. He proposed that for the time being, neither delegation should be invited. Subsequently, the Polish Representative moved to invite Thomas Kanza; the motion was defeated by a vote of 3 to 0, with 8 abstentions, including the United States. At the evening session, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian A. Zorin made a lengthy and highly critical statement on U.N. actions in the Congo and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld replied briefly. For the record of the three meetings, see U.N. docs. S/PV.899, 900, and 901; for excerpts from the statements by Zorin and Hammarskjöld, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 575-582.

216. Editorial Note

At the 459th meeting of the National Security Council on September 15, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, dated September 15, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles said it would not be easy to brief the Council on the situation in the Congo. The President, interrupting, said he understood a third force had appeared in the Congo. Mr. Dulles said a third, perhaps even a fourth, force had developed there. [Congolese Army Chief of Staff Colonel Joseph] Mobutu had attempted to dismiss both Kasavubu and Lumumba. Mobutu had proposed that the Congo should be governed until December 31, 1960 by a 'collectivity' of students and technicians. He had announced a policy of cooperation with the UN, had asked that Soviet and Czech technicians leave the country within forty-eight hours, and had demanded that the embassies of the Communist countries be placed under guard. Mr. Dulles reported that Communist technicians had not left the Congo nor had the Communist embassies been placed under guard. Mr. Dulles added that the Kasavubu-Mobutu team had moved with the speed of a snail according to reports of U.S. representatives in the Congo. The situa-

tion could only be characterized as fantastic, a situation in which no one seems able to take any action with the exception of Lumumba and his actions indicate that he is insane. Mr. Dulles believed that Mobutu probably leaned a little more toward Kasavubu than toward Lumumba since he (Mobutu) had been appointed by Ileo. Mr. Dulles said he would not go into detail on events transpiring in the UN. He would say, however, that the brutal Soviet attack on Secretary General Hammarskjöld deeply engaged the future of the latter as well as the prestige of the UN. Mr. Dulles then noted [4 lines of source text not declassified]. It is possible that a third Soviet ship is also en route to the Congo. Moreover, the Sudan recently received a request to permit the "Soviet-Congo Air Services" to overfly the Sudan. However, the Soviet planes, which had landed in the UAR en route to the Congo, had now returned to the USSR. Mr. Dulles said the latest news from the Congo was that Mobutu had been arrested and then released, which seemed to be standard practice, and that Ileo would hold a cabinet meeting today with Mobutu present. He asked whether Secretary Dillon wished to add anything on the Congo.

"Secretary Dillon said the Western Powers were taking the offensive at the UN by tabling a resolution supported by the Secretary General and by Tunisia. A Soviet veto of this resolution was anticipated, however. If the Soviets did exercise the veto in this case, they will show themselves to be anti-UN. In the event of a Soviet veto, the Congo case will probably be referred to the General Assembly." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Mobutu had announced in a radio address the previous evening that the Army had decided to "neutralize" the chief of state, the two rival governments, and the legislature until December 31, during which time the politicians could try to reach an accord. He declared that this was not a military coup but a "peaceful revolution" and that the Army would call on Congolese and foreign technicians to save the country from chaos. At a press conference later that evening, Mobutu declared his intention to close the Soviet and Czech Embassies within 48 hours. For text of his radio address, see *Congo 1960*, volume II, page 869. Dulles' report of Mobutu's arrest was incorrect. Telegram 726 from Léopoldville, September 15, reported: "During morning everyone who is anyone around here has been reported arrested several times with principal emphasis on Lumumba and Mobutu each of whom would seem to have arrested the other." (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-1560)

At the first of two U.N. Security Council meetings on September 15, Ambassador Wadsworth introduced a draft resolution which reaffirmed the Council's request to all states to refrain from any action that might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and in particular to refrain from sending military personnel, supplies, or equipment into the Congo other than through the United Nations and reaffirmed that the U.N. force should "continue to act to restore and maintain law and order as necessary for the maintenance of international peace and

security." (U.N. doc. S/4516) For text of the draft resolution and Wadsworth's statement introducing it, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 582-587; for the records of the two sessions, see U.N. docs. S/PV.902-903.

**217. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the
Department of State**

Léopoldville, September 16, 1960, 6 p.m.

736. Events of yesterday and today give me some hope that act one of the Congo drama has ended. The prologue ended with the arrival of UN troops and the withdrawal of Belgian troops to their bases.

Act two will be concerned with the slow and difficult process of establishing some sort of government that will begin to function, an effort to assess the economic damage already done and first steps to arrest further deterioration.

While the Russians will volley and thunder with redoubled vigor if their Embassys are, as we expect, evicted tomorrow, they will find it much more difficult to peddle their poison in the Congo and even harder to influence government and people here. The trained seals are running for cover and even local clerks who worked for Lumumbavitch are being methodically arrested.

I feel even more important a result will be the impact on world opinion of the fact that this new and troubled African country has given the boot to the blob,¹ realizing that it brought them only compounded woe.

Timberlake

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-1660. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, Moscow, and Prague.

¹ The notation, "Lumumba?" appeared in an unknown hand under "blob".

218. Editorial Note

On September 16, the U.N. Security Council met three times to discuss the situation in the Congo, with Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic participating at the Council's invitation. At the session that evening, Ceylonese Representative Sir Claude Corea and Tunisian Representative Mongi Slim introduced a draft resolution reaffirming that the U.N. force should "continue to act to restore and maintain law and order as necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security," reaffirming the Council's request to all states to refrain from actions that might tend to impede the restoration of law and order or that might undermine the Congo's territorial integrity and political independence, declaring that no military assistance should be sent to the Congo except through the United Nations, and calling upon all states to assist in carrying out the Council's decisions. (U.N. doc. S/4523)

Soviet Representative Valerian A. Zorin proposed five amendments (U.N. doc. S/4524) to this resolution, which Corea and Slim rejected. Ambassador James J. Wadsworth yielded priority to the Ceylonese-Tunisian resolution, but Zorin insisted that the Council vote on a Soviet draft resolution which he had introduced the previous day, calling on the Secretary-General and the U.N. Command in the Congo to "cease forthwith" any interference in the Congo's internal affairs and to withdraw U.N. troops from all airports and radio stations in the Congo. (U.N. doc. S/4519) It was voted down by 7 votes to 2, with Ceylon and Tunisia abstaining, after which the Soviet amendments were rejected in separate voice votes. The vote on the Ceylonese-Tunisian resolution was 8 to 2 (the Soviet Union and Poland) with 1 abstention (France). The resolution was thus vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Wadsworth did not press for a vote on the U.S. draft resolution but proposed a new draft resolution (U.N. doc. S/4525) calling for an emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly. This procedural resolution was adopted over Zorin's objection by a vote of 8 to 2, with 1 abstention. For the record of the September 16 sessions, see U.N. docs. S/PV.904-906. For text of the resolution which was finally adopted and Wadsworth's statement proposing it, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 587-588.

219. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

September 17, 1960, 5:37 p.m.

424. Re: Special GA Congo Session. Following are Dept suggestions which you requested use as guidance re emergency GA on Congo:

1) We consider focus of session should be maximum possible extent be one of highlighting Soviet-UN confrontation in particular obdurate Soviet insistence on pursuing unilateral course in Congo and in undermining UN and SYG action contrary to overwhelming sentiment UN members, including most Afro-Asians. Statement being prepared for Wadsworth will stress this theme.

2) At same time we recognize US must help give lead and direction to debate to encourage more timid to stand up and be counted, and that you must balance this need against main objective of having session Soviet-UN contest rather than Soviet-US contest.

3) Strongly preferable, therefore, in our view that SYG or Slim give lead off in GA and you should encourage them to do so. It would be logical for either of them to speak first or one follow other, SYG because of his heavy involvement and importance he attaches to having his mandate supported, and Slim because of his sponsorship of SC resolution. (Ceylon less desirable because of ambivalent position.)

4) If neither is willing to open debate, nor some other moderate African (such as Ethiopia), you authorized speak first, as sponsor of SC res requesting special session if you believe this desirable in order channel debate into constructive channel.

5) Re res, we understand consideration being given by Slim to introduction same res Soviet vetoed in SC with appropriate technical modifications. This strikes us as sound course, but you should make clear US unwilling accept any weakening essential ingredients, i.e. confirming and strengthening mandate UN and SYG, and focusing on activities designed undermine UN and SYG efforts.

6) You should consult urgently with all friendly dels encouraging them to give full presentation their views, expressing hope they will be unequivocal in support UN Congo operation and in opposition Soviet intervention. More and longer speeches from friendly dels better, since there is advantage from our point of view to have special GA on

Congo running simultaneously with regular GA session (see Deptel 401).¹

Herter

¹ Dated September 16, telegram 401 to USUN indicated that the Department believed an emergency session would offer an ideal opportunity to put the Soviets on the defensive and that the alternation of special emergency sessions with regular General Assembly sessions should make it possible "to minimize Soviets' efforts exploit Khrushchev presence in GA." (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/9–1660)

220. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, September 18, 1960, 1 p.m.

746. Mobutu last night asked Embassy if US could transport his delegation to New York. It was suggested that since there are already two delegations there it would be better combine them with Bomboko as head and Kanza as deputy. He seemed to buy idea and promised send telegram. Embassy now endeavoring get Kasavubu and Mobutu together on this project.

Mobutu obviously frightened possibility of assassination. This morning he nipped an attempt on his life by a major who had been put up to it by Mpolo and Gizenga. Accordingly has ordered arrest Lumumba and close Cabinet associates.

Mobutu's office a mad house. People, children, dogs come and go in steady stream. He doesn't even have a secretary and still talks naively about his "council of students" running government. He feels that this will be a device to bridge transfer his coup to an Ileo-Kasavubu government by end October but said he logically cannot support Ileo immediately. He seems be completely honest, dedicated and appalled by enormity of problems facing him. General Ketani and Moroccan officers appear be principal advisers.

Meanwhile Lumumba, who is reportedly hiding out somewhere under Ghanaian protection, is characteristically active, issuing press releases which turn up mysteriously on bars of three major hotels. He complains that UN has prevented him from flying troops here from

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–1860. Secret; Niact. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, Rabat, and Accra.

Stanleyville to "restore order". It is clear that if he can't get rid of Mobutu in next few days he will make effort get Stanleyville and operate from there. Mobutu aware this and determined to prevent.

Note: Re Department telegram 816.¹ Mobutu made it clear his initial press conference that he recognized Kasavubu as Chief of State.

Timberlake

¹ Dated September 17, telegram 816 stated that since the legitimacy question might be important at the special session of the General Assembly, the Embassy should try discreetly to encourage a public statement by Mobutu, or whoever was in control, recognizing Kasavubu as Chief of State. (*Ibid.*, 320/9-1760)

221. Editorial Note

On September 19, President Eisenhower and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home referred briefly to developments in the Congo in the course of a wide-ranging conversation. The relevant paragraph in the memorandum of conversation by John S.D. Eisenhower, dated September 19, reads as follows:

"Lord Home said the Soviets have lost much by their obvious efforts to disrupt matters in the Congo. The President expressed his wish that Lumumba would fall into a river full of crocodiles; Lord Home said regretfully that we have lost many of the techniques of old-fashioned diplomacy." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

222. Editorial Note

The Fourth Emergency Special Session of the United Nations held six plenary meetings between 8 p.m. on September 17 and 1:10 a.m. on September 20. On September 18, 17 African and Asian nations introduced a draft resolution which (1) affirmed the Security Council resolutions, (2) requested the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action to implement them, (3) appealed to all Congolese to seek a peaceful solution of their internal conflicts with the assistance of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Commit-

tee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation, (4) appealed to member governments for contributions to a U.N. Fund for the Congo, (5) requested all states to refrain from actions that might impede the restoration of law and order or undermine the Congo's unity, territorial integrity, and independence and to assist in carrying out the Security Council's decisions, and (6) called on all states to refrain from providing any military assistance to the Congo during the temporary period of U.N. military assistance, except upon request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General. (U.N. doc. A/L.292/Rev.1)

On September 19, Soviet Representative Valerian A. Zorin introduced a Soviet draft resolution which condemned Belgian "armed aggression" and demanded withdrawal of all Belgian troops from the Congo, criticized the "failure" of the Secretary-General and the U.N. Command to implement important provisions of the Security Council resolutions, and called on all states to refrain from any actions that might be detrimental to the Congo's territorial integrity and independence. (U.N. doc. A/L.293) Zorin also proposed several amendments (U.N. doc. A/L.294) to the 17-power draft resolution but acceded to a Ghanaian request on behalf of the resolution's sponsors that he refrain from pressing his amendments. Ambassador James J. Wadsworth told the Assembly the United States would have preferred to amend the Afro-Asian resolution but would support it in view of the urgency of the situation.

On September 20, the General Assembly adopted the Afro-Asian draft resolution as Resolution 1474 (ES-IV), by a vote of 70 to 0 with 11 abstentions, including the Soviet Union, France, and the Union of South Africa. For the records of the six meetings, see U.N. docs. A/PV.858–863. The texts of Wadsworth's September 19 statement, the Soviet draft resolution and amendments, and Resolution 1474 (ES-IV) are in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 589–594.

223. Editorial Note

At the 460th meeting of the National Security Council on September 21, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commented on developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief discussion followed. President Eisenhower was present at the meeting, but the memorandum of discussion by

Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, dated September 21, records no comments by the President relating to the Congo. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles said he would first summarize developments in the Congo. Several African states were making frantic efforts to save Lumumba. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Dulles remarked that the bulk of the UAR forces now in the Congo had been placed advisedly in north Equateur Province, while the Guinea forces were in the northern part of Leopoldville Province. [6 lines of source text not declassified] On September 20 Kasavubu had announced that he had reached no agreement with Lumumba but the latter had later displayed a piece of paper purporting to be an agreement with Kasavubu.

"Secretary Dillon reported that Lumumba had requested a visa for travel to New York as the representative of the Congo to the UN and had also requested a visa as an official of the Government of the Congo. We had denied both requests for visas. However, if Lumumba asked for a visa to visit the U.S. as a private citizen, we would have difficulty in turning him down. Mr. Dillon added that the Congo Government declares it will arrest Lumumba if he attempts to leave the country.

"Mr. Dulles said he believed a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Lumumba. Aside from Lumumba, Mobutu appears to be the only man in the Congo able to act with firmness. A recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. [4 lines of source text not declassified] A new development has been Mobutu's creation of a council of advisers, most of whom are graduate students. The old ministers have been turned out of office and their offices have been taken over for the council, which is intended to carry on for a temporary period. Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered a severe blow to its prestige in the Congo. However, he had been surprised at the ease with which the Soviets were forced out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats, after departing from the Congo, went to Accra but he did not know whether they had moved on toward the USSR. Mr. Gray asked whether the Soviets were really quitting the Congo. Secretary Dillon said the Soviet press has not yet admitted that the Soviets have quit the Congo. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet diplomats indicated to the press before leaving that they would be back. Secretary Dillon believed it was clear that the Soviets had not given up in the Congo. Mr. Dulles reported that the Soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly that the Soviet markings which they painted over the Congo markings on their planes were still wet when they left. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet ships off the African coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

224. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/30

New York, September 21, 1960, 3:30 p.m.¹

PARTICIPANTS

US

Mr. Livingston T. Merchant
Mr. Joseph C. Satterthwaite
Mr. Armin Meyer
Mr. E. T. Long

UK

Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
The Hon. Peter Ramsbotham
Mr. Ewart-Biggs
Lord Hood
Mr. Hurd

France

M. Charles Lucet
M. Bruno De Lesuse
M. Claude Winckler
Mr. Jacques Leprette

SUBJECT

Africa

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

Mr. Hoyer Millar asked what the latest news was from the Congo.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that Mobutu appeared to be in control and that Lumumba was still in Leopoldville. We thought it was better for Lumumba to stay in Leopoldville, for, if he goes to Stanleyville, there is a danger of another Katanga type development. We consider Kasavubu to be the legal head of the Congo Government.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said we should be careful not to back Kasavubu too openly, for there is a danger that he would be tarred with the Western brush.

Mr. Hoyer Millar then asked about the French abstention on the Congo issue.

Mr. Lucet said that the French had abstained on the Congo issue from the beginning, feeling that the question was not proper in the context utilized. The French felt that the goal of the United Nations was to expel white influence from Africa. The French were also never ready to vote for the immediate withdrawal of the Belgians from that area.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–2160. Secret; Limit Distribution.

¹ The meeting took place in Suite 2707 of the Waldorf Towers. This was one of a series of conversations between U.S. representatives and delegates to the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. Participants not previously identified include British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Director of Political Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry Charles Lucet, and Minister of the British Embassy in Washington Viscount Hood.

Admitting that there had been lots of bilateral consultations with the British and Americans, he said the French felt strongly it was not useful to expel the Belgians from the Congo nor to contribute to an anti-white movement. Actually, the French were extremely pleased with the result of the latest vote, but he pointed to the ambiguity in the resolution.

He said the French abstained because they didn't know quite where we were all going and besides they had abstained in the past.

The French have a definite feeling that the UN has been consistently anti-European and anti-white.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said that everyone admitted the whole Congo development was messy, but how could the West extricate itself except by going through the UN.

Mr. Merchant said the United States felt it had no alternative but completely to back Hammarskjold. Otherwise there was a danger that all Western influence would disappear in the area. He said he didn't want to labor the point and, observing that Hammarskjold in walking the tight rope had done some things we didn't like, said we strongly differed from the French view and felt there was no question of Hammarskjold trying to have the white Western elements evicted from Africa. Mr. Hoyer Millar noted that it would have been completely dangerous to have used in this sense troops from members on the Security Council because the Russians obviously would have been first in line.

Mr. Merchant said he knew that Hammarskjold has as a continuing long-term goal the utilization of white Western technicians, preferably Belgians, in the Congo. He observed that we were frankly acutely distressed to see in the UN the French vote on the side of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said the British also were puzzled on why we differed on this problem. Obviously tripartite action on our part would have brought the Soviets into the Congo.

Mr. Merchant added that this also would have turned all of the Africans against us. We felt there should be no doubt of our strong and continuing support of Hammarskjold.

Mr. Lucet said that the treatment of the Belgian troops had been brutal. He wondered about channeling economic aid through the UN, observing that the French object to this. The French feel the best thing is to have the Belgian technicians return to the Congo, and with the UN resolution currently in force, the UN can't ask the Belgians to come back.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said that, if the Congolese were to ask for the return of Belgian technicians, obviously there could be no UN objection.

Mr. Merchant said that we have never believed that Hammarskjold intended to impede the return of Belgian technicians to the Congo. In our strong support of the UN, we have always separated the issue of short-term rehabilitation, which we feel should be channeled through the UN, from the long-term problem of development capital, which we think should come from individual sources.

Mr. Lucet asked about Katanga.

Mr. Satterthwaite said obviously we didn't want the natural resources of Katanga lost to the West. Unfortunately, Katanga as a political issue represents to the African states the whole "capitalist-colonial" dichotomy. He said we would prefer to see a Congo federation, including Katanga.

Mr. Hoyer Millar said the British would agree with the federation idea.

Mr. Lucet said so much depends on Lumumba, and Mr. Satterthwaite agreed that Lumumba was certainly not yet out of the picture.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

225. Editorial Note

On September 22, President Eisenhower addressed the U.N. General Assembly. His comments concerning the Congo read as follows:

"In response to the call of the Republic of the Congo, the United Nations, under its outstanding Secretary General, has recently mounted a large-scale effort to provide that new Republic with help. That effort has been flagrantly attacked by a few nations which wish to prolong strife in the Congo for their own purposes. The criticism directed by these nations against the Secretary-General, who has honourably and effectively fulfilled the mandate which he received from the United Nations, is nothing less than a direct attack upon the United Nations itself. In my opinion the Secretary-General has earned the support and the gratitude of every peace-loving nation.

"The people of the Congo are entitled to build up their country in peace and freedom. Intervention by other nations in their internal affairs would deny them that right and create a focus of conflict in the heart of Africa. The issue thus posed in the Congo could well arise elsewhere in Africa. The resolution of this issue will determine whether the United Nations is able to protect not only the new nations of Africa, but also other countries against outside pressures."

The President also made several proposals relating to Africa which pertained to the Congo; see Document 34. For the record of the meeting, see U.N. doc. A/PV.868; the text of the speech is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 60–70.

226. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, September 22, 1960, 5 p.m.

783. Evidence has steadily accumulated that Ghana, Guinea and the UAR have been putting continuous and mounting pressures on Kasavubu and Ileo to reach a compromise with Lumumba. Their maximum goal is reestablishment of status quo ante dismissal Lumumba; failing that, at least his inclusion as one of ministers. I believe this move is sparkplugged by Nkrumah who clings to dream of Ghana–Guinea–Congo union as stepping stone to Nkrumization of Africa. If Lumumba is out of Congo, so is that part of dream.

In fact, Lumumba has amply demonstrated that all his instincts are destructive; he is master of attack but knows and cares nothing for pacification or construction. During his short reign terror and civil war were the order of the day. He would be a serious threat to peace and reconstruction out of the government; in it he would be or soon put himself in position to be, as disruptive as he has been.

I can think of no greater disservice to the realization of the aspirations of the Congolese people and to our own for them than to stand aside and let these three countries have the field to themselves in such pressure play. Believe our Embassies these countries should make plain our view that they should take the heat off, basing ourselves on non-interference, and adding that we feel Lumumba is bad medicine.

Timberlake

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–2260. Secret; Niact. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Brussels, Paris, London, Cairo, Conakry, and Accra.

227. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

September 23, 1960, 7:49 p.m.

488. Leopoldville's 783 (rpt. Niact 145).¹ It has unfortunately become clear Guinea, Ghana and UAR deliberately intervening in internal affairs of Congo in violation repeated SC and GA resolutions. Interference now taking form of refusal permit arrest of Lumumba and attempts convince Kasavubu, Ileo and Bomboko bring Lumumba back into Government.

USUN should make clear orally to SYG at first opportunity Department's concern this course of events. We do not wish complicate his task but we believe intervention practiced by Africans is just as contrary to UN resolutions as would be interference from any other source. You should solicit his views on general situation and particularly how he intends play it. If appropriate you may make following points. We believe SYG should take steps now to secure token forces from other countries, including newly-independent African states. Inclusion moderate African elements would serve to neutralize Ghana–Guinea–UAR axis supporting Lumumba. We believe also UN Command should take all necessary measures ensure obedience and discipline troops placed at its disposal. You should make clear our attitude towards Lumumba, drawing upon reftel as necessary.

You should also make clear to SYG, if you not already done so, our support for Bomboko as only Congolese Delegate entitled to speak for his government. We acknowledge that situation in Congo remains unclear, but Bomboko clearly speaks for legally-established authority (Kasavubu) as well as individual in de facto control (Mobutu).

Mission should also discuss foregoing informally with Africans, including Ghana, Guinea and UAR. We recognize that this position will be unpopular with countries so indicated, but it will not be first time we have opposed them successfully on African matter. If we had not done so on Cameroun, there is strong possibility it would be controlled by Communist Government under Dr. Felix Moumie. With Nigerians, you should take the position that we stand for strict non-intervention from whatever sources as the only alternative to chaos and civil war. We worked as closely with Lumumba as we were able when he was in power and we will now work with present government.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–2260. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Tron, cleared by Penfield and Deputy Director of the Office of West African Affairs Wendell B. Coote, and approved by Wallner. Repeated to Léopoldville as telegram 887, to Accra, Cairo, and Conakry.

¹ Document 226.

Inform Department when foregoing steps taken.

Dillon

228. Editorial Note

A telegram of September 24 from Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to the CIA representative in Léopoldville reads in part as follows: "We wish give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming governmental position or if he fails in Leo[poldville], setting himself in Stanleyville or elsewhere." (Senate Select Committee, *Interim Report*, page 62; brackets in the source text)

229. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, September 26, 1960, 6 p.m.

824. Reference: Deptels 886,¹ 887² and 894.³ Accompanied by Lavallee, I called on Kasavubu this afternoon in order deliver substance Deptels under reference which I explained in great detail. Ileo was also in attendance. They listened avidly to recommendations of Department and then gave impression they were very anxious to carry them out.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-2660. Secret; Niact. Also sent to USUN and London and repeated to Brussels and Paris.

¹ Dated September 23, telegram 886 to Léopoldville instructed the Embassy to try to persuade Kasavubu and Mobutu of the desirability of putting the Congo government on a better legal footing. It recommended that Kasavubu announce that he was still Chief of State and, as such, above factional disputes, and that he appoint as government the council of commissioners named by Mobutu. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/9-2360)

² Document 227.

³ Also sent to USUN as telegram 497, telegram 894 to Léopoldville, September 24, instructed the USUN to approach the Ghanaian, Guinean, and UAR Delegations to argue against their support of Lumumba and to tell them the United States opposed small power intervention as well as big power intervention in the Congo and considered it essential that the various U.N. contingents remain responsive to U.N. instructions. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-2260)

I told them that I would try to talk to Mobutu today in order obtain his support for Kasavubu's position.

During conversation which lasted approximately one hour I made following other points:

1. My government fully realizes that certain powers such as Guinea, Ghana, UAR, Morocco and Tunis have been and still are bringing pressure to bear on Kasavubu and other Congolese leaders in order to effect a reconciliation between Kasavubu and Lumumba. I stated this question of pressure was being taken up by US with SYG and respective delegations at UN in New York which include several heads of state. I declared in my opinion it would not be profitable to come to an understanding with Lumumba. During the two months he was in power, he created anarchy throughout country, he fought with his collaborators, the UN and SYG, he helped bring cold war to Congo by accepting direct assistance military nature from Soviets, he fanned fires of civil war in country and in summary constituted a centrifugal rather than centripetal force. I added he was an evil influence who would be bad for the Congo. It was for these reasons that I was squarely against him. Added we had worked with Lumumba while he was recognized Prime Minister and we prepared work with legal successor.

I stated my government considered Kasavubu to be legal head of Congo state and that it supported him strongly.

2. Kasavubu and Ileo agreed with above remarks and Kasavubu stated he had no intentions whatsoever of effecting reconciliation with Lumumba, knowing it would not be in interest peaceful settlement.

I stated that no power, whether great or small had right to inject itself in internal affairs of Congo and this is US policy.

Since army mutiny in early July, disorder and subversion have been reigning in Congolese army rank, principally because its cadre of officers has disappeared. I stated that Kasavubu may wish ask UN establish pool of army officers drawn from various countries who could be seconded to Congo to run and train national Congolese army. In order regain control army and to blunt efforts certain politicians to convert parts or all of it into political weapon, it was essential that a cadre of officers, directly responsible to Chief of State, as CINC, be created as quickly as possible. I pointed out that as soon as Congolese officers were formed they could replace the "temporary ones." Pointed out plenty of precedent in British officers with Ghana troops and with Indian troops after independence. Those, however, were bilateral while this should go through UN although requiring also agreement with countries asked to second officers.

3. I enquired why Lumumba had been permitted remain in official residence of Prime Minister since his dismissal. I stated this constituted psychological advantage for Lumumba and that Ileo in his capacity as Prime Minister should be living there now.

They agreed this was case but seemed to think this could be solved only by arresting him. I suggested they consider, whether or not they willing or able arrest him, telling UNOC they insist Lumumba be removed from official Prime Minister office and residence so that legal Prime Minister Ileo could move in. They may have accepted this idea but went back to problem of arrest.

Kasavubu declared that warrant for Lumumba's arrest which had been made out be Attorney General on September 8 was still valid, but that Mobutu had shown some hesitancy about arresting former Prime Minister. He stated there was another army officer who was willing to arrest Lumumba. I suggested that before serving warrant Kasavubu should inform Dayal to satisfy him warrant legal and ask for UN army officer to accompany arresting party in order inform UN soldiers guarding Lumumba that party had legal warrant for arrest of Lumumba. I stated that if these procedures were followed, I believed Kasavubu forces should encounter no obstruction from UN in arresting Lumumba.

4. With reference to ambiguity that exists between legal positions Kasavubu, Ileo and Mobutu's Council of High Commissioners, I asked them if they approved action of Mobutu. They replied they approved and supported him and prepared reiterate. I pointed out confusion among many nations at UNGA meeting yet to be ironed out.

5. I informed Kasavubu and Ileo that my staff and I were at their entire disposal. I added that I had not come out to see them as frequently as I would have liked, but that I did not wish give impression to their opponents that we were working too closely with them. They fully understand and agree.

6. In thanking me for my visit and advice, Kasavubu and Ileo appeared to be sincerely appreciative of the position we have taken. They also seemed to be eager to follow our recommendations. I believe my visit came at most opportune moment, in that it will show Kasavubu and Ileo, who have been subjected to various pressures, that they are not alone in their anti-Lumumba struggle. They indicated they would call Mobutu immediately to inform him of US views, to encourage him and induce him take necessary action his part.

On return to office I received disturbing reports, not yet fully confirmed, that Mobutu may be yielding to pressure (probably from Kettani whom he likes and trusts) and may already have made overtures to Lumumba assuming latter will soon be back in saddle. We are endeavoring directly stiffen Mobutu's backbone and hope Kasavubu and Ileo will also be successful today that same enterprise.

Wish to add that USUN telegram 114 to Leopoldville⁴ arrived after I was en route to Kasavubu hence could not make specific point re lunch. However, I left no doubt in minds Kasavubu and Ileo our support for Bomboko and asked them take indicated steps so that US, as member Credentials Committee, could effectively support his seating. With Department's assurances directly to Bomboko, do not think it necessary explain to Kasavubu.

Department may wish repeat to other African and Asian posts concerned.

Timberlake

⁴ Secto 15 from USUN, repeated to Léopoldville as telegram 114, September 24, explained that the Secretary had not invited Bomboko to a luncheon he had given for the chief U.N. delegates of the newly-admitted African states because the Credentials Committee had not yet submitted its report. Timberlake was instructed to make this known to Kasavubu and Mobutu at his discretion. (*Ibid.*, 303/9-2460)

230. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and Secretary General Hammarskjöld

New York, September 26, 1960, 6:30 p.m.¹

I called on the Secretary General alone at my request. I began by giving him the substance of the information contained in the attached talking paper.

When I finished, Hammarskjöld said that he found it most difficult to believe that Dayal might not share his views on the danger of Lumumba. He went on to say that he is in contact with Dayal by telephone once or twice a day and he has always found Dayal in complete agreement with his views, and ready to carry out his instructions wholeheartedly. With respect to the arrest of Lumumba, Hammarskjöld said that he had given orders that the U.N. troops should not interfere in any way with the service of a warrant or the actual arrest of Lumumba. Hammarskjöld went on to say that the difficulty is that while various people may have in their possession warrants for Lumumba's arrest, they have so far been unwilling to put them into effect because of fear of popular reaction to such a step. In addition, he

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-2660. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by the Secretary's Special Assistant Max V. Krebs.

¹ The meeting took place in Hammarskjöld's office at the U.N. General Assembly building.

went on to say that there is only one appointed judge in the whole of the Congo before whom Lumumba could be brought for trial in the event of his arrest.

As to activities of Ghanaian and Guinean troops, the Secretary General said that they have an order to prevent Lumumba from leaving Leopoldville and that so far they have carried out this order. I asked the Secretary General about the report we had received during the afternoon to the effect that Lumumba had been travelling around the city of Leopoldville in a jeep accompanied by Ghanaian troops with U.N. helmets. Hammarskjold confirmed the report but said that he had instructed General von Horn to call in the commander of the Ghanaian troops and demand that the officers responsible for this action be disciplined. Von Horn had also under instructions warned the Ghanaian commander that any further breaches of U.N. discipline of this sort would be dealt with more severely. The Secretary General concluded by reiterating his complete confidence in Dayal.

C.A.H.

[Attachment]²

It is clear to us that Guinea, Ghana, and the UAR are deliberately intervening in the internal affairs of the Congo—both diplomatically and through efforts to employ their UN troops for national objectives, especially in support of Lumumba.

We hope you might be able to improve the situation by such steps as obtaining further forces from other countries, especially new African states, making necessary redistribution of UN troops in Congo to neutralize these tendencies, and taking other measures to assure obedience and discipline of UN troops.

We would appreciate any views you may have as to what else might be done.

We have also had additional solid information confirming what Amb. Barco gave you Friday³ that UAR is taking lead with Ghana and Guinea in concerting their action in the Congo. Nkrumah speech seems to be part of this.

You should also know that Amb Dayal (SYG's Representative in the Congo) has been consulted in relation to these steps and that he is preventing arrest of Lumumba, has taken position supporting necessity of keeping Lumumba as Prime Minister, and has indicated that Mobutu is being supported by imperialist powers through payments to the Army.

² No classification marking.

³ September 23.

As this is not the policy you have been following, I wanted you to know this, which is for your personal information only.

231. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, September 27, 1960, 9 p.m.

Secto 18. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Belgian ForMin Wigny (accompanied by Ambs Scheyven and Loridan) had discussion with Secretary September 26.

Secretary said regretted there had been differences between US and Belgium and wished talk them over as friends.

Wigny said also distressed over differences. Must now discuss what can be done at present. Chief problem has been and is Lumumba, a "fool" and totally unreasonable. But everything not lost; immediate future will be important. US action can be decisive. Has not been understood in Belgium, where public opinion felt nation had not had support from US due friend in distress.

Wigny analyzed Congo situation as follows: Must have reasonable people on "other side of table", mentioning Kasavubu, Ileo, Mobutu and Bomboko. SYG and Western powers must be firm in support those who are against Lumumba. Re Katanga, Belgian policy in past had favored unity of independent Congo; however, with coming of anarchy was important save at least one part of country. Katanga must remain free until new Congo can be built up. If Katanga gives way while Lumumba remains, this end for entire Congo. Again stressed Belgium against destruction Congo unity or separate Katanga state. Wigny said officers of Katanga forces are on leave from Belgian Army and are lent to Force Publique. Do not receive orders from Belgium. If they were to leave situation would be serious.

Wigny said Congo must have strong executive, so as rebuild administrative structure, maintain social and economic achievements, protect private enterprise, and put an end to physical and legal insecurity.

Secretary said he agreed with this analysis. US had made clear only legal Congo govt is that of Kasavubu. We believe Lumumba very dangerous and must be got out of govt. Thus clear whom we support,

and we have supplied Hammarskjold with \$5 million for assistance. We deeply concerned over attitude Ghana, Guinea and UAR and actions their troops in Congo. May have offer resolution in GA that UN troops in Congo that do not remain under strict UN command must be withdrawn.

Turning to other matters, Wigny said Belgium must maintain support of NATO but it faced with difficulties (financial and political) in maintaining defense contribution.

Secretary said he hoped Belgium would maintain contribution and referred to danger of others following suit if Belgium cuts.

Secretary complimented Wigny on his intervention in GA in reply to Nkrumah.¹

Herter

¹ On September 23; for the record of the meeting, see U.N. doc. A/PV.869.

232. Editorial Note

At the 461st meeting of the National Security Council on September 29, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commented on developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief discussion followed. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, dated September 29, reads as follows:

"Turning to the Congo, Mr. Dulles reported that political jockeying was still in progress with the position of Mobutu's government, if Mobutu's collection of technicians and graduate students could be called a government, remaining rather tenuous. Mobutu had received support from Kasavubu. Meanwhile, Lumumba is still at large under the protection of the UN as represented by Dayal, who prevented Lumumba's arrest some days ago. The Ghana contingent in the UN forces is also protecting Lumumba. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Lumumba is still being supported by the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea and also by Morocco. Morocco's attitude is particularly important because of the large number of Moroccan troops now in the Congo. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mobutu arrested Gizenga; under UN pressure, however, the latter was released in a short time. Lumumba is engaged in trying to mount a counter-coup. As a result of Ghana's protest to the UN Secretary General, any decision to remove the Ghana contingent from the Congo has been either rescinded or deferred, a development which will make the position of Mobutu and Kasavubu much more difficult. Mr. Dulles said the press was now

carrying a report of the discovery of an incriminating letter among Lumumba's effects. The letter, addressed to Lumumba and signed by Nkrumah, makes references to increased Soviet assistance to Lumumba and demonstrates in various passages Nkrumah's close association with Lumumba. As yet there has been no opportunity to study this letter or to obtain information as to its authenticity. Its authenticity, however, appeared to be vouched for by the Ghanaian Chargé d'Affaires in the Congo, who is said to have delivered the letter. Meanwhile, the economy of the Congo is deteriorating. A recent report by Dayal warns of the possibility of the plague and a smallpox epidemic, indicates that there is a shortage of doctors, refers to the large number of abandoned farms, stresses the inter-tribal fighting going on in Kasai, mentions a quarter of a million refugees, and concludes that no government or administration exists in the Congo.

"Secretary Dillon said that according to a report from New York, Bomboko was returning to the Congo temporarily for a meeting of political leaders which would include Lumumba and Tshombe, and which would be chaired by Bomboko, who is also chairman of Mobutu's government of technicians. The meeting will attempt to agree on a new constitutional structure for the Congo consisting of a confederation along tribal lines. Apparently twelve tribes are involved and no tribe will be represented unless it has at least 500,000 members. Bomboko is hopeful that this confederation scheme will solve some of the Congo's problems. In any case, Mr. Dillon supposed a decision along tribal lines would be popular in the Congo. Mr. Dulles said he was concerned because Lumumba was scheduled to attend this conference. He thought Lumumba would certainly create confusion." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The report by Dayal to which Dulles referred was his first progress report to the Secretary-General, dated September 21; for text, see U.N. doc. S/4531.

233. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, September 29, 1960, 8 p.m.

863. At dinner meeting September 28 Colonel Joseph Mobutu complained he has not received political support from abroad. His verbal attacks on Ghana, Guinea and UAR particularly sharp but gave no indication he is aware Moroccan role in pressuring Congolese leaders to reconcile their differences. Again emphasized his coup staged to

save Congo from chaos and communism but in commenting on heavy pressures to which he has been subjected since September 14 he noted he sometimes wonders why he took it on himself to overthrow previous regime. In this respect he stated he does not have officers sufficiently well trained, educated or qualified in other ways to assist in carrying heavy responsibility he now must carry.

In reply to a query Mobutu said Lumumba is a dangerous demagogue who was badly influenced by Felix Moumie and a group of Guinean political advisors. He expressed distrust of Lumumba and fear of communism but when asked about his plans for future he merely commented that forthcoming round-table will settle problem and if necessary he will impose his will on the conferees.

Mobutu obviously is under great pressure and is extremely nervous. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Though he expressed view that ninety percent of army is with him he gave the impression of a man whistling in the dark.

In discussing efforts of certain powers to pressure Congolese to reconcile their differences and allow Lumumba to remain in the government I emphasized it is United States policy to oppose such pressure groups and told him the United States is making representations to various heads of government and Chiefs of Mission now attending UNGA on this matter. I also assured him United States will make every effort to support legal government appointed by Chief of State.

As Mobutu appeared almost overwhelmed by responsibilities he had assumed, I made every effort to encourage him to stand firm against Lumumba and avoid dangers of a compromise which would result eventually in a return to situation which existed prior to his coup. Only time will tell whether Mobutu has the stamina, moral courage and political savvy necessary to meet challenge of present situation.

Timberlake

234. Telegram From the Consulate at Elisabethville to the Department of State

Elisabethville, September 29, 1960, 5 p.m.

145. Re Deptels 103¹ and 106.² In lengthy talk with President Tshombe yesterday, during latter's informal evening call at my home, I made points raised in reference telegrams.

1. I outlined in detail reasons why Tshombe should publicize his willingness to talk with other moderate leaders of former Belgian Congo concerning future constitutional arrangements and stressed impact which this would undoubtedly have on leaders of independent African states. Tshombe replied that it was his idea to convoke conference of moderate leaders in first place. I suggested he follow through by supporting plans of Kasavubu, Ileo, and Bomboko for holding this conference at Leopoldville in near future, adding strong implication that Department hoped that these persons would benefit from a general rallying of moderate Congolese leaders to their support. Tshombe replied without conviction that although he still favors conference idea, he generally discouraged by inability other moderate leaders to fight for their principles and is therefore unwilling attend meeting in Leopoldville where even his personal safety cannot be assured during present chaotic period. I asked Tshombe to think over my suggestion and proposed we discuss it again this coming weekend. He indicated in reply there was little likelihood that he would change his mind until Leopoldville situation became clarified; although he himself might decide to convoke conference moderate leaders in Elisabethville.

2. Pursuing theme that Tshombe should campaign to win support among independent African States, I broached subject of possible visits by him to African capitals, beginning with those where he most likely to receive encouraging welcome. I indicated such visits might be

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-2960. Confidential; Priority. Received at 9:13 a.m., September 30. Also sent to Léopoldville and repeated to Brussels, USUN, Abidjan, and Brazzaville.

¹ Telegram 103, September 24, summarized a conversation with Bassompierre, in which Department officers suggested that it would be helpful if Tshombé would emphasize publicly his support for a united Congo and his willingness to discuss the subject with leaders in Léopoldville. They also suggested a visit by Tshombé to some of the independent African countries and Belgian efforts to minimize the more visible aspects of Belgian influence on him. The telegram instructed Elisabethville to broach these suggestions with Tshombé. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/9-2460)

² Telegram 106, September 27, informed the consulate that Bassompierre had indicated Belgian agreement with the U.S. suggestions in telegram 103 and suggested that Timberlake visit Katanga to reinforce these positions with Tshombé. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/9-2660)

of greater benefit to Katanga than sending Katangan "Foreign Minister" Evariste Kimba to New York and Washington (reported separately). Tshombe listened carefully but made no comment on this subject.

3. Commenting on important role of independent African states in supporting UN action in Congo, I proposed that Tshombe give maximum publicity to his willingness to share responsibility with UN for maintaining order in central Baluba area. I said that past unfortunate outbursts by Katangan officials against UN actions in Katanga may have had effect of painting Katanga Government as hostile to UN Congo operations which have received overwhelming support of non-Communist world. I equated Katanga's acceptance of UN assistance and cooperation with improved image Katanga might make in eyes of African states as well as other free world nations. Tshombe offered no comment concerning his present relations with UN (although I understand from UN source these relations are presently much better).

4. Finally I broached subject of minimizing more visible aspects Belgian influence Katanga. I made clear this criticism meant in constructive way and was not attempted to discredit Belgian assistance to Katanga or obliquely to achieve removal Belgian technicians from province. I indicated my willingness to make these observations to Ambassador Rothschild as proof my constructive intentions. I nevertheless stressed that too obvious Belgian presence in support Katanga Government has led to criticism abroad and in Katanga that Tshombe government is neocolonial regime. Tshombe said answer to this was simple: He and his entire family were anti-Belgian. He outlined at length his deep-rooted antagonism toward Belgium, but added that his present choice lay between accepting only western help offered him or depriving Katangan population of badly needed technical services. Tshombe added with thinly disguised bitterness that he would like nothing better than to internationalize corps of technicians upon which his government depends. I repeated that my criticism was directed toward too obvious manifestations of Belgian presence and not towards principle of European advisers who are employed by almost all independent African regimes. I again referred to image of Katanga held by independent African states and voiced my personal conviction that Katangan regime has substance as well as support of African population.

Comment: It is possible that certain ideas discussed in this conversation will take root in Tshombe's thinking and cause him to react in desired direction. However, particularly on subject joining rally of moderate Congo leaders behind Kasavubu and others in Leopoldville, he showed apparent determination to back away from Leopoldville situation and to move further on separatist limb along which he has progressed rather rapidly in recent weeks.

Most striking aspect of conversation was Tshombe's unwillingness express interest or concern over non-acceptance by independent African states of Katanga's claim to being representative African state. This blind spot called to mind my recent conversation with Interior Minister Munongo who, when reminded that African states were watching Katanga closely, called down plague on all their houses. In course conversation, I mentioned possibility of visit to Elisabethville by Ambassador Timberlake. Tshombe said he had no objection to such visit for, "although the US and Katanga do not agree on anything relating to Katanga, we are nevertheless still friends". This hardly constituted cordial invitation and I believe Ambassador will agree situation here should develop further before date for visit is set.

Toward end of conversation I suggested we discuss these subjects again and indicated my willingness to review points with other leaders in Tshombe's cabinet. Tshombe indicated meeting might be arranged with Vice President Jean Kibwe, who he said takes moderate view these matters, but he ruled out meeting with Munongo whom he described as very emotional.

In summing up his ideas before his departure, Tshombe said that US failed to appreciate hard facts of African politics. He said Africans appreciate only two things: Force and money. If US really wanted help Kasavubu and Ileo it should give them sufficient money to buy support of few key politicians and legislators in Leopoldville. This is what he himself has tried to do. Tshombe said Soviet bloc recognizes these facts and acts accordingly. However US cannot even recognize its own anti-Communist allies in Africa. This is due, he thought, to fact US makes mistake of playing game honestly and fairly, as result of which US will never succeed in its political bargaining with independent African states.

Canup

235. Memorandum of ConversationSecDel MC/118 Riverdale, New York, October 6, 1960, 11:30 a.m.¹

PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*J. C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary
T. A. Cassilly*Guinea*President Sekou Toure of Guinea
Telli Diallo, Ambassador to United
States
Ismael Toure, Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication
Damantang Camara, Minister of the
Interior

SUBJECT

Congo

After welcoming the President back to the United States, Mr. Satterthwaite emphasized our full support of the United Nations in the Congo since we saw no alternative between the United Nations and chaos. Lumumba had been received in Washington by the United States Government and we had flown his delegation to the United Nations. Nevertheless, Lumumba seemed determined to curtail the United Nations role in the Congo and facilitate that of the Soviet Union. The United States believed that the African countries also were opposed to the spread of the cold war to Africa and, therefore, approved our operating through the United Nations.

President Toure observed that it was not any individual Congolese who was important but the independence and unity of the country. He insisted that the "legality" of the Congo, as established through free elections, must be respected. Although Belgian paratroopers have committed aggression in the Congo, the United Nations declares it should be neutral with respect to both the aggressors and those attacked; Guinea does not agree with this reasoning. In intervening in the Congo the United Nations has ignored the local government which invited them in in the first place. Why should this be the case in the Congo but not the case during the Suez crisis where the United Nations cooperated with the Nasser Government?

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, 15th General Assembly—Memcons. Official Use Only. Drafted by Thomas A. Cassilly, Officer in Charge of Guinea, Cameroun, and Togo. The portion of the conversation concerning U.S.—Guinea relations is recorded in a separate memorandum of conversation; see Document 330.

¹ President Touré was attending the U.N. General Assembly; the conversation took place at his residence.

When Mr. Satterthwaite tried to point out that the two cases were not identical, the President referred very emotionally to the extreme poverty of his country, its leaders and the members of his own family. Even though we are a poor country no one can challenge the "legitimacy" of the Guinean (and, by inference, the Congolese) Government.

Mr. Satterthwaite stressed the vital importance of the United Nations especially for the smaller countries. The President agreed and remarked that although he might seem to be harsh in his attacks on the Secretary General, Guinea was second to none in its support of the United Nations.

236. Editorial Note

At the 462d meeting of the National Security Council on October 6, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, October 6, reads as follows:

"Turning to the Congo, Mr. Dulles reported there had been little change in the situation during the last few days. Mobutu, although ill and discouraged, was for the moment the strong man of the country. Support for Lumumba appeared to be decreasing. After Lumumba's fall, the Soviets withdrew their technicians, planes and equipment. Soviet Bloc diplomats are now at Accra and Conakry. A Soviet freighter, believed to be carrying equipment for Lumumba, is still off the African coast. The financial situation in the Congo is precarious. The UN fears that the country will exhaust its funds by November 15. Moreover, the water supply of Leopoldville may soon be contaminated. Mr. Dulles concluded his briefing on the Congo by reporting that the UN Force in the Congo now numbers 18,145 men.

"Mr. McCone reported that while in Europe recently he had heard that the Belgians intended to stay in Katanga. He believed the only solution to the Congo situation was some kind of federation. Apparently, the Belgians were still operating mines in Katanga. Mr. Dulles said he doubted whether the revenue from the Katanga mining went to the rest of the Congo. Mr. McCone said 1500 tons of uranium-oxide was above ground in Katanga. The U.S. was considering preclusive buying of this material to prevent it falling into the hands of the Soviets." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo

October 6, 1960, 8:48 p.m.

1009. Embtel 824, rptd New York 157, Brussels 341.¹ Following démarche reported reftel Department would appreciate your views on following subsequent steps which might be taken: Kasavubu and other appropriate Congo leaders might be approached and informed, while Department considers round-table conference useful, we hope focus this gathering will be preliminary constitutional talks, not settlement Lumumba-Kasavubu dispute or composition executive branch GOC. Whole assumption GOC should be Lumumba government now legally out of office. We hope Kasavubu will host conference and welcome delegates and Ileo or Bomboko chair session from then on. Obviously round table should include widest feasible spread Congo opinion and include parliamentary leaders and some MNC-Lumumba.

Department also considers it important Tshombe attend conference, and Elisabethville might do what it can influence him this direction. We hope he will be able come forward with specific ideas about Katanga contribution GOC revenue to assist urgent rehabilitation measures such fields as public health and refugee relief. Department feels this would win him some points African states as well as facilitate US and UN funding problems for ONUC.

Dillon

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9-2660. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Ferguson and Woodruff, cleared in draft with Wallner and Chadbourn, and approved by Penfield. Repeated to USUN, Brussels, and Elisabethville.

¹ Document 229.

**238. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the
Department of State**

Léopoldville, October 11, 1960, 1 p.m.

949. Saw Dayal four p.m. yesterday to review present situation. Said understood warrant for arrest Lumumba had been issued but that service had not been permitted. Asked whether previously understood UN policy that legitimate warrant arrest would be honored still obtained, pointing out Bunche, Cordier and he himself had assured me in past such was case. Dayal said no change in policy. I said I understood Bomboko had seen him 1300 yesterday but the warrant of arrest, which he presented, was disputed and I wished to know Dayal's position.

Latter said he had not seen warrant but had referred it to legal section UNOC which informed him warrant not valid. I said understood warrant signed by Attorney General who was so far as I knew, competent authority. Dayal said his understanding was warrant signed by Commissaire [and] UNOC considered it invalid.

Dayal said he felt arrest of Lumumba was not proper solution but "trick" and believed this was bad answer to present problem Congo. Said recent debate UNGA had won by narrow margin through support Afro-Asian group and that arrest Lumumba now would explode issue again in UNGA. Believed Afro-Asian group would object such solution and would at least be badly split. He believed eventual solution Congo depended on united support Afro-Asian group and asked me exercise influence with Bomboko desist from effort arrest Lumumba in interest of obtaining "peaceful" solution. I asked him whether this in support reconciliation. Dayal said he hoped democratic solution could be obtained.

I said experience those here during first days indicated Lumumba was unstable, had incited disorder, and had no solution to Congo problem short of domination as illustrated by attacks on Katanga and Kasai. I said return Lumumba to government would exacerbate divisive elements in Congo and that attitude Tshombe, Kalonji and other regional leaders was clear and unalterably opposed to Lumumba. Added that UNOC problems would be multiplied if Lumumba returns since he quite capable of reasserting leadership even though admitted to new government in capacity other than Prime Minister.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-1160. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Brussels.

Dayal repeated request that I use influence toward "peaceful settlement" with Bomboko.

Immediately following I attended meeting diplomatic mission chiefs convoked by Bomboko which included following: British, French, Dutch, Israeli, Indian (Rahman), Huber (German Chargé) together with Nussbaumer (Commissaire for Interior) and Cardose (Commissaire for Education). Bomboko made following exposé: He personally has nothing against Lumumba. However Lumumba has demonstrated that he is dangerous to peace in Congo. Bomboko had documentary proof distribution weapons and money (twelve distributors were caught yesterday morning at Lumumba's old house and nineteen were apprehended in Coquilhatville); he toured city day before yesterday, made speeches, and his gendarmes fired guns in air in effort demonstrate presumed power. Bomboko said had evidence Lumumba had invited terrorists from Ghana, Guinea, Cameroun, and Egypt into Congo. Has documentary evidence (from Moumie) together with photos to prove.

Bomboko made impassioned argument that Lumumba would tear Congo apart, which he had almost succeeded in doing and regional leaders unalterably opposed to him, but that he and Kasavubu, together with Mobutu, were trying to hold Congo together. If Lumumba returned, even they would declare independence, which would involve Equateur and Bakongo.

Bomboko, with every evidence sincerity, said Lumumba would be judged fairly and legally and would be permitted to bring in foreign lawyers if he chose to defend himself. He assured Ambassadors present no physical violence would be done to him. Nussbaumer said that last Thursday¹ he went three times to Dayal with warrant of arrest. First time Dayal told him warrant was not legal, second time there was difficulty with Ghanaian troops guarding Lumumba which Dayal said he would remove, and third time asked why he insisted on arrest when everything could be arranged. Nussbaumer saw Dayal yesterday morning for fourth time with warrant of arrest (the one which I personally saw) and he was left with impression warrant could not be served.

During meeting I asked Bomboko whether any other solution possible, to which he replied "no." I asked whether he saw any possibility of parliamentary solution, to which he replied this impossible while Lumumba still potentially able regain power since parliamentarians fear him with good reason because of arrests, brutalities, and intimidations Stanleyville, plus fact last parliamentary session saw

¹ October 6.

Lumumba's troops ringing Parliament. I asked him whether Katanga and Kasai Representatives and Senators were present Leopoldville or likely appear in possible parliamentary session. He replied "no."

Comment: I asked such questions in view presence Rahman who I knew would be reporting immediately to Dayal. *End comment.*

I said earlier information yesterday indicated that Congolese troops might be contemplating literal assault on Lumumba's house in effort enforce arrest and that in my considered opinion this would be serious error which would greatly influence attitude other nations toward Congo since it would be direct defiance UN. Suggested present position GOC good and should be maintained. In any case no good end would be served by "shooting way in." Other Ambassadors agreed. Added that in my opinion it would be better to withdraw troops encircling Lumumba's house and rely upon service of warrant by small group to avoid appearance of exertion force.

Should point out that prior to conversation with Dayal and Diplomatic Corps session with Bomboko, we had word (confirmed) that CNA had mounted some 300 troops around Lumumba's house and were prepared to move in with force. I had already sent word to Mobutu and Bomboko that this would be serious mistake.²

Following the session with Bomboko, British, French, Dutch Ambassadors and I had short meeting reviewing situation. We had assured Bomboko we would inform our governments and asked him take no direct action pending results such reports. Consensus opinion is that our governments should consider carefully impact which arrest Lumumba might have on UN, particularly Afro-Asian group, but that in our opinion UN would be in difficult position if it assumed prerogative of deciding legality of warrant of arrest which apparently issued by competent authority (Attorney General Rom was appointed by Lumumba government shortly after independence). This would be assumption furthermore of police powers which not so far asserted by UN.

While recognizing admitted complications which this will inevitably introduce into UNGA, or at least SYG, deliberations, it seems to me that there is enough evidence against Lumumba to warrant reasonable investigation by Congolese of his activities during time he was Prime Minister. This seems basic right government of any country. In view assurance Bomboko, which I respect, that no physical violence will be done to Lumumba, I fail to see any reasonable argument for the

² Telegram 952 from Léopoldville, October 11, reported that Bomboko had telephoned Timberlake after Dayal refused to permit the service of the arrest warrant and stated that he intended to order Lumumba's seizure by force. Timberlake told him this would be the "gravest of blunders" and advised issuing a statement that the government had decided against the use of force to avoid spilling blood. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-1160)

continued refusal UN to permit service of arrest warrant which appears to be entirely legal. Hope Department and USUN will make this point clear to SYG. Continued refusal by UNOC to allow such service would seem to me, in long run, to be indefensible unless UN prepared assume responsibility for administration justice and police powers in Congo.³

Later Bomboko gave press conference during which he stated 1500 local today deadline for service of arrest warrant.

Timberlake

³ Timberlake commented in telegram 950 from Léopoldville, October 11, that Dayal was seeking a solution "which might be viable in civilized environment but not in Congo" and that Dayal would not go along with direct action to break the impasse without specific instructions from the Secretary-General. (*Ibid.*)

239. Memorandum of Conversation

October 11, 1960.

SUBJECT

Situation in the Congo

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Wigny, Belgian Foreign Minister
Mr. Jean de Bassompierre, Counselor, Belgian Embassy

The Acting Secretary (Mr. Dillon)
Mr. C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., AF
Mr. William L. Blue, WE

After an exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Wigny began his presentation by stating he wanted to see Mr. Dillon as he felt the situation in the Congo had changed somewhat since he had seen Mr. Herter.¹ He said that he believed we were living in fateful days and that the major question now was who was to be the strong man in the Congo. He added that there were two candidates, Lumumba and Bomboko, the former supported by the Communists. He then commented that he had the impression the Communists were united and had decided what their strategy should be whereas the Western camp was undecided and seemed to be waiting to see who would win. He added he

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-1160. Confidential. Drafted by Blue.

¹ On September 26; see Document 231.

did not feel that there was any question but that Lumumba had been dismissed legally. On the other hand it was true that a new government would have to receive the approval of Parliament. He said that both houses of Parliament were inexperienced and Lumumba, who was a sorcerer, was able to turn them upside down. Mr. Dillon asked him at this point if Lumumba could be kept away from the Parliament when it met. This prompted Mr. Wigny to refer to the warrant of arrest for Lumumba which the U.N. forces had refused to recognize on grounds of parliamentary immunity. Mr. Wigny said this was an untenable position as, in trying to usurp power, Lumumba had put himself outside the law.

Mr. Wigny then indicated that the second point he wanted to bring up was the Katanga situation. He expressed concern over the criticism of the Belgian role in the Katanga. He said his Government wants to recreate the unity of the Congo as much as anyone else. He cited as evidence of this Mr. Tshombe's statement that the Belgians were opposed to independence for the Katanga. He also cited support of talks between Kasavubu and Tshombe and indicated that if these talks could take place, Lumumba's position would be weakened. Going on to a discussion of Belgian officers and technicians in the Katanga he said that they had remained in the Katanga because Tshombe wanted them and because order prevails. He added that certain of the Belgians wanted Belgian army officers to remain but that he had insisted that they leave. He was therefore all the more indignant about criticism of the Belgians on this score. As for these allegations he said that one of these officers was a Frenchman, one was unknown to the Belgians and one was a Belgian officer discharged in 1949.

He went on to mention the officers of Belgian nationality in the Force Publique in the Katanga. He said that they were Congolese officers. Indeed they could not even be integrated into the Belgian army without being subject to an examination. In response to a question from Mr. Dillon, he explained that there were some 200 officers and non-commissioned officers in the Force Publique in the Katanga. He said if these officers were pulled out chaos would reign in the Katanga. At this point Mr. Dillon interjected a remark that after all the Ghanaian army has British officers.

Mr. Wigny then went on to the third point on the state of the private sector in the Congo. He said that if the proper authorities are supported by the U.N. and by technicians then order could be restored and the economy could recover. He added that Belgian technicians could not remain however without receiving some Belgian francs as a part of their salaries.

Mr. Wigny then concluded by returning to his original point. He said that the duel between Lumumba supported by the Communists, Moroccans, Guineans and Ghanaians and the other candidates supported by everyone else had begun. He added that if the latter had a chance he was sure the future would be brighter. He called on the U.S. to press the U.N. to give them a chance.

Mr. Dillon opened his remarks by stating he was pleased the U.S. was able to work more closely with the Belgians recently than in the past on some occasions. He then referred to Mr. Lumumba and said he would not be as shy as Mr. Wigny had been in referring to him. He added that if he is not a Communist, he is a tool of the Communists and therefore hopeless. He stated that as the Belgians knew the U.S. had recognized Kasavubu as chief of state and tried to persuade him to pick someone effective as prime minister. It was obvious to him that neither Kasavubu nor Ileo nor Mobutu, for that matter, was strong enough, but perhaps Bomboko was the man. Mr. Dillon continued that we had also urged the U.N. to deal with the government of Kasavubu as the legal government. He indicated that we agreed that it would be helpful to clear up the situation by having Parliament get rid of Lumumba, but that there was no point in having such a meeting if Lumumba could not be taken care of.

Mr. Dillon expressed the hope that there would not be a clash between the U.N. forces and the Congo forces trying to arrest Lumumba. He wondered if Lumumba could not be arrested when he goes out on one of his tours of the city. Mr. Dillon reiterated the desire of the US to be of all possible help. He said an Ambassador had been trying to shore up Kasavubu and urging him not to deal with Lumumba.

Mr. Dillon then turned to the question of the Katanga and said that we understood the Belgian position on the Katanga. He said, as Mr. Wigny understood, the US believed that the Katanga should stay within the Congolese state if for no other reason than to keep the economy viable. He also stated our interest in getting Kasavubu and Tshombe together. Mr. Dillon added that the US was receptive to any ideas which might be developed on the isolation of Mr. Lumumba, the more rapidly, the better. He even asked if it might not be better if Lumumba would go to Ghana for example. Mr. Ferguson at this point spoke up to say that if he left for Ghana he might be back in Stanleyville tomorrow. In a further discussion of Lumumba Mr. Dillon said he understood the reaction to Lumumba as he had heard him talk here in Washington and he was very persuasive.

Mr. Wigny stressed again the fateful days ahead and urged that we use our influence with Mr. Hammarskjold in coping with the Congo problem. Mr. Dillon stated he thought Mr. Hammarskjold had

done a good job in the Congo. Mr. Wigny quickly agreed but said other powers were exerting pressure on Mr. Hammarskjold and that counter-pressure should also come from our side.

240. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 11, 1960.

Secto 40. Congo. Following from uncleared memo of conversation:

During courtesy call Secretary paid SYG this evening (Bunche also present), Hammarskjold made following points:

1. Situation in Congo, he said, continued extremely messy. No one person there strong enough to depend upon for future. Kasavubu was doing absolutely nothing. Mobutu was weak reed. Lumumba very likely dope addict. Bomboko suspected of being imperialist stooge. In short there was no one on scene who could be really helpful in bringing order out of chaos. In this connection, Bunche commented it would be ruinous for US [UN?] to tie its policy closely to any one of these individuals.

2. In present situation SYG remarked only thing UN could do was to steer very careful course allowing things to develop for while.

3. With respect possible arrest of Lumumba, SYG commented Ambassador Timberlake had "made noises" in Dayal's direction presumably expressing conviction UN should permit arrest. SYG expressed conviction UN could not possibly do this for variety of reasons including fact Lumumba had parliamentary immunity.

4. In present circumstances SYG thought best hope perhaps was to build toward leadership for legislative body in Congo. Difficulty here was that some members were "bought up", some were in hiding and many of course could not be relied upon.

5. Idea of Afro-Asian advisory committee for Congo had died down but now rejuvenated with coming of Sekou Toure. Newest idea among some Afro-Asians was such committee should be formed and should have Krishna Menon¹ as chairman.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-1160. Secret. Repeated to Léopoldville. The telegram does not indicate the time of transmission, but it was received at 10:29 p.m.

¹ Indian Defense Minister and Indian Representative at the United Nations.

6. In response to question SYG said Khrushchev proposal for throwing SYG out had subsided.² He anticipated taking some more wind out of Khrushchev's sails by appointing three former presidents of GA (Belaunde, Pearson and Madame Pandit)³ to consult with him for two to three day period about desirability of strengthening UN Secretariat. This move would be designed to implement suggestion he had made in SYG report to GA on improvement Secretariat and would have nothing directly to do with Khrushchev's proposal. SYG further commented Khrushchev had exuded sweetness and light since he gave SYG bear hug at USSR reception last week.

7. Nehru, he said, had come to UN session on pretty sound ground. Subsequently, however, he had been subjected to great deal of pressure from African delegates and had softened somewhat.

8. SYG reported Sekou Toure told him Mobutu had written Lumumba that if latter would guarantee his security Mobutu would give up.

9. SYG seemed in excellent spirits despite severity of recent attacks upon him. Secretary told him he should know that USG stood back of him one-thousand per cent.

Herter

² In his address before the General Assembly on September 23, Khrushchev proposed abolishing the position of Secretary-General and replacing it with a three-person executive representing the Western powers, socialist states, and neutral states. For text, see U.N. doc. A/PV.869; his proposal is extracted in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 35-38. For documentation, see vol. II, pp. 338 ff.

³ Victor Andrés Belaúnde of Peru, Lester Pearson of Canada, and Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit of India.

241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

October 12, 1960, 8:05 p.m.

654. Re Congo. Ambassador Wadsworth requested see SYG immediately and bring to his attention contents Leopoldville tels 949¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-1260. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Woodruff and Sisco and cleared by Ferguson, Penfield, and Deputy Legal Adviser John M. Raymond. Repeated niact to Léopoldville.

¹ Document 238.

and 962² rptd NY 191 and 198, stressing seriousness with which USG regards situation in Leopoldville. You requested make following points:

1. We appreciate fully political considerations SYG sees in serving warrant for arrest Lumumba at this time. We believe arrest Lumumba at this time would only be playing in hands extremists in UN and create storm there which would probably aggravate situation seriously. FYI. In any event arrest does not appear feasible since it would require Hammarskjold concurrence which he is definitely not prepared give, at least at this time. He has not only gone on public record to this effect but has made forceful presentation to Secretary. End FYI.

2. On other hand, failure partially satisfy Bomboko and Mobutu could mean serious bloodshed with CNA attacking UN troops. Such developments likely undermine irreparably UN position in Congo. We believe way out must be found in order break impasse in which legitimate authorities obstructed in seeking conduct activities of government by constant activities of Lumumba.

3. We have following suggestions which we believe completely legal and can be fully justified by UN as reasonable action in circumstances. We agree fully that UN should continue protect Lumumba's life. However, as long as Lumumba continues reside in Prime Minister's house he continues hold symbol of authority to which he not entitled under GOC constitution. We believe, therefore, that rather than permitting at this time serving of warrant of Lumumba for his arrest, that UN should effect Lumumba's removal from Prime Minister's house to some other location (perhaps some house in suburbs) on understanding that UN continues protect him. FYI. We do not believe UN has been justified in permitting Lumumba "bar-to-bar" campaign with protection Ghanaian and Guinean troops. End FYI. We believe UN could justify its action in removing Lumumba from Prime Minister's house not only on basis request from Kasavubu and constitutional position but also on grounds Lumumba's personal safety can better be protected.

In making above points you should call to SYG attention following legal considerations which we believe justify course of action being suggested: Lumumba has been removed as Prime Minister under Articles 20 and 22 of *Loi Fondamentale* and is not entitled reside in Prime Minister's residence.

² Dated October 12, telegram 962 reported that Bomboko and Mobutu had told Timberlake they could not restrain their troops much longer and that the U.N. Command had also refused a Congolese request to move Lumumba out of the Prime Minister's house. Timberlake commented that he had "worked night and day to prevent violent solution" but that he could not "hold them back much longer" unless he had some indication that the U.N. Command would permit Lumumba's arrest. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-1260)

For Leopoldville:

As you will note above we are trying find course of action which would avoid at this time specific issue of "serving of warrant" but which would for all practical purposes have similar effect with advantage of giving us some time to maneuver in this difficult situation. Without giving Bomboko any details at this time, you should inform him that we are taking this matter up with SYG, cautioning him not to move precipitously.³ If SYG reacts favorably we would then want Kasavubu make formal request to Dayal that Lumumba vacate Prime Minister's residence.

Dillon

³ Telegram 974 from Léopoldville, October 13, reported that Timberlake conveyed the message to Bomboko and urged him to start mobilizing support in the legislature for a vote of confidence in the new government. Bomboko was pleased by the message and indicated that the plan to arrest Lumumba had been abandoned. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/10-1360)

242. Editorial Note

At the 463d meeting of the National Security Council on October 13, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles commented on developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments and a brief discussion followed. The relevant portions of the memorandum of discussion by Director of the NSC Secretariat Robert H. Johnson, October 18, read as follows:

"Mr. Dulles then turned to the Congo, stating that the situation there remained much as it was a week ago. It was approaching a crisis because Mobutu, the military 'strong man', may soon move against Lumumba. He had given out cryptic statements that he would take action. Such action would create a difficult problem, involving conflict with the UN. There were a thousand Congolese troops around Lumumba's house; the UN guard force was not nearly so strong. The UN position is that it will surrender Lumumba only if his parliamentary immunity is lifted by the Congolese Parliament. There was some talk of convening the Parliament to get his immunity withdrawn. Mobutu believes he could get through a favorable vote on this issue.

"Mr. Dulles pointed out that the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea, with some help from Morocco and Tunisia, were playing Lumumba's game. A plane had taken off recently from Accra headed for the south with a load of thugs. For unknown reasons, it returned however to Accra. Weather was given as the reason but it is possible that Mobutu had arranged to have the airport at its intended destination refuse to re-

ceive the plane. There was also a report that a Russian plane had just left Accra with Ghanaian troops and the Ghanaian Ambassador to the Congo. There was no report on its destination. Five Ghanaian IL-14's were scheduled to depart between the 15th and 18th of October. Nkrumah was making a last effort to save Lumumba. Nkrumah was the bad actor in this situation. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] we know that UAR diplomats stationed in the Congo are playing an important role, engaging in bribery and other activities. We had succeeded, Mr. Dulles stated, in neutralizing Mme. Blouin who now wants to come to the U.S. She is writing her memoirs which, Mr. Dulles observed, should make interesting reading."

After brief remarks by Dulles on developments in Rhodesia, the Council returned to the subject of the Congo.

"Secretary Herter interjected to state that Mr. Hammarskjold does not have the same intelligence as we do on the UAR role in the Congo and we could not pass it to him because [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. It is Hammarskjold's view that the situation in the Congo is desperate and that there is no hope in any of the present leaders—no possibility of stability. He had confirmed that Lumumba was definitely a dope fiend.

"Kasavubu was enjoying his house and spent all of his time eating and sleeping. Nothing came out of his house unless a foreign agent got in and got him to sign a statement. Mobutu was a childish individual and might suffer a nervous breakdown. Moreover, he had no sense of administration and could be, we thought, easily bought. The direction in which the UN is headed at the moment is to get the Congolese Parliament re-assembled with a view to getting its full backing for someone. We do not think so much of the Foreign Minister, whom we once thought could provide the necessary leadership. Secretary Dillon pointed out in this connection that the Foreign Minister was viewed by other nations as a Western stooge. Mr. Dulles observed nonetheless that this was the best man we had.

"Secretary Dillon went on to state that the U.S. Ambassador in the Congo was concerned about the possibility that the Congolese troops would carry out their threat to arrest Lumumba. If the UN tried to stop them, it would create a very bad situation. Accordingly, we had been trying to think of some alternative and had made a suggestion to the UN on Wednesday night. Perhaps the UN has some reason for protecting the parliamentary immunity of Lumumba despite the fact that it did not protect other individuals on this basis when Lumumba was in power. We were suggesting to the UN, however, that there was no reason why Lumumba should remain in possession of the prime minister's mansion. Kasavubu has the full right to dismiss him. At one time earlier we did ask to have Lumumba moved out but the UN had refused. On Wednesday we had asked the UN to reconsider its refusal. If the UN agreed and Lumumba was moved out, we would tell the Congolese that this act represented a prestige gain for Mobutu but that Lumumba should not be arrested for the time being. Instead we would recommend that he be put in some less conspicuous place. Mr. Dulles asked in this connection whether it would be bad if Lumumba left the

country. Secretary Dillon said it would be all right provided he did not use the opportunity to go to Stanleyville." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

243. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 15, 1960, 8 p.m.

1021. Re: Congo, Deptel 680.¹

1. We called on SYG this morning to tell him we thought Lumumba should be removed from Prime Minister's residence because of psychological impact this would have. SYG said residence was merely one house in row of others along river where Congolese never went and he doubted whether moving him would make any difference. We replied that it did make difference in psychological impression externally and inasmuch as Lumumba had been legally deposed we thought symbols of office should be taken away from him.

2. SYG said he still regarded Lumumba as being PM. He said he had always taken position Kasavubu divesting or [sic] was legal but because of surrounding circumstances and general situation this act did not have intended legal consequences; Ileo govt had never been presented to Parliament and Ileo was phantom who was nowhere to be seen. Furthermore, Kasavubu had further clouded issue by appointing College of Commissioners whose Commissioner General (Bomboko) was supposedly FonMin in Ileo govt. Only parliamentary action since deposition of Lumumba had been to re-endorse Lumumba's status as PM, regardless of what might be said about size of vote and circumstances surrounding it. We said according our info *Loi Fondamentale* based on existing Belgian constitutional law to which

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-1560. Secret; Limited Distribution.

¹ Dated October 14, telegram 680 to USUN instructed the Mission to discuss with Hammarskjöld the question of removing Lumumba from the Prime Minister's residence. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/10-1460) Telegram 994 from USUN, October 14, reported that Wadsworth had been unable to arrange an interview with Hammarskjöld and that the Mission had therefore discussed the subject with Wieschhoff. The latter had expressed the view that political relationships in the Congo were so unstable and complex that neither permitting Lumumba's arrest nor shifting him to another residence was likely to have permanent results; the difficulties exceeded the possible gains. He thought the best thing Mobutu could do would be to keep Lumumba in isolation by keeping a tight cordon around the residence. (*Ibid.*)

one should look for interpretation for Congo. By terms of this, old govt loses caretaker status from moment new govt is named, even before parliamentary approval. SYG recognized that Belgian practice was different from that of Sweden, Italy and some other European countries where deposed govt automatically becomes caretaker govt. He seemed to dismiss this difference as unapplicable and said because of lack of legal follow-up and confusion created by various Kasavubu actions he could only regard Lumumba as PM.

