RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF ELECTORAL CLEAVAGES:
HOW STATES CREATE CLEAVAGES THROUGH POLICIES

by

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Abstract

Where do electoral cleavages come from? This dissertation provides and tests a new theory that electoral cleavages emerge in response to government policies. Electoral cleavages, that is, the social attributes that predict how people vote, exist in every country that holds legislative elections and have implications for change and stability in contemporary party systems around the world. Still, the debate about the origins of electoral cleavages is ongoing and existing theories of cleavage formation offer little analytic leverage in explaining how recent electoral cleavages emerged. The new policy-driven theory that I develop can be applied to explain how electoral cleavages emerge and persist around the world in states that hold legislative elections and have the institutional capacity to implement policies.

My theory is that electoral cleavages emerge from the responses of voters and political entrepreneurs to government policies. I argue that decisions like how to distribute resources and who can have social mobility politicize social identities when they divide society into winners and losers based on those same identities. Government policies link the fates of individuals who lose from the policies and create powerful incentives for voters to coordinate around the politicized identities. Political entrepreneurs, who recognize the potential for a new coalition of voters, begin to organize around the same identities in order to win legislative seats and influence policymaking.

The dissertation challenges the conventional wisdom about electoral cleavages, parties, and public policies and turns it on its head. I argue that electoral cleavages do not emerge from critical junctures or are crafted by entrepreneurial politicians; instead, electoral cleavages are created and sustained by government policies.

Cleavage formation, therefore, is a coordination act by both voters and political entrepreneurs in response to the state.

Testing this theory poses methodological challenges because government policies and policy preferences often affect each other. To control for reserve causality between government policies and policy preferences, I test the theory on rare cases of plausibly exogenous government policies in Prussia, Baden, Bavaria and Belgium that did not respond to domestic pressure, but rather to other forces. This allows me to analyze how voters and political entrepreneurs responded to the new policies. I substantiate my theory with both process-tracing based on sources in multiple languages and statistical analysis of new datasets with fine-grained election returns. My analysis establishes that in all of the case studies, the electoral cleavages emerged in response to government policies.

The temporal variation in the formation of the electoral cleavages across the German cases demonstrates that the cleavages emerged in response to domestic policies and were contained within each state. The formation, decline, and re-emergence of the cleavages in Prussia and Belgium allow me to control for country-level variation and demonstrate that the cleavages emerged in response to government policies.

To complement the qualitative analysis, my research design exploits subnational variation in vulnerability to government policies. This analysis uses new datasets of election returns from Prussian state elections between 1863-1873 and Belgian national elections between 1946-1974 as well as indicators of the power of the Catholic Church in Prussia in 1864, legislative behavior between 1880-1912, and the location of industry between 1896-1963 in Belgium. My analysis finds that the cleavages emerged the most sharply in districts that bore, or expected to bear, the highest cost from the policies.

Overall, my findings provide strong empirical support to the hypothesis that the state shapes how cleavages emerge and persist. Despite the stark differences across the six case studies on key variables: the scope of the franchise, the autonomy of parliament, degree of political liberties, economic development, party system institutionalization, the historical period, and the type of the cleavage, only government policies explain why the electoral cleavages emerged and persisted.

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Chapter 1

Rethinking the Origins of Electoral Cleavages

> "The core of the truth is to be found in the twin assumptions that social and economic differences usually are associated with differences in rewards and derivations, in relative advantages and disadvantages; and that these differences in rewards and deprivations simulate cohesion among those who are socially similar and conflict with those who are different."
>
> (Dahl, 1971, 367)

Electoral cleavages, that is, the social attributes that predict how people vote, exist in every political system that holds elections and yet social scientists still struggle to agree on how cleavages emerge. Scholars often observe that electoral cleavages are based on the social divisions that exist within societies. Social diversity–

religious, linguistic or regional, from Belgium to Malawi, appear to create enduring electoral cleavages that represent the main lines of conflict within societies. The experiences of many third-wave democracies and post-soviet countries, where cleavages emerged after the transition to democracy support the conventional wisdom about the robust association between social divisions and electoral cleavages. Cleavages seem to emerge where there is social diversity and appear to withstand wars, non-democratic regimes, and institutional innovations. Consequently, the outlook for socially diverse countries appears quite grim: Communal electoral cleavages perpetuate a state of ethnic fragmentation and prevent the formation of broader coalitions that transcend ethnic divisions.

The puzzle of cleavage formation has drawn the attention of social scientists for more than half a century. Conventional explanations to cleavage formation can be grouped into three kinds: Cleavages emerge when a new constituency is incorporated into the party system; cleavages emerge as a reflection of pre-existing social divisions; or cleavages are crafted selectively and deliberately by party elites. Although those are competing approaches, all agree that electoral cleavages are a reflection of identity groups. The "critical junctures" approach claims that the way in which existing social groups are incorporated into the party system determines whether they will form a new voting bloc. The "bottom-up" approach assumes that social groups hold political preferences that are based on their social structural positions, and parties, so the argument goes, emerge to represent these pre-existing preferences. By contrast, the "top-down" approach argues that political entrepreneurs imbue existing social groups with a political

consciousness or craft new voter coalitions that share similar political preferences. Although these approaches point in opposing causal directions, their basic premise is that electoral cleavages are a reflection of coherent social groups.

Across the world, however, there are exceptions to this rule. Switzerland is a multilingual country without a linguistic electoral cleavage. In South Korea, one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the world, regional divisions are relatively new. Romania and Estonia have significant ethnic minorities but ethnic groups are part of a larger non-ethnic and liberal voter coalition, and in the multi-ethnic Mali, ethnicity is a weak predictor of voting behavior. Contrary to the perception of cleavages as enduring, not all electoral cleavages persist. In Belgium, linguistic identities predicted voting behavior before World War II but during more than a decade after the war, the cleavage declined. In post-Apartheid South Africa, scholars observe in recent years that race is becoming a weak predictor of voting behavior. These examples challenge what by now has become the conventional wisdom about the relationship between social divisions and electoral cleavages. They suggests that the relationship between identities and electoral cleavages might be conditioned on another variable that establishes a link between social divisions and electoral cleavages, and when this variable is not present, the relationship declines.

Scholarship on cleavage formation and cleavage change overlooks the role of the state as a powerful political actor that shapes major political conflicts in society. Social divisions are certainly a feature of electoral cleavages but in order to understand why electoral cleavages emerge, decline, and persist, we need to explain what

charges social attributes with political content and ultimately drives voters with the same identity to vote together. Doing so requires recognizing that many of the conflicts that are fought within societies are closely linked to the state. The state shapes political conflicts because it has the power to determine how resources are distributed and who has social mobility and political rights. These decisions can determine what social attributes are politically relevant and shape the content of the political demands that are eventually brought against the state. The state, I argue, is simultaneously a powerful political actor that imposes policies and divides society in politically meaningful ways *and* an institution that is used by elites in power to realize their political agenda.

This dissertation, therefore, explains the formation and persistence of electoral cleavages as the result of government policies. Policies determine what social identities become politically relevant and create powerful incentives for voters and politicians to organize in opposition to the state. This argument departs from conventional theories of cleavage formation which argue that the incorporation of a new constituency at a critical juncture, the organization of elites, or social-structural positions explain why electoral cleavages emerge and persist. Instead, my theory makes a novel claim: That the state shapes the political meaning of social-structural positions and creates powerful incentives for voters and political entrepreneurs to organize against the policies. My theory does not contradict the prior argument that electoral cleavages can emerge based on pre-existing social divisions. Indeed, in many third-wave democracies, colonial rulers cultivated coherent ethnic groups which became the basis for contemporary electoral cleavages after the transition

to democracy. Electoral cleavages can also emerge because of the lack of state intervention like in the case of the class cleavage in Western Europe, which emerged based on the demands of workers for state regulation that will improve their living and working conditions.

This dissertation, however, speaks to those cases where government policies create a link between social identities and grievances. It develops the argument that electoral cleavages *can* emerge endogenously, when the outcomes from government policies create social cohesion and similar political interests among individuals who share a social attribute.

This research makes a critical contribution to the state of knowledge abut electoral cleavages given the prevalence of enduring communal electoral cleavages around the world. The puzzle of cleavage formation and persistence is especially timely given the recent claims about the formation of new identity-based electoral cleavages. These cleavages are based on new voter coalitions and threaten to destabilize institutionalized party systems in consolidated democracies like the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In this dissertation, I argue that the key to understanding the origins and persistence of many identity-based conflicts lies not with the social structure itself, the actions of entrepreneurial politicians, or institutional change, but rather with public policies that are initiated and implemented by the state. By developing an understanding of the conditions and mechanisms in which new cleavages emerge, persist, and decline, a study of government policies and electoral cleavages can help to clarify the causes for change and stability in contemporary party systems.

My argument is that when government policies divide society into winners and losers based on social identities, those identities become politically relevant and the basis for a new electoral cleavage. Government policies create powerful incentives for the voters who are aggrieved by the policies and political entrepreneurs to organize in order to gain legislative power and influence policymaking. From the perspective of the voters, the shared grievances from the policies link their fates and create social cohesion among them. The outcomes from policies produce a common goal: To defeat the policies and eliminate the grievances of the group. Political entrepreneurs, in turn, recognize the electoral potential in the new coalition of voters and begin to organize around the aggrieved identities and against the policies. The salience of the new dimension pushes the other parties in the system to adopt a position either in favor or against it. Consequently, the formation of a new electoral cleavage realigns the political party system. The framework that I develop can also be used to explain cleavage persistence. As long as the policies endure, they create a feedback effect whereby voters continue to vote based on the aggrieved identity and political entrepreneurs have incentives to continue organizing voters around those same identities.

Testing this argument poses methodological challenges because government policies and public preferences affect each other. To control for reverse causality between government policies and public preferences, I test the theory on rare cases of plausibly exogenous government policies in Prussia, Baden, Bavaria and Belgium that did not respond to domestic pressure, but rather to other forces. The cases in the sample exhibit variation in the dependent variable with both outcomes of cleavage

formation and non-formation within each case study, and are representative of common communal cleavages: In Prussia, Baden, and Bavaria, the policies led to the formation of a Catholic cleavage and in Belgium the policies led to the formation of a linguistic cleavage between Flemish and French speakers. In Both Belgium and Bavaria the cleavages had territorial aspects. Additionally, the case studies exhibit variation in key economic, social, and institutional independent variables as well as temporal variation in cleavage formation ranging from 1852 in Prussia to 1961 in Belgium. Because the government policies were arguably exogenous, I can examine how the aggrieved voters began to coordinate in response to the policies and reject conventional explanations for cleavage formation. I substantiate my theory with both process-tracing based on sources in multiple languages and statistical analysis of new subnational datasets. Finally, I conduct controlled comparisons within and across countries to establish the internal and external validity of my research. My analysis demonstrates that government policies explain the timing of cleavage formation as well as the variation in the strength of the cleavages across constituencies. Table 1.1 presents a summary of the case studies by outcomes within each case.

1.1 What are electoral cleavages?

In the dissertation, I define electoral cleavages as the social attributes that predict how people vote. This definition fits quite closely with the consensus in the cleavages literature. Three important features of cleavages emerge from this definition.

Table 1.1: Cleavage Formation and Non-Formation: Summary of Outcomes Within the Case Studies

Case Study	**Outcomes Within Each Case**	
	Cleavage Formation	**Nonformation**
Baden	1864: The state establishes confessionally-mixed school boards	1862: Establishment of the School Inspectorate; State attacks on Church property
Bavaria	1868: Pro-Prussian and Liberal policies	1863-1866: Attempts to pass anti-Catholic policies
Belgium I	1870: The dominance of French is a barrier to social mobility	1848: Franchise expansion; Language-based political and economic disparities in Flanders; Nonformation in Wallonia before WWI
Belgium II	1961: Economic crisis and austerity program	1945: Universal franchise; 1954 & 1958: Flemish nationalist party attempts to mobilize voters
Prussia I	1852: State attacks on the Jesuits	1848: Catholic Church attempts to mobilize voters before the national and state elections
Prussia II	1867: The Liberals join Bismarck's coalition and are in the position to shape policies	1862 & 1863: Priests attempt to mobilize Catholics in fear of the Progressive party

First, electoral cleavages are based on the various social attributes that can be found in society–examples are Muslims and women–but not all social divisions are translated into electoral cleavages.[1] This distinction is critical in order to explain when and why social divisions might become the basis for electoral cleavages. Second, electoral cleavages are based on a robust connection between particular social attributes and specific policy preferences. Implicit in this definition is that electoral

[1]This principle appeared in early definitions of electoral cleavages. Rae and Taylor (1970, 1) define cleavages as politicized social differences which could be ascriptive, attitudinal, or behavioral. Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 1) distinguish between social conflicts and electoral cleavages, which are conflicts that establish party oppositions.

cleavages are based on a sense of group consciousness which emerges from the similar experiences and outlooks of individuals. As I argue in the next chapter, those characteristic outlooks and preferences are determined by the political context, which is considerably shaped by the state.[2] Notably, my definition for electoral cleavages challenges the notion that a social division becomes an electoral cleavage when it is 'activated' by party elites and political activists. The next chapters demonstrate that social attributes become the basis for a new electoral cleavage only in response to the state. Third, electoral cleavages are based on the vote choices of individuals but are expressed in aggregate voting behavior.[3]

My definition distinguishes between electoral cleavages on the one hand and social divisions or social cleavages on the other hand. Social cleavages are the social divisions that exist in society but do not predict voting behavior and may not even be politically meaningful.[4] Electoral cleavages, by contrast, are necessarily based on a robust connection between politicized identities and specific political preferences.[5] As argued earlier, this distinction is important for explaining how social cleavages become the basis for electoral cleavages, the first step in the process of cleavage formation. It is, however, also important for thinking about cleavage

[2]This point echoes the definition by Dahl (1971, 367). Similar definitions were proposed by Inglehart (1971; 1984), who conceptualizes cleavages as based on values, and by Kitschelt (1994) who proposed that cleavages are political preferences that emerge from occupational experiences and worldviews.

[3]See a related discussion by Bartolini (2000, 19) and Bartolini and Mair (1990, 63). See also Deegan-Krause (2007) for a similar definition.

[4]The definition by Amorim Neto and Cox (1997, 152) for social cleavages echoes this notion. The term "electoral cleavages" is used in the cleavage literature interchangeably with other terms like "political cleavages" or "social divisions" (Rogowski, 1989; Whitefield, 2002).

[5]For example, fans of a basketball teams or dancers do not have predictable policy preferences but manual workers do.

persistence and decline. While social divisions are persistent structures that change slowly, electoral cleavages are much more dynamic and may emerge and dissolve even if the social reference of the electoral cleavage continues to exist. Finally, unlike social cleavages, electoral cleavages are based on a sense of group consciousness and expressed in collective voting behavior.[6]

In addition to defining what electoral cleavages are, it is also important to clarify what cleavages are not. While electoral cleavages are about political identities, policy preferences, and voting behavior, cleavages are not institutions, like, for example, parties and extra-parliamentary organizations or psychological attachments like partisan identification.[7] Persistence, which is a feature that appears in some definitions of electoral cleavages (Inglehart, 1984, 25, Whitefield, 2002, 181,Tavits, 2005, 287), is not a defining feature of electoral cleavages. My analysis in chapters 3-5 illustrates that cleavages can be short-lived and survive for several election cycles or can be enduring and persist for several decades. Whether a cleavage persists or not depends on the actions of political parties who sustain cleavages through public policies. Furthermore, electoral cleavages are different from salient issues that bring together a heterogeneous coalition of voters based on a single issue and often wither by the next election. By contrast, electoral cleavages, once they emerge, are based on a sense of group consciousness and a belief in a linked fate,

[6]Sartori's (1969) discussion illustrates this point. Some definitions for electoral cleavages include the group, see Gallagher et al. (1992); Franklin et al. (1992).

[7]This point echoes Rokkan (1990, 140), Bartolini (1990, 63), Bartolini and Mair (2000), and Enyedi (2005, 698). By contrast, Gallagher and collaborators (1992, 90) argue that organizations are a necessary part of cleavages because they give voice to the interests of the group. Kitschelt (1994, 12) contends that cleavages exists independently of parties as clusters of political preferences but parties are instrumental in realizing the political interests of individuals.

constitute a policy dimension in party competition, and predict voting behavior over several elections.

1.2 New theory: States create cleavages through policies

My theory ties together social attributes, political preferences and voting behavior in a causal relationship. Because cleavages are fundamentally about the political preferences and the vote choices of individuals, I begin by discussing when and why people who share a social attribute begin to develop similar policy preferences. Explaining why there is variation in the political significance of social divisions and what causes only some social attributes to begin to predict voting behavior is key to explaining how cleavages emerge and also why they persist.

People develop political preferences based on their identity—like their class, ethnicity, language, religion, and so forth. Identities do not have an inherent content that remains stable over time or across social contexts (Abdelal et al., 2006). Instead, the set of behaviors, preferences, and meanings that are associated with identities are situational and determined by the social and political environment. Identities shape the lives of individuals because they determine what people experience when interacting with their environment, thus affecting their outlooks on the world and shaping their political interests.

My theory focuses on one actor in particular that can shape the political environment and charge social attributes with a political meaning: the state. The

state is an actor that regularly intervenes in society through government policies. State intervention has powerful consequences for individuals and groups. The state can decide how to distribute resources and who can have social mobility and political rights. When policies are *targeted*, that is, they affect only a part of the population, they can divide society into winners and losers based on that criterion, which is often based on social and demographic attributes. Government policies, therefore, link social attributes to substantial gains and loses, which can be tangible like the availability of quality medical care or job opportunities. Gains and loses from policies can also be symbolic and have implications for the social status of certain social attributes. Targeted government policies, therefore, can politicize social groups.

Government policies, however, do more than increase the political salience of social attributes of individuals. Policies also foster a sense of "groupness" between those who are targeted by the policies (Brubaker, 2004). By creating shared grievances and linking the fates of individuals, outcomes from policies increase the social cohesion between individuals who are aggrieved by the policies and give them a common purpose: to act collectively against the policies. Government policies provide a strong motivation for voters to organize because gains and loses from policies can dramatically shape the lives of individuals in every area that is affected by state intervention. Policies affect diverse outcomes such as redistribution, access to social services, opportunities for employment, and economic development.

Grievances from government policies create the potential for a new coalition of voters who are affected by the policies. By voting instrumentally based on the

aggrieved identity, voters can express their opposition to the policies and elect delegates that represent their interests. Once in office, those delegates can use their legislative power to remove the policies or draft bills that benefit their constituency. From the perspective of political entrepreneurs, the emergence of a new cluster of voters with similar political preferences creates incentives to organize around the politicized identities. Political entrepreneurs can be party leaders, rank and file, political activists, or political novices. They can be ideologues, seat-seekers, or some combination of these types.

The likelihood of change in voting behavior varies across voters. Voters who are the most affected by the policies are also those who are the most likely to shift their voting behavior in response to the policies and begin sorting on the new dimension. Those individuals who are less affected by the policies will identify less strongly with the aggrieved identity and are the least likely to leave their existing voter coalition and shift their voting behavior. If the policies become more severe, more voters will begin to vote based on the aggrieved identity. The cleavage will strengthen and the aggrieved identity will become a stronger predictor of voting behavior.

When a new electoral cleavage emerges, it changes the party system by pushing existing parties to choose a position on the new policy dimension. Parties that can add the new issue to their policy positions without losing voters will organize against the policies. By contrast, other parties will respond to voters who prefer the status quo. If none of the existing parties represents the new cleavage, space will become available in the party system and a new party will emerge.

This theory can be applied to explain the formation of new electoral cleavages in countries that satisfy several scope conditions. First, the state has the capacity to implement policies and thus the ability to aggrieve voters through policies. Second, the aggrieved voters are eligible to vote and express their opposition to the actions of the state. Of course, without voting rights, a social identity might become politically salient but an electoral cleavage cannot emerge. Third, the executive accepts the elections as legitimate and allows votes to be counted and converted into seats. This condition is necessary to sustain the incentives of voters to turn out to vote and to cast a ballot that represents their preferences. Fourth, legislation passed by the elected delegates is binding. This condition ensures that both voters and political entrepreneurs have an incentive to coordinate around the same policymaking goals. Finally, the new coalition of voters needs to be electorally viable, that is, there are enough voters to overcome the electoral threshold and produce a legislative opposition. This condition reflects the instrumental nature of cleavage formation for both voters and entrepreneurs. Voters want to avoid wasting votes and entrepreneurs choose to invest in issues that win them legislative seats. Notably, the scope conditions for the theory do not require a broad franchise, pre-existing parties, some degree of party system institutionalization, political sophistication, previous experience with democracy or economic development. Therefore, the theory could be applied to a wide range of cases.

1.3 Conventional theories of cleavage formation

Conventional theories propose three explanations for cleavage formation and persistence: First, cleavages emerge following a critical juncture in which previously unrepresented social groups are incorporated into the political system. Second, electoral cleavages are a reflection of the social structure. And third, elites craft electoral cleavages by selectively organizing voters around certain issues. My own theory contends that government policies create strong incentives for both voters and political entrepreneurs to organize around the targets of the policies. In the empirical analysis in chapters 3-5, I engage with the three conventional theories and test my theory against these explanations.