3. We then said that basic problem with which we were concerned was that UN actions in recent weeks had tended to build up Lumumba and weaken efforts to create alternative govt. If he could not move Lumumba from PM's house perhaps there were some other steps he could take which would help bolster prestige of others. SYG said this was perfectly valid objective for Timberlake and U.S. but it could not be objective for UN; on this our views would simply have to differ.

4. We also raised question of UN troops protecting Lumumba while he traveled around city. SYG said this was error for which Ghanaian troops had been reprimanded and which he did not expect to reoccur.

5. SYG himself expressed concern about good offices commission, especially about efforts Menon seems to be making to get on commission. SYG felt Menon would try to undermine Narayanan,² Dayal and Rikhye, all of whom were "anti-Menon" Indians. *Comment:* While he obviously wants to avoid or delay good offices commission, we are doubtful whether he will exercise much initiative in doing so.

6. SYG again said he regarded Mobutu as of little value. He said he had just received telegram from Mobutu denying he had concurred in another recent telegram to SYG critical of UN and signed Kasavubu and Mobutu. (We are not clear what telegram this is, but SYG said he has received communications daily from them.) He also seems to think Mobutu is leaning again toward Lumumba at moment.

7. SYG said one of his main objectives at moment is to "break" Tshombe. He plans to do this by insisting that all help to Tshombe come through UN, e.g., SYG plans to get rid of all Tshombe's Belgian advisers and supporters. He then hopes to bring Tshombe into Leopoldville picture, thus producing change in general political situation there.

8. He expressed little regard for Kanza, implying Kanza consistently adjusting his position to whomever will come out on top.

9. SYG raised question of warrant for Lumumba's arrest. He said it was clearly improper. One part of warrant accused Lumumba of political crime while another referred to him as parliamentary deputy.

² Probably Chakravarthi Vijayaraghava Narasimhan, U.N. Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs.

Parliamentary deputies had immunity from arrest for political activities. He fully concurred with Dayal's position that this was effort at "political violence" and "prima-facie" case not made for arrest.

10. SYG also said he had revised his previous estimates about Sov activities in Congo. He had always thought they endeavored to get into Congo in major way at end July and early August, after problem had developed. He now thinks they were involved in initial mutiny of Force Publique and were making Congo major element of their African designs from moment of independence and before. He believes UN frustration of this Sov effort is reason for violent Sov reaction.

11. He told us Guinea had made effort to send unit of 200 more men into Congo. He was not specific as to how this was approached, but he said issue had been raised to HQ level and he had told Guineans this would be contrary to GA resolutions on Congo prohibiting introduction any military assistance except through UN. He implied UN would not accept any more Guinean troops. He also told us UAR had sent some of its units to Leopoldville without UN approval. He had taken this up directly with Nasser who had issued orders that UAR troops were to obey UN orders fully. SYG implied UAR troops had subsequently withdrawn at UN request. He also said Ghanaians had sent plane with Welbeck and 60 persons, whose status he did not know, toward Leopoldville last week, but they had turned back. He said he did not understand how Congolese could refuse Welbeck's return, as he was Ghanaian Chargé, and relations had not been broken, but this seemed to be position Mobutu was taking.

12. *Comment:* It was obvious from this conversation SYG is not now prepared to take any steps to diminish Lumumba's position and he will continue to provide protection to Lumumba even though this may result in UN bolstering his position in Congo. (He observed that UN had to act on basis of principles; these principles had previously worked in favor of Kasavubu and others; they were now working in favor of Lumumba.) While we have no reason to believe he has changed his views about Lumumba, it seems apparent that heavy Soviet attack against him coupled particularly with support of Lumumba and public or private criticisms by usual group of Afro-Asians, have resulted in SYG shifting toward position involving accommodation with Lumumba. This was already evident in previous conversations we have had with him when he supported necessity of some type of "reconciliation" in Congo. It is even clearer now. Our estimate is that this is effort on his part to accommodate himself to what he feels are realities of political forces at play, that while he would be delighted to see Lumumba out of way he feels he can no

longer take any hand in it but must leave it entirely to others, and that he must now play UN hand along indicated lines even if result is to bolster Lumumba.

Wadsworth

244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

October 18, 1960, 8:13 p.m.

704. Ref: Elisabethville's 168¹ (sent USUN 45, Brussels 97, Leopoldville 131), USUN's 1022.² Department seriously concerned by implications of SYG note to Belgians and report your conversation with SYG.³ USUN should approach Hammarskjöld soonest to elicit further information regarding his program for Katanga, particularly his demand that Belgium withdraw all personnel from Congo and provide assistance exclusively through UN. Purpose in seeking information on following points is to register with SYG our view that we must not risk creation of administrative and security vacuum in Katanga which would only add immeasurably to difficulties in rest of Congo.

1. How many technicians and para-military personnel does SYG believe involved? As we understand it, number in Katanga alone might be on order of some 900, in fields of public administration, technical services, judiciary as well as police and security forces. Obvious that withdrawal, without trained replacements, could result in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 343.170G/10–1560. Confidential. Drafted by Cargo and Tron, cleared by Woodruff and Blue and in draft by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Charles E. Bohlen, and approved by Wallner. Repeated to Léopoldville, Elisabethville, and Brussels.

¹ Dated October 11, telegram 168 from Elisabethville reported a conversation with a Belgian official who urged U.S. intercession to persuade Hammarskjöld to reverse his recent efforts to compel the withdrawal of Belgian technicians from Katanga and South Kasai. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/10–1160)

² Dated October 15, telegram 1022 from USUN reported that Wigny had given Wadsworth a copy of a note verbale from Hammarskjöld requesting the withdrawal of all Belgian personnel who were operating independently of the United Nations; Wigny requested U.S. support for the retention of Belgian personnel in the Congo. (*Ibid.*, 343.170G/10–1560) For text of Hammarskjöld's note verbale to Loridan, October 8, see U.N. doc. S/4557, Part B; also printed in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. V, pp. 214–215.

³ On October 15; see Document 243.

chaos. Is SYG in position to replace them immediately so that major exodus of private Europeans in Katanga and widespread lawlessness can be averted?

2. In circumstances of withdrawal of Belgian technicians, how would SYG propose guarantee public order? Even in Leopoldville, third Commissioner was assaulted this weekend while UN troops apparently observed incident without intervening.

3. How would SYG propose meet additional costs which would be incurred if all Belgian technicians were to leave as he requested? How much money would be involved?

4. What plans does SYG have for training of Katanga personnel to replace Belgians?

You should also point out that we had understood Belgian technicians in Congo would be encouraged to return outside UN framework if requested do so by GOC. We continue receive reports, indicating that even when GOC has requested Belgian aid, latter's technicians have experienced opposition from UN officials on spot. We hope UN officials in Congo will be instructed not to intervene in this matter. (FYI. Ambassador Daufresne de la Chevalerie, Belgian representative to recent DAG meeting, has raised this question with officials here and reportedly has discussed it with appropriate UN officials NY. Claims have concrete evidence of opposition of UN officials in Congo to Belgian technicians there. Belgian Embassy has made similar approach to Bohlen.)

We strongly urge SYG not make exchange with Belgians public at this time. We urge that he not move precipitously on this matter. We could not support any action which would result in extension to Katanga of chaos experienced in Congo.

At your discretion, if SYG refers further to question of status Lumumba, you may say that this whole issue and SYG's recent comments on it receiving careful attention in Washington and that you expect to seek further discussion with him about matter shortly.

In light press reports on outcome of recent Mobutu-Tshombe meeting,⁴ you may as appropriate make point that evidence is that Tshombe prepared cooperate within framework unified Congo and not pressing secessionist line.

You may also wish to point out that we feel the recent Berendsen-Tshombe agreement for division of public security responsibility

⁴ In a visit to Elisabethville, October 16-17, Mobutu declared support for a confederate structure for the Congo and invited Tshombé to participate in a round-table conference.

in Katanga⁵ is helpful step and we would welcome any further evidences cooperation including UN program to re-train Katanga forces and assume advisory role thereto.

FYI. Dept pouching copy SYG letter to Tsombe⁶ mentioned urtel 1022 just received from Belgians which you should read before making démarche. End FYI.

Herter

⁵ Telegram 172 from Elisabethville, October 17, reported that U.N. Representative Ian Berendsen and Tshombé had agreed to establish two neutral zones in North Katanga in which the United Nations would assume responsibility for preserving law and order. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-1760)

⁶ Dated October 8, the letter informed Tshombé of Hammarskjöld's request to Belgium and urged him to help resolve the Katanga problem in a spirit of conciliation and unity. For text, see U.N. doc. S/4557, Part B; also printed in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. V, pp. 218-220.

245. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, October 19, 1960, 9 a.m.

1006. Trend in Congo is far from reassuring while recent Deptels and USUN reports show increasing pressures and trends in UN which I find disturbing. Furthermore UNOC policies and thinking run along similar or more neutralist lines.

It is evident that Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and UAR have kept up drumfire of support for Lumumba both here and in UN. Considerable quantities money also given him especially by UAR. Extent involvement those countries in strictly internal affairs is as visible as the UN and published documents (never agreed to my knowledge) clinch the point.

The argument that Lumumba is "dynamic force" (Deptel 1082)¹ is quite correct but direction he has taken and would again take is destructive, not constructive. UN would face real dilemma if he were restored, of letting him retuck civil war under their noses or assuming much greater authority over CNA and internal affairs than they have

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-1960. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Paris, London, Brussels, and USUN.

¹ Telegram 1082 to Léopoldville, October 13, summarized the conversation the day before with Moroccan Crown Prince Moulay Hassan, who told Penfield he considered Lumumba a "dynamic force" and Kasavubu a "brake." (*Ibid.*, 771.11/10-1360)

so far been prepared assume. Latter would certainly provoke even shriller screams from the pro-Lumumba governments. Lumumba would immediately open the door to return Soviet and Czech Embassies which would become bases for renewed penetration.

I am still satisfied provincial leaders would resist to greatest possible degree any cooperation with any government in which Lumumba has any position and that task of such government would be immeasurably frustrated. If there is to be any peaceful and constructive reunification in the Congo, Lumumba must, in our opinion, be isolated and certainly not supported. I have expressed such personal opinion to Dayal on at least two occasions pointing out that UN task already difficult but would become major headache should Lumumba return as those of us here in early days know full well.

In view UN position on arrest Lumumba and sorry experience over other arrests of Gizenga, et al, I have little faith in such method unless competent court can be established to consider case promptly. Furthermore, I would prefer see question parliamentary immunity resolved by Parliament itself lifting his immunity. That involves reconvening Parliament which raises even more important problem of who [how?] it would vote on government confidence measure. While some of Commissioners and Ileo Government think they have lined up enough votes to defeat Lumumba and/or approve new government, I am, out of experience with their wishful thinking, inclined to doubt such claims at this point. Votes are cheap and intimidation goes on daily as attack on Ndele and other opponents of Lumumba are perpetrated with impunity so far. As matter fact, CNA is almost certainly training goon squads in camp near Leopoldville for such action.

Men in street, particularly opponents of Lumumba, are simply not convinced UN is impartial. They see Lumumba protected in Prime Ministry residence and office and government of Commissioners prevented from serving warrant on rest. They know Kettani took Gizenga and Mpolo away from CNA at airport after arrest when government was in process sending them to Katanga jail. They have seen documents never disavowed, purporting know Lumumba incited to attack and violence Stanleyville as well as traffic with Soviet bloc and Ghana, Guinea on matters clearly involving them in Congo internal affairs. They also know Nussbaumer and Kandolo were badly beaten under noses UN troops at Lumumba's house while UN troops refused calls for help. Last attack on Ndele was carried out in presence Ghana soldier who did not intervene until situation saved by civilian bystanders. Question now being asked is "who is the UN neutral against?"

Government of Commissioners is admittedly temporary but has made some real if small effort toward constructive administration. It has been rebuffed by Dayal who considers members unimportant school boys and its prestige has suffered from events noted preceding

paragraph. Army, at least Mobutu's troops is angry and restive for same reasons. While I am unhappy over poor prospects for early Parliamentary solution, I think we should make effort support Commissioners so long as they are actually in place and are at least trying to do good job for Congo. I certainly feel every effort must be made to knock down Ghana, Guinea, UAR intervention which continues apace. In particular, Welbeck is still strutting about Leopoldville in spite of fact Kasavubu and Bomboko declared him *persona non grata*. Believe they will endeavor put him physically on plane for Accra soon, if he continues refuse go voluntarily and hope UN will not prevent such action. Furthermore, problem isolating Lumumba at residence complicated since Ghana, Guinea and UAR have access to him and are suspected carrying money and messages to and from Lumumba under UN cover.

Would still consider removal Lumumba to private house psychological shot in arm for Commissioners and anti-Lumumba forces. In Prime Ministry residence he is still symbol of government which has been deposed. Fact few Congolese pass house is no argument; every one in Leopoldville and country would know almost immediately he had been removed just as they know he is there. I still feel UN is wrong in this case, any way you view it, unless its policy is to consider Lumumba Government is still legally in power.

Agree with Department that good offices committee (USUN telegram 136 to Leopoldville)² envisaged would be disastrous. Chances are it would give even more stimulus to "conciliation" pressures already being exerted. As explained already, whether knowing or unknowing, UN attitude and recent actions are more and more being interpreted by anti-Lumumba and more neutralist forces as playing into Lumumba's hands if not directly supporting him. I am first to agree that UN is in position where it has been and will be accused at times by both sides for partiality to opponents. However, it is also true that plain inaction or simple interposition can and often does have direct bearing on outcome. It is in such position today.

Timberlake

² Telegram 1004 from USUN, repeated to Léopoldville as telegram 136, October 14, reported Cordier's belief that if a Good Offices Committee went to Léopoldville it would be with the intention of restoring Lumumba to power. Wadsworth suggested that if the anti-Lumumba forces in the Congo were firm in rejecting conciliation with Lumumba and made that clear to the Congo Advisory Committee it might help change attitudes around the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/10-1460)

246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

October 19, 1960, 9:06 p.m.

716. SYG's comments reftel¹ appear to represent basic change in his position. We believe therefore it is important that Wadsworth and Barco, with Bohlen who will be in NY Friday,² seek appointment with SYG to discuss Congo question frankly with him in order ascertain more fully his views and to make sure he understands US evaluation and conclusions. You should make clear that this discussion being undertaken at express request of Secretary. If there are differences with SYG, we think it important for these to be clearly understood. Following considerations are provided for your guidance:

1. SYG has said he still regards Lumumba as Prime Minister. This represents a shift from SYG position both from legal as well as political point of view. On September 7 he told Wallner he would recognize, deal with and by implication, strongly support Kasavubu in his struggle with Lumumba.³ On September 10 he told USUN he still must break Lumumba and believed he will be able to do it, but that it was extremely difficult "to break Hitlers when alternatives were Hindenburgs."⁴ Moreover, SYG made statement in SC meeting of _____⁵ to effect that he was dealing with Kasavubu.⁴

From legal point of view SYG appears be basing his position on thesis that since parliament has not confirmed Ileo government, Lumumba remains Prime Minister. On legal question, it remains our position that Congo Constitution gave President Kasavubu power to dismiss Lumumba. Congolese Constitution clearly relates to Belgian parliamentary system and not to that of other continental or British systems. Article 22 gives President power to appoint Prime Ministers as well as to dismiss them. Kasavubu has appointed new government, the Ileo government. Although Constitution does not expressly cover case like this, the only case in which it calls for outgoing government to continue in caretaker capacity is when government resigns as result of parliamentary vote of no confidence. This quite logical since parliament cannot appoint successor government. But it would be illogical to expect Constitution to make such provision applicable when Chief of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-1960. Secret; Priority, Limited Distribution. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Bohlen, Stoessel, Satterthwaite, and Kohler; and approved by Herter.

¹ The reference telegram is not further identified but is presumably Document 243.

² October 21.

³ See Document 202.

⁴ See footnote 1, Document 206.

⁵ As on the source text; reference is to the Security Council meeting of September 9/10.

State dismisses cabinet since he can immediately provide successor government. This Kasavubu has done. Hence we regard Lumumba as legally dismissed as Prime Minister and Ileo cabinet as de jure government. This is case even though this government still has to go before parliament for formal vote of confidence in accordance with article 22 of Constitution which sets no time limit within which this must take place.

2. More important than legal considerations are political and practical results which we believe would ensue if SYG in fact insists on moving on two fronts: breaking Tshombe and removing all Belgian influence from Katanga coupled with political and pragmatic accommodation with Lumumba. We appreciate fully pressure that SYG has been under from USSR. Moreover, we understand completely reasons for doing everything feasible for maintaining maximum support among Africans and Asians. But Department would be less than frank if we did not inform Hammarskjold now that as we see it practical results of moving along two fronts he has indicated will mean return of Lumumba to power, renewed demands by him for UN to withdraw, massive Soviet intervention, fraught with possibility of major international conflict. We are confident that this is not what Hammarskjold wants—in fact SYG has made clear in past his view UN cannot work with Lumumba—but we nevertheless do not see how from practical point of view Hammarskjold actions along two fronts noted above can lead to anything other than bringing Congo back to state of chaos in which it was found when UN operation was launched. If question is matter of timing and Hammarskjold is thinking in terms of temporary slowdown in pragmatic steps that can help to bring about kind of result which we and he have wanted this is one thing. However, if views which he expressed represent change in objectives then it would be well for us and SYG to understand this clearly, since this will require fundamental reassessment of situation on our part. ⁶

Herter

⁶ Telegram 727 to USUN, October 20, encouraged the Mission to draw upon the views expressed by Ambassador Timberlake in Document 245. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–1960)

247. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 464th Meeting of the National Security Council**

October 20, 1960, 9 a.m.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-4. Secretary of State Herter presided at the meeting.]

5. *U.S. Policy Toward the Congo* (NSC 6001; NSC Actions Nos. 2262, 2270, 2276, 2284, 2287 and 2295¹)

Mr. Dulles began his briefing on the Congo by stating that the situation was not much changed. Unfortunately, we do not think that Lumumba's position is worsening and may, in fact, be improving because of the support it is receiving from the UN troops. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] it appears that the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea may make a proposal in the UN for a good offices delegation which would go to the Congo to seek political reconciliation. The effect of such reconciliation would be to restore Lumumba to power. Morocco was also backing Lumumba. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] indicated that five Congolese soldiers had attempted to assassinate Mobutu on the 15th of October. The U.S. had prior information of this attempt and had warned Mobutu. The attempt, however, had shaken him. If he had not been warned, it was probable that he would have been caught.

Mobutu had now dropped his idea of reconvening Parliament and planned to carry on with his group of administrators until the end of the year. He was optimistic if he thought that he could actually do so. Mr. Dulles referred to Mobutu's meeting with Tshombe in Katanga and to the agreement between the UN and Katanga that UN troops should be moved into a rebel area in Katanga. He noted that on the 19th of October, Mobutu had arrested a group of Lumumba's supporters but that they had been released almost immediately. Mr. Dulles concluded by stating that the situation in the Congo was about the same as it had been and that action in the UN appeared to be the next development.

Secretary Herter said that the most disturbing aspect of the situation was Hammarskjold's apparent change of heart. How much of this was due to the hammering he had received from the Soviets and how much was the result of pressure from others we did not know. Hammarskjold had sent a stiff letter to Tshombe and to the Belgians re-

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Johnson on October 24.

¹ Regarding NSC Action No. 2295, see footnote 3, Document 199.

questing them to get rid of all Belgians in Katanga. Such action would probably lead to considerable chaos in Katanga. Ambassador Timberlake was very worried about the new Hammarskjold line. Mr. Bohlen was going to talk to Hammarskjold and to Mr. Wadsworth. During the last week Hammarskjold had put a curse on everyone in the Congo, indicating that there was not a single individual in the Congo on whom one could rely. Hammarskjold's thinking then and now was to get the Congolese Parliament in session. One difficulty in this connection was that the members of Parliament were afraid to go to Leopoldville.

Secretary Herter went on to describe the economic deterioration that was taking place in the Congo. A half-million dollars had been allocated for public works for the unemployed. Probably two-thirds of the people in Leopoldville were without jobs. We were afraid that Hammarskjold's new line will mean the re-appearance of Lumumba. Cordier has stated that if Lumumba once more becomes the principal figure in the Congo, there would be no place for the UN; in such a situation the UN might as well pull out. The U.S. has put up money twice for the Congo. In addition to the one-half million dollars for public works, we had put money up for imports of spare parts in order to get some kind of industrial activity going. However, there was not anyone in the Congo who could handle this money. Soviet and Chinese money has been coming into the Congo and no one is sure who is bought by whom. We hope that someone will get parliamentary support and that this will clarify the situation. For Lumumba to get back in would just not be the answer, however.

Mr. Stans asked how much we could rely on the alleged disaffection of the members of Parliament from Lumumba. Secretary Herter stated that Ileo had been going around the country talking to members of Parliament and was quite optimistic. He thinks he can get Parliament to back Kasavubu. We did not know, however, how many members of Parliament would come back to Leopoldville. Secretary Dillon observed that the "black satchel" operation of the Soviets and Chinese also made the outcome of a parliamentary vote doubtful. Mr. Dulles observed that how the vote went depended on who controlled the troops in Leopoldville at the time of the vote. Even if members of the Parliament were bought by someone or other, it would be the control of force that would be determinant.

Mr. Gray said that he did not know what our limits were in dealing with Hammarskjold but he thought that the UN was taking a peculiar position when it stated that, if Lumumba came back, the UN would be out of the Congo, and yet that the UN had a responsibility to bring Lumumba back. Mr. Gray felt we should do everything we could to change Hammarskjold's view. If Hammarskjold was worried about Khrushchev, we should give him some assurances. We should use our

best persuasive power to convince him that he is not obligated to do something which will result in having the UN kicked out of the Congo. Secretary Herter observed that we were likely to get the same negative reaction from Hammarskjold on this as when we had approached him on the UN's efforts to prevent the arrest of Lumumba and the relationship of this action, which was very favorable to dangerous elements, to the neutrality of the UN. Secretary Herter pointed out that Guinea had introduced a resolution in the UN calling for the seating of Lumumba's delegation. The new African states had caucused on this resolution and except for Mali and, possibly, Togo and the Ivory Coast, these states were opposed to the resolution. We doubt that these states would favor the seating of Kasavubu's representatives but they are definitely against Lumumba. This fact could affect Hammarskjold's thinking. Secretary Dillon noted that there were indications of disagreement among Hammarskjold's advisers within the UN Secretariat.

Secretary Franke inquired about progress in moving Western technicians into the Congo. Secretary Herter stated that such movement had now stopped; there was no one that you could deal with in the Congo; there was no government that could make an agreement. Seventeen technicians had got in at the start and these were all still in the Congo. The move to push the Belgians out was bad; eventually, they would have to leave but now they were the only stabilizing force. He stated there had been no indication of an answer to Hammarskjold's letter to Tshombe. Secretary Dillon noted that this letter had been printed in a Brussels paper. Mr. Dulles pointed out that some Belgian technicians were back in the Congo as a result of invitations from local officials. In one case a UN official had tried to prevent such a Belgian from returning but his efforts had been repulsed by the Congolese official concerned. Secretary Herter said that he had talked with Mr. Palmer, our new Ambassador to Nigeria, a country to which evacuees had moved from the Congo. Many of these evacuees, particularly the missionaries, had now gone back. Mr. McCone noted that mining operations in Katanga continued on a normal basis. Mr. Stans said that the Presbyterians who had returned to their missions in the Congo had found no damage to their property; it remained just as they had left it.

*The National Security Council:*²

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in the Congo.

Robert H. Johnson³

² The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 2325, approved by the President on October 26. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

248. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 22, 1960, 2 p.m.

1095. Verbatim text. Subject: Re Congo, ourtel niact 1059.¹ Following is text memo, based on Dept's tels to us, and cleared with Dept, which was sent to SYG Friday 21, October, preparatory to subsequent discussion with him:

"I have been requested by the Secretary of State to discuss with you certain matters relating to the Congo and to express to you our current views.

The objectives of the United States in regard to the Congo are the same as have been previously expressed to you. We want the United Nations effort in the Congo to succeed. We have supported the United Nations fully and continue to support it fully to this end. We want to see a free and independent Congo. We want to keep the cold war entirely out of the Congo. We are confident these objectives are the Secretary General's objectives.

However, we believe it would be desirable to have a frank discussion regarding certain developments in relationship to the Congo about which we are seriously concerned as well as the methods currently being employed by the United Nations in the Congo. We are concerned regarding your note of October 8 to the Government of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–2260. Secret; Limited Distribution.

¹ In telegram 1059, October 20, Wadsworth suggested that some advance preparation was necessary to make the démarche to Hammarskjöld productive. He requested authorization to give Hammarskjöld a written statement of U.S. views with the suggestion that they discuss it the next day. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/10–2060)

Belgium.² We are also concerned because of the latest information which we have received from the United States Mission regarding your views on the constitutional situation prevailing in the Republic of the Congo, and with the effects of recent actions by the United Nations in the Republic of the Congo itself.

First, we wish to express the views of the United States regarding the legal and constitutional situation in the Congo.

The *Loi Fondamentale* of the Republic of the Congo explicitly gives the President of the Republic power to dismiss the Prime Minister. The *Loi Fondamentale* is based on the Belgian parliamentary system and not on that of other continental or British systems. The only case in which the *Loi Fondamentale* calls for an outgoing government to continue in a caretaker capacity is when the government resigns as a result of a parliamentary vote of no confidence. This is quite logical inasmuch as only the President, and not Parliament, can appoint a successor government, and since the President could not be expected to work with a government he has dismissed even in a caretaker capacity. The *Loi Fondamentale* does not provide for an outgoing government to be a caretaker government when the Chief of State dismisses a Cabinet or Prime Minister as he has authority to do, since he can also immediately appoint a successor government, both actions being provided for in Article 22. This President Kasavubu has done. Hence we regard Mr. Lumumba as legally dismissed as Prime Minister and Prime Minister Ileo and his Cabinet as constituting the *de jure* government of the Republic of the Congo. This is the case even though this government still has to be before Parliament for a formal vote of confidence in accordance with Article 22 of the Constitution. Article 22, of course, stipulates no time limit within which this must take place. Regardless of any views which may be held about subsequent steps in the Congo and any implications resulting from the creation of the College of Commissioners, it seems to us clear that the government of Prime Minister Lumumba has been legally dismissed and that neither he nor his former government has any current status under the law of the Republic of the Congo.

Secondly, the United States is seriously concerned also about your *démarche* to the Government of Belgium requesting it to withdraw all its personnel from the Congo and that it provide all assistance, including economic assistance, exclusively through the United Nations. Whatever might be the merits of providing that all assistance to the Congo—economic as well as military—should be undertaken through the United Nations, the General Assembly did not take this decision at its emergency session. There was even difficulty in assuring that in addition to military assistance, assistance which might be used for

² See footnote 2, Document 244.

military purposes would be exclusively confined to the United Nations. We believe that recent events, including the Mobutu-Tshombe meeting, give evidence that Tshombe is prepared to cooperate within the framework of a unified Congo and is not pressing a secessionist line. Many members of his Cabinet are more extreme secessionists, however, so the alternative to Tshombe would probably be a good deal worse in terms of the Congo. For our part we will continue to work within the framework of a unified Congo. We also feel that the recent Berendsen-Tshombe agreement for the division of public security responsibility in the Katanga is a helpful step and would welcome further United Nations actions along these lines.

We do feel, however, that we must not risk the creation of an administrative and security vacuum in the Katanga which would only add immeasurably to the difficulties in the rest of the Congo. The United States could not support any action which would result in the extension to the Katanga of the instability which was experienced in the rest of the Republic of the Congo and we would urge that the United Nations not move precipitously.

With these concerns in mind we would appreciate your views on how many government technicians and paramilitary personnel you believe would be involved in a full withdrawal of all Belgian Government personnel from the Congo, and whether you would be in a position to replace them immediately so that a major exodus of private Europeans in the Katanga and the possibility of widespread lawlessness could be averted. It is our understanding that the number of personnel involved in the Katanga alone might be on the order of some 900 in the field of public administration, government technical services, and judiciary, as well as police and security forces. Without trained replacements such a withdrawal could well result in chaos.

In circumstances involving the withdrawal of Belgian technicians we wonder what steps the United Nations could take to guarantee the maintenance of public order, especially inasmuch as difficulty along these lines still prevails even in Leopoldville itself. It would also be helpful to know how much money would be involved in meeting the additional costs which would be incurred if all Belgian technicians were to leave, and how you would propose to meet these costs and what plans you may have for the training of Katanga personnel to replace the Belgians.

We are also seriously concerned about the political and practical results which might ensue if the authority of provincial leaders is broken down at the same time that political and pragmatic accommodations seem to be taking place with former Prime Minister Lumumba.

The United States appreciates the extreme pressures that you have been under and we fully understand the necessity for maintaining maximum support among African and Asian members of the

United Nations. However, we also believe that the majority of African nations do not support Mr. Lumumba and the United States would be less than frank if it did not inform you that we feel the practical results of moving in the direction which now appears to be developing would mean the return of Mr. Lumumba to power, renewed demands by him for the United Nations to withdraw, and a renewal of Soviet intervention fraught with the possibility of a major international conflict. We are confident this is not what you desire—in fact you have expressed to us your own views that the United Nations cannot work with Lumumba—but we do not see how, from a practical point of view, the present situation can lead to anything other than bringing back the state of chaos which existed when the United Nations operation was launched. The information which the United States has indicates that the provincial leaders of the Congo—not only Tshombe—would resist to the greatest possible degree cooperation with any government in which Lumumba is associated and that such a government would not result in the maintenance of Congolese unity.

The actions of the United Nations in recent weeks have served to give the impression that the United Nations continues to regard Mr. Lumumba as Prime Minister of the Congo and to protect him as the Prime Minister, while failing to protect other members of Parliament and Cabinet officers of the government of Prime Minister Ileo or members of the College of Commissioners. Mr. Lumumba is protected by the United Nations in the residence and office of the Prime Minister and the United Nations has prevented warrants of arrest being presented on him, and it has refused to effect Mr. Lumumba's removal from the Prime Minister's residence. On the one hand the United Nations intervened to release from arrest Mr. Gizenga and Mr. Mpolo, and within the last day intervened to obtain the release of a number of supporters of Mr. Lumumba within hours after they were arrested, announcing, according to the information available to us, that the United Nations always intervenes in the case of 'arbitrary arrests' and that they are doing so to prevent the establishment of a military dictatorship in the Congo.

On the other hand, officials who are opposed to Mr. Lumumba have been badly beaten by Lumumba supporters in the presence of United Nations troops who either refused to intervene entirely, in spite of requests for help, or did not intervene until after the beatings had taken place. We refer specifically to the beatings of Mr. Nussbaumer, Mr. Kandolo and Mr. Ndele.

If the views which you have recently expressed represent a basic change in your approach to the Congo problem, which we assume is not the case, the United States believes we should be informed of this, since it would require a fundamental reassessment of the situation on the part of the United States. For our part we can again assure you that

the objectives of the United States have not changed. We want the United Nations effort in the Congo to be a success and we support it fully to that end. We want to keep the cold war entirely out of the Congo. We want to see the Congo remain free, independent, and united. We are confident that these continue to be your objectives also but we are much convinced that the specific actions which are now being taken will greatly complicate rather than facilitate the achievement of these results and may even lead to their total frustration."

Barco

249. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 22, 1960, 3 p.m.

1096. For Secretary. Re Congo: Deptels 716, 727:¹ Friday² morning pursuant Department agreement, Wadsworth called SYG Hammarskjold to inform him he was sending him memorandum (for text see ourtel 1095,³ worked out with Department and based on reftels) about which Secretary had asked that he, Ambassador Bohlen and Barco see Hammarskjold. Appointment fixed for Friday afternoon following end of First Committee session. Bunche and Wieschhoff joined SYG for discussion with us.

1. Constitutional situation

Hammarskjold began by referring to US "aide-mémoire" (his term; we did not so entitle it) making comments on various parts of it. He prefaced this by denying that there had in any way been any change in his attitude, and insisting he had "certainly been under no pressure." Questioning what was meant by "views recently expressed", he concluded we had in mind his remarks of last Saturday.⁴ He first said he had not taken position indicated and then went into discussion of matter in exactly same terms as contained previous report (ourtel 1021).⁵ In addition to this exposition his views, which we

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-2260. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.

¹ See Document 246 and footnote 7 thereto.

² October 21.

³ Document 248.

⁴ October 15.

⁵ Document 243.

will not here repeat he expressed "complete" disagreement with our legal analysis regarding constitutional situation, which had been complicated by attempts by Kasavubu to fire Lumumba, and Lumumba's retaliation, in which Parliament had hand. Out of all this confusion however SYG took position Kasavubu did remain as head of state. But he said Kasavubu had dropped Ileo by having suspended Parliament and disavowed Ileo's government. Hence Ileo could be disregarded. Given suspension of Parliament, sole unclouded authority in Congo, in Hammarskjold's view, is that of Chief of State. "Yet whatever fragments of Prime Minister's authority remain are, due largely to Kasavubu's way of handling it, in Lumumba", said SYG. He was "more PM" than anyone else. While UN could [not?] "deal with him as PM he could not at same time be disregarded completely. [?"

Hammarskjold at another point in conversation expanded on his legal view of situation. He absolutely refused to accept theory that interpretation of *Loi Fondamentale*, in absence of any other indicated rule of interpretation, should be based on Belgian practice. As he put it, Belgians got Congolese to accept good deal of Belgian law in their *Loi Fondamentale*, "but there is no reason to think Belgians got them to accept their (Belgian) constitutional practice."

In this way Hammarskjold refused to recognize our (and Belgian) arguments re difference in caretaker status under Belgian and other continental practices. Hammarskjold admitted he had said Kasavubu had acted legally in ending Lumumba's mandate from Chief of State, but maintained legal effect of this action was "very controversial". He went on to describe situation in this way: President had "withdrawn his part of confidence" in Lumumba, but Parliament's part of confidence was not withdrawn. Hammarskjold then said they (UN) do not regard him as "legitimate" Prime Minister, since if they did, UN would be able to deal with him. Reason UN does not deal with Lumumba is that Kasavubu's withdrawal of confidence in him has "to that extent" taken away his authority. It is this very fact of not dealing with Lumumba which has been cause of extended criticism of UN and SYG by those who insist Lumumba is still Prime Minister. (At another point it was mentioned UN does deal with Kasavubu within limits his authority, for instance writing letters to him.)

Hammarskjold pursued same line in arguing against point in memorandum regarding question of removing Lumumba from PM's residence. Hammarskjold maintained there was no justification for such step; Wieschhoff reiterated argument present residence not real PM's residence in usually understood sense, and no practical results would flow from removal. Bunche backed up Wieschhoff in describing this as impractical step. Hammarskjold said his policy "barred him from taking any action on basis Lumumba is not PM". But on opposite side of coin, he never dealt with Lumumba as if he were PM in any

formal sense, by any formal acts. Protection afforded is same as that for all other "political dignitaries" who have asked for it. "They also are entitled live in their own houses."

Hammaraskjold said UN must "keep clean on the record, wherever it may lead". "What in past actions or behavior seemed to indicate an anti-Lumumba line by SYG now seemingly indicated opposite." In fact there no change in UN's line, he said; rather, change is in behavior of individuals involved. He added that had UN agreed to remove Lumumba from PM's residence, assuming some justification could have been found, this action would have created "partial martyrdom" for Lumumba, which in turn would have strengthened hand of those in General Assembly who advocate pro-Lumumba move. By not so doing he felt that issue will peter out.

Hammaraskjold also referred to question of warrant for arrest of Lumumba "as deputy" [*sic*] which on its face thereby invalid, since it was for "political" action. Such arrests clearly being used as form of political violence, he said. UN required respect "due process" of law, he said, and consequently refused act where obviously no due process.

2. *Katanga and Belgium*

Turning to that part of our memo re Katanga he said Katanga's unity with rest of Congo is political, legal and economic necessity. If allowed to remain as separate identity it will mean cold war comes to central Africa. Problem for UN was how to get them back into picture while remaining aloof from interference in internal affairs. This could only be through diplomatic and political means. So long as Tshombe can turn to Belgium, he will not go along with cooperation with central government. In this Hammaraskjold said he disagreed with some assertions in our memo but was not explicit. He said troop withdrawal had not been end of it so far as Belgians concerned. And while Tshombe is not on Belgian side he nevertheless hangs on to them, creating psychological factor against Tshombe's turning for reliance to Leopoldville.

With regard to US concern at SYG's *démarche* to Belgians, Hammaraskjold said he has only asked of Belgians what US has already asked—namely that all aid come through UN. In measured tones Hammaraskjold said Belgians had been anything but helpful in this matter. He referred to "special interests" working on behalf of Belgium, and spoke of "systematic return of Belgians to Leopoldville" under control of Commissioners. He hinted at collusion with regard to return of these Belgians, and mentioned "coup d'état arrangements" under cover of which "Belgian comeback" might be staged.

3. Other points in memo

Hammarskjold stated that release of Gizenga and Mpolo was decision of Mobutu himself and not UN. According his version, which came from "the command", Mobutu's soldiers arrested not only these two Lumumba supporters but also two pro-Mobutu men. When Mobutu came to see Dayal (complaining for some unknown reason to Dayal about it), he said he had had nothing to do with it and it was up to Mobutu to handle; whereupon latter decided only way to get his men back was to release all four individuals.

Hammarskjold said ANC is major risk in whole picture. There had recently been in "native quarter" of Leopoldville considerable amount looting, raping (of children according to Bunche) and general pillage at hands ANC, which Mobutu once controlled. Such activity apparently explains remarks attributed to Dayal in Friday *Washington Post* story calling ANC "rabble". This disintegration of authority is another reason why SYG looks with less favor upon Mobutu. At this point Hammarskjold felt prompted to say UN cannot choose men, nor their inclinations, but rather must take objective stand. What is needed is constitutional authority including that of Parliament, giving some semblance of legitimacy to Congo Government. This would and should be case regardless whether such situation was pro- or anti-Lumumba.

SYG said two separate and opposite versions of story regarding Ndele existed. He did not elucidate upon them. According to Bunche Ndele owes his life to intervention by soldier(s) in UN Command.

According Hammarskjold there had been mistakes made. They were largely errors committed by Ghana forces, and apparently by individuals within them and not a part of some grand design. He said many steps taken correct these errors. He said two brigadiers with Ghana forces seemed all right but Welbeck (Ghana Chargé) and Djin were another story.

4. Subsequent discussion

In general discussion which followed, Bohlen led off by stating that it seemed apparent any re-assembly of Parliament in near future out of question because of fear by parliamentarians from provinces what might happen to them. Everything pointed all too squarely to likely return to power, unless something done, of Lumumba. On authority from Washington Bohlen then said if Lumumba comes back into power, US Government does not propose to stand idly by and allow Congo become Communist satellite. In view of our strong support of UN and SYG up to now on Congo question, UN would have fully to weigh possible drastic revision of our policy. Bohlen also

referred to other information our possession indicating things going on out there which indicate Russians have not given up hope of returning at all.

Bohlen also sought clarification from SYG or Bunche re nationality of soldiers in UN force in Leopoldville, many of whom had in one way or another cast doubt on their total loyalty to UN cause. Bunche said there were Sudanese troops at airport (and also small number UAR troops); in city there were Ghana and Moroccan troops.

After making absolutely clear US regarded present application SYG's rule of impartiality as inevitably operating in favor of Lumumba, and of consequences this might have for US policy, Bohlen turned conversation on to positive line by saying "What is important is to figure out where we go from here". This is endeavor in which US willing and anxious help out in any proper way. Anything to change present pattern of paralysis would be desirable. Bohlen informally suggested possibility, starting from fixed point that Kasavubu is Chief of State, that he be urged appoint caretaker government with perhaps Bomboko as PM and Mobutu in background possibly as Chief of Staff. It would be understood such government to be temporary, for interim only, pending reassembling of Parliament for purposes ratifying such government. Wieschhoff interjected at this point that this is what UN had been trying to do for three weeks without success.

Hammar skjold seemed to react favorably to idea moving on to some more constructive aspect of discussion. He said Parliament is one thing which can do anything in Congo. To have it meet there are two prerequisites: Security measures in Leopoldville; and presence of Katanga del. This latter depends on Tshombe's views. (UN nowhere near so confident, from their reports of good outcome from Mobutu's talks in Elisabethville.) Hammar skjold added that problem is not just in Leopoldville—it is in provinces as well. He despaired of abilities of leaders, saying each had missed every chance to do something effective. Bohlen's idea might work if there were some way to get it done. To put such idea or any other into effect it was necessary to work through someone. There was no one on whom to rely. There was complete lack of effective personalities. He added without spelling it out that catalyst was also required which could not be third government.

In this connection Hammar skjold referred to good offices idea which came from res adopted by special emergency GA. If such group were not homogeneous it would fall apart and create more confusion. Hammar skjold inclined doubt one would be formed but in any event he said he could not prevent it since it would be subcom of his Advisory Committee, and decision to form such group would be

theirs. His approach thus far, in hopes preventing this development, had been "socratic"; he had asked questions designed to frighten them away from taking such step, so far with some success.

Although Hammarskjold never gave concrete answer on possibility of caretaker govt along lines suggested by Bohlen, he did say such group could not ignore Lumumba. And he also noted that UN could not be sure in any dealings it might have with such govt that these were any more than on de facto basis.

Referring to impasse into which UN's policy appeared to have led it, Hammarskjold indicated that one way out of such difficulty lay in possibility UNGA taking stand on particular issue. This would make it possible for execution of policy (by SYG) to be lifted out of impasse. He felt UNGA's inaction re seating rep of Congo made his impartial behavior as between different govt'l figures absolutely consistent with overall UN stand. Way to change it, he appeared to hint, would be by GA decision.

Turning to question of Belgians (and Katanga), Hammarskjold referred to new note he sent,⁶ which explained more clearly basis of his stand regarding withdrawal of technicians and other. (For text see ourtel 1098)⁷

He described his policy as "two-pronged" approach. To restore authority to Leopoldville, and thereafter to all Congo; also to bring Katanga into central picture. He said he felt he had to try to switch Tshombe's allegiance and dependence away from Belgians and on to UN. Now Tshombe was not just dependent on Belgians, he was "overfed" by them. He had said he only needed 50 technicians and Belgians had provided 100. Such matters retain Belgian hold over Tshombe. Different Belgian attitude could have made all difference in handling. Instead they appeared be hanging on at all costs.

To Bohlen's query whether if Belgian technicians were put under UN, situation would be better, Hammarskjold several times avoided specific answer. Finally he admitted this would be better, and he said for individual Belgians to be under UN control in Congo as whole would not be excluded by his policy. Those who must go were, as pointed out in his earlier note, Belgians directly or indirectly under Belgian Govt control. This he interpreted as "govt-sponsored Belgians, who were paid directly or indirectly by Belgian Govt. Wieschhoff cited as example way in which indirect payment comes about, system where Belgian Govt gives subsidy to Katanga govt which in turn from that subsidy pays for services of Belgian "technicians".

⁶ A note verbale to Loridan, October 19; for text, see U.N. doc. S/4557, Part B, or *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. V, pp. 215-217.

⁷ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 343.170G/10-2260)

Hammar skjold admitted this could become difficult line to draw. He said it must be calculated against alternative, retention of Belgian control which could be very dangerous. Existence of such "curious in-between arrangements" required that SYG "clean things up". At this point he digressed as if by illustration to refer to troops in southern Kasai province, which were Belgian-officered troops working for Kalonji. It was argued these officers had been "seconded" from "Katanga" army and so were still not Belgians. Hammar skjold said "simple fact is there is Belgian element of control". He referred as illustration to threat posed to Tshombe before UN forces entered Katanga: Union Miniere said they would close down all mines, putting 20,000 people out of work if Tshombe let UN forces enter. Hammar skjold had advised Tshombe not to bend under this pressure but to say he would in such circumstances turn to UN for necessary technicians. Hammar skjold felt this was typical instance of Belgian control.

In conclusion, meeting having to break off by SYG's subsequent appointment, SYG agreed reality was what took place in area, and not within GA—that latter was largely reflection of reality. However he insisted GA could have influence on what happened in real world of Leopoldville. Bohlen, as parting remark, summarized that net effect of situation would seem to be that instead of keeping cold war out of Congo, situation had developed into one-sided cold war. Only US had stayed out. Soviets surely had not, nor was it anything more than naive to think they would stay out.

Begin Bohlen comment: While we left no doubt as to seriousness with which we view situation in Congo and UN attitude towards it, foregoing account of 2-hour conversation nevertheless demonstrates inconclusive results insofar as any direct expression of future policy by Hammar skjold was concerned. Our strongest impression is that he sees no clear course of action in Leopoldville to deal with the present situation and has fallen back on a completely do nothing "impartiality", although he realizes that this may be working in Lumumba's favor. Although he did not commit himself, he seemed interested in idea we put forth of having some semblance of a caretaker government to be set up by Kasavubu as an interim authority until such time as conditions would permit an orderly convening of Parliament.

Hammar skjold, however, refused, as will be noted, to make any commitment as to UN attitude towards any such caretaker government because of constitutional problem involving Lumumba. However, I believe if we could produce some coherent plan to bring about establishment by Kasavubu of a caretaker government, with possibly Bomboko as Prime Minister and Mobutu as chief military authority subordinate to it, we would have basis for further discussion with Hammar skjold.

As to letters to Belgium regarding Belgian technicians, we believe that being unable to see clearly what can be done in regard to action in Congo, he is taking this attitude in order to do something and in particular to gain favor with African states. He spoke vaguely of necessity for consultation as to disposition of these technicians and we believe this matter should also be pursued further with him. Since [*Although?*] it is our impression that he can still be influenced in more moderate action than his letters would imply, we see, however, very little real hope in changing Hammarskjöld's present attitude unless serious and constructive alternative in regard to caretaker government can be worked out and discussed with him. Such govt to have any chance of succeeding, should have different UN troops present in Leopoldville. Proposals to this effect might usefully be made to SYG at subsequent meeting with SYG which he himself suggested be held soon. *End Bohlen comment.*

Bohlen's reiteration at several different points in our conversation that present position of UN in Leo worked in favor of Lumumba and could in our view only lead to his return to power with serious consequences, even failure, for UN and SYG himself, certainly seemed to have shaken SYG. He said he agreed with our negative analysis, but did not seem have definite ideas where to go next. At the least we feel he will be more receptive in future discussion to specific proposals (a) for dealing with caretaker govt if one can be devised, (b) shifting UN troops, and, if these two factors dealt with, (c) more stringent action re Lumumba.

While we did not refer specifically to role being played by Dayal (we showed SYG Friday press reports on Dayal's attitude toward Mobutu) we continue to feel this is also major factor in situation which SYG refused to face. Bohlen alluded at different points in conversation to pressures from UAR, Ghana, Guinea and Morocco, which SYG admitted. We inferred from SYG's reaction, however, that he did not seem to feel this affected Dayal's behavior. It seems to us at very least important reduce as much as possible pressures on Dayal by shifting UN forces, and if possible try to find way either having Dayal replaced, or neutralized by addition of another UN official in Leo.

(For report of UKDel conversation with SYG on same subject see next fol tel.)⁸

Barco

⁸ Telegram 1097 from USUN, October 22, reported that Hammarskjöld stressed the need of reassembling Parliament and bringing about a reconciliation of Tshombé with the central government. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/10-2260) Barco summarized the Bohlen-Hammarskjöld meeting in a telephone conversation with Herter at 10:25 a.m. on October 22. According to a memorandum of the conversation by Mildred Asbjornson, Barco said "they all felt that Hammarskjöld does not have an idea on how to improve the situation, but that Hammarskjöld was thinking more about the problem than he had

Continued

250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

October 26, 1960, 9:37 p.m.

764. Re Congo, urtel 1096.¹ Department appreciates receipt your thoughtful report and suggestions following your long conversation with SYG. Situation in Congo continues to drift. We therefore request you follow up soonest last conversation with SYG. In our judgment it is essential that you continue take firm and constructive approach with SYG. As general framework to your discussion we suggest you include following principal considerations:

US continues be seriously concerned with developments in Congo which, if not checked soon, will inevitably lead to increasing deterioration and chaos with disastrous consequences to free world community and UN position in Congo. We have noted, and SYG is fully aware, that pressures and concrete actions by UAR, Ghana and Guinea, abetted by Dayal who is under instructions from SYG, continue unabated in direction of keeping Lumumba issue alive and otherwise making it more difficult for Kasavubu, Mobutu, Commissioner Generals, et al. to follow constructive course. We cannot stand idly by and permit situation in Congo to retrogress so as to lead to serious increase in Soviet influence in Congo, which in turn would have gravest repercussions in terms of US support for UN generally and for Congo operations specifically.

Starting point of any constructive plan for Congo must be from assumption that Kasavubu is recognized legally and otherwise as chief of state. On this there is full agreement between SYG and US. While Hammarskjold does not agree with our view that Lumumba is no longer Prime Minister, there is at least some flexibility here since he has not and apparently does not intend to deal with Lumumba as Prime Minister. These two basic factors offer some hope that we and SYG can take fresh look at situation and move ahead in concert on constructive course of action.

Our objective is to encourage emergence reasonable, stable "non-aligned" government (excluding Lumumba) which on caretaker basis can begin to bring about order from chaos and can get administrative

before." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) Telegram 1137 from USUN, October 26, reported that both Wieschhoff and Bunche had commented critically on the U.S. approach, but Wadsworth concluded that "despite what they apparently regarded as an affront in presentation of U.S. point of view, it did have some impact." (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-2660)

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-2260. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Sisco; cleared with Wallner, Stoessel, and Satterthwaite; and approved by Dillon. Repeated to Léopoldville as telegram 1207.

¹ Document 249.

mechanism and ministries started on constructive tasks. It clear that Ileo Government cannot do job. Moreover, while the College of Commissioners have been useful in reactivating GOC operations, they have no legal claim to status as a Government and so cannot long continue in present form. We believe that conditions in Congo are such that it should be possible successfully to encourage Kasavubu to appoint new caretaker government—perhaps under Bomboko or some other individual as Prime Minister. In order for such plan to be feasible, Mobutu, who in our judgment still retains good deal of strength with CNA, must be, for lack of anyone with comparable strength, force which maintains caretaker government. We believe he can be brought around to cooperating.

We have in mind ourselves going to Kasavubu with view to suggesting appointment of new caretaker government. In order for such plan to work satisfactorily, it absolutely essential have at least UN acquiescence both in NY and in Congo. We believe that if SYG willing cooperate with us on this fresh start he could provide necessary lead and instructions to Dayal which would be helpful to all concerned on ground.

Our hope would be that new caretaker government would seek approval of parliament as soon as circumstances are propitious.

In order for such proposal to work UN force in Leopoldville would have to maintain strict impartiality. As long as moderates in Leopoldville are unable express their views freely for fear of assault by Lumumba's henchmen no effort to seek constructive moderate regime which could work confidently with UN has chance of success. FYI. While we do not wish to suggest at this point what steps would be necessary by SYG with respect to activities of UN in Congo, some consideration will undoubtedly have to be given to possibility of placing Tunisian and possibly Nigerian troops along side Ghanaian and UAR troops in Leopoldville, and possibility of providing Dayal with deputies who might give more balance to leadership of UN on ground. End FYI.

While you should not seek SYG's approval of this approach which he may be reluctant to give, if Hammarskjold indicated interest in working out arrangements along lines of above, you should state that we will be prepared discuss with him details as to how this can be achieved. We believe that with close cooperation between US and SYG such caretaker government can be secured and in manner in which UN impartiality will be maintained.

Related Subject. We note further reports re possibility of good-offices commission being established and being sent to Congo. We know SYG is not keen on idea although he is likely to feel himself to be under pressure to agree. We strongly prefer that no such commission be established for dispatch to Congo. However, if this cannot be

avoided, we ought to try to make certain that its composition is acceptable to us. You should indicate to SYG that we believe strongly that no country should be included on such a commission which has taken a definite position in favor of one side or other. This criterion would rule out of membership Ghana, Guinea, UAR, India, or Soviet bloc. It would leave number of African countries, including Tunisia, Liberia and Nigeria, which together would form acceptable combination.

For Leopoldville. We believe above points fit in with your current thinking but would appreciate any comments you may have.

Herter

251. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, October 29, 1960, 4 p.m.

1188. Re: Congo, Deptels 764¹ and 772.² Barco called on SYG afternoon 28 October per reflets. Barco outlined our continued concern re developing trends in Leo and effect of UN actions there and stressed how seriously situation is considered in Washington. SYG remarked he believed UN and US were following different philosophies and pointedly remarked he considered no outside influences should be permitted in Congo. Situation could not be solved that way.

We replied we believed basic philosophies were not different and that we shared same goals, but we were concerned that UN actions in Leo, either by commission or omission, were not operating in direction of our mutual goals but were working to benefit of Lumumba.

SYG denied this contention. He reiterated previous position that UN acting on "principles" even though they "appeared" to be helping one party or another at any particular point. He said he felt Lumumba had sufficient backing in Congo that solution without him seemed impossible.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–2960. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated niact to Léopoldville.

¹ Document 250.

² Dated October 27, telegram 772 advised against expressing an opinion to the Secretary-General on the legality of the College of Commissioners and reiterated the Department's support for a caretaker government under Bomboko or someone else who could restore order. (Department of State, Central Files, 325.70G/10–2660)

He also expressed serious concern about CNA which he described as most dangerous element presently in picture because of its undisciplined strength. SYG said Mobutu, Kasavubu and Bomboko readily agreed return CNA troops to barracks as soon as they were told UN forces would actively resist any attempt breach mutual agreement keep CNA troops in Thysville from entering Leo and leave security responsibility in Leo in hands of UN forces. This indicated to SYG that, like many similar actions in Congo, they had been acting on impulse and lacked any clear plan of action. As matters stood, CNA forces would now remain outside Leo near UN airport, as well as in Thysville, by agreement between UN and Kasavubu. SYG commented strong CNA forces in Thysville, equipped with armored cars, could have seriously jeopardized UN security in Leo while at same time, because of that city's isolation from rest of Congo, could not have brought about solution or creation of stable government which would be respected beyond city. SYG said UN position on CNA now based on agreement with Kasavubu, and that whenever there had been [*was?*] an agreement such as this reached, UN would enforce it.

Turning to SYG's comment on outside forces in Congo, we reiterated we had strong evidence of outside interference in Leo by Ghana, Guinea, UAR and recently Morocco designed support return to power of Lumumba. SYG said Ghana was ringleader and said he well aware of harmful activities by Welbeck. Barco said Cairo was heavily involved. SYG reiterated he thought UAR was all right and Ghana was in lead. As example he cited fact UAR troops had been moved by barges down river to Leopoldville without UN knowledge. This had been discovered by UN personnel when UAR units asked for too many rations. SYG said he took this up with Fawzi³ who said they would straighten it out immediately. Instructions were sent through Cairo and UAR troops were withdrawn and replaced under UN orders.

In contrast, as part of normal re-deployment of its forces, UN had decided some time ago to move Ghanaian troops to Kasai. SYG said he had had long and difficult correspondence about this with Nkrumah, who was seeking to maintain his own national control over Ghanaian troops, something SYG could not allow to happen. Agreement had finally been reached with Nkrumah on transfer of Ghana troops from Leo to Kasai Province, which Cordier remarked would start next week. SYG said they would be replaced by Tunisian troops, as result of which he looked for improvement in Leo.

³ UAR Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi was heading the UAR Delegation to the General Assembly.

SYG then called our attention to reappearance of Ileo who was present and was introduced as "PriMin" when Dayal talked several days ago with Kasavubu. SYG expressed himself strongly in favor of building government which would be based on Kasavubu, as uncontested Chief of State, and would enjoy at least some prospect of parliamentary approval. He thought Ileo was person to start with as PM of such government. But there must be move toward "constitutionality", with reconvening of Parliament to approve government as stated goal.

He thought even Africans were now coming to realize that continued absence of any effective government was playing into Belgian hands. He cited examples of Belgian judges volunteering to set up court system without any prospect of payment from either UN or Congo; a move which to him clearly indicated Belgian Government was providing financial guarantees in order reestablish their influence throughout Congo. He stressed that there were two anchors of UN relations in Congo—Kasavubu as Chief of State, and Parliament. A new government should be presented to Parliament, but both he and Dayal have insisted parliamentary approval of any government must (a) be by full Parliament, with all six provinces represented, and (b) be obtained absolutely free of duress, under UN protection. (He said UN forces would patrol area of Parliament and assure protection to all concerned.)

Difficulty in convening Parliament until now had been Katanga but he thought this situation had improved. This was evidenced by recent lengthy note he recd from Tshombe⁴ in response to SYG's letter⁵ in which Tshombe sounded cooperative and willing participate in Parliament and govt so long as Lumumba not in control. SYG said purpose behind his recent strong notes to Tshombe and Belgians had been convince Tshombe he cannot rely on Belgians for long-term protection. SYG thought tone of Tshombe's response was evidence of success of this maneuver. He said its timing had been governed by fact Dayal had obtained agreement of African states in Leopoldville at that point to a parliamentary solution.

We picked up SYG's remarks re new government and said that US was prepared to encourage Kasavubu to appoint new caretaker government which he would say he would soon submit to parliamentary approval and which we hoped could bring some order out of present chaotic legal and practical situation.

SYG immediately responded that this would be most helpful particularly if we could put some "fire" into Kasavubu, so long as we could do it "delicately" and not "visibly" and so long as we "put nothing in his pocket". SYG said again he thought Ileo, now that he

⁴ Dated October 27; for text, see U.N. doc. S/4557, Part B.

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 244.

had reappeared on the scene, was best bet as PM. He believes Ileo and Bomboko are both intelligent but latter lacks stability. He felt Mobutu might remain as Army Chief-of-Staff under Ileo. He said it would be highly desirable that he be promptly informed of our approach to Kasavubu if we decide to make it but he did not pick up our suggestion that he then give Dayal appropriate instructions to cooperate. Barco came back to issue several times in order to make sure situation was clear. Result was (1) SYG agrees that US should approach Kasavubu as long as we "keep our skirts from showing"; (2) he feels step to be taken is to refurbish Ileo government, bring it into active governmental activity; (3) he "apparently" had no objections to Mobutu being in government, although he wants Gen Kettani (Morocco) to assume de facto control of Congolese army; (4) steps must be taken toward "constitutionality" of new government, especially plans present it to Parliament must be announced; (5) meeting of Parliament must be "full" and under UN protection; (6) UN will cooperate with new active government (without commitment as to quite how); (7) he wants us to keep him informed of what we are doing; (8) he did not say Lumumba had to be in government (although he earlier expressed opinion solution could not be found without taking him into account). In addition main conversation on Congo with SYG, following issues arose:

(1) SYG informed us that Guinea, India and others have submitted new draft res on effort seat rep of central government. What interested him most was that new res calls on SYG to use his best efforts to bring about speedy and secure meeting of full Parliament.⁶ He expected Sovs would not be pleased by his role under this res and he also was cheered by apparent realization reflected in res that two above conditions for Parliament meeting set down by UN must be met. He said Caba Sory⁷ (Guinea) had previously strongly opposed meeting of Parliament as a trap.

(2) SYG reported 15 member ASAF conciliation group was now in formation⁸ which, because majority of Africans do not favor Lumumba, was preferable to smaller advisory comite in which majority favored Lumumba. He thought he had forestalled group's departure to Congo by suggesting they obtain clear instructions on terms of reference from their governments on which they could all agree before

⁶ The joint draft resolution submitted on October 28 (U.N. doc. A/L.319/Rev.2) was a revision of a Guinean draft resolution of October 10 (U.N. doc. A/L.319). Both called for the immediate seating of representatives of the Lumumba government, pending the report of the General Assembly Credentials Committee.

⁷ Guinea's Representative at the United Nations.

⁸ On November 5, the U.N. Advisory Committee on the Congo established a 15-member Conciliation Commission for the Congo, which was to study the situation and make efforts, without interfering in the Congo's internal affairs, toward Congolese attainment of solutions to maintain and strengthen the country's unity, territorial integrity, and political independence, and especially to promote the speedy restoration of parliamentary institutions. The Advisory Committee's report of November 24 is U.N. doc. A/4592.

they departed. He doubted group could ever agree on anything. He noted helpful presence in group of Nigeria and Senegal and agreed with us it would be helpful have others included such as Togo which is not now member.

(3) SYG informed us he had requested Dayal submit status report by 1 November and stated his intention to discuss this report privately with certain members including USSR and US.

Wadsworth

252. Editorial Note

At the 465th meeting of the National Security Council on October 31, Acting Director of Central Intelligence General Charles P. Cabell discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Director of the NSC Secretariat Robert H. Johnson, November 2, reads as follows:

“Turning finally to the Congo, General Cabell said that Lumumba’s position was improving. Dayal was openly hostile to Mobutu. Most of the Congolese Army troops were now outside Leopoldville. The governmental commissioners and others in Leopoldville were hopeful that Mobutu would be replaced by the military commander at Thysville. General Cabell referred to the creation of the 15 Nation Conciliation Commission on the 29th of October. He stated that its large size and the inclusion in it of moderates would hamper the all-out efforts of Lumumba’s allies to use it to restore Lumumba to power. The Congolese Army could turn on Mobutu at any time. Gizenga, the pro-Lumumba vice-president, was tightening his control over the pro-Lumumba police. General Cabell concluded by stating that the situation in the interior of the Congo was threatening and described actual and potential tribal outbreaks in the interior.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

253. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, November 1, 1960, 2 p.m.

1078. Re Deptel 1246.¹

1. Mobutu, as previously reported, is impulsive, naive, but apparently honest and for the moment at least in place as leading figure in Army. Probability of friction between him, Kasavubu and future Prime Minister cannot be ruled out but in circumstances believe risk must be taken. See no unsurmountable difficulty in harmonizing our and SYG's view.

2. Do not consider Ileo best Prime Minister as he lacks necessary drive and flair. Believe Adoula,² now in New York City, best possibility, though he lacks broad political support. Bolikongo also able but bears pro-Belgian tag and considered weak by many.

3. Mobutu, despite his weaknesses, should be member inner council new government with primary responsibility for Army and stability. To accomplish this he will have to be persuaded to take less public role and agree to coordination on basic policy in which he will play part.

4. Getting full Parliament assembled will depend on Tshombe and as I read Elisabethville's telegrams he seems further away than ever. Believe it would require strong pressure from a number of sources, including Kasavubu to persuade him to participate. It will require great deal planning and should not be encouraged before end December unless a sure majority is on deck. (This also Mobutu's own position.)

5. Dayal is violently anti-Mobutu; has no respect for him. However, believe Dayal basically wants Parliament-supported government with which he can deal.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-160. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.

¹ Dated October 31, telegram 1246 stated that the Department's current objective was to obtain a de facto government in the Congo with which the United Nations could cooperate, with Parliamentary approval as soon as possible, and it requested the Embassy's comment on Hammarskjöld's eight points reported in Document 251. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-3160)

² Cyrille Adoula, a member of the Congo Senate and a member of the delegation sent to the United Nations by Kasavubu's government.

6. Lumumba is central problem. He would have to be allowed to participate in session of Parliament as deputy. There is always danger that no matter how firm opposition lineup Lumumba oratory plus threats can turn it into victory for himself. (MNC and PSA goon squads remain active threat to all who disagree.)

Timberlake

**254. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the
Department of State**

Léopoldville, November 2, 1960, 6 p.m.

1082. While three governing SC resolutions on Congo¹ provide suitable general framework foreign policy guidance, it is clear that SYG is left with wide discretion in actual operations while member states have considerable latitude in interpreting, as they choose, actions in Congo as supporting or violating such resolutions. Great majority of states seem to have supported faithfully UN actions in hope law and order will be restored and economy put back in shape without impairing independence of Congo. A highly active and vocal minority has, however, sought to influence UN action in service their several national interests, which coincide for the moment at least in Congo, making arguments on high principles of resolutions. The ensuing clamor seems to have obscured the issues as well as the facts for many member states not intimately concerned or informed.

Even most sympathetic observers know this country cannot govern itself in any intelligent fashion and that, left to its own devices and without outside aid, could not survive as a national entity. Certainly, modern economy bequeathed by Belgium would very quickly disintegrate entirely. The Belgians know this better than any others and their pre-independence plans did not envisage present situation. They have had shocking traumatic experience from which they will not soon recover. In spite of strong currents favoring other policies, Belgian policy seems to support general UN aims in Congo while hoping, through encouraging return of key technicians, to repair some of the damage done and keep the Congo above water. I do not believe Belgian policy involves, even remotely, effort reimpose colonial status

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-260. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels and USUN.

¹ Of July 13, July 22, and August 9.

on Congo as some critics claim. It does include, naturally, effort to conserve huge investment here. Very fact that investment here almost exclusively Belgian and monopolistic as well, colors attitude many nations and leaves Belgium open to attack on grounds economic, if not political, imperialism.

The Soviet bloc seeks entry, on almost any terms, into central Africa for well-known purposes. Nkrumah seeks expand personal leadership of African bloc by adding Congo. Sekou Toure has same objective with added ingredient of active disaffection for "colonialists" as result French policy there. Morocco governed more by payment due Ghana for support on Mauritania than by real persuasion on merits. UAR seems driven by general anti-western policy and desire preserve access to bloc aid by serving Soviet policy aims in area of little interest to UAR. All are united in support Lumumba: He has already proven useful tool to Soviets; he is Nkrumah's boy who signed agreement and Sekou Toure who also signed, supports Lumumba in interests preserving and expanding "union" which he hopes dominate himself; UAR supports him more as favorite Russian concubine whom it suits them to protect and cultivate rather than as direct object their affections. These countries can and do have, therefore, a positive policy line which they have consistently followed and they have exploited every possible avenue which this chartless situation has offered to advance toward the goal of restoring Lumumba to power.

The majority of states, which want to help the Congo without consideration of what they can gain individually, seem to be groupable: (1) Those which understand and fear Soviet entry into Africa and will work against it and (2) those remote, only vaguely informed and not particularly interested in the problem. Group (1) needs the facts and discreet guidance. Group (2) must be persuaded re importance and urgency and educated.

Even assuming reasonable success in achieving interested and unselfish majority, there is no simple solution to the problem of what should be done about the Congo. Individual trusteeship is impossible; UN trusteeship untenable. UN aid, scrupulous and patient as it has been in staying out of internal affairs, has been attacked as interfering by practically every politician of every stripe. As a matter of fact the very nature of the problem is such that it is impossible for the UN to be here at all without affecting internal affairs. If it did literally nothing, its mass and inertia would have at least negative effect. Therefore question is and has been how can UN objectives be achieved with least harmful effect on internal affairs?

Idealistically, UN hopes for democratically approved, relatively stable government with which it can deal with some confidence and which has international respectability according to democratic standards. I do not, unfortunately, see such government emerging for very

long time. Lumumba is best bet for strong central leadership but he is himself unstable and attitudes provincial leaders and people (who are really tribal and not even provincial) have so crystalized against him that any sort of unity would have to be enforced, internally or by external means. Internal force (by CNA) would restart civil war. External force (by UN) would compromise every principle of UN Charter and violate terms existing Congo resolutions. Department can judge whether new enabling resolution likely be voted SC or GA.

Lumumba might very well emerge with stamp of parliamentary approval but it would be compound of cupidity (bought votes), intimidation (not just in halls of parliament, which is least of our worries) and demagogic oratory, admitting to some votes from genuine supporters. We would be back to early August politically with even more dismal prospects for preserving unity of Congo.

Fact is Congo is years away from more than facade of democracy. I do not believe there is one single Congolese who has more than theoretical idea of even the most elementary principles of democracy. They obviously cannot practice something they do not understand. This does not insult the many well-intentioned Congolese but does discount their ability produce anything resembling democratic government until they have been taught. Furthermore, I do not believe democracy can be imposed upon any people overnight any more than it can be injected by hypodermic. Therefore I do not share UN enthusiasm for accelerated parliamentary solution in Congo. Fact is such solution would be simple decision to support Lumumba or not. There is no real positive alternative which would engage parliamentary attention.

If foregoing analysis accepted, then our policy should be definitely against restoration Lumumba as bad for Congo, bad for US and bad for UN. We continue believe that outlook for real leadership coming from moderate group is very dim indeed. I feel sure UN experience with ineptitude of commissioners and impotence of Kasavubu and Ileo government has not only disillusioned UN but that Mobutu, by impulsive acts and lack qualities leadership, has impelled Dayal to reject him. Mobutu's troops, certainly undisciplined but no more so than formerly, are source friction and keep UN constantly under tension in view their capability to cause really serious clash with UN forces. Return of Belgian advisers, some of whom might have stupidly sought interpose themselves between UN and commissioners, have ruffled some sensitive UN feathers and raised bogey of return of Belgium to position of major influence under cover of commissioners. Apparent solution devised by Dayal is use double barreled shotgun, first barrel designed to reverse trend toward re-Belgianization and second, not yet fired, to disarm troops, especially those believed loyal to Mobutu. I would prefer rifle technique identifying Belgians

who are at fault and urging Congolese as well as Belgians cure them or remove them. As for troops, UN could insist and I would support, that Mobutu crack down on discipline and punish offenders failing which stronger measures would have to be taken by UN.

If Dayal has any hopes for positive parliamentary action which would remove Lumumba from government, I have yet to hear them stated. I think he feels no solution is possible without Lumumba and that we might as well get present unpleasantness over with and let him back in. This, he reasons, will get unholy alliance off his neck, give UNOC acceptable government with which to work and even serve resolution on unity of Congo since Lumumba acknowledged centralist and unitarian. While semblance of logic might sell this line to the simple and uninformed, I am satisfied such policy will blow up in UN faces. It will, I believe, achieve exactly opposite ends from these apparently sought.

Embassy policy recommendations have been based on aforementioned analysis. We see no quick solution and have no favorite son. We believe we should encourage those who have generally good instincts while leaving our position flexible enough to be acceptable to any combination they may eventually produce and have blessed by parliament. Some combinations seem less impossible than others and we believe should be supported. We also firmly convinced necessity for parliamentary blessing but differ with UN on timing because we feel now would be too soon to ensure honest and threat-free vote. If CNA disarmed, that possibility will suffer serious setback. Furthermore, see no likelihood of Katanga Deputies returning with or without UN guarantee as long as they remain unconvinced that Lumumba can be beaten in Parliament and as long as they feel UN policy is pro-Lumumba and anti-Katanga.

We believe peaceful solution must be sought by convincing provincial leaders and parliamentarians opposing Lumumba that they must agree on a government which they will actively support and line up enough firmly pledged votes to have confidence in result when issue put before Parliament. In this country where clocks are toys this cannot be done overnight and morning isn't here yet. If the time element is ignored and birth induced now, the UN will probably have an abortion on its plate.

Every time I look at this truly discouraging mess, I shudder over the painfully slow, frustrating and costly job ahead for the UN and US if the Congo is to really be helped. On the other hand we can't let go of this bull's tail.

Timberlake

255. Telegram From the Department of State of the Mission at the United Nations

November 4, 1960, 8:21 p.m.

842. Following is guidance for USUN re UN Report on Congo.¹

Based on preliminary study of SYG report, Department believes there are two possible ways for US to react.

First, for US to make sharp attack on report seeking to diminish its credibility. We believe this not feasible for following principal reason: while Dayal obviously prejudiced and has used intemperate and overdrawn language, all-out attack on report would represent break with SYG and UN which would play fully into hands of USSR and pro-Lumumbaists.

Second, for US to accommodate itself to report by putting as good face on it as possible, emphasizing points supporting our own approach to Congo problem and taking constructive line in noting shortcomings of report. We believe this approach is only feasible way to deal with UN report which obviously puts US in difficult position, primarily because of its strong attack on Belgian activities in Congo. There are elements in report which provide basis for US to take this approach. The emphasis given to Chief of State and Parliament as two institutions through which peaceful solution can be developed; the continued expressed intention of UN bring about stability, order and peaceful political evolution in Congo.

Most difficult aspect of report relates question Belgian technicians. For guidance this aspect see transcript Dept statement Nov 4² transmitted Wireless Files.

We believe there is advantage, pending more concrete indications of how Soviets and pro-Lumumba Africans intend to play this, for US adopt wait and see approach at outset of debate. Since UN report does emphasize Kasavubu position as legal chief of state, we hope it will prove possible to get clear-cut decision seat his representative. While Soviets will undoubtedly seek to make Belgians main scapegoat for situation in Congo, from US point of view, if we have adequate support, credentials question is politically sound issue for us to press.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-460. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Penfield, Coote, Blue, and U.N. Adviser in the Bureau of European Affairs William T. Nunley; and approved by Bohlen. Repeated to Brussels and Léopoldville.

¹ Reference is to Dayal's second progress report to Hammarskjöld, November 2. (U.N. doc. A/4557)

² It stated that the Department had every confidence in Belgium's good faith in its desire to be of assistance in the Congo and that it therefore could not accept the implication to the contrary in the report. (*New York Times*, November 5, 1960)

Would help reduce focus on Belgians and, if successfully carried forward, would make significant contribution to achievement our political objectives in Congo.

Point should also be noted that report on Congo is by UN Special Representative Dayal and not by SYG. While we know of no basis for suggesting split between SYG and Dayal, there will probably be advantage in discussion this issue to treat report as Dayal's.

Herter

256. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, November 5, 1960, 3 p.m.

1116. Deptel 1295,¹ USUN 145.² I called on Kasavubu this morning and informed him we believed his presence at debate UNGA which is to begin Monday³ afternoon would be most useful. He agreed immediately with this point of view and declared he planned leave immediately. First possible plane is Air France leaving Brazzaville 1140 tomorrow arriving Paris 2100 on which reservations firm. Chief of State is to be accompanied by Justin Bomboko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philibert Luyeye and Martin Ipoto, personal secretaries.

I made following suggestions to Kasavubu: (1) He should prepare full thought out statement to be given press upon landing New York which should be based on broad principles. He should not let himself be drawn out by newspapermen into discussing details situation in Congo. If necessary, he should inform press that he will discuss these problems at the GA.

(2) He should try to remain as natural as possible and to let his good nature, patience, maturity, warmth and sense of balance shine through. For many months world press has been picturing various

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.11/11-560. Confidential; Niact. Repeated to Paris, Brussels, Elisabethville, and USUN.

¹ Dated November 4, telegram 1295 to Léopoldville stated that it would be useful if Kasavubu were present from the outset of the U.N. debate on the Congo, since he was the only Congolese political leader whose position was recognized by everyone. (*Ibid.*, 770G.11/11-460)

² Telegram 145 from USUN, November 2, commented that Kasavubu's representatives at the United Nations appeared to be gaining some respect and sympathy for their cause. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/11-160)

³ November 7.

Congolese leaders as being irresponsible, impulsive, petulant and puerile. Kasavubu's attributes should produce a refreshing welcome and could do much to increase his prestige.

(3) He should be thoroughly prepared discuss various aspects fundamental law in GA. His presence and arguments should tip scales in his favor regarding seating his delegation and recognition his government.

(4) He should work closely with our delegation which knows ins and outs of UN working and which will be at his disposal.

(5) Communist, anti-US and anti-Kasavubu press have been trying give impression Kasavubu and his associates are in pocket of US. For these reasons, I pointed out it would be unwise for him to proceed to Washington. Such a visit might easily be distorted or wrongly interpreted and might give our adversaries ammunition. In any event, he would be working with US representatives in New York who could relay any message he might desire to send. I also stated Presidential elections to be held Tuesday was not conducive to satisfactory visit Washington.

Kasavubu readily agreed with all the points I made, particularly regarding his not proceeding to Washington now. He stated he wished to work closely with our delegation in New York and thanked me for the suggestions I had made. He wished to make sure that Cyrille Adoula remained in New York until his arrival (USUN requested convey that message to Adoula).

Timberlake

257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Elisabethville

November 5, 1960, 4:28 p.m.

169. Contel 183.¹ Department feels continued presence UN in Katanga and Tshombe cooperation with UN essential in terms reduction Tshombe reliance on Belgian technicians and advisors. You therefore asked do all appropriate restrain Tshombe from taking any further

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-2260. Limited Official Use. Drafted By Woodruff and cleared by Coote, Wallner, Satterthwaite, Day, and in draft by Sisco. Repeated to USUN, Léopoldville, and Brussels.

¹ Dated October 22, telegram 183 reported on a crisis in relations between the U.N. leadership in Katanga and the Tshombé government. Tshombé's demand for Berendsen's recall was expected imminently. (*Ibid.*)

precipitate action against Berendsen or ONUC forces generally. In this connection you can tell him US has been seeking clarify with Hammaraskjold points raised in his letter to Tshombe requesting withdrawal Belgians and that we would hope Tshombe would not take drastic action. Arguments to use at your discretion however if you continue feel Tshombe interested in diversifying origin of technical assistance and advice available to him. UN is best available means at present and we would hope that Tshombe would not consider SYG letter as threat to him. Nature of Tshombe reply to SYG² is constructive and we welcome this helpful and statesmanlike approach on his part.

You should emphasize with Tshombe our hope he will not feel himself isolated in present situation, that we obviously appreciate his pro-Western orientation and his efforts maintain stability and a working economy in Katanga. You may also indicate that he is by no means alone in his opposition to Lumumba and that USG and many African states are taking appropriate measures in various ways to achieve stable, moderate government in Congo. While we unable in present circumstances to help Tshombe directly, he should realize our approach is, within the context of a unified Congo, to work for stable government, deter Communist intervention and contribute to economic recovery Congo in which Katanga would share.³ You may wish call his attention resolutions recent Abidjan Conference⁴ in connection African opposition Lumumba.

You should indicate we would welcome whatever statements he can make indicating willingness to talk with Leopoldville leaders about federal structure for Congo and to cooperate fully in such a government. His September 7 public declaration⁵ indicating his ideas on federation and budgetary contribution to central government was helpful and he might wish reiterate this. You should also emphasize with him that without Katanga support and cooperation with other anti-Lumumba Congolese, removal of Lumumba politically will be considerably more difficult if not impossible, and with Lumumba in a position of authority, the stability for the rest of the Congo which Tshombe has stated is a prerequisite for any rapprochement, will be equally impossible. FYI: This line was advanced by Department officer

² See footnote 4, Document 251.

³ Telegram 201 from Elisabethville, October 28, reported that Tshombé had told Canup he was disillusioned by the U.S. attitude toward Katanga; he cited the refusal of a scholarship to an individual but refused to elaborate further. Canup thought the basic cause of irritation was the Western powers' failure to recognize Katanga. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.70G/10-2860)

⁴ A meeting held October 23-25 in Abidjan by 12 French-speaking African nations: Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta.

⁵ Reference is apparently to a statement of September 6, the text of which was enclosed with despatch 528 from Brussels, December 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-960)

to Mwant Yav⁶ during latter's call in Department. He appeared to be receptive to it, although Department takes his acceptance this line with some salt.

Dillon

⁶ Tshombé's father-in-law, Paramount Chief of the Lunda, Mwata Yamvo Ditende Nuwezi III.

258. Telegram From the Consulate at Elisabethville to the Department of State

Elisabethville, November 8, 1960, 4 p.m.

228. Reference Deptel 169.¹ Yesterday I verbally communicated to Tshombe all pertinent points in reference telegram. Tshombe's reaction was most gratifying. He said he was enormously encouraged by interest shown by USG in his problems. Although message contained no promise of direct US support for Tshombe's position, he indicated following areas of agreement with points enunciated: (1) He will avoid precipitate action against Berendsen or UN presence, (2) he is appreciative of US support in helping clarify Hammarskjold's thoughts regarding Belgian presence in Katanga, (3) he is willing to continue to envisage possibility UN may provide technical assistance of diversified origins, (4) he is grateful for personal compliments contained in reference telegram and grateful also for US attitude toward Lumumba, (5) he will study possibilities of issuing additional statements indicating his willingness to discuss federal structure for Congo with moderate Congolese leaders and to provide financial support for such a structure.

Tshombe asked me to relay his appreciation for this message and his determination "not to fail US". He indicated his satisfaction stems from fact that for weeks he has believed himself alone in anti-Lumumba battle. He hopes Department will continue periodically to offer words of encouragement which help dispel his doubts.

Canup

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–860. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Léopoldville and USUN and repeated to Brussels. Received at 7:56 a.m. on November 10.

¹ Document 257.

259. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas) to Secretary of State Herter

November 10, 1960.

DEAR CHRIS: From reports available to us it appears that, in his 21 October conversation with Secretary General Hammarskjold,¹ Ambassador Bohlen made a forcefully clear presentation of the United States position on the present situation in the Congo. Defense is in complete agreement with the conclusions reached by Ambassador Bohlen as a result of this conference. Additionally, we concur with the three courses of action which the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations suggests be taken within the UN framework.

We are concerned, however, because the reasons offered by the Secretary General for the present inactivity of the UN in a rapidly deteriorating situation in the Congo ignore the pressing requirement for immediate restoration of law and order. The prestige of the United Nations itself is deeply involved in successful solution of the Congo problem. In view of this and the interest shown by Secretary General Hammarskjold in definite ideas about "where to go next", Defense believes that the United States should take full advantage of this opportunity to influence UN actions and regain the initiative.

Accordingly, I am enclosing a list of recommended courses of action which Defense believes will assist us toward our common goal of:

- a. Establishment of law and order in the Congo and creation of stable conditions for UN operations; and
- b. Establishment of a legally recognized and responsible Congolese Government.

Because of the initial momentum achieved by Ambassador Bohlen and the instability within the Congo, I hope that these courses of action will receive early review and, as appropriate, will be brought to the attention of the Secretary General at an early date.

Sincerely yours,

Jim Douglas

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-1060. Secret. Filed with a covering note from William B. Grant of the Executive Secretariat referring it to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs for the preparation of a reply.

¹ See Document 249.

[Enclosure]²

RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION

A. Basic Objectives in the Republic of the Congo

1. Establishment of law and order in the Congo and creation of stable conditions for UN operations.
2. Establishment of a legally recognized and responsible Congolese Government.

B. Establish Law and Order

1. Representations to the United Nations.
 - a. Provide the UN Representative in the Congo and the Commanding General, UN Forces, with directives clearly defining their mission and responsibilities so as to stimulate them to take positive action to restore law and order and to maintain public safety.
 - b. Neutralize Lumumba by denying him UN protection not in fact accorded members of the Ileo government, removing him from the Prime Minister's residence and ultimately removing him from Leopoldville.
 - c. Transfer Dayal, UN Special Representative, and General Von Horn, Commanding General of UN Forces in the Congo, to UN Headquarters to be advisers to the Secretary-General.
 - d. Replace Dayal and General Von Horn in the Congo with more dynamic and effective leaders.
 - e. Achieve more effective UN assistance and advice looking to control of the Congolese national army excluding military advisers from Ghana, Guinea, UAR, and Morocco. This would require a reassignment of General Kettani.
 - f. Cause UN forces to exercise more effective control of all major ports and airports of entry in order to minimize and restrict introduction of arms, ammunition and unauthorized personnel into the Congo.
 - g. Assure that members of Parliament, College of Commissioners and other government officials are provided full protection by UN troops.
 - h. Assure and assert centralized, positive command and control of all UN troops to include their redeployment as necessary.
 - i. Through UN Special Representative:
 - (1) Assume control of traffic in and around Leopoldville.
 - (2) Establish curfew in Leopoldville and other major cities.
 - (3) Establish control of radio, press, public health and medical facilities, public utilities, and civilian public transportation.
 - (4) Establish widely separated points for emergency distribution of food to avoid the assembly of large numbers of people.

² No classification marking.

2. Unilateral U.S. Action.

a. Take all feasible means to discredit or eliminate Lumumba as an effective political force to include support of anti-Lumumba factions financially and by propaganda activities.

b. Undertake vigorous diplomatic campaign to induce other nations, especially African and Asian, to provide positive, active support of the UN efforts.

c. Take necessary steps, overtly and covertly, to identify unauthorized foreign agents, particularly Communist Bloc personnel currently in the Congo and initiate propaganda looking to their expulsion from the country.

d. Keep informed of activities of other nations in the Congo and seek to ensure that their actions are in best interests of the Congo.

e. Be prepared to implement plans for direct intervention in the event of failure of UN efforts to restore order or to prevent resumption of power by Lumumba.

C. Establish Competent Government

1. Representations to the United Nations.

a. Foster the formation of a new caretaker government with Kasavubu as Chief of State, Bomboko as Prime Minister, and Mobutu as Chief of Staff or Defense Minister.

b. Enhance prestige of the Kasavubu Government by seating of its delegation in the General Assembly.

c. Develop a basic plan of action for the new government which can be discussed with the political leaders and members of Parliament by UN representatives.

d. Provide technical, political, economic and military advisers who are fully informed of basic UN policy and able to work effectively with counterparts in Congolese Government.

e. Provide counsel and support for members of government including legislative elements in an effort to establish a capable, stable government.

f. Establish and support a judiciary.

g. Reorganize, train and administer the National Congolese Army and Gendarmerie under the supervision of the UN.

h. Induce Congolese provincial leaders to support de facto government pending determination of future structure of government.

2. Unilateral U.S. Action.

a. Continue efforts to guide and stimulate Kasavubu, Bomboko and Mobutu to develop positive plans and programs.

b. Enhance position of Kasavubu through positive public relations program and by direct grant of "prestige" accouterments such as automobile and airplane.

c. Send in modest numbers of U.S. personnel, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to provide counsel and assistance at all levels.

d. Provide grant aid assistance in economic and social fields as required.

260. Memorandum of Conversation

November 11, 1960.

SUBJECT

Congo

PARTICIPANTS*Belgium*

Belgian Foreign Minister Wigny
Ambassador Rothschild
Ambassador Scheyven
M. de Bassompierre

United States

The Secretary
Mr. Bohlen, IO
Mr. McBride, WE

Foreign Minister Wigny opened the conversation saying that in view of our common interests in the Congo he would like to present the Belgian viewpoint on the present situation. Initially, he said, he wished to express thanks for the recent statement which the United States had made, with regard to the Dayal report, supporting the Belgian position.¹ He said this statement had ended the feeling of isolation which the Belgians had felt previously. He thought the strong position which we had taken on the Dayal report and on the Hamarskjold notes with regard to Belgian technicians had been very helpful and had materially changed the situation in New York. He said that in particular the fact we had let our position be known had been useful to the Belgians. He also expressed appreciation at the willingness of the U.S. delegation in New York to meet with the group of interested Western delegations almost on a day-to-day basis.

Foreign Minister Wigny then passed to a discussion of Belgium's difficulties with the Secretary General. He said the Belgian Government believed and recognized the fact that the UN should remain in the Congo for a long time. Nevertheless, Belgium also thought there was a role for Belgians in the Congo as well, both in the private sector and in the supplying of technicians. There should be at least co-existence and preferably cooperation between the United Nations and Belgium in the Congo. Belgium certainly does not want to reoccupy the Congo and her initial action in sending security forces at the time of outbreaks in July was only to protect Western interests. As soon as UN forces had arrived, Belgian forces had been withdrawn.

Foreign Minister Wigny continued by saying that now the Secretary General had undertaken a series of unwise actions. He noted the expressed desire of the Secretary General to crush Mr. Tshombe. Foreign Minister Wigny said that Belgian policy was that Katanga was

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-1160. Secret. Drafted by McBride and approved in S on November 25.

¹ See footnote 2, Document 255.

only temporarily a separate entity. He said that Hammarskjold, however, had the foolish idea that the first step in the Leopoldville struggle should be to get Tshombe on his knees and then to recreate a group of leaders of a united Congo through the parliamentary process. He said he thought this was unrealistic, although in the long run Belgium, of course, hoped that all Congo elements would effectively get together and approve a new fundamental law. However, it seemed unwise to remove Tshombe at such a time as the security situation was worse everywhere else in the Congo than in the domain which he controls. Although Hammarskjold had not written down his views on these points, Wigny continued, he had made them clear and had repeated them again yesterday to him in New York. Foreign Minister Wigny went on to say that there should be created a new unity in the Congo including Katanga, but that this needed the cooperation of the Katanga authorities, including Tshombe, as well as the more sensible elements in Leopoldville. Although the Secretary General said he was not a supporter of Lumumba, he seemed to envisage his return to power. Reconvening Parliament as Lumumba desired would play into the latter's hands and would probably lead to his restoration to power because of his ability to convince and frighten the Parliamentarians. Foreign Minister Wigny indicated that the Belgians thought that some satisfactory group of leaders should be settled on first with Parliament convened at a later date to approve them. He thought that to ask Parliament itself to select the leaders would almost inevitably lead to the return of Lumumba.

The Secretary said he had been interested by the views of Sendwe in favor of a loose confederation including a central government and strong provincial governments. Under the Sendwe plan the central government would handle foreign affairs, defense, financial and communications problems. Furthermore, Katanga revenues would be turned over to the central government in the amount of one-third while Katanga would keep two-thirds of its revenues for itself. He thought that this seemed like a moderate proposal and therefore was somewhat encouraging.

The Belgian Foreign Minister said that he thought the situation of centralization versus decentralization should be left fairly fluid and that it should simply be stated that the different interested elements in all parts of the Congo including Katanga were working together in a brotherly way. At the same time stress should be put on the fact that Lumumba was the one who was dividing the Congo. Unity should be achieved in Leopoldville first and then an arrangement for decentralization worked out including the Katanga.

Foreign Minister Wigny then passed to the question of Belgian technicians and said that the Secretary General was asking for their removal but that it was somewhat hard to follow him. The Belgians

were not entirely clear as to what he wanted, whether or not it was to eliminate the Belgian element in the Congo entirely. Foreign Minister Wigny said that on some occasions Mr. Hammarskjold seemed to envisage only the departure of certain categories of Belgian civil servants but that at other times he seemed to want to do away with the Belgian presence entirely. Hammarskjold had asked that Belgian bilateral assistance should stop and should be channeled through the UN. Foreign Minister Wigny was exercised at an article appearing in the US press that morning to the effect that UNESCO was seeking 500 French-speaking but non-Belgian teachers for the Congo. Foreign Minister Wigny pointed out that even if 500 French-speaking teachers could be found, it would not be possible to find ones who understood the local political situation and spoke the local languages. He thought only the Belgians would fulfill such a requirement. Foreign Minister Wigny said he was aware of Hammarskjold's rationale that if Belgian bilateral assistance were permitted this would establish a precedent for Soviet bilateral aid in the event of the return of Lumumba. The Foreign Minister then pointed out that the Belgians involved in the Congo were not Belgian Government civil servants but were employed by the Congolese Government which has requested their return often by name. He added that it was not only Tshombe but authorities in Leopoldville and other provincial capitals who had requested these technicians, who now numbered about 2100. Foreign Minister Wigny said seven hundred of these were teachers, three hundred were with OTRACO² and five hundred with Sabena. Only a third of the total were in the Katanga. The Secretary asked if it were true that the Belgian Government paid one-third of these salaries while two-thirds was paid by the local authorities. Foreign Minister Wigny said that this was correct.

Foreign Minister Wigny then proceeded to criticize Mr. Dayal, saying that he was unfair to the Belgians on the technician problem and that the Congolese wanted them present. The Foreign Minister added that the Belgians were not undertaking any new bilateral programs but simply carrying out agreements which had been reached before independence. Therefore, this did not establish a precedent for an eventual Soviet presence since the Belgian agreements were a factor of independence. The Foreign Minister then declared that if Belgium had had an additional fifteen years in the Congo it would have been the best prepared country in Africa for independence. The base of the pyramid of people who had been trained was large, but there simply had not been time to build up a sufficient group of upper-level personnel. There were more Congolese in secondary institutions, for example, than there were Nigerians. The UN could not find the proper

² A parastatal transportation organization.

people to fill technical jobs in the Congo but wanted to displace Belgians. Foreign Minister Wigny said he wondered if the Secretary General, in fact, wished to establish a UN trusteeship over the Congo. He thought this would be a dangerous precedent for Africans generally. He also referred to the Secretary General's letter to Tshombe which he criticized and added that Lumumba would certainly bring back Soviet technicians on a bilateral basis should he attain power again.

The Secretary inquired regarding the Foreign Minister's talk with Hammarskjold and Dayal in New York the previous day. Foreign Minister Wigny said that the Secretary General had been courteous but had maintained all of his positions, which the Belgians thought were unwise. Foreign Minister Wigny said he thought that Hammarskjold had been very much affected by the attack which Khrushchev had made on him and felt that he must at all costs have Afro-Asian support even if the Afro-Asians should decide they wanted Lumumba's return to power. Foreign Minister Wigny stated he thought Hammarskjold was forgetting that he might be damaging the future of the Congo and also acting to the detriment of the West as a whole. He noted that the money for the Congo rescue operation was coming entirely from the West. He said Belgium wanted to cooperate with the UN since both Belgium and the UN are in fact present in the Congo. However, the UN was making it difficult for there to be genuine cooperation and UN policy seemed to be to eliminate Belgium from the picture entirely. He stressed that some settlement must be found but said that the present conditions of the Secretary General were unacceptable. He referred again to Belgian displeasure with the remarks of Bunche in a magazine article and Cordier in a T.V. interview.

Ambassador Rothschild referred again to remarks attributed to Hammarskjold to the effect that Tshombe must be removed and that the Belgian presence in the Katanga should be eliminated because it was the prop without which Tshombe could not continue to exist. Rothschild added that the Secretary General seemed to have the mistaken idea that Congolese unity would be achieved by the collapse of the present Katanga administration. The Secretary noted that it was somewhat difficult to envisage what would happen if Tshombe were to disappear and who would replace him. Mr. Bohlen said that Hammarskjold thought Tshombe was an obstacle to Congolese unity and that he would fall if Belgian support were removed. Therefore, according to the Secretary General's reasoning, this Belgian help should be withdrawn. The Secretary General, according to Mr. Bohlen, also felt that there was strong opposition to Tshombe in Katanga and that there were numerous Lumumba followers there. However, he said, the Secretary General was not entirely clear on these points. Mr. Bohlen

stressed that Hammarskjold was not consciously planning the return of Lumumba though he admitted this might well be the result of the policy which he espoused.

The Secretary said that Dayal did not seem to be too well informed on the plotting which was going on in Leopoldville and which was anti-UN in nature. He thought there was danger of merely creating additional chaos.

The Secretary then asked Wigny if he was planning further talks with the SYG. Mr. Wigny indicated that he was sending Foreign Office Secretary General van den Bosch, who knew Hammarskjold, to New York to hold further discussions. However, he thought that the November 10 discussion which he had had with the SYG had been on the whole discouraging. Nevertheless, the UN must be pushed hard to effect a compromise with the Belgians since both were necessary to the Congo. He added that Hammarskjold was playing the African game, but that the Congolese should have freedom to select technicians as they desire. This was not a Belgian reoccupation. Foreign Minister Wigny indicated he would send to the Secretary details regarding the number and type of Belgian technicians who are now present in the Congo. He referred to the fact that the courts cannot function at the present time because of the absence of Belgian judges and that various Congolese provincial governments had requested the return of such officials. The Secretary referred to the need for Belgian judges and lawyers and wondered how the Congo could operate without them, how courts could operate, how warrants would be written, etc.

Wigny then said that the SYG appeared to differentiate between various categories of Belgians in the Congo. The two categories to which he objected as near as the Belgians could tell were: 1) army officers and 2) "policy makers". The officers, Wigny said, were public servants hired by the Congolese prior to independence. He noted the contrast between the peaceful conditions existing in the rest of the Katanga where there were Belgians and the chaos now existing in the northern portion of the province where the UN was present. Wigny also stated that there would be a bad reaction among the large and important Belgian colony in Elisabethville if Belgian officers were to depart.

Wigny went on to say that Hammarskjold was also wrong in his feeling about the so-called "policy makers" among Belgian technicians and said these were simply advisers to the Commissioners. When anything went wrong, he said, the Belgians were blamed, but these men were not operating as Belgian government functionaries. Rather, the Congolese felt the need of them and had asked for them. Hammarskjold had asked that they be refused Belgian passports but this was not possible for the Belgian government. Wigny then said he had suggested that there should be personal contact in Leopoldville be-

tween a Belgian liaison officer and the UN there. He said, however, Dayal appeared to treasure his troubles and did not want to take steps to iron them out; rather, he would prefer to use a big stick against the Belgians. The Secretary inquired whether, since the Belgian Government was paying one-third of the salaries of these people, it could recall them. Ambassador Rothschild said that these were mostly former colonial officials which had been selected by name by the Congolese. They go under the terms of the agreements reached between Belgium and the Congo before independence. The Belgian contribution is for the upkeep of the families of these people in Belgium. The Secretary thought that it might be useful to go over problems involving Belgian functionaries on a case by case basis and perhaps recall trouble-makers who might be found. Ambassador Rothschild said that the Belgians had proposed a liaison officer in Leopoldville who could be in touch with the UN and use his influence with the Congolese and keep Belgian functionaries in line. However, he said, Hammarskjold had rejected this idea. He concluded that ultimately the Belgian Government could recall these functionaries but that this would be highly undesirable.

Mr. Bohlen then said it might be possible for the Belgians to discuss the problem of their technicians with Mr. Hammarskjold on a basis of different categories, such as para-military technicians, teachers, etc. He said that Hammarskjold had been vague with him some weeks ago when they had discussed this problem as to exactly what technicians he thought should go. It seemed to Mr. Bohlen that he did not mean that all of them should depart but that only some of them.

The Secretary then inquired into the Belgian attitude on the 15-man commission. Mr. Bohlen said that this group was still in New York and that there was some difficulty about its terms of reference. Mr. Bohlen did not think it would go for a couple of weeks. He thought it was important that there be some moderate African representation thereon, and added that Hammarskjold was not keen about it. Mr. Bohlen said that Hammarskjold was well aware of our views on all of these problems and we would continue to talk with him.

The Secretary agreed with the Belgian point to the effect that the West was paying the bill for this operation and that the Afro-Asians were trying to direct it. He did not approve of the idea of placing only Africans on the 15-man commission and eliminating countries such as Ireland which is also participating with forces in the Congo. Wigny said that he was afraid the 15-man commission would take certain decisions and that perhaps these would be adverse to the West. He admitted that Kasavubu had not presented his viewpoint effectively to the other Africans in New York. Wigny said that he had also thought perhaps it could be suggested to Kasavubu that he might invite a group of friendly African Chiefs of State to Leopoldville in order to

counter-balance the 15-man group. Perhaps all Chiefs of State of countries south of the Sahara could be invited, as this would lead to the presence of, on the whole, a moderate group. The Secretary inquired if it were the Belgian thought that Kasavubu should initiate such an invitation. Wigny replied in the affirmative and Ambassador Rothschild added that the 15-man group would undoubtedly favor Lumumba. Mr. Bohlen said that not all of them would favor Lumumba but admitted that the dominating ones probably would, although perhaps this was not a numerical majority. Rothschild added that the Belgian thought was that this would be a parallel operation to the dispatch of the 15-man group and that it would not be an operation mounted through the UN but rather by direct invitations to the countries involved.

The Secretary thought that it would be a good idea to seat the Kasavubu delegation first or otherwise it risked adding to the confusion. Wigny agreed. The Secretary said he was disturbed by the strong racial element involved and the exclusion of Sweden, Ireland and Canada from the 15-man group although these countries were also participating in the UN operation. Furthermore, countries like ours which were providing the money for this operation were also worried about the "stacked" nature of the commission. He thought that Malaya might be helpful but that Indonesia would not be so good.

Ambassador Rothschild added that Kasavubu was personally opposed to this commission. The Secretary said that unfortunately Kasavubu had not made a particularly good impression in New York³ and had not been very forceful. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that Kasavubu was of course the one person on whose status there was universal agreement. Wigny said it was therefore important to seat him and his delegation in New York. Mr. Bohlen noted that the Credentials Committee had reported favorably by a six-to-one vote.⁴

Foreign Minister Wigny then returned to the problem of Belgian teachers in the Congo and referred again to the press report that UNESCO was seeking five hundred French-speaking teachers but excluding Belgians. The Secretary said he had not been under the impression that Hammarskjold was particularly concerned about Belgian teachers, but rather by Belgian officers in the cabinets of the Congolese Commissioners. Therefore he thought the suggestion of the Belgians studying with Hammarskjold the different categories of Belgians in-

³ In an address to the General Assembly on November 8, Kasavubu announced the names of a delegation headed by himself and requested that they be seated immediately; for text, see U.N. doc. A/PV.912.

⁴ The Credentials Committee voted on November 10 in favor of a U.S. draft resolution recommending acceptance of the Kasavubu delegation's credentials. For the committee's report, see U.N. doc. A/4578; for text of Barco's November 10 statement before the committee, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1960, pp. 904-906.

volved would be helpful. Wigny repeated his desire to be cooperative with the UN in the Congo, but noted that of course Belgium has no Ambassador in Leopoldville and that his suggestion for a liaison arrangement had been turned down. He said that Belgium would continue to have a role in the Congo if only because of the private sector.

The Secretary said he would be glad to have the figures regarding Belgian technicians. Mr. Bohlen asked if this problem would be discussed further by Wigny with Hammarskjold. Wigny said he did not believe so but that he would send van den Bosch to New York to follow up on the previous talk. The Secretary said he thought this would be a good idea and that further exploratory talks would be useful. The meeting closed with a further reference to the credentials situation in New York with Wigny saying he thought it would be helpful to have the plenary on seating the Kasavubu delegation as soon as possible. Mr. Bohlen said we would push forward, but of course we did not know yet how the voting situation looked for the plenary. It was agreed that the Belgians certainly would not take any leading role on this problem either publicly or even privately. There was then a brief reference to the postponement of the Congo debate and Mr. Bohlen said he believed that the official who had been in the chair at the time had not followed the proper rules of UN procedure.⁵

⁵ Reference is to a procedural issue during a General Assembly debate on the Congo on November 9. Ghana moved to adjourn debate on the subject on the ground that further debate might obstruct the task of the Conciliation Commission. The U.S. Delegation sought priority for a motion to adjourn the meeting, which would have postponed the vote on the Ghanaian motion, but General Assembly President Frederick H. Boland of Ireland ruled that the latter had priority. The General Assembly adopted the Ghanaian motion by a vote of 48 to 30 with 18 abstentions. For the record of the meeting, see U.N. doc. A/PV.913.

261. Telegram From the Consulate at Elisabethville to the Department of State

Elisabethville, November 12, 1960, 10 a.m.

232. Reference: Deptel 177.¹ Before I discussed with Tshombe on November 10 points raised in reference telegram, Tshombe's Cabinet

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/11-1260. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Léopoldville and USUN and repeated to Brussels.

¹ Dated November 9, telegram 177 instructed Canup to point out to Tshombé the importance of U.N. acceptance of Kasavubu's delegation and to urge him to instruct Katangan Foreign Minister Evariste Kimba, who was in New York, to cooperate with

Director showed me instructions which Tshombe was about to send Evariste Kimba by teletype. These instructions authorized Kimba to join Kasavubu's UNDel provided prior discussions between Kimba and Bomboko resulted in agreement by Central Government to recognize independence, or at least application for autonomy, of Katanga. After speaking to Tshombe as instructed, latter told me of his instructions to Kimba. I pointed to apparent similarity between Tshombe's viewpoint and that expressed in my instructions and suggested only that instructions to Kimba seemed likely to lead to lengthy negotiations in New York with Kasavubu and Bomboko on exact character of future ties between Katanga and Congo. I suggested therefore that question of exact relationship be left open and Katanga's position on this reserved.

At this point Tshombe, who appeared haggard and tired, launched into lengthy, querulous and somewhat irrelevant discussion of US attitudes toward Katanga. He said that suggestion I had just made concerning his willingness to support Kasavubu while reserving his position regarding future relationships appeared to him to be an attempt by US and Kasavubu to entrap Katanga into returning as part of Congo Republic. He criticized USG for lack of consideration for Katanga and overemphasis on unity of Congo. I answered by saying that, if Lumumba's delegation were seated by UN, Katanga could indeed be fearful of its future as an autonomous area. However, I did not believe that Tshombe honestly thought that a Kasavubu victory would lead to subjugation of Katanga by Central Government, by UN or by USG. Tshombe then asked why USG continues to refuse to recognize Katanga as separate state, if not because US intends that Katanga eventually lose its national identity. I replied that our lack of recognition to date was due to fact that peoples of all sections of former Belgian Congo have not yet had opportunity, given continual disruptions of past months, to decide future relationships among and between each other and that pending this US does not wish to prejudice outcome. I referred to Tshombe's repeated statements of his willingness to contract ties of association with other areas of former Belgian Congo and said it appeared logical not to proceed toward future association by beginning with total divorce. Tshombe's reply was that this was purely occidental approach to political problems and that US was mistaken in not allowing Congolese peoples to work out their own relationships.

Kasavubu to that end. Kasavubu had named Kimba as a member of his delegation but had identified him as a "Provincial Minister for Katanga," whereupon Kimba had made a public statement denying that Kasavubu could speak for the entire Congo. (*Ibid.*, 320/11–960)

Following discussion in which I underlined difficulties inherent in forming associations between states totally independent of each other, Tshombe returned to what he described as lack of USG regard for Katanga due mainly to fact Katanga has not attempted blackmail of Western Governments through appeals for Communist assistance. He said he greatly disturbed over USG failure to accept repeated invitations for official US participation in Elisabethville International Fair next July. I said lack of acceptance to date did not mean that reply would necessarily be negative and that I foresaw possibility of US participation in exposition. Tshombe said somewhat bitterly that Communist countries have already reserved space and he imagined this would be only reason for eventual participation by Western Governments.

Tshombe made final point that attitude of USG toward Katanga has given him heart condition.

Comment: Tshombe, who according to reliable sources suffers from insomnia and excessive worry, was obviously haunted by fear on this occasion—fear that this support of Kasavubu would signal eventual absorption of Katanga by Central Government and fear on other hand that his failure to support Kasavubu might mean return of Lumumba to power. I assume he sent instructions to Kimba in line with those already prepared prior my visit.

With reference to Tshombe's attitude toward US, it apparent he increasingly victim of advisors who attempt to turn him against US. This and previous moment of anti-US feeling on Tshombe's part have coincided with attempts by American companies to obtain economic positions in Katanga, most recent effort being that by Seven Seas Airlines to obtain air freedoms here. Katangan officials initially welcomed approaches by American companies and admit they desirous of breaking Belgian monopolies in Katanga. However, doubtless under pressure from private Belgian advisors, they characteristically accompany their reconsideration of private American requests with anti-American political posture.

I believe success of those advising anti-American line due less to lack of US recognition of Katanga, reasons for which are well understood, than to failure of USG to extend minor courtesies toward Katanga Government which would have far-reaching political impact. Problem of educational grant for Paul Malimba² was apparently used as principal talking point in first instance. Presently fact that USG has not requested space for international fair has taken on exaggerated

² See footnote 3, Document 257.

importance in Tshombe's troubled mind and has perhaps been used to show that USG will not go out of its way to grant even small favors.³

Canup

³ Telegram 207 to Elisabethville, November 22, stated that the Department was anxious to preserve the Consulate's rapport with Tshombé and to sustain his position against the more extreme secessionists and xenophobes in his government. It authorized Canup to tell Tshombé that the Department did not object to public statements complaining about U.S. lack of support but that it wished to maintain good relations with him and explore points of difference as they arose. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-1660)

262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo

November 12, 1960, 2:23 p.m.

1372. Embtel 1129.¹ Points raised reftel indicate Embassy and Department may be thinking along somewhat divergent lines. Following comments and questions intended clarify positions. Request all addressees' comments, under similarly numbered paragraphs:

1. Previous cables regarding caretaker Government going back to Deptel 1207 October 25² all based on concept of development new Government which would eventually be presented for parliamentary approval. We consider such concept essential to gain support SYG. Difference seems to be one of timing. We would certainly hope avoid immediate session Parliament and fully share Embassy views on difficulty sustained constructive Parliamentary action. *Loi Fondamentale* provides no time limit for presentation new Government and if UN and African pressures permit could be postponed until right moment. Further we see no reason why, if Parliament is eventually convened and delivers vote confidence to non-Lumumba Government, plus votes other essential items like Geneva ratification, it could not then be adjourned by Kasavubu, perhaps in favor of constituent assembly.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-760. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Penfield and Woodruff, cleared in draft with Wallner and Cargo, and approved by Satterthwaite. Repeated to Elisabethville and USUN.

¹ In telegram 1129, November 7, Timberlake commented that the idea of a new caretaker Government would be difficult to sell to Mobutu and Kasavubu, would have no prospect of obtaining early parliamentary approval, and would create even more confusion in the United Nations. (*Ibid.*)

² Printed as Document 250.

2. Regarding composition new Government, we note Embassy suggestion Adoula as PriMin, but would appreciate comments on Bomboko, who appears have certain advantages; e.g., he apparently ablest and most dynamic anti-Lumumbaist, is well and favorably known to Africans in New York despite recent misunderstanding, and as present Chief Commissioner might be more acceptable Mobutu as face-saver for dissolution Commissioner Government. Alternatively, contents Deptel 1369³ suggest your problem of "new caretaker Government" might be handled for time being if Ileo Government could be revived and could make use of Commissioners General. Ileo's personal weakness might be minimized if Mobutu could successfully maintain his strong-man role (as Chief of Staff or MinDef), thus leaving Ileo as little more than figurehead he is now. We would not rule out Ileo replacement by Adoula or other suitable man before Parliamentary approval stage. In addition to solving problem raised reftel, such a development would have obvious, although perhaps not decisive, advantages in furthering our objective of Government with which UN would cooperate.

3. Preparatory steps needed prior resumption Parliament include careful planning and agreement on floor tactics. Appears attendance full membership essential in terms SYG and international support generally and Conakat attendance in particular might well be decisive based on most helpful box score provided Embdes 103.⁴ Conakat attendance could be urged when appropriate by Consul Elisabethville in coordination Embassy. Lumumba's presence Parliament would have to be accepted but interim steps above should help minimize danger his presence. Should cabinet idea prove acceptable present Congo leaders, thought might be given having new cabinet make gesture obtain national support by grass-roots tour, including Katanga.

4. In summary appears to us advantages caretaker Government proposal include: better chance international approval, including UN, than Commissioners can muster as extra-Constitutional government; some reduction Ghana-Guinea pressure; legally appointed functioning cabinet would increase Lumumba isolation and remove his claim

³ Dated November 11, telegram 1369 to Léopoldville repeated telegram 1348 from USUN, November 10, which reported a conversation with Cordier. Cordier suggested revival of the Ileo government; he thought the U.N. forces could work with it on a de facto basis, paving the way for its establishment on a de jure basis by a reconvened Parliament. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-1160 and 770G.00/11-1060, respectively)

⁴ Dated October 19, despatch 103 estimated parliamentary support for Lumumba as follows: in the Chamber of Deputies, 65 Lumumba supporters, 57 opponents, 5 probable opponents, 7 whose positions where unknown, and 7 who had died, resigned, or never appeared; in the Senate, 29 supporters, 36 opponents, 1 probable opponent, 10 unknown, and 8 dead, resigned, never appeared, or unable to vote. The despatch noted that the figures included 7 Conakat Deputies and 7 Senators who opposed Lumumba but might not return to participate in a vote. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/10-1960)

to be legal Government; improved chance GOC–ONUC cooperation in vital economic programs; and reduction trouble-making potential of Advisory Commission if it can be set up prior their arrival. Caretaker Government would not simply add another Government. It should legally replace all previous, including Commissioners, and public announcement this effect should be made by Kasavubu, Mobutu, Bomboko when new Government announced. At same time, should be accompanied by publicly announced intention seek Parliament approval when full security can be guaranteed and full attendance arranged.

5. There are obvious advantages in moving promptly, particularly in view prospective Advisory Commission visit. At same time, full Kasavubu cooperation essential and he would probably resent it if significant action taken in his absence. Have you taken any action pursuant Deptel 1274?⁵ If not, do you consider that in circumstances it would be inadvisable take preliminary soundings with Mobutu, Ileo et al. before return Kasavubu, Bomboko, Adoula?

Herter

⁵ Dated November 2, telegram 1274 authorized the Embassy to take appropriate steps along the lines envisaged in Documents 250, 251, and 253 and footnote 1, Document 253. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–160)

263. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, November 15, 1960, 5 p.m.

1181. Deptel 1372.¹

1. No difference opinion except perhaps on timing.

2. Adoula is as anti-Lumumbaist as the others including Bomboko, is energetic and has better general position among parliamentarians many of whom resent closure of Parliament by Mobutu and Commissioners. He also stands well with Mobutu. In last analysis it will be Kasavubu and other Congolese who should and will decide makeup which we can hope influence but by no means control. We can, I believe, work with almost any likely combination of moderates

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–1560. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent priority to USUN and repeated to Brussels.

¹ Document 262.

and I would, therefore, not wish take strong line favoring any one list now. Believe solution will be found only if anti-Lumumba leaders get together (Embtel 1082).²

In view line taken by SYG that Lumumba not legally ousted and Ileo not legally installed (not so far changed to our knowledge) is there any reason to think UNOC would cooperate with the Ileo government more than with Commissioners in the interim before parliamentary approval? Would not same apply to a new cabinet formula? UNOC has said it deals with man in chair. Do Department and USUN believe position with Afro-Asian nations would be improved by substitution of "cabinet" for "Commissioners"? While latter is novel appellation, they are civilian, not military, officials and any anti-Lumumba "cabinet" would need Mobutu and CNA behind it to survive over near future at least.

Mobutu is the key for the present even though I could wish he were more able and less impulsive. He has announced timetable December 31 for completion work Commissioners as such. We feel it will take at least until then for provincial leaders get together to obtain necessary atmosphere for peaceful political activity (i.e. Stanleyville) and prepare to get parliamentary support for a new formula. Problem especially difficult for Tshombe and only slightly less so for Kalonji.

I question therefore (A) whether dissolution Commissioners would be acceptable Mobutu and other key figures before end December, (B) whether fallback to Ileo government (never, incidentally, dismissed) or some reshuffle in cabinet would really get us further forward. Fact is Commissioners have been much more constructive and productive than either preceding government even though UNOC disparages them. I hope they will be retained in some appropriate capacity in eventual government.

Finally, we have distinct impression UNOC policy is directed toward solution which would, in our opinion, lead to restoration Lumumba to power if implemented before opposition can organize itself. Unless such policy changes, I have feeling any new or revived cabinet formula would be equally distrustful to UNOC and no less subject attack by unholy alliance. If, on other hand, UN interpretation *Loi Fondamentale* were changed to recognize dismissal Lumumba and embrace Ileo government, we would have quite a different situation.

3. Agree but problem not simple and very little confidence should be placed in durability or even accuracy our head count. We know very large amounts have been given already to members Parliament by Soviet Bloc and lately through UAR for pro-Lumumba votes. We have by reliable authority been told certain members have been promised \$2,000 US for each when next favorable vote cast. The stakes may

² Document 254.

go even higher. Hence, I feel there is a very real risk that Parliament will vote by pocket rather than by principle in enough numbers to support Lumumba in near future and might do so even after best efforts of working coalition of anti-Lumumba leaders. I think it is logical and prudent therefore to keep in mind that Mobutu and CNA represent only relatively stable counter to return Lumumba at present and might have to assert themselves again if moderates fail. I would not like to see them emasculated.

4. (A) Previously discussed. (B) Possibly so but would reduction pressure be significant? (C) and (D) Already discussed. (E) Do not believe it likely that change in present situation could be sold and implemented before arrival advisory commission understood be end this week. Simple withdrawal of Commissioners by Mobutu with Kasavubu approval would automatically revive Ileo government as we see it.

While reiteration intention seek parliamentary approval might be good public relations move, it has been implicit in announcement Ileo government. Commissioners have constituted only interim government by definition from beginning with announced termination date.

5. Doubtful particularly in view considerations paragraphs 2 and 3, that any definitive or constructive solution can be found appease advisory commission at this late date before arrival. Agree Kasavubu would be offended by action his absence. Best bet appears try impress Commission with good intentions and accomplishments Kasavubu, Mobutu and Commissioners. Lines should be that necessary and effective groundwork must be laid before democracy can hope function. For example all provinces must participate and all parliamentarians must be free to express opinions.

We have continued discussions with Mobutu, Ileo and others along lines leading, we hope, to eventual government which could obtain parliamentary approval. We cannot and should not try precipitate them into action which, in our view, is highly questionable at moment and which they are not prepared take for much same reasons.

Specification replies pursuant Deptel 1274³ have been sent through other channels which should, in my opinion, be used such purpose although we continue report other developments in regular series.⁴

Timberlake

³ See footnote 5, Document 262. Telegram 1274 also requested that the Embassy keep the Department fully informed of developments.

⁴ Telegram 1431 to Léopoldville, November 18, conveyed a message from Penfield requesting that Ferguson, who was passing through the Congo, discuss this telegram and related correspondence, on all channels, with the Embassy. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–1560)

264. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 16, 1960, 2 p.m.

1414. Subject: Congo.

1. Dept requested urgently circularize field to obtain commitments to vote against expected motion to postpone GA decision on credentials of Kasavubu del when issue comes up this week. This is separate and more difficult vote than direct vote on credentials which was subject previous Depcirtel.¹ Question urgent because issue likely arise Friday am. Request tels go to fol countries to support our efforts here:

Austria, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iceland, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaya, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Sudan, Somalia, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay.²

2. We believe fol line of argument best meets arguments others putting forward:

(a) US has given and will continue give firm support to UN efforts in Congo, to steps which will help preserve territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Congo. We believe one such step is to help strengthen its legal institutions.

(b) Kasavubu as Chief of State is one of only two remaining legal institutions in Congo. He was recognized as such in recent UNOC report by Dayal.³ He was invited to speak as Chief of State to GA without challenge by anyone.

(c) Kasavubu specifically asked in his speech as Chief of State that del appointed by him, which he is heading, be seated promptly.

(d) Credentials Comte has approved credentials Kasavubu del by 6 (US, NZ, Costa Rica, Haiti, Philippines, Spain)-1 (USSR) with Morocco and UAR not voting.

(e) Issue now likely to come before GA this week. We believe Kasavubu's request to be seated must be supported. Otherwise UN will be undermining sole effective legal institution in Congo. (Parliament under present circumstances has been unable to meet.) If Kasavubu has to return Congo without such support, we feel further confusion and disintegration may set in to detriment UN long-range efforts.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/11-1660. Confidential; Niact.

¹ Circular telegram 665, November 7, instructed the recipient embassies to urge the importance of seating Kasavubu's delegation to the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, 320/11-760)

² Circular telegram 719, November 16, sent to the capitals of most of these countries and to Athens, Nicosia, and Tel Aviv, repeated the text of telegram 1414 and instructed the embassies to put forward their arguments as soon as possible. (*Ibid.*)

³ Dayal's second progress report, dated November 2; see footnote 1, Document 255.

(f) Key vote on Kasavubu del seating almost certain to be on motion to postpone consideration, based on argument issue should not be faced because conciliation commission going to Congo shortly. We feel delay Kasavubu del seating would not increase but decrease prospects successful UN efforts and would cast doubt on position Chief of State, which we feel crucial to avoid if UN effort in Congo to succeed.

(I) Kasavubu has publicly said he wants his del seated now. Postponement would be rebuff to uncontested office of Chief of State of Congo.

(II) Kasavubu has told members UN Congo Advisory Comte that if they expect to deal with him as Chief of State in Congo (as they do) they must give him same recognition here.

(III) Kasavubu has also indicated he would be willing to consider question of conciliation after his del has been given opportunity to express its own voice in UN but not before. FYI. Only after being seated Kasavubu with support French-speaking Africans will then take position any outside help should come only from African Chiefs of State who do not have troops in Congo. He has already so indicated in letter to Dayal for info UN Advisory Comte. End FYI.

(g) It is thus clear that postponement credentials issue would not improve but would detract from possibility successful efforts by UN and would also weaken one of two legal pillars in Congo.

3. While some African states—notably Ghana and Guinea—are vigorously opposed to taking up credentials question now because they oppose Kasavubu, and some others (Nigeria) prefer issue not be faced now because they want conciliation commission to go first, immediate seating Kasavubu has support majority African states, including Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Chad, Dahomey, Niger, Gabon, Upper Volta, and possibly Togo. They will both speak and vote in favor immediate seating Kasavubu del and against any postponement motion. Congo (Brazzaville) and Cameroun feel strongly enough to have sent Chief of State and Foreign Minister to NY specifically for this debate.

4. Because of alliance Communist bloc with Ghana, Guinea and India on substance and with others on procedure who prefer not meet issue now, procedural vote may be close and we hope respective dels will be instructed vote against any (there are various possibilities, such as simple adjournment of mtg, adjournment of debate, or postponement until after conciliation commission goes to Congo) postponement of motion as well as to support seating Kasavubu del when issue comes to vote. Extremely important that dels vote no (not abstain) on these theoretically procedural votes. Postponement motion or motions will be in fact the most substantive issue before GA and vote on them will determine outcome. Some dels feel they can avoid appearance too close tie to West by abstaining on procedure while voting with US on

substance. In this case procedural vote is key substantive vote. If we do not win it, we will not get to substance. Our calculation on procedural vote is very close and we need all possible votes to be sure of winning it. Once we defeat postponement we expect seating of Kasavubu del to follow as consequence (e.g., when postponement motions failed in Credentials Comte UAR and Morocco did not feel able to vote against Kasavubu del but avoided vote entirely. Some dels, furthermore, who may support postponement will vote for Kasavubu del when issue comes to that point.).

5. Missions will obviously have to vary approaches according to reactions on Kasavubu del received in response Depcirtel 665.

Wadsworth

265. Editorial Note

On November 18, the U.N. General Assembly took up the report of the Credentials Committee (U.N. doc. A/4578), which recommended the seating of the delegation appointed by President Kasavubu. Ghana's Representative moved for adjournment of debate on the report on the ground that discussion before the Conciliation Commission completed its work would be undesirable. The motion was rejected by a vote of 51 to 36, with 11 abstentions. For the record of the meeting, see U.N. doc. A/PV.917.

The Assembly considered the Committee's report at seven plenary meetings between November 18 and 22. At the first session on November 22, the Assembly rejected a motion by Ghana to adjourn debate on the report by a vote of 50 to 34, with 13 abstentions, and a similar motion by Mali by a vote of 47 to 32, with 16 abstentions. At the second session that day, a Guinean proposal to postpone decision on the Credentials Committee's draft resolution was defeated by 50 votes to 32, with 14 abstentions. The draft resolution was then adopted by a vote of 53 to 24, with 19 abstentions, as Resolution 1498 (XV). For the records of the November 22 sessions, see U.N. docs. A/PV.923 and 924. The text of the resolution is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, page 77. For texts of statements made before the General Assembly on November 22 by U.S. Representative Wadsworth, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1960, pages 906-909.

266. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

November 23, 1960, 11:09 p.m.

971. Dept appreciates effective efforts of GADel to achieve important GA decision in favor Kasavubu. Successful outcome of Congo credentials vote, in Department's judgment, sets stage for next phases of operation to consolidate gains in effort to restore tranquillity and stability to Congo. Vote was expression by General Assembly of support for Kasavubu and moderates in Congo and rejection extremists both in Congo and in GA. We assume that Hammarskjold will no longer give undue weight to views of Ghana, Guinea and others in implementing UN decisions and will now be prepared work forthrightly with Kasavubu and his supporters.

We must now take all necessary measures to help place government in Congo on firm constitutional footing. We can expect that Lumumba supporters in Assembly and Congo will make every effort reverse results if given opportunity. U.S. interests and prestige continue be very directly involved in Congo and we believe Kasavubu now in more favorable position to take lead in bringing about improvement in Congo situation.

Pursuant to our policy of maintaining frank and open lines of communication with Hammarskjold USUN should seek earliest opportunity discuss Congo with Hammarskjold, making inter alia following points:

1) United States remains concerned with highly dangerous potential of Soviet and Lumumba activities in Orientale Province. We recall SYG's previous statements of concern in this regard. Current reports indicate Lumumba continues regard Orientale Province as possible stronghold and base for separatist government is event he unable regain power in Leopoldville. Seating of Kasavubu could trigger Lumumba and his Congolese and other supporters to take further measures in Stanleyville area. You should draw upon Leopoldville's 1243,¹ 1249² as well as Despatch 138³ to make clear steps already taken by *Lumumbistes* achieve firm control over province, possibly in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-2360. Secret. Drafted by Tron, Cargo, and Sisco; cleared by Penfield, Blue, and Bohlen; and approved by Merchant. Also sent to Léopoldville and repeated to Brussels.

¹ Dated November 19, telegram 1243 reported that the situation in Orientale had deteriorated since early spring due to the activity of Lumumba and his followers. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/11-1960)

² Dated November 19. (*Ibid.*, 332.70G/11-1960)

³ Dated November 16. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/11-1660)

preparation Katanga-type secession. Sufficient evidence has now accumulated concerning these activities to make problem one requiring his urgent attention.

Major threat to peace and future of Congo lies in possibility secessionist Lumumba group in Stanleyville would receive prompt Soviet and Satellite recognition and support, as well as that of Guinea and possibly UAR and Ghana. This would bring about critical world security situation UN presence was designed avert. SYG must know US is deeply committed to precluding Soviet take-over in Central Africa.

Possibility of Lumumba-inspired secession by Orientale Province all more disturbing because reports of concentration of Communist-bloc personnel there. (FYI. According to press reports Polish medical team located there. End FYI) With activities of Louis Lumumba,⁴ Gizenga, and Salumu⁵ and others, Stanleyville has emerged as center of extremist activity. Even without Lumumba-Communist involvement, situation would be bad, with breakdown of law and order.

We hope SYG will consider Stanleyville problem carefully. We believe two concrete steps would help: a) assignment of strong, moderate UN personnel in key positions in province; and b) prompt UN intervention to secure release of Songolo⁶ and ten other parliamentarians still being held by *Lumumbistes* and insistence on future security guarantees. All information we have is that Songolo is not receiving adequate medical treatment. In addition, we believe it would be desirable to have SYG consider desirability of moving some UN forces into Stanleyville area in addition to Ethiopians now there.

2) We hope that Hammarskjold will now work with Kasavubu and his supporters to place Congo Government on firmer footing. In this connection, major role for UN would seem to be in guaranteeing security for moderates in Congo. Without such conditions, it would not be possible to move ahead to putting Congolese Government on more firm footing.

3) If, but only if, Hammarskjold requests US views, you may confirm US not favorably impressed with Dayal. At same time he should be informed that we appreciate fully difficulties involved in changing his top team in Congo. Our hope is that now that Kasavubu position clear that appropriate instructions will be sent to UN Command in field and that tight and effective control be maintained from New York.

⁴ Patrice Lumumba's brother and Minister of the Interior, Social Affairs, Youth, and Information on Orientale Province.

⁵ Commissioner of Stanleyville District Bernard Salumu.

⁶ Alphonse Songolo, formerly Minister of Communications in the Lumumba government, repudiated Lumumba; he and other deputies were imprisoned when they arrived in Stanleyville on October 17.

4) Re problem of Belgian technicians, US continues be impressed with tremendous gap between requirements for services and ability to meet these which exist almost across board in Congo. We see no reasonable prospect for meeting most of these needs without significant role being played by Belgian technical and other personnel for some time to come. Nevertheless, we recognize that there are Belgian nationals in Congo who are "soldiers of fortune" types, e.g. in Katanga and Kasai, and others who are advancing their personal interests and acting in ways contrary to program which United Nations is trying to pursue in Congo. We think important step to be taken at this stage is for Secretary-General to enter into full and frank discussions with Belgians on full range of these problems. We understand that Belgians are prepared to send high-ranking Belgian official from Brussels and would hope that consultations between him and SYG could shortly be undertaken. Highly pragmatic approach to problem is probably most productive, i.e., examination of problem areas by categories or if necessary on case-by-case basis. We have constantly counseled Belgium to work closely with Secretary-General and will continue to attempt to secure their close cooperation with UN. We prepared to encourage Belgians to exercise more effective control over their nationals in Congo. We believe that this whole problem stands better chance of being resolved satisfactorily if for the time being at least there is a moratorium on public pronouncements on both sides.

5) You should also make it clear there is no question of our continued support for UN effort in Congo. We continue to believe that it affords the only real hope of minimizing the threat to world peace and of restoring stability to the Congo.

USUN should also take occasion of Kasavubu's continued presence in New York to make following points to him:

1) Favorable outcome of vote on credentials, due mainly to Kasavubu's statesmanlike behavior in New York, places obligations on him as well as new opportunities. If victory is not to be Pyrrhic, there must be political progress in the Congo. Of utmost importance is need for Congolese Army to act in a responsible and disciplined manner. While we defended in GA Mobutu action in Welbeck case,⁷ subsequent acts of violence against UN personnel most difficult to defend and if repeated can only diminish international support of Congo and Kasavubu Government. Kasavubu should recognize that UN will hold him personally responsible, as Chief of State, for actions of CNA.

⁷ Reference is to an incident that occurred early on November 22 when Congolese army forces sought to remove Ghanaian Chargé Welbeck from the Ghanaian Ambassador's residence, which was guarded by U.N. forces. It came under discussion in the General Assembly when Ghana proposed to adjourn debate on the credentials issue pending a report by the Secretary-General on the incident.

2) We have noted with satisfaction Kasavubu's intention to convoke a round-table conference in Leopoldville of representative provincial leaders. We hope Katanga and Kasai representatives can be induced attend and believe Kasavubu should consider a personal initiative with Tshombe in this regard. We hope conference could be followed at some appropriate time by some move reconvene representative organs of nation either to endorse new government or to elaborate new constitutional framework. Point to emphasize is that we have won a battle and not a war. Proponents of partisan solution in Congo can be expected return to attack.

3) In view importance of UN as political factor in Congo, we believe he should discuss his differences with present UNOC hierarchy frankly with SYG with a view to reaching concrete solutions.

For Embassy Leopoldville: Department hopes every effort will be made capitalize on Kasavubu victory. We hope he will receive warm reception on his return to Leopoldville and that public relations aspects his victory will be exploited to full by friendly news media. UN vote in effect means Kasavubu has now emerged as undisputed spokesman for Congolese people before the world.

Herter

267. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 25, 1960, 9 p.m.

1526. Congo.

1. SYG asked to talk to us yesterday on Congo, so we had opportunity take up with him points in Deptel 971.¹ (Before this meeting we had exchange views with UK and found their instructions virtually identical with ours, including attitude toward Dayal.)

2. SYG started mtg out by discussing events Wednesday² re Conciliation Commission. He took strong exception to first letter Kasavubu had written to commission,³ said Kasavubu had been more forthcom-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-2560. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Léopoldville and Brussels.

¹ Document 266.

² November 23.

³ In it, Kasavubu objected to the dispatch of the Conciliation Commission to the Congo. For text, see Annex IV to the Report by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, November 24, 1960; U.N. doc. A/4592.

ing in their subsequent conversation, but that second letter had been less satisfactory than their oral discussion.⁴ SYG said Kasavubu was obviously getting advice from different quarters which accounted for his shifts in position. (We felt he implying US doing some of this and in unhelpful manner.) Subsequently Kasavubu had met with Advisory Comite.⁵ Kasavubu had told them he needed time to quiet situation in Congo before any UN Conciliation Commission was sent. To question from Wachuku (Nigeria) as to how long this would be, he replied would depend on how preparations went. SYG said this position was unsatisfactory and Kasavubu should accept Conciliation Commission and agree to it going within 10 days. Kasavubu had also asked him to remove Dayal, which he had immediately rejected. Kasavubu also said there should be no more UN troops and that start should be made in reducing them. SYG said he had pointed out to Kasavubu he (Kasavubu) could not maintain order in Congo with Congolese Army, even if it were all operating under his control. It was not under control since, through no fault their own, there no officers in ANC at all. SYG implied he might threaten Kasavubu with withdrawal UN entirely.

3. Inasmuch as SYG had raised Dayal question, Barco reiterated we continued to believe Dayal not pursuing same policy as SYG and that we had considerable evidence of this. SYG again defended Dayal. He cited as evidence of Dayal's orientation fact that he had recently asked for Adeel⁶ (Sudan) as his deputy. SYG commented that Adeel's anti-Lumumba sympathies were well known. Barco replied we did not regard this as evidence of Dayal's attitude, noting Sudan was located next to Orientale Province and was under political pressures because of this and that in any case Adeel not likely to be counterweight to Dayal. (SYG not apparently aware possible plans involving Stanleyville from Sudan side.) We also referred to vigorous pro-Lumumba position India had taken in UN as evidence Indian attitude and told him our concern continued. SYG said he expected to be able to get Sudanese Govt to release Adeel for assignment at Dayal's request. We do not think this will be desirable. (UK agrees with us, feeling Adeel too weak.) Dept may wish ask us to urge him to get more favorable deputy such as Irish or Tunisian.

4. In his initial presentation and throughout later discussion SYG also continued to express considerable suspicion of Belgians and of their influence on Kasavubu. He particularly critical of Wiginy's public

⁴ In it, Kasavubu expressed willingness to discuss with Hammarskjöld or the Advisory Committee measures that might promote conciliation in the Congo. For text, see Annex V, *ibid*.

⁵ On November 23. It was agreed that the Conciliation Commission would postpone its scheduled November 26 meeting in the Congo until the week of December 5; see the Advisory Committee report, *ibid*.

⁶ Sudan's Representative at the United Nations, Omar Abdel Hamid Adeel.

attitude, noting he claimed "victory" at Kasavubu seating. SYG clearly regards Belgian Govt as pressing active political interests against UN in Congo. In accordance reftel Barco urged him work out problems with Belgians on case-by-case method and have moratorium on public statements. SYG said he agreed and found van den Bosch easy to work with. He said Belgians wanted to "cooperate" with UN. He feels "coordination" all he can do now. As example "coordination" he said Belgians should not attempt to fill jobs UN already holding. He cited case of ICAO personnel whom Belgians displaced. (We also think he means that Belgians should consult UN before they fill any posts so UN can fill them first if UN wishes.) SYG said he prepared to talk with Belgian rep but not for few more days.

5. Re question improved cooperation between SYG and Kasavubu, SYG agreed GA action had strengthened Kasavubu position and that it was important to build him up. He said GA action had both advantages and disadvantages. He thought latter outweighed former but did not specify reasons. As result GA decision he thought Kasavubu should now be built up by UN "internationally" but not "nationally". Barco said we consider UN should cooperate with Kasavubu and not continue to put roadblocks in way of Congolese exercising their authority. Psychologically it extremely important they not be rebuffed every time they try to act with authority. When he cited Welbeck case as example, SYG defended UN action by saying proper expulsion order (as distinguished from declaration he persona non grata), had not been issued until after action against Welbeck begun. Barco replied we would not expect Congolese to act in diplomatic affairs with precision of Europeans; UN should have told Ghanaians, at time Welbeck declared P.N.G., they should get Welbeck out, instead of protecting him. SYG said perhaps he himself should have done this here with Quaison-Sackey. (It not at all clear yet extent to which SYG prepared to go in developing UN-Congo cooperation, and Dept may want instruct us go back to him on necessity UN supporting Kasavubu nationally as well as internationally.)

6. SYG seemed aware of dangers in Orientale but did not commit himself on additional troop units or getting Songolo out of Gizenga's hands. On troops he observed Ethiopian were among his best. On Songolo he said UN taking continuing interest. He said Gizenga periodically asked for UN protection there, which UN refusing until he released deputies; he hoped this would bring him around. SYG also said UN had refused permission for Lumumba go to Stanleyville to attend daughter's funeral, pointing out this difficult decision to take.

7. He referred again to need bringing Ileo govt into more active operation and to necessity Kasavubu establishing control over Mobutu in such govt as Chief of Staff responsible to civil authority.

8. In course presentation Barco read to him all points Dept requested us to put to him in refel virtually verbatim. SYG said he agreed with our entire position (except Dayal) and our objectives were same. Nevertheless our distinct impression is that there remains considerable difference of approach, as above report shows, and that SYG attitude not yet satisfactory. We also told him what we expected to say to Kasavubu, which he appreciated.

Wadsworth

268. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 25, 1960, 9 p.m.

1527. Congo.

1. Fol mtg with SYG reported USUN 1526¹ Barco saw Kasavubu in accordance Deptel 971.² He made presentation along fol lines:

2. SecState asked me call on you to express our pleasure at your seating by GA and discuss what next steps might be to help yourself and Congo. We spoke to SYG this morning to urge he work closely with you and your supporters in Congo. We told him we thought you needed time in Congo before any conciliation group is sent by UN. We also told him US continues support UN effort in Congo. We think your victory in being seated here presents new opportunities which must be pursued. We think it most important there be political progress in Congo. We have noted with satisfaction your intention convoke round table conference. We hope Katanga and Kasai reps might attend and hope you will consider personal initiative with Tshombe to this purpose. We hope conference could be followed at appropriate time by move to reconvene representative organs of country to endorse either government or new constitutional framework. Of even more immediate importance, we feel, is need for you to establish full control over army and assure it acts with responsibility and under discipline. Now that you been recognized by UN as Chief of State, UN will look to you as being responsible for actions army. As you know, we defended army's actions against Welbeck in GA. While understanding emotions

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-2560. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Léopoldville and Brussels.

¹ Document 267.

² Document 266.

aroused, however, will be difficult defend other actions taken since then against UN personnel, and such actions can make it difficult hold for you from other governments [*sic*]. We believe it most important relations between UN and you be cordial and hope you will work to that end. We have said same to SYG. We believe you should discuss differences with UN frankly with SYG with view to reaching solutions. We believe if cooperation can be brought about between UN and you, UN will prove be helpful in achieving objectives for which you stand in Congo.

3. Kasavubu expressed appreciation US support getting his del seated and said he leaving Cardoso and Badibanga here to represent him and sit for Congo.

4. He said he had spoken to SYG twice about Dayal and believed SYG understood his position. He reiterated Dayal should be removed. He said everything had been fine with Bunche but things started to go badly when Dayal came. (Ormsby-Gore (UK) met Kasavubu just before we did. We talked briefly with him following his meeting with Kasavubu and asked if anything had arisen concerning Dayal. Ormsby-Gore said nothing had come up, but just previously he had had meeting with Hammarskjold who had said that Dayal and Kasavubu now saw eye to eye.)

5. Kasavubu agreed to UN conciliation in principle but people in Congo had to be prepared for it and this would be difficult task. UN conciliation effort should be to help Congolese, not to try to impose solutions.

6. Tshombe had already been invited to round-table conference. He expected conference to produce new constitution; *Loi Fondamentale* did not fit Congo needs. (At lunch Kasavubu told Mrs. Lord³ Belgians still trying to persuade Tshombe not to deal with him and insist on independence.)

7. UN in Congo had not in past cooperated with Congolese enough but had attempted to take over. He said "UN wants to do everything itself". UN role was to help Congolese. There could not be two armies in Congo under separate commanders, for example. UN should help Congolese Army establish order. He also referred to UN interference with *Mandat d'Arret* (Lumumba). (Earlier Bomboko told us Lumumba be allowed attend round-table as deputy but only if he abandoned claim to be PM.)

8. He agreed about supremacy civil over military authority and said this was provided for under *Loi Fondamentale*.

9. We had very good impression of Kasavubu. He saw us alone. He was soft-spoken but more forthcoming than he seems to be generally regarded as being. (From what Ormsby-Gore and Moore (UK) told

³ Mrs. Oswald B. Lord was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations.

us, they had pleasant but much less informative discussion.) In our opinion he has clear views as to what he wants done and has not been shaken from them here even though large number of people, including SYG to some extent, have tried to do so.

Wadsworth

269. Editorial Note

On November 25, President Eisenhower sent a message to Guinean President Sékou Touré replying to a November 20 cable from Touré. In that message, Touré charged that the United States had taken a "partisan position" and was supporting "the enemies of African emancipation" in the Congo and threatened that if the United States maintained its position, Guinea would refuse to take part in the Conciliation Commission and would take "any position in African affairs consistent with Congolese interests." President Eisenhower's reply declared that the United States had "been in the forefront of those nations who have favored emancipation of all peoples" and urged Guinean support to the U.N. effort in the Congo. For texts of both messages, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 601–602.

270. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, November 28, 1960, 2 p.m.

1292. Although I have not yet seen memo conversation which Canup was to prepare, I wish comment on visit Elisabethville and conversations with Tshombe.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2860. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, Elisabethville, and USUN.

¹ Timberlake visited Elisabethville November 21–23. Canup reported the conversation in telegram 260 from Elisabethville, November 25, which states that it took place on November 22. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/11–2560) Under Secretary of State for Management Loy Henderson, who was visiting a number of African countries, had a brief, unplanned

Was met with full military honors by Tshombe and we drove to his residence together. In following one hour conversation with Tshombe and four ministers, Tshombe voiced complaints regarding US attitude. Said Katangan independence was fact and they would never resume political association with Congo although prepared make arrangements financial help to brothers in Congo. I reiterated US policy respect for integrity of Congo and told him I saw no likelihood that any country would be prepared near future recognize Katangan independence. He criticized US failure show interest in 1961 Elisabethville Fair, to which I replied that government funds for such purposes limited and usually committed year or more in advance and US Government just cannot pressure private business to participate. Told him I would raise question again with Department. *Comment:* I consider it would be useful participate in some way for political reasons and because Russians have reserved considerable area for their exhibit.

Tshombe denounced Belgians for failure support Katangan independence which I determined meant Belgian Government policy. Belgian *colons*, led principally by Union Miniere, obviously encouraged Tshombe in separatism which impression confirmed by later talks with others in Elisabethville. Further accused US of being in league with Belgian Government to stifle bid for Katangan independence. I told him US-Belgian relations at all time low ten days ago and that his charge of collusion was totally without foundation.

I asked what he thought of roundtable with other provincial leaders who are anti-Lumumba, to which he replied he would have nothing to do with it. Said he considered Kasavubu weak and ineffectual and he should have taken lead in ousting Lumumba from beginning. I said our hope is that right thinking Congolese leaders should work out solution to political impasse referring to provisional nature fundamental law; and fact Parliament constituted as primarily Constituent Assembly and only provisional as legislative body. Tshombe insisted fundamental law "imposed" by Belgium.

While I had feeling Tshombe might be exhibiting public profile for benefit of his four ministers, my net impression at end of visit was most pessimistic. Propped up by Nineteenth Century Belgian advisers and growing to like the attributes of kingship, it seemed to me Tshombe was hardening position of separatism.

conversation with Tshombé on November 20. Timberlake was scheduled to arrive on Henderson's plane, and Tshombé had gone to the airport to meet him. Telegram 258 from Elisabethville, November 25, reported that conversation, in which Tshombé was critical of U.S. policy. Henderson pointed out that his mission showed U.S. concern with African developments but referred Tshombé to Timberlake for detailed discussion of U.S. policy. (*Ibid.*, 110.13-HE/11-2460)

In later talk with Berendsen (UN) he told me there had been no contact with Tshombe or ministers for over one month. He too was discouraged over prospect obtaining Tshombe's support for effort to reunite Congo politically. Berendsen is level-headed sensible man. Has been doing best he could under most difficult circumstances.

Yesterday I saw Dayal for one hour and a half at his request and gave him straight synthesis of conversations with Tshombe and my impression as stated above. I added only possible good I saw coming out of trip was possibility that Tshombe might have been shocked into recognition of reality which would eventually destroy his concept of a Shangri-la in the Katanga. Dayal said he had just received a telegram from Berendsen stating that Tshombe and his ministers has asked for conversations and that atmosphere had cleared somewhat. I hope this is good sign.

Further, reports that Kasavubu has obtained Tshombe's agreement for meeting may also have been conditioned by firmness with which I dealt with Tshombe's attacks. I might add Kibwe and Monongo were most violent in attacking US policy, are xenophobes and lack any comprehension of the facts of international life. They are definitely bad influence on Tshombe.

Aside from these acrimonious substantive discussions, Tshombe could not have been more friendly or pleasant and the other aspects of the visit were very pleasant. I have the impression that few if any people have talked quite so frankly with Tshombe since independence.

Timberlake

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo

November 30, 1960, 2:27 p.m.

1510. Embtel 1181 rptd USUN 262 Brussels 450.¹ Armed clash ONUC and CNA forces, while apparently not instigated by Mobutu, serves emphasize importance providing means for more harmonious relations between ONUC and GOC. This means as far as GOC con-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-1560. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Woodruff; cleared by Ferguson, Wallner, Cargo, and in draft by Penfield; and approved by Satterthwaite. Repeated to USUN and Brussels.

¹ Document 263.

cerned, establishing government ONUC can recognize and deal with. Department has given most careful consideration reftel but continues feel such cooperation will not be forthcoming in full until government with more claim legality can be set up. In this connection wish point out SYG agreement to caretaker government proposal (USUN tel 1188 repeated Leopoldville 142).² Line taken by SYG is that Lumumba legally ousted but still has to be recognized to some extent since he has semblance parliamentary sanction and has not been replaced by any government which is both legal and effective. Ileo cabinet qualifies on grounds legality but due Mobutu coup never functioned as a government, and while Commissioners more effective than any other government they are extra-constitutional. See USUN tel 1096 rptd Leopoldville 1026.³ Therefore Department feels ONUC would cooperate much more with a Kasavubu-appointed caretaker cabinet. This would appear be particularly true now that Kasavubu has been recognized by UN New York and his delegation seated. Department feels that while Linner and other UN civilians may be willing work with Commissioners and other "men in the chair" to get economic programs going, what needed more is across board cooperation all levels with real exchange views and attempt reach agreed solution larger issues. Recent show force by CNA may have possible advantage in inducing ONUC take GOC somewhat seriously and be more agreeable to non-Lumumba government, particularly if legally appointed.

Regarding your point in reftel that time will be required "to get parliamentary support for new formula", Department agrees but wishes stress that parliamentary support need not be a pre-condition for announcement new cabinet. As indicated Point 4 Deptel 1372, rptd USUN 898,⁴ announced intention should be seek eventual parliamentary approval, but we see no reason, since Parliament not now in session, why formation government need be delayed due lack parliamentary support at present time.

Department agrees that formation such government would not entirely remove pressure Ghana-Guinea-UAR but would make it considerably more difficult for them to work openly against and easier for US work for support GOC as whole without limiting our support to Kasavubu as the only part of GOC with solid legal basis. Department officers in New York for recent Congo debate have stressed view that question of legality important for Africans and one reason French Africans spoke for Kasavubu was that he was legally acceptable and

² Document 251.