Critical junctures and institutional change

Institutional explanations to cleavage formation are one of two kinds. The first explanation is based on the correlation between social diversity and the number of parties, as observed by Lijphart (1984). However, there is little empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that the transition to proportional representation (PR) leads to the emergence of new cleavages. Historical studies of the transition to PR in Western Europe find that antecedent diversity reduced the likelihood of transition to PR (Cusack et al., 2007).[8] Empirical research in contemporary democracies finds that once in effect, PR is associated with a large number of parties (Duverger, 1954), greater ethnic diversity (Rokkan, 1970; Lijphart, 1984), and greater intra-party cohesion (Cox et al., 2019) but there is little evidence to suggest that PR affects

[8]See also Kreuzer (2010) in a replication of Boix (1999).

the number of cleavages.[9] Neither is the relationship between ethnic identities and parties straightforward. Ethnic parties are more prevalent in PR systems with ethnic diversity (Lublin, 2017) but ethnic voting is lower under PR (Huber, 2012). Other studies found that cleavages do change when electoral rules remain fixed (Stoll, 2013) and remain stable when rules change (Andersen and Yaish, 2003).

As I show in the analysis, electoral rules shape the strategic calculations of parties and push voters to forge coalitions and coordinate around candidates (Cox, 1997). They do not, however, determine voters' policy preferences; those emerge from their social-structural positions and the political context.

The second explanation for cleavage formation is proposed by critical junctures theories (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Collier and Collier, 1991; Scully, 1992) which argue that the circumstances in which social groups are incorporated into the electorate determine whether a new cleavage emerges. Yet the theory of critical junctures is insufficient for explaining cleavage formation because it assumes that social groups are coherent and have fixed political preferences that remain stable over time. These assumptions contradict what has by now become a consensus among identity scholars: That social identities, group membership, and the salience of identities are fluid and change in response to the social environment. My analysis shows that social groups cohere in response to government policies and therefore, that social groups are often the outcome of cleavage formation and not the cause for it.

An additional weakness of the critical junctures approach, in particular in the

[9]Ordeshook and Shvestova (1994) show that the geographic concentration of ethnic groups affects the number of parties and that electoral rules have a mediating effect.

work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), is by viewing cleavages as quite rigid structures that constrain the formation of future cleavages. As such, the approach has a limited capacity to explain how new electoral cleavages emerge in contemporary democracies and why persistent cleavages decline in institutionalized party systems. As my theory and analysis show, what determines whether new electoral cleavages emerge is the actions of the state and not the pre-existing cleavage structure.[10]

Social structural positions

The "bottom-up" approach assumes that the interests and values of individuals are derived from their locations in various structural positions like their occupation, religion, ethnicity, and linguistic community (Evans, 2010, 635) and that parties emerge as a reflection of voters' preferences (Campbell, 1958; Rokkan, 1970). If cleavages are a mere reflection of social structures, then we should be able to observe a gradual change in both the size of the social groups and the strength of the electoral cleavages at about the same rate and time (Evans, 2010, 635) but this hypothesis received mixed support in empirical studies (Knutsen, 1988; Stoll, 2010b).

Recent experiences of party system formation outside of Western Europe question the usefulness of social divisions in predicting the structure of the party system. While the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argues that parties emerged as a reflection of the social structure in Western Europe, party systems in Eastern Europe did not follow the same pattern (Evans, 2006). There, the social bases

[10]However, whether a new party emerges with the new cleavage depends on the social bases and the internal structures of existing parties. See discussion in chapter 6.

of electoral cleavages vary from country to country (Evans and Whitefield, 1993; Whitefield, 2002) and are composed of a combination of social divisions that survived from the communist era, like ethnic and religious divisions, and new conflicts that developed in the emerging market conditions around issues of distribution (Evans, 2006; Whitefield, 2002). As my analysis in the empirical chapters demonstrates, what determines if a social structure becomes the basis for an electoral cleavage is whether the social identity is targeted by government policies and thus becomes politically relevant (Whitefield, 2002, 191).

Organization by elites

One of the most longstanding and persistent literatures in political science sees cleavages as latent social forces that need only to be activated by elites. Scholars have suggested that elites craft cleavages selectively and deliberately in order to create winning coalitions of voters (Schattschneider, 1960) and that without political parties to articulate the cleavage, it will not emerge (Lipset, 1960; Sartori, 1969; Kriesi, 1998). These theories assume that the social structure matters for cleavage formation because it determines what social divisions *could* become the basis for electoral cleavages, however, eventually political entrepreneurs decide what divisions to translate into electoral cleavages. These theories are based on two assumptions that received little support in empirical research. The first assumption is that political entrepreneurs have sufficiently precise information about the political preferences of the electorate. But empirical studies of political parties demonstrate that parties operate under uncertainty about the preferences of voters and the strategies of

other parties. Because they have limited information, parties struggle to find the policy positions that maximize their vote share and they require several elections to find an ideal policy position.[11]

The second assumption is that parties are unitary actors and therefore their leadership can move the party to ideal positions on the policy space. In practice, however, a party's leadership is often constrained by its internal structure (May, 1973; Kitschelt, 1989). No doubt, the policy cues that parties send to voters affect the strength of voter alignments (Evans and Tilley, 2012; Bargsted and Somma, 2016) but entrepreneurs do not have the power to change the underlying policy preferences of voters; those are rooted in voters' social structural positions. Table 1.2 summarizes the theoretical expectations from the new theory and the conventional theories of cleavage formation.

1.4 Research design

Case selection: Plausibly exogenous government policies

Testing the theory that new cleavages emerge in response to government policies poses a methodological challenge because government policies and policy preferences often affect each other. As Campbell (2012, 334) points out, the beliefs, attitudes and capacities of elites who design new policies are shaped by existing

[11] In new party systems, entrepreneurs go through an iterated process of strategic coordination and positioning until they learn about the structure of political preferences in the electorate and find an optimal policy position (Kreuzer, 2009). Even in institutionalized party systems voter dealignments happen when parties fail to recognize before the elections the changes in the positions of the voters.

Table 1.2: Competing Theoretical Expectations

Theory	**Causal Mechanism**	**Observable Outcomes**
States Create Cleavages	When shared grievances from government policies overlap with social attributes, the attributes become the basis for a new electoral cleavage; both voters and entrepreneurs organize in response to policies	Cleavages emerge in response to policies; mobilization without grievances will not lead to a new cleavage; cleavages dissolve if the policies are removed
Social Structure	Electoral cleavages reflect the structure of society; parties emerge as reflections of the social structure	The formation and decline of electoral cleavages follows changes to the social structure; social cleavages become electoral cleavages immediately after democratization
Elite-Driven	Elites deliberately craft cleavages; elites selectively organize voters around issues or identities based on institutional constraints	Elite mobilization never fails to craft a new cleavage
Critical Junctures	Large-scale conflicts divide society in politically meaningful ways and create coherent social groups.	Electoral cleavages emerge when social groups are incorporated into the political system; once cleavages emerge, they persist and freeze in party systems

policies. Voters, too, change their attitudes and adjust their behavior in response to existing policies. The feedback between public policies and mass preferences is a product of political representation and reflects perhaps the main underlying logic in the process of candidate selection. Voters elect representatives who are responsive to their policy positions and represent their interests through legislation and policymaking (Fearon, 1999).

To control for reverse causality between government policies and political preferences, I identify rare cases of plausibly exogenous policies that were not initiated in response to domestic pressure but rather to other forces. I selected the case studies

based on two criteria (for a similar strategy, see Morgan-Collins and Teele (2018)). First, the countries held elections before and after the government policies were initiated. This condition is crucial for establishing a baseline of voting behavior and detect a shift in voting patterns. Second, the policies were not responding to domestic pressure or were contingent on previous policies. This condition allows me to trace how both voters and political entrepreneurs responded to the new policies initiated by the state. All of the policies in this dissertation are plausibly exogenous to the formation of their respective cleavages for one of the following reasons: (1) they affected people or communities that were not meant to be affected by them (Prussia I and Belgium I), (2) the timing of the policies was exogenous (Baden, Bavaria, Prussia II), (3) the policies responded to international (external) forces (Belgium II). I rely on the definition of Skocpol and Amenta (1986, 132) for social policies as "state activities affecting the social status and life chances of groups, families, and individuals." My theory focuses specifically on targeted policies which are selective and might be discriminatory, as opposed to universal policies which are applied broadly.

Why historical analysis?

As Table 1.1 makes clear, the majority of the case studies in the analysis are from the 19th century. Plausibly exogenous cases of government policies are especially rare in contemporary advanced democracies because these countries are characterized by a high degree of party system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007) and parties have a considerable degree of certainty regarding democratic continuity and

the invariability of electoral rules (Lupu and Riedl, 2013). This certainty encourages parties to develop long time horizons and cultivate a stable support base that the party can count on in future elections. Parties do so by developing an ideology and a name brand (Downs, 1957, ch.7), using the resources of the state to guarantee their survival (Katz and Mair, 1995), and adopting positions that broaden the appeal of the party and reach a large number of voters (Kirchheimer, 1966, 190). These party strategies lead to stable and predicted patterns of party competition because they lock parties in self-sustaining repertoires of policy and ideological positions. By contrast, in the nascent party systems of 19th century Western Europe, the relationship between parties and policies was more fluid and consequently cases of plausibly exogenous government policies were more common.

Additionally, the analysis of historical cases of cleavage formation in Western Europe provides an opportunity to revisit the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) which formed much of the theoretical ground for the formation of cleavage structures in the region and around the world (Dix, 1989; Chhibber and Petrocik, 1989; Kitschelt, 1995; Chhibber, 1999). Analyzing some of those same cases from a policy-centric lens can provide new insights on the historical cases. The work of Lipset and Rokkan combined a remarkable knowledge of historical detail with the goal of explaining differences and similarities across countries using the comparative method. It is, however, largely retrospective and focuses on successful outcomes of cleavage formation, which provides no variation on the dependent variable. Moreover, it conflates social cleavages and electoral cleavages, thus providing little explanation for when social cleavages no longer predict voting behavior.

This dissertation thus re-examines an old question using new data, a nuanced research design centered on causal identification, and the knowledge accumulated in comparative research on political parties, political identities, and voter behavior.

Although the majority of the cases analyzed in this dissertation took place in the 19th century, the cleavages persisted well into the 20th and 21th centuries. In Germany, religious practice remains a consistent and strong predictor of voting behavior (Elff, 2007, 282–283) and the Christian Democratic parties, the CDU and CSU, served as the major coalition partners since 2005. Belgium emerged as a unitary state in 1830 but after the cleavage emerged for the second time, it began to federalize in 1971 in a series of reforms that gradually transferred power to regional councils representing linguistic communities. Linguistic divisions continue to destabilize Belgian politics and reached a new peak in 2010-2011 when Walloon and Flemish political parties took 541 to form a new government (BBC, 2012; Kroet, 2014).

The stark differences between the cases in the sample on key institutional, economic, and social variables, in Table 1.3, provide high variation on key independent variables while allowing to control for region-specific variables and alternative explanations. Additionally, the considerable variation across the cases illustrates the universe of cases to which the new theory can be applied. The types of electoral cleavages that are analyzed in this dissertation–religious, territorial, and linguistic–are some of the most common and persistent communal cleavages around the world today.

In Prussia, Baden, and Bavaria the new cleavage was religious and in Belgium it

was based on language. In both Bavaria and Belgium that cleavages had a territorial component. The size of the social identity that formed the basis of the new cleavage was quite large in Bavaria and Baden and small in Prussia. In Belgium, the share of Flemings was roughly half of the population in both cases of cleavage formation.

Prussia, Bavaria, and Baden were far less industrialized than Belgium in 1870 when the cleavages emerged and additionally they allowed less political liberties. There is also considerable variation between the German states in the limitations on political participation–only 20% of the population in Prussia was eligible to vote compared to 45% in Bavaria–and considerable variation in the degree of civil liberties[12] and legislative power.[13]

Comparatively, in Prussia I and Baden, the parliament placed fewer constraints on the executive than the lower houses of Prussia II, Bavaria, and Belgium. In Bavaria and Belgium the legislature could propose bills–unlike the legislators in Baden and Prussia. Notably, across the cases, there is considerable variation in the degree of party system institutionalization which demonstrates that it is not a scope condition.[14]

[12]Specifically, this indicator (variable *v2x_clpol* in the V-Dem dataset) captures "to what extent are political liberties respected. Government repression not directly related to elections."

[13]Variable *v2xlg_legcon* from V-DEM version 9. It captures "To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive? ordinal."

[14]This is an index compiled by the V-Dem project (variable *v2xps_party*). The variable's description from the codebook (p. 281) is: "Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, e.g., level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature."

Table 1.3: Case Study Variation on Key Variables and Dependent Variable Coding

Case Study	**Baden**	**Bavaria**	**Belgium I**	**Belgium II**	**Prussia I**	**Prussia II**
Government Policy	Religiously-Mixed School Boards	Increase in Prussian and Liberal Influence	The Dominance of the French Language	Austerity Program	State Attacks on Jesuits	Anti-Catholic Attacks
Year of Cleavage Formation	1864	1868	Circa 1870	1961	1852	1867
Social Identity	Catholic	Catholic & Territorial	Flemish Speakers	Flemish and French Speakers	Catholic	Catholic
Dependent Variable						
Sorting	By Voters	By Voters	By Delegates	By Voters	By Voters	By Voters
Party System Change	New Party	New Party	Realignment of existing Parties	Realignment of existing Parties & New Party	New Party Formation	New Party
Social Structure						
Relative Group Size	64%	72%	47%⊕	51%⊖	33%	33%
Economic Development						
Primary School Enrollment	.	.	55%	100%	38%	47%
GDP per Capita [1990 Int. GK$]	2,800⊗	2,218⊙	4,386	9,635	1,385	2,102
Political and Civic Liberties						
Share of Population with Suffrage	45%	32%	4%⊘	100%	20%	20%
Political Civil Liberties Index [0-1]	0.62	0.34	0.9†	0.94	0.43	0.52
Legislative Power and Autonomy						
Leg. Constraints on Executive [0-1]	0.17	0.58	0.75†	0.81	0.27	0.54
Lower Chamber Members in Gov.	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Lower House Introduces Bills	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Political Parties						
Party Institutionalization [0-1]	0.36	0.14	0.9†	0.97	0.08	0.38

Notes: Source: V-Dem Dataset Version 9 (Coppedge and Ziblatt, 2019; Pemstein and von Römer, 2019). Data represent values in the year of cleavage formation in each case. ⊕: Flanders only; 1866 (McRae, 1983, 48). ⊖: Flanders only; 1961 (McRae, 1983, 48). ⊗: 486RM GDP per Capita between 1849-1861 was taken from Ziblatt (2002, 55) and converted to 1990 US Dollars at `https://www.historicalstatistics.org/`. ⊙ Converted from 385RM. Source and conversion are the same as in the note above. ⊘: 24% of men in local elections. † denotes data for Belgium from 1900, the first year in the V-Dem dataset. Relative group size is taken from the secondary sources used in the empirical chapters.

In addition to the case-by-case analysis, my research design exploits the multiple outcomes of cleavage formation and non-formation within each case study to test competing explanations for cleavage formation. This strategy also increases the number of observations while not selecting on the dependent variable. My research uses Mill's method of agreement and difference and compares cases both within and between countries, which allows me to test the main argument: That new electoral cleavages emerge from government policies. In analyzing cases within the same country, I am able to control for a variety of state specific variables and this contributed to the internal validity of my analysis. The comparisons across countries establishes the external validity of the analysis (Slater and Ziblatt, 2013; Mill, 1843).

A mixed-methods approach

Testing a theory about individual level behavior using aggregate historical data poses a methodological challenge. When attempting to infer individual level behavior from aggregate data one risks the danger of ecological fallacy. Secondary qualitative sources are both too narrow because they are based on a small number of observations and too wide because they tend to focus on macro level processes at a national or regional level. There is no solution to these problems but my research design compensates for the disadvantages of each method by combining qualitative and quantitative approaches to analyze different aspects in the process of cleavage formation.

The qualitative analysis traces the process over time and examines how actors

respond to the policies. This analysis relies mostly on secondary sources and focuses on the actions of political entrepreneurs and political parties. The quantitative analysis, by contrast, examines change over space and is focused more specifically on voting behavior and sorting at the mass level. The qualitative analysis contextualizes the statistical analysis and reduces the likelihood of ecological fallacy. The quantitative analysis adds observations and tests the argument on a larger number of cases. While the quantitative analysis allows me to establish internal validity within each case, the qualitative analysis is useful for cross-country comparisons which establish external validity. Additionally, this approach allows me to examine the outcome, cleavage formation, as a binary variable in the qualitative analysis and as a continuous variable in the quantitative analysis. Overall, the strategy of combining two methods contributes to the robustness of my findings.

Because the government policies were arguably exogenous, I can analyze how voters and political entrepreneurs responded to the new policies and assess competing hypotheses for cleavage formation. Within each case study, my analysis establishes a "baseline" of voting behavior in the election that preceded the arguably exogenous policies. Then, I analyze the impact of the policies on the behavior of voters and political entrepreneurs in the next election. Based on my definition of electoral cleavages as the social attributes that determine how people vote, I expect to observe that individuals who share one or more social attributes will begin to vote together after the policies are initiated. In my analysis I trace the act of sorting by voters between party alternatives and the re-positioning of political parties when the new cleavage emerges. This strategy is different from existing studies that

analyze the strength of cleavages by observing the correlation between social structural positions and vote choice over time.[15] As Evans (2010, 636) observes, these minimalist measures often lack content that would explain why people choose a party based on their social attributes given the party alternatives that they face.

In chapters 3-5, my analysis focuses on three observable implications of cleavage formation. First, the voters who are aggrieved by the policies develop a sense of group consciousness. The belief in a linked fate and the sense of *groupness* are what distinguishes electoral cleavages from salient political issues that bring together a heterogeneous coalition of voters and often wither after a single election cycle. Second, the voters who share a social identity and are aggrieved by the policies begin to sort based on the new policy dimension and vote together.[16] Therefore, when a new electoral cleavage emerges, I expect to see a shift in the voting behavior of those who are affected by the policies as the aggrieved identity will begin to predict

[15]For example, see Lijphart (1979); Dalton et al. (1984); Knutsen (1988); Chhibber and Torcal (1997); Dalton (1996); Kriesi (1998); Elff (2007); Evans and Tilley (2012); Raymond and Feltch Barros (2014). Other studies that examine the strength of electoral cleavages use indirect measures such as the salience of issues (Bornschier, 2009; Stoll, 2010b) or map dimensions of party competition (Stoll, 2010a). Both of these outcomes could be the result of party strategy and reflect the policy positions of party elites but not necessarily the policy positions of voters (Jackman, 1998; Fiorina et al., 2005). Other studies use the ratio of "materialists" to "post-materialists" (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995) or less precise measures like the correlation between a structural index like the Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) and the Alford Index (Chhibber and Petrocik, 1989, 13). In the past, scholars have also used electoral volatility to proxy for the stability of electoral cleavages (Rose and Urwin, 1970; Bartolini and Mair, 1990) or a combination of electoral volatility and the fractionalization of the party system (Dalton et al., 1984). Certainly, the stability and institutionalization of the party system are connected to the formation or decline of electoral cleavages. But changes to party systems can be the result of a host of other factors, such as the entry and exit of new parties (Powell and Tucker, 2014) and demographic changes (Stoll, 2013).

[16]Whether the formation of a new electoral cleavage leads to the formation of a new party depends on the policy positions of existing parties. When existing parties are unable to move to the position of the voters, a new party is likely to emerge. When existing parties are able to adjust to the new position while keeping their voters, they fill the new policy space. See also the discussion about party system change in the concluding chapter.

their voting behavior. Third, because the emergence of a new electoral cleavage introduces a new policy dimension, the observable outcome is a realignment in the party system.

In the qualitative analysis of each case study, I rely on secondary sources in multiple languages. I base my analysis on historical research that deals directly with the formation of the cleavages but also with work that focused on the years before the cleavages emerged. This allows me to increase the number of observations, i.e., historical studies, and the validity of my inferences. Additionally, I rely on sources which did not focus on the formation of the cleavages. By drawing on sources that do not focus on the phenomenon I seek to explain, I can address concerns for bias in historical research (Lustick, 1996).

Data quality and availability pose challenges to any historical analysis. I cross-referenced evidence from multiple sources to increase the precision of my measurement. For example, in Prussia, to resolve mismatches between secondary sources about the founding date of the new Catholic Center party, I relied on the reports of contemporaries and statements that were published in Prussian newspapers. When possible, I relied on election records that were cross-referenced by historians using local newspapers. In the two case studies of Prussia, I preferred to rely on sources from two periods. The first period is the years around the formation of the cleavages. Sources from this period were written by contemporaries and illustrate how the anti-Catholic attacks and the formation of the Catholic cleavages were understood by the people who were present in these events. The second period is the last few decades. Sources from this period draw on the rich political culture and

political engagement of Prussian voters. Unlike research on Imperial Germany from the decades after WWII, recent studies emphasize the democratic features of the Prussian political system and the political agency of voters and politicians. In the two case studies of Belgium, I found mismatches between secondary sources about the popularity of the Flemish movement and the social coalitions that supported it. I resolved these mismatches by relying more on recent historical research and drawing on sources in multiple languages.

To complement the qualitative analysis of cleavage formation over time, I analyze the subnational variation in the strength of the cleavage across electoral districts. Fine-grained subnational data are available in three of the case studies, Prussia II (1867) and the two Belgian cases. This strategy allows me to increase the number of observations (King et al., 1994, 219-220) and provides additional evidence to the impact of the policies.[17] This design exploits differences in the vulnerability of electoral districts to the impact of the policies and is used to asses the hypothesis that the cleavage emerged more sharply in those constituencies which expected to bear a higher cost from the policies. Because in all of the cases the policies were initiated at the national level and did not take place on districts with a high or low proportion of Catholics or Flemish speakers, the legislation was exogenous to the subnational units. This allows me to estimate the local treatment effect of the policies on districts that vary in their degree of vulnerability.