³ Document 249.

⁴ Document 262.

not to support him would be to deny rule of law in Congo. Moreover caretaker cabinet government might serve to swing some fence-sitters into Kasavubu column.

Regarding composition of new government, Department certainly does not wish second guess you on best choice for Primin, and would welcome any combination of moderates which could gain acceptance. At same time, we continue feel Ileo should chair Senate in view of Okito's support for Lumumba, unless other anti-Lumumba Senate President would be possible. Also agree talent and accomplishments Commissioners should be utilized and feel best way might be include them in government as permanent under secretaries or in some cases as Ministers.

Department agrees that Mobutu would be key to agreement this plan, and that CNA support through him will be essential. We feel however he might best be approached on basis that installation cabinet would get him off spot of having to make repeated political decisions as de facto power despite his disinclination do so as self-professed non-political figure. Also could be pointed out that new cabinet would contain many of "his" commissioners and Mobutu himself could be Minister Defense or Chief Staff. While establishment new cabinet government could follow upon termination of Commissioner government December 31, we see substantial advantages in return to Cabinet government as soon as Kasavubu can complete necessary arrangements. Advantages are principally: (1) Further enhancement Kasavubu's legal and constitutional position and personal prestige; (2) Strengthening of international support for Congo government by strengthening its legal basis, thus following up on gains made in UN acceptance of Kasavubu credentials; (3) Improvement in working relationship between UN and Congolese officials. We recognize however Mobutu may be unwilling step down until Commissioner period expires December 31 and Kasavubu will have to work out question of timing. Approach to Mobutu at early point would serve emphasize to him our view of need for early return to civilian government.

It should also be emphasized that resumption of cabinet government by no means precludes the calling of a Round-Table Conference which Kasavubu has announced he wishes to do, since we assume that such a conference would be called primarily discuss new constitutional arrangements. In any case might be considerable time before such a conference, if held, produced any results in terms of an agreed draft constitution and meanwhile the Congo would have made no further progress in setting up a generally acceptable government to function in interim.

Department feels that US can continue exert constructive influence in Congo particularly now with Kasavubu in view our support for

him in New York. Embtels 824,⁵ 1017,⁶ 1040⁷ and 974⁸ demonstrate effectiveness your démarches GOC various subjects.

Department therefore suggests you make preliminary sounding this proposal with Kasavubu and if he appears receptive, discuss with him possibility he make further approach Mobutu. If, after complete presentation US views, it apparent Kasavubu or Mobutu will not accept basic idea, you should not press issue, but should leave matter on basis preliminary sounding to which we hope they will give full consideration.

Dillon

⁵ Document 229.

⁶ Dated October 20, telegram 1017 reported that, as a result of Timberlake's démarches, the Congo was sending a delegation headed by Adoula to the United Nations. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10-2060)

⁷ Dated October 25, telegram 1040 reported that Mobutu had decided to postpone his trip to the United Nations. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/10-2560) Telegram 1029 from Léopoldville, October 24, reported that Mobutu planned to go to New York in order to go over Dayal's head and talk to Hammarskjöld; the Embassy urged him to reconsider. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/10-2460)

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 241.

272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

November 30, 1960, 8:19 p.m.

1016. Ref: USUN's 1526,¹ Department's 971.² You should seek early opportunity again discuss with SYG situation in Stanleyville. Concerns which you expressed to SYG November 24 now even more strongly justified in light Lumumba's escape³ and increased possibilities of move to establish separatist government in Stanleyville. You should utilize points contained previous telegrams this subject and ascertain steps SYG is taking to deal with situation.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11-2560. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Tron and Cargo; cleared by Ferguson and Chadbourn; and approved by Bohlen. Repeated to Léopoldville, Paris, London, and Brussels.

¹ Document 267.

² Document 266.

³ On November 27.

In course of conversation you should let SYG know that we intend make approaches number of African and Asian capitals to ensure that they understand dangerous potential of situation which is developing and firm attitude of US against Soviet domination of Congo.

We strongly hope SYG will reinforce Ethiopian garrison with additional troops and assign competent civilian personnel in key positions. Our information indicates that situation Orientale province deteriorating and that Ethiopians unable do more than maintain security and headquarters and communications. This obviously inadequate under present conditions. UN should have sufficient force in Stanleyville area to maintain general security and to assure that airfields cannot be used by Soviets and others to supply and assist Lumumbaists.

Without assuming existence of problem in this regard, you should assure yourselves that SYG and Dayal will not obstruct whatever attempts GOC may wish to take to render Orientale more secure. You should reemphasize that USG views with great alarm present developments Orientale view distinct possibility permanent division Congo and East-West confrontation. Should SYG point out analogy to Katanga situation last August, you might point out none of above dangers existed in Katanga secession movement. In Department's view this situation different in political terms from earlier Katanga and Kasai situation. No country recognized either Katanga or Kasai and gradual program for their reintegration was possible and now appears be achieving results. Danger in Orientale is that prompt recognition Lumumba Government by Soviets, Ghana, Guinea and UAR might be forthcoming and major threat to world peace would result. This connection, we assume in view recent developments, problem of UN protection would not arise in event arrest of Lumumba. With regard to para 5 your 1526, we agree that SYG and UN personnel at all levels should now deal with Kasavubu and present government. You should reiterate our continued concern that each UN member which has furnished UN forces act in Congo in accordance with mandate and within UN framework. Department would also appreciate any indication that SYG has taken steps to assure tighter and more effective control from NY over UN command and UN representative in Congo.

We also agree fully with principles expressed para 7, although person to be named as Prime Minister obviously up to Congolese.

You authorized inform SYG as you consider appropriate of your conversation with Kasavubu reported urtel 1517.⁴

Dillon

⁴ Reference is presumably to Document 268; telegram 1517 from USUN concerns another subject.

273. Editorial Note

At the 468th meeting of the National Security Council on December 1, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, December 2, reads as follows:

"Mr. Dulles reported that Lumumba's whereabouts in the Congo were unknown. He was believed to be on his way to Stanleyville by road but it was possible he might be traveling by river. There was also a rumor that he had gone to Luluabourg. If Lumumba turns up in Stanleyville, he will have tribal and other support of such a nature that civil war in the Congo may ensue. During the last few days Lumumba's supporters have been trekking toward Stanleyville in small numbers. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] had indicated that the Stanleyville district commissioner had ordered the identification and arrest of Europeans in Orientale Province preliminary to their expulsion. Mr. Dulles said that things were quieter in the Congo today than they were yesterday but the situation remains dangerous. The UN Representative in Stanleyville had asked for the emergency air evacuation of 1000 Europeans yesterday but had cancelled the request today. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] indicated that the Egyptian Ambassador had no advance knowledge of Lumumba's attempt to escape but considered that Lumumba was in a 'disturbed personal condition.' Mr. Dulles concluded his briefing on the Congo by reporting that the Kasavubu government was asking the UAR Ambassador to leave the country." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

274. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 2, 1960.

1592. Congo.

1. SYG asked to see us this am on Congo so we had opportunity to discuss points contained Deptel 1016¹ with him.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-260. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Léopoldville, Paris, London, and Brussels. The time of transmission is not indicated; the telegram was received at 3:01 a.m.

¹ Document 272.

2. SYG began discussion by reading several telegrams he had received from Dayal regarding recently expressed anti-UN attitudes by Mobutu, Ileo and others. Main point seemed to be emphasize to us difficulties he felt he had in dealing with Congolese. He stressed anti-UN attitude had increased since seating Kasavubu in New York although it might logically have been expected move in other direction. (He seemed give no recognition to effect of conflict over Welbeck on UN–Congo relations.)

3. He said Congolese [1 line of source text not declassified] were easily depressed and easily excitable. Recent successes had made them “cocky”. For example, he referred to Kasavubu’s statement here that time was coming when UN should start remove its military units. SYG said neither Kasavubu nor his supporters nor any Congolese by themselves could as of now run Congo without UN support and he hoped we would bring this home to them. He also cited Bomboko statement to Dayal that “Congo at war with UN”. When Dayal objected, Bomboko reportedly said “at least ANC is”.

4. Barco replied what SYG said about Congolese probably true. They were inexperienced and no doubt excitable. This was framework in which we had to learn to work. Our own reactions to such situation should not be emotional but carefully thought out. Perhaps Congolese did need be handled with firmness but they must also be treated with sympathy. Care must be taken as specific problems arose not rebuff them.

5. SYG agreed to this as way to handle specific cases, but he noted there also was question of general attitude. This was harder to define but essentially UN must keep them “chastened”. At another point he used expression “pushed down”. Barco reiterated we thought they should be treated with sympathy and must not be given feeling they being blocked whenever they tried do something. (SYG came to this same point in various ways, his main emphasis being on “chastening”. Telegrams he read from Dayal showed further evidence this element UN attitude, frequently using word “rebuked” in connection his talks with Congolese.)

6. We then discussed Orientale situation along general lines but not details of Deptel 1016. SYG said he had about all units he could spare in Stanleyville. (Wieschhoff later said he thought units in Orientale Province had been regrouped and mainly in Stanleyville.) SYG also said he sending more civilian personnel, and had asked Iyassu return.² (Wieschhoff repeated what previously told us: Main UN civilian in Stanleyville was Brzac, a Czech, but “good” one. We do not know whether he anti-Communist Czech or not. SYG had also

² Ethiopian Major General Iyassu Mengesha.

asked Dayal send Swiss legal man named Berthu (?)³ and others with him.) He agreed with our grave concern about situation there and that it presented unusual difficulties because some African governments would recognize Lumumba as legal government Congo and seek support him as such. In all he thought as many as twenty states might recognize such government. Lumumba would be able get supplies and military equipment and possibly even some planes. He could not develop military positions to point where he could threaten Leopoldville area, although he might become threat to Kivu and upper Katanga. Mobutu might well seek send force Stanleyville to gain control, but unlikely he could handle logistics. SYG estimated Lumumba could command 3,000 man force in Stanleyville and that Mobutu could not match this even if he could get there. SYG said if fighting type situation broke out between Mobutu and Lumumba forces over Orientale, he would have raise it here but would take it not to SC or GA but to Advisory Committee. He was not sure what instructions he should give ONUC forces in Stanleyville. Best thing UN could do in area, he thought, would be "interposition" of UNOC to prevent conflict. Barco said we hoped UN could take steps maintain general security in area itself before Lumumba took over. But whatever UN did it must not appear be acting frustrate Mobutu. SYG said UN action should be step taken equally in both directions. Barco replied this was not enough that it should give appearance of UN restoring situation favorably from point of view of Kasavubu and must not appear as UN action frustrating Kasavubu as other UN steps had seemed be. Further discussion revealed continued difference view on this, with SYG continuing think in terms "interposition", which we think will appear as effort prevent Kasavubu and Mobutu from establishing their authority.

7. In further discussion SYG said regardless unhelpful attitude Ethiopian Delegation to UN, Emperor clearly did not want Soviets in Africa and he thought he could count on present Sudanese Government resist efforts turn Orientale into pro-Soviet base. He did not rule out possibility Soviets might seek change situations in these countries, however, through civil disturbances. He was encouraged by fact number Afro-Asians now regarded as serious possibility Soviets might attempt turn Congo into another Korea, although they had not taken possibility seriously when he had raised it in summer. Barco said we agreed but warned SYG we had information indicating some important people in area seemed welcome such development.

8. Barco also told SYG Timberlake been instructed talk to Kasavubu about reestablishing active government with which would be possible work more effectively. (Deptel 1510 to Leopoldville)⁴ SYG

³ As on the source text.

⁴ Document 271.

obviously regarded this as good thing but did not follow up conversation very extensively.

9. We also raised financial crisis in Congo in light information in Leopoldville 1311 to Department.⁵ Before we had chance say UN and Dayal specifically being unhelpful, however, SYG said from cable this morning he understood problem had already been overcome. He also said UN people were taking strong line against numerous trips being taken by Congolese to Paris and Brussels, which were heavy drag on Congolese foreign exchange position.

10. Referring to escape Lumumba and apparently abortive meeting between Kasavubu and Tshombe in Brazzaville,⁶ SYG said he assumed Kasavubu would now send him message he unable establish proper arrangements at this time for Conciliation Commission would accept this but it would not go down without certain definite loss in Kasavubu's international position, as some favorable representatives in Advisory Committee would regard this as at least partially bad faith. SYG said he coming rather strongly to view that under present circumstances Kasavubu could himself use Conciliation Commission both to his own personal advantage in Congo against Lumumba and Tshombe and to his benefit in good will at UN as well. Instead asking Commission not come, Kasavubu should send message saying he been unable make preparations he had intended for reasons which they would all understand, that he doubtful whether there any value in Commission coming, but he would be glad receive them if they wanted come on their own responsibility. Barco then referred to "suggestion" which had been made here that Kasavubu might not invite full Commission but only its officers. Officers are from Nigeria, Malaya and Ethiopia. Political complexion this group should therefore be quite acceptable from Kasavubu point view, even if Ethiopia doubtful. SYG immediately reacted favorably to this possibility.

11. SYG also now fears we may have another Congo debate before Christmas recess. Menon arriving from India over week-end and SYG understands he has "Congo brief" with him and this will mean India will press for debate.

12. Conversation with SYG most cordial and constructive one we had with him for some time. We not at all satisfied however he yet pursuing right line in number of ways. His attitude of keeping Congolese "chastened" seems to us be totally wrong psychological approach, for example, and Dayal's pursuit such attitude in Leopoldville clearly causes sharp Congolese reactions. We tried convey to him our

⁵ Telegram 1311 from Léopoldville, November 30, reported that the unexpected U.N. decision not to provide financial help to enable the Congo to surmount its December 1 budget crisis might result in the collapse of the government. (Department of State, Central Files, 343.170G/11-3060)

⁶ On December 1.

belief this wrong approach but are not sure to what extent we got across. In terms practical UN action he also continues to follow legalistic approach and to think in terms of steps which almost certain appear be deliberate UN rebuffs to Kasavubu and Mobutu. His idea of "interposition" in Stanleyville, for example, is most likely develop as UN action preventing Mobutu from establishing control in province by force. Idea of UN preventing conflict there by itself seeking establish control before Lumumba does, with results that UN action will appear be directed against Lumumba rather than against Kasavubu, did not seem strike responsive chord.

13. Recommendation: We think Department should give serious consideration urging Kasavubu invite officers Conciliation Commission to Congo to talk to him. We inclined agree with SYG Kasavubu could utilize this to his own advantage vis-à-vis Lumumba and Tshombe in Congo and that would cause favorable response here. If UN Mission visiting Leopoldville at request Kasavubu at time Lumumba likely be purporting establish central government in Stanleyville could in itself be valuable to Kasavubu as recognition his position. UK Delegation has also recommended to London UK urge Kasavubu invite officers for similar reasons. UKDel also speculated Menon's "brief" on Congo may be effort get GA discussion that UN disband CNA. They think departure officers CC might help prevent such debate. If Department concurs, message should go promptly to Leopoldville, as UK understands Kasavubu intends reply on December 3.

Wadsworth

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo

December 3, 1960, 1:22 p.m.

1529. Re: New York's 1619.¹ Dept agrees with SYG and USUN it important Lumumba be treated within legal framework. You autho-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-360. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Michael H. Newlin of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, cleared by Ferguson, and approved by Bohlen. Repeated to USUN.

¹ Dated December 3, telegram 1619 reported that rumors were circulating in New York that Lumumba, who had been recaptured by Congolese forces on December 1, faced imminent execution. Hammarskjöld had met with Asian and African representatives to reassure them that this was not the case and had sent a letter to Kasavubu urging

Continued

rized approach Kasavubu soonest and impress on him importance Lumumba's case be handled through legal processes and that his physical treatment be as humane as is compatible with maximum security.²

Dillon

that due process should be observed in dealing with Lumumba. He hoped the United States would also make this argument with Kasavubu. (*Ibid.*)

² Telegram 1335 from Léopoldville, December 3, reported that Timberlake pointed out to Mobutu and Kasavubu the importance of humane treatment of Lumumba. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-560)

276. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, December 3, 1960, 4 p.m.

1330. While arrest of Lumumba may be expected to reduce political temperature in Congo in immediate future, much depends on ability Congolese authorities keep him confined and eventually on outcome of trial. Certainly seating of Kasavubu delegation and now arrest of Lumumba have enhanced prestige Kasavubu and his supporters internally and in UN. I fully agree that GOC should capitalize immediately on this situation but the lack of dynamics and political skills of Kasavubu and present government do not encourage me to believe they will be able achieve very much.

While Afro-Asian hangers-on are, and should be, discouraged, I anticipate no letup in their efforts to restore Lumumba. There may, however, be a change of tactics which should soon be evident if my guess is correct. This likely take form of concentrated attack on UN and particularly UNOC for favoring "imperialist" policies and on inefficiency UNOC. If they believe, however, that a further reinforcing of "neutralist" influence on UNOC can be achieved, they may attempt that. They already have excellent start through attitude Dayal and Indianization top military command. Dayal views scene with Olympian detachment, unconcealed disdain and anxiously awaits day when he can get out of Congo mess and bathe in pure waters of Pakistan. He

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-360. Secret. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Brussels.

is man of principle but does not understand practical problems involved in translating them into action which might conceivably lead to progress on the road to achievement.

Although UN prestige ebbed slowly from the beginning because of its refusal to take clear and firm stand on vital matters such as restoration of law and order, it dipped sharply after inexcusable blunders in handling Welbeck's ouster. It would have been much better to have replaced Dayal then. If my understanding that he endeavored to resign while in New York is correct, it might be worthwhile to explore with SYG possibility accepting such resignation now on face-saving basis his services in Pakistan are urgently required.

Rikhye's prestige is at low level as result Ghana affair. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

It has long seemed to me that UNOC has lacked, at the top, executive skills and that its present disorganization and wasteful procedures can be corrected only by the assignment of a special representative who possesses such skills in addition to some ability in the diplomatic field. A part of the problem lies, of course, in the fact that no clear or strong mandate has been given to UNOC by New York. Its posture has accordingly been hesitant, uncertain and largely ineffective. This became evident early to the Congolese who interpreted this as weakness and they have accordingly issued themselves licenses to do as they please. The UN response has been to deal with the resulting brushfires on an ad hoc basis without any clear definition of either the strategy or the tactics of carrying out in actual practice objectives laid down in the SC resolution on the Congo. In a following telegram I shall attempt to make some suggestions as to what might be done to get on with the job.

Timberlake

277. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 6, 1960.

1635. For Secretary and Bohlen from Wadsworth. Subject: Congo.

1. Every indication here is that we are fast approaching a new crisis in Congo. Afro-Asians led by Krishna Menon and USSR will probably ask for new SC or GA debate as soon as SYG had circulated promised report. (Report just received is that USSR is asking for SC mtg.¹ We have nothing substantiate this.) Pressures from neutralists, pro-Communist Africans and USSR on SYG appear to be producing increasing weakness on his part. Unless strong counter-pressures are introduced, it seems to me UN will drift from bad to worse in Congo. I believe that only practical way to exert necessary counter-pressures on SYG and reverse trend is for Secy to make personal visit to SYG with strong *démarche* asking for reorganization UN Command and staff in Congo and development UN-Congolese cooperation. I believe UK (Ormsby-Gore) would be agreeable to joining in such *démarche* and that it would be additionally effective if this were case. First objective of such approach should be take advantage Hammarskjöld's intention replace Von Horn as Supreme Commander and ask for appointment outstanding officer to take over as senior UN official in Congo but we should also try to bring about major reorientation SYG's policies.

2. Believe US and UK policies should be concerted to this purpose promptly and that approach be made to SYG just as soon as possible, i.e., this week if feasible.

3. Fol is suggested US–UK policy line for approach to SYG:

(a) We alarmed at drift in Congo which, if continued, likely result in UN failure and bankruptcy.

(b) We believe steps need to be taken both by UN and by Congolese to assure this does not happen and that cooperation replaces recrimination. US and UK willing to help assure this.

(c) On UN side we see necessity certain definite actions as fol:

(1) UN rep in Congo needs to be changed so that Kasavubu and Congolese moderates have confidence in it. Relations between Congolese and Dayal are such that Dayal cannot command cooperation from Congolese and we think he should be replaced. We understood Von Horn also about to be replaced. Von Horn replacement should be of such stature and ability that he can weld UNOC into effective command which will be more consistent than UNOC now is. This officer should be someone with combat experience and administrative capabilities. If immediate replacement of Dayal proves difficult, new CO should also become in effect chief UN official in Congo. We have in mind people like Gen Bull (Norway), etc. for this spot (see USUN 1634).²

¹ For text of a Soviet statement of December 6 calling for a meeting of the Security Council and criticizing U.N. and U.S. policies, see U.N. doc. S/4573.

² Telegram 1634 from USUN, December 6, indicated that discussions had been held with British and Norwegian representatives about the availability of General Odd Bull, Chief of Air Staff of the Royal Norwegian Air Force. (Department of State, Central Files, 332.70G/12–660)

(2) Think SYG should take this and other such actions without regard to reaction that can be expected from USSR, Ghana, Guinea and possibly UAR. Soviets are totally against UN effort in Congo and will be violent against any effective UN steps there. Ghana, Guinea and those of similar view will also not be satisfied by anything that does not support Lumumba. We consider it much more important to have UN succeed in Congo than to ameliorate their criticism.

(3) We also believe SYG should promptly settle differences with Belgians on civilian aid in Congo. There is no possibility UN having enough funds to replace all Belgian civil assistance in Congo. Nor is Congo viable without such help. Therefore modus vivendi must be arranged to assure that UN and Belgians are working in harmony or at least not at cross-purposes. We think SYG must work this problem out promptly. We are urging same thing on Belgians and are willing to help SYG to seek to eliminate such political and anti-UN influences which exist on Belgian side.

(4) In Congo UN must take more active initiative in trying to work with Kasavubu and moderate forces in Leopoldville with view to helping them really take hold of governmental machinery. GA's seating of Kasavubu del established necessary political lead in this direction. UN should also reinstitute efforts to assist in training and organization CNA with view to bringing it under more effective leadership and control and welding it into unified force. Finally UN should be more active in areas, such as Stanleyville, where nationally directed control by Congo itself has broken down, to assure maintenance of law and order.

(d) On Congo side US and UK are willing to take steps to seek assure Congolese cooperate with UN as fol:

(1) We will strongly press Kasavubu, Bomboko, and Mobutu to reorganize govt in way which will make it more regular and effective. Specifically we will urge govt be formed to replace College of Commissioners and that Mobutu be brought into it in some constitutional fashion, preferably as Chief-of-Staff. We will urge them to establish govt in way which will give supremacy to civilian institutions. We will also urge them to say they intend submit it to Parliament as soon as possible, although we cannot say when this would actually be. We can only be successful in this, however, if we can show them this will bring UN cooperation. Therefore SYG's attitude on personnel and willingness UN to extend cooperation is essential element.

(2) We will also tell Kasavubu and Mobutu we do not believe Congo unity and integrity can be preserved without UN assistance at this time and that they must develop close cooperation with UN. We will be willing to stress to them firm US and UK backing for UN and to say our continued support Congo authorities based on assumption they make every effort cooperate with UN.

(3) We prepared also exert such influence as we have with Tshombe to persuade him make arrangements with Kasavubu which will assure maintenance Congo unity and establishment national govt with effective authority throughout Congo. We also will intercede with Belgians on this, although contrary to general impression, they are not advocating Katanga separatism.

(4) Only if some such approach made early and with emphasis visit Secy would give it do I see possibility developing better situation between SYG and Congo in foreseeable future. In absence major approach, continued "neutralist" pressures on SYG, especially from India, likely keep him from developing any more firm direction than now exists.

Wadsworth

278. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, December 7, 1960, 5 p.m.

1351. Deptels 1510,¹ 1534,² 1539,³ 1541,⁴ 1542.⁵ Hope Department is not assuming from a few modest successes that Embassy has Kasavubu, Mobutu or any other Congolese "in pocket". While we have consistently endeavored through counsel and advice to guide moderate elements along reasonable path, they rarely consult us voluntarily regarding prospective moves. This should be evident in light of reported examples impulsive action by even our closest friends against which Embassy would have advised them had it been forewarned. In fact our most strenuous efforts have been engaged in putting out senseless brush-fires started by ill-considered actions or statements concerning which we had no forewarning. It would be necessary to live 24 hours a day with the principals in this drama to know what role they may decide to play at any given moment. I like to

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-760. Secret. Repeated to Brussels and USUN.

¹ Document 271.

² Telegram 1534, December 5, stated that since Mobutu had announced that he intended to extend the Commissioners' term beyond December 31, the Department considered it even more important for Kasavubu and Mobutu to agree on action along the lines of Document 271. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-560)

³ Dated December 6, telegram 1539 urged that Kasavubu send a message to Hammarskjöld as soon as possible with a statement of the facts of Lumumba's arrest and confinement, the report of the doctor who examined him, an invitation to Red Cross representatives to visit him, and assurances as to his future safety and fair trial with due process of law. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-660)

⁴ Telegram 1541, December 6, stated that the Security Council meeting on the Congo had been moved up to the following morning and urged that Kasavubu cable Hammarskjöld immediately requesting that a Congolese representative be given the opportunity to address the Council. (*Ibid.*)

⁵ Dated December 6, telegram 1542 advised that to strengthen the case for Lumumba's arrest, Kasavubu should transmit a statement to Hammarskjöld supporting the argument that Lumumba had committed treason. (*Ibid.*)

think if we were really directing this show a somewhat more professional performance could be expected. I can add only that Lumumba's coterie of advisers encountered the same difficulties even though they had him literally hedged in.

We have consistently advised all participants against violence and inhumane treatment and continue to do so. It must however be understood that in the Congo what passes as inhumane to US is customary among them. Thus the abuse of Lumumba shocks civilized countries while Congolese themselves consider he is pampered. Fact is he is much better treated than any other prisoner has been to best our knowledge. Mobutu continues to assert he will be tried in a proper court with legal safeguards. I am certain Kasavubu fully supports this proposal and will endeavor have him so inform SYG.

Dayal's report could only have been hearsay so far as inhumane conditions of confinement are concerned and he obviously did not have accurate information regarding physical well-being of Lumumba. Mobutu's statement that he will not permit outside doctor to examine Lumumba before release Songolo and others held at Stanleyville is obvious effort obtain their release.

In case Songolo, Department is fully informed of documented brutality practiced by pro-Lumumba masters of Stanleyville. I still feel this would be useful line in Security Council debate as counter to Soviet bloc charges. Also realize may be attempt to negotiate release Lumumba as quid pro quo release Songolo et al. Aside from fact I do not believe Mobutu or Kasavubu would settle for any such deal, if consummated it would put us back to July and August. I realize Dept and USUN are having and will continue to have very rough time in New York and that a government with more claim to legitimacy would make it easier to deal with Soviet bloc attacks and with African community. In spite of efforts along lines long since mapped out and agreed, we have not made measurable progress in convincing Kasavubu, Mobutu or other moderate leaders of desirability fall back to Ileo Government or establishment of any other Cabinet. We cannot dictate either terms or timing. Furthermore, possibility of obtaining full session Parliament is dimmer today than a month ago owing to hardened position Tshombe and probable refusal Kalonji to permit Kasai Deputies to attend. This would make serious inroads on already questionable parliamentary alignment pro and con Lumumba. If moderate government was approved by truncated Parliament Soviet bloc would protest illegality owing absence members from all parts Congo. If no confidence voted and Parliament approved vote of confidence in Lumumba, Communist bloc would immediately claim its position vindicated and UN would be forced deal with Lumumba.

On other hand, we have reported apparent switch in pro-Lumumba advocates who now appear against reopening Parliament. This can only mean their assessment of pro-Lumumba votes has changed and they fear defeat. It is quite within cards that Lumumba's support will continue to ebb while he is confined by GOC. This will dishearten all but hardcore Lumumbaists and may already have swung votes away from him. Will endeavor convince Kasavubu and Mobutu of necessity for issuance statement in line lettered paragraph 3 of Deptel 1539. Will also endeavor have Kasavubu transmit appropriate statement for possible translation [*transmission*] SC on justification for Lumumba's arrest incorporated Deptel 1542.

FYI. Kasavubu returned late last night from three-day trip through Bas-Congo.

Timberlake

279. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

December 8, 1960, 9:29 p.m.

1106. For Wadsworth from Secretary. Re your 1635.¹ I concur fully we are fast approaching new crisis in Congo and that a joint UK-US approach to the SYG along lines you propose is necessary. Since it is not practicable for me to go to New York at this time, however, I suggest that you first give the SYG the following personal note from me which makes it clear that the *démarche* is being made at my specific request.

"Dear Dag,

"I have asked Ambassador Wadsworth to discuss with you on my behalf a number of questions posed by recent developments in the Congo. I had hoped to be able to meet with you myself, but am not able to get to New York at this time.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-660. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Tron; cleared by Satterthwaite, Bohlen, and Ferguson and in substance with Benjamin A. Fleck, Officer in Charge of India, Ceylon, and Nepal Affairs; and approved by the Secretary. Repeated to London and Léopoldville.

¹ Document 277.

"In suggesting this discussion, I would like to make it very clear to you that I remain fully satisfied that our principal objectives relating to the Congo have been and are similar. This does not preclude the constant necessity of keeping in step on the tactics each of us utilizes in furthering these objectives.

"I am therefore looking forward to receiving from representatives of the United States in New York an account of your current thinking on the difficult and tragic situation in the Congo. With warmest personal regards, Most sincerely, Chris."

In *démarche*, it would be preferable for UK to take lead, particularly since question of replacement of Dayal is bound to play major part in conversation.

I agree fully with substantive points you have proposed be made to SYG, but three additional items should be included: (1) In circumstances where UAR and certain other countries clearly considering removal their troops from Congo UN operation, we hope SYG will examine possibility requesting forces from certain French Community states as well as from Latin America; (2) In course of discussion with SYG, I also believe it should be made clear that US believes Von Horn should be replaced as urgent measure. You should indicate we would welcome Generals McKeown or Bull as replacement. We also inclined think General Thimayya of India, or possibly General Cariappa, former CINC of Indian Army, might be acceptable, but you should discuss these possibilities in first instance with UK in New York; (3) You should also discuss with SYG report that Belgians intend withdraw all technicians from Kamina, Kitona and Banana bases by end February 1961, asking what plans SYG has for assuring continued security and maintenance of bases and welfare of Congolese whose livelihood has depended on employment at bases.

Herter

280. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, December 10, 1960, 6 p.m.

1370. Deptel 1551¹ and Embtels 1351² and 1352.³ Had half hour with Mobutu last night during which I set forth and explained problems for Congo, US and other friends in NY arising out of government by Commissioners. I told him convinced friends of Congo who understood situation were having increasingly difficult time holding line against dedicated enemies who sought personal or national ends in Congo situation. Those who could be expected support genuinely neutral policy which would permit Congolese people to solve own problems are becoming disturbed over simple fact normal executive machinery is not operating in Congo and many are inclined to feel a military dictatorship, which they dislike, is in fact now operating here. I assured him again we wished to be as helpful as possible and urged upon him the necessity for asking such changes as we recommended in order that Congo representatives and friends at UN would be given the necessary means for attracting and holding largest possible number of nations in this middle group. I said failure or delay in taking such steps might seriously jeopardize future of moderate government in Congo which I knew he favored.

We shall have another session with him tomorrow or Monday.⁴

This morning I went over the same ground with Adoula who is politically more perceptive and who has been working with other leaders including Bolikango, Ileo and Kasavubu. He urged that he talk also with Mobutu with whom his relations have been good in past but over preceding two months have slightly cooled. I believe he will now make effort to sit down with Mobutu and discuss creation of Cabinet which Kasavubu can appoint.

I have appointment with Kasavubu early Monday afternoon during which I shall make same pitch. Earlier date could not be obtained. Embassy has reported I think fully on developments and actions in line with agreed policy although we have refrained from reporting in

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-1060. Secret; Priority. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Brussels.

¹ Dated December 8, telegram 1551 to Léopoldville emphasized the importance of persuading Mobutu and Kasavubu to restore constitutional government. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/11-1560)

² Reference is presumably to Document 278.

³ Dated December 7, telegram 1352 from Léopoldville reported a conversation with Adoula. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-760)

⁴ December 12.

detail conversations with leaders which did not produce facts or indications of significance. We have used other channels as appropriate for reporting.

I think I am fully and sympathetically aware of the need for an urgent solution along lines Department has so ably laid out. We have found out, however, from bitter experience here that it is possible to achieve results opposite to or different from those sought by pressing Congolese too closely or too hard. I am satisfied that Soviets erred in that respect and that it was one of important contributing causes of their ouster. Congolese are extremely sensitive to pressure even when it is exerted in their own interests as the UN should already have found out. Department and USUN can be sure we shall take them down the right road as fast as we think they can be inspired to move and that our best efforts are being expended to that end. I would be less than candid if I were to express my feeling that this can be accomplished in next few days. One of difficult problems which Congolese themselves must solve is composition new Cabinet. Until that is agreed upon by Kasavubu, Mobutu and other leaders, or they agree to restore Ileo government as now constituted, we cannot expect them to eliminate College of Commissioners since it is only government now operating. I can, however, without exaggerating say that I believe since urgency has finally been injected into principal participants and that they understand the issues, I am satisfied they are doing their best to come up with a solution which will meet the exigencies of present situation. Furthermore, and most important, they have not lost their confidence in our friendship and disinterested consideration for their well-being and success.

Timberlake

281. Editorial Note

The Security Council discussed the situation in the Congo at nine sessions between December 7 and 14. A Soviet draft resolution submitted on December 8 (U.N. doc. S/4579) called upon Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to secure the immediate release of "Prime Minister" Patrice Lumumba and other Ministers and deputies and take all necessary steps to ensure the resumption of the activities of the Congo's "lawful Government and Parliament," requested the U.N.

Command to disarm “the terrorist bands of Mobutu,” and called upon the Belgian Government immediately to withdraw Belgian military, paramilitary, and civil personnel from the Congo.

Also on December 8, Argentina, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted a draft resolution (U.N. doc. S/4578) expressing concern for the protection of human rights in the Congo. A slightly revised version introduced on December 13 (U.N. doc. S/4578/Rev.1) expressed the expectation that no measures contrary to recognized rules of law and order would be taken against any persons held prisoner or under arrest anywhere in the Congo, expressed the hope that the International Committee of the Red Cross would be allowed to examine detained persons throughout the Congo, and requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to assist the Congo to restore law and order and to adopt all necessary measures tending to safeguard civil and human rights for all persons in the country.

At an extended meeting of the Council which began on the evening of December 13 and ended at 3:45 a.m. on December 14, the Soviet Union proposed 5 amendments to the four-power draft resolution (S/4578). Subsequently, the Argentine Representative introduced the revised draft resolution described above (S/4578/Rev.1). The Council voted first on the 5 Soviet amendments, all of which were defeated. The four-power draft resolution received 7 favorable votes, 3 opposed (the Soviet Union, Poland, and Ceylon), and 1 abstention; thus it failed as a consequence of a Soviet veto. The paragraph of the Soviet draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of Belgian personnel was rejected by 6 votes to 4, with 1 abstention; the remainder of the resolution was defeated by 8 votes to 2, with 1 abstention.

The Polish Representative then proposed a draft resolution (U.N. doc. S/4598) requesting the Secretary-General to undertake the necessary measures to obtain the immediate release of Lumumba and other imprisoned members of Parliament. It was defeated by 6 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions.

For the records of the meetings, see U.N. docs. S/PV.912–920. The texts of the Soviet draft resolution and the revised four-power draft resolution are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 611 and 618. The text of a statement made by U.S. Representative James J. Wadsworth on December 9 is *ibid.*, pages 612–616; the texts of statements made by Secretary-General Hammarström on December 7 and 13 are in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, volume V, pages 242–268.

282. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 14, 1960, 4 a.m.

1747. Congo.

1. Ormsby-Gore (UK) and I saw SYG this am to make presentation re Congo along lines mytels 1635¹ and 1716² as authorized and modified Deptels 1106³ and 1126.⁴ Ormsby-Gore made main presentation, as suggested by Dept, and I made supporting statement. Copy joint paper from which we talked pouched Dept (UNP-Cargo).⁵ SYG's comments and observations set out below.

2. SYG encouraged US continue to try bring about reorganization of Congolese Govt. He was somewhat pessimistic about results, especially because of failure Kasavubu to capitalize on his seating in UN when he returned to Congo by establishing his supremacy over Mobutu at that time. He thought it would be helpful for governmental change to be brought about before he goes to Congo if possible.

(I told him Timberlake had already made efforts on these lines with Kasavubu, Mobutu and others but that we found developments came about slowly in Congo.)

3. Approach has already been made by SYG to Abboud (Sudan)⁶ for services Adeel as deputy to Dayal, and he expects agreement. Admits frictions have developed between Dayal and Congolese and says he can see evidence of Dayal's attitude toward them in his telegrams. He expects that in due course Dayal will leave and Abdeel will take over as top UN rep in Congo. He did not indicate when this might happen though we had impression it would not be for month or two. SYG made point that at present time Dayal served useful political purpose in keeping Indian support for UN action in Congo. He believes Dayal has sent direct reports to Nehru which help account for more moderate position India is taking in comparison with certain other Afro-Asians.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-1460. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

¹ Document 277.

² Dated December 10, telegram 1716 from USUN transmitted British suggestions for the proposed joint démarche to Hammarskjöld. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-1060)

³ Document 279.

⁴ Telegram 1126 to USUN, December 12, instructed Wadsworth to make the démarche to Hammarskjöld, since neither Herter nor Dillon was available, and it authorized him to put forward the British suggestion that the Secretary-General should make another visit to the Congo. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-1060)

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Sudanese Prime Minister Ibrahim Abboud.

4. On replacement for Von Horn SYG said he had already made approach to Ireland to obtain services of General McKeown. He said Pakistanis (who have 500 in Congo) had stated they would not serve under command of Indian general and that Indians would not serve under Pakistani general. UK informed SYG there was no one they knew of from Malaya who was qualified. We did not raise name of Gen Bull in light SYG's statement about McKeown. SYG said his soundings with couple of Africans showed Ireland was acceptable source for commanding officer.

5. On withdrawal of troops SYG said much of present talk was political blackmail to see how far they could push diplomatic situation in GA.⁷ Fawzi (UAR) in recent talk with SYG noted that UAR had also said in September they were withdrawing troops but that UAR had not been embarrassed at not carrying this out. SYG indicated he would be glad to be rid of Guinean troops. He said he would not ask us to fly them out if sea transportation were available. Moroccan withdrawal would be more serious problem, but he showed no concern that it might happen immediately and seemed regard King's declaration as hedged. He said he had already made initial sounding about increased troops from Nigeria but that PriMin Balewa had replied he could not make more available now. SYG uncertain whether this meant it would be politically difficult for Nigeria to increase its continent while other Africans taking theirs out or whether they could not actually be spared. He suggested we (especially UK) might discuss question with Nigerians. He also thought Senegalese troops might be brought back. He said his experience with Latin Americans in UNEF had not been good and that for political reasons he preferred not go outside Africa if he could avoid it. He wants to keep UN troop strength at about 20,000.

6. On talking to Belgians about their civilians in Congo, SYG showed some annoyance and also lack of real desire to talk at this point. While in his customary fashion of delayed responses he may change mind later, today he said he could only discuss problem of Belgians on one of two bases: (a) that Belgian Govt had nothing to do with Belgians in Congo, in which case he could discuss problem only with Congolese, or (b) that Belgian Govt did accept responsibility, in which case discussion would have to be under context of emergency GA res on Congo (which SYG has previously interpreted as meaning technical assistance should be extended only through UN). He was not concerned with greater portion of Belgians in Congo, such as teachers, doctors, etc. but only with two to three hundred Belgians in key

⁷ Between December 7 and 12, Ceylon, Guinea, Indonesia, Morocco, the UAR, and Yugoslavia had announced their intention to withdraw their troops from the U.N. force in the Congo.

positions. He said there were three to five Belgians in key positions in each ministry of govt and that they were ones who were causing problem. He said he did not accuse Belgian Govt because had no evidence that govt was in fact doing this (although he obviously certain it and they probably are). But he thought govt could exert considerable influence in right direction if it wished. He referred specifically to activities of Wendelen⁸ (without mentioning his name) in regard to recent Kasavubu communications to UN as example influences on Kasavubu and Bomboko to detriment UN effort. He also reverted to frequently cited ICAO case where Belgians were brought in to take over control towers of airports although ICAO had already hired people for job. Our impression is that he would like to establish in principle that all key Belgian officials in group of 200 or 300 he mentioned should be replaced by UN officials but that in practice this would either take considerable period of time or would never be completed.

7. He agreed he had to go to Congo, especially as he still intended to go to South Africa in January. His conversations with Slim and others revealed concern on their part that SA situation was potentially serious at moment as Congo and that he should give that first priority. They apparently expect there will be renewed outbreaks in SA result developments elsewhere in continent and that even if visit by SYG can do almost nothing, it would be valuable demonstration of UN interest. In any case SYG will visit Congo either on way down or way back.⁹

8. Re current political position of UN as institution, he said he was worried that current development, where everyone was attacking SYG and Secretariat, might do permanent damage to UN. He is therefore planning to make vigorous statement in SC, through which he clearly intends displace some of this blame. He gave only elliptical indication of what he would say but we gathered speech will not be too helpful to us in current political situation. For one thing he plans point out he has constantly taken politically more advanced position than GA or SC on Belgians (possibly including both question of Belgians in Katanga and Belgian civilians in Congo) and on "legality" (on which he did not elaborate). On other hand, he also plans to issue stern warning to those threatening withdraw their troops about consequences for world peace and security if, through such actions, they help bring about collapse of UN action in Congo.

⁸ André Wendelen. Telegram 1671 from USUN, December 7, described him as a Belgian Foreign Ministry official who had been advising Bomboko; it complained that his advice was harmful and urged the Department to take this up with the Belgians. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-760)

⁹ Hammarskjöld arrived in Léopoldville on January 3, 1961, for a 3-day visit during which he conferred with Dayal and met with Kasavubu.

9. As part of his defense against attacks on UN executive machinery he also favors establishment in Congo of small political unit (possibly Nigeria, Ethiopia and Malaya, who are officers of Conciliation Commission) composed of reps of states who would share responsibility for decisions there. He believes, however, that this unit must have some kind of legislative backing, presumably through GA res. (UK Del raised doubts about such development on grounds it first step toward establishing political direction of Secretariat along lines Russians have in mind.) SYG said he was especially interested because he thought that in practice UN would probably have to step beyond its technical mandate again in future occasions in Congo. Presence such group would protect UN in doing so. On other hand his desire have GA establish such unit contrasted to opinion he expressed earlier in conversation SC would be unable take any action on Congo and that there might be sufficient negative sentiment in GA to prevent issue being taken up there at all, especially since officers of Conciliation Commission were on verge departing for Congo. (Wachuku not expected arrive there until next Tuesday¹⁰ after spending day and half in London and three in Lagos.)

10. We thought attitude SYG generally helpful with exception continued indication his disinclination talk to Belgians without preconditions and his continued attitude toward Congolese that they are "cocky" and incapable of running country and that UN must in effect take over. Believe we should proceed with Belgians along lines suggested by UK and reported USUN and continue press Kasavubu and Mobutu to reorganize govt along lines Timberlake has already started. I cannot lay too much stress on importance reconstitution of govt in Leopoldville which will pull Ileo govt, Commissioners, and especially Mobutu into one "legal" institution under authority of Kasavubu. This step even on paper will immeasurably improve Congolese position in world opinion, especially with countries like Tunisia, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Malaya which form backbone of UN force, and will be political move which will enable SYG to cooperate more openly with moderates and help development and functioning Congolese Army.

Wadsworth

¹⁰ December 20.

283. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State

Léopoldville, December 14, 1960, 9 p.m.

1389. Following conversation reported my telegram 1388 to Department,¹ I stayed behind at my request with view to airing, if I could, differences which appear to have arisen between Dayal and myself and his views on US policy. I did this with prior knowledge of the information contained in my telegram 1384.² In following discussion, which lasted approximately an hour and a half, I told him that I wanted, if possible, to discuss any and all matters in which he felt there was some question regarding US policy, the activities of the Embassy and myself in particular. I told him I was prepared to answer any questions that I could and informed him of our own views and actions.

He then proceeded to give me for ten minutes or more his concept of the job which he has undertaken, emphasizing that he did not ask for it and accepted it only because of his feeling of duty to help the UN effort. He pointed out his own long record of service to his own government and to international bodies and said that he had only the best interests of the UN at heart. He added that he was terribly worried over the present situation in Congo, said that the Stanleyville mess was serious and believed that certain governments would now support the rump government announced by Gizenga.

I told him that I had never questioned his principles and that I felt sure he was doing what he could to ensure a successful UN effort. I added that that was also the policy of the US and of the Embassy. I said that no action taken or statement made by any responsible American official from the President on down had violated our policy of

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-1460. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to USUN and repeated to London, Brussels, and Paris.

¹ Dated December 14, telegram 1388 reported a meeting of Timberlake and several European representatives with Dayal concerning the situation in Orientale Province, where tension was high after Gizenga's December 12 proclamation of the Free Republic of the Congo, with Stanleyville as its capital. U.N. forces in the province were being regrouped because of the withdrawal of some U.N. contingents. (*Ibid.*) Telegram 1378 from Léopoldville, December 13, reported a meeting with Dayal that day at which Timberlake and British and French representatives stressed the disastrous effect that would result if Europeans were evacuated from Orientale, but Dayal said he had no troops available to reinforce the U.N. forces there. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-1360)

² Dated December 14, telegram 1384 reported that *New York Times* correspondent Paul Hofmann had told an Embassy officer that Dayal had summoned him for a talk in which he bitterly attacked U.S. policy, charging that the Congo was on the verge of civil war because of U.S. support of Mobutu. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-1360)

complete support for a UN effort in the Congo and that I had from the beginning felt that there was no acceptable alternative to a UN effort here which I had sincerely and clearly followed as the record shows.

Dayal said that the ANC is completely out of hand and committing aggressions daily against the UN. He cited the most recent invasion of the Kitona base,³ stealing of UN vehicles and the arrest of UN personnel.

I said that we deplored such acts as much as he did. I followed this up by saying that it has been alleged in certain quarters that Kasavubu and Mobutu are in US hands and assured him that this was not the case. He said that the US had supported Kasavubu and had placed him "above the constitution". I told him we had supported the seating of Kasavubu delegation since they represented the Chief of State and that that position was one which had been so far unchallenged by any government. I added that Kasavubu's position is no different than it was prior to seating of his delegation so far as we are concerned.

He said that he had hoped that the conciliation commission might have come earlier before Lumumba's arrest and that he had felt that it might bring Lumumba and Kasavubu together so that civil war might be avoided. He felt that we are practically in a civil war.

I said that our policy had been and continues to be to encourage local leaders to agree upon a form of government and a Cabinet which they could all support. I said we further hoped for the earliest possible Parliamentary blessing of any new government so formed. I said that I had called on Kasavubu twice to urge this proposal and had also spoken to Mobutu in the same regard.

He then raised the problem of Belgian interference and said that the Commissioners are living [garble] Belgian mistresses "all of whom are spies" and that the Belgian advisers of the Commissioners and of Mobutu are urging them to hamper UN activities and that Belgian policy is obviously to get the UN out of the Congo. He said, frankly more by implication than direct accusation, that US policy was in league with the Belgians.

I said that our relations with Belgians had reached an all time low just before our statement in connection with the SYG proposal to have all Belgians removed from the Congo. I added that it was scarcely credible that American policy was designed or could be interpreted to be in league with such dark Belgian designs. I said on the contrary our feelings had been that some means must be found to eliminate foreign advisers, Belgian or otherwise, who were obstructing the performance of legitimate UN functions but that we frankly did not feel all Belgians

³ On December 13, ANC forces, accompanied by some Commissioners, occupied Kitona.

could be so categorized. I added that I had suggested the possibility of forming a committee of cooperation in Leopoldville which would include representatives of Belgian Government, UN and Congolese Government and asked whether he thought such a commission might be useful.

He said emphatically he did not believe it could perform any useful function until the principle had been decided and accepted by the Belgian Government. He identified the principle as the one enunciated in the SC resolution which called for the channeling of all aid through the UN.

I remarked that we had followed such policy and had not departed from it except in minor case such as establishment English-language training center which had been fully coordinated with UN and had their blessing before it was inaugurated. I said that Belgian case seemed to me slightly different from others in view of the history of Belgian administration and their very large investments here.

He still affirms that Belgium must accept this principle or UN effort would fail.

Dayal then said he had been reassured during his recent visit to New York in conversations he had with Dean Rusk,⁴ Chester Bowles,⁵ Averell Harriman⁶ and John D. Rockefeller.⁷ He said they were all satisfied regarding the aims and objectives of the UN in the Congo and in his stewardship. He said he had been assured that the new administration would take firm position especially with regard to the problem presented by Belgium and Belgian technicians.

The entire conversation was in low key. I took my departure after he told me that he was extremely discouraged over situation which had developed and that he saw no solution under present circumstances. He said matter is now "out of my hands".

After I returned to the office I learned from Stewart Alsop⁸ that he had been given same line yesterday afternoon as Dayal [garble] Hofmann. Irving Levine of NBC also told me that he was seeing Dayal at the latter's request later this afternoon.

Timberlake

⁴ President of the Rockefeller Foundation.

⁵ Democratic Congressman from Connecticut.

⁶ Former Governor of New York.

⁷ Presumably John D. Rockefeller III, chairman of the board of trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation and vice chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations.

⁸ American journalist.

284. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

December 15, 1960, 9:45 p.m.

871. Depcirtel 840.¹ We are becoming increasingly concerned over likelihood Sudan being subjected to pressure from USSR, UAR and others to permit transit of military and other supplies from Bloc to build up Gizenga regime in Stanleyville and thus promote civil war in Congo.

On instructions, our Chargé has expressed to Sudanese FonMin our concern about this matter and is expected make same remarks to President Abboud in next few days.² While we have no confirmed information on Bloc and UAR initiatives to permit air transit military supplies to Stanleyville, there is increasing body reports to suggest Sudan coming under such pressure. (FYI. We also understand [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that military governor for South Sudan at Juba is friendly to Gizenga and Congolese troops on Sudanese border are pro-Gizenga. End FYI.) If Gizenga regime receives recognition from Bloc and certain pro-Lumumba African countries, pressure for air and land communication via Sudan can be expected to increase.

In these circumstances we regard it important that West and responsible African countries exert appropriate countervailing influence and if necessary take tough line to prevent Sudan from becoming gateway for Communist supply to virtual satellite regime in Congo. Dangers to UN operation in Congo and to Western position in Africa in general are obvious if Gizenga regime can be built up by Communists. Result could be eventual Korean-type conflict. On other hand if Sudan denies facilities for such operation, problem for Communists would be much more difficult.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-1560. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Herz; cleared by Satterthwaite, White, and Bohlen; and approved by Hare. Sent priority to London, Bonn, Tunis, and Lagos; repeated to Paris, Brussels, Cairo, Khartoum, Léopoldville, Moscow, and USUN; and pouched to 9 other African missions.

¹ Circular telegram 840, December 9, sent to the embassies in 12 African and Asian capitals, warned that establishment of a separatist regime in Stanleyville would endanger Congolese unity and peace, especially if it was supported by the Soviet bloc and by other African states. It instructed the embassies to discuss these U.S. views with their host governments. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-960)

² Telegrams 488 and 494 from Khartoum, December 16 and 20, reported that the Sudanese Foreign Minister had assured the Chargé that arms would not be shipped to Gizenga through the Sudan. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-1660 and 770G.56/12-2060, respectively)

If you perceive no objection, you should enlist cooperation govt to which accredited, which believed in good position exert influence on Sudan, to take steps parallel to those we have taken and which we will continue to take, in attempt persuade Sudan hold firm line against use of its territory to supply military equipment to Gizenga regime.

Henderson

285. Memorandum of Conversation

US/MC/20

Paris, December 15, 1960, 10:30 p.m.¹

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Secretary Herter
 Ambassador Houghton
 Mr. Merchant
 Mr. Kohler
 Mr. Penfield
 Mr. Parsons
 Mr. McBride
 Mr. Hillenbrand
 Mr. Kidder
 Mr. Long

United Kingdom

Lord Home
 Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
 Sir Pierson Dixon
 Sir Anthony Rumbold
 The Honorable Peter Ramsbotham
 Mr. Boothby
 Mr. Gerald Warner

France

M. Couve de Murville
 M. Garbonnel
 M. Charles Lucet
 M. Hervé Alphand
 M. Chauvel
 M. Roux
 M. Sauvagnargues
 M. de Beaumarchais
 M. Laloy
 M. Froment-Meurice

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, NATO Ministerial Meeting—Memcons. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Merchant's special assistant, Edward T. Long, and approved in S on December 23.

¹ Secretary Herter and Lord Home were in Paris for the NATO Ministerial meeting, December 16–18. This conversation was held at the Quai d'Orsay and lasted until 1:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Tripartite Dinner Meeting—Congo

M. Lucet presented to the Ministers a paraphrase of the following paper which had been agreed to by the tripartite African experts:²

“In the face of the latest developments in the situation in the Congo, the Western countries should have as their objective:

(a) to reenforce the position of Mr. Kasavubu.

(b) to avoid the installation in Orientale Province of a Lumumba bastion which could at a later date be furnished with arms by Egypt or the Soviet Union.

Insofar as concerns (a), it is desirable to persuade Mr. Ham-marskjold to improve cooperation between the local organs of the United Nations and the Leopoldville authorities.

Even though the College of Commissioners was invested by the Chief of State, the representatives of the Secretary General in Leopoldville have persistently protested its legality and frequently blocked its actions.

The démarche mentioned below would be facilitated if, as appears to have been envisaged recently, Mr. Kasavubu should decide, in accord with Mr. Mobutu, to clarify the juridical and constitutional situation by setting up a Government composed of ministers without, however, convoking the Parliament. This last point could be made not collectively, but individually, by the three Ambassadors in their talks with their Congolese interlocutors, taking the precautions which are indicated by our desire not to intervene in internal Congolese affairs.

In order to affirm without question his authority, Mr. Kasavubu should doubtless give evidence of his capacity to reestablish the necessary cooperation between the provinces with a view to assuring to the Congo the economic unity without which it cannot be viable. The calling of a round table of Congolese leaders would permit putting off until a relatively distant date convocation of the Parliament. The key to the problem is in the hands of Mr. Tshombe, whose intransigence unfortunately appears greater than ever. We should, therefore, examine what means we dispose of to influence the problem through

actions by the Belgian Government;

² Prepared by a tripartite working group on the Congo (apparently Sauvagnargues, Penfield, and Boothby), at the request of Merchant, Hoyer Millar, and Lucet. The paper purported to express the sense of a discussion between those three on December 14 and was approved by them at a meeting on December 15. The text of the paper, as incorporated in the memorandum of discussion at the December 15 meeting, is virtually identical to the “paraphrase” here quoted. The December 14 and 15 meetings among Merchant, Hoyer Millar, and Lucet are recorded in US/MC/2 and US/MC/7, both in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, NATO Ministerial Meeting—Memcons.

actions by the moderate African states and particularly the Community states.

For Mr. Kasavubu the accusation of collusion with the Belgians might be a source of weakness. It is important that Belgian technical assistance to the Congo, indispensable for obvious reasons, should be less apparent than is actually the case. A solution to this problem would be facilitated by an examination of the Belgian proposal to establish an efficient liaison with the United Nations. These points can be pursued further in Brussels.

Insofar as concerns (b), it would be desirable to encourage efforts tending to reestablish ties between all the provinces of the Congo.

The United Nations command should maintain a very strict control over all of the contingents placed under his orders as well as over the air fields of Orientale Province through which Lumumba supporters might be furnished arms.

Troops of the countries who have withdrawn their contingents from ONUC should evacuate the Congo with their equipment as promptly as possible.

The situation in Stanleyville might become serious if Sudan and Ethiopia change their attitude with regard to the supporters of Lumumba. Sudan commands the approaches to Orientale Province. The ONUC detachment in Stanleyville is Ethiopian. In this connection the indications of a change in the Sudanese position as well as the coup d'état in Addis Ababa³ appeared disturbing."

During the course of his presentation he referred to Dayal, the UN official in Congo, "as not especially wonderful for his job."

He also mentioned Mr. Merchant's concern expressed earlier about the withdrawal on January 1st of the Belgian technicians from the air bases at Kamina and Kitona.

Since the Soviets had vetoed in the Security Council the Western resolution on the Congo it appeared that the Congo item would be reintroduced into the General Assembly.

The Secretary wondered what would happen to the Ethiopian troops stationed in Stanleyville in view of yesterday's coup in Addis Ababa.

Lord Home said he had no idea what would happen in Stanleyville. It was necessary for the UN to keep control of the airport there in order to deny it to the Egyptians and/or Soviets.

Sir Frederick referred to a recent good talk between the British Ambassador at Khartoum and Sudanese Prime Minister. The Sudanese claimed still to be on the side of the West but were dickering with the Soviets on a military arms program.

³ Reference is to an attempted coup on December 14.

M. Couve said there was only one problem in the Congo. A real government must be formed. The next two steps would be for the UN to recognize that government and then work with it.

The Secretary said that as long as Lumumba was in jail, he thought it should be relatively easy for Parliament to convene in some safe place and ratify a new government. Parenthetically, he said the Belgians earlier this week had told him they had given Tshombe a bad time during his stay in Brussels.⁴ They presented him with a stiff note⁵ insisting that he work toward a federated government in the Congo and telling him the Belgians did not want an independent Katanga.

M. Couve said the UN people don't want a government in the Congo.

Mr. Merchant referred to his statement made to the other deputies concerning the fact that the problem of UN troops in the Congo would become academic if the UN member countries did not contribute to the cost of that operation. The US had pledged upwards of 40 million dollars (some of this conditionally the Secretary interjected). With the Soviet bloc refusing to make any contribution there was now the real question of whether the UN operation would continue. There is general agreement that the situation in the Congo would become appreciably worse if the UN troops were withdrawn.

The Secretary said he was extremely worried about this problem. What would happen if the UN troops stayed on without leadership, unpaid, and without transportation to their home countries.

Lord Home said facetiously, "They'll be eaten."

M. Couve said you can't ask France to pay for the UN forces in the Congo when France doesn't know for what purpose they were really sent. The UN shouldn't pay for Congo budgetary support. The Congo is not a rich country but it has some resources and it could pay its way.

Lord Home said that bad as the UN operation is the alternative is worse.

M. Couve said the UN forces can't be held in the Congo indefinitely acting as they do. There is only one sensible thing to do, that is for the Congo to have a real government with a small army of its own. And this is something no one from the UN wants to do.

Lord Home said "but until then you have to have UN forces in the Congo."

M. Couve said it shouldn't take long to form a government.

⁴ Tshombe made an unofficial visit to Brussels in early December to present a wedding gift to King Baudouin. Documentation concerning U.S. efforts to dissuade him from making the trip and to persuade the Belgians to minimize its impact is in Department of State, Central Files 033.70G55 and 770G.00.

⁵ On December 8; despatch 531 from Brussels, December 9, transmitted a translation. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-960)

The Secretary asked whether the French position on non-payment was conditional or positive.

M. Couve said that from the beginning the French said the UN operation had started in a bad way. The UN intervened against Europe, and the French didn't think that was sensible. The UN operation has contributed to the anarchy in the Congo. There is a Swedish general, an Indian High Commissioner, and everybody is doing what he wants.

Lord Home said he didn't think he could accept this analysis.

M. Couve said the UN went into the Congo thinking 100 troops with UN armbands could solve the problem. They couldn't have.

The Secretary said he didn't agree with "couldn't have."

Lord Home said the thing to do was exactly what we were trying to do now.

M. Couve said, "And do it despite the UN."

The Secretary said that three weeks ago it might have been necessary to work for this kind of solution despite the UN but not now.

Mr. Boothby said that three weeks ago there would have been civil war.

M. Couve said there is a problem in Katanga only because there is no central government in Leopoldville.

The Secretary admitted that the UN had gotten off on a bad footing in Katanga. Von Horn and Dayal have been flops. If we get rid of them, perhaps the situation will improve.

Kasavubu really hasn't done anything since his position was strengthened through the seating of his delegation by the UN. Someone has to give Kasavubu benzedrine day by day.

M. Couve said Kasavubu was exactly like the King of Laos.

Mr. Merchant observed that our nickname for the King of Laos was Sitting Bull.

286. Editorial Note

On December 16, at the request of the Representatives of India and Yugoslavia, the U.N. General Assembly resumed discussion of the situation in the Congo. An eight-power draft resolution was submitted on December 16 by Ceylon, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia (U.N. doc. A/L.331). That draft resolution, as revised on December 19 (U.N. doc. A/L.331/Rev.1), declared that the United Nations should "henceforth implement its mandate fully" to prevent breaches of peace and security and

to restore and maintain law and order and that a standing delegation appointed by and representing the General Assembly be located in the Congo to cooperate with the Secretary-General's special representative. It also urged the immediate release of all political prisoners, the immediate convening of Parliament with U.N. protection, and measures to prevent the Congolese Armed Forces from interfering in the country's political life, demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian military and quasi-military personnel, and recommended that all necessary economic and technical assistance should be provided promptly through the United Nations so that it would not be used as an instrument for continuing foreign intervention.

On December 17, the United States and the United Kingdom proposed a draft resolution (U.N. doc. A/L.332) that requested the Secretary-General to "continue to discharge the mandate entrusted to him by the United Nations," to "continue to use the presence and the machinery of the United Nations" to assist the Congo in restoring and maintaining law and order throughout its territory, and to "continue his vigorous efforts" to ensure that no foreign military personnel were introduced into the Congo in violation of U.N. resolutions. It called upon all states to refrain from providing military assistance to the Congo except through the United Nations during the period of U.N. military assistance, requested the Secretary-General to assist the Congo's Chief of State in establishing conditions in which Parliament could meet in security and freedom from interference, and repeated the provisions of the four-power resolution on human rights vetoed by the Soviet Union a few days earlier. (See Document 281)

The texts of both resolutions, along with the text of a statement made by U.S. Representative James J. Wadsworth before the General Assembly on December 17, are in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 619-627.

287. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 18, 1960, 8 p.m.

1806. Subject: Congo.

1. During late afternoon 18 December we learned from various French African dels they receiving instruction from Chiefs of State at Brazzaville¹ to vote against US-UK draft res (sent separate tel) as well as any other res which could conceivably be interpreted as interference in domestic affairs of Congo (L). As we understand this view, these states oppose any new action in Congo by UN and wish leave entire problem for solution by themselves operating in purely African context.

2. Three-way conversation between Cameroun rep, Madagascar rep, and USUN liaison officer revealed however difference in interpretation of instructions from Chiefs of State. Madagascar rep insisted instructions meant only vote against Ghana res, since US res would ask UN assist Chief of State of Republic of Congo to accomplish various things. Madagascar could therefore at least abstain our res. Cameroun rep said all others in French African group agreed wording instructions "vote systematically against res providing for interference in internal affairs Congo" meant vote against both Ghana and US res. He had urged US withdraw our res but was shaken by liaison officer's insistence that only existence our res made possible drawing off votes from Ghana res and prevention two-thirds majority that res. He then gave as further argument that states in his group could not afford be marked as in Western camp by voting against Ghana res and for US-UK res.

3. FYI only, in vote which scheduled for late morning 19 December we cannot expect necessary two-thirds majority without French African support. End FYI.

4. Believe every effort should be made with Chiefs of State in Brazzaville and through Kasavubu to have French African dels instructed support US-UK res. Following are arguments we suggest be employed:

a. Our res was prepared and introduced both (1) to counter res submitted by Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, UAR, Yugoslavia and Ceylon which would constitute interference in Congo affairs and is favorable to Lumumba, as well as (2) to insure continued mandate for UN operation in Congo. Regardless of difficulties which may have developed between UN force and Kasavubu, fact is UN can be of extremely important help to Kasavubu and moderate elements in Congo as well as to nation's economic well being. Without UN there is serious risk of intervention or aggression by outside powers, including Soviets, who may seize upon situation in Stanleyville to operate in

¹ The heads of state of 12 French-speaking African countries met at Brazzaville, December 15-19. A declaration, which they issued on December 19, called for a round-table conference representing all the Congolese parties. The text is in *Documents on International Affairs, 1960*, edited by Richard Gott, John Major, and Geoffrey Warner (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 341-344.

Congo for their own interests. Our res is designed insure UN works with, not against, Kasavubu to develop increased cooperation and to prevent outside intervention which would itself be harmful to French African interests.

b. Para by para analysis of operative paras our res shows it does not amount to authorization to UN force to interfere in domestic affairs. First para reiterates previous mandate and specifically requests SYG assist Republic. Second, third and ninth are targeted against any outside military interference. Fourth asks SYG assist Kasavubu carry out his wish re Parliament. (On 16 Nov Kasavubu circulated official UN document² which included statement "The President of the Republic is in favor of the reopening of Parliament as soon as the necessary conditions of security and freedom of action for members of Parliament are once again established.") Fifth and sixth are designed primarily meet situation in Stanleyville where Minister Songolo and others are still detained and are so worded as to minimize pressure for release of Lumumba. Seventh³ opens way for constructive assistance by Chiefs of State assembled in Brazzaville and is based on our understanding Kasavubu does not object to three members of Conciliation Comte who are now on way to Leo. Eighth para⁴ should be read in light of UN mandate to assist Republic of Congo.

5. Because of importance this question and because of possibility French African opposition may be based on misunderstanding we believe Department should authorize above approaches immediately in hope favorable instructions can be received by dels here early 19 Dec.

Wadsworth

² U.N. doc. A/4577.

³ It expressed the hope that the forthcoming round-table conference (which Kasavubu had indicated he would convene) and the forthcoming visit to the Congo by the Conciliation Commission would help to resolve internal conflicts by peaceful means and to preserve the Congo's unity and integrity.

⁴ It requested all Congolese to lend practical cooperation to the United Nations.

288. Editorial Note

At the 470th meeting of the National Security Council on December 20, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, dated December 21, reads as follows:

"The Director of Central Intelligence said the most critical development in the Congo at the present time was the effort of Gizenga to pull together a dissident regime in Stanleyville with the active support of the USSR and the UAR. The USSR has experienced some difficulties in sending supplies to Stanleyville because the Sudan has refused refueling of Soviet planes at Khartoum. Moreover, there appears to be some policy difference between the USSR and the UAR over the Congo. The pro-Lumumba African countries are now thinking of withdrawing their military contingents from the UN force while leaving them deployed in the Congo. Meanwhile, Mobutu is considering military action against Stanleyville. The Congo Army units in Orientale and Equateur provinces were probably loyal to Mobutu. Reports have been received from Leopoldville that Gizenga doubts his ability to repel an attack by Mobutu's forces. Dayal is increasingly hostile to the West and wants the Congo Army disarmed. Under Western pressure, Mobutu has professed a willingness to reconvene Parliament. Kasavubu plans a conference of political parties late in December. Mr. Dulles then noted that he had just received a report that Lumumba was dead, but he placed no credence in this report." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

289. Editorial Note

After discussing the situation in the Congo at ten sessions between December 16 and 20, the U.N. General Assembly voted on December 20 on the two draft resolutions on the Congo (see Document 286). The eight-power draft resolution was rejected by 42 votes to 28, with 27 abstentions. Of the African countries, only the Congo (Léopoldville) and South Africa joined the United States in opposing the resolution; Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, and the United Arab Republic supported it. The U.S.-British resolution received 43 votes in favor, 22 against, and 32 abstentions. It thus failed to receive a two-thirds majority and was not adopted. No African nation voted for the resolution; Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic voted against it, while all the others, including the Congo (Léopoldville), abstained.

The General Assembly then adopted without objection as Resolution 1592 (XV) an Austrian draft resolution providing that the General Assembly would keep the Congo item on the agenda for the second part of the fifteenth session, scheduled to resume in March 1961. For text of the resolution, along with the texts of General Assembly Reso-

lutions 1583 (XV) and 1590 (XV), both of which concerned the financing of the U.N. operations in the Congo, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 627–630.

290. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, December 27, 1960, 7 p.m.

1846. Congo.

1. We (Cumming) and Dean (UK)¹ made joint approach to SYG this morning to convey current information on Stanleyville situation.²

2. We agreed ahead of time that Dean would make main presentation with Cumming supplementing it and adding U.S. had independently verified UK information. Cumming told SYG he had come to New York to discuss Congo at specific instruction of Secretary. Both Dean and Cumming indicated information was of such nature that we regarded it as fully trustworthy.

3. SYG's reaction was responsive and he apparently took information seriously and at full face value. He observed that our information was of such nature that it difficult for him to act directly on it. After earlier U.S. approach last week³ and UK approach on Saturday⁴ he had sent cables to Leopoldville asking that Stanleyville situation be watched closely. He had had no reply. He would now send another cable and press for early response. He said that anything he cabled as result approaches of this sort by us were captioned for Dayal only.

4. SYG said he had good representative in Stanleyville now that Duran was there. He felt most promising step he could take immediately would be to add to number of reliable UN people in Stanleyville.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2760. Secret; Limited Distribution.

¹ Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and Sir Patrick Dean, a member of the British Delegation to the United Nations.

² A December 23 memorandum of conversation by Herter states that in a conversation that day, British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia had suggested a joint approach to Hammarskjöld to convey information concerning the activities of certain missions in the Congo, especially the UAR mission. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Miscellaneous Memoranda of Conversations, 1960)

³ Reference is apparently to a conversation on December 22, reported in telegram 1840 from USUN, December 23, in which Wadsworth told Hammarskjöld of U.S. concern with the situation in Stanleyville. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–2360)

⁴ December 24.

He implied he would send several more when he got to Leopoldville. When Cumming asked (per Deptel 1200)⁵ whether he could himself visit Stanleyville during Congo visit, SYG replied he did not think this feasible but he would send McKeown for number of days immediately after his arrival in Congo (about January 5). He thought this might help achieve same result. SYG also said he would not want to stay in Congo for more than 2 days because he did not want to get too much entangled in internal problems.

5. On possibilities major external assistance to Gizenga SYG said it was difficult to see how full-scale operation could come about. UAR supplies to Salumu and Gizenga might develop "minor Spanish war" situation, even possibly leading to split in country, and it would also produce major political nuisance value. (Dean said it could develop into Malayan type problem. SYG immediately agreed this was more apt comparison.) While not minimizing seriousness of "Malayan-type" situation, SYG said it seemed unlikely magnitude problem would become greater (e.g, Korean-type). Full-scale effort to utilize Stanleyville as base for major military operation in Congo would mean USSR would have to do it and would have to have staging area outside Congo, either in Sudan or UAR. UAR was likely to balk at becoming Soviet staging base, and he consequently did not think situation would reach this point.

6. While not discounting possibility UAR might have plans to use its troops in Congo as channel for supplies to Gizenga forces, SYG felt it would be difficult in practice for them to do anything substantial without UN knowing it. He pointed out that at top levels he always mixed in people from various nationalities so that anyone with "eyes open" could see what others were doing. He also said that his own "re-deployment plans" might upset other ideas (thus confirming earlier indication—USUN 1840⁶—re planned shifts in UAR troops). SYG also said UN regarded Bumba as strategic point and was watching it with this in mind. He said financial support was more difficult to control than military support, "as we know." He added that he thought enough financial support could easily be made available for Gizenga to obtain support from any forces in Kivu.

7. SYG also raised possible visit Conciliation Commission to Congo (see USUN 1840). He referred to message he had received from Kasavubu, apparently in reply to message SYG had sent asking for Conciliation Commission to be received by January 3. In his message

⁵ Telegram 1200 to USUN, December 22, instructed the Mission to explore the Stanleyville situation with Hammarskjöld, indicating the Department's concern, and suggesting that U.N. action to freeze the situation by reinforcing U.N. troops and controlling the airport might make it possible to isolate Gizenga. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-2260)

⁶ See footnote 3 above.

Kasavubu indicated willingness to receive Commission but with exclusion Ghana, Guinea, Mali, India and Morocco. (SYG's recollection was that he had not mentioned UAR.) SYG observed that Kasavubu was extremely unwise politically in objecting to India and Morocco. It would be particularly unfortunate for him to irritate Nehru at this point; furthermore, Indian representative on Conciliation Commission Rao (?)⁷ was not type who would cause trouble. SYG said he "must insist" on getting CC to Congo by January 3. He urged U.S. and UK to speak to Kasavubu about accepting it without delving into composition. (SYG seemed to have in mind that if Kasavubu does not raise issue composition Commission should be satisfactory from Kasavubu point of view with Ghana, Guinea, Mali and UAR not participating, while if he poses issue there will be another difficult political hurdle.)

8. At conclusion meeting SYG referred to *New York Times* story⁸ that Lumumba now eating at officers mess at Thysville. He did not exclude this at all and said he would not be surprised if he heard Lumumba dining with Kasavubu again (to which Dean agreed). SYG said he understood there had been strenuous political debate within garrison at Thysville after Lumumba was brought there, partly as result treatment Lumumba got when arrested. He thought what appeared to be present liberal treatment of Lumumba was concession by Mobutu officers at Thysville to attitude of enlisted men.

Cook

⁷ As on the source text. Reference is to Rameshwar Rao.

⁸ On December 27.

291. Editorial Note

At the 472d meeting of the National Security Council on December 29, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in the Congo during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, December 29, reads as follows:

"Turning to the Congo, Mr. Dulles reported that the situation in Stanleyville remained about the same. Gizenga has apparently improved his position by moving into Kivu Province where more food is available. Mobutu is attempting to starve out Gizenga by a blockade. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Moscow apparently intends to go

as far as it can in the Congo. The Sudan, however, is blocking Soviet plans by refusing refueling rights to Soviet planes at Khartoum. Kasavubu has expressed a willingness to receive the UN Conciliation Commission. Mr. Merchant said Kasavubu had made the exclusion of certain countries, e.g., the UAR and Morocco, a condition for receiving the Commission." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo

December 31, 1960, 4:24 p.m.

1627. Embtels 1419,¹ 1432,² 1436.³ We approve your efforts encourage Bomboko and others avoid actions leading to civil war and gather from your reporting (latest Embtel 1452)⁴ you optimistic Gizenga regime can be overthrown or neutralized by political means backed by economic pressure. Also agree your doubts re possibilities military solution without serious fighting (Embtel 1450).⁵

On other hand we cannot discount possibility that political efforts may fail or may drag on while Gizenga consolidates and strengthens his position with outside aid. In such eventuality, which would in effect constitute failure UN military mission, we would hardly wish to

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12-3060. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Penfield, cleared with Cumming and David A. Korn of S/S, and approved by Merchant. Repeated to Brussels and USUN.

¹ Telegram 1419 from Léopoldville, December 21, indicated there was a chance to elicit the backing of some Lumumba followers for a government of moderates, which could command parliamentary support. Timberlake advocated the convening of a round-table conference prior to the formation of a government. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-2160)

² Telegram 1432 from Léopoldville, December 26, relayed the substance of a conversation between the Ambassador and Ethiopian Major General Iyassu Mengesha, who intended to travel to Stanleyville. Unlike Dayal, he believed that the United Nations should assume full control in the province. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-2660)

³ Telegram 1436 from Léopoldville, December 27, reported a meeting with Bomboko in which Timberlake attempted to persuade him of the wisdom of avoiding actions which could lead to civil war. Timberlake suggested that economic factors might shortly undermine the Gizenga regime and that negotiations might forestall violence. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-2760) In telegram 1429 from Léopoldville, December 24, Timberlake predicted economic collapse in Stanleyville in 2 to 4 weeks and expressed his preference for a negotiated political settlement. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-2460)

⁴ Telegram 1452 from Léopoldville, December 30, reported the prospect of defections from the Gizenga camp in Orientale. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/12-3060)

⁵ Telegram 1450 from Léopoldville, December 30, reported that Mobutu planned a three-pronged attack on Orientale Province on December 31. The Embassy indicated that it was not as optimistic as the authors of the plan that Gizenga and company would flee without fighting. (*Ibid.*)

be in position of urging Kasavubu and allies to continue rely on UN to insulate Congo against outside force. It would follow that we would not discourage military action such as that outlined Embtel 1450 which held good promise of being successful. It follows further that we should not actively discourage current planning and build up for such eventuality. It should be made clear however that we convinced full-scale military operations not now in Kasavubu–Mobutu interest.

Our basic reasons for this position are 1) military operations would almost certainly be interpreted by UN itself and great majority its members as defiance UN Congo effort and run great risk bringing Mobutu forces into direct conflict UN forces (e.g. current reports Bukavu situation). Encouragement such operations on our part would constitute reversal our firm policy of support for UN Congo operation; and 2) Mobutu military action could well be used as excuse, which would appear justified to entire Afro-Asian group, for more overt and effective outside aid to Gizenga, thus contributing to East-West military confrontation in Congo under conditions which would enlist minimal neutralist support on side of West.

Merchant

GHANA

U.S. RELATIONS WITH GHANA; PRIME MINISTER NKRUMAH'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

293. Editorial Note

Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah made an official visit to Washington July 23–26, 1958. For text of President Eisenhower's invitation to him, dated March 4, 1958, and his reply, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, pages 211–213. While in Washington, Prime Minister Nkrumah met with President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, and other U.S. officials and addressed both Houses of Congress.

For the records of Prime Minister Nkrumah's discussions with President Eisenhower, see Documents 294 and 295. A memorandum of a conversation between Nkrumah and Secretary of State Dulles on the subject of the Middle East is in Department of State, Central Files, 033.45J11/7–2458. A memorandum of a conversation with Under Secretary of State Herter concerning Ghana's economic aims is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, Nkrumah Visit. Additional documentation concerning the visit, including briefing material, is *ibid.* A briefing memorandum of July 19 from Dulles to Eisenhower is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. The text of the joint statement issued by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Nkrumah on July 26 is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pages 1093–1095. The texts of Nkrumah's addresses before the Senate on July 24 and the House of Representatives on July 25 and the exchange of greetings between the Prime Minister and Vice President Richard M. Nixon are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 18, 1958, pages 284–286.

Prime Minister Nkrumah was in the United States July 23–August 2. After leaving Washington, he visited Philadelphia, New York, and Chicago.

294. Memorandum of Conversation

July 23, 1958.¹

SUBJECT

Prime Minister Nkrumah's Talk with the President

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana
The Under Secretary of State
His Excellency D. A. Chapman, Ambassador of Ghana
Joseph Palmer 2nd, NEA:AF

The President welcomed the Prime Minister, emphasizing our pleasure at the fact that he had found it possible to visit the United States. The Prime Minister similarly expressed his appreciation at the honor thus accorded him.

Following a discussion of air communications in Africa, the Prime Minister mentioned that he had recently been in Morocco. The President spoke in friendly terms of the high esteem which he had for the King, who had visited the United States last year. The Prime Minister said that he had been greatly impressed in his recent trip to the independent states of Africa with the quality of the leadership which he had found generally in North Africa. The President said that he felt that this area had a great future. We were anxious to have close and friendly relations with the peoples of the North African area, but sometimes we did not meet with the understanding of our policies and intentions which we would like to see.

The Prime Minister said that he would like to speak in great frankness and to tell the President that he had encountered a general feeling among the leaders of North Africa that the United States did not sufficiently understand their needs and their problems. He said that he had heard this particularly from President Bourguiba of Tunisia, who had spoken of his high hopes of obtaining the understanding and assistance of the United States and his disappointment that it had not been forthcoming in sufficient measure.

The President said that the cornerstone of American policy is to assure the strength and stability of independent countries. We believe that in so doing, we strengthen ourselves. However, there are heavy demands and requirements for assistance in all areas of the world and it is not always possible for us to respond as fully as we would like.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph Palmer 2d.

¹ The meetings between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Nkrumah were presumably held at the White House.

The President mentioned, in this connection, the difficulties foreign aid and the reciprocal trade program have encountered in the Congress, but said that he was glad to say that there had been a greater understanding of these problems during the last two weeks, and that there is now a more promising prospect for legislation which will serve the liberal foreign policy objectives which he had mentioned. The President emphasized, in this connection, that the United States has no intention whatsoever to dominate any country in the world. Our sole objective is to buttress their stability, prosperity and independence.

The President went on to say that it is an unfortunate fact in international relations that efforts to create a strong and durable association between two countries usually encounter the problem of the interests of a third country which intrude to complicate the desired relationship. By way of illustration, he referred to Israel as a complicating factor in American relations with the Arab countries. The Prime Minister confirmed his agreement with the truth of this observation. He said that he had been struck, however, with the fact that many Arab statesmen were prepared tacitly to accept the fact of an independent Israel. The Prime Minister felt that this was particularly the case with Libya. The President replied that he had often heard similar expressions from Arab leaders. Unfortunately, however, they do not feel that they can openly encourage a similar sense of reality by their people. The Prime Minister agreed, observing that this is particularly true with Egypt.

The conversation broke off at this point for the reception before lunch.

295. Memorandum of Conversation

July 24, 1958.

SUBJECT

Prime Minister Nkrumah's Talk (Second) with the President

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana
The Under Secretary

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Drafted by Palmer.

His Excellency D. A. Chapman, Ambassador of Ghana
Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Deputy Asst. Secretary for AF

After an exchange of greetings, the President welcomed the Prime Minister and asked him to open the conversation. Dr. Nkrumah said that ever since Ghana gained its sovereignty, it has sought to consolidate its independence and to create the necessary conditions of economic stability. He stressed the importance of a rising standard of living for the Ghanaian people and said that Ghana's vulnerability is its one crop economy; some way must be found to diversify. The Prime Minister mentioned coffee, timber and animal husbandry as possible fields for further development. Ghana also hoped to bring about industrialization of the country, although it would probably continue to be primarily an agricultural nation. All of these economic objectives require power, the possibilities of which have been investigated in connection with the Volta River scheme.¹ The Prime Minister said that two possible dams were involved, one at Ajena, which would cost 65 million pounds, and produce one million kw; the other is at Abouya and would produce 60,000 kw at a cost of 20 million pounds.

The Prime Minister continued by speaking of the huge deposits of bauxite in Ghana, which, it has been estimated, would require two hundred years to exhaust. The President said that he had been talking to Mr. Black of the IBRD about this matter and that he had indicated that the difficulty is that bauxite is presently so cheap as to make new sources not particularly attractive. The Prime Minister indicated assent, stating that this is the reason why Ghana does not wish to rely on bauxite alone. The President said that he had previously had the impression that the entire Volta River scheme would cost considerably more than the £65 million which the Prime Minister had mentioned. The Prime Minister replied that it is true that the entire scheme is much more extensive than those components he had mentioned and include facilities at the bauxite deposits, the smelter, and harbor and railway facilities. Some of these were going along at the present time in any event, particularly the new port at Tema. He said that he was presently emphasizing the power aspect of the project.

The President said that the United States always tries to be helpful with respect to projects of this kind. We believe that the best basis for undertaking such development is private capital. If it is possible to

¹ The proposed Volta River project included construction of a dam with a hydroelectric power plant which would power an aluminum smelter, development of Ghana's bauxite mines, and construction of railroad lines between the two. Nkrumah had requested U.S. assistance in financing the project in a letter of November 12, 1957; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. xviii, pp. 384–386. In his reply of January 3, 1958, Eisenhower indicated that if the majority of financing were arranged from other sources, the United States would consider assistance in financing a part of the project, such as a portion of the hydroelectric installation. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 174)

get private aluminum companies interested in this project, then the remaining financing could be explored with the International Bank, the Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund and other similar sources. The President said we would be delighted to continue our exploration of these possibilities. He said that we entirely supported Ghana's objectives of an expanding economy and a rising standard of living. He went on to warn, however, that such developments take place slowly and, by way of illustration, mentioned the experience of the Philippines, where we had tried for thirty years to create a viable economic and social base. The Independence Law² provided for a further ten years temporary status in which further efforts were made to assure that a strong economic basis would exist for Philippine independence. Even with these preparations it was necessary to make certain extraordinary arrangements whereby the Philippines had preferred access to the American market for such produce as hemp, sugar and cocoa after independence. The President mentioned these matters to indicate that the construction of a strong viable economy is a long process. Moreover it can be successful only if everyone cooperates.

In reply to a question by the President, the Prime Minister said that Ghana is placing great emphasis at the present time on education. It is spending more per capita in this field than any other African state and, in fact, the rate of spending compares favorably with many European countries. In response to a further question, the Prime Minister said that Ghana's ordinary budget is £48 million for the current fiscal year. In addition to this, £22 million has been allocated from Ghana's own resources for economic development. The Prime Minister went on to say that Ghana has a second five-year development plan which will involve the allocation of £1 million, primarily to agricultural and industrial expansion.

The President said that he understood that Secretary Benson³ had indicated at luncheon the previous day that he would be glad to go out and take a look at Ghana. The President said that he thought the Secretary could be very helpful in these matters. The Prime Minister said that he would look into the possibilities of extending Mr. Benson an invitation after his return to Accra.

Reverting to the Volta River scheme, the President reiterated that the State Department would continue to explore the possibilities of bringing this project to fruition. He wished to assure the Prime Minister that we would not forget his interest in this matter. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation. He added that his government would be most grateful for any assistance which could be given in exploring the problem with private aluminum interests. Even if such

² The Philippine Independence Act, approved March 24, 1934. (48 Stat. 456)

³ Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson.

companies were not interested, however, the Prime Minister hoped it would prove possible to press on with the power aspect of the scheme, which would be beneficial to Ghana's other development requirements and, at the same time, might attract the aluminum interests once a cheap source of power were created. The President asked what other uses Ghana intended to make of the power and the Prime Minister mentioned small industries and agricultural uses. The President observed that the Ghana program sounded something like the Rural Electrification Administration, which he described to the Prime Minister. He then asked whether it was possible to start with the small dam at Abouya which the Prime Minister had mentioned. The latter replied that this was feasible and that it would have beneficial results. Unfortunately, however, the site of this dam is not sufficiently near the bauxite deposits.

The President mentioned the importance of a coordinated plan for diversifying Ghana's economy and asked whether any kind of Coordinating Commission existed. The Prime Minister confirmed that a Development Commission has been in being for some time and is concerned with the necessary planning.

The President said that he found Ghana's economic plans to constitute an exciting story. He thought that the world could somehow or other assist Ghana in its realization.

The Prime Minister said that he was also anxious to explore with the United States Government possible means by which it could help with the industrial development of Ghana, as we had done in the case of the Philippines. The President expressed the hope that in the further conversation which the Prime Minister and his party would be having with the State Department, it would be possible for him to acquaint us with enough of Ghana's plans to permit us to speak somewhat more specifically. The President said that he was sure that competent agricultural scientists could advise Ghana on how it should diversify its agriculture in order to obtain the maximum dietary benefits and, at the same time, produce cash crops for export which would reduce the present heavy dependence on cocoa. He asked about the work ICA was doing in Ghana at the present time.⁴ The Prime Minister confirmed that the USOM is doing a great deal of helpful work. The President said that he thought this is a situation where technicians can be of enormous benefit. The thing to do is to start moderately, utilizing the best brains available in working out a coordinated program. Considerable planning would be required. Once this had been accomplished, he thought that it would be desirable to mobilize the

⁴ The Department of State announced on April 4 that the United States and Ghana had agreed on the establishment of a U.S. Operations Mission to conduct a technical cooperation program in Ghana; see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 21, 1958, p. 663.

widest possible assistance in implementing the program. It was particularly important to enlist the support of the people of Ghana in order that the benefits should come about with the participation of their hard work, rather than as the result of something granted to them from outside. The Prime Minister signified his assent and said that he would be happy to pursue these matters further in his discussions with the Department of State.

The Prime Minister also mentioned the improvement of communications as an area in which his government was most active. He cited the recent establishment of Ghana National Airlines and the Black Star Shipping Lines, which had been formed with Israeli participation, as examples. The President asked if Ghana were trying to establish close relations with Israel and the Prime Minister confirmed this to be the case. There was further conversation regarding the possibilities for particular crops in Ghana, with the Prime Minister mentioning rubber as a field in which ICA had recommended close study. The President mentioned meat as a possible field for development, mentioning the success which the southern part of the United States had had with the El Santa Gertrudis breed. The President said Ghana might wish to explore the possibility of importing two or three small herds as a nucleus.

Before leaving, the Prime Minister said that he would also like to mention several political matters. He was deeply concerned about the present instability in the world. He had recently toured the eight independent African states which had been represented at the Accra conference.⁵ He felt that these states had a united outlook. He noted that there are only eight such nations at the present time and that the rest continue under the domination of the metropolitan powers. Ghana wants to do what it can to help them enjoy the same freedom which it now has. This is, the Prime Minister observed, perhaps more Ghana's problem than that of the United States. He wished the President to know that at no place during his tour had he noted the expression of any views which were antagonistic to the United States. He had, however, found some disappointment. President Bourguiba of Tunisia, for example, who makes no secret of his pro-Western views, had expressed his concern that the United States did not appear to understand his problems. Mr. Bourguiba had told the Prime Minister that he knew how difficult it was for the United States to help everyone but that he did wish for greater understanding than he had thus far received.

⁵ Regarding the Conference of Independent African States, which met at Accra, April 15-22, 1958, see Document 2.

The President asked if he were to understand that the African countries wished to cooperate informally among themselves. The Prime Minister confirmed this to be the case, although he emphasized that the primary area of cooperation is Africa. He noted that at the recent meeting in Accra, the other African states had made very clear to the Egyptians that they wished to confine their deliberations to African rather than Middle Eastern questions.

296. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State

Accra, August 13, 1958, 4 p.m.

78. I saw Prime Minister for half hour this morning prior his departure for four day rest at unannounced destination. According to Adu of External Affairs who was present, Acting Canadian HICOM and myself only diplomatic representatives being received at this time. Following are principal points:

1. Before I uttered word Prime Minister stated he considered trip to US unqualified success from every point of view. He was impressed by warmth of official and unofficial reception and all but overwhelmed by hospitality. On substantive side he expressed pleasure with progress made on Volta and other economic matters emphasizing rate of development suited him entirely.

2. Re London talks he stated there had been no discussion of Volta. Queen's visit to Ghana late next year confirmed but exact date not yet set. He partially evaded my efforts stimulate recital of his conversation with Malik¹ but did relate he lectured Malik on ways decrease East-West tension and "mistrust" between great powers. Also indicated he had had difficulty countering Malik's pressure for exchange of diplomatic missions soon. He had repeated need for further consideration of details, especially size of Soviet mission here, and reiterated wish to have exchange take place after Ghana goodwill mission to Moscow some time next year. As indication of his wobbling on this line he said to Adu "we will probably have to advance date for Moscow trip". In answer my question he said categorically no date set for diplomatic exchange.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645J.00/8-1358. Confidential.

¹ Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom Yakov Alexandrovich Malik.

3. Remarks on visit here of GRC representative Tang reported separate telegram.

4. He expressed confidence President would make statesmanlike speech to GA today² and pleasure with news unit of American troops being withdrawn from Lebanon. He seemed pleased with my reference to several flattering comments in American and British press re his ME proposals. However indicated uneasiness with rapid recognition of Iraq regime saying he would continue withhold recognition by Ghana because "you just cannot encourage these fellows to believe they can seize power by subversion." (Adu had told me previously that he and Prime Minister were pleased with course of US position in ME but that he and to lesser extent Prime Minister were dissatisfied with British position in Jordan on grounds it was senseless to "prop up weak and archaic regime".)

Prime Minister's remarks confirmed impression received from all other sources that Prime Minister and associates highly pleased with US trip. Is now clear that Prime Minister's foremost objectives on domestic front are construction of power dam (smelter of only secondary interest) and large number of factories before Nigeria becomes independent. For present he seems satisfied with US contribution and realizes delays largely caused by Ghana's slowness. Thus while situation now serene I anticipate that before end of year he will clamor for positive actions to provide large amounts public and private assistance from US.³

I hope Department has been able pouch copies of available memoranda of conversation on talks. Adu mentioned Ferguson offered provide memoranda of certain conversations for his files.

Rutter

² President Eisenhower addressed the Third Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on August 13 on the subject of the Middle East; for text of his address, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1032-1039.

³ Despatch 105 from Accra, August 22, provided a more detailed account of Ghanaian reaction to the visit. It reported that Prime Minister Nkrumah and other officials were very pleased with his reception but that the Embassy sensed some disappointment that the visit had not yielded more tangible results in the form of U.S. commitment to the Volta project or other economic aid. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.45J11/8-2258)

297. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State

Accra, July 3, 1960, 2 p.m.

4. Deputy Under Secretary Hare departed July 2 after four days here attending ceremonies incident to Ghana's becoming a republic July 1.¹ Before inauguration he talked briefly with Nkrumah who was still Prime Minister. On departure day he was received by President Nkrumah for private conversation lasting thirty minutes which was notable for its frankness and cordiality.

At outset this last conversation Hare presented gift globe of world and made some fitting remarks about roles our respective countries in world today. This pleased Nkrumah and created friendly atmosphere for talk.

Hare then opened main conversation with general exposé of USG's inescapable role in current world affairs. He said USG faced two basic challenges which he characterized as (1) destructive and (2) constructive. The destructive challenge was direct result of Soviet imperialistic Communism. USG accepted principle of "peaceful coexistence" if it truly meant a policy of live and let live and USG had proved this by its relations with Communist Yugoslavia. But USSR did not hide fact it seeks Communist supremacy throughout the world.

Nkrumah who had been nodding assent vigorously interrupted at this point to say with obvious relish: "Yes, they want to do all the 'existing' and have others do all the 'co-ing'."

Hare went on to say USG desires disarmament but this complicated by vital control problem arising from closed nature of Soviet world which was quite different from open nature of Western, especially US, world. He stressed current difficulties this subject stem from our prudence in negotiating with a society that is reluctant to reciprocate the open attitude we have demonstrated.

Nkrumah indicated a sympathetic understanding of the problem.

Turning to the "constructive challenge" confronting USG, Hare said it concerned countries sometimes referred to as "underdeveloped" but which he preferred to call "emerging" or "re-emerging" countries. He stressed USG has neither political nor economic imperialistic designs; that only thing American people and their government want is to see that development of strong political and economic systems which will permit the full cultural expression of the people within these countries as regards their political development, USG

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.13-HA/7-360. Confidential.

¹ For text of President Eisenhower's congratulatory message of July 1 to President Nkrumah, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61*, p. 551.

considered this the affair of each individual country but hoped they would develop into strong nations with external policies permitting them to maintain their political integrity.

During this phase of conversation Nkrumah frequently demonstrated his agreement with what Hare was saying.

Turning to subject of economic and cultural development of African countries, Hare said USG wants to be as helpful as possible but is confronted by a number of practical problems in attempting to provide assistance. He remarked that in Department today no subject is of greater interest than Africa, noting there were committees to study specific African problems and mentioning the recent chiefs of mission meeting in Tangier.² He emphasized that, although USG has a clear general policy regarding Africa, there was considerable difficulty in determining what specifically should be done. Unlike Ghana, many of the emerging countries were "formless" in that they were not aware of their own needs or possible ways of meeting them such a situation placed USG in awkward position. USG policy was one of responding to requests of others, not of imposing our own views therefore programs of action are difficult to set out when the various countries are not clear about what they themselves want. Hare concluded that he would like to have any suggestions Nkrumah might make.

Nkrumah appeared genuinely pleased by this opportunity to express his views and started out by recognizing that the problem was indeed difficult. He made three major points:

- (1) That USG should choose "certain countries" in Africa to assist USG in carrying out its policies and programs in Africa;
- (2) That aid to Africa should be administered on a multilateral basis; and
- (3) That an "American" approach to Africa (as distinguished from a "European" approach) should be developed.

In elaborating the first point Nkrumah stressed that direct assistance from outside Africa would be suspect to many African countries but that such outside assistance could be funneled successfully through some truly independent African state. He left little doubt as to the one African country he had in mind which could be used. Within this context he cited both directly and by inference, Ghana's actions in relation to Guinea and Congo.

In relation to Guinea, Nkrumah said he had talked at length with Sekou Toure since Toure's arrival in Ghana June 28 for inaugural celebrations. He had questioned Toure directly on reports of Communist penetration in Guinea and after two hours discussion with Toure he thought the reports had been exaggerated to some extent. He recalled that Ghana had tried to help Guinea initially and indicated that

² Held May 30-June 2; see Document 30.

after further conversation with Toure he (Nkrumah) probably would advance more of the ten million pounds credit once offered by Ghana of which Guinea has already drawn four million. Nkrumah added that because of Ghana's limited resources he had not been able to help Guinea as much as he would liked; that if Ghana had been backed by help of "other countries," he could have done more to keep Guinea from becoming so heavily involved with Soviet Bloc.

In relation to Congo, Nkrumah said Belgians had sought his help as result he had sent some of his people to Leopoldville and they had been able to convince Lumumba and Kasavubu to work together. Nkrumah expressed hope he himself could visit Congo near future.

In presenting second point which concerned multilateral aid Nkrumah told Hare about his conversations with me on possibility of a "Colombo Plan" for Africa. Nkrumah then enlarged on his apprehensions for the former French territories in Africa alleging that neo-colonialism is keeping these countries under thumb of France. He referred to Mali and Conseil de l'Entente countries as travesties of sovereignty and eligibility for UN membership.

Hare replied that Nkrumah's conversations with me had indeed been reported to Department. He hoped Nkrumah was aware that Department had taken careful note of Nkrumah's hopes regarding multilateral aid. This was a demonstration of US interest in Nkrumah's ideas and showed that our request for Nkrumah's views was not idle chatter. As an aside, which Nkrumah appreciated fully, Hare said that Nkrumah was thus playing a positive role in helping formulation of US African policy.

In his third point Nkrumah said that vacuums are being created throughout Africa which somebody will fill. He declared Metropolitan powers still want to maintain their positions but are unacceptable to the Africans and are thus unable to fill these vacuums. He said other countries "with bad views" will try to fill the void. Therefore it was urgent that USG move to fill the void, formulating its own policy without worrying what the Metropolitan powers may think.

Hare responded that USG is indeed developing its own African policy, taking into account the views of the African nations and peoples. It was however inevitable that USG should also take into account the views of the Metropolitan powers. The policy that will emerge will be our own but it can only be elaborated after consideration of all points of view.

Nkrumah said he realized this to be both logical and inevitable.

Embassy comment: I was present during this conversation which was first of its kind held by Nkrumah as President. I felt Nkrumah was pleased as well as impressed by Hare's forthrightness in describing our posture towards world generally and Africa particularly and his convincing assertions of our desire to help Africa within the bounds of our

global responsibilities. At a public reception that night, after Hare had left, President told me it had been an "excellent talk" and expressed confidence that good would flow from it.

Flake

298. Letter From President Eisenhower to President Nkrumah

August 7, 1960.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It has given me great pleasure to receive your letter of July twenty-sixth concerning the Volta River project.¹ The United States Government has followed your endeavors in this regard with sympathetic interest, and the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Douglas Dillon, has given this matter his personal attention. Last year, you will recall, Mr. Dillon suggested to Ambassador Chapman that you request the cooperation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in reviewing the Volta River project in the light of your country's development plans and that the Bank be looked to as the focal point for mobilizing international financing.² The Under Secretary did so with the confidence that you would receive sound and objective economic advice, and I understand that the Bank has submitted a report to your Government. Especially in view of your report on the developments which have taken place since then, I quite understand your desire to proceed with the more tangible aspects of this project as soon as possible.

I agree with you that it is now desirable to pursue negotiations with the Bank and the aluminum companies here in Washington. In the absence of Mr. Dillon, I have requested the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. Edwin M. Martin, to follow these discussions as closely as possible. The Secretary of State and the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Mr. Raymond Hare, as well as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Grady Upton, will also be

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. No classification marking. Attached to an August 10 memorandum for the record by John S.D. Eisenhower. The letter was transmitted in telegram 135 to Accra, August 7. (*Ibid.*)

¹ This letter declared that the project had reached a "critical stage" and expressed the hope that the United States would take an active interest in negotiations which were to begin on August 8 between Ghana and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development concerning its financing. (*Ibid.*)

² Dillon suggested this to Ghanaian Finance Minister H.K. Gbedemah on October 6, 1959; a memorandum of the conversation is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

discussing the Volta project with your Finance Minister, Mr. Gbedemah, next week.³ These officials and others in the United States Government will be pleased to cooperate with him in his efforts to conclude arrangements so that construction may proceed with a minimum of delay.

With this letter I send you my warmest personal regards and my very best wishes for the progress of your country and its people.

Sincerely,⁴

³ A memorandum of a conversation on August 9 between Herter and Gbedemah is *ibid.*, Central Files, 845J.2614/8–960. The Department of State announced on August 18 that Ghana had been informed that the United States was prepared to provide funds totaling \$30 million toward the financing of the Volta River project when Ghana reached a satisfactory arrangement with the owners of the proposed aluminum smelter and when the additional necessary financing was assured. (Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1960, pp. 364–365)

⁴ Printed from an unsigned copy. The letter as transmitted by telegram 135 bears the President's typed signature.

299. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State

Accra, August 25, 1960, 6 p.m.

283. Deptel 183.¹ Apparent drift towards Soviets noted in reftel is in my opinion a reflection of GOGhana's determination to pursue more actively its policy of positive neutralism (like India, it now seeks political support and material benefits from any source so long as it feels this can be done without dangerous involvement). It is not a turning away from the West. It is Ghana's idea of wide angle vision as it seeks political friends and commercial bargains wherever they may be found. It is what Ghana regards as the final breaking of chains that before independence kept Ghana confined entirely to the West. I do not think this could have been prevented by any USG action and feel

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645J.60/8–2560. Confidential.

¹ Telegram 183 to Accra, August 19, reads in part as follows:

"FYI. Dept concerned re apparent increase Bloc influence Ghana (i.e. ChiCom Embassy, alleged Soviet interest in Volta Project and steel industry, alleged purchase of Soviet aircraft, continued utilization Soviet aircraft by GOG, etc.). Request your appraisal of seriousness this apparent drift toward Soviets and your recommendations as to what action Dept might consider. End FYI." (*ibid.*, 745J.11/8–1260)

we must expect some more manifestations of closer relations with Soviets before position stability. I believe that when this point is reached the West will still be far ahead.

GOGhana has always recognized ChiCom but never took initiative to exchange diplomatic missions. ChiCom Embassy is the 23rd diplomatic mission established in Ghana and GOGhana claims and I believe it accepted ChiCom's for same normal reason it accepted new Turkish Embassy just established here.

The alleged Soviet interest in Volta project does not attract Nkrumah so long as he has faith in effective support from US as he now has. He has told me this several times recently. At same time he sees no reason to turn down USSR offer to build steel mill if it proves feasible and USG or US companies not interested or not competitive with USSR.

The purchase of 4 Soviet aircraft is part of expansion scheme announced by Minister of Transport "to make Ghana airways the leading airline of Africa". Ghana simultaneously purchased five new British aircraft and three second-hand American aircraft. Soviet prices and terms were more favorable than others. The four Soviet aircraft now here are being used by GOGhana pending delivery of the new aircraft.

I would not wish minimize dangers inherent in this increasing contact with Soviet Bloc but feel we must be careful not to attribute motives to GOGhana that do not exist. The West has always had a dominant position in Ghana and in my opinion this will continue. I believe we would defeat our own purpose if we tried at every turn to thwart contact with Soviet Bloc.

To match USSR fully in cultivating friendship with Ghana we would have to be more positive in supporting Africa against European NATO powers. We would also have to oppose "neo-Colonialism" in Africa and encourage Ghana's desire to create (in the words of Nkrumah) "a socialist New Jerusalem" in Ghana.

In my opinion Ghana is not communist and I detect no desire here that it become so. It is trying to develop a type of socialism that has its roots in tribal life determined not to be exploited by East or West. I feel we should endorse Ghana's policy of positive neutralism and as far as possible show Ghana by our deeds that we are truer friends than USSR. This will not be easy as long as some of our official documents and unofficial papers emphasize we are interested in Africa as a source of raw materials and market for our manufactures while USSR cites brotherhood as its motive.

For background see Embdes 497 March 3 and 590 April 28.²

Flake

² Despatch 497 contains an analysis of Ghana's politics and policies. (*Ibid.*, 745J.00/3–360) Despatch 590 transmitted a country summary paper prepared for the Conference of Chiefs of Mission held at Tangier, May 30–June 2. (*Ibid.*, 120.1471/4–2860)

300. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State

Accra, September 5, 1960, 3 p.m.

319. Deptels 226¹ and 228.² In talks September 3 and 5, I informed President Nkrumah of decisions re USG loans for Volta project.

President seemed surprised it still necessary make detailed application as required Section 517 MSA³ but accepted it after I explained necessity this formality and assured him it did not mean reconsideration of broad question of loan. He asked whether he should believe some talk that terms of loan to Ghana are less favorable than those accorded certain other countries. I replied negative (and I hope I am right). Those 2 points settled, President was much pleased with outcome of what he called his "first effort to borrow money". He said he had come to USG first because USG is his first friend; he had always kept faith USG would help him and this had been justified. He did not say directly but clearly indicated this would confound some persons who had been cynical about USG help. He especially wanted remind them this USG loan is money for shopping among competitive US suppliers as contrasted with loan offered by another government which itself would be sole bidder. He agreed this was important factor in comparing interest rates and tied aspects of loans. President added he had word from Kaiser⁴ which makes it desirable for GOGhana

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 845J.2614/9–560. Confidential.

¹ Dated September 1, telegram 226 set forth the terms on which the United States was willing to provide \$30 million: a \$20 million loan from the Development Loan Fund at 3½ percent with a 30-year term and a \$10 million loan from the Export-Import Bank at 5¾ percent with a 25-year term. (*Ibid.*, 845J.2614/9–160)

² Dated September 2, telegram 228 clarified one of the points in telegram 226. (*Ibid.*, 845J.2614/9–260)

³ The Mutual Security Act of 1955, approved July 8, 1955. (69 Stat 283)

⁴ Reference may be to Edgar Kaiser, President of Kaiser Industries Corporation, a member of the Valco aluminum consortium, or to the corporation.

representative (probably Ayeh-Kumi) go Washington mid-September to try resolve question of power rate. President hoped USG would use its good offices make sure this question does not wreck project. I myself feel it would be severe loss to US and West if in end Ghana had to turn elsewhere to get Volta project started.

Flake

301. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/60 New York, September 22, 1960, 2:40–3:20 p.m.¹

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

Secretary of State Herter

General Goodpaster

J.C. Satterthwaite

Ghana

President Kwame Nkrumah

Ambassador Halm

SUBJECT

President Nkrumah's call on the President

After an exchange of amenities in which the President expressed his pleasure at seeing Mr. Nkrumah again, Mr. Nkrumah thanked the President for all the assistance he had given Ghana toward the realization of the Volta project. However, he added, there were still difficulties involving the question of rates.² All could be solved, he thought, with an additional loan of ten million pounds and he requested the President's assistance. After Secretary Herter explained some of the difficulties the President said that we do indeed wish to work this out, adding that he has known of no country where there has been a continued excess of power.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Satterthwaite.

¹ The conversation took place in the President's suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel; he was in New York to address the U.N. General Assembly.

² Negotiations for a power rate agreement between Ghana and the Valco aluminum consortium were in progress; U.S. and IBRD financing was contingent on an agreement. A letter of September 19 from Eisenhower to Nkrumah stated that the U.S. Government would continue to follow the negotiations closely. (Department of State, Central Files, 845].2614/9–1960)

The conversation turned to the Congo with the President requesting Mr. Nkrumah's views on the crisis prevailing there. Mr. Nkrumah said that in his view the problems of the Congo were not insoluble. They must however be worked out through the UN. If the UN fails, all small nations are finished.

To this the President remarked that our whole policy is to work through the UN as he explained in his speech this morning.³ In his speech he had been careful not to place the problem on what he described as a bi-polar basis. On the contrary, our policy is to solve problems through the UN even when we ourselves would prefer them worked out in another way.

The President spoke highly of Secretary General Hammarskjold and praised him for his great patience, a virtue of which he said he did not have an abundance. Mr. Nkrumah said he held Hammarskjold in equally high esteem and noted that he has twice visited Accra.

At this point Secretary Herter remarked to Mr. Nkrumah that he thought the latter could do a great deal with Guinea which is tending to get off the road. The President supported this suggestion strongly. Mr. Nkrumah did not reply in detail except to remark that he had this very much in mind.

As the conversation turned to Mr. Khrushchev Mr. Nkrumah remarked that an appointment had been fixed for him to call on Khrushchev yesterday at 5:00 p.m. He had however not accepted this appointment (in fact he did not arrive at Idlewild until 7:15 p.m. yesterday) as he wished to call on President Eisenhower first.

The President then reminisced most interestingly of his experiences as Supreme Commander during the war in which he had serving under him such varied forces as the British, the French and the underground Belgian and Netherlands forces. From this he learned that peoples differing widely from each other could get along together and he wished that everyone could have a similar experience. As he was arriving at the UN building this morning the crowds shouted, "Give 'em hell, Ike, give 'em hell." But what do we gain by giving them hell, he asked? Rather each country is really dependent on every other.

At this point Secretary Herter remarked that the Soviet Delegation was requesting the General Committee to inscribe an item on the General Assembly agenda entitled "Situation in the Congo". The Secretary explained that we were opposed to inscribing this item for the reason that this problem had just been thoroughly discussed at the special session of the GA, that it was one which in any event should

³ See Document 34.

first be taken up through the Security Council if there was need for it to be discussed further, and that only then should it again be referred to the GA.

The conversation reverted to the President's speech this morning, with the President remarking that he was most enthusiastic of all over his fifth point recommending UN aid for education in Africa. He noted the need for furnishing teachers and schools for use in Africa as well as for sending African students abroad to study.

Referring again to the question of the UN, the President said he would be interested in the tune which the Soviet Delegation adopts at this Assembly. The U.S. Delegation has but one aim—to press forward with all other delegations.

As the conversation drew to a close Mr. Hagerty came in with the Ghanaian Press Officer to receive guidance on what they should say to the press. After this was received Mr. Nkrumah spoke briefly of the situation between the Mali Federation and Senegal,⁴ explaining the steps he had taken not only with the leaders of these two countries but with Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast to ensure a peaceful solution.

At the conclusion of the interview, the President accompanied Mr. Nkrumah to the elevator in order that photographs might be taken by the numerous photographers awaiting them there.

⁴ Senegal seceded from the Mali Federation on August 20; see Document 75.

302. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) and the Ghanaian Representative at the United Nations (Quaison-Sackey)

SecDel/MC/29

New York, September 24, 1960, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Appointment to Call on President Nkrumah

After consulting the Secretary this morning we requested through the Ghanaian Mission an appointment for me to call on President Nkrumah. At the time latter had called on the President I had told him I would request an appointment to call on him. He replied that he

would be glad to see me. The Secretary had suggested that I express to Mr. Nkrumah our surprise over the contents of his speech at the General Assembly yesterday.¹

About 3:30 this afternoon I received word through Mr. Dickenson that the matter had been taken up with the Ghanaian Foreign Minister, who expressed surprise at my request in view of the disparity in rank. I suggested to Mr. Dickenson that he phone back to the Ghanaian official with whom he is in touch to say that I, of course, accepted this, but to point out that Marshall Tito had been glad to receive the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and that President Olympio had received me. Ambassador Quaison-Sackey thereupon phoned to say he thought that the Foreign Minister had been misunderstood; in any event, that Mr. Nkrumah did not know of my request, that he was very friendly and would not stand on rank.

The Ambassador then remarked that his delegation had been very surprised at the Secretary's statement criticizing President Nkrumah's speech.² I replied that we were even more surprised at the contents of this speech. I noted that although he had already arrived in New York, President Nkrumah had not been present when President Eisenhower delivered his speech. In contrast, President Nkrumah, with great display, took his seat at the head of his delegation to listen to the 2 hour and 20 minute speech of Premier Khrushchev.³

As to the content of the speech, I pointed out that except for Nkrumah's personal praise of Secretary Hammarskjold, it was difficult to find a word in the speech showing any understanding of the position of the West in the East-West conflict. Moreover, in Nkrumah's discussion of the Congo no mention was made of the unilateral intervention of the Soviet Union outside United Nations channels involving the arrival of several hundred Soviet technicians. Certainly, therefore, the content of the Nkrumah and Khrushchev speeches and the display attached to the reception by the eastern bloc delegates of the Nkrumah speech gave us every reason to believe there had been collusion between the two. Ambassador Quaison-Sackey said this was not the case, as he, himself, had fixed the time for Nkrumah's speech several weeks ago. He also remarked that the applause of the eastern bloc was due to the fact that Nkrumah's speech was anti-colonial in

¹ The speech largely concerned the situation in the Congo. It declared that the Congo was an African problem which could only be solved by Africans, urged that the U.N. Force in the Congo should be restricted to Africans, supported former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba as head of the Congo government, and criticized actions taken by the U.N. Command. For text, see U.N. doc. A/PV.869.

² Not further identified.

³ On September 23; for text, see U.N. doc. A/PV.869.

tone. I said that this seemed ironic to me, since in our view the Soviet Union was the greatest and most extreme colonial and imperialist power in the world today.

The tone of the conversation was friendly at all times on both sides. The question of an appointment for me to see Nkrumah was left open.⁴

⁴ No record of such a conversation has been found.

303. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State

Accra, October 7, 1960, 5 p.m.

418. Deptel 348.¹ President Nkrumah returned late yesterday and early this morning called me to his office for talk lasting one hour.

At outset he praised PAA charter and said he had decided purchase two DC-8's and two Boeing 702's. Waldorf Hotel was excellent and New York police wonderful.

President then named all prominent persons he saw which to me seemed effort to dilute significance his meetings with Khrushchev. He felt both USA and USSR genuinely desired disarmament and said problem was "the chicken and egg question of which comes first: Controls or disarmament." He had been unable to get very far on this subject with Khrushchev in New York but Khrushchev had promised send him letter to Accra within next few days. President indicated he hoped he could be helpful in resolving this problem.

I replied there was no question in USG mind about which must come first; that the American people were in no mood to let their government expose them to another Pearl Harbor; that USSR talks a lot but always backs off when its bluff is called by our honest proposals. I thought best way President could be helpful was to get USSR to agree to open inspections by competent observers.

Turning to Congo, President said he had heard about the public exhibition of a letter he had written to Lumumba and was thinking of releasing all his letters to Lumumba which would set things in proper light. He then read me extracts from several which advise Lumumba on administrative problems. President told me his advice to Lumumba

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/10-760. Confidential; Priority.

¹ Dated October 5. (*Ibid.*, 941.61/9-2860)

to get UN out of Congo meant he should remove need for UN troops before attempting other things. President still regarded Kasavubu and Lumumba as legitimate government which should be supported by UN until Parliament might decide otherwise.

I questioned Lumumba's suitability as Prime Minister on basis his past showing and also wondered if Nkrumah really was getting true picture of Lumumba's behavior. President replied he (1) thought Lumumba adequate and (2) believed he was getting complete and correct reports from Congo. I pressed my two questions several times in modified form and believe they made President begin to wonder.

President referred to Secretary Herter's comments on his speech at UN. He regretted Secretary's misunderstanding but had not wanted to make issue of it and had let it pass without great public protest.

I replied that had not been case here where his party papers had kept up vicious drum fire against Secretary. I thought calmness and restraint would assist President in correcting any misunderstanding his speech may have created and I was sure Secretary Herter would be most attentive to any further public pronouncements President might make that would clarify his position on subjects covered in UN speech. President remarked he would be broadcasting to nation in next few days.

President then turned to Volta River project and said Kaiser people will visit Ghana next week for final discussions now that power rate has been agreed. There were two or three minor questions remaining but he thought project now fully assured.

I expressed pleasure at outcome of long negotiations on Volta project but said I thought there was one remaining big question that did not directly involve USG willingness to help finance. In my view it involved wisdom of consortium putting its stockholders money into a private enterprise here when CCP newspapers, certain influential party men such as Tettegah and even some Cabinet Ministers are in full cry against the evils of capitalism and economic exploitation by the imperialist including US. I thought the President had to declare himself. If he and his supporters did not want private enterprise to undertake the Volta or some other project for the purpose of making a profit he should say so at this time and the American companies would go elsewhere; but if the President wanted the consortium to proceed under conditions mutually agreed upon, then it was the President's responsibility to stop some of his supporters from their campaign of hate against American and other "economic imperialists." I assured the President that I myself would advise Kaiser when he is here next week to get this question settled clearly before signing any final agreement. I said that quite frankly I was getting a bit weary of all the double talk among some of his supporters who think they can have things both ways.

President was clearly taken aback by my remarks but after I documented them he agreed I was justified in my views. He declared he wanted the private enterprise consortium to proceed and that he would take steps immediately to bring all his supporters into line on his "four stream development" plans. First stream was socialist type cooperatives and fourth stream was private enterprise which if invited into Ghana would be fully protected by Government of Ghana and hecklers silenced.

I said I was glad to have President's assurance and wondered if he would consider something else I recalled that when I arrived in Ghana three years ago he had told me he would never permit Ghana soil to be used as base for one outside country to attack another verbally. I had lived up to this in supervising our information program here but now I find the USSR and ChiCom Embassies here are distributing publications containing anti-American material and in addition the ChiComs were running a propaganda factory here to feed the press with hate American stories. I wondered how this stacked up against the President's wish that Ghana not be used as base for hate campaigns.

President expressed surprise which I feel was partially feigned but after I documented my assertions he declared emphatically he would put a stop to it as he would not permit Ghana being used as cockpit to fight cold war.

Conversation was friendly from start to finish and President followed me to steps to express his thanks for "this good talk."

Flake

304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana

October 13, 1960, 7:43 p.m.

372. Embtel 412.¹ Dept hopes it is significant that Nkrumah took initiative in promptly discussing his New York experience with you. It

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/10-560. Confidential. Drafted by Director of the Office of West African Affairs C. Vaughan Ferguson and William D. Toomey of that office, cleared by Hare and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Woodruff Wallner, and approved by Satterthwaite.

¹ Dated October 5, telegram 412 from Accra requested guidance for further relations with Nkrumah, who was to return from New York the next day. (*Ibid.*)

would certainly be in Nkrumah's best interest to clarify his position on points made in his speech, on Congo question and future of private enterprise in Ghana.

His performance at UN session made most unfortunate impression in this country because it reflected a complete lack of appreciation of Western position on almost every issue and, while consistently critical of West, failed to find fault with flagrant unilateral Soviet intervention in Congo. By actions as well as words Nkrumah seemed determined abet Soviet cause. Under these circumstances and given adverse reaction many other African states to his performance we do not wish take action to encourage Nkrumah's role in Africa unless and until he shows greater signs of stability and that his actions are not furthering Soviet objectives in such matters as Congo and UN machinery. This does not mean however that our relations with Nkrumah or GOG should be any less cordial than heretofore and we hope frequent personal contact will make Nkrumah realize where his interests lie and make him aware he cannot indefinitely take one line in private with us as he did with President and a completely opposite line in public as he did at GA.

Nkrumah has grandiose view part he is to play in future Africa. Resistance and resentment his leadership attempts growing in Africa and we hope counter force such as Nigeria will now begin assert strong moderating influence on manner in which regional cooperation is achieved. Remains to be seen how Nkrumah will cooperate with these moderate forces which are inclined toward gradual economic, cultural and educational approach to creation of an African Community rather than schemes for immediate political unity. We would hope his great energies and talents could be turned inward for a time to meet challenge developments within Ghana itself. Your forceful statements concerning advice you will give consortium should prove salutary and Nkrumah's explanation his "four stream" development plans will be awaited and closely scrutinized by USG and private enterprise.

Nkrumah's offers silence anti-American press campaigns also encouraging and we will await results his efforts prohibit Ghana becoming a "cockpit" in cold war.

Herter

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State

Accra, October 25, 1960, 5 p.m.

490. Department telegram 372.¹ After I spoke to Kaiser along lines indicated in Embassy telegram 418² he raised subject with Nkrumah who cited his "four stream" development speech October 9 (Embassy despatch 236).³

According to Calhoun⁴ Kaiser told Nkrumah that Nkrumah has nevertheless made bad impression by his conduct at UN and his October 18 speech here (Embassy telegram 468);⁵ that American bankers had to remain convinced Ghana is good political risk if they are to furnish required private financing for consortium smelter; that if Nkrumah had to say some nice things about USSR, he should at same time be equally complimentary of USA.

Embassy comment:

While Nkrumah's October 9 speech is encouraging, I am not entirely satisfied he has definitely cured some of his powerful supporters of their desire to develop an economic system in which private enterprise would play no part. I intend to discuss this with President next time I see him. Meanwhile there is no denying fact there is growing feeling in Ghana, which Nkrumah shares, that USSR as well as USA can be friendly and helpful to Ghana and that best of both economic systems can be used in Ghana. While noting Ghana's wide angle outlook on the world (Embassy telegram 283)⁶ I can detect no fundamental desire on Nkrumah's part to desert the West for the East or even to become more friendly towards USSR than towards US.

Flake

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/10-2560. Confidential.

¹ Document 304.

² Reference is apparently not to telegram 418 (Document 303) but to telegram 468 from Accra, October 19, which reported that Flake had complained to the Ghanaian Foreign Office about an October 18 speech by Nkrumah in which he had coupled favorable remarks about the Soviet Union with critical remarks about the Western powers; it stated that Flake had repeated his comments to Kaiser. (Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/10-1960)

³ Dated October 10; Nkrumah stated in his October 9 speech that Ghana was seeking to develop its own brand of socialism but that private capital was welcome. (*Ibid.*, 745J.11/10-1060)

⁴ Chad F. Calhoun, Vice President of Kaiser Industries Corporation.

⁵ See footnote 3 above. Telegram 462 from Accra, October 19, reported the remarks in the speech which Flake criticized. (Department of State, Central Files, 745J.11/10-1960)

⁶ Document 299.

GUINEA

U.S. RECOGNITION OF GUINEA; U.S. RELATIONS WITH GUINEA; PRESIDENT TOURÉ'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

September 25, 1958, 8:10 p.m.

1052. Department grateful efforts obtain info re future status those French territories who vote "no" in referendum¹ and French Government position thereon. Latest info Dakar 68² particularly helpful. Appreciate moreover French reluctance reveal now any intentions they may have for continued association with and assistance to such territories in view adverse effect it would have on other territories inclined vote "yes". Final decision in any case may not yet have been made by de Gaulle.

Nevertheless Department concerned by likelihood we will be confronted immediately following results referendum by situation similar that on occasion Moroccan and Tunisian independence where other countries will immediately recognize territories opting for independence and France will delay and also request us delay recognition.

It would obviously be desirable for France take lead in recognizing following results referendum. We may not be able delay long pending French decision should others such as UAR and USSR recognize in meantime.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.002/9-2558. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Matthew J. Loomam of the Office of Western European Affairs, cleared by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph C. Satterthwaite, and approved by Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs C. Vaughan Ferguson. Repeated to Dakar and London.

¹ A referendum was to be held on September 28 in France and all its overseas territories on the draft constitution for the Fifth Republic. French President Charles de Gaulle had defined a vote by any territory against the constitution as a vote for independence. Guinea was expected to vote in the negative.

² Dated September 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 751.03/9-2458)

You should accordingly see Joxe in endeavor coordinate our respective positions in advance.³ Failing that you should see Foreign Minister as soon he returns.

At your discretion and if you believe it would not be counter-productive, you may tell French in confidence were it not for UAR-USSR aspect of problem which is made more serious by Toure's past history, Dept would wish to proceed cautiously in recognizing an independent Guinea since recognition would create serious complications in other African areas, could be interpreted as endorsement fragmentation of Africa and of regime of questionable ability and political orientation. We are also disturbed over internal security situation which may arise with withdrawal French army and gendarmérie. But on balance believe early US recognition inevitable.⁴

Herter

³ Telegram 1103 from Paris, September 27, reported a conversation that day between Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry Louis Joxe and Ambassador Amory Houghton. Joxe told Houghton that negotiations would be necessary to establish Guinea's status. He declared that immediate U.S. recognition would have a "catastrophic moral reaction" in France and urged that the U.S. Government wait and see what relations Guinea wished to have with France before taking action. (*Ibid.*, 751T.02/9-2758)

⁴ Telegram 1092 to Paris, September 29, stated that in view of the French position, the Department would take no immediate action concerning recognition. (*Ibid.*)

307. Memorandum of Conversation

October 4, 1958.

SUBJECT

Guinea's Request for Recognition

PARTICIPANTS

French Ambassador Hervé Alphand
 M. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
 M. Jacques Leprette, Counselor, French Embassy

Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
 Mr. William Porter, AF/N
 Mr. Matthew Loram, WE

Following a conversation on another subject, Mr. Murphy informed the French Ambassador that he had just been advised that the White House had received a message from Sekou Touré requesting U.S. recognition of the independent Republic of Guinea.¹ It appeared, Mr. Murphy stated, that similar messages had been sent to the British and other foreign governments. He questioned the Ambassador as to the present status of this matter.

M. Alphand stated that an agreement would first have to be negotiated and concluded between France and Guinea before the latter could be considered independent. He assured that this would not take long.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that this was a delicate matter, particularly in view of the possibility of recognition of Guinea in the near future by the Soviets and other governments. He, therefore, hoped that the French Government might regularize the situation promptly and requested that we be kept closely informed in this connection.

¹ Text of Touré's message to President Eisenhower, dated October 2, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 15, 1958, p. 966.

308. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State

Paris, October 15, 1958, 7 p.m.

1360. Re Deptel 1309, rptd London 3771, Dakar 82.¹ I discussed subject reftel with Foreign Minister this afternoon.

Couve de Murville said subject was thoroughly discussed in Quai meeting this morning and that, while there has been and continues to be communication between Conakry and French Govt, latter does not want to move forward too quickly since all other African territories (Ivory Coast, etc.) are watching anxiously to see what treatment Guinea will receive and what they can expect later. French Govt does

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.02/10-1558. Secret. Repeated to London and Dakar.

¹ Telegram 1309 to Paris, October 14, instructed the Embassy to take up the question of recognition of Guinea with French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, pointing out the "increasingly difficult posture of the United States" as more countries recognized Guinea and requesting information on French plans for recognition or "at what point France's friends can extend recognition with French acquiescence." (*Ibid.*, 770B.02/10-1258)

not wish at this juncture to take action which would give members of future community ground for feeling they might have done better by voting "no."

At this morning's meeting it was decided that France would consult with friendly govts, and particularly UK and ourselves, requesting us to postpone recognition for present. He trusts the matter will be settled in about two or three weeks.

With respect to possible application for Guinea membership UN, he says he hopes we may keep in close touch on this. In any event the matter would come soon before Security Council "where it is more easily handled" and it would be better were application made in middle of November (near end of GA) than in middle October.

It would be best of all, in his opinion, if application for membership were made at next session as this would permit France to sponsor Guinea, which she would like to do but does not feel she can do at this juncture.

In reply to my inquiry as to whether it would not be possible to separate question of recognition and future Franco-Guinean relations, he said from French point of view two are closely allied and particularly in minds of other territories.

He thoroughly realizes our embarrassment and appreciates attitude we have taken so far and trusts we can delay at least few weeks more. Meanwhile he trusts French, British and ourselves can keep in close touch on this question.

With reference to my remark re number of countries recognizing, he rather caustically said, "Yes, Soviet Union, Communist China, Egypt and Yugoslavia."

I said that I understood there were some 28 (Dakar's 115 to Dept).²

Lyon

² Telegram 115 from Dakar, October 13, reported a conversation between Dumont and Joseph Diallo, an emissary from Sekou Touré, who had delivered a letter from Touré to Dumont dated October 9 renewing his request for diplomatic relations with the United States. Diallo conveyed a message from Touré emphasizing the importance he attached to U.S. recognition and stating that he realized it was in Guinea's interest to remain with the Western bloc. (*Ibid.*, 770B.02/10-1358)

309. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate General at Dakar

October 17, 1958, 12:38 p.m.

92. Re Deptel 83.¹ Unless you perceive overriding objections you should transmit following message to Sekou Toure in same manner as previously.²

“On behalf of the Government of the United States, I acknowledge receipt of your telegraphic message of October 13 addressed to the President whereby you renew your proposal of October 2 concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States.

“The United States Government is giving due consideration to the question of the recognition of your country as an independent state. I can assure Your Excellency that the Government and people of the United States have the warmest friendship for the people of Guinea and are looking forward to giving full expression to their feelings through lasting ties of a political and cultural character.”³

Dulles

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70B/10-1758. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted by William C. Canup of the Office of Middle and Southern African Affairs; cleared by the President's Staff Secretary Andrew J. Goodpaster, Loomis, Deputy Legal Adviser John M. Raymond, and Satterthwaite; and approved by Murphy. Repeated to Paris and London.

¹ Telegram 83, October 14, transmitted to Dakar a translation of an October 13 telegram from Sekou Touré to President Eisenhower. (*Ibid.*, 611.70B/10-1458) A slightly different translation of the message is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 15, 1958, p. 966.

² Reference is to a message from Consul General Donald Dumont to Touré, sent by commercial telegram on October 8. It stated that a reply to Touré's October 2 message to President Eisenhower would be sent “when all aspects of the juridical position of Guinea are clarified.” A copy is filed as an enclosure to despatch 78 from Dakar, October 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 770B.02/10-858)

³ Telegram 135 from Dakar, October 19, reported that the message had been sent to Touré on October 18. (*Ibid.*, 611.70B/10-1958)

310. Telegram From the Consulate General at Dakar to the Department of State

Dakar, October 23, 1958, 7 p.m.

150. My telegram 146¹ Deptel 101² received Dakar too late.

Return evening October 22 from Conakry having spent three and one-half hours conversation with Sekou Toure and Minister of Interior Fodeba Keita. Upon arrival airport met Cassell and Fernanadez, Liberian visiting emissaries who showed great excitement over news Toure had given them that US Government had recognized government Guinea and said they had already cabled this to Tubman. I set Cassell straight immediately.

Toure said he regretted his people had incorrectly translated my telegram of October 18 and appeared glum when I told him it might be impossible avoid issue denial Washington if world press inquiries necessitated statement by Department. Said he thoroughly understood and appreciated American Government's position of desire avoid misunderstanding with France but emphasized great importance his government attached to recognition by west in general and USA in particular. Spoke at great length of cordial conversations with Tubman's emissaries and although he had taken no action yet he was prepared to enter dollar zone (or sterling) unless France made some gesture to help Guinea by removing doubts in realm of trade and commerce. I made special point of appealing to his realism by saying quite apart from sentimental feelings of friendship of American peoples towards his own, US Government wished Guinea success and hoped that conditions would permit extension its recognition soon. At this point our conversation interrupted by telephone call from Vice Consul Vassenen at Dakar which led me to infer recognition by US Government might be forthcoming soon. I conveyed this thought to Toure but nevertheless asked him to give as little publicity as possible to his own

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.02/10-2358. Secret; Niact. Also sent to Paris, London, Bonn, and USUN.

¹ Telegram 146 from Dakar, October 21, reported that Dumont had met that day with Guinean emissary Telli Diallo and told him that his October 18 message to Touré did not constitute U.S. recognition. (*Ibid.*, 770B.00/10-2158) Telegram 137 from Dakar, October 19, had reported an October 19 message from Touré acknowledging "United States recognition" and promising to send a good will emissary to the United States. (*Ibid.*, 770B.02/10-2058)

² Telegram 98 to Dakar, October 20, instructed Dumont to go to Conakry and explain orally that his message expressed U.S. friendly feelings toward Guinea but that the question of recognition was still under consideration. (*Ibid.*, 770B.02/10-2058) Telegram 101, October 21, countermanded this instruction because of a report from London that the French had withdrawn their objections to recognition. (*Ibid.*, 770B.02/10-2158)

message of reply to me dated October 19 and to get in touch with me before sending an emissary to US. This he agreed to do (his message of October 19 was broadcast over Radio Conakry and printed in Guinea press but no publicity to date has appeared in Dakar news media) but without enthusiasm. He plans on sending Telli Diallo as Ambassador to US and still wants him to leave for Washington within the next week. Camara, he said, is now slated for Liberia and not London. Thus first diplomatic missions would be Washington, Paris, and Monrovia. Said diplomatic relations with Liberia important because of mutual interests in Nimba or exploitation plus diamonds and forest products. Said he was very impressed by Cassel and keen on establishing best possible relations with Liberians. I must admit atmosphere was one of Guinean-Liberian lovefest. Toure said small party had drunk champagne October 21 and had photos taken celebrating recognition by US Government.

Prime Minister made great point telling me Guinea's basic interests lay with the west and that East German delegation was still cooling heels at Conakry. Said his first messages (of October 2) were addressed to West and those to satellites sent 48 hours later. In short he pled for US recognition. Although no specific request made he intimated Guinea later on would desire economic assistance from America (I avoided any comment on this subject).

View some of glib answers Toure had to problems of running post and telegraph services, secondary school system et cetera without French and naive idea he can jump into dollar or sterling zone overnight I stressed following three points:

1. France had not imposed severe sanctions on Guinea (had not withdrawn treasury advances, had not imposed French tariff on bananas or otherwise inflicted MFN treatment on Guinean products). Therefore Prime Minister should endeavor ignore certain unfriendly newspaper stories (e.g. *Figaro*) and patiently wait for acts of recognition from western countries which would certainly be forthcoming soon.

2. That US Government attached singular importance to continuation of mutually profitable economic relations and friendly political association between new African states and former mother countries and that in this case both Guinea and France as well as west as a whole had most to gain by creation and fostering best kind of post-independence relations this regard.

3. That in presenting his case to western countries Prime Minister, view his Marxist training, would hurt Guinea's case by letting it appear he was trying to blackmail west by raising spectre of Communist take-over in Guinea.

Toure said he appreciated this candid counsel and in return for such frankness said he personally would prefer not having anything to do with East Germans for fear that after signing some kind of barter

deal he might be left high and dry whereas with the west he knew that good faith was basic ingredient of any agreement. Nevertheless he felt in view of continued nonrecognition by any western power to date, question of international prestige his government was reacting a critical point and that slightest sign of troubles (e.g. Soussou-Foulah tribal incidents) would be pounced upon by certain elements French Government and elsewhere as proof his government was not stable and hence did not merit recognition.

As for this translation my telegram to him of October 18 I have not [now] seen text and am furnishing it to Department by despatch.³ Even admitting their inaccurate rendition of "is giving due consideration" by phrase "accordela consideration votlue", the French translation could not properly be considered as constituting recognition. Therefore conclude that Toure thought there was enough warmth in message to qualify inaccurate conclusion he drew and subsequent issuance text his October 19 telegram to *Guinee Matin* and Radio Conakry. I told him that recognition, when it came, would be a message emanating from the President of the US. As for UN membership I intimated to Prime Minister that it might be technically difficult if not impossible to comply with UN procedures at this date so as to accomplish Guinea's membership this session. Toure said he very much wanted it this session and smilingly hoped he could have US Government also as sponsor.

Conclusions: 1. Economic life city Conakry subnormal perhaps but not critical. Rumors of storage of rice and price soaring from 35 francs September 14 to 180-200 today entirely without foundation. Price is 40 francs. (Messmer had promptly arranged for Belgian deal to furnish 4,000 tons which Houpouet had "hijacked" from the *Atlas* at Abidjan.) Visited port and noticed three ships being loaded with bananas and palm kernels.

2. Politically, Guinean populace appears quite calm. Leaders including Toure acted rather tense, alternately between shy uncertainty to bitterness and frustration. For example, as Minister Interior Fodeba Keita, with whom I lunched, went into long explanation of how irritated and supersensitive Guineans now were on political developments in country and why he had felt obliged to expel a certain employee (named Letten) of *Guinee Matin* who left Conakry last night on same plane with me.

3. Liberian delegation which told me it was preparing the way for Guinea's acceptance by the west certainly went overboard in effusive display of friendship. Believe this augurs well for future Liberian-

³ Despatch 88 from Dakar, October 20. (*Ibid.*, 770B.02/10-2058)

Guinean relations and although Cassell may have pushed things too far this may be unique case in which Liberia has rendered signal service to US Government.

Dumont

311. Memorandum of Conversation

October 25, 1958.

SUBJECT

Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Embassy

M. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy

Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

Ambassador Alphand asked regarding the US attitude on the Guinea situation.¹ The Secretary said this had been simmering in his absence. Ambassador Alphand said there was no question but that Guinea would be independent and a member of the UN, but we did not wish to go too fast. Guinea will be separated from the French Community and will have to be recognized. However, we should study this problem and not rush diplomatic representation nor UN membership. In response to the Secretary's question, Alphand said France thought she would have to veto Guinea's membership in the UN this year but would much prefer in the Security Council to obtain five abstentions so that a veto would not be required. He expressed the hope that the US would abstain the Security Council if this matter arose and expressed the belief that the UK would abstain.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.00/10-2558. Confidential. Drafted by McBride.

¹ Lucet had conveyed the French position on Guinea to Satterthwaite the previous day. According to a memorandum of conversation, he said the French considered that Guinea had "juridically speaking become a separate entity" by its negative vote but that it was not capable of exercising sovereignty. He said they did not object to U.S. recognition of Guinea's "new status" but hoped it would be qualified rather than formal recognition as a fully sovereign state. It would be "very premature" to consider establishment of diplomatic relations or admission to the United Nations. Satterthwaite replied that he did not find the French position very clear. (*Ibid.*, 770B.00/10-2458)

The Secretary expressed the view that in the case of Guinea and others, voting UN membership was really a violation of the UN charter since these states had demonstrated no capacity as required by the charter. The result was the weakening of the UN. However, he thought the present trend had gone so far that it was questionable whether it could be reversed. Alphand noted that all cases of admission of new states in the past had taken a certain length of time noting the cases of Libya, and the future case of Togo. Even Morocco and Tunisia had waited until after the signature of the treaties of independence, an occurrence which had not yet taken place in the case of Guinea. The conduct of foreign affairs, defense, etc., had not yet been transferred to Guinea.

The Secretary noted that the British were somewhat worried over non-recognition because of the effect in Ghana and elsewhere. The Secretary added he had a basic sympathy with the French position but noted that the precedents for delaying UN membership were not good. Alphand said he did not know when France would turn Guinea loose entirely, but that the territories voting in favor of the French Community obviously took precedence and that the whole question of the relationship of the Community to Guinea must be developed. If the other territories believed it was favored, they would be encouraged to follow the same course with the resulting Balkanization of Black Africa, a development which would be against the interests of the West as a whole.

312. Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower

October 31, 1958.

SUBJECT

Recognition of the Republic of Guinea

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Guinea, in telegraphic messages to you on October 2 and October 13, requested recognition by the United States. The French Government has reluctantly given qualified concurrence to the recognition of Guinea by powers friendly to France. France urges that these powers refrain from establishing

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.02/10-3158. Secret. Drafted by Canup. A note on the source text in Dulles' handwriting dated October 31 states: "Communicated by phone to President & approved by him. JFD."

diplomatic relations with Guinea at present. The French have also requested assistance in delaying Guinea's entry into the United Nations Organization.

I am informed that a telegram of recognition of Guinea as an independent state will be sent to Prime Minister Sekou Toure by Harold Macmillan on Nov. 1.¹

I recommend that the United States now extend recognition to the Republic of Guinea and that this be accomplished by dispatch of the enclosed message from you to Prime Minister Sekou Toure. If you approve this message, I recommend that you authorize release of the text of the message upon receipt of confirmation of delivery.²

I further recommend that the question of establishment of diplomatic relations with Guinea be held in abeyance for the time being. We plan to consult with the United Kingdom and France to determine what practical steps might be taken to dissuade Guinea from requesting admission to the United Nations during the current session.

JFD

¹ The words "on Nov. 1" are in Dulles' handwriting; the words "in the near future" were crossed out.

² For text of the message, dated November 1, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958*, p. 826.

313. Memorandum of Conversation

December 1, 1958.

SUBJECT

United States Relations with Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

M. Telli Diallo, Emissary of the Republic of Guinea
The Acting Secretary
Mr. C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., Director, AFS
Mr. Matthew J. Looram, WE

M. Diallo called on the Acting Secretary to present to him a letter from M. Sekou Touré, Prime Minister of Guinea, requesting United States good will, the establishment of diplomatic relations and support for Guinea's candidacy for admission to the United Nations.¹

The Acting Secretary said that he regretted that the Secretary was absent but that he was most happy to be able to receive the first representative of the Government of Guinea to come to Washington. M. Diallo said that he felt that he was among friends and expressed his appreciation for the warmth of his welcome in Washington.

M. Diallo referred to his immediately preceding conversation with Mr. Murphy² and said that he did not believe he had had time to cover all of the subjects he had intended, and said that he was prepared to come back to Washington, if necessary, after the close of the current session of the UN General Assembly.

Mr. Herter said that he believed that all of the points raised in the Prime Minister's letter had been covered in Mr. Diallo's talk with Mr. Murphy. M. Diallo agreed, but said that there was one important and delicate question which he had not had time to discuss with Mr. Murphy, namely, technical and financial assistance to Guinea.

The Acting Secretary said that United States aid programs abroad must be the subject of negotiation and agreement between the two parties. He said that these are usually inaugurated by the sending of technical missions on the part of either or both countries. He said that the United States would be willing to take up the question of assistance to Guinea at the appropriate time. He added that the United States is not in a position to make any definite comment without knowing exactly what Guinea has in mind. The Acting Secretary went on to say that the Department would be glad to discuss specific requests but pointed out that it was still far from clear what Guinea would continue to get from France. He emphasized the fact that the United States hoped that Guinea would continue to draw the major part of its economic assistance from France.

M. Diallo said that Guinea was equally hopeful of continued French aid but that the French attitude in the past two months has not been encouraging. He said that Guinea had made many *démarches* without any reply. He pointed out that Guinea's need is now and that the young state is going through difficult days with many unsolved problems and needs concrete proof of United States good will.

M. Diallo went on to say that it was in the long-time interest of the United States and the West in general to support the aspirations of the African peoples for independence and unity. He said that Africa

¹ Dated November 11; not found. Herter replied in a letter dated December 17. (*Ibid.*, 611.70B/12-1758)

² A memorandum of the conversation is *ibid.*, 601.70B11/12-158.

needs the moral support of the United States. He added that he was aware of the natural sympathy of the American people towards emerging Africa, but he said he was afraid that our alliances would serve as a brake on our assistance to the emerging states of Africa. M. Diallo pointed out that it would be in the interest of the United States and its Western allies to intervene with France and point out to the French that the latter should guide rather than oppose African independence.

The Acting Secretary thanked M. Diallo for his frankness and complimented him on the eloquence with which he had presented his views.

314. Memorandum of Conversation

December 18, 1958.

SUBJECT

United States Relations with Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Telli Diallo, Emissary of the Republic of Guinea
Mr. C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., Director, AFS
Mr. George D. LaMont, Deputy Director, AFS
Mr. Robert L. Ware, AFS

Ambassador Diallo called at the Department to say good-by prior to his departure on December 19 for Conakry via Paris and Dakar. Mr. Diallo said he was extremely grateful for the support given his country by the United States in connection with Guinea's application for UN membership.¹ He also expressed pleasure at the information that the Department's plan called for the opening of an Embassy at Conakry early in February 1959.²

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70B/12-1858. Confidential. Drafted by Ferguson.

¹ The United States voted in favor of Guinea's admission to the United Nations on December 9 in the Security Council and on December 12 in the General Assembly.

² The United States and Guinea established diplomatic relations on February 13, 1959. The Embassy in Conakry was established by Chargé d'Affaires ad interim Robert W. Rinden, who presented his credentials to President Sekou Touré on that date. He reported his meeting with Touré in despatches 1 and 3 from Conakry, both dated February 19, 1959. (*Ibid.*, 770B.11/2-1959 and 123-Rinden, Robert W.)

Mr. Diallo said that he would leave the question of economic and technical assistance to Guinea until his return to this country in January or February. Mr. Ferguson said that he believed that this was a good idea since Guinea was at the moment in the process of negotiating economic and technical aid agreements with France and obviously this would have a bearing on Guinea's external requirements. He added, however, that if Mr. Diallo had time ICA stood ready to explain the technical aspects of United States assistance programs to the Ambassador. Mr. Diallo replied that he did not have the time and preferred to leave the matter in abeyance until his return.

Ambassador Diallo went on to say, however, that he personally believed it essential that the United States make some sort of gesture towards Guinea at an early date. He said that he believed the most effective gesture would be an invitation to President Toure to visit the United States. Mr. Ferguson replied that unfortunately state and official visits had to be planned long in advance and that at the time the schedule of visits for 1959 was drawn up and no one in the United States Government envisaged the early emergence of Guinea as an independent state. For this reason, he said, there was absolutely no possibility of a visit in 1959. Ambassador Diallo replied that he understood this but that possibly some sort of vaguely worded general invitation might be conveyed orally to Mr. Toure with no date mentioned. Mr. Ferguson said the Department would consider his suggestion.

(Mr. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, entered the meeting at this point to wish the Ambassador bon voyage.)

Ambassador Diallo concluded by repeating his appreciation and gratitude for the courtesies he had received personally and the support his Government had received officially in the United States.

315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea

April 7, 1959, 1:06 p.m.

21. Diallo expressed great concern to Department last evening over April 4 *New York Times* story of Czech arms shipment particularly part reading "Both at the Pentagon and in the State Department there are experts who wish some new initiative in West Africa could be developed soon particularly in view of the Guinea situation. Experts in several branches are studying developments. However US military officials have not dealt with the subject as a matter for immediate action. There have been no meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor any Pentagon–State Department consultations in this respect."

Diallo interpreted word "action" to connote possibly military action and said this would create serious repercussions in Conakry.

Department officials explained nature of free press to Diallo and said article in no way represented views of US Government. Department doubted use of word "action" by *Times* reporter referred to military action. In any event there is no military aspect to current US policies with respect to Guinea.

Department told Diallo however while US officials familiar with situation might be able understand Guinea's willingness accept aid from all sources US press and public opinion were bound to interpret receipt of large number Czech arms as contrary to interests American people and Free World. Diallo replied that although he had no precise information he strongly doubted Czech arms shipment anything like as great as that reported in press.

Department will leave to your discretion best means of handling *Times* story in Conakry but at some stage conversation with Toure himself would seem warranted.¹

Herter

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.56/4–759. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Ferguson, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Edwin M.J. Kretzmann and Public Affairs Adviser for African Affairs Rupert Prohme, and approved by Ferguson.