For the subnational analysis of the Prussian case, I collected district level state election returns from 1863-1873 from several sources as well as various indicators of

[17]See Dorn and collaborators (2016) for a similar strategy to estimate ideological shifts at the district level.

the power of the Catholic Church, the number of Catholic priests, and the number of Catholic pupils from Prussian statistical yearbooks and existing datasets. This dataset also contains the occupational profile of districts, measured in the German occupational census, and proxies for the development of civil society based on an exogenous border change, the Napoleonic occupation of parts of Prussia. I constructed the dataset for Belgium based on national level election results from the Constituency Level Elections Archive (CLEA) (Kollman et al., 2016) as well as various linguistic, occupational, and economic indicators from various censuses held between 1896-1963.[18] I addition, based on the legislative protocols of the Belgian lower house, I constructed an original dataset with proxies for the position of Belgian legislators on the Flemish issue between 1880-1912.

The main explanatory variable is vulnerability to government policies, which captures the cost a district bears, or expects to bear from the policies. In Prussia, the Catholic cleavage emerged after 1867 following anti-Catholic legislation that mostly affected public schools. Therefore, I expect districts with a high proportion of Catholic pupils to be negatively affected by the removal of priests. In the first case of Belgium, districts that experienced more economic development in the 19th century bore a higher cost from the language policies. In the second Belgian case, manual workers in majority French speaking districts and high income voters in majority Flemish speaking districts were especially vulnerable to the cost of government policies. The dependent variable captures sorting of voters into parties (Prussia and Belgium II), and when no such data were available, sorting by legislators into

[18] I received the raw data from The Historical Databases of Local and Cadastral Statistics at Ghent University (LOKSTAT-POPPKAD, 2018).

policy positions (Belgium I).

1.5 Roadmap

The next chapter lays out the theory. It begins with the level of the individual and discusses how people come to have political preferences based on their social attributes. This happens when government policies charge identities with a political meaning, create cohesion among those whose fates are linked, and generate a shared goal: To defeat the policies or replace them with policies that eliminate the grievances. When political entrepreneurs recognize that there is a potential for a new coalition of voters based on the aggrieved identity, they begin to organize around it and develop a political platform based on opposition to the policies. A new electoral cleavage emerges when both the aggrieved voters and political entrepreneurs have an incentive to continue coordinating on the new issue. Voters want to gain legislative power through their delegates and influence policy-making. Political entrepreneurs are ideologues or seat-seekers, or both, and coordinate around the issue because it has electoral benefits. The formation of new cleavages leads to a realignment of parties and voters. It forces existing parties to take a position on the policies and organize either in favor or against the policies. Based on this logic, the theory can be used to explain the persistence of cleavages. As long as the policies continue to cause grievances, both voters and entrepreneurs have an incentive to continue coordinating around the same issue, and the cleavage persists.

In chapter 3, I analyze the formation of electoral cleavages in the 19th century in three German states, Prussia, Baden and Bavaria, each with a considerable Catholic minority. The cases of cleavage formation in the German states illustrate why and when a pre-existing social division can become the basis for a new electoral cleavage. In the three states, Catholicism was the basis for a distinct social identity and Catholics were considered by Protestants as backward and were disproportionately concentrated in the lower classes. Given the salience of religious identities in the German states after the Protestant Reformation and the lingering tension between the religious communities, conventional theories of cleavage formation expect the religious cleavage to emerge once a critical scope condition was met: When Catholic voters were given voting rights. However, in the three cases, as my analysis shows, the electoral cleavages emerged only later, when the government began to pursue anti-Catholic policies. In response to the policies, lay Catholics, the clergy, and Catholic nobles began to coordinate and organize Catholic voters in opposition to the polices. After the initial success and given the persistence of the anti-Catholic position of the state, new Catholic parties were established in the three states.

The variation across the three case studies in the timing of cleavage formation and the fact that each cleavage was contained within the state that initiated the policies provide additional support to the argument that electoral cleavages emerge in response to state policies. In addition, the chapter analyzes in depth the decline of the Catholic cleavage in Prussia. It shows that when the policies were removed and Catholics were no longer at risk, the Catholic party could not maintain its internal unity, struggled to adopt a divisive policy position on pressing political

conflicts, and gradually lost seats until it dissolved. Finally, I reject the conventional explanations to cleavage formation in the three case studies and demonstrate that the cleavages did not emerge from critical junctures, elite organization, or the pre-existing social divisions.

Chapter 4 analyzes the formation of the linguistic cleavage in Belgium in the 19th century. This case study illustrates how new electoral cleavages can emerge as the result of a social and economic change that makes the status quo no longer sustainable. When this happens, voters and entrepreneurs organize to demand policy change. In contrast to the abrupt formation of the Catholic cleavages in the German states, the formation of the cleavage in Belgium demonstrates that the background for a new electoral cleavage can evolve gradually over multiple election cycles and finally emerge when reaching a critical point in which a group of voters demands change. In Belgium, the industrialization of Flanders transformed the Belgian society and economy and created a class of Flemish speaking petite bourgeoisie that saw the dominance of French in the public and business sectors as a barrier to social mobility. When the status quo in which French was the language of the socially mobile could no longer be tolerated, the new cleavage emerged. Two decades later the franchise was expanded and the cleavage broadened to the lower classes. Because of the multi-class nature of the linguistic cleavage, both the Liberal and the Catholic parties could adjust to the policy positions in the electorate and mobilize voters based on the Flemish issue. Therefore, unlike the German states, the formation of the new cleavage did not lead to a new party. Just as in the German states, the new cleavage introduced a new policy dimension and pushed

existing parties to crystallize the ideological differences between them based on that dimension. In addition to tracing the process of cleavage formation from circa 1870, my analysis rejects alternative explanations for cleavage formation and demonstrates that the cleavage emerged before a potential critical juncture, the expansion of the franchise, and that attempts by entrepreneurs to organize voters had only limited success before the electoral cleavage emerged. To complement the qualitative analysis, my analysis uses an original dataset of Belgian legislators between 1880-1919 to test the hypothesis that Belgian delegates sorted themselves based on the new policy dimension and adopted the Flemish issue in districts that bore a higher cost from the dominance of the French language.

Two cases of cleavage re-emergence and persistence are analyzed in chapter 5. The re-emergence of the cleavages in Prussia and Belgium illustrates the difference between social cleavages which may be based on a salient social identity but do not predict voting behavior and electoral cleavages, which have an instrumental aspect and are based on a coalition of voters who act collectively in order to shape policymaking. The Catholic cleavage re-emerged in Prussia in 1867 in response to increased anti-Catholic aggression by the National Liberal party and the cleavage in Belgium re-emerged in 1960 when austerity measures initiated by the Belgian government linked linguistic and regional divisions to distributional outcomes. In both of the cases, the aggrieved voters organized in opposition to the policies and the cleavage persisted because the policies continued. My analysis in this chapter makes use of new datasets of election returns from Prussian state elections between 1863-1873 and Belgian national elections between 1946-1974 in addition to various

indicators on the power of the Catholic Church in Prussia and the occupational, linguistic, and class profile of constituencies in Belgium. In a statistical analysis, I demonstrate that in both Prussia and Belgium, the cleavages were more pronounced in the constituencies that bore a higher cost from the policies.

Finally, in chapter 6, my comparison between the six case studies demonstrates that government policies are the necessary condition for cleavage formation. Although my analysis in chapters 3-5 finds that the social structure or political entrepreneurs do not cause cleavage formation, both are a part of the mechanism. The second section focuses on the contribution of the theory to understanding how electoral cleavage emerge and persist beyond Western Europe. The chapter concludes with a discussion about how the formation of new electoral cleavages affects party system stability and change.

Chapter 2

Theory of Cleavage Formation

> "New policies create a new politics"
>
> (Schattschneider, 1935, 288)

A rich literature has investigated the causes for stability and change in the relationship between social attributes and voting behavior over time (Kitschelt, 1994; Dalton, 1996; Evans and Whitefield, 2000; Elff, 2007; Evans and Tilley, 2012). The focus of this dissertation is not to contribute additional evidence to this vast literature. Instead, it makes a unique contribution to our understanding of how new electoral cleavages emerge. This chapter articulates the conditions that form the initial relationship between social identities and vote choice. New cleavages emerge when voters begin to vote instrumentally based on a particular identity and when political entrepreneurs have a powerful incentive to organize voters based on that identity. In regards to voters, a new cleavage emerges when voters believe

that their identity is the source of their grievances and they seek candidates that represent their political interests. The first section of this chapter draws on the rich literature of social identities and voting behavior and discusses the dilemmas that voters face when formulating their vote choice. The unique contribution of this section is by connecting identity theories to the role of the state as an actor that shapes the political environment and charges social identities with political content. In regards to political entrepreneurs, a new cleavage emerges when entrepreneurs believe that organizing around the aggrieved identities is electorally beneficial to them. The second section draws on the literature on party competition and party organization and sketches the conditions in which political entrepreneurs begin to organize around a politicized identity that increases their vote share. The formation of a new electoral cleavage adds a new dimension of party competition and causes a change in the party system. The third section discusses how the formation of a new voting bloc and the introduction of a new dimension of party competition affects the existing parties in the system and forces them to choose a position on the new policy dimension. Finally, I draw on this framework to explain why electoral cleavages persist.

As scholars of electoral cleavages have observed, cleavages are based on the social structure and are represented by political parties. Conventional explanations to cleavage formation focus on the social attributes that exist in society and the strategic calculations of political entrepreneurs who wish to gain legislative seats and access to state resources. There may be different paths in which new electoral cleavages emerge. My theory considers one path in particular: That new electoral

cleavages can emerge endogenously in response to government policies. The new theory does not contradict present theories of cleavage formation, and in fact, many of the assumptions in the dissertation are consistent with those of instrumental voting and elite organization, which are foundational to both the "top down" and the "bottom up" approaches. My theory differs from conventional theories of cleavage formation, however, by connecting the formation of electoral cleavages to government policies. It points to the implications of government policies on the political relevance of social identities and the incentives of political entrepreneurs to organize voters based on particular social divisions. Instead of assuming that social attributes are politically salient and that social groups are fixed, the theory considers how identity salience and group cohesion are shaped in response to the political environment, and more specifically, to the actions of the state.

With this in mind, my theory distinguishes between electoral cleavages, which are the social attributes that predict how people vote and are based on a sense of group consciousness, and social cleavages, which do not predict voting behavior. When social identities become politically meaningful and are linked to grievances from policies, they become the "basis" for a new electoral cleavage.[1] I use the term "political entrepreneurs" to reference any actor who engages in the organization and mobilization of voters. Examples are party and union leaders, incumbent politicians, political aspirants, members of civic associations, political activists, and laymen.

[1]By this logic, only when a social division becomes the basis for a new electoral cleavage, it becomes a 'latent' cleavage. The terms "cleavage activation" and "latent cleavage" appear in theories of cleavage formation to connote the idea that social divisions are latent electoral cleavages that become active following the actions of elites. By contrast, I argue that social attributes become the basis for a new electoral cleavage only when they are targeted by policies.

The strategies these actors use can range from campaigning at polling stations and distributing ballots to indirect engagement with elections, for example, by establishing cultural, linguistic, and religious associations that are meant to create group consciousness. The decision to code elite mobilization broadly was informed by the evidence from the case studies. I find that political entrepreneurs engaged in mobilization and attempted to organize voters both immediately before the election or between elections. Because the impact of mobilization and persuasion varies by politicians and voters, this variable is treated as an indicator rather than a gradient. As such, it allows me to evaluate the conventional explanation that cleavages emerge from organization by elites.

2.1 Government policies, social identities, and political preferences

The types of political preferences that people develop based on their identity depend on the interaction with their environment. For example, a person's African heritage has a different meaning in Nigeria than in the United States. The political preferences of American Jews are different from the preferences of the median Jewish voter in Israel. Identities determine what people experience when interacting with their environment. These lived experiences are what leads people to develop the policy preferences that are tied to their identities (Kitschelt, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2007).

People have multiple identities and the degree to which these identities are

salient varies over time and depends on external circumstances. Drawing on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981), my theory argues that what causes a certain identity to become politically salient is what people experience, or what they expect to experience, from government policies based on their identity. When individuals see a connection between their identity and the grievances they experience, that is, when they believe that their identity is under threat or think that their identity is the source for their grievances, that particular identity increases in salience and becomes more dominant than their other identities. When deciding how to vote, people draw on the identity that is the most salient to them and vote according to the political preferences that are connected to that identity. For example, in the choice between a vote for a workers' party and a religious party, a Catholic worker who sees her social class as dominant will have in mind her policy preferences as a worker and cast a ballot for a workers' party. A similar worker, who perceives her religious identity as more salient, will draw more strongly on the political preferences that are linked to her religious identity and vote for a religious party.

Scholars have long recognized that government policies powerfully influence mass politics (Schattschneider, 1935) because they shape the behavior and attitudes of voters and policymakers (Campbell, 2012). Yet the conventional wisdom about electoral cleavages still remains that cleavages emerge based on pre-existing social groups. My theory challenges this assertion and argues that social groups become cohesive because of government policies. That is, social identities politicize and become the basis for common political outlook and collective action because of the impact of government policies. Policies charge social identities with a political

content, increase their salience, and produce an incentive for voters to act collectively in order to shape policymaking.

Government policies shape the policy preferences of individuals because they have a considerable impact on the political environment. When policies are targeted, as opposed to universal, they classify society and sort individuals based on social attributes. Because of this categorizing function, policies mark boundaries between individuals and groups, and by that, they can politicize social identities or reinforce existing group boundaries (Barth, 1969).[2] The impact of government policies on the construction of social groups goes beyond boundary-making. When policies have powerful outcomes, they can significantly shape the social structure by determining what social attributes become politically salient and thus increase the importance that people place on particular social identities (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986; Mettler and Soss, 2004). This happens because government policies powerfully shape almost every aspect in people's lives. These aspects range from tangible outcomes like resource distribution and the prospects of social mobility to more symbolic outcomes like social status or cultural distinctiveness.

Social divisions become the basis for a new electoral cleavage when voters experience grievances from government policies because of their identity. This can happen in several ways. Grievances can be the direct outcome of government policies or can happen indirectly as an outcome that was not intended by the actors themselves. While some targeted government policies are focused on a particular social attribute, voters can come to believe that they are being aggrieved by policies

[2]See related arguments about identity construction by the state (Laitin, 1985; Lieberman and Singh, 2012, 2017).

based on a comparative evaluation of the status of their group compared to the status of other groups. Government policies might politicize identities even before they are implemented. This can happen when voters believe that the threat of the policies has a high probability of materializing.

In this case, support or opposition to democratic rule will be the issue that divides society and delineates the boundary between the two sides of the cleavage. The new coalition of voters might subsume existing social groups like class or ethnicity (see LeBas 2013). Because gains and loses from targeted government policies depend on social categories, policies, much like other dramatic episodes, produce clarity about group membership (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Sambanis and Shayo, 2013). The boundaries of the new group can temporarily surpass or subsume other social categories as policies bring together people from different networks who did not previously share cultural practices (Wimmer, 2008). In fact, policies need not target a pre-existing social group.[3] Instead, policies can "make" the group through creating shared grievances and linking the fates of individuals. In addition to increasing group cohesion, government policies give the group a purpose (Abdelal et al., 2006; Simmons, 2014): To engage collectively in the political process and challenge the policies by voting as a bloc.

Grievances from government policies create a sense of cohesion between those who share a social identity. Drawing on the work of Brubaker (2004), those individuals enter a state of "groupness." That is, when a new electoral cleavage emerges, social categories transition from nominal categories to a social relationship between

[3]For example, society can cleavage around other conflicts, such as on the question of democratic rule (Riedl, 2016).

individuals who share the same identity and see each other as connected. Electoral cleavages are based on those moments of enhanced solidarity and increased identification with the aggrieved social identity.

The state of *groupness* marks a moment of increased group solidarity that is not fixed. The distinction between moments of increased group cohesion and moments of looser ties between individuals is useful in illustrating the difference between social cleavages and electoral cleavages. Electoral cleavages emerge when individuals have a strong sense of group consciousness; they believe that their fates are linked and have a reason to vote together instrumentally.

Precisely because the state of *groupness* is not fixed, it is analytically powerful in thinking about electoral cleavages as dynamic constructs. For example, it allows us to consider when might electoral cleavages decline, that is, when the state of *groupness* fades. It also allows us to consider the possibility of failed cases of cleavage formation. In the words of Brubaker, it "keeps us alert to the possibility that groupness may *not* happen, that high levels of groupness may fail to crystallize, despite the group-making efforts of ethnopolitical entrepreneurs" (Brubaker, 2004, 12). Contrary to the "top-down" approach to cleavage formation, which suggests that elites organize voters into blocs, my theory argues that without grievances from government policies, entrepreneurs cannot successfully create a moment of *groupness*. Therefore, attempts by elites to create a new cleavage without policies do no succeed.

Once voters have developed a sense of linked fate and group consciousness, they search for the candidates or parties that represent their interests. In doing so,

they choose the identity that they most identify with and use their social group as the reference for their policy preferences (Converse, 1964, 14; Lieberman and McClendon, 2013; McCauley, 2014). Because the policies threaten the group and individuals within the group, voters instrumentally use their votes to fight the policies and shape future politicking. In order to act collectively, voters do not need to have high levels of political sophistication (Cramer, 2012; Cramer and Toff, 2017). They can rely on other voters who they see as opinion leaders (Adams and Ezrow, 2009) or political experts (Adams et al., 2014). Moreover, because voters infer their policy positions from their group membership, voters' education level, literacy, the maturation of the electorate or prior experience with political participation are not necessary or sufficient conditions for cleavage formation; the threat to the group provides enough information for voters to identify the parties or candidates who are committed to protecting their group's interests.

Aggrieved salient identities powerfully shape voters' choices but not all individuals who share a social identity are affected by the policies to the same extent. This is because individuals vary in their vulnerability to the impact of the policies. For example, a non-frequent churchgoer might identify with her social class more than with her religious group. She will bear a lesser cost from policies that target religious communities compared to a devout Christian. The voters who bear, or expect to bear, the highest cost from the policies are those whose social identity will become more salient. They are more likely to increase their identification with the aggrieved social group and vote for a platform that opposes the policies. By contrast, the voters who are the least affected by the policies face fewer incentives

to shift their voting behavior and might continue to vote based on other identities or ideological positions. The shift in voting behavior, in sum, is likely to be stronger among those voters who are the most strongly affected by the policies.

Compared to conventional theories of cleavage formation, the new theory that I develop offers greater analytic leverage in explaining how decisions by individuals lead to the formation of electoral cleavages. While the "bottom-up" and the "critical junctures" approaches assume that groups are monolithic and that all social groups have high social cohesion, my theory draws on the social constructivist approach to social identities and recognizes that individuals belong to numerous social groups and that the relevance of these groups changes according to circumstances. Therefore, voters who share the same identity may vote similarly when they are losing from government policies but under other conditions their vote choices might be heterogeneous.

This new policy-driven theory improves upon existing research on the stability of contemporary electoral cleavages which frequently does not incorporate the notion that voters choose between party alternatives (Evans, 2010). This is important because voting blocs emerge when individuals independently decide to vote for a party or candidate over other alternatives. Consistent with this logic, my theory assumes that individual voters select the party or the candidate that best serve their interests as they see them. Although they do not all vote in the same way, in the aggregate, the vote choices of individuals who share the aggrieved identity will cluster around candidates or parties that oppose the policies.

2.2 Political entrepreneurs organize voters

The demand from voters for representation produces powerful incentives for political entrepreneurs to begin coordinating around the politicized identities. When political entrepreneurs learn that there is a potential for a new voting bloc, they need to decide whether to match their policy positions to the position of the voters. Entrepreneurs will adopt to the positions of voters if they believe that the new voter coalition is electorally profitable, that is, whether they stand to gain seats from moving to the new policy position of the voters. For other entrepreneurs, on the other hand, moving to a new policy position could be costly and alienate their voters.

Entrepreneurs begin to organize voters when they believe that the underlying policy positions of voters have changed. The process of elite learning can happen quickly, for example, when voters publicly protest a new policy, or slowly, when political entrepreneurs take several elections to identify the potential for a new voting bloc and use elections as a way to gauge voters' positions (Magaloni, 2006). While my theory expects new electoral cleavages to emerge in response to the government policies, the process of cleavage formation may vary across cases. That is, the duration of government policies, the tempo of cleavage formation, and its timing are unique to each case (Grzymala-Busse, 2011).

Of course, because of the entrepreneurs' uncertainty about the underlying preferences of voters, entrepreneurs may attempt to organize voters into a new coalition in the absence of grievances from policies. These efforts, however, will not be successful because the social identities of voters have not been politicized and their

underlying political preferences have not changed. A rich literature in political behavior examines the limitations of elite mobilization and demonstrates that elite cues are only persuasive if voters can link them to their experiences and outlooks on the world (Zaller, 1992). Elite cues can shape voters' evaluation of the importance and salience of issues, but cues fail to change their underlying preferences (Peterson, 2018). Voters accept elite cues when the messages are consistent with their predispositions and reject elite frames that are not aligned with them (Druckman, 2001, 241). Without grievances from policies, elite cues will manage to move only voters with no prior predispositions or no political knowledge. This, however, will have a short term effect (Zaller, 1992), and therefore, will not establish a new voting bloc.[4] By contrast, when political entrepreneurs attempt to organize voters in the presence of grievances from government policies, the voters who are aggrieved by the policies will accept elite cues and join the new coalition of voters (Zaller, 1992; Bechtel et al., 2015).