¹ Rinden reported in airgram 2 from Conakry, April 10, that he had not discussed this with Touré. He thought the "ruckus over the Czech arms" had been a "salutary lesson," and neither reassurances nor reiteration would be useful. Furthermore, he commented, because of Touré's resentment of the delay in U.S. recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, and appointment of an ambassador, and the disappointment of his "apparent expectation" that the United States would hasten to compete with the Soviet Union in offering economic aid to Guinea, "U.S. diplomatists are not in a very graceful position when it comes to volunteering advice." (*Ibid.*, 770B.56/4–1059)

316. Memorandum of Conversation

April 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

Conversation between Mr. Murphy and Mr. Telli Diallo, Appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Telli Diallo, Appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. J. C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary, AF
William C. Canup, AFS

Ambassador Diallo opened the conversation by explaining that he hoped to initiate his mission to Washington¹ in a spirit of friendship and cooperation, to which Mr. Murphy replied that the Department was conscious of its good relations with Guinea and assuredly would cooperate with the Ambassador. Mr. Murphy explained that the Department's position should be clear and that it consisted of a desire to have close ties with Guinea, whose problems it understood and whose needs it intended to consider sympathetically. The Ambassador then pointed out the financial and personnel difficulties standing in the way of the establishment and staffing of a Guinean Embassy in Washington.

Ambassador Diallo set forth the guiding lines of Guinea's policy, which he described as based on a consciousness of Guinea's ties with the West and appreciation for Western culture. He pleaded for direct contacts between Guinea and the United States so that the latter country would not be prejudiced by the opinions of Guinea held by third countries. He added that Guinea will never intentionally take action to damage its relations with the United States, but that Guinea might be the victim of attempts by other nations to separate it from its Western friends. Mr. Murphy replied that, as an independent country, Guinea would be dealt with directly by the United States, that the United States intended to be frank in its dealings with Guinea and that we would not hesitate to question Guinea whenever doubts arose which affected our relations with it.

Mr. Murphy said that such a doubt had already arisen in connection with the Czech arms deliveries to Conakry. While professing to understand the reason for acquiring a certain quantity of arms, Mr. Murphy wondered at the circumstances which had caused such a large quantity of arms to arrive in Guinea at the same time as Communist

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.70B11/4-2459. Confidential. Drafted by Canup.

¹ Diallo was to present his credentials to the President on April 27.

bloc specialists and a Soviet diplomatic mission. He requested an explanation. The Ambassador referred to his press conference at the United Nations on March 18, and explained that Guinea had never requested arms of Czechoslovakia. Guinea had, he explained, made general requests for assistance for all nations in a position to offer it, and Czechoslovakia had come forward with arms. The Ambassador further explained that, although Guinea has an army of 2,000 soldiers and has 13,000 demobilized former French Army soldiers, it has no fear of attack nor projects for disturbing its neighbors. The acceptance of the arms, according to him, did not symbolize Guinea's capitulation to any political terms which the Communist bloc countries might have in mind.

Mr. Murphy expressed surprise that Czechoslovakia had sent arms without first obtaining the agreement of Guinea or even showing the Guinea Government an inventory list. The Ambassador replied to this that Guinea's trouble arose in part from a blatant French campaign to discredit Guinea in the eyes of the world. The discussion then passed to the reasons for the lack of fulfillment of the three protocols of association signed between France and Guinea on January 7. Mr. Diallo denied French statements that Guinea was reluctant to sign conventions with France, pointing out that Guinea needs French aid for many reasons and is basically well-disposed towards France. The Ambassador explained the French attitude towards Guinea as springing from a serious dilemma. In effect if Guinea succeeds in making independence work, it will act as a pole of attraction for states presently in the French community. Mr. Murphy asked what benefit France might gain from Guinea's present difficult situation, to which the Ambassador replied that Guinea would become an object lesson to the states of the Community, in addition to which the French undoubtedly hope that a successor government to Sekou Toure's could be enticed back into the Community. For this reason, the Ambassador said, France is pursuing a conscious policy of sapping Guinea's strength and attempting to suppress Guinea in the international arena. The Ambassador complained that although Guinea asked France for permission to remain in the franc zone and offered the French buildings in Conakry for their Embassy, the French have not so much as shown the courtesy of helping the Guinean Ambassador in Paris to find decent office space. For this reason, the Guinea Government was convinced that France was working for Sekou Toure's downfall. The Ambassador added that because of the withdrawal by France of its two-billion-franc 1958 treasury advance, Guinea did not have the funds to open its Embassy in Washington. Mr. Diallo said that in their precipitate departure the French had stripped the country of many essential items such as medical supplies.

Mr. Murphy then asked the Ambassador how long he would remain away from Washington,² but the Ambassador's reply was vague. It appeared that he would be gone at least 3-6 weeks and possibly longer.

Ambassador Diallo then mentioned his country's need for United States assistance, stressing that an immediate program constituting a gesture and an indication of United States support was vastly preferable to a large aid program which might be several months in the planning. Mr. Satterthwaite replied that the Agricultural Attaché at Monrovia had been sent to study Guinea's immediate food needs and that further studies of Guinea's needs would be made as rapidly as possible. Mr. Murphy reminded the Ambassador that Guinea had not asked for precise and well-defined United States aid.

In conclusion, the Ambassador again pleaded for United States understanding of Guinea and its problems and asked if there were any questions remaining in Mr. Murphy's mind concerning Guinea's policies. Mr. Murphy thanked the Ambassador for his visit and asked him to explain to President Toure that the Department would be pleased to make contact with the President should he decide to pay a visit to the United Nations General Assembly next fall.

² After presenting his credentials, Diallo was to return temporarily to Conakry.

317. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower

April 24, 1959.

SUBJECT

Proposed Visit of the President of Guinea

Recent developments in the relations of Guinea and the Soviet bloc countries are causing serious concern. Since September 28, 1958, when Guinea attained independence by her vote in the French referendum, the Soviet Union and bloc countries have been actively wooing her by the signing of trade, cultural and educational agreements. This has culminated in a Czech arms gift and the assignment of Soviet, Bulgarian and Czech representatives in Guinea.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.11/4-2459. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs James K. Penfield and Ware.

Because of conditions in Guinea, President Sekou Toure was forced to defer an invitation to visit Washington unofficially in connection with his planned attendance at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly.¹ President Toure has, through his Ambassador-designate, indicated his intention to visit the United Nations General Assembly during its next session in September of this year. I believe that the extension of an invitation from you to President Toure for an official visit to the United States at the same time would be most effective in counteracting the rapidly developing communist influence in Guinea.

It is suggested that President Toure be invited to spend three days in Washington at the President's Guest House and be a guest of the Government for an additional week for visiting other parts of the United States. I believe that you will be involved personally to the extent of meeting President Toure at the Airport, if his visit occurs during the appropriate months, serving as host at a luncheon during his first full day in Washington, and possibly receiving President Toure for an office call at the White House during the visit. If it is your wish, Sekou Toure would be advised that it is not necessary for him to give a return luncheon or dinner for you.

I also recommend that, if convenient, your official airplane be made available to transport President Toure from New York City to Washington on arrival and that you request the Secretary of Defense to furnish suitable aircraft for the transportation of the President and his party within the continental United States on a non-reimbursable basis, as being in the national interest.

The Guinean Ambassador-designate to the United States, Mr. Telli Diallo, is scheduled to present his credentials to you at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, April 27. The following day he is returning to Guinea for consultation with his Government. I believe that a most favorable psychological impact would be produced within the Government of Guinea if, on that occasion, you were able to informally advise Ambassador Diallo of your intention to issue a formal invitation to President Toure to visit the United States. The Ambassador could be told that arrangements concerning the date of the visit and other matters would be worked out through normal diplomatic channels.

¹ Telegram 298 from Dakar, February 13, reported that Touré planned to leave Conakry for New York on February 18. (*Ibid.*, 770B.11/2-1359) Rinden reported further concerning his plans in despatch 1 from Conakry (see footnote 2, Document 314). Telegram 2 to Conakry, February 18, authorized Rinden to invite Touré to visit Washington unofficially in connection with his visit to New York, and despatch 4 from Conakry, February 20, reported that he had accepted. (Department of State, Central Files, 770B.11/2-1859 and 770B.11/2-2059, respectively) Despatch 10 from Conakry, March 4, reported that Touré had decided to defer his trip until the fall session of the General Assembly. (*Ibid.*, 770B.11/3-459)

Both Bob Murphy and I feel that in the category of official visits this one deserves priority consideration over any others that have yet come to our attention.²

Christian A. Herter³

² A handwritten note on the source text states that the visit was approved but with different timing. Telegram 37 to Conakry, May 5, instructed Rinden to extend an invitation from Eisenhower to Touré to make a State visit to the United States in late October. (*Ibid.*, 770B.11/5-559)

The last sentence was added later, apparently by Herter.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

318. Memorandum of Conversation

April 28, 1959.

SUBJECT

Sixth Tripartite Talk on Africa¹

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Mr. Robert Murphy
Mr. J. C. Satterthwaite, AF
Mr. Dwight Porter, G
Mr. David Nes, AF
Mr. Lewis D. Brown, WE
William C. Canup, AFS

U.K.

Sir Harold Caccia
Mr. Piers Carter
Mr. Charles Wiggan

France

M. Herve Alphanand
M. Jacques Leprette

Ambassador Alphanand outlined French concern with regard to recent events in Guinea, including deliveries of arms, medicines and non-military supplies from the Communist Bloc. He indicated that the French were worried about the effects of these deliveries on one of the few remaining parts of the world still disarmed. The Ambassador pointed out that Ambassador Diallo had told him that Guinea did not request the Czech arms, does not need them, and cannot use them. Continuing by saying that this highly dangerous situation results from

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770.00/4-2859. Secret. Drafted by Canup.

¹ Regarding the five tripartite discussions on Africa held April 16-21, see Document 13 and footnote 1 thereto.

a design of the Communist Bloc to build a depot in Guinea, the Ambassador indicated that French legal experts were studying the possibility of stopping further arms shipments. However, in his opinion, the problem was more political than legal and required the sounding of a general alarm by Guinea's African neighbors. Alphand suggested that if Liberia were to react publicly against the arms deliveries, the Community, Sierra Leone, the Portuguese and even the United States could join the outcry and this could be the beginning of an international convention preventing the flow of arms to Guinea.

Mr. Murphy expressed the opinion that Liberia would be unwilling to issue a public statement. He also indicated that the Department's Legal Adviser had found no legal ground for preventing the arms deliveries. Mr. Murphy asked if we were certain that arms had arrived in considerable quantities. [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*]

Ambassador Caccia stated that British alarm was less over the size of the arms deliveries than over the presence of Czech instructors and technicians which the West should attempt at all cost to dislodge. He placed the presence of the Communist personnel ahead of the actual arms as the primary danger. Mr. Murphy voiced the fear that we may see the beginning of an arms race in Africa because of the peculiar appeal which armament has to newly independent nations.

There followed a discussion of Guinean charges that France had removed so much equipment from Guinea that the country was in urgent need of supplies from every source. Ambassador Alphand indicated that France had tried to help Guinea since its independence but that Guinea had refused all French offers. Mr. Murphy concluded that the first thing for the West to do in this situation was to send a competent ambassador or ambassadors to Conakry without delay in order to obtain badly needed information.

Mr. Alphand stated that France will not now send an ambassador and preferred that the U.S. also not send one. Mr. Murphy asked what the French reasoning was behind this decision adding that an ambassador is nothing more than a business representative and that the real decision concerning relations with Guinea was taken at the time the Western powers recognized that country. Mr. Alphand said that France did not like the attitude shown by the Guinea Government and that with or without Western ambassadors the problems with Guinea remain as acute. Mr. Murphy asked if this meant the French wished to leave Guinea to the Soviets, adding that Diallo and the Guinea Government have strong feelings that France is abandoning Guinea by refusing to implement the protocols of January 7. He asked Mr. Alphand what President Toure must think when the Communist Bloc is sending ambassadors and the Western nations not. He asked if the French attitude was calculated to improve President Toure's attitude

toward the West. Mr. Alphand replied that nothing the West does can improve the President's attitude, and that France does not wish to honor the Guineans by sending an ambassador but desires only to stop the arms deliveries.

Ambassador Caccia stated that British legal experts doubted that the arms could legally be stopped, except under certain circumstances if aboard Western ships or in French Community territorial waters. Therefore, Britain could not support a seizure of the arms. The Ambassador went on to ask if anyone knew the real size or threat of the arms. He said that public statements by African Governments could be extremely damaging if the quantity of arms turned out to be small. Mr. Caccia added that, as for accrediting a British ambassador to Conakry, it has already proposed to President Toure that Ambassador Clarke in Monrovia be accredited to Conakry as well.

Mr. Murphy regretted that no Western power has yet discussed the arms matter with President Toure, adding that normally one would expect to discuss a matter of this importance with a friendly government before making a public outcry against that government. Mr. Murphy added that the latter course could lead to a damaging public debate, with President Toure making countercharges against his attackers.

Mr. Alphand pressed his request that the Department approach President Tubman and that the British approach Prime Minister Nkrumah. Mr. Murphy voiced his great concern over possible public statements from these statesmen. However, it was agreed that approaches would be made.² Mr. Murphy again stressed the necessity for sending ambassadors to Conakry to help Guinean Ambassador Diallo who is expected to advocate a pro-Western stand by President Toure. Ambassador Caccia repeated British uneasiness over the lack of precise information concerning the size of the arms deliveries.

² Telegram 295 to Monrovia, April 28, suggested that the Embassy discuss the reports of the build-up of Communist arms in Guinea with President Tubman and noted that it might be useful if he made inquiries of Sékou Touré. (Department of State, Central Files, 770B.00/4-2859)

319. Telegram From the Embassy in Guinea to the Department of State

Conakry, June 24, 1959, 11 a.m.

91. Department pouch Paris, Monrovia. From Satterthwaite. Thanks to joint efforts Rinden and Ambassador Diallo I found on my arrival here yesterday an exceptional cordial atmosphere toward US as indicated by fact President Sekou Toure and members government have given me a very cordial reception. I had an hour with him and leading members his government last night followed by dinner with Foreign Minister Fode, Ambassador Diallo and new Secretary General of Foreign Affairs Diallo. This morning Rinden and I had an hour with Sekou Toure at which Legislative Assembly President Diallo Saifou-laye was only other person present.

Yesterday President spoke very bitterly of manner in which French left here (taking everything possible including arms from security forces with them) and of subsequent French intrigues to overthrow his government. He spoke with pride of impressive progress his government has made in spite the difficulties in both political and economic fields since independence.

This morning President discussed first role of French in Guinea and its interest and between Guinea and US in the development of our relations with Guinea; of the political and economic situation in Guinea and of what he called "the mystic" of Union of Black African States which he thought might spread to other African States later.

As of incidental interest he said that only visit he had made behind Iron Curtain was one to Warsaw of about four days in 1950 or 1951 of which French had full knowledge. On question of Czech arms he reiterated that Guinea had not asked for these arms and said that maximum number of rifles was between 2500 and 3000.

I mentioned in latter connection the confusion about his request to US for arms made through President Tubman of Liberia. I said that President Tubman had sincerely desired help Guinea in this matter and should not be criticized in any way for any misunderstandings which arose later.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70B/6-2459. Confidential. Repeated to Paris and Monrovia.

¹ Despatch 69 from Conakry, May 13, reported a conversation the previous day between Touré and Rinden in which Touré stated that he had sent a letter to the U.S. Government via Tubman several months earlier requesting U.S. arms. (*Ibid.*, 770B.5-MSP/5-1359) After a report along the same lines appeared in the *New York Times* on April 28, the Department of State issued a statement that the Liberian Ambassador had conveyed a Guinean request for arms to the Department on December 17, but that no formal communication had been received. (Telegram 300 to Monrovia, May 4; *ibid.*, 770B.56/5-459)

Rinden will prepare airgram reporting conversation in greater detail.²

Rinden

² Airgram 10, June 30. (*Ibid.*, 611.70B/6-3059)

320. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon)

October 6, 1959.

SUBJECT

Aid to Guinea

Discussion:

President Sekou Toure's forthcoming trip to Washington (October 26-28) provides a unique opportunity to exert a moderating influence on the future course of Guinea.

I. The Importance of Guinea to U.S. Interests

In the year since Guinea's independence, the country has assumed a critical importance among all the French-speaking areas of West and Equatorial Africa. Because Guinea accepted General de Gaulle's challenge and voted for independence, its experiment is being closely watched by all its French-speaking neighbors. If it seems to be succeeding, it will almost certainly act as a magnet to the surrounding area.

Furthermore, if the Soviet Bloc is able to achieve a dominant position there, it will undoubtedly use Guinea as a bridgehead for expanding its influence throughout West Africa.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/10-659. Confidential. Drafted by Thomas A. Cassilly and Eugene L. Padberg of the Office of Middle and Southern African Affairs. Those concurring included Deputy Coordinator for Mutual Security John O. Bell, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann, ICA Deputy Director for Operations Dennis A. FitzGerald, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ivan B. White.

II. Bloc Penetration

The Soviet Bloc appears to be making an all-out effort to capitalize on the present situation in Guinea. So far five Bloc nations have concluded bilateral trade agreements, theoretically committing a third of the country's trade. Some 150 Bloc technicians have replaced French officials so that the key officers in many vital ministries are from Eastern Europe: i.e., Radio Conakry, which in the absence of daily newspapers is the principal information medium in the country, is being operated by Czech technicians and the leading advisers of both the Ministries of Defense and Mines are also from behind the Iron Curtain. Recently the Soviets have offered a 35 million dollar loan.

Although we believe President Toure is trying to maintain a neutral policy, there are members of his government who reportedly are trying to push him to the left. Saifoulaye Diallo, for example, who concluded the negotiations for the Soviet loan, may develop into a potential rival of Sekou Toure if he is able to represent the Soviet Union as the real supporter of African nationalism, as opposed to the United States which delayed recognition of Guinea and has produced comparatively little aid. The recent Congress of the PDG, the only political party in Guinea, was attended by official delegations from the Soviet Communist Party and the parties of other satellites and represented the high-water mark so far of Bloc influence in the area.

An indication of President Toure's determination to maintain a neutral course is his choice of the United States for his first official trip outside Africa. Our Embassy in Conakry reports, however, that if he is unable to show that, as a result of this visit, the United States is as firm a supporter of Guinea as the USSR, his dominant position in the ruling hierarchy may be threatened by those further to the left.

III. United States Objectives

(1) Our principal objective in Guinea is to maintain the presence of the United States and the West in the country and to establish a position for future United States action to stem the flood of expanding Soviet influence and reinforce our own influence when this flood recedes.

(2) Also we believe that while Toure cannot be considered wholly satisfactory from the West's point of view, he nevertheless represents a stable element strongly committed to neutrality and, as such, is worthy of our support. Only with this support will he be able to oppose extreme leftist opposition now developing within the Party and be influenced toward a position more truly in Guinea's (and our own) best interests.

IV. United States Action Program

You will recall that on April 27 you approved the principle of United States aid to Guinea and the dispatch of an ICA survey team there (Tab A).¹ As a result of this visit, the team recommended (a) a technical cooperation program, (b) P.L. 480 support activities and (c) possible DLF loans, including one for setting up a development bank (Tab B).²

In addition to any impact projects that may be approved for presentation during the visit of Sekou Toure, it is planned to mention as evidence of United States interest in the well-being of Guinea the following examples of present and potential United States assistance:

English Teacher Program

ICA and USIA have initiated a joint English teaching project (Tab C)³ which to date has resulted in the arrival of one English teacher in Conakry on August 15, and the supplying of necessary equipment, such as tape recorders, mimeograph machines, books and supplies.

Following the signature of a Technical Cooperation Agreement with Guinea, which it is hoped will be ready for signature by Sekou Toure during his forthcoming visit to Washington (October 26–28), ICA proposes to expand this program by contracting with a university in the United States to provide a minimum of at least four additional English language teacher-trainers plus necessary backstop equipment. The estimated cost of this project is \$200,000 for two years. This joint ICA–USIA project could be expanded as opportunities present themselves.

Other ICA Projects

ICA, following signature of the Technical Cooperation Agreement, is also prepared to finance the training at Ohio State University of five (5) Guinean elementary school teachers whose classes initially would be in French. This would be a one-year program commencing in January 1960, the total budget for which would run approximately \$42,500.

¹ The tabs are not attached to the source text. Tab A is listed as a memorandum of April 27 approving aid to Guinea; not found. In a meeting that day with Diallo, Dillon said the first step in the consideration of U.S. aid to Guinea would be the sending of technicians to collect data and determine what kind of assistance program might be feasible; he indicated that he did not know how long Guinea would have to wait for a policy decision on U.S. aid, but he believed Diallo could tell President Touré that "something concrete will probably come from Guinea's requests." (Memorandum of conversation, April 27; *ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)

² ICA Report on Guinea; not found.

³ Telegram 24 to Conakry, July 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 870B.43/6–2659)

Additionally, ICA contemplates obligation of up to \$370,000 for technical assistance projects in the fields of agriculture, education, industry, etc., based on such recommendations as may develop out of joint USOM/GOG planning.

The foregoing activities scheduled for FY 1960 implementation will lay the basis for a continuing program, currently estimated at \$2.5 million for FY 1961.

USIA Program

Guinea has already agreed to a USIA program. USIA will formally open its office in Conakry with the assignment of one American officer who, it is hoped, will be on duty before the end of the calendar year. The activities to be undertaken are a press operation based on radio-teletype monitoring of the wireless file, film distribution, and local production to be included in the agency's African newsreel, "Today".

In the field of radio, USIS Conakry will publicize the Voice of America schedule to build up listenership for VOA programs and will attempt to place package programs with Radio Conakry. A library of English and French books will be opened in the Information Center.

The contract English teacher previously mentioned, who arrived in Conakry on August 15, is conducting an English teaching program aimed primarily at VIP's.

On September 15 a USIS officer was sent to Conakry to arrange for coverage of the Sekou Toure visit. Approximately \$39,000 will be spent in FY 1960 under this program for USIA Mission expenses alone.

ICA Investment Guaranty Program

Ambassador Morrow has been instructed to discuss this with the Guinean authorities when he considers it opportune.⁴

P.L. 480 Programs

In FY 1959 Title II PL 480 commodities, consisting of 5,000 tons of rice and 3,000 tons of wheat flour valued at \$2,175,000 were made available to Guinea. Similar commodities under the same program mounting to \$4,000,000 may be proposed during FY 1960.

There are several possibilities of providing further assistance to Guinea under P.L. 480:

1. Under Title II or possibly Title III, the initiation by some welfare agency of a school feeding program in which Sekou Toure has expressed interest. (This program might be arranged through CARE since all religious mission schools have been closed down.)

⁴ Ambassador John Howard Morrow had presented his credentials on July 30.

2. Utilization of Section 104 (d) currencies, which the United States own, (such as Israeli pounds or Indian rupees), to purchase and supply Guinea with pharmaceutical supplies, a refrigeration plant, earth moving equipment, trucks, jeeps, tires and spare parts.

DLF Loans

Indicate to Sekou Toure our willingness to consider applications for DLF loans. In this connection we can point out that once an ICA mission has been established, it would be willing to provide assistance in advising on DLF loans and the preparation of applications.

Impact Projects

We believe it is essential that we make a favorable impression on President Toure during his visit. Listed below are my recommendations for a minimal package which we should be prepared to offer:

1. *Plane (DC-3) (Tab D)*⁵

Since the Guineans have inquired about acquiring a DC-3 through commercial channels, the Embassy has recommended that consideration be given to presenting an aircraft to Sekou Toure during his visit. AV reports that a surplus DC-3 passenger plane in good condition, plus spare parts, can be obtained for \$80-100,000 and another \$100,000 or more would have to be spent to change it to an executive configuration. In addition, it is estimated it will cost approximately \$10,000 to ferry the plane from the United States to Guinea. The former Chargé in Conakry reports that the Guinean Government could probably provide its own crew and maintenance facilities. There are precedents for such a gesture in the Coast Guard patrol vessel given Liberia after the Nixon visit and the Constellation given the Emperor of Ethiopia.

2. *IES Exchange Program (Tab E)*⁶

Under the IES Exchange Program three grants have already been allocated to Guinea. IES is prepared to increase this number to 15 in accordance with the Embassy's recommendation on page 9 of the referenced despatch.

Recommendation:

That you approve the above course of action, including the use of up to \$600,000 from Contingency Funds for Technical Cooperation with Guinea, and up to \$250,000 from Special Assistance Funds for the airplane, leaving a balance of possible requirements in Special Assistance of \$1,150,000.⁷

⁵ Despatch 63 from Conakry, August 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 770B.72/8-2459)

⁶ Despatch 73 from Conakry, September 1. (*Ibid.*, 611.70B/9-159)

⁷ Dillon initialed his approval of the recommendation on October 13.

321. Editorial Note

President Sekou Touré made a State visit to Washington, October 26–28. Regarding President Eisenhower's invitation to him, see Document 317; for text of the June 4 announcement of the visit, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 22, 1959, page 917. While in Washington, President Touré met with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Herter; see Documents 322 and 323.

The text of the joint communiqué issued by President Eisenhower and President Touré on October 28 is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pages 1109–1110. The texts of the exchange of greetings between Vice President Nixon and Touré on October 26 and the exchange of toasts between Eisenhower and Touré at a White House dinner that evening is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 16, 1959, pages 719–722. For text of a cultural agreement signed on October 28 by Secretary of State Herter and Acting Foreign Minister Louis-Lansana Béavogui, see 10 UST 1829. A briefing memorandum of October 22 from Herter to Eisenhower is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. Additional documentation concerning the visit, including briefing materials, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1518–1520.

President Touré was in the United States October 25–November 9. After leaving Washington, he visited Durham, North Carolina; Chicago; Los Angeles; Wheeling, West Virginia; and New York, where he addressed the U.N. General Assembly.

322. Memorandum of ConversationOctober 27, 1959.¹

SUBJECT

Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador John Morrow

Guinea
President Sekou Touré
Saïfoulaye Diallo, President of the
National Assembly

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.11/10–2759. Confidential. Drafted by Satterthwaite and approved in the White House.

¹ The conversation was presumably held in the White House.

Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite
Colonel Walters (Interpreter)

Ambassador Telli Diallo
Louis-Lansana Beavogui, Minister of
General Economy
Fodeba Keita, Minister of Interior

After an exchange of greetings President Eisenhower noted that Guinea had acquired its independence by peaceful means. It would however be unrealistic, he added, to expect the United States to interfere in those countries which are not yet independent. But in those countries which are independent we want to be helpful. Furthermore we deplore any actions which make Guinean problems more difficult.

The President reviewed the history of our relations with the Philippine Islands, pointing out that in the very early days of our occupation we made it clear to the Philippine leaders that it was our intention to prepare the Philippine people for independence. He himself, working under General MacArthur, had been given the task of organizing a Philippine Army. He also recalled that when the Soviet Union some years ago had described the United States as a colonial power because of its relationships with Puerto Rico, he had instructed our chief delegate at the United Nations to make it clear that Puerto Rico could have its independence any time it wished it. Puerto Rico however said no. The President also referred to the fact that we had been instrumental in helping Cuba acquire its independence.

Thus our own history of independence and of giving independence to others, President Eisenhower continued, makes it evident that we do not believe in dominating any other peoples. At the same time, however, we cannot stir up unrest in Africa or elsewhere. Nevertheless he wished to make it clear that the United States welcomes the emergence of independent states and is happy to welcome Guinea as the newest of such states. We desire to be helpful. In this connection he recalled that we ourselves were once a colony.

The President then noted that education usually has the first priority in new nations. He thereupon congratulated President Sekou Touré on his considerable accomplishments in this field since acquiring independence, especially his success in building new schools. He was, he continued, particularly delighted by the visit of President Sekou Touré and his party to this country. Our relations with Guinea will, he said, be direct and not influenced by third parties. At the same time, he added, we expect that Guinea likewise will not be influenced by third parties in its relations with the United States. He then told President Sekou Touré he would listen with great interest to whatever he might wish to say.

In replying to President Eisenhower, President Sekou Touré said that he hoped that the present lack of knowledge and understanding of Africa would soon be replaced by a fuller knowledge of that continent. Such progress as has been made in Guinea, he continued, is due

to the simplicity and the honesty in the relations between the people of Guinea and its leaders. Referring to the referendum of September of last year, the people of Guinea voted "no", he said, not just for Guinea but for all of Africa. This has been borne out, he stated, by the fact that virtually all those who voted "yes" at that time now want their independence. This, he said, is because by independence they mean confidence in themselves. Their real treasure lies in their honesty and in their will to work.

Continuing, he said, the Guineans have been completely frank with the French and the latter know exactly how the Guineans feel toward them. The French created many difficulties for the Guineans, ordering all their security forces, their teachers and technicians, in sum all of the French officials and advisers, back to France immediately. Moreover, the French removed from Conakry all their records including those of the courts. All this action was difficult enough but more important were the French efforts to ruin the economy of Guinea. Notwithstanding all this they had, as President Eisenhower remarked, made progress and had also acquired many friends around the world.

President Sekou Touré said they thereupon had to search for means to help themselves. Missions were shortly thereafter received from the Eastern countries who offered their help. Indeed so dire was their need that they would have accepted help from the devil himself at that juncture. These missions from the Eastern countries offered them barter arrangements of a type which they were able to accept. They also sent some 2500 rifles, three tanks, six tractors, a number of field kitchens and several thousand steel plows, all of which were given Guinea without their having made a request for them of any kind either orally or in writing.

The one country of which they did make a request, President Sekou Touré added, was the United States through President Tubman. Although they approached President Tubman several times they did not receive a favorable answer from the United States to their request for small arms for their security forces. They worked through President Tubman because Ambassador Diallo was not in the country at that time. (*Note: President Sekou Touré was in error at this remark as Telli Diallo, who was later named Ambassador, was in the United States at least part of this period.*) Moreover, President Sekou Touré added, the French were at this time introducing automatic weapons into the country surreptitiously and getting them into the hands of their former soldiers. In fact, he said, they had seized about a thousand of such arms. On this President Eisenhower smilingly remarked that this at least meant they were receiving arms for their security forces in this way.

President Sekou Touré thereafter made the following comments: English has now been made compulsory in all their schools. Guinea continues to aid all countries seeking their independence. The French had nothing to fear from Guinea in the economic and cultural fields and could well have helped Guinea. All Africans are seeking their independence but the French are doing everything to prevent them from obtaining it.

President Sekou Touré then spoke with considerable eloquence of the greatness of the African continent and of its need for moral and spiritual, as well as material, aid. Guinea, he said, felt that it must aid in solving all these problems. Moreover all the other continents except Africa are now free. Africa is nevertheless obtaining its independence at the rate of four to six countries per year. He thought it would be in the best interests of the United States to aid all these countries on a continental rather than a piece-meal basis. Africa will inevitably move on to its final liberation. The measure in which the United States can adapt its policies to help Africa will redound to the credit of the United States. The only real concern of his visit is to make this understood.

President Eisenhower thereupon said that he would like to make one or two more comments. He mentioned a dinner which he had attended recently in Paris at which were present the Prime Ministers of the member states of the French Community.² These Prime Ministers had told him that they had decided to remain in the Community. At the same time they had not criticized Guinea for not doing so. They felt that it was in the best interests of their countries not to create trade barriers but rather to continue to enjoy the advantages which the Community gave them. At the same time they mentioned the fact that the constitution of the Community still gave them the opportunity to choose independence. One of the Prime Ministers had indeed hinted that his state would probably so choose. The others indicated that they would remain in the Community. If and when they do decide for independence, the United States will try to be helpful to them.

President Eisenhower with great feeling then said that our belief in the brotherhood of man and our religious beliefs strengthen us in this faith. We will not violate our own traditions. Any and every problem presented to us by the new countries of Africa will be considered sympathetically.

In closing the conversation President Eisenhower commented that he had been very interested indeed in hearing President Sekou Touré's remarks and of learning something of the needs of Guinea and of its domestic problems. He was confident that in the further conversations in the State Department these would be spelled out in greater detail

² On September 2.

and over a period of time during which they may wish to send some people here and we some to Guinea. It would, he said, be a privilege and not a burden for us to do all we could to help Guinea.

Whereupon the interview, having lasted for an hour, was broken off at the Secretary's suggestion by the taking of photographs.

323. Memorandum of Conversation

October 27, 1959.

SUBJECT

Africa and Aid

PARTICIPANTS

Guinea

President Sekou Toure
Saifoulaye Diallo, President of
National Assembly
Louis-Lansana Beavogui, Minister of
National Economy
Ambassador Telli Diallo
Fodeba Keita, Minister of the Interior
Major Noumandian Keita, Chief of
Staff

United States

Secretary of State Herter
Under Secretary Murphy
Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite
Ambassador John H. Morrow
John O. Bell, U/MSC
W. J. Handley, USIA
Marcus Gordon, ICA
C. Vaughan Ferguson, AFS
Thomas A. Cassilly, AFS
Marcel Van Essen, AFS

The Secretary welcomed President Toure and asked him to open the discussion.

President Toure began by describing the main purpose of his visit to the United States as "moral and political;" Guinea's independence would constitute a springboard for the "achievement of the African peoples' personality and the rehabilitation of their culture." Whatever our faults may be, our people have great moral integrity, he declared, and we are faithful to Africa.

There can be no quarrel, the President declared, between such advanced nations as the United States and the undeveloped countries of Africa. Moreover, the problems of Africa are interlocking and one problem cannot be considered in isolation from all the others. Since the United States is able to contribute a great deal to humanity, it has an equally great responsibility. Any plan for the economic develop-

ment and emancipation of Africa must aim at giving the African people a sense of security and confidence. The sooner Africans realize that they can rightfully count on assistance, the more they will accept sacrifices on their own part since their future security would be assured.

Sekou Toure urged the United States to adapt its policies to the new realities in Africa. This did not mean that he wanted the United States to declare war on the colonial powers; he would, however, ask that our consideration of African problems not be subordinated to the views of colonial powers since colonialism is outdated.

As far as Guinea is concerned, President Toure declared that its regime is neutral. It might be argued that there is no such thing as neutrality and that everyone must belong to one bloc or the other. This, Toure judged, is both true and false at the same time. It is true if you consider Africans to be self-sufficient. But this is not the case; one-third of the continent is underfed and lacks basic, elementary needs such as medicine, tools or ploughs. On the human level, Africans are motivated by an irresistible force so that they do not stop to ask why they lack these basic needs; all they know is that they are relentlessly driven to satisfy such needs.

Guinea and the rest of Africa are in favor of fraternal cooperation with all nations. They want it understood that the present situation in Africa requires more than a piecemeal attack on isolated problems. Such developed countries as the United States should do more than just concentrate on a single school building in Conakry or a dam somewhere else. We ask for a dynamic American policy, Toure declared, affirming its determination to help all the undeveloped countries of the world and especially Africa. Security for invested capital and reasonable profits should go hand in hand with a sense of security and confidence in these investments on the part of the African people.

Sekou Toure concluded by referring to Guinea's counter proposals to the draft technical cooperation agreement which were given to the United States Embassy in Conakry.¹ Also, he declared that an agreement on cultural relations between the two countries should be concluded within the framework of Guinea's position as outlined above.

In reply, Secretary Herter acknowledged the United States' responsibility to the rest of the world and referred to President Eisenhower's recent speech in Abilene, Texas [*Kansas*] where he had said

¹ Telegram 124 from Conakry, October 19, reported a discussion with Guinean officials that day concerning a proposed technical cooperation agreement. The Guineans stated that they considered the terms of the U.S. proposal too restrictive and presented a counterproposal for a more general agreement including cultural and commercial relations. (*Ibid.*, 870B.00-TA/10-1959)

that it was a privilege for us to assist undeveloped countries.² The Secretary mentioned that Toure's intimation that these talks might exceed the limits of U.S.-Guinean relations was somewhat beyond our scope. Nevertheless, he wanted to affirm that President Toure's moral position on African problems was very similar to that of the United States.

With regard to the technical cooperation agreement with Guinea, the Secretary observed that it was broad in scope and covered the technical and economic fields in general terms. With regard to the cultural pact, the Secretary expressed hope that agreement on this matter would be reached that same day or the next, so that it could be signed while President Toure was still in Washington. Sekou Toure affirmed that his Government accepted the terms of the cultural agreement and was ready to sign.³

The Secretary then broached the subject of an economic agreement which would provide for the protection of private investments and assistance to be granted by the United States Government. He noted that the United States is required by law to operate on a project-by-project basis and cannot enter into a world-wide assistance program. The Secretary also reminded President Toure that our legislation prohibits the U.S. from committing itself to projects of more than one year's duration and that, consequently, United States foreign assistance has to be implemented on a year-to-year basis. The Secretary then turned over the meeting to Mr. Murphy.

President Toure said he wished to clarify his previous statement, which he believed may not have been fully understood. Guinea is not seeking a written political agreement with the United States nor is it seeking a formal declaration of U.S. intentions with regard to Africa. The main points the President wished to convey were: (1) the African need for moral and diplomatic support from the United States, and (2) the need to situate the moral context of these talks so as to reach a firm agreement which would cover not merely the present but also problems likely to arise in the future. Sekou Toure gave a concrete example of the kind of support he had in mind: during the first difficult months after independence, the Government of Guinea had kept a close eye on any factors which might have curtailed its newly-acquired sovereignty. The Guineans were aware, for example, that France had discussed the problem of Guinea's independence with its NATO partners and was considering occupying by force the islands of Los (situated just outside Conakry). The French would have tried to justify such a

² Reference is to the President's address at the groundbreaking ceremonies for the Eisenhower Library on October 13; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*, pp. 719–725.

³ For text of the agreement signed on October 28 by Herter and Béavogui, see 10 UST 1829.

move on the grounds that these islands were not part of continental Guinea. According to Toure, his Government had been informed that, thanks to United States pressure on the French, this plan did not materialize. "This fact is known by every single Guinean," the President asserted.

Mr. Murphy replied that President Toure's remarks had been most useful in helping the United States to understand the general situation in Africa. Broaching specific matters, he asked President Toure for a clarification of Guinea's economic position vis-à-vis France. Mr. Murphy said that he understood that this matter had been discussed generally with President Eisenhower that morning but that President Toure's analysis and estimate of the future economic relations between Guinea and France would be helpful to the United States Government in evaluating its own program to assist Guinea.

President Toure replied that Guinea was going through a period of "creativity" which was made possible by the advent of independence. Important steps had been taken in many fields to exercise full national sovereignty. In the economic field, before independence, France had all the privileges and especially had held close to all functions connected with imports and exports, while Africans were excluded from most economic activities. Following independence, the Government of Guinea had created a National Office of Foreign Trade which was made a part of the Ministry of Economy. This Office is responsible for implementing trade agreements with other countries and insuring a balanced flow of imports and exports. Before independence, practically all of Guinea's exports had been shipped to France; since then, France has refused to buy Guinea's coffee and banana crop which are the country's most important exports. Consequently, Guinea has made barter agreements with Czechoslovakia, East Germany (and West Germany), Bulgaria, Poland and the USSR. With the latter country only coffee and palm products are involved. Guinea also trades with Italy, the UK and the U.S. Although it may not appear to be sound economics, Guinea, in its early steps towards independence, preferred to resort to barter arrangements in order to tailor its imports to its exports. These barter arrangements can be either entirely or partially fulfilled or even cancelled. President Toure revealed that next year Guinea also plans to initiate its first three-year plan which is designed to develop all sectors of the economy. This plan will be established on the basis of thorough studies and sound statistics. Foreign investments are welcome either in a majority or in a minority participation, and security and profits will be insured.

Mr. Murphy thanked the President for this information and asked him the following specific questions:

1. Are Guinea's barter arrangements, presently in force, confined to a specific time limit? President Toure replied that these arrangements are limited only in quantity, not in duration.

2. How does Guinea visualize the position of the United States vis-à-vis the National Office of Foreign Trade? Will this office authorize trade with the United States following a certain formula? Toure replied that it would. During the first eight months of 1959, Guinea's exports to the United States had totalled approximately \$185,000 and imports from the United States about \$1.6 million.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that, while he understood Guinea's need to barter, this posed a difficult problem for the United States since we were not authorized by law to enter into barter agreements. However, the U.S. is ready to discuss a trade agreement with Guinea at any time.

Mr. Satterthwaite at this point stated that in order to satisfy President Toure's need for a concrete gesture on our part, the United States Government was prepared to offer Guinea 150 scholarships. These scholarships are to be part of the technical cooperation agreement now being negotiated and would be granted as soon as this agreement was signed.

Mr. Murphy invited President Toure's attention to the facilities of the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund in considering Guinea's need for loans for specific projects.

As President Toure had to leave for the National Press Club, the talks were suspended. Mr. Murphy and President Toure agreed to meet the following morning for the signing of the cultural agreement. It was further agreed that Mr. Ferguson and Ambassador Diallo would work out a joint press communiqué.

324. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dillon to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Riddleberger)

March 3, 1960.

SUBJECT

Aid to Guinea

Recent reports from our Embassy in Conakry have made it abundantly clear that we will not be able to negotiate a Technical Cooperation Agreement with Guinea in sufficient time to begin to implement the Teacher Training Program and the 150 scholarships we have offered. The Guineans have made it plain that they do not like anything about our proposed Technical Cooperation Agreement. They find the whole concept of our requesting rights and privileges for ICA technicians most offensive since they believe it is the role of a sovereign government to prescribe what privileges will be accorded. It is also clear that the Sino-Soviet Bloc has stepped up the pace of its activity in a very dramatic fashion and is determined to make Guinea an African show place.

I believe it has now become of overriding political importance for the United States to take unusual steps to implement the offers of assistance we have already made to Guinea in order to establish U.S. presence in Guinea. In view of the already massive assistance Guinea is getting from the bloc it is clearly in the U.S. political interest to extend to Guinea, on a special basis, assistance in which it has shown an interest. I recognize the fact that we may be setting a precedent for other emerging nations of Africa but in view of the special circumstances we face in Guinea I believe this is a risk we must face. I regard it as essential that Guinea not be required to agree to any of the usual requirements normally attached to U.S. assistance, such as privileges and immunities, observation and review, publicity, etc.

Accordingly, I suggest that we proceed on the basis of a simple exchange of notes with the Guinean Government informing it that we are prepared to implement the teacher training program and the 150 scholarships.¹

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.70B7/3-360. Confidential. Drafted by Politico-Economic Adviser for African Affairs George Dolgin. Sent to Dillon with a covering memorandum of March 2 from Satterthwaite. (*Ibid.*, 870B.00-TA/3-260)

¹ A memorandum of March 18 from Riddleberger to Dillon stated that ICA was preparing to implement the two programs but considered that they should be carried out on a contractual basis without direct U.S. Government involvement. It expressed the hope that "at least a reasonably satisfactory" agreement could subsequently be negotiated. (*Ibid.*, 770B.5-MSP/3-1860) Instruction A-5 to Conakry, July 28, informed the Embassy that a revised and broader draft agreement for economic and technical cooper-

In order to finance these programs I have approved \$1.1 million in Special Assistance.

Douglas Dillon²

ation had been given to Diallo on July 20. (*Ibid.*, 611.70B7/7–2860) An agreement was effected by an exchange of notes in Conakry on September 30; for text, see 11 UST 2258.

² Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

325. Editorial Note

At the 436th meeting of the National Security Council on March 10, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Guinea during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, dated March 14, reads as follows:

“Mr. Dulles reported that the recent actions of Guinea highlighted the drift of that country toward closer relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The recognition of East Germany and the probable taking of similar action with respect to North Vietnam reflected Sekou Toure’s willingness to do business with the Bloc. Guinea’s recent withdrawal from the franc zone, reflecting a mistrust of Paris, resulted in considerable confusion. The currency for the new monetary system was probably printed in Czechoslovakia. The Three Year Economic Plan of Guinea had a strong socialist flavor, with the state exercising a virtual monopoly over trade and industrial development. Six Soviet Bloc nations were, or were about to be, represented in Guinea; Bloc economic and technical assistance in Guinea surpasses that for any other African state; and Guinea has a great deal of barter trade with the Bloc. The Czechs, East Germans, and Poles have about 100 advisors in Guinea and there are about 100 Guinean students behind the Iron Curtain. Mr. Dulles felt the Bloc was attempting to make Guinea a showcase in Africa. Mr. Dillon reported that the U.S. had been trying to conclude a technical assistance agreement with Guinea, but had been unsuccessful because Guinea refused to allow U.S. technicians sent to that country any privileges. Apparently the Czech technicians in Guinea lived in barracks and marched to work like soldiers. Guinea thought the U.S. technicians should behave in the same way.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

326. Memorandum of Conversation

May 18, 1960.

SUBJECT

Economic Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary (Mr. Dillon)
Telli Diallo, Guinean Ambassador
Lamine Sylla, Secretary of Embassy
Mr. James K. Penfield, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF
Thomas A. Cassilly, AFS

Ambassador Diallo informed the Acting Secretary that Guinea appealed to all nations for aid. There is no need to waste time surveying the country's requirements, he said, since Guinea needs everything. The Ambassador observed that he was aware of procedural difficulties which had hampered U.S. action in the past but strongly urged reconsideration of Guinea's needs. His country considers American aid essential because if it commits itself too exclusively to one side, Guinea will be unable to maintain its position of true neutrality.

Mr. Diallo pointed out that he and other Guinean ambassadors now have the equivalent of cabinet rank and have full power to enter into negotiations. "I come here with the best will to succeed in these negotiations but will remain here only so long as I feel there is some chance of success. The moment I am convinced that there is no hope for these negotiations, I shall leave".

Above all Guinea needs trained personnel, the Ambassador stated. Although he had met dozens of students from English-speaking Africa here, Mr. Diallo expressed regret that there were only two Guineans in the U.S. and he had not met any students from Senegal, the Ivory Coast or other French-speaking areas. Mr. Dillon referred to the language barrier and stated that after these areas become independent there would undoubtedly be a greater exchange of students.

High on the list of Guinean needs were agricultural products (both loans and purchase) and loans for development, according to Mr. Diallo. Guinea is quite satisfied with the functioning of Fria and remembers that this enterprise showed confidence in the new government just after independence when others did not. To attract further U.S. investments Guinea had passed an investment guarantee law five days before. The country also needs payment facilities to obtain dollars; Guinea wanted American products (and had bought automobiles,

motor cycles, etc., last year) but had been prevented from making further purchases because of the lack of dollars. Above all, Guinea needs the Konkoure Dam and hopes the U.S. can be persuaded to help build it. This project is so essential, the Ambassador maintained, that we cannot wait for any one country but will appeal to everyone to help us with this dam. We are prepared to do everything to cooperate with the U.S. and realize this project must be considered in conjunction with similar projects in Ghana and the Belgian Congo. Guinea believes the Konkoure project is by far the most feasible economically because of the proximity of the bauxite deposits.

Mr. Dillon asked whether Guinea had considered joining the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The Ambassador reported that Guinea had welcomed an official of the IMF who had made suggestions, but with the advent of the new currency reforms the situation had changed. Now his Government wanted to consolidate the new currency before considering whether it would join the Bank or the Fund; possibly in a year it would be in a position to join.

Meanwhile, the Ambassador continued, Guinea would like U.S. banks to establish themselves in the country. Also it hoped that the Pan American Airways would agree to stop over in Conakry on their Dakar-Roberts Field flights.

The Acting Secretary thanked Mr. Diallo for this exposition. As a result of Sekou Toure's letter to the President,¹ Mr. Dillon has been asked by the President to discuss mutual problems with the Guinean Ambassador. The U.S. Government was studying the possibility of modifying the usual procedures so that it would conform with the special situation in Africa.

We have confidence in the U.S., the Ambassador affirmed, but something must be done soon to justify such confidence. Since he planned to attend the Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa on June 15, he expected to discuss the entire question of U.S. aid with President Toure who will also be in Ethiopia. By that time he hoped he would have some definite information to give his President.

The Acting Secretary assured Mr. Diallo that we would do our best to find a satisfactory solution.

¹ The letter, dated April 20, was delivered to the Department by Ambassador Diallo on April 29. It enclosed descriptions of Guinea's recently-adopted currency reform and Three-Year Plan, and stated that Touré would welcome "all suggestions and proposals you deem appropriate to give us on this matter." (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) Eisenhower's reply, dated May 14 and transmitted in telegram 565 to Conakry of that date, stated that U.S. experts would be discussing the points raised in Touré's letter with Ambassador Diallo and assured Touré of "the great sympathy with which we regard your efforts to improve conditions in Guinea." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 870B.13/5-1460)

327. Memorandum of Conversation

June 10, 1960.

SUBJECT

Aid to Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

The Under Secretary

Mr. Telli Diallo, Ambassador of Guinea

Mr. Lamine Sylla, Secretary of the Guinean Embassy

Mr. Graydon Upton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury

AF—Mr. Penfield

U—Mr. Leddy

AFS—T. A. Cassilly

The Ambassador began by announcing he did not intend to go to Addis Ababa on June 15, as previously planned, and would return to Conakry only if his negotiations with U.S. officials seem to warrant his personal consultations with President Toure.

The Under Secretary outlined the contents of an Aide-Mémoire proposing U.S. assistance (attached).¹ He said he realized the importance the Guineans attached to the Konkoure Dam and observed that the most significant first step would be to up-date the present plans for this project. The question of the survey was under study at this time and we hoped in two or three weeks to give the Ambassador more definite news on this matter.

Mr. Dillon stressed the importance of prompt Guinean action on the offer of 7,000 tons of rice under Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act. Perhaps the Guinean Government did not fully appreciate the urgency of meeting the June 30, 1960 deadline for FY 1960, but the U.S. Government would have to act soon so that the 7,000 tons of rice and one million dollars could be set aside for this purpose.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/6-1060. Confidential. Drafted by Cassilly.

¹ Not printed. It stated that the U.S. Government was prepared to offer Guinea approximately 7,000 tons of rice, valued at \$1 million, under Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act and a local currency sales program valued at \$7.5 million for a 3-year period beginning July 1 under Public Law 480, and that it had under study the question of the Konkoure Dam survey. It further stated that the United States was prepared to discuss making available commodities such as jeeps, tractors, cement, and peanut oil, subject to funds being made available by Congress, that it was prepared to offer technical assistance, subject to the conclusion of an agreement, and that Guinea was eligible for aid projects in the fields of education and training under the Special Program for Tropical Africa and was eligible to apply to the Development Loan Fund and the Export-Import Bank for capital funds on a loan basis. It expressed the hope that Guinea would consider joining the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.

The Guinean Ambassador expressed the profound gratitude of his Government for this generous offer. He assured Mr. Dillon that Guinea appreciated the Section 402 offer and he would telegraph Conakry that night concerning the need for prompt action. Mr. Diallo expressed the hope that, given the lack of organization in the Guinean Foreign Ministry, the Department would explain to him (at the same time Ambassador Morrow was approaching officials in Conakry) the significance of major U.S. démarches in Guinea. He could then support Mr. Morrow's efforts in Conakry by telegram from Washington and perhaps help his Government understand some of the aspects of diplomacy that might be taken for granted in more experienced countries.

As far as the Konkoure Dam was concerned, the Ambassador declared that Guinea placed primary importance on this project and he looked forward to discussing the dam again with Mr. Dillon in two or three weeks.

Also, the Ambassador reported that he had been engaged in continuous discussions with ICA in a very friendly atmosphere concerning a possible bilateral agreement. Mr. Diallo said he believed he understood now the reasons why ICA was insisting on certain points and he hoped the ICA representatives understood why the Guinean Government had raised the objections it had. After Guinea's independence, there had been a sudden vacuum when French technicians were withdrawn. Since then, many of these positions have been filled by foreigners who have not been accorded any special privileges. If the Guinean Government should now make an exception for American technicians, it would be difficult to explain this to the other foreigners who have been there all along.

The important point, however, is that we are convinced of U.S. good will, and are anxious to cooperate with the United States, the Ambassador declared. We want to thank you not only for this present aid offer, but also for previous assistance from the U.S. and the invitation to President Toure.

(In leaving, the Guinean Desk Officer informed the Ambassador that, since negotiations were still under way, he hoped the Guinean Government would make no announcement now of this aid offer. The Ambassador agreed to this request.)

328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

June 24, 1960.¹

5548. Following based on uncleared memorandum of conversation:²

Under Secretary Dillon and Alphand discussed Konkoure dam project June 24.³ Alphand said French believe that informing GOG now that US intends proceed with study dam project would inevitably leak and therefore have adverse affect elsewhere in Africa, especially in evolving Community. On other hand, France fully aware of interests involved and desirability retaining Boke bauxite deposits for West. GOF proposes that US delay informing GOG for short period and in meantime US and France study means by which public announcement or explanation could be made which would refer to development in West Africa on regional basis. Specifically, French would like mention made of Kouilou plan. Alphand explained that he did not wish imply France sought US aid for Kouilou project but rather that development various projects by different members of West be viewed as part of larger whole.

Under Secretary replied US realizes West African development is interrelated and that Konkoure project cannot be examined in vacuum. Volta, Kouilou, Konkoure and possibly Inga⁴ are all parts of African development. Said French suggestion re broader announcement is one we ready to study and we see advantages in having mentioned status Kouilou and Volta. We want, however, have announcement made well in advance of Khrushchev visit to Guinea. Therefore, would be useful have French thoughts on broader statement soonest so that we can have matter settled by mid-July.

Ambassador replied that he unsure just how long a delay GOF wishes and promised seek instructions. Felt sure GOF fully aware of advisability having matter decided and dealt with before Khrushchev trip.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 870B.2614/6-2460. Confidential. Drafted by L. Dean Brown, cleared by Satterthwaite and Ferguson, and approved by Brown. Repeated to Conakry; pouched to Accra, Dakar, Brussels, Léopoldville, and Brazzaville.

¹ The time of transmission is illegible.

² Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 870B.2614/6-2460)

³ On June 9, the Department informed the French of the possibility of a U.S. updating of the Konkouré dam survey. The French had asked for time to consider the impact of this on their relations with the members of the *Conseil de l'Entente*, and Dillon had agreed to delay informing Diallo. (Telegram 5260 to Paris, June 10; *ibid.*, 870B.2614/6-1060)

⁴ The projects under reference, in addition to the Konkouré project, were proposed power-aluminum projects in the Congo Republic, Ghana, and the Belgian Congo.

Under Secretary stressed fact that commitment to make study is not tantamount to commitment construct project. Study additionally gives us period of time to think subject through more thoroughly. Also useful have study going on while Khrushchev in Guinea. Noted that we would naturally want to use earlier plans drawn up by GOF as basis for US study. In response to question, said he believes Toure would welcome offer to make study.

Alphand said France would also wish to consider with US use of Boke bauxite. Under Secretary replied that we not sure what influence we would have on this subject but would talk to companies about French position and needs. Noted that, given size of reserves at Boke, consortium might be looking for customers.⁵

Herter

⁵ On July 8, Dillon gave Alphand a draft press release and told him the Department proposed to inform the Guinean Ambassador the following week. Alphand again told him that Paris would prefer a postponement. (Memorandum of conversation, July 8; Department of State, Central Files, 870B.2614/7-860) On July 12, Hare asked Lebel if the Embassy had received any response from Paris. Lebel replied that the French still had misgivings but fully understood what the United States intended to do. (Memorandum of conversation, July 12; *ibid.*, 870B.2614/7-1260)

329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guinea

July 21, 1960, 9:14 p.m.

41. Guinean Ambassador handed revised aide-mémoire on Konkoure Dam, text of which follows:

“During the conversations between the Ambassador of Guinea and Under Secretary Dillon, on June 10, Ambassador Diallo expressed the interest of the Guinean Government in obtaining assistance for the construction of the Konkoure Dam (Souapiti). At that time, the United States informed the Guinean Government that the question of the Konkoure Dam survey was under study and that the United States hoped to be in a position to discuss the matter soon.

The United States Government is now pleased to inform the Government of Guinea that the United States Government would be prepared to undertake, at its own expense, a study of the Konkoure

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 870B.2614/7-2160. Confidential. Drafted by Cassilly; cleared by Kretzmann, Philip H. Valdes of the Office of Western European Affairs, and Eugene B. Abrams of the International Cooperation Administration; and approved by Ferguson.

hydroelectric project, taking into account all information previously prepared and available with respect to the project. If the Government of Guinea so desires, the United States would be prepared to proceed expeditiously with the arrangements for completing an up-to-date study of the Konkoure Dam project.

Following this study, the United States Government will consider how it might assist financially, in addition to financial participation of other appropriate private and public sources, in the construction of this project, if the project is found to be economically and financially feasible and private financing for related aluminum smelter facilities is assured.

It is observed that the proposed Konkoure Dam and related aluminum operations in the Republic of Guinea form one of a number of power-aluminum complexes, such as the Volta, Kouilou and Inga projects, which are at some stage of consideration in several states of Africa by various governments, enterprises or international institutions. Also, the sale of Guinean bauxite or alumina may yield additional export earnings to Guinea by providing other aluminum-power complexes in Africa a useful source of supply. Pertinent aspects of these matters may warrant study at an appropriate time in relation to progress regarding the Konkoure Dam.

As the Government of Guinea is aware, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has had wide experience in hydroelectric field and recourse to the Bank at the earliest feasible time could be very useful in the construction of this project."

Assuming Guineans approve our offer, Dept intends make press release. Diallo has recommended simultaneous release in both capitals, probably next week. Embassy should provide GOG advance copy our release and inform Dept suggested release time, allowing 48 hours advance notice. Hope GOG will accept following text since unlikely we can agree significant changes:

[Here follows the text of a proposed press release. Since Guinea did not accept the U.S. offer, it was not released.]

Herter

330. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel MC/119 Riverdale, New York, October 6, 1960, 11:30 a.m.¹

SUBJECT

Konkoure Dam²

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

J.C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary

T.A. Cassilly

Guinea

President Sekou Toure

Telli Diallo, Ambassador to the U.S.

Ismael Toure, Minister of Public Works,
Transport and Communications

Damantang Camara, Minister of the
Interior

Mr. Satterthwaite observed that we had made an offer on the Konkoure Dam which, in conjunction with the offer of the private aluminum producers, constituted a serious proposal to aid Guinea. We were waiting for a reply to our offer of July 19 to resurvey the dam; as the President was aware, this was the same procedure we had followed in the case of the Volta River Dam in Ghana. There the new study had resulted in lowering the estimated cost of the dam by a very large margin.

Mr. Toure reaffirmed that the Konkoure Dam was the cornerstone of Guinea's development plans. What he reproached the US for, in a friendly manner, was that although there was no country in a better position to aid Africa (the US had no colonies there and was the most advanced nation in the world), the US apparently had little understanding of the needs of Africa or the desperate urgency of those needs. For example, when the announcement was made last year that 150 scholarships would be offered Guinea, every one expected these students would leave at once. If the US could have sent five students the same week of the announcement, the effect would have been extraordinary. Now, however, a year has passed, and frankly, much of the effectiveness of this offer has been lost.

Moreover, Guinea sent an urgent circular appeal to the US, UK, West Germany, the USSR, Yugoslavia and Switzerland for aid in the

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770B.2614/10-660. Official Use Only. Drafted by Cassilly.

¹ President Touré was attending the U.N. General Assembly; the conversation took place at his residence.

² For another portion of the conversation concerning the Congo, see Document 235.

Three-Year Plan,³ the President declared. He himself had repeatedly explained Guinea's needs to Ambassador Morrow. President Eisenhower's reply⁴ had been satisfactory in principle but Toure said he had been definitely disappointed by the qualifying remarks. It was apparent that the US did not understand the great importance which Guinea places on its Three-Year Plan.

The National Economic Convention scheduled for the middle of October has been postponed until the end of the month or the beginning of November. At that time all the replies to the circular appeal will be submitted for general discussion and after each offer has been considered, the Government's decision will be announced. All foreign ambassadors will be invited to participate in these proceedings.

According to the President, the USSR has offered Guinea a long-term loan to finance the entire construction of the Konkoure Dam and is prepared to send all the technicians and equipment necessary to begin work on January 1, 1961. If the USSR, which is not acquainted with this project, had replied that it would have to undertake a new survey,⁵ the Guineans would have some understanding of the necessity for such a delay; they find it more difficult to understand why the US, which already has the French plans for this dam, should propose another survey. If the US should make an offer now equivalent to that of the Soviets', however, there would be no question that Guinea would accept the US offer instead. When Mr. Satterthwaite indicated that the Guineans might find they had committed themselves too heavily to the Soviets and were no longer in a position to choose who would or would not participate in projects in Guinea, Mr. Toure replied that he would prefer to have the US build the dam but was obliged to begin work as soon as possible on the basis of the best possible offer.

Mr. Satterthwaite emphasized that we wanted to help Guinea on this project and had had a great deal of experience in building dams. The President replied that the Soviets were prepared to supply everything that was needed. He had asked Fria and Olin Mathieson repeatedly to construct the dam but they had never agreed to do so. (Ambassador Diallo interjected that the US offer was tied in with the projected aluminum smelter to be built by a consortium of Western producers

³ A letter of July 19 from Touré to Eisenhower described Guinea's bauxite and iron deposits, discussed the Konkouré project, and stated that Guinea appealed to friendly powers for assistance. It is filed with an August 12 memorandum from Herter to Eisenhower which states that Touré had apparently sent similar requests to a number of other countries on the same day. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)

⁴ Eisenhower's reply, dated August 15, stated that the United States was prepared to proceed with the survey offered in its July 19 aide-mémoire as soon as it received Guinea's response. (*Ibid.*)

⁵ A handwritten note in the margin next to this sentence reads: "They did so reply."

including Olin Mathieson.) When Toure complained that the International Bank also had not helped, Mr. Satterthwaite pointed out that Guinea was not a member of the Bank.

As far as the \$35 million Soviet line of credit was concerned, the President declared that Guinea had utilized none of it so far. Mr. Ismael Toure corrected him to say that Guinea had in fact bought some Soviet jeeps. The President agreed and pointed out that he would have preferred American jeeps but he had received no satisfaction on his repeated requests for them. The Soviet line of credit was to be used principally to modernize Guinea's agriculture but, if necessary, it could all be devoted to construction of the dam.

When the Assistant Secretary indicated that it was sometimes difficult for democracies to operate as fast as authoritarian governments, Toure commented that he, nevertheless, "knew" that \$13 million had been allotted for US aid to Guinea (which he noted with satisfaction was one of the highest amounts allotted any African country) but that "not one dollar" had yet arrived in Guinea. The Assistant Secretary said he would discuss this matter further with Ambassador Diallo in Washington in order to make sure our figures agreed with those of the President.

When Mr. Satterthwaite observed that the Soviets were not disinterested in their aid offers, the President replied that he was convinced the USSR was not doing this for selfish interests but genuinely to help Guinea.

331. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/134

New York, October 12, 1960, 12:45 p.m.¹

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite
T.A. Cassilly (Reporting Officer)

Guinea
H. E. Telli Diallo, Ambassador to the
U.S.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Cassilly.

¹ The conversation took place in the Waldorf Towers.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Guinean Relations (One of two)²

The Secretary mentioned that he had hoped to have a chance to speak with President Toure the day before but that it would have been impossible for him to go all the way out to Riverdale in the late afternoon traffic and keep all the other appointments which he had made that day. He said he had a number of things to take up and thought that the best way to present them was in the form of aides-mémoire.

(The interpreter then read four aides-mémoire on: 1. Guinea's neutral foreign policy;³ 2. the Konkoure Dam project;⁴ 3. American aid;⁵ 4. the Congo.⁶)

The Ambassador replied that he was very pleased to have this opportunity to see the Secretary since he had made many requests in the past and had been unable to arrange an appointment. Mr. Diallo expressed great disappointment that the Secretary was not able to discuss the grave problems raised in the aides-mémoire directly with President Toure. He reiterated his previous requests to arrange an appointment between the President and Sekou Toure and was sorry this could not have been arranged. President Toure had not been able to receive the Secretary at the United Nations because he had considered that there were important matters between the two countries which should be discussed calmly, outside the atmosphere of the United Nations. He regretted that as Guinean Ambassador he had apparently so little credit with the U.S. Government that he was unable to arrange a meeting between his president and the U.S. Chief of State, let alone the American Secretary of State. The U.S. attitude appeared to raise the serious question whether Mr. Diallo should continue to remain in the U.S. or should ask to be relieved.

² The second memorandum of conversation, which concerned the Congo, is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

³ It expressed concern at "recent indications that Guinea is deviating from a neutral foreign policy in favor of close alignment with Soviet positions." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 770B.00/10-1360)

⁴ It reiterated the U.S. offer to update the existing survey, noted that the significant part of the July 19 aide-mémoire was its indication of U.S. interest in financing the dam, and declared that the United States could not promise action without adequate analysis of all the problems involved. (Telegram 986 from USUN, October 13; *ibid.*, 870B.2614/10-1360)

⁵ It stated that the \$13 million figure mentioned by Touré did not reflect any definite U.S. plans or commitments but might have been given by a U.S. official to Guinean officials on an informal basis to suggest the approximate amount of U.S. aid over the next 2-3 years, if the necessary preliminary agreements were signed, and it stated that U.S. plans for aid to Guinea were set forth in the aide-mémoire given to Diallo on June 10 (see Document 327). (Telegram 982 from USUN, October 13; Department of State, Central Files, 770B.5-MSP/10-1360)

⁶ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 770G.00/10-1260)

After discussing the memorandum on the Congo (separate memorandum of conversation) the Ambassador raised the problems on the aide-mémoire concerning technical assistance. Generally he agreed with everything in the memorandum except for one point which was totally inexact: namely that concerning the million dollars for agricultural products. (The aide-mémoire had said "This credit was opened in June 1960, but it was not until October 11, 1960, during the current visit of President Toure that information was received that Guinea would be prepared to make purchases against it." This was later changed to "This credit was opened in June 1960 but no orders have been placed so far." before the aide-mémoire was handed to the Ambassador.)

Concerning the aide-mémoire on the Konkoure Dam the Ambassador agreed in principle to the points raised but noted that they would be subject to further discussion. One point he did want to emphasize, however, was the urgency with which Guinea regarded this very vital project. As President Toure had pointed out to Mr. Satterthwaite, the U.S. did not appear to appreciate the vital need to proceed with development in his country.

The Secretary suggested that there appeared to be something of a contradiction in what the Ambassador had just said. We had offered on July 19 to undertake a new survey of the Dam and no reply had yet been received. This had nothing to do with the "slowness" of our parliamentary procedures to which the Ambassador had referred. Certainly we would have had the survey well under way now if Guinea had accepted our offer in July. Moreover, the U.S. would not have made this offer unless it seriously considered helping the development program in Guinea.

The Ambassador replied that, since the U.S. already has the previous studies made on this project, Guinea expects something more than just another survey. Moreover, there were so many conditions in the U.S. offer that Guinea was unable to conclude whether the U.S. was genuinely prepared to go ahead with this project or not. For this reason the American offer was considered as possibly constituting a delaying action.

As far as the aide-mémoire on foreign policy was concerned, this raised very serious problems to which President Toure himself would reply. The Ambassador very strongly urged the Secretary to arrange a meeting with Sekou Toure before the President left New York on October 18. The Ambassador said he was not in possession of all the declarations made during his President's trip to the Far East, but he wished to confirm categorically that there was no basis to the assertion that Guinea had left the path of neutrality.

Ambassador Diallo returned to his own "problem of conscience" in the development of U.S.-Guinean relations. He had himself insisted on separating Guinean representation to both the U.N. and the U.S. so that he could devote his full time to dealing with the U.S. In Guinea he is known as "the man of Americans". This may not be completely so, since he is above all loyal to Guinea, but Ambassador Diallo emphasized that he was indeed a true friend of the U.S. If he could not be more useful in furthering good relations between the two countries than he appeared to be able to do now, it would be doing everyone a disservice if he remained at his post. If under the present circumstances, Sekou Toure should leave without meeting a high member of the U.S. Government, the situation would be very unfortunate.

The Secretary said that he would assure Mr. Diallo that someone from the U.S. Government would discuss these problems with President Toure before his departure.

Ambassador Diallo expressed appreciation for these encouraging words and urged again that President Eisenhower receive his own President. He pointed out that Guinea had bought a new chancery and residence in Washington which the President had hoped to dedicate. Moreover, the other heads of state and important visitors had been received by the President and even the heads of delegations of all the newly-admitted nations in the U.N. Unfortunately Guinea was unable to arrange an appointment even with the Secretary of State.

The Secretary pointed out that he had done his best the day before and Mr. Satterthwaite pointed out that other chiefs of state had been quite willing to receive the Secretary at the U.N.

It was agreed in parting that the Ambassador would be informed before the end of the day which American official would call on Sekou Toure.⁷

⁷ Telegram 975 from USUN, October 13, summarized the conversation that day between Touré and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Francis O. Wilcox, and telegram 217 to Conakry, October 17, summarized discussion that day between Touré and Under Secretary Dillon concerning the Konkouré dam. Both indicated that Touré went over much the same ground as in his October 6 meeting with Satterthwaite. (*Ibid.*, 870B.2614/10-1360 and 870B.2614/10-1760, respectively)

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Guinea to the Department of State

Conakry, December 20, 1960, 9 p.m.

298. Department pouch Freetown. CODEL Church¹ met December 19 with Sekou Toure and Cabinet. Atmosphere notably cooler than on similar occasions in past particularly meeting with Harriman.² First 50 minutes occupied by elementary lecture by Toure on Guinean history, geography, and civics. President apparently prepared continue this vein but Church and Kennedy³ broke in with questions which led to give and take. Following most important points to emerge:

1. Church asked about arms shipments from USSR which he said had been mentioned to him by other African leaders who alarmed at build-up. Toure did not reply directly but admitted there large stock small arms in Guinea as well as some anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. Said small arms would be stock of all villages in order arm whole population if need arose for national defense. Said he would make public announcement this effect shortly.

2. Toure repeated old complaint US ignored his requests for arms and economic and technical aid. "If I listen to advice from one side, it only because nothing coming from other side."

3. Toure said early as "five years" ago (*sic*)⁴ was proposed to FRIA as largest potential consumer electricity that it build Konkoure Dam. There no response. Similarly no offers forthcoming from US or other Western nation since [garble] of his letter requesting aid for developing mineral and hydro-electrical resources.⁵ "Russians have offered build dam. Do you want me to refuse?"

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-CH/12-2060. Confidential. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, Bamako, Dakar, Monrovia, Accra, Abidjan, and London and pouched to Freetown. Received on December 22.

¹ A senatorial delegation headed by Senator Frank Church of Idaho visited Guinea, December 17-19; despatch 158 from Conakry reported on the visit in detail. (*Ibid.*, 033.1100-CH/12-2160)

² Former Governor of New York W. Averell Harriman visited Guinea in August as part of a fact-finding mission for Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy. Telegram 104 from Conakry, August 29, sent to Dillon for transmission to Kennedy, reported two discussions with Touré in which the latter set forth his philosophy of "positive neutrality." (*Ibid.*, 670B.00/8-2960)

³ Edward M. Kennedy, brother of President-elect Kennedy.

⁴ As on the source text.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 330.

Obvious to CODEL as well as Embassy officers Toure distorting facts and slurring over truth in making above remarks. However Toure's attitude seemingly one of indifference to what we might think. Left impression that he has all but written off possibility any significant cooperation with United States.

Morrow

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA; THE QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA

333. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Pretoria, June 20, 1958, 4 p.m.

348. To Gerig and Palmer. From Walmsley.¹ Re Embtel 346.²

1. Eighth and final session GOC with Union representatives concluded yesterday afternoon present phase of good offices exercise Southwest Africa.

2. Agreement was reached on four paragraphs of operations portion of GOC report text of which, together with independent South African statement and GOC statement pouched to Gerig. The Department will note that only agreement reached related to (A) readiness of Union Government to investigate practicability of partition; (B) if investigation shows practicable, Union will formulate proposals to UN; (C) on understanding Union will undertake investigation and put forward proposals to UN, committee will be prepared to express to GA (1) opinion that a form of partition might provide a basis for agree-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5745X/6-2058. Confidential; Priority.

¹ Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs O. Benjamin Gerig, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Joseph Palmer, 2d, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Walter N. Walmsley. Walmsley was the U.S. representative on the U.N. Good Offices Committee on South West Africa, which was in Pretoria for discussions with representatives of the South African Government. The committee, established by the General Assembly on October 25, 1957, had held a series of meetings in London in May before beginning discussions in Pretoria on June 13. Further documentation concerning the U.S. participation on the committee is *ibid.*, 320.5745X.

² Telegram 346 from Pretoria, June 20, reported that the South Africans had rejected any formulation involving the United Nations as the second party, thus eliminating various ideas which the committee had considered, and that South African Foreign Minister Eric H. Louw had raised the idea of partition. The committee had concluded that although this idea was impractical, was probably little more than a way for South Africa to buy time, and stretched, if it did not exceed, the committee's terms of reference, it was "about the maximum that could be extracted from the Union." (*Ibid.*, 320.5745X/6-1958)

ment, and (2) the hope in these circumstances Union would be encouraged to carry out investigation. Although Union in its independent paragraph anticipates some details of partition. Possible trusteeship agreement, the committee expressly refrains from "any pronouncement on the merits and demerits" of the idea.