The idea that political entrepreneurs articulate cleavages and organize voters into electoral coalitions based on shared identities and interests is, of course, not new. Parties are commonly understood by social scientists as organizations that aggregate preferences and communicate the demands of voters to the state (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966, 3). My theory, however, argues that organization by elites is not the cause for cleavage formation. Instead, political entrepreneurs are a part of the

[4] Although parties do not create electoral cleavages, they can affect the strength of the cleavages by weakening the association between politicized identities and vote choice. This can be done by sending inconsistent or vague cues to voters about the position of the party or by limiting the choices offered to voters (Elff, 2007; Evans and Tilley, 2012; Evans and De Graaf, 2013; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003; Bargsted and Somma, 2016).

process in which new cleavages emerge. Entrepreneurs spread information about the new policies, use framing to shape how voters think about issues, and organize voters into a new voting bloc by articulating the cleavages. But entrepreneurs succeed in organizing voters because voters experience grievances from government policies. That it, entrepreneurs' success is conditioned on voters' belief that they are experiencing grievances.

The types of political entrepreneurs that are drawn to organize around the politicized identities could be ideologues, seat-seekers, or some combination of both. Political entrepreneurs could be ideologues who recognize that there was a change in the opportunity structure (McAdam et al., 1996) and enter politics to advance their political agenda through legislation. Entrepreneurs could also be seat-seekers who recognize the electoral benefits from organizing around the politicized identities. Of course, entrepreneurs could be some combination of these two types. Depending on the structure of the party, entrepreneurs could move the position of the party from within and match the new preferences of voters. Alternatively, entrepreneurs could join other like-minded entrepreneurs and form a new party around the new issues.[5]

Voters, in turn, are likely to select entrepreneurs who operate in a social and institutional structure that allows them to reach voters and thus sends a signal about their ability to deliver on campaign promises (Masoud, 2014) and gain access to state resources compared to other entrepreneurs (Auerbach and Thachil, 2018; Grzymala-Busse, 2002).

[5]See also the discussion in the concluding chapter.

The policy-driven theory that I propose diverges from existing theories of cleavage formation in the role that it assigns to the agency of political entrepreneurs. "Top-down" theories of cleavage formation view organization by elites as a necessary condition for the formation of electoral cleavages. These theories suggest that political entrepreneurs craft cleavages by organizing coalitions of voters (Schattschneider, 1960; Lipset, 1960), imbuing objective groups with a political consciousness (Sartori, 1969) or by expanding the boundaries of the social group to create a voting bloc (Przeworski and Sprague, 1986). Certainly, entrepreneurs play an important role in the formation of electoral cleavages because they inform voters of the policies and organize groups and individuals before elections. However, as my theory makes clear, entrepreneurs respond to the actions of the state and place a high weight on the preferences of voters when choosing their policy positions (Downs, 1957). My theory, therefore, diverges from the "top-down" approach by arguing that organization by political elites is not a necessary condition for the formation of a new electoral cleavage (Gerring, 2011, 336–7).

Of course, government policies come from elites in power who use the capacity of the state to draft and implement policies that realize their political agenda. Those elites, however, are different from the elites in the "top-down" theories. The elites in the theory I develop control the executive and use their position to pass and implement legislation that realizes their agenda.[6] By contrast, in the "top-down" theories, elites are party leaders, rank-and-file, and extra-parliamentary

[6]This view of the state is different from previous scholarship that conceptualizes the state as a bureaucratic structure that is autonomous from society (Weber, 1946; Evans et al., 1985; Migdal, 1988; Scott, 1998). In this theory, the state is both an actor and a powerful institution controlled by elites in power.

organizations that organize voters before elections.

2.3 Party system change

Once a new electoral cleavage emerges, it realigns the party system. This happens because the introduction of a new policy dimension changes the ideal policy positions of existing parties. Parties that want to appeal to a large number of aggrieved voters must move to a position that differentiates them from the incumbent and the other parties. They face strong incentives to polarize the policy space on the new dimension. Polarization is useful for opposition parties because it forces the other parties to crystallize their policy positions. Moreover, in a polarized policy space, voters are more likely to notice differences between parties (Brader et al., 2013; Lupu, 2015; Montagnes and Rogowski, 2015), and elite cues resonate more strongly with voters (Levendusky, 2010; Druckman et al., 2013).[7] By polarizing, the opposition party can frame the electoral competition as *us versus them* and push voters to choose a position on the new dimension (LeBas, 2013). This strategy allows the opposition to attract the voters of rival parties by pressuring them to choose a party based on a single new policy dimension (Adams, 2001). Eventually, these patterns of opposition and polarization shape the structure of the party system (Hofstadter 1969; Dahl 1971, 65; Mair 2006).

In new democracies, the formation of electoral cleavages also nationalizes the party system (Sartori, 1990, 75; Rokkan, 1970). Cleavage formation adds a policy

[7] A single opposition party will achieve the largest possible number of voters. Otherwise, voters face a trade-off between several parties that stand for similar policies (Kitschelt, 1993, 324).

dimension, which forces political parties to crystallize the ideological differences between them, and encourages political entrepreneurs to coordinate across electoral districts (Hicken, 2009).

2.4 Explaining the persistence of electoral cleavages

The framework I develop can be used to explain the persistence of cleavages. As long as the policies persist, both voters and politicians continue to coordinate around the same policy positions and the cleavage will be sustained. Individual voters who experience grievances from government policies will continue to vote for the candidate that represents the interests of their salient identity group. The party that represents the aggrieved voters could sustain the cleavage by using rhetoric to keep the issues salient, drafting and passing legislation that reinforces the boundaries of the group, or by using the resources of the state to provide targeted goods and services for their voters (Bates, 1983; De Leon et al., 2015, 2).[8] With time, the cleavage could be sustained even without the deliberate actions of entrepreneurial politicians: Past policies will shape future policies and this will lead to enduring policy preferences and sustain the salience of the identities (Pierson, 1993). Figure 2.1 illustrates the theory.

[8]This echoes the logic in theories of ethnic voting where ethnicity sends a distributive signal (Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005, 2007; Huber, 2017).

Figure 2.1: Theory of Cleavage Formation and Persistence



Scope Conditions

The theory has several scope conditions. First, the aggrieved voters need to be enfranchised. Second, the results of the legislative elections should be accepted by the executive, and therefore, the elections will have real implications and their results reflect the choices of voters. Third, the legislature should be able to pass binding legislation. Otherwise, voters and entrepreneurs will have less incentives to coordinate on a platform that seeks to reverse or amend the policies. Fourth, the new coalition of voters should be electorally viable. That is, it should be large enough to overcome the electoral threshold and win legislative seats. This is important because voters want to avoid wasting votes (Cox, 1997) and entrepreneurs want to

maximize their vote share (Downs, 1957). Finally, the state should have sufficient capacity implement policies.

These scope conditions echo Rokkan's four thresholds of representation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967;1970, 75): The right to express opposition and organize through petitions and demonstrations (legitimation of an opposition), voting rights for the aggrieved groups (incorporation), translation of the votes into legislative seats (representation), and finally, whether the party can effectively influence "central decisions for the policy" (executive power). Although the scope conditions are similar, they vary in one critical respect. Rokkan expected the interaction between each of thresholds of representation and the national and industrial revolutions to explain the formation of different cleavages. My theory, by contrast, requires all four conditions to exist for a new cleavage to emerge.

Chapter 3

Catholic Cleavage Formation in Prussia, Baden, and Bavaria

This chapter analyzes the formation of cleavages in three German states, Prussia, Baden, and Bavaria, each with a substantial Catholic population. The differences in the timing of cleavage formation, first in Prussia, then in Baden, again in Prussia, and finally in Bavaria, listed in Table 3.1, allow to compare the mechanisms of cleavage formation across four cases and to test the main hypothesis: That new electoral cleavages emerge in response to government policies. Despite differences in the relative size of the Catholic population, Church-State relations, and electoral rules, my analysis finds that the sequence of cleavage formation was the same across the four cases: All the cleavages emerged in response to domestic government policies.

The temporal variation in cleavage formation provides strong empirical support to the hypothesis that the new cleavages emerged in response to state policies.

Table 3.1: Comparative Cleavage Formation in Baden, Bavaria, and Prussia

	Prussia I	**Prussia II**	**Bavaria**	**Baden**
Variation on key variables				
Percentage Catholics	33%	33%	72%	64%
Church-State Relationship	Tension	Tension	Collaboration	Conflict
Electoral Rules	Unequal	Unequal$\oplus$	Census Suffrage$\ominus$	Census Suffrage$\ominus$
Key moments in cleavage formation				
Attempts at Mobilization	1848	1862	1868	1862
Policies Pass or Likely to Pass	1852	1866	1868	1864
Politicians Organize Voters	1852	1867	1868	1864
Cleavage Formation	1852	1867	1868	1864
Party Formation	1852	1870	1869	1869

Notes: $\oplus$: Except for the national elections in 1867 to the North German Reichstag. $\ominus$: Except for the national elections in 1868 to the Customs Parliament. $\ominus$: Except for the national elections in 1868 to the Customs Parliament.

The new cleavages were contained within each state's jurisdiction and emerged following the coordination of Catholic voters and entrepreneurs within each state.

3.1 Anti-Jesuit decrees and the Catholic cleavage in Prussia in 1852

The Catholic cleavage emerged in 1852 when Karl von Raumer, the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs in the Prussian government, together with the Westphalian Interior Minister issued a series of decrees (known as *Die Raumerschen Erlasse*) against Jesuits, a persecuted religious order. The decrees called to monitor the activity of the Jesuits in confessionally-mixed areas and ban the participation of young Catholic priests in a seminary in Rome, the *Collegium Germanicum*. The Catholics saw these decrees as an attack on their religious freedom and a violation of the constitution (Bachem, 1927, 99-101). In response, the bishops of Cologne

and Munster as well as the local councils of the Rhine, Westphalia and Silesia sent petitions to the Prussian king (Bachem, 1927, 103).

The Raumer Decrees were plausibly exogenous to the formation of a Catholic cleavage because they were not intended to aggrieve ordinary Catholics but instead targeted the Jesuits, who at the time were a small religious order. Moreover, the Prussian state had no intention to create a Catholic cleavage. After 1848, the Church and the state allied against the radicals, who wanted to democratize Prussia. The Prussian state saw the Catholic Church as a force of political stability that was vital in sustaining the social order. Accordingly, the Prussian constitution from 1850 included guarantees for religious freedom. Raumer issued the decrees to limit the activity of the Jesuits, who were banned from Prussia in 1848 but slowly returned to confessionally-mixed areas. In addition, the decrees themselves were an internal government document and were not intended to reach the public (Bachem, 1927, 100).

The decrees, which were issued several months before the next Prussian state elections of 1852, aroused hostility among Catholics (Hyde, 1991, 95). The *Deutsche Volkshalle*, a newspaper of Prussian Catholics, called to form a Catholic party to protect the interests of the Church and the interests of Catholics (Bachem, 1927, 103–4). As predicted by my theory, in the elections following the policies, Catholics began to vote for pro-Catholic candidates who organized to defeat the decrees. In 1852, 63 of the 352 (18%) legislative seats were captured by pro-Catholic delegates. This was a significant achievement for political Catholicism since Catholics composed roughly a third of Prussia's population (Bachem, 1927, 105). Furthermore, as the historian

and contemporary Bachem (1927, 104–105) notes, thirty-two Protestant delegates were replaced by Catholic delegates. In the Rhine province, a majority-Catholic province, out of 61 delegates, 39 were 'true' Catholics.

The Catholic parliamentary group, *Die Katholische Fraktion*, was established on the first day of the legislative period and voted together on ecclesiastical issues. It occupied a unique policy position in the Prussian policy space. Unlike the Conservative party, it supported a constitution, but as opposed to the left parties, its members all supported the *Großdeutsch* solution (Bachem, 1927, 109).[1] Once in parliament, the group sought to defeat the decrees, which it succeed to do when the house of deputies deemed them unconstitutional by a majority of 175 to 123 votes (Bachem, 1927, 121).[2]

Between 1852-1858 the Catholic parliamentary group perused issues related to the rights of Catholics, among those were improving Catholic education, equalizing the religious rights of Catholics to the rights of Protestants, and the funding of Church institutions (Bachem, 1927; Anderson, 1991, 134). But when the tension between the state and the Church weakened in the following years, the group and the cleavage dissolved.

A month before the Prussian state elections of 1858, the Prussian king was replaced by his brother prince Wilhelm I. Two weeks after assuming power Wilhelm dismissed the conservative government, appointed a moderately liberal govern-

[1] However, since the question of German political unification was not about to be determined in the Prussian house of deputies, it is not clear whether it correctly characterized the policy dimensions at that time.

[2] See also the account by Bachem (1927, 114-122 of the legislative deliberations about removing the decrees. After the decrees were defeated, twelve Conservative delegates left the faction, claiming they feel uncomfortable with its demands to alter the constitution (Bachem, 1927, 151)

ment, and relaxed the restrictions on political associations and the press.[3] These actions marked the beginning of a short-lived liberal era in Prussia during which religious rights were not threatened.

In preparation for the state elections in November 1858, August and Peter Reichensperger, two brothers who effectively led the parliamentary group since 1853, sought to re-brand the group and appeal to new constituencies. Drawing on their parliamentary activity between 1852-1858, they branded the group as the protector of the religious rights of all minorities, including Jews and Evangelicals (Bachem, 1927, 151). But in the political climate that emerged with the dismissal of the conservative government there was no pressing need for this platform and it did not capture a large number of voters.

In the following years, Prussian politics began to transition from a kind of local "noble politics," to a nascent form of mass politics that was directed from Berlin (Sperber, 1984, 100). Progressive delegates, who still opposed the government, were the first to engage in mass mobilization. Many of the liberals were educated middle-class Protestants and had an advantage in political organization compared to the Catholics, who were limited by the Church's reluctance to promote lay organizations until the late 1860s (Tenfelde, 2000, 91). The Liberal organizations, which were typically local, became national with the establishment of an umbrella organization called the National Union (*Deutscher Nationalverein*) in 1859 to facilitate their activity. In the 1860s, these organizations, many of them were urban, spread

[3]Pflanze (1963, 122) notes that this change also diminished government interference with the elections. While in the legislative period 1855-1858, 218 Conservative delegates supported the government and 116 moderate Liberals opposed it, in 1858 the Conservatives numbered 57 compared to 263 Liberals.

to the countryside, and accordingly, expanded their membership from the middle-class to rural Prussians (Tenfelde, 2000, 94).

The conflicts that dominated Prussian politics between 1859-1866 posed a challenge to the parliamentary unity of the Catholic Center delegates. Without ecclesiastical conflicts to unite them, they were now divided between the Progressive and Conservative camps on constitutional issues and this schism was reflected in their floor votes (Bachem, 1927, 175). In 1862, Wilhelm I, now the Prussian king after the death of his brother, appointed Otto von Bismarck as the Minister-President, Prussia's head of government. When the lower house refused to approve Bismarck's military budget, he continued to rule by the power of emergency laws. Officially, the Catholic Center continued to support the government even though its rule was no longer constitutional. In practice, however, the conservative leaders of the group sided with the government while the majority of the group's members voted with the Progressives (Bachem, 1927, 179).[4]

Now that the political conflicts in Prussian politics were about the military reform and the rule of law and the status of the Church was secured, the members of the Catholic Center could hardly agree on their policy positions.[5] As the conflict between Conservatives and Liberals polarized—the Liberals were now pushing for a more democratic regime, ministerial responsibility and more authority for local governance, among other things—the inner unity of the Center dissolved (see Bachem, 1927, 179—183). Specifically, the conservative Westphalian delegates

[4]Furthermore, in those years, the national question returned and Catholic delegates, the majority of them supported the *Großdeutch* solution and political unification with Austria, found it difficult to support Bismarck who increasingly favored the *Kleindeutch* solution (Bachem, 1927, 182).

[5]Already in 1852, they agreed mostly on ecclesiastical issues (Hohmann, 1967, 294).

supported Bismarck and the more liberal Rhinelanders supported the Liberals (Hohmann, 1967, 294).

Before the elections, the Center took an ideologically middle position. It supported a military expansion within the limits of the constitution but remained vague about the national question, which resurfaced in Prussia after the Italian unification. The Center supported monarchical rule but sought to protect political rights. It sided with the government on ecclesiastical and economic issues, often in contrast to the interests of the Catholic middle class. Consequently, it failed to present a coherent position that matched the preferences of the majority of the Catholic voters (Bachem, 1927, 161–163).[6]

In the elections of 1863, the Catholic vote was split. The Catholic voters who were disappointed with the Center's support for Bismarck voted for anti-government liberal candidates. The liberal wing of the Center did better than the moderate wing, especially in the western and more liberal regions (Bachem, 1927, 184). Catholics in the rural areas, who were still heavily influenced by the parish priest, tended to vote for pro-government candidates. Overall, the elections of 1863 were marked by apathy by Catholics. The clergy continued to mobilize the parishioners by delivering passionate sermons but voters were apathetic and turnout was low compared to other parts of Prussia (Sperber, 1984, 107). Even the growing tension outside of Prussia between the Pope and the Progressives during the 1860s did not manage to create a Catholic voting bloc. As long as Prussian Catholics were

[6]Bachem (1927, 187) notes that even the left members of the Center party did not oppose Bismarck. The party was probably controlled by the Catholic Church, who still wanted to maintain a good relationship with the state.

not in real danger from anti-Catholic legislators–and this was the case because the Progressive party had no influence over the executive–the Catholic faction failed to rally significant support (Anderson, 1968, 412–3). Compared to the 63 seats it won in 1852, the party won only 50 seats in 1861 and lost 19 the next year. In 1863, it won only 29 seats. In 1866, after winning only 15 seats, it finally dissolved (Hohmann, 1967, 294).

As my theory predicts, Catholics began to vote together in response to government policies that caused them grievances. In response, Catholic entrepreneurs began to coordinate on the new issue and campaigned on the religious freedom of Catholics. The loose coalition of Catholics formed a parliamentary group that fought the policies and managed to remove them. However, as opposed to what my theory predicted, the formation of the Catholic cleavage did not polarize the Prussian policy space. The Catholic group voted together on confessional issues but often joined liberal-minded parties on other issues.

As expected based on my theory, after the anti-Catholic policies were removed and the tension between the state and the Church decreased, Catholic voters became divided on the more salient issues: the democratization of Prussia and the military budget. These issues polarized the policy space and pressured the Catholic party to adopt a coherent position either in favor or against the government. The party, which was split on the new cleavage, chose a middle position. This strategy was ineffective in recruiting voters the party and gradually lost seats until it dissolved.

3.2 Mixed school boards and cleavage formation in Baden 1864

A conflict between the state and the Church emerged in the Grand Duchy of Baden in 1848 when the state sought to attack Church privileges. Eventually the two sides reached a compromise and a new cleavage did not emerge. This happened when the liberal Grand Duke wished to cancel the Badenese school law from 1834 and merge the separate Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish schools into confessionally-mixed schools (Bachem, 1927, 268). The proposed legislation was eventually abandoned with the outbreak of the second revolution in 1849 (Bachem, 1927, 269). The tension between the state and the Church resumed in 1852, when the archbishop of Freiburg adopted the call of Pope Pius IX to increase the Church's autonomy. The archbishop demanded the Badenese government to lift state supervision over elementary schools and refused to get state approval before appointing priests (Evans, 1999a, 97). In response, the state arrested the archbishop and several other priests. Notably, these events led to limited mobilization among rural Catholics but did not evolve into a large-scale mobilization. The tension between the state and the Church subsided in 1855 when, under Austria's pro-Catholic influence, prince regent Friedrich I, the head of the Grand Duchy, sought to reach a compromise with the Catholic Church (Evans, 1999a, 97—98).

The conflict between the Church and the state, which seemed about to be resolved in 1859, escalated in 1860 and four years later, the Catholic cleavage emerged. In 1860 the Liberals won the majority of seats in the lower house (37 out of 63)

and rejected the new compromise. Friedrich married Louise, the daughter of the Prussian King Wilhelm I and the influence of Prussia in Baden consequently grew during the 1860s, while at the same time the influence of pro-Church Austria, which was distracted by the Italian wars of unification, diminished. During that decade, as Evans (1999a, 97—98) notes, "Baden functioned as Germany's first parliamentary state, with the majority Liberal party acting in harmony with the ministry to enact a complete agenda of economic and social modernization."

Certainly, the state and the Church were in conflict even before 1848. The Badenese bureaucracy sought to transform the state's institutions and the Badenese society in light of progressive values (Lee, 1991). However, the timing of the policies in 1864 was plausibly exogenous to the formation of the cleavage. After the 1849 uprising Baden was placed under Prussian military rule. From 1852 to 1858 the Conservatives had the majority of seats in the lower house. Baden was perhaps the most liberal of the German states already in the first half of the 19th and the Badenese constitution constrained the executive, which was responsible to the lower house. Therefore, until the Liberals came to power at the end of the 1850s, the executive did not have the legislature's support for Liberal policies.

Starting in 1860, the Badenese government and the lower house began to initiate legislation that encroached on the Church's finances and privileges, especially in the area of elementary education. In 1862, the state established the School Inspectorate (*Oberschulrat*) to supervise the schools. By establishing an independent state agency, it was able to circumvent the Church's autonomy over religious instruction and effectively direct the education in elementary schools (Bachem, 1927, 303).

In response to the establishment of the Inspectorate, a new form of Catholic association emerged called the Casinos (*Casinobewegung*). These associations functioned as social and political clubs where Church-minded Catholics could gather and exchange ideas about the position of Catholics. Although their activity was greatly limited because of the Badenese limitations on political associations, they gained popularity two years later, after the government increased into anti-Catholic attacks and the policies exerted a direct cost on ordinary Catholics (Becker, 1973, 142).

In 1864, the government decided to establish confessionally-mixed school boards to supervise the elementary schools (Evans, 1999a, 98). Membership in the school board was to be determined by elections. The Catholic Church ordered the clergy and the parishioners to boycott the elections, which many of them did, while many Liberal Catholics turned out to vote (Bachem, 1927, 305; Evans, 1999a, 98). Catholic turnout in the elections among eligible voters was 26% and this was the first time since 1846 that Catholics mobilized and demonstrated to Catholic political entrepreneurs the potential for Catholic mobilization against anti-Catholic government policies (Becker, 1973, 135—136).

Catholics in Baden mobilized in opposition to government policies on two occasions in 1864 and 1865.[7] The first occasion was the first local elections in Baden, which were a part of a series of domestic reforms. In the elections to the local councils (*Kreisversammlungen*) the ultramontanes[8] managed to place pro-Catholic

[7]Catholics also sent petitions protesting the new proposed legislation (Becker, 1973, 140). In that same year the Pope published its Syllabus of errors.

[8]Catholics who believed in the supremacy of the Pope and his authority.

representative in every council; one in every 11 councils had a pro-Catholic majority (Becker, 1973, 145). Out of 169 delegates, 25 Catholic priests were elected in addition to 60 pro-Church lay Catholics. The second occasion was the (indirect) elections to the lower house in 1865 that witnessed the highest turnout in 15 years with 73% of eligible voters. In these elections, 1,671 of the electors were ultramontane (300 of them were priests) compared to 3,278 Liberal electors (Becker, 1973, 145).

The candidates of the new pro-Catholic party[9] declared their platforms orally and in open assemblies in order to avoid restrictions on political activity. The new party stood as an opposition to the Liberal government and its anti-Catholic policies. In addition, it adopted a social agenda related to workers and a position on taxation and militarization, issues that Catholics cared about (Becker, 1973, 143). As my theory predicts, the formation of the Catholic cleavage in Baden polarized Badenese domestic politics between the ultramontane Catholics and the liberals. Each side benefited electorally from this polarization as voters were forced to choose sides in the conflict (Becker, 1973, 141).

Two developments helped political entrepreneurs to start an opposition movement in response to government policies. Before the elections, Hermann von Vicari, the archbishop of Freiburg, issued pastoral letters where he called Catholics to vote for candidates that will protect the interests of the Church. This was the first time since 1846 that the Catholic Church in Baden participated in the elections (Becker, 1973, 144) and this happened because the traditional channels to the government were blocked. The second development was the formation of the Casinos, which

[9]Spelled the same as in English, *Conservative Opposition*.

emerged as extra-parliamentary associations. Although the Casinos remained separate from the Catholic opposition, the party recruited voters from the branches of the Casino movement which grew quickly in size in the weeks before the elections could be found almost everywhere in Baden. Although the limitations on associations constrained the activity of the Casinos, their leaders were able to partially avoid the restrictions by defining them as social clubs (Bachem, 1927, 307) or "simply occasional meetings of men" (*Es ist einfach eine gelegentliche Zusammenkunft von Männern*; author's translation) and by no means an organized association (Becker, 1973, 141—142).

As my theory predicts, as long as the conflict between the state and the Church persisted, the cleavage was sustained. In 1868, the new Minister-President Jolly appeased the Liberal majority by allowing new anti-Catholic legislation (Evans, 1999a, 99). The Liberal government passed a new law forcing the clergy to pass a state exam in history and philosophy in addition to the classics. In that same year, the government finally managed to pass the mixed-schools bill (Bachem, 1927, 316-7). Districting in state elections in Baden and the indirect electoral rules managed to restrain the true electoral power of Catholics in local and state elections (Evans, 1999a, 102). But the elections to the Customs Parliament (*Zollparlament*), a German national parliament that Bismarck established to bring the German states in a closer union, which were direct and based on near-universal male suffrage, revealed the size of the Catholic opposition: Of the 14 delegates elected in Baden, 6 were opposition Catholics (Evans, 1999a, 99).

Before the next state election of 1869 an electoral reform expanded the franchise

to all men (Evans, 1999a, 99). Although the elections were still indirect, more Catholics than before could now participate. Before the elections, Jakob Landau, the leader of the opposition Catholics and the founder of the Casinos, established the Catholic People's party (*Katholische Volkspartei Badens*, KVP). The party opposed the Liberal attacks on the Church, advocated for direct vote, supported federalism in Germany and a union of the Southern German states (*Südbund*), freedom of association, and reduction of military service, among other issues. In addition to Landau who had already served as a Landtag member since 1867, three additional delegates were elected (Bachem, 1927, 318-321).[10] The party persisted and eventually merged with the Catholic Center party in 1881.

As my theory predicts, the cleavage emerged and persisted in response to government policies. When the state and the Church were in conflict, the Church began to mobilize Catholics in order to put pressure on the state. When it could no longer influence policymaking using extra-parliamentary protest and lost its diplomatic channel to the government, it encouraged voters to participate in the elections and vote for pro-Catholic candidates. However, the process in which the cleavage emerged in Baden demonstrates that not all mobilization attempts were equally successful. Catholics were more responsive to mobilization when the policies aggrieved ordinary Catholics. In the 1860s, the peak years of the Badenese *Kulturkampf*, attempts by the clergy to mobilize Catholics in response to state attacks were far less successful when the attacks targeted only Church property and the high clergy and not ordinary Catholics (Bachem, 1927, 297,300). The differential

[10] According to another source, five and not four delegates were ultramontane.

success in the mobilization of Catholics supports the hypothesis that individuals were more likely to join the new voter coalition when they *personally* experienced grievances from policies.

3.3 Prussian dominance and a new cleavage in Bavaria 1868

A new electoral cleavage formed in Bavaria in 1868 when a possibility materialized for a Prussian-led national unification. This was precipitated by several developments. After the Austro-Prussian war in 1866, in which Prussia defeated Austria and paved the way for a German unification with Prussian dominance, the Bavarian head of government, Von der Pfordten, was forced to resign. Unlike his predecessor who was a Bavarian separatist, the new head of cabinet, Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, was a moderate Liberal who was publicly perceived as a Progressive. Second, in 1867, Bismarck abolished the Customs Union (*Zollverein*) and instead established the Customs Parliament (*Zollparlament*). The new institution brought the southern states into a closer economic association with the north and served as a basis for a future political unification (Wright, 1975, 3-4). That same year, Bavaria signed a secret mutual protection agreement with Prussia (Wright, 1975, 4), and when the news about the agreement was revealed, it aroused extra-parliamentary opposition that feared the "Prussianization" of Bavaria. The treaty was notably more progressive and pro-Prussian than anticipated. In the lower house, a group of 17 conservatives joined forces and opposed the treaty, which eventually passed with a

majority of 117-17 (Wright, 1975, 5). Finally, the Bavarian progressive party began in 1867 to signal its intention to secularize the school system (Wright, 1975, 4). This alignment of identities: Bavarian particularism, ultramontanism, and conservatism was the basis of a new electoral cleavage in Bavaria.

The anti-Catholic and pro-Prussian shift in Bavarian politics was plausibly exogenous to the formation of a new electoral cleavage because its was caused by an external international change: Prussia's triumph over Austria. This event was not caused by Bavarian domestic policies, as the Bavarian Dynasty was Catholic and maintained a good relationship with the Catholic Church. The rise in the dominance of Prussia and the weakening of Austria were an unexpected outcome since Austria's military was larger than the Prussian army.

The new cleavage emerged in the *Zollparlament* elections in 1868, which were the first direct elections with near-universal male franchise in Bavaria. At the basis of the new voter coalition were multiple occupational groups and classes that came together in response to the actions of the Bavarian government and opposed its pro-Prussian and anti-clerical policies. The Bavarian clergy and ultramontane Catholics, which until 1867 did not hold a position on Prussia, became anti-Prussian following the encroachment of the Progressive Party on the privileges of the Church (Wright, 1975, 10). The clergy protested the establishment of the new Customs Parliament and attempted to pressure Landtag delegates in the southern German states to reject the treaties (Windell 1954, 113). Despite the historically good relationship between the state and the Church, the threat of the anti-Catholic policies pushed the clergy to join the opposition. Wright (1975, 10) notes: "Without the initiatives

of the Bavarian Progressives into the areas of educational and social legislation it remains doubtful whether the Catholic Church would have played such an important role in the struggle over national union."[11] In addition to rural Catholics, middle-class Catholics mobilized against the Honhenlohe government in response to the increased influence of Prussia and the fear that it will subsume Bavaria. Much like in the Badenese *Kulturkampf*, they formed social and political Catholic clubs—the Casinos—where they discussed political issues (Wright, 1975, 11). Another Catholic subgroup, the farmers, too, began to mobilize against the Liberal government and organized in Farmers' associations (*Bauervereine*). They sought to establish cooperatives to help farmers deal with the rising costs of land and mortgage rates, and to preserve their way of life against Liberal bankers, capitalists, and merchants, who all lived in the cities (Wright, 1975, 12).

To be sure, public opinion in the Kingdom of Bavaria was particularist, conservative, and ultramontane even before the Austro-Prussian war in 1866. But after Austria' defeat and given the pro-Prussian Liberal dominance in the Bavarian government, both Bavarian particularism and the Catholic identity were threatened by domestic government policies. The policies created a concrete threat, something tangible that Catholics, Bavarian patriots, and rural voters could organize against.

As predicted by my theory, the emergence of the new cleavage in the *Zollparlament* elections polarized and realigned the Bavarian party system. The Middle party (*Mittlepartei*), which until 1866 controlled the lower house with a loose majority coalition, struggled to appeal to voters with its moderate positions (Wright, 1975,

[11]However, in 1868 the anti-Catholic policies had little chance to pass because they would be vetoed by the upper house (Wright, 1975, 13).

24).[12] Before 1866 the Bavarian Progressive Party (*Die bayerische Fortschrittspartei*) had been judged negatively for being somewhat pro-Prussian. But after Austria's defeat to Prussia it enjoyed a positive image and increased its power (Eiklor, 1963, 171-174). The Right party (*Rechte*), which before 1866 was a conservative party that received most of its support from rural voters and clericals, who were loyal to the Church and the clergy, was now torn between different responses to the dominance of Prussia—which ranged from forming an alliance with France to opposition to the *Kleindeutch* solution (Eiklor, 1963, 174).

The Patriotic Movement emerged just before the *Zollparlament* elections in 1868 in opposition to the Liberal government of Bavaria. Politicians and voters who before the war supported the Middle party now abandoned it and joined the new opposition (Wright, 1975, 24). The new movement emerged spontaneously within the course of a month and without an organized structure; just weeks before the elections, Patriotic activists tried to copy the Liberals' organizations and infrastructure in order to mobilize voters more efficiently (Wright, 1975, 32).[13] The Liberals, alarmed by the mobilization of conservative ultramontanes, declared that to vote for their opponents "was to encourage the national enemy" (Wright, 1975, 20). The Liberals have attempted to discredit the Patriots by presenting them as

[12]Eventually the party abandoned its *Großdeutch* policy and merged with the Progressives (Eiklor, 1963, 174). The exact fate of the party is not clear. In a different account, Wright (1975, 23) notes that the Middle party formed an organization only after 1866. Even then, it voted with the progressives. In any case, by the Landtag elections of 1869 the Middle party had disappeared (Wright, 1975, 24).

[13]The lower clergy and local press mobilized voters (Evans, 1999a, 104). This reflected a conflict within the clergy. The clergy in Bavaria, both high and low came from the middle classes and the peasantry. The Church was a means of social mobility and the Church leadership was a part of the political elite. During the Bavarian Kulturkampf, young and junior clergymen were a part of the state opposition (Southern, 1977, 7-9).

a religious party. But in fact, the Patriots campaigned on economic issues, which were to be at the center of the Customs Parliament. Furthermore, to distinguish themselves from the Liberals and speak to the rural sentiment of many of the voters, they claimed to represent "the people", unlike many of the Liberal representatives (Wright, 1975, 25—27).

Because the Patriotic movement was composed of multiple subgroups, it struggled to define its policy platform in positive terms; it could more easily define it as an opposition to the Liberal agenda (Wright, 1975, 28—30; Southern, 1977, 39—40). The polarization between the parties reached its peak just before the elections. Wright reports (1975, 31): "by the beginning of February [the elections took place on February 10], issues and ideological distinctions had boiled down to the simple Patriotic elections slogan: "Hie Bayern!" "Hie Pruessen! (here is Bavaria and here is Prussia)." In the elections, turnout in Bavaria was 68%. Out of 48 delegates elected in Bavaria, the Progressive party won 12 seats, the Middle party won 9, the Free Democrats one seat, and the Conservatives, which represented the Patriotic opposition to government, had won 26 seats. These results were significantly different from the previous Landtag elections returns in 1863, where the Middle party held half of the seats and the Progressive party—a third (Wright, 1975, 46).

As the threat of the policies persisted, the opposition to the government institutionalized in the form of a new political party. The Bavarian Patriots party (*Bayerische Patriotenpartei*) was officially established in 1869 ahead of the next Landtag elections (Evans, 1999a, 104). The polarizing issue in the elections was a school reform bill, which was drafted at the end of 1867 and remained in the committee

until the end of the six-year term in 1868. The salience of this issue in the elections was so high that it "overshadowed all others, with a temporary interruption for the Zollparlament election" (Wright, 1975, 70). This issue was mentioned in almost every assembly meeting together with the number of petitions that were sent to the Landtag and urged the government to respect the Church's authority (Wright, 1975, 70-71). In this polarized policy space, what most clearly distinguished between Conservative and Liberal delegates was their position on the school reform. The results of the 1869 Landtag elections reflects this polarization: The Patriots won 78 seats, the Liberals 55 seats, and the rest of the parties won 21 seats (Wright, 1975, 71).

In sum, the electoral cleavage in Bavaria emerged in response to the anticipated national unification with Prussia which posed a threat to the Catholic, conservative, and Bavarian particularist voters. While the new electoral cleavage in Prussia and Baden was mostly Catholic, in Bavaria it was an alignment of different social identities that formed the basis for the new electoral cleavage. As the policies persisted, the opposition to the government became more formalized which resulted in the formation of a new Catholic and Bavarian particularist party.

3.4 Conventional explanations for cleavage formation in the German states

This section assesses competing explanations to the formation of the new cleavages in the three German states. Specifically, it tests three alternative explanations: that

electoral cleavages are a reflection of the social structure, that cleavages emerge when political entrepreneurs attempt to organize voters, and that electoral cleavages emerge from critical junctures and institutional change.

In this section, I analyze outcomes of *Nonformation* (see Table 1.1 in the introduction) whereby (1) the social identity at the base of the new electoral cleavage was not a predictor of voting behavior before the cleavage emerged. This allows me to asses the competing hypothesis that electoral cleavages reflect social divisions. Outcomes of *Nonformation* can also happen if (2) political entrepreneurs attempted to craft a new cleavage by mobilizing voters but a new cleavage did not emerge. I use these outcomes to assess the elite-driven hypothesis. A third pathway for *Nonformation* is when (3) the franchise was expanded but a new cleavage did not consequently emerge and I use these outcomes to asses the institutional change and critical junctures hypothesis.

Prussia

Electoral cleavages emerge from critical junctures

Figure 3.1 illustrates the change in the political relevance of the Catholic identity in Prussia between 1849-1881. In 1849, the share of Catholics in the Prussian lower house was just below 25%. When the Catholic cleavage emerged, it increased to roughly 33%. After 1852, the number of Catholic delegates slowly declined until reaching a low point of 18% in February 1867. After that election, the cleavage emerged and Catholic politicians began to coordinate around the Catholic identity

and between 1871-1878 the share of Catholics remained stable.[14]

Figure 3.1: Change in the Share of Catholic Delegates Over Time 1849-1887

Notes: The percentage of Catholics between 1849-1866 is calculated based on the results of Prussian state elections, where the sample consists of 129 districts. Election results in 1867 are from the elections to the North German Reichstag and later the German Reichstag (starting in 1871), where the sample consists of 136 districts. The number of Catholic delegates in the Prussian lower house was coded from the *Biographisches Handbuch für das preussische Abgeordnetenhaus, 1849-1867* (Haunfelder, 1994). Data from 1867-1881 was taken from the *Members of the Reichstag in the Empire 1867/1871-1918 dataset* compiled by Heinrich Best (1990). The boundaries of state and national constituencies in Prussia were almost identical although they varied by district magnitude.

A similar pattern emerges from the association between the Catholic identity and the voting behavior of Catholics. Figure 3.2 shows predicted probabilities from two probit regressions that use the Catholic party affiliation of delegates as the dependent variable between 1849-1867 and 1871-1912. Between 1849-1867, the association between the percentage of Catholics and the election of Center party

[14]The percentage of Catholic delegates does not provide information about the number of Catholic candidates who failed to win the elections and therefore about the demand for Catholic representatives, but the abrupt increase and later the gradual decline in the share of Catholics suggest that the political meaning of Catholicism changed over time.

delegates declined in magnitude from the party's founding election in 1852 to 1866.[15] Between 1871-1887, Catholicism continued to predict the electoral fortunes of the Center Catholic party at a roughly stable rate. These patterns are consistent with cleavage formation, decline, and re-emergence which are investigated in Chapters 4 and 5.

Figure 3.2: Catholic Alignment and Dealignment in Prussia 1849-1912



Notably, the Catholic cleavages did not emerge in 1848, 1868, or 1871, three years in which there was a major institutional change. The first potential critical juncture was in 1848, in the first elections to the National Parliament, the Frankfurt Assembly, that were held with universal male suffrage and the election was indirect. The cleavage did not emerge in 1848 but instead it emerged in 1852 in Prussia's three-class suffrage.[16] The second potential critical juncture was in August 1867,

[15]The unit of observation between 1849-1867 is delegates in Prussian state constituencies (N=2,024). Between 1871-1912, the unit of observation is German national constituencies (N=2,026). The independent variable is the share of Catholics in Prussian or German constituencies measured in 1864. The regression for the Prussian state elections includes a control for district magnitude.

[16]Prussia was a competitive-authoritarian state with a notoriously unequal franchise. The entire male population[17] was divided into three classes according to the amount of tax that they paid. The votes of each class received an equal weight but within each class the number of voters was different.

in the elections to the Reichstag of the Northern Federation. This election was the first election with a direct and equal franchise. However, by that time the elections took place the cleavage had already emerged.

Political entrepreneurs organize voters

Catholic bishops, priests, and laymen attempted–and failed–to align the voting behavior of Catholics in the German national elections in 1848 and before the Prussian lower house elections of 1849. The two elections were understood by Catholic elites as opportunities to guarantee the protection the Catholic Church in the new state constitution.[18] The new national parliament, the Frankfurt Assembly, was seen by contemporaries as an opportunity to come to a solution on the question of German national unification[19] (Herrmann and Sieberer, 2017, 3) and facilitate a debate about the status of the Catholic Church within the future German state. Similarly, the Prussian lower house (*Preußisches Abgeordnetenhaus*), which was elected in 1849, was scheduled to vote on the contents of a new state constitution that will determine the position of the Catholic Church within the Prussian state.

During the upheavals of 1848-9, which were a part of the large anti-monarchist revolutionary wave in the Spring of Nations in Western Europe, many Catholic associations emerged in Prussia. Notably among them were the Pius Associations

Effectively, the Prussian franchise weighted the value of the vote by the amount of income tax paid by the voter. Additionally, the suffrage was indirect and voters selected electors who placed a direct vote for candidates.

[18] Before the uprisings of 1848, the rare conflicts that emerged in connection to Catholics brought the Catholics together. They were however settled in favor of the Church because the head of state was tolerant of Catholics (Evans, 1999a, 61—62).

[19] Also known as the "National Question."

for Religious Freedom (*Piusvereine für religiöse Freiheit*), which the Bishops, the clergy, and lay Catholics used in order to organize Catholics before the coming national elections. Named after Pope Pius IX, the associations called on the faithful to vote for pro-Catholic candidates and protect the interests of the Church. Between March and October, about 400 branches were established with 100,000 members in all the German states (Nipperdey, 1996). This was a moment of intensive activity for political Catholicism: Many of these associations held political campaigns and some of the priests nominated themselves as candidates.

Due to the widespread Catholic mobilization network, the Catholic leadership and the lower clergy had the upper hand in organizing Catholics in the early stages of the campaign. However, as the events unfolded, Prussian public opinion radicalized and many called to democratize Prussia and support radical-democratic candidates. The Catholic Church, which was not interested in seeing Prussia become a republic, moved to seek an accommodating position with the Prussian state and took a conservative, rightist position (Sperber, 1984, 50). At that point, the Church and the radical-democrats attempted to mobilize the same Catholic voters based on different issues: The Church called on Catholics to defend religion and religious freedom, while radical-democrats campaigned to change the nature of the regime. During the revolutions, the radical-democrats developed an organizational infrastructure and expanded their activity outside of the cities and into the rural areas. The Church, which was especially strong in the Catholic villages, called Catholics to oppose leftist, radical-democratic candidates and vote for Conservative candidates.

Without a real threat to the position of Catholics, the attempts by Catholic entrepreneurs and the Church to establish a new Catholic cleavage have largely failed. The Catholic delegates who were elected to the Assembly, although many of them were priests, won based on their party affiliation and their position on the democratization of Prussia and not because of their religion (Evans, 1981, 11). As predicted by my theory, as long as there was no concrete threat to the position of Catholics in Prussia in the form of anti-Catholic policies, and the major conflict in the elections was the democratization of Prussia, the majority of Catholic voters joined Protestants in a non-denominational and pro-democratic coalition. Together, they voted in support for the protection of political freedoms (Sperber, 1984, 51).