3. Chairman (UK)³ and Da Cunha (Brazil)⁴ felt very strongly that this is best that can be obtained from Union and were willing to accept text on basis of half loaf better than none. I went along reluctantly in order not to split committee but reserved position in manner quoted in separate telegram to follow.⁵

4. Important to note in foregoing connection that chairman and Da Cunha apparently totally unrestricted by instructions, and are quite prepared to support formula even if their governments do not favor. I said I could not be bound should my government or UN reach judgment that committee had exceeded terms of reference.

5. My conclusion is that UK member primarily guided by Commonwealth factors; and that Brazilian concern is to maintain position consistent with presumed commitment to support Portuguese in matter of reporting under Article 73(E).

6. Chairman in final statement repeated that GOC members in no way engage their governments in submitting coming report to GA.

7. Final session approved text of press statement to be released simultaneously Pretoria and UN, at 6 p.m. June 22 EDT (see Embtel 349).⁶ Union representative also showed committee press release it will make afternoon June 23 to effect that on conclusion of official discussions in Pretoria Union Government invited members of GOC to visit territory in personal capacity if they had the time.

8. UK and Brazilian members plan to accept invitation and will be in territory June 23-27. Although it might be helpful to strictly bilateral US-Union relations if I went, I believe that on balance my acceptance unwise (Deptel 402).⁷ Union although making public none of the discussions, is endeavoring to create impression that meeting resulted in "progress" and endeavored to say so in agreed press release. I insisted successfully on present language i.e., "the parties feel that the discussions have attained a stage where the committee is able to report, et cetera". Such progress as may have been made require calipers to measure; but at the same time I agreed that there is nothing we can do in face of adamant attitude of Union than to report to GA.

³ Governor General of Ghana Sir Charles Noble Arden-Clarke.

⁴ Brazilian Ambassador to Cuba Vasco T. Leitao da Cunha.

⁵ Telegram 351 from Pretoria, June 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 320.5745X/6-2358)

⁶ Dated June 20. (*Ibid.*, 320.5745X/6-2058)

⁷ Telegram 402 to Pretoria, June 19, left the question of accepting the invitation to Walmsley's discretion. (*Ibid.*, 320.5745X/6-1658)

Moreover, in the face of gossip here and in southwest territory that partition discussed, and considering the statement and press release that "certain aspects will require further study" I feel that my visit to the territory on a guided tour will be readily interpreted as a commitment in favor of partition. Wieschoff (Secretariat) fully agrees and is himself not going. I should go he would also, in order to make it an obvious UN visit; but he believes that this would kill any remote chances there may be that the fourth committee will accept eventual South African proposals.

9. Secretariat plan is to circulate first draft of report to members and Union July 15, second draft August 10, and publish September 2. It was agreed with Union representatives that submission of draft to Union is only to permit it to comment on portion intended to reflect South African position. GOC members will have final say.

10. I am requesting reservations to depart for Brazzaville June 24, but as yet do not yet know what stops I can make conveniently in West Africa, cannot estimate ETA Washington. What are IO's wishes concerning return date?

Byroade

334. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)

July 9, 1958.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Regarding Africans in South Africa

At today's staff meeting you asked whether I thought it was just a matter of time when violence might start in the Union of South Africa against Europeans. Your question suggested also that you would be interested to know the extent of Communist penetration in the African populations in the Union.

During the 12 days I was in the Transvaal (of which 10 days in Pretoria with a brief visit to Johannesburg, and two days in Kruger Park) I was pretty well circumscribed in my contacts which consisted almost entirely of Union officials and diplomats. I am hardly qualified to write even "Inside the Union of South Africa". I was, however,

taken by officials to visit some slum clearance and resettlement projects for Africans and colored in and around Johannesburg, including the notorious Soffiatown. Curiously, while Foreign Office officials attacked foreign (especially UN) intrusion in the Union's domestic affairs, they and other officials at the same time took the initiative to help me "understand" the Union's internal problems and policies better. Thus I was exposed to many long speeches by Union officials on apartheid. My sources are listed on the last page.¹

The policies of the Strijdom Government are not only those of eventual total segregation of non-European peoples within the Union, economic, political, cultural and social, but also of total domination of the society of the Union by the Afrikaner element. The English-speaking element has pretty much lost out politically; culturally and linguistically it is in a steep decline; and economically it faces a rough struggle for survival. Members of the Embassy said that quite a few of their English-speaking friends had decided after the latest elections to move to other parts of the Commonwealth; others are thinking of doing so.

The Government applies its immigration laws selectively and restrictively against the English and Europeans who are not Germanic and Calvinist. This is probably unnecessary since the Union's domestic policies do not attract many settlers. Catholics in one way or another seem to be excluded; and no Catholic priest enters to minister or to engage in educational or social work. The foreign traveler on arriving in the Union is confronted by a form headed in red uppercase letters: WARNING TO ALIENS!

The curfew, which I believe varies somewhat from place to place, against non-Europeans is vigorously enforced. The African may not leave his "location" roughly between the hours of 9 PM and 6 AM. This provides for a European monopoly even of hooliganism, which, for example, is admitted in Johannesburg to be beyond the ability of the police effectively to cope with. The security forces seem to be even less interested in what goes on among Africans within their locations. The authorities couldn't care less how many fewer Africans there might be the next morning. In Johannesburg visiting women are warned at their hotel not to be on the street unaccompanied after 6 PM; and men are reportedly normally armed when not at home after dark.

¹ It reads as follows:

"Note: My longest talks were with Louw, the Minister of External Affairs, Jooste, Secretary of that Ministry, and Mills and Oxley of the Foreign Office; Verwoerd, Eiselen and deVilliers, Minister, Secretary and Under Secretary of Native Affairs (deVilliers now I believe is Secretary to the Prime Minister); Van Rhijn, Minister of Economic Affairs and Mines (from South West Africa); Monseigneur Domiano, the Apostolic Delegate (an American); Knobel, Director of National Parks; and of course Byroade and members of his staff."

Europeans who have non-European servants living out have to provide "passes" for their servants or themselves drive them home after dark. The pass is by no means a guarantee of safety. Native servants may live in at Pretoria, provided their masters house them outside their own dwelling house, e.g. the garage. There was much talk in Pretoria still about the former private secretary to Strijdom who during the election campaign was brought into court for having an affair with a native girl. He was fined £ 25; she was given six months of hard labor. While he lost his job as Secretary, I understand he was elected on the Nationalist ticket over his United party opponent to the House.

In view of the official attitudes toward what goes on within the locations it is logical to conclude that the South African security authorities do not get very reliable intelligence with respect to African attitudes and the activities, if any, of subversive agents.

The official attitude toward the United States being rather cool, although correct, the relations between our own intelligence people and those of the Union have gone downhill from the time that Mr. Wailes² was Ambassador (he has just told me that in his time the relations were reasonably satisfactory). It seems to me unlikely, therefore, that we can get much reliable intelligence through the South Africans.

There are, moreover, great difficulties in the way of direct contacts with non-Europeans. The Union Ministry of External Affairs, for example, has even complained to the Embassy when members of the Staff have had American negroes in their homes. There is great vigilance exercised by the authorities over the movements and conduct of our own officials. I was, myself, quite conscious of this with respect to the Members of the Good Offices Committee, who incidentally were "warned" by the Union High Commissioner in London when we met there that our contacts should be solely with officials of the Government. I do not think you want me to go into the details of the application of apartheid and of the Government's cultural and linguistic policies but I cannot refrain from mentioning some of the extremes, and some estimate of the eventual results. For example, in Pretoria they do not have Jim Crow buses; they have two bus systems. In most office buildings, there is one elevator reserved for non-Europeans. The school system restricts the choice of schools linguistically so that an Afrikaans-speaking student can only go to an Afrikaans school, taking English as a subject only. The English-speaking officers in the Army and Air Force have now practically all been retired. Any paper going to the Ministerial level must be in Afrikaans. The Cabinet conducts its business in Afrikaans. The menials in government offices are now

² Edward T. Wailes, Ambassador to South Africa, 1954–1956.

almost entirely Afrikaners. (Generally, at this point retired railway employees do the custodial services.) The Foreign Office communicates with its missions alternately month by month in English and Afrikaans. Promotion in the Foreign Service is dependent upon a periodic successful examination in Afrikaans.

The estimate of the Embassy and of a couple of the English-speaking Foreign Office officials who had occasion to talk with me privately is that in a few years the Union will be monolingual in Afrikaans. These (but not the Afrikaners) look forward "in a few years" to, at a minimum, a Mau Mau situation. The Afrikaners on the other hand insist that any "mixture" of races or cultures spells the end of "European" culture on the continent; and that their policies are the logical and best ones to preserve the continent (and the world) from barbarism and communism.

Although I can hardly ask you to read them, I shall be glad to forward to you in a couple of days a copy of a more detailed memorandum I am preparing of my conversations.³

WNW

³ Not found. Walmsley's formal report of the Good Offices Committee's discussions in Pretoria, addressed to the Secretary and dated July 24, is in Department of State, Central Files, 320.5745X/7-2458.

335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations

October 2, 1958, 10:31 p.m.

305. For Lodge from the Acting Secretary. Reference Delga 70.¹ I would appreciate it if you will arrange, unless you have serious objec-

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-158. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs Robert G. McGregor, Director of the Office of Middle and South African Affairs C. Vaughan Ferguson, and Marcia M. Fleming of the Legal Adviser's Office; cleared by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Francis O. Wilcox, United Nations Adviser for European Affairs William T. Nunley, and in substance by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph C. Satterthwaite; and approved by Acting Secretary Herter. Repeated to Pretoria.

¹ Delga 70 from USUN, October 1, reported that Louw was requesting an appointment with Secretary Dulles, probably in connection with Fourth Committee discussion of South West Africa. It urged that either Dulles or Herter receive him and impress on him "the importance of South Africa's making it easier, not more difficult, for its friends to help it play its proper role." (*Ibid.*)

tions, meeting with Eric Louw, Foreign Minister, Union of South Africa, urgently and impress upon him US Government's apprehension that an inflexible stand by the Union at this point in discussion of Report of Good Offices Committee on South West Africa² makes very difficult efforts by friendly governments to be helpful and will close the door to further negotiation and may lead to referral by some State to ICJ with probability judgment adverse to Union and therefore against Union's interest. US as many others endorsed GOC and agreed supply member because it considered this furnished long awaited opportunity finally resolve future of territory. It is hopeful that even if Fourth Committee turns down idea of study of Partition the Union would remain receptive to further discussion with GOC or other body so authorized by GA. We fear Louw's present tactics will result in exactly opposite result from what he intends and can serve not only to intensify present hostility to Union in UNGA but place Union's friends in extremely awkward position.³ Keep UK Del informed.

Herter

² The report noted that the South African Government had rejected the Committee's proposals for a modified mandate arrangement or trusteeship, and it expressed the opinion that some form of partition, under which part of the territory would be annexed by South Africa and the rest would be placed under trusteeship, might provide a basis for an agreement. For text, see U.N. doc. A/3900.

³ Delga 94 from USUN, October 6, reported that Walmsley had talked to Louw along these lines. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/10-658) Resolution 1243 (XIII), adopted by the General Assembly on October 30, rejected partition as a basis for solution and invited the Good Offices Committee to renew discussions with South Africa in order to find a basis for agreement on the territory as a whole. It was adopted by a vote of 61 to 8, with 7 abstentions; the United States voted in favor. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, p. 1105.

336. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Pretoria, November 7, 1958, 3 p.m.

116. When I saw Louw this morning re China situation he quite occupied due to backlog of matters awaiting his attention since his return and necessity leave again for short period tomorrow. However, he wished review Middle East situation (which consisted of mere

exchange of such information as we both had about recent developments in Iraq and along Israeli border) and discuss our vote in UN on apartheid.¹ On latter he spent half hour reading to me press treatment of our vote in about a dozen leading U.S. newspapers. He accepted the information that I had previously given his staff about our role in moderating the original resolution² but stated press treatment of our change from "abstention" to "voting for"³ had been very bad indeed, showing large shift in our thinking. He himself guessed that the press treatment was partially accurate and that there had been considerable hardening of our position, partially due at least to our domestic problems on racial issues.

He then went into the familiar arguments of Union's position, taking exception in factual way to some of the remarks made by Harrison⁴ as to obligations under the UN Charter, the apparent willingness to violate Article 2, paragraph 7, etc, etc.

I reminded Louw that the resolution obtained, in large part at least by our efforts, contained little more than what we had in past years seen fit to vote for in piecemeal fashion. I thought U.S. press treatment as he had read it to me made too much of point of connection our own domestic problems with our vote in the UN. Nevertheless I supposed in fact there might be some connection. For one thing it could hardly be denied that our problems at home had made more people aware of and think about racial problems than in years of the recent past. Also if we felt compelled to uphold a vital principle considered West in East-West struggle for men's minds in our own country to extent of much regretted necessity use troops to enforce courts' decision and integration, we would perhaps be less likely avoid taking a position against segregation and discrimination abroad. However I thought Union should appreciate our desire avoid singling out Union for condemnation and general tone of Harrison's remarks which showed considerable sympathy and understanding of magnitude of local problem here. Louw said he would try in the next Parliamentary debate to put the brighter side (milder resolution, etc.) forward, but that I should know there was considerable feeling in Union about U.S. position. He said as far as he was concerned he would have preferred

¹ The United States had voted in favor of Resolution 1248 (XIII), which, inter alia, expressed "regret and concern" that the South African Government had not responded to previous U.N. appeals to reconsider governmental policies impairing the right of all racial groups to equal rights and freedoms. It was adopted by the General Assembly on October 30 by a vote of 70 to 5, with 4 abstentions. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1098-1099.

² Documentation on this subject is in Department of State, Central File 320.

³ In previous years, the United States had abstained on resolutions concerning South Africa's apartheid policies.

⁴ The text of the statement made by U.S. Representative George McGregor Harrison in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly on October 16 is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, pp. 1096-1098.

the original Indian resolution with our abstention rather than the modified resolution with our support. When I expressed surprise at this statement he said he wished be very frank. A specific and strong resolution against South Africa voted for by a majority of nations in UN did not matter so much as this was to be expected. What mattered perhaps more than all other votes put together was that of U.S. in view its predominant position of leadership in Western world.

There is no doubt that Louw is quite upset over this matter and it accounts I suppose for Prime Minister's specific reference to U.S. in his recent speech. (Reference my message from Capetown October 29)⁵ Am also informed that he has expressed his concern over our position to other members of Diplomatic Corps he has seen since his return here.

Louw stated he wished to balance his discussion with me by expressing his gratitude for the positions we had taken in the Fourth Committee on Southwest Africa and hoped I would relay gratitude of his government to Department. I expressed my appreciation and said I would.

Byroade

⁵ Telegram 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/10-2958)

337. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Capetown, April 27, 1959, 2 p.m.

78. Made initial call on Prime Minister April 24. Verwoerd is middle-aged with white hair and tendency to pudginess, but there is nothing pudgy about his personality or intellect. He is man of considerable personal charm with disarming manner that tends to soften force of his arguments. There is, however, no mistaking the will underneath. He is a fanatic with a fanatic's absolute faith in his own righteousness. After a polite inquiry on Mr. Dulles' health he plunged into case for apartheid and gave 45-minute lecture on government's racial policies.

Points covered included strong hint government plans take over British Protectorates¹ when time comes. Questioned on relations with

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 645A.00/4-2759. Confidential.

¹ Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland.

newly-independent Black states of Africa, Verwoerd said he wants good relations with them but will not exchange Ambassadors as does not want problem of looking after non-White diplomats in Union. He added that even if he wanted received non-White Ambassadors, could not rationalize such a departure to Bantus in Union. If Black diplomat from Accra treated as White man, leaders of local Bantu would want similar treatment. He was referring to time when separate Bantu states will have been created and presumably be run by Bantu authorities.

Like Louw, Verwoerd has low opinion of press especially American. Verwoerd said used to like *Time* until it published lies about Union. Reminded that I worked for *Time* for some years, he gave me singularly sweet smile and said was sure *Time* attacks did not occur during that period. He has sense of humor but I do not think it would extend to racial problem.

Despite above his manner was extremely friendly. I received impression he really does not understand why world does not see his point on race relations within Union. He spoke of Black man in kindly and clearly sincere terms. He honestly believes his policies are best for all concerned. At this point he asked me his first question, "Why do you think we are so misunderstood?" For half hour I attempted explain in moderate language objection of most Americans to his policies. He listened carefully and thanked me profusely. Believe I have established working relationship that might some day pay moderate dividends.

Crowe

338. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Pretoria, July 20, 1959, 11 a.m.

14. Ex-Chief Albert Luthuli, President of African National Congress, told me that present government of union is worst he has ever had to deal with and that unless there is some softening in its attitude toward country's 9 million non-whites he does not see how trouble can be avoided. He added that he himself is against violence but that

there are strong elements in his movement who advocated direct action. Question on amount of Communist infiltration he said he knew there was some Red influence in ANC but that is not important.

I talked with Luthuli at town of Stanger, in area to which he has been exiled,¹ and was accompanied by Potgieter, the Senior Government Information Officer for Natal and Zululand. However, I sent Potgieter on an errand so that I had about fifteen minutes alone with ex-Chief.

Luthuli said his exile is mild. He is allowed to see friends, write letters, and even write for publication but he cannot address a meeting of more than three persons. He said he is lucky that he has not been sent to infamous prison camp in Kalahari Desert. He spoke highly of United States and he said he hopes his daughter can be educated there.

Crowe

¹ The South African Government imposed restrictions on Luthuli's movements on May 22, 1959.

339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa

July 29, 1959, 7:33 p.m.

41. Reference Deptels 83, 90; Embtels 106, 15, 325.¹ On July 21 Mr. Murphy met with Ambassador du Plessis at Department's request and outlined our expectations as to how South West Africa issue would probably develop at coming 14th UNGA.² Du Plessis said he would convey substance of conversation to Pretoria. Following points discussed in particular:

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/7-2259. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Trusteeship Affairs Nicholas Feld, cleared by Ferguson, and approved by Walmsley. Repeated to London and USUN.

¹ Telegrams 83 and 90 to Capetown, May 29 and June 12; telegram 106 from Capetown, June 18; and telegrams 325 and 15 from Pretoria, June 5 and July 22. They all concerned a proposed approach to the South African Government to urge a final effort to find an acceptable solution for the South West Africa problem. (*Ibid.*, 745X.021/5-2859, 745X.021/6-1259, 745X.021/6-1859, 745X.021/6-559, and 745A.00/7-2259, respectively)

² A memorandum of the conversation is *ibid.*, 320.5745X/7-2160.

1) UN debate on Good Offices Committee's Report, which difficult and acrimonious in 1958, would probably be more so this year since gap between Union and UN thus far not bridged.

2) US had tried over period of years play helpful and moderating role re SWA at UN but we puzzled as to what more could be done in view GOC's unfruitful efforts thus far find mutually acceptable solution of problem. Our freedom of action to moderate tone of forthcoming UNGA debate would depend on progress made in the Union's negotiations with the GOC.

3) ICJ's advisory opinions on Territory's international status and Union's accountability under League Mandate³ with which US has agreed and has voted for UN resolutions pursuant thereto.

4) UN members most active in SWA case were Afro-Asians and some LA's but certain European countries also involved.

5) Our objective is to help find acceptable solution, to which end GOC will probably again meet with Union's representatives in New York in September.⁴

6) If Department wishes discuss matter further with Union we will do so with Union UNDel in New York in accordance du Plessis' desire have discussions of a matter, which primarily involves UN aspect, handled there.

During conversation, which amicable throughout, du Plessis reiterated and elaborated on points contained in Louw's May 15 letter to Chairman of GOC.⁵ He added however that from Union's viewpoint, it preferable talks with GOC continue, for several years if necessary, rather than have them break down with what he implied might be unforeseeable consequences.

Dillon

³ For text of the Mandate, see U.N. doc. A/1901, pp. 9-10.

⁴ The Good Offices Committee reported to the General Assembly in September that it had met with South African representatives in New York, September 11-21, but had not succeeded in finding a basis for an agreement under its terms of reference. For text of the report, see U.N. doc. A/4224.

⁵ The letter stated that the Union Government was prepared to collaborate with the Good Offices Committee on the basis of the 1957 U.N. resolution but that if the Committee felt the 1958 resolution prevented it from giving further consideration to the partition proposal, renewing the discussions would serve no useful purpose. The text was transmitted in telegram 1068 from USUN, May 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 745X.021/5-2859)

340. Memorandum of Conversation

SecDel/MC/12

New York, September 21, 1959, 11 a.m.¹

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
Mr. Wilcox
Mr. Satterthwaite
Mr. Hadsel

South Africa

Mr. Eric Louw, Minister of External
Affairs, Union of South Africa

SUBJECT

South African Attitudes at the United Nations

By way of preliminary, Mr. Louw mentioned that he would be in Washington October 14–16 for the Conference on the Antarctic² and would then return to the Union of South Africa by way of Chile and the Argentine, where his country had Legations.

With respect to the items on Indians in South Africa and apartheid, Mr. Louw planned to put on record the objections of his Government to their discussion under Articles 55 and 56 in view of the overriding application of Article 2 paragraph 7 concerning domestic jurisdiction. He expressed his disappointment that the U.S. had supported so-called “moderate” resolutions on these items last year,³ but did not press this point. He felt that Krishna Menon had led other delegations “down the garden path” in his formulation of the resolutions which—whatever their wording—still had sting in them of interfering in South African domestic affairs.

Mr. Louw planned to devote his entire speech in the general debate to Africa with a view to developing the attitude of his government in respect to this continent. He felt that independence was coming too rapidly in parts of Africa, where the masses were still primitive, and that the Union’s policy of developing self-government for its Africans in due course should be explained. He emphasized the fact that unlike other European territories in Africa, the white population in the Union was permanent. His own roots went back 250 to 300 years, and neither the Europeans of Dutch or British ancestry had any

Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Fred Hadsel of the Bureau of African Affairs.

¹ The conversation took place at the Secretary’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel; he was in New York to attend the U.N. General Assembly.

² The Conference on Antarctica, which opened on October 15, negotiated the Antarctic Treaty, signed on December 1; for text, see 12 UST 794.

³ See footnote 1, Document 336. Resolution 1302 (XIII), adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1958, appealed to South Africa to enter into negotiations with India and Pakistan on the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa; for text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958*, p. 1099.

real affinity with any other country. He thought, moreover, that full equity for the natives in the Union would not only swamp the Europeans but it would be bad for the West as a whole to have the southern tip of Africa under a native proletariat control. He referred to the fact that the African National Congress, although not banned in his country, was under communist domination. Mr. Louw described as "unbelievable" the press distortions in the U.S., U.K., and especially Sweden concerning the true conditions in the Union of South Africa.

With respect to South West Africa, Mr. Louw reaffirmed his Government's position that the League "died without leaving a testament" and that the UN therefore had no authority with respect to this territory. Noting that he probably was the only head of delegation who had served in both the League of Nations and the United Nations, Mr. Louw said that the treatment of this problem by the League was entirely different from that of the UN, especially with respect to the hearing of oral evidence. He then went on to complain of the assistance of the United States Consul General in Salisbury in giving Mr. Beukas,⁴ a native of South West Africa, a visa and travel documentation for the purpose of giving oral testimony at the UN. Beukas had been condemned by his father and the elders of his tribe for undertaking this trip. Mr. Louw said that a visa presupposed a passport and he repeated his complaint about giving Beukas a visa.

The Secretary pointed out that under the U.S. agreement with the UN, the Department had no alternative but to issue a visa to anyone who had obtained an invitation from the UN to appear before the UN. He could understand how various governments might not always be pleased with this procedure. If there was any remedy, however, it was to persuade the UN to be more discriminating in its invitations.

Mr. Louw concluded the above conversation, which was almost entirely a monologue on his part, with his appreciation for this opportunity to talk with the Secretary.

⁴ Hans J. Beukas, a South West African student whose passport had been withdrawn, appeared before the General Assembly's Fourth Committee in October. Resolution 1358 (XIV), adopted by the General Assembly on November 17, 1959, declared the withdrawal of his passport to be contrary to the Mandate for South West Africa.

341. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Pretoria, October 30, 1959, noon.

153. I had long cordial talk with Prime Minister today in which he covered his government's native policy and his thinking in regard to Southwest Africa and British protectorates. Among previously unclarified points that he raised in hour-long discussion was financial help to native areas. He told me that press reports to the contrary his government is prepared to spend many million pounds to make "Bantustans" economically viable. He added that the half million pounds so far appropriated is only a token.

After sketching history of the Union's relations with Southwest Africa he said that it is his government's policy to cooperate with UN that he had instructed his UN representatives to make it clear that the Union is quite willing to enter into complete review of entire question. He said that adverse resolution by Afro-Asian nations however might make such gesture difficult for him in view of anti-UN feeling in the country at large.

Questioned on British protectorates, Prime Minister, without actually saying so, gave me definite impression that he is contemplating some sort of economic sanctions if British continue to go ahead with plans toward making these enclaves self-supporting. He pointed out heatedly that the protectorates should belong to the Union and that if they were added to his country problem of land for new native states would be largely solved as one half of total area of such an enlarged Union could then be in native hands.

The Prime Minister has a great deal of confidence in his powers as a persuader and said rather wistfully that he wished it were possible for him to go to America and explain his government's policies. I did not urge him to embark on such a crusade but said I would report him faithfully during my forthcoming visits to Washington.

Crowe

342. Editorial Note

On November 17, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1375 (XIV), which, *inter alia*, expressed opposition to the continuance or preservation of racial discrimination in any part of the world, and appealed to all member states to use their best endeavors as appropriate to achieve the purposes of the resolution. It was adopted by a vote of 62 to 3, with 7 abstentions, the United States voting in favor. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pages 1116–1117. The text of a statement made by U.S. Representative Harold Riegelman in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee on November 2 is *ibid.*, pages 1113–1116.

Resolution 1360 (XIV), also adopted by the General Assembly on November 17, invited the South African Government to enter into negotiations with the United Nations through the Committee on South West Africa or any other committee which the General Assembly might appoint with a view to placing South West Africa under the International Trusteeship System. It was adopted by a vote of 56 to 5, with 12 abstentions, the United States voting in favor. For text, see *ibid.*, pages 1118–1120.

Resolution 1361 (XIV), adopted by the General Assembly on the same date, drew the attention of member states to the conclusions of the 1957 special report by the Committee on South West Africa (A/3625) concerning the legal action open to member states to refer any dispute with the Union of South Africa over the interpretation or application of the Mandate for South West Africa to the International Court of Justice. It was adopted by a vote of 55 to 4, with 16 abstentions, the United States voting in favor. For text, see *ibid.*, pages 1120–1121. The text of a statement concerning both resolutions relating to South West Africa made by U.S. Representative Mason Sears in the General Assembly's Fourth Committee on October 29 is *ibid.*, pages 1111–1113.

343. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Liberia

February 26, 1960, 6:56 p.m.

387. Department appreciative difficulties referred to Embtel 528¹ and tendency equate South West Africa with Hungary and Tibet. Moreover, US of course concerned for welfare of inhabitants South West Africa and that obligations of Mandate should be carried out.

At same time Department anxious US not encourage situations which would unnecessarily offend Union Government or lead to unfavorable developments in already highly difficult situation now prevailing in Union.

Department infers Liberia may be planning to go ahead with ICJ case regardless of expression of US views, and has been informed by James N. Hyde (New York lawyer) that GOL has approached him re presentation of case to ICJ and is seeking funds from US private sources.

Having in mind above considerations, Department suggests your reply to Grimes might be made along following lines:

1. As GOL knows from stand taken by US in UNGA, we regard avenue of ICJ contentious case as open to qualified UN member such as Liberia.

2. US is concerned for welfare of inhabitants of South West Africa and for carrying out of obligations of Mandate.

3. US wld point out that decision whether to institute ICJ proceedings is for Liberia to make and that we wld not wish to influence GOL one way or other.

4. US wld wish nevertheless to observe that in event of failure of South Africa to carry out ICJ judgment serious difficulties might be entailed by SC proceedings under Article 94 of UN Charter, possibly leading to withdrawal of South Africa from UN.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745X.00/2–1960. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs Leonard C. Meeker and Officer in Charge of Trusteeship Affairs Robert A. Aclty; cleared by Gerig, United Nations Adviser for African Affairs Martin Herz, and Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs William I. Cargo; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Woodruff Wallner. Repeated to Capetown.

¹ Dated February 19. (*Ibid.*) Telegram 513 from Monrovia, February 12, reported that Secretary of State Joseph R. Grimes had told the Ambassador that Liberia was considering taking a case to the International Court of Justice against South African administration of South West Africa and hoped to have U.S. sympathy and moral support. (*Ibid.*, 745X.00/2–1260) Telegram 372 to Monrovia, February 16, stated that the U.S. position with respect to legal action was made clear by its support of Resolution 1361 (XIV) (see Document 342) but that the Department did not wish to encourage such action (Department of State, Central Files, 745X.00/2–1260) Telegram 528 urged reconsideration of this position, noting that in African eyes, "Union actions in South West Africa are as bad as those of ChiComs in Tibet and USSR in Hungary."

5. If GOL decides to submit case to ICJ we wld hope that it be handled as regular legal case designed to secure helpful and workable legal judgment and in such manner as to avoid political and propaganda exploitation of grievances against Union.

In your discretion you may also draw on information on latest Fabregat initiative contained Depcirtel 1075,² stressing confidential nature that information.

Dillon

² Airgram G-64 from Monrovia, March 7, reported a March 2 conversation with Grimes in which Ambassador Mathews gave him the Department's views. (*Ibid.*, 745X.00/3-760)

344. Editorial Note

On March 21, at least 68 people were killed and more than 220 were injured in Sharpeville, South Africa, when police fired on demonstrators who were participating in country-wide protests against the South African pass laws. At the Department of State press briefing on March 22, in response to a query from a news correspondent, Director of the Office of News Lincoln White read the following statement:

“ The United States deplors violence in all its forms and hopes that the African people of South Africa will be able to obtain redress for legitimate grievances by peaceful means. While the United States, as a matter of practice, does not ordinarily comment on the internal affairs of governments with which it enjoys normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrators in South Africa.”

Telegram 49 to Capetown, March 22, informed the Embassy that the statement had been prepared in view of the prominent press attention to the incident and the impossibility of avoiding press questioning. It stated that White had refused to interpret the statement and declined to comment on further questions. (Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/3-2160)

President Eisenhower raised this with Secretary of State Herter at a meeting at 8:45 a.m. on March 24. The relevant portion of a memorandum of the meeting by Andrew J. Goodpaster, reads as follows:

“The President said he had seen in the newspapers a statement from the State Department deploring actions in South Africa, and asked about this. Mr. Herter said he had not heard about this until after the statement had been made to the press. He is furious about it,

regarding it as a breach of courtesy between nations. It occurred through internal failure within the State Department whereby a bureau chief proposed a statement and the press office released it without checking at the top policy level, and without investigating the facts of the matter. The President said the fat is in the fire. All he could see to do would be to call in the South African Ambassador and tell him that, although we are much distressed by events in South Africa, we do not regard it as our business to make public statements about this, and officially regret having done so. This action should be kept secret. In further discussion, the President agreed that this action might be taken through our Ambassador in South Africa if Mr. Herter wishes. The President said that, if it were his decision, he would find another post for the bureau chief involved." (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records)

A March 24 memorandum from Secretary Herter to Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Andrew H. Berding reads in part as follows:

"The appearance in the press Wednesday morning of the Department's rather strong statement deploring the police violence in South Africa took me by surprise. On inquiring, I have learned that Messrs. Dillon and Merchant were likewise not consulted before the statement was issued at noon on Tuesday.

"The issuance of a statement of this nature outspokenly critical of a Government with which we maintain friendly relations, and on a subject which not only has world-wide interest, but also involves domestic political factors—is, it seems to me, a decision to be taken only at the highest level in the Department of State." (*Ibid.*, Herter Papers)

Secretary Herter discussed the statement with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs James K. Penfield in a telephone conversation at 2:10 p.m. that afternoon. According to a memorandum of the conversation, he suggested that "Mr. Penfield give some thought to what could be done." He commented that "we had jumped awfully fast on this one and made a real mistake" and that "we had clearly taken sides and might be accused of inciting a revolution." (*Ibid.*, Telephone Conversations)

Representative at the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge telephoned Herter that afternoon to report that the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations was requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council on the matter and that they had extended "unanimous thanks" to the United States for the Department's statement; he commented that since the Secretary received so many complaints, he should be pleased "by the tremendous credit and good which has come out of this in all these countries." (Note to Herter from "marian," March 24; *ibid.*)

345. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Capetown, March 25, 1960, 9 p.m.

91. For the Secretary from Ambassador: Re your G-4 [54].¹

(A) I do not believe our relations with the Union are likely to be permanently damaged, but there is no disguising fact government will certainly be extremely cool for long time to come. Our action at this time is bitterly resented by government and by great mass of Afrikaner people, who feel we have sold out Whites in order to curry favor with Blacks.

Union Government has been aware increasing US as well as international disapproval its race policies for long time. Macmillan's wind of change speech² brought UK views with which government believes we agree forcibly to its attention. I believe our statement should be seen in perspective of inevitable increase in strain our relations with South African nationalist government intransigence and rising native resistance result in ever more frequent clashes.

(B) Informed non-White circles are delighted our statement and belief spreading that US now supports their course. Rising tension and disturbances have prevented our seeing any natives last few days but above impression confirmed by White sources. Conservative opposition (United Party) while regretting our commenting on internal matters agrees that civilized world horrified at situation, by Nationalist race policies. Liberal opposition (Progressives) have wholeheartedly welcomed statement.

(C) Commissioner of Police told [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] six to eight hours passed before he ordered police to fire in self-defense. Police used tear gas but due to wind and lack of masks this technique failed.

In my opinion police had no choice under circumstances, but South African riot control tactics not similar to ours. US police might have controlled mob without so much loss of life.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/3-2560. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Pretoria.

¹ Telegram 54 to Capetown, March 24, for the Ambassador from the Secretary, requested Crowe's comments on several points and instructed him to assure the South Africans that there had been no change in basic U.S. policy. (*Ibid.*, 745A.00/3-2460)

² Reference is to an address by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan before the South African Parliament on February 3, 1960; extracts are printed in *Documents on International Affairs, 1960*, edited by Richard Gott, John Major, and Geoffrey Warner (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs; London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 344-348.

Police Commissioner did not sustain Louw's statement to me³ that mob fired on police first, but missiles such as stones were thrown and mob was heavily armed with axes, iron bars and other home-made weapons.

Commissioner also made point that in recent Catomanor disturbances at Durban, eight police were brutally stoned and clubbed to death, pictures of which are now en route Washington [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

In view present tension I am afraid police may not use so much restraint in future.

(D) On basis general attitude of government toward UN on other questions (apartheid and Southwest Africa) I am confident South Africans will feel disturbances and race policies from which they stem are exclusively a South African problem and that UN has no business whatsoever meddling in this matter. Am seeing Permanent Secretary External affairs tomorrow at his request on this subject.

I am concerned over trend of events here. Government plan to ban African National Congress and Pan-Africanists, thus driving them underground, continuing demonstrations by natives seeking turn in passes and be arrested, day of mourning on 28 March, all make for a very tense atmosphere to which I believe our statement [on?] this contributed.

In the future I would appreciate being consulted before such statements are made, particularly where a 24-hour delay is not a factor.

I feel nothing would be gained from replying to Louw at this time.

I made it clear to him at our recent talk that there is no change in US policy toward his country.

Crowe

³ In a conversation on March 23, Louw had called Crowe in to express concern over the Department's statement the previous day. Telegram 82 from Capetown, March 23, reported the conversation, and telegram 85 of the same date transmitted the text of a South African aide-mémoire recapitulating the interview and delivered shortly afterward. (Both *ibid.*, 745A.00/3-2360)

346. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, Maryland, March 28, 1960, 2:45–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

US–UK Discussions at Camp David: South African Problem

PARTICIPANTS*British Side*

Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
 Sir Norman Brooks
 Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia
 Mr. C. D. W. O'Neill
 Mr. Philip F. de Zulueta

U.S. Side

The President
 Under Secretary Dillon
 Assistant Secretary Kohler
 General Goodpaster

The Prime Minister indicated that because of its urgency he would like first to raise the South African problem. The President agreed and the Prime Minister said that he was very worried about the forthcoming discussions in the UN Security Council meeting, called on the initiative of the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN. He indicated that he understood that the United States as a matter of fixed policy always supported inscription. The Prime Minister's problem was essentially whether the British should oppose inscription. They had in fact done so in the past. If they do not oppose, they risk losing the Union of South Africa. On the other hand, if they do oppose, they risk losing the emergent African states over which they hope to have a strong influence. It was all well enough to contemplate the satisfaction of the fine statements which would be made and the vote which would be obtained, but this had to be balanced against the British hope for a more liberal evolution inside the Union of South Africa.

The President indicated his sympathy with the Prime Minister's dilemma, and Mr. Dillon added that our Embassy in Pretoria had reported that there was some question as to whether the Union of South Africa might not in fact leave the UN if the subject were taken up.

The Prime Minister resumed, saying that if the British let the meeting go ahead, then maybe with US help an innocuous resolution could be obtained. Fortunately Ambassador Lodge is in the chair this month. He therefore hoped that it would be possible for the British to propose that they be allowed to protest the procedure orally and then

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series. Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy D. Kohler. Attached to an April 6 memorandum from Director of the Executive Secretariat John A. Calhoun to Goodpaster, enclosing three memoranda of discussions between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan on March 28.

have the chairman's acquiescence in not pushing this protest to a vote. Then, in the Security Council, we could go ahead to work for a moderate resolution.

The President said that he would agree with such a procedure. He had strong feelings that one could not sit in judgment on a difficult social and political problem six thousand miles away. He had to say that our own problem was in his mind in this connection, and that he had some sympathy even with his friends in Atlanta on some of their difficulties. He suggested that a UN resolution could perhaps just express regret about the disturbances in South Africa and hope that measures would be taken to prevent their recurrence.

Mr. Dillon said that the Department had been trying to work towards such an end with Ambassador Slim of Tunisia. However, it seemed certain that the language which emerged from the Afro-Asian group, even under the relatively moderate influence of Ambassador Slim, would be too tough and would attempt to condemn the South African Government's policy.

The President repeated that the United States would go as far as possible along the lines indicated consistent with our past record on insurrection.

The Prime Minister commented that if the resolution were too violent, perhaps we could muster the necessary 7 votes to beat it, and Mr. Dillon agreed that this would be desirable. The Prime Minister then went on to say that he would send a message saying that this line should be followed, and that the Union of South Africa should be urged to explain its situation and problem, and not just be huffy about it.

Mr. Dillon said there was some indication that the Soviets themselves would favor what we called a "hortatory" resolution. Apparently they did not want the Security Council to be permanently seized with the question, so that it could come up again in the forum of the General Assembly where it could be effectively debated.

[1 paragraph (1½ lines of source text) not declassified]

The Prime Minister indicated agreement with the President. He then referred to the speech that he had made when he was recently in South Africa. He wanted the change to come from inside the country and felt that outside pressure would just get the South Africans' back up.

The President said that in our own country he had always opposed extreme laws on the colored question. He had felt it best to concentrate on getting the negroes the right to vote and then let matters follow a natural course. He then referred to his discussions

with General de Gaulle on the emergent African states.¹ He said that de Gaulle had brought the subject up 4 times. He commented on the seriousness of the problem which these new nations presented, saying that except for Liberia, which was an old American problem, he felt that the British and the French should take the lead in these countries.

The Prime Minister then concluded this session of the talks by commenting on the political situation in the Union of South Africa. He said that the Boers and the British were about 50-50 in the country. However, the Boers had gerrymandered the voting districts in order to assure themselves a permanent majority. They were intense Calvinists who felt themselves to be God's anointed. They actually believed in slavery. There was even a certain nobility in the tenacity and sense of righteousness with which they held to their views.

(Note: Late in the evening the British handed us the attached memorandum on this subject,² text of which was communicated to the Department early the next morning.)

¹ Reference is to conversations held during the President's visit to Paris, September 2-4, 1959.

² Not printed. The memorandum, headed "South Africa and the Security Council," dated March 28, stated that the British would not oppose inscription of the item, that their aim would be to ensure that the debate and resulting resolution were as moderate as possible, but that if a resolution which was more than hortatory or was "too condemnatory" was likely to be adopted, they would have to consider voting against it.

347. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Capetown, March 30, 1960, 11 a.m.

117. Department pass to other posts as desired. Although I believe we have kept Department fully informed of developments here, I believe it may be pertinent analyze outlook as we see it today.

Most important element of situation is that natives for first time have demonstrated both to themselves and whites their power in terms of withholding labor and disregarding basic laws such as pass system. The Union Government's suspension of enforcing the pass system, and currently, the impunity with which non-whites demonstrated in urban areas and caused authorities withdraw from whole native townships, all have greatly encouraged urban natives. They are

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/3-3060. Secret. Repeated to Pretoria, London, and Salisbury.

now more ready to follow leaders calling for direct action than ever before, and leaders no longer are thinking of very gradual revolution some time in the future. This creates a most dangerous and explosive situation.

If, as seems likely, the government does not make a major concession, and relies on further repression, the long-term outlook is for tests of strength by the natives and increasing violence. This in time would turn Union into virtually an armed camp, with the natives partially controlling major locations and parts of reserves, and the country's economic system declining due to unreliable labor forces, sabotage, decline of investment, and wasteful effort of having large numbers of whites under arms. Any non-white rising would be put down with great loss of life, mostly non-white.

Even if government makes concessions we do not see how, with the natives' appetite whetted by these concessions, further disturbances can be avoided as campaigns for minimum wage or other goals would then be launched. Most probable is a relaxation onerous aspects apartheid measures combined with increased repression. This combination will not satisfy non-whites.

Further serious disorder is probable next few days. Stay-at-home campaign might then peter out or leaders may call it off and cease direct action for a short time to so prepare for a further test of strength. In neither short nor long run is it likely that unrest will decline to what was normalcy ten days ago.

The strains on the National Party and on Dr. Verwoerd are many, and there is substantial criticism of his leadership within Parliamentary Party and outside in Afrikaner churches, universities, and business. There is remote possibility Dr. Verwoerd might lose control of the caucus, if situation deteriorates markedly, and Party might overnight change its leader and moderate some of its policies. More likely is a palace revolution engineered within the tribes and national parties. In either case such a government would have to adopt policies well to the left of present day United Party platform if it were to have any hope of stabilizing this situation.

Despite all these possibilities, Embassy is not yet prepared to write off Dr. Verwoerd. The fears and prejudices of the Afrikaner rank-and-file, which has been fostered by the National Party for many years, remain strong; and Dr. Verwoerd as the strong man with a clear forceful program may be strengthened within the Party by disorder and world criticism, despite the qualms of many of the intellectual elite. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

348. Editorial Note

Secretary of State Herter discussed the proposed Security Council resolution on South Africa with President Eisenhower and with Andrew J. Goodpaster in several telephone conversations on March 30 and 31. A memorandum of a March 30 conversation between the Secretary and the President reads as follows:

"The President called to ask if the Secretary had spoken to Ambassador Lodge about keeping the resolution mild and the Secretary said he had called last night. The Secretary explained Lodge did not have a text but he was going to try to get it tonight. Knowing of the President's interest, the Secretary wanted him to see it. The President said he could not get over the feeling that although we were in an entirely different position they have the right to say they want to make progress in their way. The President said if we get too tough there could be a resolution that would make us awfully red faced. The Secretary said the South Africans had implied that. The meeting this morning went well. It was not voted on but went through without incident. The Afro-Asians haven't agreed on anything. The President said he did not want our defenses down. The Secretary said he had alerted Lodge of how the President felt and so had Wilcox. He had recommended no violence on either side in his speech. The President said he had just wanted to check up on this." (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

On March 31, Herter informed Goodpaster of a Ceylonese-Ecuadoran draft resolution, which he thought was "surprisingly mild," although the United States was proposing some changes. Goodpaster informed the President, who thought the resolution was "mighty tough" and suggested additional changes. Later that day, however, the President told Herter that after talking to Henry Cabot Lodge, he understood the "difficult conditions" under which Lodge was working. He instructed Herter to call Prime Minister Macmillan and tell him the resolution was "something we will have to vote for if we can keep it to this tone." (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Herter and Goodpaster with attached draft resolution, memorandum to Herter and Eisenhower, all dated March 31; *ibid.*)

On April 1, the Security Council adopted a resolution proposed by Ecuador which was similar to the earlier draft resolution although not identical with it. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pages 635-636.

349. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Capetown, March 31, 1960.¹

128. Re Salisbury 246 to Department,² London 4733.³

I completely agree Palmer and Whitney's⁴ views expressed reference telegrams. Despite difficulties and tension here, I endorse fully the concept that we must conduct our relations in a way which will permit our exerting a constructive and restraining influence on all sides. It is most important that we not appear to be backing one group or race at the expense of others. It was for this reason I planned include a reaffirmation of US policy towards South Africa in Port Elizabeth speech. Declaration of state of national emergency here, since that time, however, makes any statement whatsoever inadvisable.

I strongly recommend, however, that a statement as suggested by Palmer be made in the near future.⁵

Crowe

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/3-3160. Confidential. Repeated to Pretoria, Salisbury, and Nairobi.

¹ The time of transmission was omitted. The telegram was received at 10:14 a.m.

² Dated March 26, telegram 246 from Salisbury reported that there were indications that Rhodesians were interpreting the Department's March 22 statement as "another indication" of U.S. willingness to abandon Europeans in Africa. It commented that the growing danger in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was the tendency of Europeans who felt isolated and abandoned to take refuge in xenophobia, and it urged a U.S. statement expressing support for genuine multiracial development. (Department of State, Central Files, 745A.00/3-2660)

³ Dated March 29, telegram 4733 from London endorsed the thinking in telegram 246 from Salisbury. (*Ibid.*, 745A.00/3-2960)

⁴ Consul General in Salisbury Joseph Palmer 2d and Ambassador to the United Kingdom John Hay Whitney.

⁵ Telegram 255 to Salisbury, April 4, transmitted extracts from an April 1 statement made by Lodge in the Security Council and said that Satterthwaite would make similar remarks in an April 8 address. (*Ibid.*, 745A.00/3-3160) For text of the former, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 633–635; for text of the latter, see *Department of State Bulletin*, May 2, 1960, pp. 686–693.

350. Editorial Note

At the 439th meeting of the National Security Council on April 1, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in South Africa during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief discussion followed. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Deputy NSC Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs, dated April 2, reads as follows:

“Mr. Dulles thought that the events in South Africa had been well described in the press. The principal questions now were: what is the shape of the future? and what political decisions are needed? He believed the South African Government would be able to hold the situation in check but noted that the blacks in South Africa had gained a substantial victory for the first time in forcing the abandonment of the identity papers system. This first victory would probably spur the black population of South Africa on to attempt other victories. However, very few arms were in the hands of the natives because of past restrictions and penalties against the possession of arms. This situation would provide an opportunity for exploitation by the Soviet Bloc. Especially after the Congo becomes independent, there would be great opportunities for smuggling arms to the natives of South Africa. Mr. Dulles said this problem would be with us for a long time. He was discouraged at any possibility that a liberal government would be formed in South Africa, or if formed would be able to negotiate a workable settlement. He thought the present repressive measures would continue. The President asked whether South Africa was likely to withdraw from the UN. Secretary Herter said the South African representative had remained in the room during UN Security Council discussion of the situation in South Africa and had asked for an opportunity to speak once more on the question of principle, although not on the Security Council Resolution. In direct answer to the President’s question, Secretary Herter said he believed not even the South Africans knew what their future course of action in the UN would be. The President asked whether any nation had ever withdrawn from the UN. Secretary Herter said no UN member had ever withdrawn permanently; however, South Africa had withdrawn in 1955 and had returned to membership two years later. Mr. Dulles did not believe that the South Africans would withdraw from the UN if they could avoid it.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

351. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Pretoria, June 30, 1960, 2 p.m.

528. During extended weekend in country where we were both guests, Eric Louw, Minister External Affairs, had three long talks with me about what he said are deteriorating relations between our two countries.

He blamed US press and American committee on Africa for grossly misleading American public on true state of affairs here, and went on to add that State Department's recent decision to admit Oliver Tambo¹ who he says is Communist, was regarded by his government as unfriendly act.

He then cited South Africa's firm anti-Communist position in UN, her armed contributions during great and Korean wars and his government's present willingness to react favorably to our desire to conclude agreement with US on NASA and Defense. He added that even though many South Africans are commencing to think that a neutralist policy may be their only alternative, his government will stand firmly with West against Communism and that Dr. Verwoerd recently assured Macmillan to this effect.

He then asked me why South Africa was getting such bad press in America and listened carefully while I told him that in my opinion his racial policies will always provoke an indignant press in both England and America, and that until present government decides on less rigid attitudes toward non-whites he can expect nothing else.

Louw then criticized England for selling his country Centurian tanks which have little local use and said that after attending Prime Ministers conference he had sounded Belgians and Czechs on possibility of purchasing arms from them.

Turning to matter of his country's relations with emerging black states of Africa he told me ruefully that Nkrumah had embarrassed him at London Prime Ministers conference by publicly taking back his invitation for Louw to visit Ghana. He also commented somewhat bitterly on decision of new Congo Government withdraw their invitation to SA attend their independence day celebrations and added that he had had a gold cigarette box made for new Congo Chief of State.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745A.56311/6-3060. Secret. Repeated to London, Capetown, Johannesburg, Durban, and Port Elizabeth.

¹ Deputy President of the African National Congress; he fled South Africa at the end of March.

Louw said that these new black states are ganging up against Union and he thought it strange that an ex-State Department advisor such as Ernest Gross² would agree to act in behalf of such a combine.

Comment: Although we have officially disagreed my personal relations with Louw have always been good and I felt he was glad we could talk in relaxed atmosphere of country rather than his office. While he did not directly say so he inferred that Cabinet expected him tell me what he did. I also felt for the first time he really listened to my warnings about his country's racial policies.

Crowe

² Department of State Legal Adviser, 1947-1949; he was acting as Counsel for the Liberian Government on the question of South West Africa.

352. National Intelligence Estimate

NIE 73-60

July 19, 1960.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Problem

To re-examine the outlook for South Africa in the light of present racial tension.

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were interdepartmental reports drafted by officers from agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated to the President, the National Security Council, and other appropriate officers of cabinet level.

A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board on 19 July 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

Conclusions

1. The recent wave of racial disturbances in the Union of South Africa has reinforced our view that in that country the years ahead will be characterized by increasing tension, culminating eventually—probably after considerable bloodshed—in the end of white domination. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that the white minority, with all the powers of a modern state at its disposal, and with a firm determination to use them, will be able to maintain its dominance for the next few years. (Para. 22)

2. Despite their number, the Africans are presently too weak and disorganized to mount a broad and sustained campaign of resistance in the face of the means of coercion available to the white community. Nevertheless, localized strikes, boycotts, and other manifestations, touched off by some specific grievances or incidents, will probably flare up more frequently over the next few years. The more activist non-white elements are likely to turn to terrorism. Africans outside the Union will probably find means of furnishing at least small amounts of arms and other material support to the Africans within the Union. (Paras. 11–15, 23)

3. Continuation of internal strife in this manner will further increase racial tensions in the community and magnify the difficulties of maintaining white dominance. It may provoke a number of Asian-African states—and perhaps others—to adopt economic sanctions against South Africa. It will lead to some local economic dislocations within the country, and will further reduce South Africa's ability to attract the investment capital, both foreign and domestic, which is needed for the country's continued prosperity. (Paras. 24–25)

4. At present the rather substantial structure of influence which the Communists had established within the leadership of the older non-white political movements in South Africa appears to have been hard hit by recent events. Since the development of a new apparatus will probably have to be started at the local level, it cannot be accomplished rapidly. The Communists will be hampered by the absence of reliable and numerous African cadres. Over the longer run, however, with their conspiratorial skills and their ability to get material support from the Bloc, Communists may come to exercise important influence within the protest movement in the Union. (Para. 16)

5. Although the white community generally supports the government's efforts to stamp out African dissidence, recent events have aroused increased misgivings, even within the dominant Nationalist Party, as to the moral, economic, and international implications of the government's *apartheid* policy. Within another year or two, the growth of this feeling will probably begin to force some easing of the government's more onerous racial restrictions, but no comprehensive accom-

modation to non-white aspirations is likely. Probable government concessions are likely to have no more than a temporary calming effect, and probably will only stimulate pressure for further change. (Paras. 17-21)

6. Growing world disapproval of its racial policies will probably push South Africa into an increasingly isolated and controversial position in international affairs. There is at least an even chance that it will be forced out of the Commonwealth if it carries out its plans to become a republic. South Africa will almost certainly be a target in the UN for the growing number of Afro-Asian members, but it is unlikely to withdraw unless sanctions are voted against it. Given the vehemence of both Afro-Asian and South African feeling, the Western powers will find it increasingly difficult to avoid offending one side or the other. (Paras. 26-27)

[Here follow the "Discussion" portion of the estimate (paragraphs 7-27), with sections headed "Introduction," "Non-White Pressures for Change," "Reactions in the White Community," "The Internal Outlook," and "External Repercussions;" Annexes A, "The Union of South Africa," and B, "Military and Security Forces;" and a map.]

353. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Hare) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Williams)

August 19, 1960.

DEAR MR. WILLIAMS: I am writing to you to confirm our conversation of August 16, 1960,¹ concerning the proposal of the Department of Defense to secure the approval of the South African Government for the establishment of a facility in the Union in connection with the Department's missile and satellite program, and the Department of State's agreement to enter into negotiations for that purpose.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 745A.56311/8-1960. Secret. Drafted by George S. Newman, Special Assistant for Politico-Military Affairs in Hare's office.

¹No record of this conversation has been found. On August 15, Hare met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert H. Knight and Lieutenant General D.N. Yates, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; Yates reported on a survey trip investigating sites in South Africa and Bechuanaland for a proposed missile and satellite tracking station. (*Ibid.*, 745A.56311/8-1560)

As you are aware, the survey and briefing trip to South Africa by General Yates and his party was based on the understanding between our Departments that the United States would not alter its basic policy toward the Union of South Africa in order to secure the approval of the South African Government to the establishment of the proposed facility. While the separate reports of Ambassador Crowe² and General Yates to date indicate that the South Africans will not raise this point, should they do so during the course of any negotiations on this subject, we would abandon our plan to have the facility in the Union of South Africa.

As I outlined during our discussion, agreement was reached with Mr. Knight and General Yates that, in the event political developments in the African area result in the proposed facility becoming a net disadvantage to United States interests, it would be removed. It was also decided there should be no publicity by the U.S. concerning the negotiations or the establishment or operations of the facility. We should assume, however, that the existence of the facility will become known and may be subjected to attack and misrepresentation. Accordingly, it was agreed that a public information policy should be prepared for contingency use which would be honest and forthright and which would be based on the following points: (a) the purpose of the facility is research and development related to military purposes; (b) it is in no sense a military operational installation; and (c) a civilian contractor manages the facility which is maintained and operated by civilian personnel.

In view of the potential political implications in Africa of the establishment of the facility, I believe that representatives of our Departments, in Washington and in the Union of South Africa, should maintain close liaison on developments which may affect the facility.³

Sincerely,

Raymond A. Hare⁴

² Telegram 93 from Pretoria, August 6. (*Ibid.*, 745A.56311/8-660)

³ A letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John N. Irwin, II, to Hare, dated September 10, confirmed the understandings in this letter. (*Ibid.*, 745A.56311/9-1060)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

354. Memorandum of Conversation

October 25, 1960.

SUBJECT

Visit of the South African Minister of External Affairs

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Eric H. Louw, South African Minister of External Affairs
Dr. Willem Christiaan Naude, South African Ambassador

The Secretary
J.C. Satterthwaite, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
James J. Durnan, AFE

Mr. Louw, who was on a two-day visit to Washington from New York, where he is attending the Fifteenth UNGA session, called to pay his respects to the Secretary.

In referring to the Soviet Premier's activities in the UNGA, Mr. Louw stated that since Khrushchev's departure the Soviet UN delegation has been doing everything it can to create difficulties and to embarrass Secretary General Hammarskjold.

As Mr. Louw must return to South Africa by November on matters relative to the South African budget, he had sought to get the agreement of the Fourth Committee for him to speak on the Southwest Africa item in the near future, leaving the debate on this subject in its present position on the agenda. He had been unsuccessful as a result of Ethiopia's objection, despite the fact that South African troops had liberated Ethiopia in World War II.

He referred also to South Africa's difficulties with Ghana, mentioning Nkrumah's peremptory withdrawal at the Commonwealth Conference of the invitation he had extended Louw to visit Ghana and the restrictive measures Ghana had instituted with respect to flights from South Africa to Ghana.

The Secretary stated that he would like to take this opportunity to express our thanks for the very fine cooperation we had received from the South African Government, and from the Minister personally, in the matter of our outer-space programs in so far as they involve South Africa. Mr. Louw informed the Secretary that he highly appreciated the Secretary's letter of gratitude for the assistance rendered American evacuees into the Union at the time of the Congo riots.

Mr. Louw remarked that he was glad the Secretary had mentioned the matter of our outer-space programs, since he had received a message in connection with the current discussions concerning our

Defense Department project. The message raised three questions, (1) whether the facilities would become South African property after operations are completed, (2) whether the facilities would be operated by South African personnel, and (3) whether South Africans would be trained to operate the facilities. The establishment of facilities for the project in the Union was a cause of concern to the South African Government, since the outbreak of a local war between the United States and the USSR, for example in Formosa, would involve the question of South Africa's neutrality. This would not arise in the event of a total war. South Africa wished to be assured that it will take over the facilities after completion of the operation, but with rights reserved to the United States in the event of total war. The matter had been referred to South African Government legal advisers for consideration. No decision on our proposal would be taken, however, until after our Presidential elections.

Mr. Louw stated that he must be frank in informing the Secretary that South Africa had been very unhappy at the action we had taken in issuing a statement on the Sharpeville riots. The incident had been distorted and exaggerated by the press. The facts were that a mob of about 18,000 had stormed a small police force. Tear gas could not be used owing to an unfavorable wind and the police had been obliged to fire on the mob.

On matters relating to South Africa in the United Nations, Mr. Louw noted that we had changed our position in the last two years by voting against South Africa on the resolution concerning South Africa's racial policy. While not suggesting that the United States should support South Africa on the issue, Mr. Louw felt that the changed position of the United States was unfortunate when South Africa was evidencing every desire to be cooperative with the United States.

The Secretary stated that we had always been frank with South Africa and expressed the hope that real progress can be made in ameliorating racial conditions in the Union. While we have always fully appreciated the difficulties of the problem, we cannot support South Africa's official racial policy. Mr. Louw replied that he does not ask for our support and remarked that South Africa is already making considerable headway. Questioned by the Secretary as to whether he referred to economic advancement, Mr. Louw answered in the negative, and stated that the advancement was being made in the political sphere. Mr. Louw went on to say that the position of the tribal natives was quite different from that of other natives. Two Bantu Territorial Authorities have been established and are functioning very well. The tribal natives are perfectly happy with their organizational set-up and in time will achieve self-governing status. The South African Govern-

ment, Mr. Louw said, spends five to six times more per capita on development of the African than does any other country on the Continent.

Referring to criticism of the forced carrying of reference books by the Bantus, Mr. Louw stated that all South Africans, whites and non-whites, are required to carry identity cards. For the urban Bantus these serve to protect them in getting work and housing since they are a means of controlling the 750,000 African immigrants from neighboring territories. Raising the question to why South Africa does not grant a qualified vote to the non-whites, Mr. Louw said, in citing Rhodesia and Nyasaland, that experience has shown the qualified vote satisfies nobody. The Blacks, according to Mr. Louw, want everything or nothing. The alternative to a qualified vote was a full vote and the whites of South Africa had no wish for a nation of mixed-blood.

Mr. Louw described the history of the early European settlements in South Africa and compared the position of their present day descendants with those of North and South America. The position of the whites in South Africa was different from that of the whites in other African countries. The South African whites were a permanent part of the population and had no other place to which they could go.

Mr. Louw referred to a statement by Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker that there should be no double standard. He could not understand why criticism should be levelled at South Africa and not at other countries when riots occur, mentioning specifically the recent disturbances in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He believed that the United States should try to appreciate South Africa's position and mentioned Ambassador Wailes, who had served in the Union, as one American individual who thoroughly understood the situation in South Africa. He referred to a letter of Mason Sears to the *New York Herald Tribune* in which Mr. Sears said, "It might prove extremely effective if a U.N. 'presence' could be established in the heart of South Africa before racial unrest gets out of hand". As Mr. Sears had signed himself as "Former U.S. Representative on the U.N. Trusteeship Council", Mr Louw indicated concern that the views expressed in the letter by Mr. Sears might be interpreted as U.S. Government policy.

South Africa, Mr. Louw stated, was anxious to cooperate with the United States, as Ambassador Crowe and his predecessors, Ambassador Byroade and Ambassador Wailes, could testify. The time may come, Mr. Louw continued, when South Africa could be a worthwhile ally of the United States. South Africa, he pointed out, had never voted to interfere in the domestic affairs of another country and recalled that the President of the United States in a statement on one occasion had made a point against interference in another country's internal affairs.

Mr. Louw invited the Secretary to visit South Africa some time and assured him that he would be free to travel wherever he wished and not be subjected to a conducted tour of the country.

355. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Herter

December 5, 1960.

SUBJECT

Telephone conversations with Senator Morse¹

Senator Morse called me from New York at about 12:30 to ask for a change in the voting instructions in regard to the Resolution before Committee IV involving the recommendation for the despatch of the Committee on Southwest Africa to go to Southwest Africa on a Committee of Inquiry.² Senator Morse said that they had worked very hard to have certain parts of the original Ghanaian Resolution modified and he felt it would be very detrimental to the U.S. standing, therefore, to abstain on the Resolution as a whole. He said the Italian Delegation had suggested a procedure which they intended to follow and which Senator Mores hoped we could do likewise. This would involve voting on operative paragraph 3 of the Resolution³ — the one providing for the Committee to go to Southwest Africa first—on which vote the U.S. would abstain. If, as was expected, however, this paragraph still carried, the U.S., after having made its position plain on the Committee by abstention, would then vote in favor of the Resolution. I told the Senator we would look into this matter and I would call him back.

After discussion with the Staff of IO and other interested Officers of the Department, I called Senator Morse back and said that we did not see how we could vote in favor of the Resolution quite apart from the Committee paragraph because of its very extreme text. I also pointed out to him that in terms of references, the Committee seemed

Source: Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 65 D 379, South West Africa. Official Use Only.

¹ Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

² Reference is to an 11-power draft resolution, a revised version of a draft resolution proposed on November 24 by Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Togo, and Tunisia; see U.N. docs. A/C.4/L.653 and A/C.4/L.653/Rev.1 and Rev.2.

³ Operative paragraph 4 of the final resolution.

to go beyond the requirements of Class "C" mandate which the ICJ had specifically certified as being the only international agreement binding on the Union of South Africa in this respect.⁴ Senator Morse pointed out that the language in paragraph 2 condemning the Union of South Africa had been changed to disapproval. He further questioned the legal interpretation of the Department of State in regard to the problem of the mandate. I told him that in view of the change in language to which he referred which we had not known about, we would have a further look at the matter. However, on further examination, it was the general consensus in the Department that we could not support the precedent of attempting to send a Committee to a country against that country's wishes, nor could we, as the language indicated, go beyond the requirements of the mandate.

At three o'clock, Senator Morse telephoned me and I told him that our final decision was to abide by the original instructions and abstain on the whole Resolution. Senator Morse said he would accept the decision but wishes to state that "we were making one of the greatest mistakes" that we had ever made in the UN and that we would have a bad time, not only in Committee IV, but again when this matter came to the floor of the Assembly. I told him we had carefully considered all the factors involved, but we felt that we would be in worse shape after we voted for a Resolution with which we disagreed on so many points.

In the meantime, following Senator Morse's first call, Mr. Wallner called up Ambassador Wadsworth who confirmed his support of Senator Morse's opinion, but said, of course, they would abide by our instructions.⁵

⁴ In an advisory opinion of July 11, 1950; *International Status of South-West Africa*, I.C.J. Reports (1950) 128. The term "Class 'C' mandate" refers to the classification of mandated territories in Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant; the text is in 2 Bevens 55.

⁵ The draft resolution was approved by the Fourth Committee on December 6. In separate votes on the operative paragraphs, the United States voted in favor of all except operative paragraph 4, on which it abstained. The resolution was approved by a vote of 65 to 0, with 15 abstentions, including the United States, and was adopted by the General Assembly on December 18 as Resolution 1568 (XV) by a vote of 78 to 0, with 15 abstentions, including the United States. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960*, pp. 642-643.