After the national election in 1848, the radical movement was outlawed and its members were imprisoned or exiled. Moderate left candidates, which were allowed to operate in Prussia's competitive-authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way, 2002), campaigned on the protection of political rights in the Prussian state elections of 1849. Those candidates saw ecclesiastical freedom as inseparable from civic liberty and therefore represented the political interests of Catholics. Without an active conflict between the state and the Church, both the rural, agrarian parishioners and the middle-class Catholics in the cities were subsumed in a larger Liberal coalition (Bachem, 1927, 2).

The Prussian constitution from 1850 rewarded the Catholic Church for its opposition to the radicals and guaranteed the freedom of religion, the administrative autonomy of the Church, and gave it a considerable degree of control over the public school system (Sperber, 1986, 52–53). In the absence of conflict between the

state and the Catholic Church, in 1850 there was no Catholic confessional party in the Prussian House of Deputies. Now that the state and the Church had reached a mutual understanding and the interests of the Church were guaranteed by the constitution, the majority of the Pius Associations disappeared and those that continued to operate became apolitical; some even banned political conversations in their meetings (Windell, 1954, 33; Evans, 1999a, 71). Prussia was a competitive authoritarian state (Levitsky and Way, 2002), where the executive and the cabinet were appointed from above and the state employed a variety of surveillance measures against political activity, detaining political activists, censuring the press, and banning political associations. As long as the Church had maintained understanding with the state, the state did not attempt to encroach on the special privileges of the Church and the religious freedom of Catholics.

Electoral cleavages reflect the social structure

Catholicism was a distinct social identity in majority-Protestant Prussia and the relationship between Catholics and Protestants was tense at times. The elementary school system was divided along confessional lines and Catholics lived in majority Catholic provinces, Rhineland and Westphalia. Before 1852 class best predicted the voting behavior of Catholics. Rural parishioners followed the parish priest and voted for Conservative candidates, while the Catholic middle-class Bürger saw no contradiction between being religiously Catholic and politically liberal, and voted for Liberal parties (Mergel, 1996). German Catholics, who were forced to join Prussia in 1815 after Napoleon's defeat, resented the Prussian state and saw the

1848 upheavals as an opportunity to "escape Prussian domination" (Sperber, 1984, 48). Brought under the Prussian rule, Catholics had to pay higher taxes to help fund Prussia's expanding military and now faced military conscription. The tension between Catholics and Protestants was also reflected in the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church. In 1849, in the aftermath of the upheavals, the two formed an alliance against the radical-democrats but this did not eliminate their mutual suspicions. Although in 1849 post-revolutionary Prussia the Catholic Church was considered a force of political stability, vital in sustaining the social order, the Prussian bureaucracy, which was predominantly Protestant, openly disliked the Catholic Church (Sperber, 1986, 47).

Until the Catholic cleavage emerged in 1852, the Catholic vote was split between Liberal and Conservative candidates. The absence of a Catholic electoral cleavage between 1848-1852 is also evident in the ideological fragmentation of Catholic elites during those years. In general, Catholic nobles, who believed that engagement in politics should be limited to protecting the interests of the Church, competed as candidates of the Conservative party. They were supported by the majority of the clergy, especially in the high levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchy (Sperber, 1986, 50–51). By contrast, Catholic middle-class and a minority of priests in the lower level of the Church hierarchy supported the protection of civil rights and were associated with the left democratic movement.

Patterns of roll-call votes in the national assembly elected in 1848 illustrate the ideological fragmentation of Catholics. The main cleavage in the elections to the assembly was ideological and non-denominational. It focused on the character of

the future German state and on whether the state will be a constitutional monarchy or a republic (Herrmann and Sieberer, 2017). Catholic delegates in the Assembly held disparate political views on the question of political authority and were affiliated with parties anywhere on the political spectrum from the radical left to the far right. In contrast to the first policy dimension, the positions of Catholics were more similar on the second, and much less important political dimension–the question of German national unification. In this debate, Catholics often supported the Greater Germany solution (*Großdeutsch*) which meant a political unification extending from Prussia in the north to Austria in the south, while Protestants typically favored the Lesser Germany solution (*Kleindeutsch*) which excluded Austria. The national assembly was dissolved without a solution on the national question and the issue did not resurface in the Prussian lower house until 1866, when it was clear that Prussia will lead a German unification without Austria.

Without a clear threat of anti-Catholic policies, Catholics did not appear to organize around the religious identity. In the Frankfurt Assembly, a small minority among the Catholic delegates formed a loose intra-parliamentary organization, the Catholic Club (*Katholischer Club*) (Evans, 1981, 11). Only a handful of the delegates wanted the Club to become a political party. Instead, they all agreed to advance the defense of religion from within their own parties (Evans, 1981, 12). Outside of the Landtag, since 1848, and especially between 1848-1858, a heterogeneous group of Catholics–political entrepreneurs, clergymen, lay Catholics, and Catholic nobles met annually in an umbrella organization, the Catholic Conferences (*Katholikentage*;

author's translation).[20] There, they talked about ways to advance the freedom of religion and the freedom of the Church (Morsey, 1985, 10). Participants would make speeches, the assembly would vote on them, and these were supposed, in principle, to be sent to the state, wider society, the church and lay Catholic movements (Ruppert, 2015, 49–50). These meetings illustrate that although political Catholicism continued to exist since 1848, it remained extra-parliamentary and did not have a mass movement or a political party until 1852. In fact, the assemblies, which were the main organ of political Catholicism, did not become political until 1879, several years after the Catholic cleavage re-emerged for the second time and the Catholic Center party appropriated them (Ruppert, 2015, 58).

Baden and Bavaria

Theories of critical junctures do not explain the formation of the cleavages in Baden and Bavaria. Like Prussia, the Grand Duchy of Baden and the Kingdom of Bavaria were competitive-authoritarian states: They held indirect elections for a national parliament in 1848 and revised their constitutions after the upheavals of 1848-1849. They held state elections with a limited franchise and their legislatures were accountable to the executive. Just like in Prussia, the cleavages in Baden and Bavaria did not emerge after the first major institutional innovation, the first national elections in 1848, or after the second major change, the expansion of the franchise in 1868 in the *Zollparlament* elections.

[20] Renamed *Generalversammlung der katholischen Vereine* ('The General Assembly of Catholic Associations'; author's translation) after 1856 (Nipperdey, 1991, 439).

Neither do social structural positions explain the formation of the cleavages in Baden and Bavaria. In both of the German states the Catholic identity did not predict voting behavior until the cleavages emerged during the 1860s. The relationship between the state and the Catholic Church in the Grand Duchy of Baden was tense and oscillated between an open conflict and compromise even before 1848. Unlike in Bavaria and Prussia, where the state and the Church had a good relationship (Bavaria) or had reluctantly reached a mutual understanding (Prussia), in Baden the state was better able to establish its supremacy over the Church. Already in 1848 it supervised the curriculum at elementary schools, leaving only religious instruction to the Church, and had the authority to approve the appointments of the clergy. Moreover, Leopold the Grand Duke of Baden was a Liberal and sought to secularize and modernize the constitutional monarchy, thus further increasing state supremacy. In the middle of the 19th century, the divisions between Catholics and Protestants were stark. The civil service in Baden was overwhelmingly Protestant although Catholics composed 64% of the population. Catholics were typically found in the lower classes, and like in Prussia, were seen by Liberals as backward, ignorant and controlled by the clergy (Evans, 1999a, 95). In Baden's bicameral legislature, membership in the upper house was hereditary and open to Catholics and Protestants from the upper class. Despite the distinctiveness of the Catholic identity in Baden and its overlap with social class, these differences were not translated to voting behavior until 1864, when Catholics organized against the establishment of mixed school boards.

In Bavaria, too, Catholicisms overlapped with class and rural lifestyle, but it did

predict voting behavior until 1868. During the 1860s, the tension between Prussia and Austria increased, and the question of Bavaria's political loyalty—whether it should be loyal to Austria or to Prussia—emerged in Bavarian politics. However, although more than two-thirds of Bavaria's population was nominally Catholic, Catholics in Bavaria were not clearly aligned against Prussia before the Austro-Prussian war. Neither did the Catholic Church attempt to politically mobilize Catholics before 1866 (Eiklor, 1963, 54). The Bavarian conservative party, *Rechte*, was more aristocratic and dynastic than clerical (Wright, 1975, 66).

3.5 Appendix 1

Appendix 1A Key moments in Prussian history 1848-1873

Table 3.2: Major Developments in Prussian History 1848-1871

Year	
1848† ±	Revolutions; Elections to the Frankfurt Assembly
1849†	Radical-democrats are outlawed
1850	New Prussian constitution with a three-class franchise
1852†	Raumer Decrees; the formation of the Catholic parliamentary group
1855†	
1858†	Wilhelm I dissolves the cabinet and appoints moderately liberal ministers
1861†	The Progressive party is established
1862†	
1863†	Beginning of the constitutional conflict between the left and Bismarck
1864-1866	Wars with Denmark and Austria
1866†	Prussia defeats Austria; end of the conflict between Bismarck and the Right-Liberals
1867† ±	Elections to the Reichstag of North Germany
1868	The Prussian lower house attempts to pass a school bill
1869	Attacks on Catholic orders
1870†	The Catholic party is relaunched
1871±	Elections to the Reichstag of Imperial Germany; Male near-universal suffrage
1872	Bismark orders to draft anti-Catholic legislation which opened the Kulturkampf

Notes: † marks years with Prussian state elections and ± marks years with national elections.

Chapter 4

Linguistic Cleavage Formation in Belgium

> "To the extent that the Belgian communities were mobilized on and off in the twentieth century, it was usually for action against the government rather than for action against each other."
>
> (Zolberg, 1974, 232)

This chapter analyzes the formation of the linguistic cleavage in Belgium in the last third of the 19th century. Unlike the electoral cleavages in the German states, which emerged abruptly in response to policies that posed an immediate threat to the Catholic population, the cleavage in Belgium emerged gradually, as an increasing number of Flemish speakers began to bear the cost of the dominance of French in business and administration. As my analysis shows, linguistic divisions

overlapped with power and wealth ever since Belgium gained its independence. But language began to predict voting behavior only several decades later when the status quo in which French was the dominant language in Flanders could no longer be sustained.

4.1 Blocked social mobility and cleavage formation in Belgium ~1870

The linguistic cleavage in Belgium emerged gradually in the last third of the 19th century as the result of two processes. The first was the process of industrialization, which began in the 1850s and continued for over half a century, and the second was the gradual expansion of the franchise to low income voters in municipal and provincial elections. International developments like the war in Crimea, the national unification wars of Italy and Germany, and the American expansion to the west created a demand for cheap Belgian products. The result was a rapid change in Belgium's occupational profile. While in 1846 agriculture accounted for half of the gross national product, it shrunk to 39% in 1866 and 29% in 1880 (Witte, 2009a, 63). In 1846 only 12.8% of the active population was employed in the tertiary sector, but in 1880 this parentage doubled and reached 30% in 1900 (Zolberg, 1974, 204). Flanders, the northern Flemish-speaking region, especially benefited from the industrial revolution and managed to attract foreign investment because of its proximity to harbors and cheap labor force (Witte, 2009a, 62).

The dominance of the French language in Belgium is plausibly exogenous to the

formation of the linguistic cleavage because it was not established in order to block the social mobility of petite bourgeoisie Flemings. In 1830, the provisional Belgian government that seceded from Dutch rule determined that local authorities should use the local language when communicating with citizens and the government. In national institutions, French became the only language (Curtis, 1971, 190–1). The choice of French was motivated by a desire to distance the newly independent Belgium from Dutch rule but also by a pragmatic reason: It was easier to use only one language in parliamentary debates and legislation (Curtis, 1971, 190–2). Moreover, the coalition that built the new state, a combination of clericals and middle class liberals, believed that bilingualism would threaten Belgian unity (Witte, 2009a, 57).

Development in Flanders in the second half of the 19th century led to the growth of a new class of technicians, clerks, teachers, lawyers, and doctors, who wanted access to administrative and other high-status positions (Witte, 2009e, 92). Before the industrial revolution, upwardly-mobile middle-class Flemings would gradually be integrated into the Francophone culture and the majority of Flemings worked as manual laborers in Flemish-majority districts where French was not required. But because industrialization escalated the rate of social and economic change, gradual assimilation into Francophone culture was no longer feasible, and language became a barrier to upward social mobility for a growing group of Flemish speakers (Vos, 2002, 186).

This group of petite bourgeoisie Flemings gained political power because of reforms to municipal and provincial elections that enfranchised a substantial share

of the Belgian population. In 1870, the Catholic party managed to replace the Liberal government after more than a decade in the opposition. Once in office, they initiated electoral reforms that enabled them to incorporate additional conservative voters and change the balance in the electorate to favor the Catholic party (Eenoo, 1979, 341-342). The reforms lowered the tax requirement from 42 francs—the threshold for national elections—to 20 francs in provincial elections and 10 francs in municipal elections (Clough, 1930, 135). As a result, they enfranchised 25% of the male Belgian population in municipal elections. Another reform in 1883 doubled the electorate in municipal elections to 48% of all men, among them were members of the new middle class. By shaping the outcomes of municipal and provincial elections, the Flemish petite bourgeoisie was able to gain influence within the national parties at least a decade before the national franchise was expanded.[1]

The formation of a new pro-Flemish constituency that opposed the dominance of French in Flanders provided the Flemish movement with concrete policy goals. The historian Clough (1930, 117) divides the character of the Flemish movement into two periods. Before 1870 the movement was an exclusive intellectuals' clubs. From 1870, it moved away from the "romantic literary" phase, developed a more pragmatic character, and began to reach a wider audience. It declared a national holiday, founded patriotic organizations and started to publish cheap newspapers with a wide circulation. These steps marked the shift of the movement from improving the literary position of the Flemish language to improving the position of Flemish speakers by focusing on economic and social action (McRae, 1983, 25).

[1]See discussion in Van Ginderachter (1998).

Despite the rise of Flemish consciousness among the Flemish petite bourgeoisie, the Flemish issue still occupied a small section of the Belgian political space in the 1870s and 1880s. The voters who supported it were a minority in the Belgian electorate and were divided on the Catholic cleavage, the dominant electoral cleavage at the time. Flamingant delegates, too, were divided between the two parties and interpreted the causes for the grievances of Flemings according to their ideology. Liberal Flamingants blamed the Church for the backwardness of Flemings and sought to improve the condition of Flemings through education and a cultural revival. The Catholic delegates in Flanders saw the Flemish language and the Catholic religion as intertwined and supported the Flemish movement (Witte, 2009e, 94).

As predicted by my theory, as long as pro-Flemish voters were not a significantly large group to form a viable coalition, and as long as another electoral cleavage was more salient, none of the existing political parties had a reason to adopt the Flemish demands as a dimension of party competition. Moreover, the leaderships of the Catholic and the Liberal parties opposed the Flemish issue in principle. The Liberal party received its support from the urban middle-class in Wallonia, who opposed the idea of a bilingual Belgium because this would force their constituents, many of them were employed in the public service, to learn Flemish. The Liberal party also opposed bilingualism on ideological grounds because it feared this will undermine Belgian national unity. The Catholic party was reluctant to adopt the Flemish issue because the Catholic high clergy was Francophone and instruction in the Catholic private schools, which were the vast majority of primary schools in

Flanders, was done strictly in French.[2]

Without a parliamentary organization, through much of the 19th century, the Flemish movement acted as an extra parliamentary pressure group and was able to pass laws in the lower house when it found support among individual Catholic and Liberal delegates who were sympathetic to the grievances of Flemings. The language laws that were passed between 1873-1891 in the lower house focused on improving the legal status of Flemish in penal courts, local administration, and higher education, and reflected the concerns of middle-class Flemings. The laws that eventually passed were considerably softened from the original bill drafts to the floor votes, and included exceptions for the Brussels region and French speakers in Flanders (Van Ginderachter, 1998). What determined how individual delegates voted was their political views on the Flemish problem, how the law affected the interests of the constituency they represented, and the position of the government (Van Ginderachter, 1998; see also Van Velthoven, 1982).

Franchise expansion and cleavage broadening after 1894

The expansion of the franchise in 1894 multiplied the size of the electorate by ten and created incentives for the Catholic and Liberal parties to adopt policy positions that appeal to the new voters (Witte, 2009e, 123). Language became an even more politically charged issue in the 1890s because the expansion of the franchise coincided with a second industrial revolution in Flanders, which led to

[2]The Church actively resisted Flamingantism. The pupils were not allowed to speak Flemish while at the school and when pupils or teachers became Flamingant, they were dismissed (Clough, 1930, 152).

the development of the service sector and created pressures for a more linguistically integrated environment.

In addition to the rational reasons for advancing the use of Flemish in Flanders, the expansion of the franchise gave the lower classes the kind of political power that they were lacking and a channel to express their grievances. Decades before the franchise was expanded, the Flemish lower classes have protested the need to speak French when communicating with state officials or the fact that trials were held in French even when the defendant could only speak Flemish.[3] The grievances of the lower classes were tied with the dominance of the French language because language overlapped with political and economic power. French was the language of the banking sector and the factory manager. The French language also represented the Walloon culture, which at the end of the 19th century was perceived as a threat to Flemish and Catholic rural way of life. In Flanders, similarly to Bavaria, this alignment of identities: Flemish, class, and religion, were all perceived to be threatened by the dominance of the French language but they became more pressing and the basis for a new collective identity when the region became more integrated.

As predicted by my theory, since multiple social classes in Flanders were aggrieved by the power differentials associated with language, each of existing parties could adopt the Flemish demands and incorporate them into their platform. Both the Liberal and the Catholic parties democratized following the expansion of the

[3]For example, the trial of two Flemish workers who were accused of robbery and murder, tried in French, the only language in which legal proceedings in Belgium held, and convicted based on circumstantial evidence (McRae, 1983, 25). Another event was when a Flemish worker refused to register the birth of his daughter because the process was in French, had to pay a fine, and appealed to the Brussels high court (Clough, 1930, 135).

franchise and the transition to PR and incorporated pro-Flemish representatives. As a result, a new party did not emerge when the cleavage expanded.[4]

In their response to the Flemish demands, the reputation of existing parties, their social linkages, internal structure, and organizational infrastructure shaped the paths they took to adapt to the Flemish issue (Riedl, 2016, 227). The Catholic party, which many of its representatives supported the Flemish demands before the expansion of the franchise, could easily adopt the Flemish issue and managed to bring many groups within the Flemish constituency under its wing. During the "School War" (1878-1884), when the conflict between the state and the Church emerged, the Catholic party had managed to gain a wide popular support in Flanders. Changes to the economic structure in Flanders in the late 19th century, which included a return to a cottage industry, small-scale or subsistence farming and some household work (Zolberg, 1974, 198-199), contributed to the creation of a Flemish consciousness that combined tradition and Catholicism with an objection to industrialization and urbanization, which were symbolically associated with the French language and Wallonia (De Smaele, 2009). Thanks to the construction of an efficient railroad system, rural Flemings who worked in industrial areas could communicate daily and consequently remained entrenched in their rural Flemish community (Pasture, 2000, 40). The Catholic party also managed to organize workers in the cities in Catholic workers' associations, which tied together the Flemish and the Catholic identities (Pasture, 2000).

The Liberal party, which became anti-Flamingant during the "School War" de-

[4]In the long term, as Zolberg observes, this "insured that as language-related issues became more prominent in Belgian politics, they would not necessarily threaten the system" (1974, 207).

mocratized its candidate selection after the transition to PR and allowed pro-Flemish voters to elect representatives that shared their policy preferences. Consequently, after 1900, right-wing pro-Flemish Liberals gained greater influence within the party and began to recruit the support of the Flemish petite bourgeoisie and intellectuals and capture votes from the socialists and the Catholics (Van Velthoven, 1982, 199–200; Witte, 2009d, 132).

The third major party in Belgium, the Workers' party, did not have the flexibility to officially adopt the Flemish issue. The party's leadership was reluctant to break the alliance between Flemish and Francophone socialists and divide the working class based on language since this contradicted its ideology (Strikwerda, 1997, 312). Moreover, it was reluctant to cooperate with the Flemish movement which was a middle-class conservative movement and had little in common with the demands of workers (Strikwerda, 1997, 313).[5] In practice, however, socialist leaders realized that the social and economic grievances of workers are closely tied to the language issue (Strikwerda, 1982, 161-162). Within parliament, they often voted with the Flamingants on language issues[6] and actively joined Flamingants in their efforts to turn Ghent University into a monolingual Flemish institute (Van Velthoven, 1982, 216). In contrast to the official party line, Socialist workers' associations in Ghent organized workers in Flemish (Strikwerda, 1997, 314–315).

By the interwar era, all of the parties in Flanders were mobilizing workers based on the Flemish issue with the intention to make Belgium truly bilingual. As my

[5] Although at the local level, the socialists and the Flemish movement had some contact. See, for example (Van Ginderachter, 2007, 236) and Strikwerda (1982).

[6] The socialists often supported the language laws but the Flamingants rarely supported socialist legislation because they were anti-socialist.

theory predicts, in the pre-war era, the linguistic cleavage was contained within Flanders and Brussels as long as the new policies posed no threat to French speakers in Wallonia. In the interwar era, when French speakers in Wallonia began to worry that Belgium could become a truly bilingual state, they began to develop a Walloon consciousness and established pressure groups to oppose the policies (Strikwerda, 1997, 37).

In the interwar era, the three political parties attempted to make Flanders monolingual and mobilized voters in based on this position (Strikwerda, 1982, 162). The language laws that were passed in 1927 and 1932 achieved this goal. As my theory predicts, when the policy goals of the aggrieved voters were largely achieved, the cleavage declined. After 1945, when the Belgian party system regenerated, political parties did not mobilize voters based on linguistic appeals.

4.2 Conventional explanations for cleavage formation in Belgium

Cleavages emerge from critical junctures

Belgium's limited franchise was perhaps the most restrictive in Europe at that time. In 1831, only 1% of all men could vote. Between 1848-1893, electoral rules granted voting rights to 4% of the population. The criterion for exclusion was based on income and excluded all Flemish and Walloon lower classes as well as significant

portions of the Belgian middle class.[7] The linguistic electoral cleavage emerged around 1870 before the franchise was expanded, that is, before the critical juncture, and was not followed by the formation of a new party. Instead, the Flemish issue was represented by individual delegates who adopted their policy positions to the positions of their constituency. The cleavage emerged for the second time in 1961, 15 years after Belgium declared a universal franchise.

Figure 4.1: Effective Number of Parties by Votes in Belgium 1848-1995



Note: Calculated based on data from the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA) (Kollman et al., 2016)

A quick glance at Figure 4.1 demonstrates that except for after the expansion of the franchise, the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) did not change together with the opening of the political system.

The formation of the linguistic cleavage in Belgium was the subject of inquiry by Stein Rokkan in multiple works over the years. Rokkan and collaborators saw the formation of the linguistic cleavage as grounded in the Belgian social structure

[7]The cutoff, which was based on income tax, was somewhat arbitrary. Intellectual capacity tests were not required (Witte, 2009a, 27). In 1843, 51% of the population was illiterate in its mother tongue and the average rate of illiteracy was somewhat similar in Flanders (57%) and Wallonia (44%) (McRae, 1983, 88).

and closely linked to state and nation-building. Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 37-38) describe Belgium as a "striking example of cleavage reinforcement" of three conflicts[8]: First, Catholic Flanders and secular Wallonia were divided on the Church-state conflict, later the conflict between the primary sector [agricultural Flanders] and secondary sector [industrial Wallonia] mapped onto the same territorial lines of conflict. Finally, the conflict between the center and the periphery, which was expressed in the cultural and social mobilization of Flanders against Francophone Wallonia, reinforced these territorial divisions.[9]

My analysis makes a different point. While Lipset and Rokkan (1970, 125) assume that the political conflict between Catholics and Liberals overlapped with the territorial-cultural cleavage , my analysis will demonstrate that this overlap was the outcome of the formation of the linguistic electoral cleavage and the re-positioning of the Catholic party to occupy the Flemish dimension in the Belgian policy space. In contrast to Lipset and Rokkan who view the conflict between Flemings and Walloons as a conflict between a primary sector (Flanders) and a secondary sector (Wallonia), my analysis argues that the cleavage was about social mobility between sectors within the same region.

[8]The same paragraph appears verbatim in another work of Rokkan (1970, 121).

[9]Unlike in the collaborative work with Lipset that pointed to a conflict between the primary and the secondary sectors, in his later book from 1970 Rokkan 1970, 134 argues that the third cleavage in Belgium was between workers and owners and expects the periphery-center, Church-state, and worker-owner cleavages in Belgium to translate into lasting national party alternatives (See Rokkan's notes for table 5.A on page 133).

Electoral cleavages reflect the social structure

Similarly to the cases of the Catholic cleavages in Prussia, Baden, and Bavaria, the demographic potential for a linguistic cleavage was present in Belgium before the electoral cleavage emerged. But in Belgium, the cleavage emerged 40 years after the country gained its independence and in response to policies implemented by the state. Ever since the country was established, French was associated with cultural, economic, and political power. Although the Belgian elite that rebelled against the Dutch king incorporated the freedom of language into the new constitution, the provincial government declared that French will be the language of business and administration. In the following years, the Belgian parliament passed laws that reinforced this decision (Zolberg, 1974, 191–192).

Belgium was the first country in continental Europe to industrialize but the development of Belgium was unequal and Wallonia benefited from industrialization more than Flanders did. Since the 1840s, it began to generate wealth while the Flemish-speaking Flanders suffered an economic crisis.[10] The differential social status of the two languages gave French an added sense of prestige: French was perceived as the language of progress while Flemish, and those who spoke it, were stigmatized and seen as backward. The disparities between French and Flemish were also reflected at the political level. The small Belgian electorate which comprised only 2% of the country's population was overwhelmingly gallicised. In addition to the differences in cultural, economic, and political power along linguistic lines, the French and Flemish-speaking populations were considerably segregated,

[10] In 1846, Flanders received only 9.2% of the country's corporate investment (Zolberg, 1974, 197).

as seen in Map 4.2. In 1866, almost all Flemings and Walloons were monolingual: 49.8% of the Belgian population spoke only Flemish and only 6.4% spoke French and Flemish (McRae, 1983, 37).

Figure 4.2: Language Use by Municipality in Belgium 1900



Until the franchise was expanded in 1894, the majority of the voters in national elections spoke French and therefore to them language was not a source of grievances. Accordingly, until the late in the 19th century neither the Catholic or the Liberal party strong incentives to support the Flemish demands. In those years and given Belgium's limited franchise, the Liberal party was supported by the upper bourgeoisie in Belgian cities and the middle class in the industrial Walloon districts. The Walloon elite, which did not speak Flemish and was employed by the

state in Flanders, stood to lose from advancing the use of Flemish. The Catholic party, which found support among the agricultural classes and the bourgeoisie in the smaller towns in Flanders and Wallonia was reluctant to support an issue that was unpopular (Clough, 1930, 95–96). Moreover, the high clergy spoke French and the curriculum in Catholic private schools, where the majority of pupils were enrolled, was in French. Therefore, the Church had no interest in promoting the use of Flemish.

Historical research on the rural consciousness of Flemish speakers in this era suggests that there was no coherent Flemish political consciousness that identified language as a source of group-based grievances. As the historian Zolberg notes (1974, 179-180): "It is not that there were Belgians in 1830 and only Flemings and Walloons in 1912, but rather than the linguistic segmentation which characterized the country from the very beginning underwent a significant transformation in the course of socioeconomic and political development in the nineteenth century." Between 1830-1850 Flanders was still mostly an agrarian region and the most important political unit was the municipality. Although the high clergy in the Catholic Church spoke French, the parish priests in Flanders spoke Flemish with the parishioners (Zolberg, 1974, 193—194). Until the cleavage emerged, French was the language of those with power: the banker, the factory owner. But power was not understood to be only about language but rather about a variety of grievances. Language acquire a particular cultural and political meaning for the majority of Flemish only in the late in the 19th century, and became a focal point for demands from the state. This happened when Flemings began to see themselves as members

of the same social group, which was defined by the language that they spoke and aggrieved because of it.

Political entrepreneurs organize voters

Elite organization does not explain the formation of the cleavage in Belgium. In 1832, a year after Belgium gained its independence, Flemish-minded entrepreneurs called on Flemings to promote the use of Flemish. The Flemish philologist and historian Philip M. Blommaert published the first call for Flemings to use their mother tongue. In a pamphlet, Blommaert protested the inferior position of Flemish in Belgium, questioned the popular image of Flemish as a crude language which lacks refinement, and called to use it in discussing important matters such as science (Blommaert, 1992, 78). In the following years, other pro-Flemish activists, the so-called Flamingants, made similar claims and called on Flemings to increase the use of Flemish in Flanders.

Despite the inferior position of Flemish in Belgium, however, these arguments made almost no impact on the Flemish masses. Between 1830 and 1850 the Flemish issue gained support only among two very small groups of Flemings. The first group, in Ghent, was composed of intellectuals who received high education in Dutch before the Belgian independence.[11] The second group was established in Antwerp and was composed of a younger generation of Flemings who came from the lower classes (Witte, 2009a, 57; Zolberg, 1974, 191).

In mid-century Belgium, French was the language of business and administra-

[11] Flemish is a dialect of Dutch.

tion. The Flemish elite was assimilated into the French culture. Flemish middle-class voters, although they still spoke Flemish at home, were overwhelmingly gallicized. They had practical no use for Flemish in the French-dominated business and public service sectors in Flanders and saw no reason to encourage their children to use the language in the public sphere (Clough, 1930, 52–56; Strikwerda, 1997, 36). In addition to the practical considerations, the reluctance to advance the use of Flemish was symbolic; While French was considered to be an a cultured and mature language, Flemish was seen as a mere dialect of Dutch (Clough, 1930, 56; Witte, 2009a, 57).

Without pressure from voters to coordinate on the language issue, the early Flamingant organizations did not focus on political action and instead were focused on cultural and literary. In comparison to the attempts of Catholic political entrepreneurs in Prussia, which were largely constrained by the Catholic Church (Kalyvas, 1996), the Flamingant associations in Belgium were scattered and their actions were uncoordinated. These initiatives were established independently and reflected the personal aspirations of their founders.

Early Flamingant organizations were literary and dedicated to improving the position of the Flemish language and "rekindle a sense of pride in Flemish history, culture, and language" (McRae, 1983, 23). Flamingant entrepreneurs published letters, wrote poems, and printed books in Dutch. In 1841, they organized the first Flemish festival, which brought together Flamingant politicians, artists and writers. Without a mass base that demanded to improve the position of Flemish and thus formed a basis for collective action, the Flamingant organizations were not focused

on political action and lacked a unified and clear goal. They differed in the rate in which they wanted to achieve their goals and on even whether they believed that the Flemish movement needs to find an expression in a political party in order to improve the position of Flemish (Zolberg, 1974, 206).

Before 1870, Flamingants activists were able to gain small victories when they found support among delegates from the Liberal and the Catholic parties who sympathized with the Flemish sentiment. A petition that was sent in 1840 to the lower house and protested the dominance of French led the provincial councils of Antwerp and East Flanders to approve the use of Flemish alongside French in administration (Witte, 2009a, 57). After they succeeded to pass local laws that advanced the use of Flemish in Antwerp, Flamingant activists formed the Flamingat "Meeting party," which sent three representatives to the lower house in 1861 (Clough, 1930, 98). Yet despite these scattered achievements, these actions were not backed by a Flemish voting bloc until the 1870s, when the linguistic cleavage began to emerge. In the absence of a popular support base that could function as a pro-Flemish constituency, Flamingant activists worked outside of Parliament and established organizations that functioned as pressure groups.[12]

[12]Such organizations emerged in 1847 in major cities with Flemish speakers—Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, and Brussels. Additional organizations were established in 1861 in Gent and another in Antwerp that same year (Clough, 1930, 96-98).

4.3 Variation across delegates in the adoption of the Flemish issue

This section explores how vulnerability to the dominance of French affected the adoption of the Flemish issue. Ideally, the most suitable way to explore how the rise of the Flemish consciousness spread across Flemish constituencies is to analyze election returns and search for a 'sorting' effect whereby voters shift their voting behavior and begin to support candidates that campaign on the Flemish issue. Inferring the preferences of constituencies from district level election returns is sufficiently challenging, but Belgian electoral rules make this task especially difficult. Electoral rules have changed twice in a short period of time–the franchise was expanded in 1894 and the electoral system transitioned to PR in 1899, which does not allow for a clean comparison across the time periods. In addition, after 1894 voters were given multiple votes depending on their income and marital status: 60% of the electorate had three votes, 23% two votes (1,240,000 voters combined), and 17% (850,000 voters) one vote, and as a result, election returns over-represent the political preferences of particular voters.[13] The ballot itself allowed voters to rank candidates within the party list and select as many candidates as could be elected in the multi-member district. Additionally, voters could select candidates from several party lists. In addition to the challenge in distinguishing between the support for candidates, the continued dominance of the Catholic party in Flanders after the

[13]Specifically, additional votes were given to men over 35, owners of property valued at more than 2,000 francs, voters with high education, some professions like doctors and lawyers, and heads of households. Additionally, voting became compulsory (Clough, 1930, 135; Deneckere, 2006, 101; Witte, 2009e, 114-115).

expansion of the franchise produces low variation on the dependent variable, the movement of voters between parties based on the Flemish issue, which leaves little leverage to explain sorting by voters.

Instead of looking at sorting by voters, I look at the sorting of delegates on the Flemish issue. There are two reasons to think that Belgian delegates in the pre-war era enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy to respond to the preferences of their constituencies. The Catholic party, which held the majority of the legislative seats in Flanders, was based on loose coalitions of Church supporters and did not have a party organization until 1945. For this reason, politicians had some degree of autonomy from party influence as long as their actions did not contradict the party's agenda. Second, the ballot, which allowed voters to mark individual candidates across parties contributed to the incentives of delegates to cultivate personal votes and serve the interests of their constituents (Carey and Shugart, 1995).[14]

Testing the hypothesis that districts which experienced grievances from the dominance of French will begin to vote for opposition candidates poses methodological challenges in the Belgian case. Almost every person whose primary language was Flemish was influenced by the uneven position of French and these grievances were shared among Flemings across social classes and multiple occupational groups.

[14]Before the expansion of the franchise, the ballot included party lists and within each list appeared the names of the candidates, alphabetized, and the voters could select the entire list or individual candidates from the list (De Smaele, 2009, 37). The winner was the party or the candidate who won the absolute majority of the votes. With the transition to PR, legislative seats were allocated in a two-stage process. First, the relative share of the party votes determined how many seats each party won. Then, within each party list, in order to allocate the seats to candidates, the votes for each candidate were counted. Voters could either accept the entire party list or select individual candidates. The candidates were then ranked based their ranking within the party list and the number of personal votes that they won. This ranking determined who won a seat (De Smaele, 2009, 45).

Therefore, meaningfully differentiating between districts based on the degree of grievances is not straightforward. In addition, Flemings have developed a Flemish consciousnesses before the expansion of the franchise. My dependent variable for cleavage formation is calculated based on voting behavior and cannot capture the preferences of disenfranchised voters. However, my analysis can focus on one aspect of cleavage formation—sorting by elites–and examine where delegates were more likely to adopt the Flemish demands of their constituencies. In other words, instead of testing the hypothesis that voters sorted in response to the policies, my statistical analysis examines whether delegates adopted the Flemish issue when their voters were likely to support it.

To be clear, my argument is not that the expansion of the franchise or the transition to PR caused the cleavage to emerge. The linguistic cleavage in Belgium emerged because of the dominance of French, which was the result of government policy. Flemings have begun to see a connection between their grievances and the language that they speak before the institutional change. The expansion of the franchise allowed them to express their political preferences. The cleavage had already begun to emerge among a small group of Flemings, the petite bourgeoisie, before the mass expansion of the franchise. However, the expansion of the franchise broadened the cleavage because it established one of the scope conditions for cleavage formation: The aggrieved voters were eligible to vote.

My analysis focuses on variation across districts between two time periods, before and after the expansion of the franchise. The first voters who organized to advance the use of Flemish in Flanders were petite bourgeoisie who saw French

as a barrier to social mobility. Therefore, before the expansion of the franchise, I expect to see that delegates who represented districts with a high proportion of petite bourgeoisie adopt the Flemish demands. After the expansion of the franchise, when Flemings from the lower classes were given the vote, I expect delegates who represented rural districts.

The dependent variable: Adoption of the Flemish issue

I analyze the behavior of elected delegates in the Belgian lower house using an original dataset of Belgian legislators between 1880-1919. Specifically, I examine whether elected delegates signaled to their voters that they support the Flemish demands. Partial or full elections to the Belgian lower house were held every two years. After every election, the assembly in the lower house met to review the results, and declared the names of the winners. The elected delegates then took the oath of office in front of the assembly. At that moment, delegates had a unique opportunity to signal to voters how they stand on the Flemish issue by choosing whether to take the oath of office in French or Flemish, and their decision was recorded in the transcripts of the legislative debates (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 1880a, 1882a, 1884a, 1886a, 1888a, 1890a, 1892a, 1894a, 1896a, 1898a, 1900a, 1902a, 1904a, 1906a, 1908a, 1910a, 1912a, 1919a).

Delegates chose to take the oath of office in Flemish to signal to their constituents that they stand for the Flemish issue even if they themselves were not Flamingants or support the Flemish demands (Curtis, 1971, 112). The language in which delegates took the oath provides a better indication for the positions of individual

delegates than roll-call votes, which are influenced by party discipline. Instead, these decisions at the start of a legislative session provide a direct measure of how delegates communicate with their constituents. Analyzing the behavior of those who won the elections does not provide information about the electoral benefits of adopting the Flemish issue because we are unable to estimate whether this position is associated with a higher vote share. However, it does provide an indication for whether the district has developed a sense of Flemish consciousness.

The dataset contains 1,078 observations from 18 elections with 387 unique legislators. To create the dataset, I took the name and constituency of each legislator from the official records of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives published for every session that followed either partial or full elections between 1880-1919 (Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 1880b, 1882b, 1884b, 1886b, 1888b, 1890b, 1892b, 1894b, 1896b, 1898b, 1900b, 1902b, 1904b, 1906b, 1908b, 1910b, 1912b, 1919b). Next, I coded the party affiliation of each legislator from the handbook of Belgian legislators compiled by Paul van Molle (1969). The handbook covers legislators who were elected from 1894. Since many of the legislators in the handbook served before the expansion of the franchise, I was able to complete the information about their party affiliation before 1894 from the handbook. When no information was available, I retrieved this information from the short biographies of Belgian legislators on Wikipedia (Wikipedia contributors, 2018). Using these two methods, I was able to match the party affiliation of all of the legislators in the dataset except for one.

In the handbook, each legislator is affiliated with a single party throughout his career. While it is possible that legislators switched parties, this was unlikely to

happen during the period covered in the dataset. After the "School War" between 1879-1884, the ideological differences between the Catholic and the Liberal parties were crystallized and this made party switching less likely. In addition, until 1900, legislative seats were allocated according to a 'winner-take-all' principle. Because the Catholic party held legislative majorities in Belgium between 1884-1912, legislators had a powerful incentive to maintain their affiliation with the Catholic party.[15]

Included in the sample are all the delegates who were elected in the Flemish provinces Antwerp, East Flanders, Limburg, West Flanders and two constituencies in Brabant province with Flemish speakers, Brussels and Leuven. Since the dependent variable is binary, I use logit models to estimate the probability that a delegate will choose to take the oath of office in Flemish.

Explanatory variable: Vulnerability to the dominance of French

I develop two proxies for vulnerability to the dominance of French. The first proxy is the percentage of literate voters in national constituencies. Because the dominance of French was a barrier for social mobility for the petite bourgeoisie, a relatively educated population, I expect that constituencies with a high literacy rate should bear a higher cost from the policies. To construct this variable, I use data from the language census of 1900, which I received from the Historical Databases of Local and Cadastral Statistics (LOKSTAT-POPPKAD, 2018). I aggregated the data from

[15]The preferential ballot can produce both incentives for party loyalty or defection. After the transition to PR, the party determined the order in which names appear on the ballot and this produced incentives for party loyalty. On the other hand, voters could select candidates across parties and this produces incentives to cultivate personal votes.

the municipality level to the level of the electoral district. Then, to calculate this variable, I divided the total number of men and women who were literate in their mother tongue in 1900 and divided it by the total population of the district.

The second proxy for vulnerability is the percentage of Flemings who were born in the same municipality when the census has taken place, in 1900. This proxy, *Locals*, captures rural Flemings who saw a French as threat on their identity, religious beliefs and way of life. This variable is calculated from the demographic census of 1900 by dividing the number of people who were born in the municipality by the total population. I expect to find a negative relationship between the percentage of *Locals* and the language in which delegates took the oath before the expansion of the franchise. After the expansion of the franchise, I expect to find a positive relationship.

In the analysis, I control for several alternative explanations that the delegate chose to take the oath of office in Flemish because on considerations other than the preferences of their district. This strategy addresses concerns for endogeneity due to omitted variable bias. The variables include party dummies for the party affiliation of the candidate. Overall, the Catholic party was more supportive of the Flemish issue than the Liberal party and it could be that representatives of the Catholic party adopted the Flemish demands because of their party. Two variables control for the competitiveness of the district. The first is the magnitude of the district, that is the number of delegates elected in the constituency. The second control for competitiveness is a lagged variable for the closeness of the elections and is calculated based on election returns from CLEA (Kollman et al., 2016).

Specifically, I calculate it as $(1 - vs_p)^2$ where vs_p is the vote share of the Catholic party in the previous election in the district. In one district the Catholic party did not field candidates and vs_p is the vote share of the Liberal party. The Catholic party fielded candidates in 75% of the districts in the sample. In 24% of the districts the election was uncontested and *Competitive* takes the value of zero.[16] Finally, I include the percentage of men, women, and children who could speak only Flemish in 1900[17] and divide it by the total population in the municipality. The source of this variable is the 1900 census. I expect to see no association between the percentage of Flemish speakers (monolinguals) and the language of the oath of office before the expansion of the suffrage. The petite bourgeoisie were a small group among Flemings. After the expansion of the franchise, I expect to see a positive relationship between the percentage of Flemish speakers and the choice of delegates to take the oath in Flemish. PR is an indicator that equals 1 if the elections took place after 1899.

To address concerns for endogeneity due to omitted variable bias, all the regressions include random effects and controls for alternative explanations. My case selection addresses concerns for endogeneity due to reverse causality, that is, that the dominance of French was intended to block the social mobility of Flemish speakers. Notably, this specification does not address the concerns for endogeneity due to measurement error since the independent variables were not measured before constituencies began to bear the cost of the policies.

[16]The last uncontested election was in 1898. 93% of the uncontested elections (N=58) took place before the expansion of the franchise.