Index

- Abbas, Ferhat, 430
Abboud, Ibrahim, 177-178, 623, 630
Abrams, Eugene B., 714n
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Alhaji, 221-222
Achilles, Theodore C., 110
Acly, Robert A., 740n
Adeel, Omar Abdel Hamid, 596, 623
Aden, 176
Adenauer, Konrad, 70
Adoula, Cyrille, 561, 585-586, 605n, 620
Africa (*see also specific countries and areas*):
 Asian minorities, 61, 64-65, 79, 92-93
 British economic aid, 94-95
 Chinese People's Republic, relations with, 135-136
 communist influence (*see also Chinese People's Republic subheadings under other subjects; Soviet bloc subheadings under other subjects; specific countries and areas*), 8, 49, 67, 69-70, 82, 100-101, 130, 159
 nationalist movements and, 8-9, 12, 25, 38, 41
 independence (*see also Newly independent countries; specific countries, areas, and organizations*), 2-3, 7-8, 38, 40-44, 46-47, 49, 94
 multilateral economic aid (*see also U.S. economic aid below and under other subjects*), 10, 19-20, 48, 51, 96, 105, 113, 147-148, 150, 153-154
 neutralism, 149
 racial policies (*see also Union of South Africa; white settlers below; specific countries and areas*;), 5, 8, 29, 59, 61, 63-64, 91, 122
 U.S. domestic racial issues and, 21, 28-29, 82, 123, 731
- Africa—Continued
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 41, 47, 49, 101, 148, 153-154, 157
 tripartite talks, 44-53, 52-53, 96, 689-691
 United States, relations with, 10, 23, 127, 151-153
 U.S. economic aid (*see also multilateral economic aid above and under other subjects*), 47-48, 76-77, 127-128, 134, 156-157, 262
 U.S. military aid, 148-149, 154-156, 155-156, 158-159
 U.S. policy toward, 43-44, 53, 126-127, 147-149, 151-152, 159-160, 167-170, 196, 654-657
 white settlers (*see also racial policies above and under other subjects*), 5, 12, 20, 54, 59, 61, 63-65, 63-66, 79, 89, 91
- Africa South of the Sahara (*see also British territories; East, Central, and South Africa; French territories; French Tropical Africa; specific countries*), 22-37
 communist influence, 29, 38, 40
 economic situation, 14-15, 31-32, 34-35
 independence, 12, 15-16, 19-20, 25, 27-29, 39, 129-130
 multilateral economic aid, 19-20, 105, 110, 112-113, 115-116
 NSC discussions, 13-16, 19-22
 OCB reports, 11-13, 39-40
 regional cooperation, 10, 13, 32-35, 37
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 12, 25, 29, 39, 104, 114
 United States, relations with, 14, 22, 26, 69-72, 105-106, 114, 137

- Africa South of the Sahara—Continued
 U.S. economic aid, 16, 19-21, 27, 33-36,
 39, 69-70, 99-106, 109-116, 133
 U.S. policy toward, 12, 16, 19-21, 24-
 37, 39, 46
- African Front conference (Abidjan, Oct.
 1960), 235, 569
- African National Congress (ANC), 12, 733
- Afro-Asian bloc (*see also specific coun-
 tries*), 46, 69, 94, 518, 524, 609, 742,
 745
- Afro-Asian conferences, 204
- Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference
 (Cairo, Dec. 1957–Jan. 1958), 8-9, 12
- Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council,
 12, 47
- Ahidjo, Ahmadou, 212
- Akintola, 222
- Akilou. *See* Habtewold, Aklilou.
- Alexander, Maj. Gen. H. T., 313, 322-323
- Algeria (*see also* French territories; North
 Africa), 43, 132-133, 137, 235, 241,
 250, 420, 430
- All-African People's (Pan African) Confer-
 ence (Accra, Dec. 1958), 40, 46, 63,
 208
- Allen, Arthur B., 191*n*, 197-198*n*
- Allen, George V., 20, 184, 186-187, 269,
 354, 375
- Alphand, Hervé, 44, 51, 68, 128-129, 468
 Congo crisis, 333-334, 415-417, 483-
 484
 Guinea, 672, 678-679, 689-691, 713-
 714
- Alsop, Stewart, 629
- Amory, Derek Heathcoat. *See* Heathcoat
 Amory, Derek.
- Anderson, Robert B., 75, 94-95, 97, 111,
 152-153, 158, 183-184, 354, 377
- Angola (*see also* Africa South of the Sa-
 hara; East, Central, and South Africa;
 Portuguese territories), 6, 15, 58, 62,
 90-91, 376
- Arden-Clarke, Charles Noble, 725
- Argentina, 622
- Asbjornson, Mildred, 478*n*, 553*n*
- Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 227-232, 624
- Barco, James W., 168, 402-405, 542-553,
 556-557, 559, 596-600, 608-610
- Barnes, Nathan, 352-353
- Barrows, Leland, 212-213, 240-242
- Bartlett, Frederic P., 214
- Bassompierre, Jean de, 253, 366*n*, 512*n*
- Basutoland. *See* British territories; High
 Commission territories.
- Baudouin (King of Belgium), 77, 259, 276*n*
- Baum, Robert D., 435*n*
- Beard, John, 186
- Beaudry, Robert M., 385*n*
- Bechuanaland. *See* British territories; High
 Commission territories.
- Beeley, Harold S., 401-402
- Behanzin, Louis, 420
- Belgian Congo (*see also* Africa South of
 the Sahara; Congo crisis; East, Cen-
 tral, and South Africa; Republic of
 Congo), 47, 85, 89, 95-96, 220, 254,
 257, 274-276
 Angola, relations with, 6, 90
 Belgian economic aid, 259, 263, 276
 economic situation, 15, 30, 61, 88-89,
 114, 133, 153, 254, 269-270, 274,
 276*n*
 foreign investment, 261, 265
 independence (*see also* Congo crisis; Re-
 public of Congo), 2, 12, 59, 133,
 276
 Belgian reform policies, 5-6, 62, 65,
 77, 89, 94, 251-263, 267, 272
 nationalist movements, 5, 89, 255-
 257, 262-266, 263-264, 267*n*,
 275*n*, 275
 INGA project, 254, 265
 Schrijver Plan. *See* Belgian reform poli-
 cies *under* independence *above*.
 separatist movements, 77, 89, 275-276,
 278*n*
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 263-264,
 267-268, 271-275, 272
 United States, relations with, 261-267,
 272
 U.S. economic aid, 111, 133-134, 138,
 152, 259, 262, 265, 267-270, 274-
 276
- Belgium (*see also* Belgian Congo; *Belgian
 subheadings under other subjects*;
 Congo crisis; Republic of Congo; Ru-
 anda-Urundi), 12, 367-368
- Bell, John O., 110, 113-115, 143, 146*n*,
 693*n*
- Ben Aboud, El-Mehdi, 234
- Bérard, Armand, 416
- Berding, Andrew H., 742
- Berendsen, Ian, 533-534, 544, 568-569,
 602
- Beukas, Hans J., 737
- Bing, Geoffrey, 75-76

- Black, Eugene R., 364n
 Blancké, W. Wendell, 218-219
 Blouin, Mme., 420, 528
 Blue, William L., 392n, 446n, 452n, 473n, 521n, 532n, 566n, 592n
 Board of National Estimates, 435-442
 Boggs, Hale, 152
 Boggs, Marion W., 14n, 19-22, 73-78, 126-128, 174, 708, 751
 Belgian Congo, 257-258, 274
 Congo crisis, 280, 353, 372-376, 421n, 442-443, 489-491, 496-497, 508-509, 607, 638-639, 642-643
 West Africa, 93-98, 106-109
 Bohlen, Charles E., 344, 532n, 540, 537n, 549-553, 566n, 574, 577-581, 592n, 611n, 618n, 630n, 760-761
 Bolikango, Jean, 404, 418, 472, 561
 Bomans, Jan Baptist, 255
 Bomboko, Justin (*see also* Congo crisis: political situation), 299, 429, 567
 Belgian technicians, 399-400, 625
 caretaker government, 550, 555, 573, 585
 Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict, 479-482, 489, 502, 506, 518-521, 526n, 527n, 529
 political situation, 418, 510, 528
 Soviet bloc, 315, 322-323
 U.N. intervention, 294, 396-397
 Bourguiba, Habib, 75, 446, 487, 646, 651
 Bowles, Chester, 629
 Bradford, Saxton, 110, 115
 Brand, Vance, 110, 112, 114
 Breitweiser, Maj. Gen. Robert A., 282n
 Brewer, William D., 52
 British East Africa (*see also* British territories; *specific countries*), 92-93
 British Somaliland (*see also* Somalia), 176, 181, 190, 204
 British territories (*see also* British East Africa; *specific countries*), 15, 19, 30-31, 39, 59, 61
 independence, 2, 4-5, 12, 62, 65
 Brown, L. Dean, 45n, 415n, 433n, 713n
 Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 96, 99, 111, 136n
 Buffum, William B., 392n, 413n, 446n, 452n, 455n, 493n
 Bull, Gen. Odd, 614, 619, 624
 Bunche, Ralph J.:
 Congo crisis, 292n, 313, 322-323, 356n
 Belgian troop withdrawal, 311n, 329, 334-335, 344, 396, 398
 Bunche, Ralph J.—Continued
 Congo crisis—Continued
 political situation, 354, 518, 547
 U.N. intervention, 286-287, 289n, 303, 398, 446, 549
 Burden, William A. M., 77, 260n, 262, 267-270, 284-291, 308-309, 330-332, 343, 368n, 381-385
 Burgess, W. Randolph, 98
 Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 95, 98, 184, 186, 346-349, 453-455, 469, 471
 Byroade, Henry A., 15, 724-726, 730-732
 Cabell, Lt. Gen. Charles P., 107, 280, 560
 Caccia, Harold S., 50-52, 640n, 689-691
 Cairo Afro-Asian Conference. *See* Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference (Cairo).
 Calhoun, Chad F., 669
 Calhoun, John A., 68n, 194-195, 381n, 411n, 413n, 452n, 745n
 Cameroun (*see also* French territories; French Tropical Africa; West Africa), 3, 18, 56, 120, 125, 138-139, 212, 637
 communist influence, 12, 18, 56, 502
 United States, relations with, 10, 74, 138, 212, 242, 245
 Canada, 153, 368, 369n
 Canup, William, 45n, 278n, 291, 317n, 349-351, 386n, 402-403, 512-514, 570, 581-583, 582-584, 674n, 679n, 685n, 689n
 Cargo, William I., 303n, 392n, 446n, 488n, 532n, 566n, 584n, 592n, 602n, 605n, 740n
 Cariappa, Gen., 619
 Carlier, Georges, 251
 Carlucci, Frank C., III, 322
 Cassilly, Thomas A., 226n, 378n, 411n, 515n, 693n, 702n, 709n, 711n, 714n, 716n, 718n
 Castro, Fidel, 448
 Central African Republic (*see also* French Community), 218, 233
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (*see also* Dulles, Allen), 179, 503
 Ceylon, 346, 492-493
 Chad (*see also* French Community), 218, 233
 Chadbourn, Philip H., 253n, 473n, 517n, 605n
 Chase, Peter, 378n

- China, People's Republic of, 12, 49, 110, 132, 135-136, 193, 201-202, 206, 208, 280, 301, 667
- Church, Frank, 722-723
- Cleveland, Stanley M., 262*n*, 265*n*, 270
- Colonial powers (*see also* Western Europe; *specific countries*), 12, 16, 19-20, 28, 39, 69-72, 81
- Commerce, U.S. Department of, 136*n*
- Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (*see also* Foundation for Mutual Assistance of Africa South of the Sahara), 13*n*
- Committee on Economic Development, 157
- Common Market, 10, 20, 31, 34-35, 39-40, 119, 206
- Commonwealth, 86, 119
- Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, 39*n*
- Conference of Independent African States, 11, 142, 167-168, 455, 651
- Conference of Principal Diplomatic and Consular Officers of North and West Africa. *See* Tangier Conference.
- Congo crisis (*see also* Belgian Congo; Republic of Congo (Léopoldville)), 282-284
- Belgian intervention (*see also* Belgian troop withdrawal *below*), 283-289, 297, 361
- Belgian technicians, 327-328, 353-354, 574, 619, 622
- Congolese position, 399, 429
- Dayal Report, 566-567, 574, 576
- economic situation and, 318-320, 362
- French position, 499-500
- political situation and, 373-374, 558
- U.N. control proposals and, 441, 551
- U.N. intervention and, 369, 386-389, 397, 420-421, 459, 467
- U.N. policies, 499, 530, 532-534, 538-541, 543-544, 551-553, 564-565, 568-569, 575-581, 615, 624-625
- U.S. position, 382, 474, 564-565, 594, 615
- Belgian troop withdrawal (*see also* Katanga secession *below*), 353
- African positions, 356, 395
- Belgian position, 305, 308-310, 326, 329, 337-338, 340, 369, 442, 452, 516
- British position, 308
- Congo crisis—Continued
- Belgian troop withdrawal—Continued
- Congolese position, 310, 323, 358, 361-363, 365, 399-400, 434
- French position, 308, 333, 498-499
- Ghanaian position, 390-392
- Hammarskjöld position, 371, 396, 398, 404, 458-459, 466-467, 470
- Katanga secession and, 340, 342, 382-383, 386-387, 393, 458
- Soviet position, 324, 334-335, 341-342, 381, 496
- Tunisian position, 305-306, 324
- U.N. base occupation proposal, 383, 473
- U.N. Security Council meetings, 346, 393-394
- U.S. airlift assistance, 343-344, 452, 459
- U.S. position, 327-328, 334-336, 341-342, 381-383, 393, 399*n*, 411-412, 425-427
- Board of National Estimates memorandum, 435-442
- British position, 401-402, 495, 500
- caretaker government proposals, 550-551, 554-555, 558-559, 573, 584-588, 603-605, 615, 617, 620-621, 626, 632, 634
- confederation proposals (*see also* round table meeting proposals *below*), 350, 353, 357, 407-408, 410, 423, 440, 474, 488, 500, 510, 533*n*, 569, 575
- Congolese position, 360-361
- food shortages, 294, 296, 298-299, 301, 308-310, 322, 354
- French position, 334, 483-484
- Kasavubu—Lumumba conflict (*see also* Ghana-Guinea-UAR support *under* Lumumba government *below*; round table meeting proposals *below*), 457, 459-464, 468, 471-472, 475-476, 478*n*, 497, 581-583
- African positions, 501, 527
- Belgian position, 460, 508, 521-523
- Belgian role, 477, 596-597
- French role, 477
- Hammarskjöld position, 524, 529-530
- Kasavubu position, 471-472, 486, 504-505
- Lumumba position, 477, 480
- Tripartite discussions, 498

Congo crisis—Continued

Kasavubu–Lumumba conflict—

Continued

- U.N. General Assembly representation and, 580, 589-591, 597, 615
- U.N. good offices commission proposals, 482-483, 530, 536, 539
- U.N. intervention and, 464, 466, 475-476
- U.N. policies, 464, 466, 475-476, 484-485, 520-521*n*, 530-532, 534-536, 539-547, 556-557, 587, 597
- U.N. representation and, 479-483, 489, 502, 506, 541, 559, 580-583, 589-591, 597, 615
- U.N. Security Council sessions and, 479-483, 489, 502, 506
- U.S. position, 508-509, 523, 542-543

Katanga secession (*see also* Belgian technicians *above*), 274, 277-279, 291, 310

- African positions, 356, 512-514
- armed struggle, possible, 438
- Belgian position, 310-311, 369, 574-575
- Belgian support (*see also* Belgian technicians *and* Belgian troop withdrawal *above*), 316, 329, 338, 345, 350, 362, 397, 438, 458-459, 474, 513, 522, 543-544, 548, 551
- confederation proposals and, 353, 357, 500
- Ghanaian position, 391
- Guinean position, 438
- Hammarskjöld position, 445, 548
- Lumumba position, 362, 468, 486
- Parliament reconvention proposals and, 550
- political situation and, 331, 344-345, 349-351, 581-583
- Soviet bloc influence and, 458-459
- Soviet military intervention proposals and, 349
- Soviet position, 438
- tribal rivalries and, 389
- U.N. good offices commission proposals, 482-483
- U.N. guarantee proposal, 398-399
- U.N. policies, 412-414, 429, 433, 513, 532*n*, 570, 577
- U.N. public security division agreement, 533-534, 539, 544

Congo crisis—Continued

Katanga secession—Continued

- U.N. troops, admission of, 312, 317, 344-345, 370, 385-386, 402-403
 - Belgian position, 326, 338, 369, 386-387, 397-398
 - Congolese position, 397
 - French position, 333-334, 415-416
 - Hammarskjöld position, 321, 371, 392*n*, 396-398, 402-404
 - Tshombé position, 344-345, 402-403, 570
 - U.S. policy toward, 456-457, 512-514, 568-570, 582-584, 600-601
 - U.S. position, 317-318, 331, 345, 423-424, 433, 440, 500, 523, 544, 601-602, 615
- Lumumba arrest, 506-507, 509, 518-521, 523-531, 524, 526-527, 547-548, 611-612, 616-618, 621-622, 642
- Lumumba government (*see also* caretaker government proposals *above*; Kasavubu–Lumumba conflict *above*; Parliament reconvention proposals *below*; political situation *below*; Stanleyville secession *below*; U.N. intervention: Congolese opposition *below*), 310, 327, 359*n*, 366*n*, 367*n*, 408, 410, 441, 477, 497, 575
- Ghana–Guinea–UAR support, 437, 439, 501, 510, 534, 541, 563, 593
- Ghanaian position, 665-666
- Kasavubu–Lumumba conflict and, 501-502, 504, 539
- Mobutu coup and, 509, 527-528
- Soviet bloc influence and, 419-420
- U.N. policies and, 445, 553-554, 557
- U.S. policies and, 433, 507, 509, 536, 572
- Hammarskjöld position, 537-538
- Katanga secession and, 331, 349-351
- Lumumba assassination plots, 435*n*, 437
- possible opposition, 404, 407, 410, 418, 437, 444, 449
- Soviet bloc economic aid and, 439
- Soviet bloc influence (*see also* Soviet bloc military aid *below*; U.S. intervention proposals *below*), 376, 455-456, 458, 472, 477, 510, 587-588

Congo crisis—Continued

- Lumumba government—Continued
 - Soviet bloc influence—Continued
 - Belgian position, 267*n*, 276, 314-315, 314-316, 355
 - Congolese position, 263-264, 355, 430
 - U.S. position, 280, 330, 338-339, 342, 355-356, 409, 437, 441-443, 448, 486, 563, 592-593
 - Soviet position, 408, 419
 - U.N. policies, 404, 465-469, 540, 565, 577-578, 587, 596
 - U.S. intervention proposals, 549-550
 - U.S. policy toward, 275-277, 330-332, 342, 408-410, 419, 432, 437-440, 455, 564, 573
 - covert action, 443, 503
 - Lumumba assassination proposals, 421*n*
 - U.S. position, 484, 486, 501, 504
- Mobutu role, 489-490, 494-495, 497-498, 503*n*, 505, 509-511, 516, 525, 527, 622
 - assassination attempts, 494, 539, 549
 - caretaker government, 561, 573, 585, 587, 604-605, 620
 - Hammar skjöld position, 530, 549, 559
- Oriental Province. *See* Stanleyville secession *below*.
- Parliament reconvention proposals, 527, 539-540, 549-550, 575, 585, 587-588, 618
 - Hammar skjöld position, 528, 550, 552, 559
- political situation (*see also*
 - Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict *above*; Lumumba government *above*; Mobutu role *above*), 276, 563-564
 - Belgian technicians and, 373-374, 558
 - Katanga secession and, 331, 344-345, 349-351
 - Lumumba U.N. trip and, 354
 - Soviet position, 621-622
 - U.N. withdrawal and, 436-438
- round table meeting proposals (*see also* confederation proposals *above*), 487-488, 510-512, 517, 533*n*, 595, 598-599, 601, 604
- Senegalese position, 248
- South Kasai separatist movement, 404*n*, 438, 442

Congo crisis—Continued

- Soviet bloc military aid, 446-447, 453-454, 466, 472, 483-484
 - U.N. responses, 458, 461-462, 465, 467-468, 470, 482, 490-491, 493
 - U.S. responses, 454, 456, 484, 487
- Soviet bloc withdrawal, 491, 497, 516
- Soviet military intervention proposals, 309, 315-317, 320, 322-327, 329, 335, 341, 343, 346-349, 354, 373, 381, 449-450
- Soviet position, 297, 622
- Soviet role in, 325, 334, 342, 355-356, 531, 609
- Stanleyville secession, 592-593, 597, 605-609, 627*n*, 630-631, 638-642, 639, 642-643
 - strategic importance, 425-426
 - tripartite discussions, 415-416, 498-500, 631-635
- U.N.-channeled economic aid, 363-365, 368, 372, 374-375, 378-380, 391, 406, 470
 - French position, 416-417, 499
 - Hammar skjöld contribution requests, 465, 485
 - Katanga secession and, 543-544, 548
 - Lumumba position, 378, 477
- U.N. control proposals, 423, 433, 440-441, 551, 563
- U.N. General Assembly sessions, 495-496, 500-501, 550-551, 581*n*, 591-592, 635-636, 639-640
- Kasavubu seating, 567-568, 580, 589-591, 597-598, 615
- Nkrumah speech, 663-665, 667-669
- U.S. policies, 493-494, 662-663
- U.N. intervention (*see also* Katanga secession *above*; U.N. General Assembly sessions *above*; U.N. responses *under* Soviet bloc military aid *above*; U.N. Security Council sessions *below*; U.S. intervention proposals *below*)
 - Advisory Committee, 435, 559*n*, 596
 - African positions, 149, 637-638
 - Afro-Asian positions, 614
 - Afro-Asian troop withdrawals, 619, 624-625, 639
 - airport and radio control, 455-456, 461, 465, 470, 474, 477, 478*n*, 479, 482, 485, 492, 572
 - army training, 292-293, 374, 419-420, 430, 456, 504

Congo crisis—Continued

U.N. intervention—Continued

- Belgian policies, 628
- Belgian position, 311, 328, 523-524
- Belgian technicians and, 387, 397, 420-421, 459
- British position, 614
- cease-fire, 484-485
- command, 293, 321-322
- Conciliation Commission, 559-560, 579-580, 581*n*, 591, 595-596, 600, 610, 626, 628, 641-643
- Congolese National Army conflicts, 549, 557, 594, 598-599, 602-603, 608, 628
- Congolese opposition (*see also* troop withdrawal *below*), 420-424, 431, 433-434, 437, 444-445
- Dayal discussions, 627-629
- Dayal replacement proposals, 572, 593, 596, 612-615, 619, 623
- Dayal Report, 566-567, 574
- equipment, 307
- Ethiopian troops, 195-196, 203-204, 597, 606, 633
- financing, 153, 301-302, 340-341, 376-378
- Force Publique disarmament proposals, 423, 444*n*, 445, 451-452, 454-456, 482, 486
- French position, 302, 307, 406
- Ghanaian position, 663-665
- Ghanaian troops, 469, 484, 488, 509, 531, 549-550, 557
- good offices commission proposals, 482-483, 530, 536, 539, 550-551, 555-556
- Guinean position, 515-516
- Guinean troops, 321, 376, 445, 468, 497, 509, 531
- Hammar skjöld discussions, 295-298, 607-608, 610-611
- Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict and (*see also* good offices commission proposal *above*), 464, 466, 475-476, 484-485
- Malian position, 245*n*, 246
- political unit proposal, 626
- Soviet bloc participation, 303
- Soviet position, 300-301, 396-397, 405, 445, 448, 479, 485, 492, 531, 540, 577, 614
- Soviet proposed amendments, 306-307, 311

Congo crisis—Continued

U.N. intervention—Continued

- Stanleyville incident, 448, 450-451, 453-455
- Stanleyville secession and, 593, 608-609, 627*n*, 633, 640-641
- troop makeup, 303, 307, 321, 363, 376, 383, 388, 404, 414, 416, 420, 550
- troop withdrawal (*see also* Congolese opposition *above*), 413-414, 422-424, 431-433, 436-438, 437-438, 444-445, 448-450, 469, 476
- UAR troops, 484, 486, 497, 509, 531, 557, 619, 624, 641
- U.N. courts control, 482, 486
- U.S.-British démarche, 613-616, 618-619, 623-626
- U.S.-British draft resolution, 622, 636-638
- U.S.-Hammar skjöld discussion, 546-553
- U.S. participation, 293-299, 302-303, 328-329, 339-340, 343, 363
- U.S. position, 148, 286-288, 594, 614-616, 643-644
- U.S. support planning, 449-450, 571-573
- U.N. Security Council sessions, 301, 305-307, 333, 346, 392-393, 401-402, 434-435, 469, 621-622
- Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict and, 479-482, 479-483, 489, 502, 506, 540
- Lumumba U.S. trip, 344, 351-354, 359-368, 372
- U.S. policies, 303-304, 334-336, 341-342, 393-394, 413-415, 476, 481-483
- U.S. intervention proposals, 449-450, 469, 484, 549-550, 573, 644
- U.S. observer proposal, 458-460
- U.S. policies, 367-368, 381-385, 471, 600
- U.S. statement proposal, 356
- Congo Republic. *See* Congo crisis; Republic of Congo; Republic of Congo (Brazzaville).
- Congress, U.S., 23, 154
 - acts of:
 - Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480), 84, 124, 237, 294, 696-697, 711*n*

- Congress, U.S.—Continued
 acts of—Continued
 Economic Cooperation Act (1948)
 (P.L. 472), 150
 Mutual Defense Assistance Control
 Act (1954), 238*n*
 P.L. 85-524, 23
 U.N. Participation Act (1945) (P.L.
 264), 329, 340
Conseil de l'Entente (see also Dahomey;
 Ivory Coast; Niger; Upper Volta),
 216-217, 235, 237, 240-241
 Cook, Charles D., 457-460, 464-468, 640-
 642
 Coolidge, Harold Jefferson, 429
 Cooper, Chester L., 435*n*
 Cooper, Henry Ford, 168
 Coote, Wendell B., 502*n*, 566*n*, 568*n*
 Cordier, Andrew W., 327*n*, 352-353
 Congo crisis:
 political situation, 458, 464, 477, 518,
 536*n*, 585*n*
 U.N. intervention, 289*n*, 396, 414,
 445-446, 536*n*, 540, 557
 Corea, Claude, 492
 Cornélis, Gen. Henri, 267*n*
 Council on Foreign Economic Policy
 (CFEP), 14*n*
 Couve de Murville, Maurice, 128-136,
 632, 634-635, 672-673
 Crowe, Philip K., 732-734, 738, 743-744,
 747-748, 750, 752-753
 Cumming, Hugh S., Jr., 355-356, 640-642,
 643*n*
 Cutler, Gen. Robert, 16
 Czechoslovakia. See Soviet bloc; *Soviet
 bloc subheadings under other subjects.*
- Da Cunha, Vasco T. Letao, 725
 Dacko, David, 218
 Daddah, Mocktar Ould, 234*n*, 244, 249-
 250
 Dadzie, 353
 Dahomey (see also French Community),
 118, 215-217, 223, 233, 235-236,
 240*n*
 d'Aspremont-Lynden, Harold, 397
 Davis, Richard H., 343
 Dayal, Rajeshwar (see also U.N. subhead-
 ings under Congo crisis), 506
 appointment, 405, 446
 Congo crisis, 510, 530, 549, 560, 564,
 602, 617, 627*n*
- Dayal, Rajeshwar—Continued
 Congo crisis —Continued
 Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict, 478*n*,
 506-507, 509, 518-519, 520*n*,
 553-554
 replacement proposals, 572, 593, 596,
 612-614, 619, 623
 Report on Congo, 566-567, 574, 576
 De Gaulle, Charles, 18, 44, 53, 68-69, 71-
 72, 95, 132-133, 154, 250, 406, 747
 de la Chevalerie, Daufresne, 533
 de Schrijver, Auguste, 260*n*, 266-267,
 269-270, 288, 290, 295
 Dean, John Gunther, 226*n*
 Dean, Sir Patrick, 640-642
 Debré, Michel, 50, 129*n*, 132-133
 Defense, U.S. Department of, 53, 136*n*,
 151, 284*n*, 328, 427*n*, 571, 756-758
 Dejean, Maurice, 233
 Denny, Adm. Sir Michael, 51
 Depi, Georges, 276
 Deressa, Yilma, 142
 Detribalization, 2-3, 36
 Detwiler, Edgar, 353-354, 358, 364-365,
 428-429
 Development Assistance Group (DAG),
 105
 Development Loan Fund (DLF), 13, 39,
 53, 96, 100, 102, 111-112, 114, 136*n*,
 140, 158, 697
 Devlin, Lawrence R., 313-314
 Dia, Mamadou, 226, 246-249
 Diallo, Joseph, 673*n*
 Diallo, Saïfoulaye, 694
 Diallo, Telli, 378, 395*n*, 675*n*, 680-687,
 709-712, 714-715, 717-721
 Dillon, C. Douglas, 219, 221, 232-233,
 277*n*, 554*n*
- Africa:
 multilateral economic aid, 96, 107-
 108, 111, 116, 148, 150
 U.S. economic aid, 133-134, 156-157,
 188-189, 197-198, 236-238, 245-
 246, 365-366, 657*n*, 707-714,
 721*n*
 U.S. military aid, 148-149, 154, 158-
 159, 192
 U.S. policy toward, 126-127, 147-149,
 151-152
 Africa South of the Sahara, U.S. eco-
 nomic aid, 99, 109-112, 116
 Belgian Congo, 133, 149, 153, 253-254,
 258-260, 262, 266

- Dillon, C. Douglas—Continued
 Congo crisis, 364-366, 415-416, 541, 568-570
 Belgian troop withdrawal, 411-412, 427n
 Lumumba arrest, 523, 525-529, 611-612
 Lumumba government, 367n, 421n, 605-606
 political situation, 502-503, 517, 540, 603-605
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 446-447, 490, 497, 540
 U.N.-channeled economic aid, 363-365, 374-375, 416-417
 U.N. intervention, 376-378, 413-415, 422-424, 433-434, 450-451, 602-603
 Guinea, 158, 693, 707-714, 721n
 newly independent countries, 149-150, 226-227, 236-238
 Union of South Africa, 734-735, 739-741
 Diomi, Gaston, 255
 Diori, Hamani, 216, 236n
 Djin, Amb., 420, 549
 Dolgin, George, 99n, 707n
 Dorros, Leon, 45
 Douglas, James H., 74, 161n, 165, 311, 425n, 462, 571
 Drake (correspondent), 428
 du Plessis, W.C., 734-735
 DuBois, W.E.B., 137
 Dulles, Allen, 157, 183-187, 257-258, 274, 376, 708, 751
 Congo crisis, 280, 310-311, 516
 Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict, 460-461, 509-510, 527-529, 539
 Katanga secession, 424, 433, 541
 Lumumba government, 338-339, 342, 423, 442-443, 503, 510
 political situation, 353-354, 442, 489-490, 496, 510
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 309, 341, 354, 490-491, 497
 Stanleyville secession, 607, 638-639, 642-643
 U.N. intervention, 309-310, 375-376, 539
 Dulles, John Foster, 11, 18, 40n, 41, 42n, 44-45, 74-76, 95
 Belgian Congo, 77, 95, 251-253
 Guinea, 674, 678-680
 Dumont, Donald A., 213, 673n, 674n, 675-678
 Durnan, James J., 757n
 East, Central, and South Africa (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; British territories; French territories; French Tropical Africa; *specific countries*), 58-68, 73-93
 communist influence, 67, 80, 82
 economic situation, 66-67, 74, 79
 independence, 58-67, 79-82
 political situation, 55-56, 74-76, 79
 U.S. policy toward, 74-76, 79, 81-84
 Egypt. *See* United Arab Republic.
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 44, 53, 74-77, 152, 160, 167, 183-184, 196
 Belgian Congo, 257-258
 Congo crisis, 279, 295-296, 300-302, 328-329, 354, 374, 377, 406, 411-412, 421n, 424, 451n, 495, 500-501, 600
 Ethiopia, 192, 196-197
 French community, 68, 70, 154
 Ghana, 645-652, 657-658, 661-662
 Guinea, 70, 212, 687, 698-702, 717
 Mauritania, 249-250
 newly independent countries, 20, 70, 155, 212-219, 226-227, 233, 234n, 244
 Nigeria, 228-232
 Togo, 223-225
 Union of South Africa, 741-742, 745-747, 749, 751
 U.S. economic aid to Africa, 19, 21, 70, 77, 117, 154, 157, 196-197, 216, 236-238, 657-658, 661-662
 West Africa, 95-98, 108
 Eisenhower, John S.D., 195-197, 223-225, 227n, 228-233, 293-295, 399n, 411n, 484-486, 495, 657n
 Eliot, Theodore, Jr., 233
 Emmerson, John K., 219-222
 Eritrea, 190-191, 200
 Ethiopia, 1, 8, 168, 190, 202, 210-211
 Congo crisis, 195-196, 203-204, 321, 597, 606, 609, 633
 Greater Somalia proposal, 181-182, 188, 200-201, 203, 205
 political situation, 175-176, 185, 190, 202, 210-211, 633
 Somalia, relations with, 9, 135, 181, 188-190, 200-201, 205, 209

- Ethiopia—Continued
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 8, 47, 176, 185-187, 190, 203, 210
 United States, relations with, 9, 180-181, 185-186, 191-192, 194-197, 203-204, 207, 210
- European Common Market. *See* Common Market.
- Export-Import Bank, 100, 102, 112, 158, 163
- Eyskens, Gaston, 254*n*, 401
- Fall, Mamadou, 293
- Fawzi, Mahmoud, 557, 624
- Federation of French Equatorial Africa. *See* French Equatorial Africa.
- Federation of French West Africa. *See* French West Africa.
- Federation of Mali. *See* Mali Federation.
- Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; British territories; East, Central, and South Africa; Rhodesia), 5, 10, 59, 63-65, 85-86, 90-92, 750*n*
- Feld, Nicholas, 734*n*
- Ferguson, C. Vaughan, Jr., 71*n*, 128*n*, 240-241, 245*n*, 258*n*, 260*n*, 271*n*, 277*n*, 303*n*, 317*n*, 333*n*, 359*n*, 378*n*, 392*n*, 433*n*, 435*n*, 446*n*, 455*n*, 473*n*, 481*n*, 488*n*, 517*n*, 525*n*, 602*n*, 605*n*, 611*n*, 618*n*, 667*n*, 670*n*, 680*n*, 684*n*, 713-714*n*, 729*n*, 734*n*
- Congo crisis, 293, 366*n*, 588*n*
- Guinea, 682-683
- Liberia, 162, 164
- Fessenden, Russell, 473*n*
- FitzGerald, Dennis A., 693*n*
- Flake, Wilson C., 239-240, 271*n*, 390-392, 395*n*, 488*n*, 654-661, 666-667, 669
- Fleck, Benjamin A., 618*n*
- Fleming, Marcia M., 729*n*
- Floyd, Avra C., Jr., 245-246*n*
- Fomin, Andrei A., 422
- Foote, Wilder, 327*n*
- Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (FAMA), 10, 13
- France (*see also* Colonial powers; *France, French, and tripartite subheadings under other subjects*; French territories), 69-70, 138-139, 208-209, 282, 477
- France—Continued
 Guinea, 69-72, 240, 671-673, 678-679, 686, 692, 700-701, 704-705, 713-714
 United States, relations with, 12, 19-20, 68-70, 128-136
- Franke, William B., 541
- Free Republic of the Congo (Stanleyville) (*see also* Congo crisis: Stanleyville secession), 627*n*
- Freeman, Tony, 272-274, 309
- Freers, Edward L., 343
- French Camerouns. *See* Cameroun.
- French Community (*see also* French Equatorial Africa; French territories; French Tropical Africa; French West Africa; Newly independent countries; West Africa), 56, 72-73, 130, 134-135, 167
 Constitution revision and, 4, 18, 130*n*, 131, 670
 French economic aid, 119, 144, 149-150, 235
 Guinean withdrawal, 69-72, 119, 132
 United States, relations with, 131-133, 144, 154, 216-217, 236-238, 243-244
 U.S.-French discussions, 68-70
- French Equatorial Africa (*see also* French Community; French territories; French Tropical Africa; West Africa), 3, 10, 15, 18, 134
- French Republic of Congo. *See* Republic of Congo (Brazzaville).
- French Somaliland (*see also* Somalia: Greater Somalia proposal), 176, 181-182, 208-210
- French territories (*see also* French Community; *specific countries and areas*), 2-4, 12, 18-19, 30-31, 47
- French Tropical Africa (*see also* French Community; French territories), 17-18
- French West Africa (*see also* French Community; French territories; French Tropical Africa; West Africa), 3-4, 10, 18
- Freund, Richard B., 284
- Gabon (*see also* French Community), 120, 219, 233
- Gaillard, Felix, 3*n*
- Galo Plaza, Lasso, 445-446

- Gambia. *See* British territories; West Africa.
- Ganshof, Walter J., 290
- Garvey, Marcus, 137
- Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 127-128, 153-154, 156-158, 186, 340-342, 346, 425, 453
- Gbedemah, H.K., 241, 657*n*, 658
- Geleé, Gen. Max, 50
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 35
- Gerard-Libois, J., 290*n*
- Gerig, O. Benjamin, 724, 740*n*
- Ghana (*see also* West Africa), 37, 48, 168, 241, 271-274, 417, 652, 752, 757
 Chinese People's Republic, relations with, 12, 667
 Congo crisis (*see also* Ghana-Guinea-UAR support *under* Congo crisis: Lumumba government), 285, 352-353, 378-380, 389-392, 487, 663-665, 667-668
 political situation, 419-420, 422, 433, 488
 U.N. intervention, 310, 313, 396, 404-405, 432, 484, 581*n*, 591
 economic situation, 30, 120, 158, 648
 political situation, 55, 75, 126, 241
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 8, 12, 29, 161-162, 220-221, 652, 658-660, 662, 665, 669
 United States, relations with, 13, 27, 161, 645-657, 662-665
 U.S. economic aid, 12-13, 33, 158, 220-221, 648-650, 657-658, 660-661, 666-667
- Gheysen, Gen. Roger A., 322
- Gizenga, Antoine (*see also* Congo crisis: Stanleyville secession), 399-400, 410, 418, 494, 509, 535, 549, 560
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 276, 330, 355
 U.N. intervention, 293-294, 396-397, 403
- Gleason, S. Everett, 13*n*, 14-16, 23-24, 181-186
- Glenn, E.S., 249*n*
- Good, Robert, 172
- Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., 68*n*, 194, 236*n*, 293, 328*n*, 377*n*, 379*n*, 674*n*, 741, 745*n*, 749
- Grant, William B., 571*n*
- Gray, Gordon, 77, 147, 151-152, 154, 158, 173, 184, 186
 Africa South of the Sahara, 19, 21
- Gray, Gordon—Continued
 Congo crisis, 312, 339-341, 354, 373, 376, 407, 461-462, 497, 540-541
 East, Central, and South Africa, 73-74, 76-77
 West Africa, 93-94, 96-98, 107
- Greece, 447*n*
- Green, Howard C., 368, 369*n*
- Grimes, Joseph R., 740*n*
- Grimes, Rudolph, 163, 167
- Gromyko, Andrei A., 343
- Grootaert, 427-428, 430
- Gross, Ernest, 753
- Guinea (*see also* West Africa), 119-120, 132, 236-237, 241, 275, 682
 Chinese People's Republic, relations with, 110, 132
 communist influence, 48-49, 56, 69-72
 Congo crisis (*see also* Ghana-Guinea-UAR support *under* Congo crisis: Lumumba government), 322, 352, 378, 389, 419-420, 559
 Belgian troop withdrawal, 395, 411-412
 U.N. intervention, 396, 405, 432, 515-516, 600
 troop participation, 321, 376, 445, 468, 497, 509, 531
 France, relations with, 240, 686, 692, 700-701, 704-705
 independence, 39, 48-49, 212, 252
 political situation, 55, 240
 Sékou Touré U.S. visit, 683, 687-689, 693-706
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 47, 49, 684-686, 689-692, 694
 economic aid, 220, 717-718, 722-723
 U.S. policy, 125, 161-162, 165-166, 684, 708
 United States, relations with, 680-682, 696, 718-721
 U.S. development of aluminum, 158
 U.S. economic aid, 95, 113, 125, 134, 138-139, 144, 681, 683, 687, 695-696, 705-706, 709
 French position, 69-72, 713-714
 Konkoure Dam, 710-718, 720, 722-723
 P.L. 480, 696-697, 711*n*
 Technical Cooperation Agreement, 695, 703-704, 707-708
 U.S. policy toward, 125, 149, 161-162, 165-166, 684, 693, 708

Guinea—Continued

U.S. recognition, 72, 212, 670-680, 678-679

Gullion, Edmund A., 167*n*

Gutt, Camille, 325-328

Habtewold, Aklilou, 195-197

Hadsel, Fred, 736*n*

Hager, Eric H., 329*n*

Haile Selassie I (Emperor of Ethiopia), 182, 185, 194-195, 202-203

Hammarskjöld, Dag (*see also U.N. sub-headings under other subjects*), 153

Congo crisis, 292*n*, 298, 404, 458-460

Belgian technicians, 530, 532-534, 538-541, 543-544, 551-553

Belgian troop withdrawal, 311*n*, 369, 382-383, 386-387, 396, 398, 459, 466-467, 470

Congolese National Army role, 549, 557

good offices commission proposals, 530, 550-551

Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict, 457, 459, 466, 485, 506-508, 524, 529-532, 537-538, 596-597

Katanga secession, 321, 369, 371, 386-387, 389-390, 396-399, 402-404, 458-459, 530, 532-534, 538-541

Lumumba arrest, 611*n*, 612*n*

Lumumba government, 465-467, 528, 556

Parliament reconvention proposals, 550

political situation, 444, 558-559

Soviet bloc influence, 458-459, 468-469

Soviet bloc military aid, 458, 461-462, 466-467, 470

Soviet military intervention, possible, 320, 322

Stanleyville secession, 640-641

U.N.-channeled economic aid, 363, 365, 465, 485

U.N. intervention, 289*n*, 295-301, 321-322, 434-435, 607-608

airport control, 477, 478*n*, 479

Conciliation Commission, 559-560, 595-596, 641-642

Congolese opposition, 422-424, 444-446

financing, 302, 377-378

Hammarskjöld, Dag—Continued

Congo crisis—Continued

U.N. intervention—Continued

Katanga secession and, 321, 369, 371, 386-387, 389-390, 396-398, 402-404, 412-413

U.S.-British démarche, 623-626

Hare, Raymond, 110, 114, 234*n*, 262, 270*n*, 277*n*, 298*n*, 413*n*, 433*n*, 449-450, 630*n*, 654-657, 667*n*, 755-756

Harr, Karl G., Jr., 11*n*

Harrar, J. George, 104*n*

Harriman, W. Averell, 219-222, 230-231, 471-472, 477-478, 486-487, 629, 722

Haskins, Charles A., 192*n*, 406-407

Heathcoat Amory, Derick, 311

Henderson, Horace E., 317*n*

Henderson, Loy W., 162-165, 233, 239-240, 242-244, 271, 600*n*, 601*n*, 630-631

Herter, Christian A., 52, 129, 135, 142, 161*n*, 163*n*, 191, 224, 661, 680*n*

Africa South of the Sahara, 20, 71

Algeria, 132

arms control, 167-170

Belgian Congo, 257-258, 261, 277-279

Congo crisis, 325, 364, 540, 631-635
Belgian technicians, 327-328, 474, 532-534, 539-541, 566-567, 578, 581, 594

Belgian troop withdrawal, 305, 308-309, 326-329, 333-335, 340-344, 452, 473

Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict, 506-508, 507, 524, 537-538, 554

Katanga secession, 310-312, 317-318, 326, 333-334, 344-345, 385-390, 452-453, 456-457, 473-474, 532-534, 539-541, 577

Lumumba government, 339, 355, 359*n*, 376, 409-410, 508-509, 528, 592-593

political situation, 354, 474, 488, 525, 554-555, 575, 584-586, 595

Soviet bloc, relations with, 315-317, 325-327, 341, 343, 346*n*, 355, 373, 449, 461-462, 493-494

U.N.-channeled economic aid, 365, 368, 378-380, 406

U.N. General Assembly session, 493-494, 662-663, 667-668

U.N. intervention, 295-298, 300-301, 303, 406, 455-456, 478*n*, 479, 488, 566-567, 579-580, 618-619

- Herter, Christian A.—Continued
 Congo crisis—Continued
 U.N. intervention—Continued
 army training, 292-293
 Belgian troop withdrawal and, 305, 308-309, 327
 financing, 301-302, 340-341, 377-378
 good offices commission proposals, 482-483, 556-557
 Katanga secession and, 312, 326, 333-334, 344-345, 370, 385-386, 385-390, 457, 473-474
 U.S. participation, 295-296, 299, 302-303, 328-329, 339-340, 343, 571
 U.N. Security Council sessions, 303-304, 327, 329, 334-336, 341-342, 344, 479-483
 U.S.-Belgian relations and, 367-368, 381-384
 U.S. economic aid, 298-299, 301, 366
 French Community, 71, 131-132, 134
 Guinea, 670-671, 680-682, 684, 687-689, 702-706, 713-715, 718-721
 Ivory Coast, 216-217
 newly independent countries, 184, 233, 236*n*
 Senegal, 246-249
 Somali Republic, 215
 Somalia, 188-189
 Sudan, 173-174
 Union of South Africa, 133, 726, 729-730, 736-737, 741-742, 749, 751, 757-760
 United Nations, 247-248
 West Africa, 93-97
- Herz, Martin F., 143*n*, 165*n*, 170*n*, 493*n*, 630*n*, 740*n*
- High Commission territories (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; British territories; East, Central, and South Africa), 4-5, 88, 732
- Hoffman, Paul, 225
- Hofmann, Paul, 627*n*
- Holmes, Julius C., 1-11
- Home, Lord, 495, 631-635
- Hope, A. Guy, 433*n*
- Horn of Africa (*see also* Ethiopia; Somalia), 175-177, 181-185, 189-191
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 176, 180, 190, 201-202, 209
 UAR influence, 180, 190, 201-202, 209
- Horn of Africa—Continued
 U.S. policy toward, 10, 180-182, 186-187, 191-192, 198-211
- Houghton, Amory, 282, 671*n*
- Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 3, 68-70, 69-70, 72, 216*n*, 218, 220, 235-236, 240
- Hoyer Millar, Frederick, 498-500, 632*n*, 633
- Hussein, Mohammed, 8
- Hyde, James N., 740
- Iléo, Joseph (*see also* Congo crisis: political situation), 372, 404, 418, 444, 458, 490, 558
 caretaker government proposals, 558, 561, 585, 587
 Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict and, 457, 461, 464, 468, 479, 485, 504-505, 540, 547
- India, 65, 156, 559, 596, 610, 614, 623-624
- Indonesia, 469
- Inter-River Economic Survey, 205
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 31*n*, 105, 113, 153, 158, 183, 362, 364-365, 657, 715, 718
- International Committee of the Red Cross, 616*n*, 622
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 29
- International Cooperation Administration (ICA) (*see also* U.S. economic aid under other subjects), 13, 39, 53, 112, 136*n*, 157, 216-217, 712
 Africa South of the Sahara, 100, 102-104, 110, 112
 Belgian Congo, 151, 269
 Republic of Congo, 281, 340
- International Court of Justice (ICJ) (*see also* United Nations), 87, 739
- International Development Association (IDA), 105, 113
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 105, 113, 362, 364
- Ipoto, Martin, 567
- Ireland, 624
- Irwin, John N., II, 427*n*, 450-452, 756*n*
- Islam, 7-8, 37
- Islamic Republic of Mauritania. *See* Mauritania.
- Israel, 651
- Issa, Abdullahi, 198*n*

- Italy (*see also* Italian Somaliland; Somalia), 134, 188-189, 197-198, 206-207, 211, 622
- Ivory Coast (*see also* French Community), 69, 118, 216-221, 235-236, 541
- Jacobs, J. Roland, 214
- Janssens, Gen., 360
- Johnson, Maj. Gen. D. V., 53
- Johnson, Robert H., 147-159, 309-312, 338-342, 421-424, 460-462, 527-529, 539-542, 560
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 21, 52-53, 97-98, 107, 161-162, 165-166
- Congo crisis, 346-349, 373, 425-427, 453-455, 468-471
- State-JCS meetings, 468-471
- Joxe, Louis, 44-45, 48-51, 671*n*
- Junkermann, Col., 162, 164
- Kaiser, Edgar, 660, 669
- Kalonji, Albert, 404, 418, 472, 617
- Kandolo, 535
- Kanza, Daniel, 256
- Kanza, Thomas, 322-323, 336-337, 352, 358, 396-397, 399-400, 480-481, 487, 489, 530
- Kasavubu, Joseph (*see also* Congo crisis), 214, 275, 279, 309*n*, 323, 361, 567-568, 594
- Belgium, 255-257, 299, 313-314, 361, 625
- caretaker government, 550, 555, 558-559, 573
- political situation, 280, 316, 323, 330, 332, 404, 410, 424, 432, 444, 509
- U.N. intervention, 288-289, 300, 310, 595-596, 610
- Kashamura, Anicet, 276, 285, 330, 355, 410, 420, 430
- Katanga secession. *See under* Congo crisis.
- Keita, Fodeba, 675
- Keita, Modibo, 213, 226, 240, 245
- Kellogg, Edmund H., 167*n*, 170*n*
- Kennedy, John F. (*see also* Harriman, W. Averell), 172, 219, 221, 471*n*, 486, 722*n*
- Kenya (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; British East Africa; East, Central, and South Africa; Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa), 8, 41, 64-65, 92-93, 129, 176, 208
- Kettani, Gen., 293, 321, 403, 430, 456, 535, 559, 572
- Khalil, Abdullah, 9, 173-174, 178
- Khrushchev, Nikita, 49, 101, 132, 297, 309, 315, 487, 525, 540, 577, 665
- Kibwe, 602
- Kimba, Evariste, 513, 582
- Knight, Robert H., 194*n*, 453*n*, 755*n*
- Kohler, Foy D., 52, 455*n*, 537*n*, 745*n*
- Korn, David A., 643*n*
- Krebs, Max V., 233, 506*n*
- Kretzmann, Edwin M.J., 684*n*, 714*n*
- Kuznetsov, Vasili Vasilievich, 405, 458
- Lansdale, Lt. Col. Edward G., 75
- Latin America, 156
- Lavallee, Jerome R., 255-257, 313-314, 428
- Lay, James S., Jr., 74, 126-127, 159*n*, 179, 198-199, 346*n*
- Lebel, Claude, 71*n*
- Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 159, 161-162, 165, 469-470
- Lennox-Boyd, Alan, 182*n*
- Leopold II, 5
- Levine, Irving, 629
- Lewis, Samuel W., 197*n*
- Liberia (*see also* West Africa), 16, 29, 48, 167-168, 241, 691-692, 700, 740
- Congo crisis, 352-353, 378
- economic situation, 1, 30, 120
- United States, relations with, 13, 16, 33, 95, 125, 162-165
- Libya, 8-10, 96, 125, 168-169
- Linner, Sture, 397-398, 603
- Liu, F.T., 464
- Lloyd, Rupert A., 235-236
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, 43-44, 742
- Congo crisis, 358-359, 447*n*
- Belgian troop withdrawal, 305, 308, 311*n*, 324, 337, 393*n*, 396, 398, 399*n*
- Belgium, relations with, 336-338, 357-358, 397, 399-400
- Katanga secession, 321, 338, 396-399
- Soviet military intervention proposals, 320, 322, 324
- U.N. intervention, 300, 301*n*, 302, 321-322, 338, 344, 351-353, 396-398, 401-402, 424, 432-433, 444-446
- nationalist movements, 40, 42*n*
- Loi-Cadre of 1956, 3-4
- Long, Edward T., 197*n*, 631*n*

- Looram, Matthew, 45, 670-671n, 674n
 Lord, Mrs. Oswald B., 599
 Loridan, Walter, 305
 Louw, Eric H., 724n, 727n, 729-732, 736-737, 744, 752-753, 757-760
 Lucet, Charles, 498-500, 631-635, 678n
 Lukens, Alan W., 218-219, 282
 Lumbala, 323
 Lumumba, Louis, 593
 Lumumba, Patrice (*see also* Belgian Congo; Congo crisis), 149, 151, 153, 220, 272, 274-275, 280, 360-361, 376, 494-495
 Belgium, relations with, 263, 299, 310, 313-314, 323, 357-358, 361-363, 365
 Soviet military intervention proposals, 309n, 323, 327, 354
 U.N. intervention, 288-289, 300, 374, 396-397, 412-414, 434, 448
 U.N. trip, 344, 351-354, 359-368
 U.S.-Congo relations, 262-266, 281, 358-359, 363-366, 427-429
 Luthuli, Albert, 733-734
 Luyeye, Philibert, 567
 Lynch, Andrew G., 215
 Lyon, Cecil B., 282, 672-673
- MacKnight, Jesse, 213
 Macmillan, Harold, 44, 50, 70, 95, 743, 745-747
 Madagascar (*see also* French territories; Malagasy Republic), 3, 10, 637
 Maga, Hubert, 215, 236n
 Maghreb. *See* North Africa.
 Magsaysay, Ramón, 75
 Makoso, 408
 Malagasy Republic (*see also* Madagascar), 118, 125, 130, 214
 Mali (*see also* Mali Federation), 226-227, 236-237, 236-238, 239n, 240, 245, 321, 443, 541
 Mali Federation (*see also* Mali), 55-56, 72-73, 117-118, 130, 132, 138, 213, 220, 443
 Malik, Yakov Alexandrovich, 652
 Mann, Thomas C., 104, 693n
 Marof, 352
 Martin, Edwin, 110, 115
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 103
 Mathews, Elbert G., 164, 389n
 Mauritania (*see also* French Community), 118, 120, 234, 244, 249-250
- M'ba, Leon, 219
 Mboya, Tom, 63
 Mbuyi, Joseph, 429
 McBride, Robert H., 44, 110, 115-116, 128n, 188n, 258n, 277n, 298n, 314n, 317n, 325n, 333-334n, 344n, 367n, 386n, 473n, 483n, 574n, 678n
 McClelland, Roswell D., 162-165, 227n, 234
 McCone, John A., 353, 516, 541
 McElroy, Neil H., 21-22
 McGregor, Robert G., 729n
 McIlvaine, Robinson, 356-357, 370n, 371-372
 McKeown, Gen., 619, 624
 McSweeney, John M., 446n
 Meeker, Leonard C., 479n, 740n
 Meloy, Francis E., Jr., 271n, 449n
 Mengesha, Iyassu, 608, 643n
 Menon, V.K. Krishna, 530, 610, 614
 Merchant, Livingston T., 71, 74, 76-77, 165-166, 187, 213, 334n, 344n, 392n, 592n, 632n, 643n
 Congo crisis, 284n, 333-334, 344, 452-453, 469, 471, 498-500, 643-644
 Belgian troop withdrawal, 343-344, 452, 470
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 453, 468-469, 483-484
 U.N. Security Council sessions, 336n, 392-394
 Somalia, 197-198
 Soudan, 468
- Metropolitan powers. *See* Colonial powers; *specific countries*.
 Michel, Serge, 420, 430
 Middle East, 10, 21, 26
 Middle East Development Fund (Pella Plan), 10
 Miller, Robert H., 381n, 446n, 473n
 Mobutu, Joseph (*see also* Congo crisis), 489-490, 497, 502, 503n, 505, 507, 509-511, 516, 525
 assassination attempt, 494, 539
 caretaker government role, 550, 555, 558, 573, 585, 587, 604
 Lumumba arrest proposals, 526n, 527
 Stanleyville secession, 639, 642
 Mohammed V (King of Morocco), 75
 Monongo, 602
 Moose, James S., Jr., 173-174
 More, Bolard, 212
 Morocco (*see also* French territories), 47, 49, 72-73, 169, 234, 249

Morocco—Continued

Congo crisis, 321, 378-379, 504, 509-510, 527, 534, 539, 550, 553, 557, 563, 624

Morrow, John Howard, 212, 717, 722-723

Morse, Wayne, 760-761

Moumie, Felix, 502, 511

Mozambique (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; East, Central, and South Africa; Portuguese territories), 6, 15, 58, 62, 90-91, 376

Mpolo, 494, 535, 549

Mueller, Frederick H., 157-158, 215, 340

Munongo, Godefroid, 278*n*

Murphy, Robert D., 44*n*, 45-48, 51-53, 214, 267, 279-280, 671-672, 674*n*, 685-687, 689-691, 704-706, 734-735

Mutesa, Edward Frederick, II, 59

Narasimhan, Chakravarthi

Nijayaraghava, 530

Nasser, Gamal Abdel (*see also* United Arab Republic), 64-65, 417, 531

National Academy of Sciences, 104

National Intelligence Estimates (*see also* Special National Intelligence Estimates):

NIE 70-59, 54-57

NIE 72.1-60, 193-194

NIE 73-60, 753-755

NIE 75-58, 17-18

NIE 76-58, 175-177

NIE 76-59, 58-68

NIE 76-60, 189-191

National Security Council:

actions:

No. 1290-d, 149

No. 1904, 16

No. 1961, 22

No. 2053, 185

No. 2175, 78

No. 2199, 98

No. 2209, 108-109

No. 2215-b, 198*n*

No. 2219-b, 128*n*

No. 2262, 312

No. 2270, 342

No. 2276, 375

No. 2284, 407

No. 2286, 159

No. 2287, 424

No. 2294, 462

No. 2295, 462

No. 2325, 542

National Security Council—Continued

Africa, U.S. policy toward, 126-127, 147-159

Africa South of the Sahara, 13-16, 19-37

Belgian Congo, 257-258, 274

Congo crisis, 309-312, 338-342, 353-354, 373-376, 406-407, 442-443, 460-462, 489-491, 496-497, 509-510, 516, 539-542, 560, 607, 638-639, 642-643

documents:

NSC 5719/1, 11-13, 19-22

NSC 5818, 23-37, 39-40

NSC 5820, 174

NSC 5903, 179-181, 191-192

NSC 5906/1, 95

NSC 5920. *See* NSC 6001 *below*.

NSC 6001, 73-93

NSC 6005, 93-98, 107-109

NSC 6005/1, 117-126

NSC 6028, 198-211

East, Central, and South Africa, 73-78

Guinea, 708

Horn of Africa, 181-185, 198-211

meetings:

365th, May 8, 1958, 13-16

375th, Aug. 7, 1958, 19-22

377th, Aug. 21, 1958, 173

378th, Aug. 27, 1958, 173-174

397th, Feb. 26, 1959, 181-185

414th, July 23, 1959, 185-186

423d, Nov. 5, 1959, 257-258

432d, Jan. 14, 1960, 73-78

438th, Mar. 24, 1960, 93-98

439th, Apr. 1, 1960, 751

440th, Apr. 7, 1960, 106-109

441st, Apr. 14, 1960, 126-128

443d, May 5, 1960, 274

June 20, 1960, 290

451st, July 15, 1960, 309-312

452d, July 21, 1960, 338-342

453d, July 25, 1960, 353-354

454th, Aug. 1, 1960, 372-376

455th, Aug. 12, 1960, 406-407

456th, Aug. 18, 1960, 147-159, 421-424

457th, Aug. 25, 1960, 442-443

458th, Sept. 7, 1960, 460-462

459th, Sept. 15, 1960, 489-490

460th, Sept. 21, 1960, 496-497

461st, Sept. 29, 1960, 509-510

462d, Oct. 6, 1960, 516

463d, Oct. 13, 1960, 527-529

464th, Oct. 20, 1960, 539-542

- National Security Council—Continued meetings—Continued
 465th, Oct. 31, 1960, 560
 468th, Dec. 1, 1960, 607
 470th, Dec. 20, 1960, 638-639
 472d, Dec. 29, 1960, 642-643
 newly independent countries, United States, relations with, 127-128
 Special Group on the Congo, 443
 Union of South Africa, 751
 West Africa, 93-98, 106-109
- Ndele, 535, 549
- Nes, David G., 48n
- Newlin, Michael, H., 611n
- Newly independent countries (*see also specific countries and areas*):
 economic situations, 66-67
 multilateral economic aid, 55, 70, 94-97, 110
 political boundaries, 82, 121, 134, 155, 237
 political situations, 55, 75-76
 relations with colonial powers (*see also French Community*; multilateral economic aid *above*), 25, 31, 39-40, 83, 94-97, 149-150, 171
 Soviet bloc economic aid, 183, 236-238
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 9, 18, 56, 80, 82, 118
 U.N. membership, 137-138, 149, 154, 252
 United States, relations with, 16, 27, 39, 47, 83, 122, 127-128, 184
 U.S. economic aid, 19, 30, 83-84, 183, 236-238, 237
- Newman, George S., 755n
- Ngalula, Joseph, 264
- Niger (*see also French Community*), 216-217, 233, 235-236
- Nigeria (*see also British territories*; West Africa), 7, 47, 120, 126, 168, 170, 230
 Congo crisis, 487, 502, 624
 independence, 4, 48, 117, 150, 221, 227
 political situation, 55, 75, 241
 United States, relations with, 10, 114, 221-222, 227-232, 245
- Nixon, Richard M., 22, 75-76, 103, 126-127, 270, 406
- Nkrumah, Kwame (*see also Ghana*), 13, 64, 168, 220, 271-274, 645-657
 Congo crisis, 313, 380n, 390-392, 404-405, 445, 487-488, 557
 political situation, 422, 433, 528, 665-666
- Nkrumah, Kwame—Continued
 Congo crisis—Continued
 U.N. General Assembly speech, 663-665, 667-668, 667-669
 Pan-Africanism, 48, 137
 political situation, 75-76, 241
 U.S. economic aid, 11-12, 648-650, 660-661, 666-667
- Norland, Donald R., 215-217
- Norstad, Gen. Lauris, 384
- North Africa (*see also French territories*), 10, 21, 46, 49, 136-141, 143-146, 202
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (*see also specific countries*), 16, 20, 26, 29, 48, 50-51, 251, 253
 Congo crisis, 345, 350, 384, 436, 438, 441, 469, 473-474
- Northern Rhodesia. *See* Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
- Northwestern University, 103-104
- Noyes, W. Albert, Jr., 104n
- Nunley, William T., 292n, 566n, 729n
- Nussbaumer, 535
- Nuwezi, Mwata Yamvo Ditende, III, 570
- Nyasaland (*see also Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*; Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa), 92
- Nyembo, Albert, 294
- Nyerere, Julius, 63n
- Nzeza, Simon, 256
- Ogaden, 190
- Okito, 604
- Olympio, Sylvanus, 213, 223-225
- Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 11-13, 39-40, 108, 173, 186-187, 191-192, 215
- Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 98
- Ormsby-Gore, David, 599-600, 614, 623-626
- Osman, Aden Abdulla, 215
- Padberg, Eugene L., 693n
- Padmore, George, 163-164
- Pakistan, 624
- Palmer, Joseph, II, 227, 541, 646-647n, 724, 750
- Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), 63
- Pan-Africanism (*see also specific conferences*), 48, 55, 69, 137, 204, 207-208, 437

- Parsons, J. Graham, 128, 135-136
Pella, Giuseppe, 10*n*
Pella Plan. *See* Middle East Development Fund.
Penfield, James K., 99*n*, 258*n*, 378-379*n*, 381*n*, 385*n*, 392*n*, 409*n*, 502*n*, 517*n*, 525*n*, 566*n*, 584*n*, 592*n*, 602*n*, 632*n*, 643*n*, 687*n*
Congo crisis, 284, 291, 344, 588*n*
Ethiopia, 192
Union of South Africa, 742
Pétillion, Leon, 15
Philippines, 75-76, 252
Pinzi, Arthur, 255
Poland, 622
Porter, William J., 128*n*, 188*n*
Portugal (*see also* Portuguese territories), 12, 376
Portuguese territories (*see also* Angola; Mozambique), 2, 6, 12, 30, 65, 85, 90-91
Potgieter, 734
Prohme, Rupert, 684*n*
Quaison-Sackey, Alex, 352-353, 446, 597, 663-665
Quezon, Manuel, 76
Rabb, Max, 354
Radio Cairo, 8
Randall, Clarence B., 14-16, 19-20
Raymond, John M., 525*n*, 674*n*
Reams, J. Borden, 215-218
Reid, Ralph W.E., 159*n*, 377
Republic of Cameroun. *See* Cameroun.
Republic of Chad. *See* Chad.
Republic of Congo (*see also* Congo crisis):
Belgium, relations with (*see also* Belgian subheadings under Congo crisis), 309-310, 313-314, 319, 336-337, 357-358, 441, 562-563
Chinese People's Republic, relations with, 280, 301, 303, 540
economic situation, 318-320, 354, 358, 362, 364, 510, 516, 540, 610
foreign investment, 281, 353-354, 358, 360, 364-365, 428-429
human rights, 622
independence (*see also* under Belgian Congo), 214, 256
neutralism, 281, 362-363, 439
Pan-Africanism, 437
separatist movements (*see also* Katanga secession under Congo crisis), 357
Republic of Congo—Continued
Soviet bloc, relations with (*see also* Soviet subheadings under Congo crisis), 280-281, 372, 375, 405-406, 437-439, 442-443, 477-478, 540
tribal rivalries, 389, 430, 461, 560
U.N. membership, 331
Union of South Africa, relations with, 752
United Arab Republic, relations with, 338
United States, relations with, 214, 344, 351-354, 358-368, 372, 427-429
U.S. economic aid (*see also* U.N.-channeled economic aid under Congo crisis), 279-281, 294, 296, 358, 363, 365-366, 372, 407, 477, 540
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), 120, 219, 486
Republic of Congo (Léopoldville). *See* Congo crisis; Republic of Congo.
Republic of Dahomey. *See* Dahomey.
Republic of Gabon. *See* Gabon.
Republic of Guinea. *See* Guinea.
Republic of Niger. *See* Niger.
Republic of Togo. *See* Togo.
Republic of Upper Volta. *See* Upper Volta.
Rhodesia (*see also* Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland), 15, 20-21, 41, 61, 64, 274, 376
Richards, Arthur L., 192, 194-195
Riddleberger, James W., 76-77, 104-105, 110, 113-114, 152, 707*n*, 708*n*
Rikhye, Gen., 403, 445-446, 464, 530
Rinden, Robert W., 212, 684*n*, 692-693
Roberts, Edward, 110, 115
Roberts, Owen W., 351
Rockefeller, John D., 629
Rockefeller, Nelson, 227, 229
Rogers, Charles E., 171
Rogers, William P., 213
Root, John, 186
Rothschild, Robert, 313, 574, 577, 579-580
Ruanda-Urundi (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; East, Central, and South Africa), 59, 85, 89-90, 340
Rucht, James R., 109*n*
Rusk, Dean, 629
Rutter, Peter, 652-653
Saccio, Leonard J., 102*n*, 114, 128, 134
Salumu, Bernard, 593

- Satterthwaite, Joseph C., 48n, 102n, 226n, 236n, 249n, 271n, 277n, 292n, 298n, 303n, 317n, 385n, 409n, 413n, 433n, 445n, 479n, 537n, 554n, 568n, 584n, 602n, 618n, 630n, 661n, 667n, 670n, 674n, 698n, 713n, 729n
- Africa South of the Sahara, 99-106, 110-111, 113-114, 116
- African Regional Conference, 53
- appointment of, 23
- Belgian Congo, 255-257
- Chinese People's Republic, 135-136
- communist influence, 38
- Congo crisis, 450n, 469-470, 500, 515-516
- French Community, 69, 71-73, 135
- Ghana, 515-516, 663-665
- Guinea, 71-72, 678n, 687, 693-697, 716-718
- Horn of Africa, 191-192
- independence, 38, 134
- Lodge's special representative proposal, 44n
- Mali Federation, 72-73
- newly independent countries, 171, 240
- Tangier Conference, 136n, 143-146
- Togo, 224-225
- tripartite talks, 46n
- U.S. economic aid, 143-146
- U.S.-French discussions, 128, 135
- Sauvagnargues, Jean de, 632n
- Scheyven, Louis, 261, 325, 327-328, 367-369, 386-387, 386-390, 416n, 452-453
- Scheyven, Raymond, 266, 269-270, 315-317
- Schuurmans, Constant, 251, 253, 285, 291
- Scribner, Fred C., Jr., 187
- Sears, Mason, 40-42
- Sedgwick, Charles, 246n, 359n, 361n, 363n
- Segni, Antonio, 188-189, 197-198
- Sekou, Yansan, 420
- Sendwe, Jason, 350-351, 357, 575
- Senegal (*see also* French Community; Mali Federation), 220, 226-227, 241, 246-249, 443, 624
- Sherman, W.C., 258n, 271n
- Shoup, Gen. David M., 469
- Sierra Leone (*see also* British territories; West Africa), 118, 120, 150, 241
- Silvercruys, Baron, 251
- Sisco, Joseph J., 303n, 334n, 344n, 378n, 392n, 473n, 481n, 493n, 525n, 537n, 554n, 566n, 568n, 592n
- Slim, Mongi, 307, 324, 346, 465, 478, 480-481, 492-493, 625
- Smirnovsky, Mikhail N., 343
- Smith, Abbot, 435-442
- Smith, Gerard, 159n, 469
- Smith, James H., Jr., 21
- Sobolev, Arkady A., 322
- Somali Republic (*see also* Somalia), 204-209, 211, 215
- Somalia (*see also* Somali Republic), 8, 93, 168
- Ethiopia, relations with, 9, 135, 175-176, 181, 188-190, 200-201, 205, 209
- Greater Somalia proposal, 181-182, 188, 200-201, 203, 205, 208-209
- independence, 9, 176, 183-184, 190, 204-205
- Italian economic aid, 188-189, 197-198
- United States, relations with, 9-10, 134, 157, 183, 188-189, 191, 197-198
- Somare, Abdoulaye, 293
- Songolo, 617
- Sory, Caba, 559
- Soudan (*see also* French Community; Mali Federation), 468
- South Africa Act of 1909, 88
- South West Africa (*see also* East, Central, and South Africa), 85, 87, 724-726, 729-730, 734-735, 737, 760-761
- Southern Rhodesia. *See* Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
- Soviet bloc (*see also* Soviet bloc subheadings under other subjects), 48-51, 176, 190, 206, 208, 338-339
- Soviet Union. *See* communist influence under other subjects; Soviet bloc; Soviet bloc subheadings under other subjects.
- Special Group on the Congo (NSC), 443
- Special National Intelligence Estimates (*see also* National Intelligence Estimates), SNIE 72.1-59, 177-178
- Stabler, Wells, 188n, 251n
- Stans, Maurice, 77, 97, 155-156, 158-159, 183-184, 236-238, 257-258, 312, 423, 540-541
- State Department-JCS meetings, 468-471
- Stoessel, Walter J., 333n, 379n, 537n, 554n
- Stokes, William N., 45
- Straneo, Carlo Alberto, 197-198
- Sub-Saharan Africa. *See* Africa South of the Sahara.
- Sudan, 9, 168, 193, 203

Sudan—Continued

- Congo crisis, 487, 490, 550, 609, 630-631, 633, 639, 643
 - National Intelligence Estimates, 177-178, 193-194
 - Soviet bloc, relations with, 8, 49, 193-194
 - United Arab Republic, relations with, 173-174, 178, 193
 - United Kingdom, relations with, 176, 178, 193-194
 - United States, relations with, 9-10, 173-174, 178, 194
- Suez Canal, 86
- SUNFED, 237
- Swank, Emory C., 194-195
- Swaziland. *See* British territories; High Commission territories.
- Sweeney, Joseph, 425*n*
- Tanganyika (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; British East Africa; East, Central, and South Africa; Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa), 8, 41, 59, 66, 112, 114, 129
- Tangier Conference, 136-141
- Task Force on Africa, Report, Dec. 31, 1960, 172
- Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 52-53
- Terrill, Robert, 110
- Thatcher, Nicholas G., 433*n*
- Thayer, Robert H., 103
- Thimayya, Gen., 619
- Timberlake, Clare H., 214, 242-244, 270*n*
- Congo crisis, 283-284, 307, 391*n*, 427-429, 448, 477, 567-568, 600-601, 627*n*
 - Belgian technicians, 318-320, 373-374, 420-421, 423, 540, 564-565
 - Belgium, relations with, 283, 309-310, 313-314, 343-344, 389*n*, 562-563
 - caretaker government proposals, 561-562, 584*n*, 586-588, 620-621
 - Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict, 462-463, 471-472, 477, 501, 504, 518-521, 527*n*, 534-536
 - Lumumba arrest, 612, 616-618
 - Lumumba government, 407-409, 417-419, 430, 501, 504
 - political situation, 494-495, 510-511, 563-564, 601

Timberlake, Clare H.—Continued

- Congo crisis—Continued
 - Soviet bloc, relations with, 322-323, 375, 477-478, 491
 - U.N. intervention, 286-287, 292*n*, 293-295, 374, 420-421, 423, 430-432, 444*n*, 448-449, 504, 612-613, 627-629
- Togo (*see also* French territories; French Tropical Africa; West Africa), 3, 10, 18, 56, 117, 138-139, 213, 223-225, 237, 240*n*, 245, 541
- Tomlinson, John D., 214, 261, 275-277, 277*n*, 280-281
- Toomey, William D., 667*n*
- Toure, Ismael, 718
- Toure, Momo, 420
- Touré, Sekou, 71-72, 212
- Congo crisis, 389, 395, 405, 411, 487, 515-516
 - U.S.-Guinean relations, 673*n*, 675-678, 683, 687-689, 693-706, 710, 716-718
- Treasury, U.S. Department of, 74, 95-96, 99, 111
- Tron, René, 245*n*, 292*n*, 392*n*, 502*n*, 532*n*, 592*n*, 605*n*, 618*n*
- Tshombé, Moïse (*see also* Congo crisis: Katanga secession), 350, 397, 472, 485, 512-513, 517, 561, 599
- Tsiranana, Philibert, 72, 214
- Tubman, William V.S., 162-165, 239*n*, 389, 692, 700
- Tunisia (*see also* French territories; Slim, Mongi), 49, 75, 168, 646, 651
- Congo crisis, 310, 322, 324, 378-379, 446, 465, 480, 504, 527, 557
 - U.N. resolutions, 302, 305-307, 346, 492-493
- Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 310-312, 339-341, 373, 375, 425-427, 469-470
- Uganda (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; British East Africa; East, Central, and South Africa; Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa), 10, 59, 93
- U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), 322
 - U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, 13, 32
 - U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 576
 - U.N. Operations in the Congo (UNOC). *See* Congo crisis: U.N. intervention.


- U.N. Special Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED), 225, 231, 237
- U.N. Special Projects Fund, 206
- Union of South Africa (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; East, Central, and South Africa), 30, 86, 90, 376, 625
- apartheid*, 64, 87-88, 726-729, 732-734, 743, 745-747
- National Intelligence Estimates, 58-59, 753-755
- protests, 741-744, 747-748
- U.N. consideration, 87, 731-732, 736-739, 745-747, 749, 751
- U.S. policy toward, 6, 81-82, 84-85, 731-732, 741-744, 749-753, 758-760
- communist influence, 7, 12, 29, 60, 65, 68, 87-88
- Ghana, relations with, 752, 757
- High Commission territories, 5, 88, 733, 738
- political situation, 15, 133, 748
- self-determination, 6-7, 18, 41, 62
- South West Africa, relations with, 85, 87, 724-726, 729-730, 734-735, 737, 739-741, 760-761
- United States, relations with, 25, 84, 86-87, 752-753, 755-760
- Union of the Camerounian People (UPC), 18
- United Arab Republic (UAR), 7-9, 49, 93, 180, 184, 190, 200, 206-207, 338-339, 417
- Congo crisis (*see also* Ghana-Guinea-UAR support under Congo crisis: Lumumba government), 338, 484, 486
- Sudan, relations with, 173-174, 178, 193
- United Kingdom (*see also* British territories; Colonial powers; *British, tripartite, and U.S.-British subheadings under other subjects*), 12, 20, 39-40, 73, 119-120, 173, 203
- economic aid, 32, 94-95
- Ghana, 75, 241, 652
- Kenya, 92, 176, 208
- Somali Republic, 206-207, 211
- Union of South Africa, 743, 745-747
- United Nations (*see also* U.N. and *Hammarskjöld subheadings under other subjects; specific U.N. agencies*), 46, 94, 151, 167-168, 204, 247-248, 525, 682
- United Nations—Continued
- Chinese People's Republic membership, 135, 231-232
- Eisenhower speech, 160, 167, 196
- French Equatorial African membership, 134
- General Assembly Resolutions:
- 1243, 730n
- 1248, 731n
- 1360, 739
- 1361, 739
- 1375, 739
- 1415, 293
- 1444, 304
- 1445, 304
- 1474 (ES-IV), 496
- 1592 (XV), 639-640
- multilateral economic aid, 105, 113, 150, 225, 231, 236-237
- new members, 137-138, 149, 154, 252
- racial policies and, 29, 64, 82, 87, 731-732, 736-739, 745-747, 749, 751
- Security Council Resolutions:
- S/4387, 305-307
- S/4405, 346
- Somali Republic, 206-207, 211
- South West Africa, 85, 87, 724-726, 734-735, 737, 760-761
- Trust territories (*see also specific territories*), 27
- U.S. policy in, 42, 82, 122
- Upper Volta, 118, 168, 216-217, 233, 235-236
- Upton, Grady, 657-658
- U.S. Information Service (USIS), 39, 53, 136n, 268-269, 471
- Valdes, Philip H., 714n
- Van Den Bosch, 285, 290, 295, 337, 578, 581, 597
- Van Der Meersch, 295, 313, 429
- Van Essen, Marcel, 68, 702n
- Verhaegen, Benoit, 290n
- Verwoerd, Hendrik F., 727n, 732-733, 748
- Villard, Henry S., 227n, 244
- Voice of America, 268-269, 471
- Von Horn, Maj. Gen. Carl C., 321-322, 572, 614, 624
- Wachuku, 596, 626
- Wadsworth, James J., 160, 245-246n
- Congo crisis, 489, 496, 557, 589-591

- Wadsworth, James J.—Continued
 Congo crisis—Continued
 political situation, 475, 485, 525, 529-532, 542*n*, 556-557, 589-591, 596-600, 608-609
 U.N. intervention, 475-476, 478*n*, 490, 492, 559-560, 595-596, 607-608, 610-611, 613-616, 623-626, 636-638
- Wallner, Woodruff, 381*n*, 385*n*, 392*n*, 433*n*, 465-467, 493*n*, 502*n*, 517*n*, 532*n*, 554*n*, 568*n*, 584*n*, 602*n*, 667*n*, 740*n*
- Walmsley, Walter N., 724-729, 730*n*, 734*n*
- Walravens, Gérard A.J., 272
- Ware, Robert L., 687*n*
- Watson, John Hugh Adam, 50*n*
- Waugh, Samuel C., 112
- Welbeck (chargé), 531, 536, 549, 594, 597, 608, 613
- Wendelen, André, 625
- West Africa (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; *specific countries*):
 communist influence, 56-57, 118, 120-121, 123
 France, relations with, 119-120, 241
 independence, 54-55, 94, 117-118, 121, 134, 136
 multilateral economic aid, 94-97, 119, 121, 124, 139
 National Intelligence Estimate, 54-57
 NSC discussions, 93-98, 106-109
 NSC Reports, 117-126
 Soviet bloc, relations with, 118, 123, 125, 138, 143-146
 United States, relations with, 120, 138, 141 143-146
 U.S. policy toward, 97-98, 107, 118, 120-125, 136-141
- Western Europe (*see also* Colonial powers; multilateral economic aid *under other subjects*; *specific countries*), 25-26, 31, 119, 253
- White, Ivan B., 344*n*, 381*n*, 413*n*, 433*n*, 445*n*, 473*n*, 630*n*, 693*n*
- White, Lincoln, 741
- White, Gen. Thomas D., 21, 470
- Whitehead, Edgar, 20
- Whitney, John Hay, 486-487, 750
- Wieschhoff, Heinrich, 352, 403-404, 447*n*, 464-465, 467, 482*n*, 529*n*, 547, 551, 608
- Wight, William L., Jr., 109*n*, 278*n*, 409*n*, 452*n*
- Wigny, Pierre:
 Congo crisis, 285, 289-290, 314-315, 325-326, 337-338, 381*n*, 401, 458, 574-581, 576
 Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict, 460, 508-509, 521-523, 596-597
 Katanga secession, 338, 398, 403, 522, 574-575
 U.N. intervention, 288, 398, 403, 579-580
 U.S.-Belgian relations and, 251-253, 381*n*, 383*n*
- Wilcox, Francis O., 105*n*, 113, 292*n*, 298*n*, 303*n*, 334*n*, 413*n*, 445-446*n*, 479*n*, 481*n*, 729*n*
- Africa South of the Sahara, 110, 113, 115
 Congo crisis, 336*n*, 478*n*
 Guinea, 721*n*
- Williams, Haydn, 755
- Witman, William, II, 197*n*
- Woodruff, Arthur H., 344*n*, 385*n*, 488*n*, 517*n*, 525*n*, 532*n*, 568*n*, 584*n*, 602*n*
- World Bank. *See* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- Wossen, Asfa, 185, 190, 202
- Yameogo, Maurice, 217, 236*n*
- Yates, Lt. Gen. D.N., 755*n*
- Yemen, 176
- Youlou, Fulbert, 219, 486*n*
- Yugoslavia, 303
- Yumbu, Joseph, 286, 418
- Zanzibar (*see also* Africa South of the Sahara; British East Africa; East, Central, and South Africa; Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa), 8, 59
- Zorin, Valerian, 489, 492, 496

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