[17]The language of the children was coded by the enumerators in 1900 as the language of the parents.

Figure 4.3: Adoption of the Flemish Issue Over Time 1880-1919



Notes: The figure shows the percentage of legislators who took the oath in Dutch out of the total number of delegates elected in the Flemish provinces Antwerp, East Flanders, Limburg, West Flanders and two constituencies in Brabant province—Brussels and Leuven. Included are partial (P) and full (F) elections: 1880 (P), 1882 (P), 1884 (P), 1886 (P), 1888 (P), 1890 (P), 1892 (F), 1894 (F), 1896 (P), 1898 (P), 1890 (F), 1892 (P), 1894 (P), 1896 (P), 1898 (P), 1900 (P), 1902 (P), 1904 (P), 1906 (P), 1908 (P), 1910 (P), 1912 (F), 1919 (F). Partial elections were merged by legislative term.

The percentage of delegates that took the oath of office in Flemish between 1880-1919 is presented in Figure 4.3. 10% of the delegates elected in 1880 and 1882 in Flanders and Brussels chose to take the oath in Flemish. Those are delegates who represented urban districts which before the expansion of the franchise were the center of the linguistic cleavage. Notably, the greatest shift in the adoption of the Flemish issue was at the beginning of the 1890s, before the expansion of the franchise. In 1890, it was clear that the franchise will be expanded considerably but the specific scope of the suffrage was not yet determined. In preparation for

improved suffrage, delegates began to signal to voters from the lower classes that they support the Flemish sentiment and began to take the oath in Flemish.

A look at the data presented in Figure 4.4 suggests that the values of the proxies for vulnerability to the dominance of French are consistent with the variation in the language the delegates chose when taking the oath of office. Delegates took the oath of office in Flemish districts which on average had a high proportion of *Locals* and low literacy rates. The small differences in the literacy rates might indicate the multi-class character of the cleavage which emerged in urban and rural districts.

Figure 4.4: Vulnerability to the Dominance of French: Variation Across Districts



Results

Table 4.1 presents estimates from logit models with constituency random effects where the dependent variable equals 1 if the delegate took the oath of office in Flemish. In column 1, the coefficients for the effect of the literacy rates and the share

of locals take the expected positive signs. Between 1880-1912, delegates in districts with low literacy rates and delegates representing rural districts were more likely to take the oath of office in Flemish. When PR is added to the model in column 2, it takes the expected positive sign and is statistically significant. This is effect is consistent with the increase in the percentage of delegates who took the oath in Flemish after the expansion of the franchise in 1894. Notably, the inclusion of PR improves model fit and the AIC decreases.

Table 4.1: District Characteristics and the Flemish Issue

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Literacy	-1.6	-0.3	10.3	-1.7
	(5.3)	(4.2)	(5.8)	(4.5)
% Local	4.8	-1.4	3.1	-2.1
	(4.7)	(3.6)	(4.9)	(3.9)
PR		2.6***	26.6***	-6.9***
		(0.3)	(4.3)	(1.4)
PR × % Literacy			-36.5***	
			(6.4)	
PR × % Local				14.5***
				(2.2)
% Flemish Speakers	5.3	5.1*	5.8	5.5*
	(3.3)	(2.6)	(3.4)	(2.7)
AIC	1130	1032	988	984
Pseudo R^2	-555.78	-490.48	-480.99	-482.76
Observations	1078	1078	1078	1078

Notes: The table shows estimates from logit regressions with constituency random effects where the language of the oath is the dependent variable. The unit of observation is legislator-year.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Next, the coefficients of the interactions term between PR and the two proxies in columns 3-4 take their expected direction and are statistically significant at

conventional levels. In column 3, after the transition to PR, delegates in districts with high literacy rates were less likely to take the oath in Flemish. This result might be driven by two factors. First, the Workers' party, which emerged after the expansion of the franchise and won seats in industrial areas did not formally adopt the Flemish issue. In the sample, less than half of the party's delegates (45%) took the oath in Flemish compared to 66% of the Catholic delegates. Second, French speakers in Brussels organized to defend the use of French and their delegates took the oath in French. In column 4, the positive coefficient of the interaction term between PR and the percentage of locals is consistent with the broadening of the cleavage to rural areas and the lower classes. Across models 1-4, the percentage of Flemish speakers takes its expected positive sign.

To gauge the interactive effect of the transition of PR and the two demographic attributes on legislators' decision to take the oath in Flemish, I calculate the predicted probabilities from the interactions in models 3 and 4, shown in Figure 4.5. Before the transition to PR, delegates in districts with a higher literacy rate were more likely to take the oath in Flemish. These districts were urban and had a higher proportion of the petite bourgeoisie, which supported the advancement of Flemish and were enfranchised in local and provisional elections. Before PR, delegates in districts with a high proportion of locals, that is, in non-urban districts outside of industrial areas were less likely to take the oath. After the transition to PR, delegates were more likely to take the oath in Flemish in rural districts where life centered around religion, the family and the Flemish identity.

Figure 4.5: Adopting the Flemish Issue: Predicted Probabilities



Note: The figure shows predicted probabilities based on estimates from columns 3-4 in Table 4.3.

The Flemish issue and career longevity

The expansion of the franchise opened the political system to inexperienced political entrepreneurs from the lower classes. This could be an alternative explanation to the increase in the number of oaths in Flemish: Instead of responding to the preferences of their constituency, the new delegates took the oath in Flemish because they expressed their private political preferences. Another alternative explanation to the increase in the percentage of delegates who took the oath in Flemish is that political novices chose Flemish because they could barely speak French , which was the case with some of the new delegates (Clough, 1930, 146). To control for these explanations, I investigate whether adopting the Flemish was associated with longer legislative careers, and therefore, that voters rewarded legislators who adopt the Flemish demands.

From the dataset, I keep only the delegates who (1) switched the language of

the oath from French to Flemish or (2) only took the oath in French. This reduces the number of legislators in the sample from 387 to 188 with 41 delegates who switched the language and 147 who only took the oath in French.[18] As seen in Table 4.2, the majority of language switches took place in the years around the expansion of the franchise. This suggests that switching the language might have been done strategically.

Table 4.2: The Adoption of the Flemish Issue

Year	Switched	Year	Switched
1884	1	1898	2
1886	1	1900†	1
1888	2	1902	2
1890	2	1910	3
1892	7	1912	1
1894‡	19		
Total	32	Total	9

Notes: ‡ denotes universal franchise. † denotes transition to PR.

The *Longevity of legislative careers* is calculated by counting the number of legislative terms that the delegate served. Almost all of the legislators in the sample served consecutive terms. The dependent variable, *Changed from French to Flemish* is an indicator that equals 1 if the legislator began his legislative career by taking the oath of office in French and in a later legislative term switched to Flemish. *Catholic Party* and *Liberal Party* are indicators for the party affiliation of the delegate and are included in the regression to control for the alternative explanation that the party affiliation of the delegate explains career longevity.[19] I also control for the year in

[18] 12 legislators switched the language of the oath from Dutch to French. Because this might be a measurement error, that is, the language of the oath was noted incorrectly in the legislative protocols, these observations are excluded from the analysis.

[19] See variable construction for Table 4.1.

which the delegate entered parliament, which could also explain career longevity. This variable is treated in the regression as a categorical variable. To control for the alternative explanation that career longevity was driven from the position of the delegate in the community, I include the percentage of *Locals* as a proxy for the rural nature of the constituency. Finally, I include the lagged *Competitiveness* variable, which I expect to be positively correlated with career longevity because it captures the dominance of the Catholic party. I estimate the effect of language switch in OLS models with random effects (RE) at the level of the constituency.

Figure 4.6 presents the distribution of the dependent variable among the two groups of legislators. One immediately notices that the legislators who switched from French to Flemish served a larger number of terms in office, while those legislators who continued to take the oath in French had shorter legislative careers. A two-way t-test confirms this intuition ($p < 0.001$). On average, those who switched to Dutch served 5.6 terms while those who only took the oath in French served for 2.1 terms.

As Table 4.3 makes clear, switching the language of the oath is associated with three additional legislative terms. In addition, adding the indicator for language switch improved model fit and increased the R^2 from 0.37 to 0.55. All the other coefficients take their expected direction. Membership in the Catholic party is positively associated with career longevity and this is consistent with the dominance of the Catholic party in Flanders. The percentage of locals is positively associated with career longevity. Delegates in rural districts faced less competition and benefited from their local reputation. The closeness of the elections is positively associated

with a longer legislative career and this association is statistically significant in models 1 and 2.

Figure 4.6: Adopting the Flemish Issue and Career Longevity



Notes: The figure shows the number of legislative terms served by those legislators who always took the oath in French (N=147) and those legislators who switched from French to Flemish (N=41).

To conclude, the linguistic electoral cleavage in Belgium emerged when the dominance of French became a barrier to social mobility. At first, none of the political parties in Flanders had an interest in adopting the Flemish issue. After the expansion of the franchise, the political parties democratized and searched for the policy position that will allow them to gain votes. After the expansion of the franchise the Catholic and the Liberal parties mobilized voters based on the Flemish issue, and consequently, the formation of the cleavage did not change the

Table 4.3: The Flemish Issue and Career Longevity

	(1)	(2)
Changed from French to Dutch		3.1***
		(0.4)
Catholic Party	1.4*	0.2
	(0.6)	(0.3)
Liberal Party	-0.6	-0.6
	(0.6)	(0.5)
% Locals	8.8**	3.7
	(2.9)	(3.1)
Competitiveness	6.4**	6.1***
	(2.0)	(1.8)
Random Effects	yes	yes
Clustered SE	yes	yes
R^2	0.37	0.55
Observations	187	187

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Notes: Estimates from OLS models with constituency random effects. Standard errors are clustered by province. The unit of analysis is the individual legislator. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

structure of the party system in the 19th century.

4.4 Appendix 2

Appendix 2A: Language Laws in Belgium

Table 4.4: Language Laws in Belgium 1873-1938

Year	Laws
Prewar Legislation	
1873	The use of Flemish in criminal courts
1878	Flemish to be used to communicate with the public in Flanders
1883	Public secondary education to teach some courses in Flemish
1889	The use of Flemish in military criminal justice
1890	State university courses to be taught in Flemish
1891	Flemish to be used in Brussels and Liege appeal courts
1898	Flemish is an official language (rejected in the lower house; approved by the Senate)
1907	Mining law contained a clause on language
1909‡	Language law of the labor courts
1910	Private secondary schools can opt-in to 8 weekly hours of Flemish
1913‡	Ghent University to become a monolingual Flemish-speaking institution
1914	Classes must be taught in the mother language at primary schools
Interwar Legislation	
1927	Flanders is monolingual
1930	University of Gent runs in Flemish
1932	Municipalities can no longer choose their language
1932	Belgium's territorial principal of monolingual regions
1935	Judicial matters to be held in Flemish
1938	Army recruits to be instructed in their mother tongue

Note: ‡ denotes bills that failed to pass. Source: Witte (2009d).

Appendix 2B Descriptive statistics Belgium 1880-1919

Table 4.5: Summary Statistics Belgian Elections (Prewar)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Catholic Party	0.737	0.44	0	1	1078
Liberal Party	0.163	0.37	0	1	1078
% Locals	0.638	0.107	0.471	0.803	1077
% Literacy	0.655	0.05	0.561	0.736	1077
% Flemish Speakers	0.699	0.166	0.399	0.872	1077
District Magnitude	8.871	6.868	1	26	1076
Competitiveness	0.258	0.194	0	0.621	1078
Year Entered	1893.78	11.01	1880	1919	1078
Years in Office	13.523	9.222	2	39	1078

Table 4.6: Correlation Table Belgium (Prewar)

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1) Catholic Party	1.000							
(2) Liberal Party	-0.740	1.000						
(3) % Locals	0.339	-0.219	1.000					
(4) % Literacy	-0.274	0.187	-0.745	1.000				
(5) % Flemish Speakers	0.347	-0.208	0.882	-0.684	1.000			
(6) District Magnitude	-0.383	0.212	-0.868	0.728	-0.844	1.000		
(7) Competitiveness	-0.298	0.172	-0.572	0.448	-0.523	0.680	1.000	
(8) Year Entered	-0.340	0.166	-0.064	0.096	-0.044	0.237	0.339	1.000

Appendix 2C Key moments in Belgian history 1830-1971

Table 4.7: Major Developments in Belgian History 1830-1971

Year	
1830	Belgium gains independence; French becomes the de-facto official language
1848	Franchise expansion that enfranchised 7% of all men
1871	Reforms to municipal and provincial elections that enfranchised 25% of all men
1883	Reforms to municipal elections that enfranchised 48% of all men
1893	Universal male franchise that enlarged the electorate tenfold
1899	Multi-vote PR
1919	Single-vote PR
1960	Austerity policies
1960-1961	General strike
1962 & 1963	Language laws
1971	First laws that transfer power to regional councils

Chapter 5

Re-Emergence and Persistence in Prussia and Belgium

This chapter analyzes the re-emergence and persistence of electoral cleavages in two of the country cases, Prussia in 1867 and Belgium in 1961. In both of the cases, the identities at the basis of the new electoral cleavage have already been charged with a political meaning from the previous time the cleavage emerged. Yet, as my analysis will show, only when these identities became again tied to grievances from government policies did the cleavages re-emerge. In addition to providing additional support to the argument that cleavages emerge from government policies, the analysis in this chapter tests the hypothesis that electoral cleavages persist as long as the policies endure.

5.1 Liberal threat and Catholic opposition after 1866 in Prussia

The Catholic cleavage re-emerged when the political climate in Prussia became nationalist, liberal, and anti-Catholic. Several developments led to this change. First, Liberalism and opposition to the Pope were on the rise in Europe at the time and this was a part of a general trend in the region. Additionally, Austria's defeat to Prussia in the battle of Königgrätz in 1866 changed the power balance between the two states. Before the war, both Austria and Prussia were considered as candidates to lead the German unification. With Austria's defeat, it became clear that Prussia will unite the German states without Austria. The implication for Catholics in Prussia was that without Catholic Austria, they would become a religious minority in the new German state. This would not be a major concern during the first half of the 1860s, when the regime's domestic coalition was conservative and respected the special privileges of the Church. But after 1866, Bismarck, who needed allies that supported the German unification, ended the conflict with the Liberals and began to form a new coalition with the right wing of the Progressive party (Lerman, 2004, 125).[1] Whereas before 1866 the Progressives' attempts to reform the schools were blocked and never reached a floor vote, as Bismarck's allies after 1866, they were now in a position to realize their anti-Catholic policies. The National Liberals, which split from the Progressive party and ended the conflict

[1] It eventually seceded from the party and formed the National Liberal Party (*Nationalliberale Partei*). Specifically, in 1866 Bismarck signed the indemnity bill, which retroactively legitimized his unconstitutional rule in the previous years.

with Bismarck, targeted Catholics because they saw them as backward–Catholics were concentrated in the lower classes and many of them followed the authority of the parish priest–two qualities which the Liberals saw as a threat to social and economic progress (Blackbourn, 1988). Additionally, German Catholics in Prussia were non-Prussian and fiercely opposed the Austro-Prussian war (Sperber, 1984, 156) and this reinforced the Liberals' existing perceptions of Catholics as enemies of the state (Blackbourn, 1988, 60—61).

Because Bismarck changed his domestic alliance in preparation for the German unification and not with the intention to target Catholics, the anti-Catholic attacks in 1868 and 1869 are plausibly exogenous to the formation of a cleavage. Moreover, the historian Margaret Lavinia Anderson (1981, 128–9) remarks that there is no evidence that before 1870 Bismarck planned to launch a war on Catholics or the Catholic Church. Indeed, Bismarck was alarmed by German Catholics' opposition to the Austro-Prussian war in 1866 but only after 1870, when he recognized the power of political Catholicism, he began to think of it as a threat.

In response to the threat posed by Bismarck's possible alliance with the Liberals, both Catholic voters and the clergy began to organize against the state.[2] The priests, joined by lay Catholics, campaigned around polling places and walked from door to door, handing out the ballots of their candidate and tearing the ballots of opposing candidates (Sperber, 1984, 165–168). After the Center parliamentary group dissolved in 1866, Catholics in Prussia did not have a political organization that could coordinate across districts. Instead, in each district, the clergy endorsed

[2]The upcoming elections were to the Reichstag of the North German Federation (*Norddeutscher-bund*) and held in February 1867.

the candidate who was committed to protecting the interests of the Church. As a result, in some districts the priests endorsed pro-Catholic candidates and in other districts and they supported anti-Bismarckian Progressives (Sperber, 1984, 160—161). These efforts were very effective; in almost every Catholic district, the candidate endorsed by the clergy had won (Sperber, 1984, 164). In other words, Catholics preferred to vote for Liberal candidates, some of whom were anti-clerical and secular but opposed the war with Prussia rather than to vote for clerical delegates who supported the government.

As predicted by my theory, both voters and political entrepreneurs began to coordinate in response to the concrete threat of anti-Catholic policies. However, among the political entrepreneurs only lay Catholics and the clergy began to organize. By contrast, Catholic politicians ran under the banner of various Liberal parties and preferred to compete in the national elections of August and October of 1867. This perhaps reflects the uncertainty among pro-Catholic politicians about the political atmosphere in Prussia after 1866 and their disappointment by the decline of the parliamentary group. The national parliament, the *Zollparlament*, by contrast, was scheduled to vote on a new constitution for the future German state which provided Catholic politicians to organize around concrete principles. Catholic delegates supported federalism, objected the creation of a strong state and eventually rejected the proposed German constitution (Lamberti, 1989, 41).

After 1868, the Liberals in Prussia began to take more active steps against Catholics. Because of the alliance between the state and the Church, until 1868 no school bill in Prussia had ever reached the floor (Lamberti, 1989, 29–32). But in

1868 and 1869, the Prussian lower house discussed two school bills. The Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, Heinrich von Mühler, reenacted a school bill that was proposed by the Progressives in 1863 but shelved by his predecessor. The Church's influence on the Catholic elementary schools was considerable and Liberal delegates have attempted to reform the school system since 1851 (Lamberti, 1989, 32). The Church appointed priests to the Office of School Inspectorate, the agency responsible for overseeing the schools, and the priests designed the curriculum so that it focused on religious instruction (Lamberti, 1989, 37). The bill was brought up to a vote in 1868. It was opposed by the two Liberal parties–the National Liberal and the Progressives, after Mühler altered it and omitted the proposed changes to the special position of the Church in the schools. In 1869 the bill was eventually defeated (Lamberti, 1989, 36). Another bill was introduced at the end of that year. After a long debate, it was sent to a committee for revisions but the legislative term ended before the committee finished its work, and so the bill was abandoned (Lamberti, 1989, 37). Although neither of the proposed bills were voted into law, the Prussian lower house was considerably close to pass legislation that could negatively affect Catholics. For the National Liberals, education was a means to integrate the lower classes, and among them the Catholics, into the German nation (Lamberti, 1989, 7).

While the Prussian Parliament discussed the school bill, the government began to act against religious orders. In December 1868, the Prussian government began to enforce an old cabinet order to suppress a Franciscan monastery (Anderson, 1981, 134—135). In 1869, a mob, mobilized by the liberal press, vandalized a chapel in a

Berlin suburb and attacked the two priests who lived there. Instead of condemning the events, the Progressives called to close religious orders in order to preserve the peace (Anderson, 1981, 124; Sperber, 1984, 186). In the Prussian lower house, the petitions committee issued a report that called to restrict monastic settlements. By 1869, it was clear to the Church that it could no longer rely on the previous traditional channels of influence (Anderson, 1981, 134—135).

The explicit anti-Catholic shift created powerful incentives for voters and political entrepreneurs to organize against the state. Several months before the next elections in 1870, the Church removed its objection to clerical participation in the elections (Anderson, 1981, 134), which it established after the state elections in 1867. Catholic politicians, together with the clergy and lay Catholics, began to coordinate around a shared platform for an electoral program to protect their interests (Anderson, 1981, 134—135; Sperber, 1984, 187).[3] The program was distributed among regional Catholic associations, who modified and adopted it. Any candidate who committed to the program before the election was endorsed by the associations and the clergy.[4]

In the face of the threat posed by the policies, elite attempts to mobilize Catholic voters were successful. Multi-member districts with a substantial Catholic popu-

[3]Before that, in 1868, a central committee for Catholic associations was established in the Catholic Conferences with an advisory board made of three clergy men and three lay Catholics. Its chairmen suggested to turn it into a political association but this proposal was rejected (Ruppert, 2015, 51).

[4]In addition to religious freedom, the various programs of the Catholic political movement included concrete proposals to confront the anti-Catholic state policies during 1868-9, among then to protect the religious orders and reduce military spending, two pressing issues for Catholics (Anderson, 1981, 135; Windell, 1954, 279). The program also included the military budget, which was about to expire in 1870 and the issue was expected to come up in the next legislative term, and a clause on social welfare intended to appeal to working-class Catholics.

lation became overwhelmingly dominated by the Center Party, replacing Liberal Party Family (LPF) candidates [5] and Conservative deputies. This was done despite attempts by LPF and Conservative candidates to block the power of the Catholics by forming electoral coalitions within districts, in some cases between ideological rivals. Even where Catholics were too few to elect a Center representative, they voted for the Center candidate. And when the party did not field one, it endorsed the candidate who protected the interests of Catholics (Kühne, 1994). A month after the election, Catholic politicians resurrected the Catholic Center Party, which became an opposition party in Prussian and German politics in the following years.

As my theory predicts, the cleavage persisted as long as state attacks on Catholics continued. In 1872, Bismarck ordered the minister of Education Falk to draft anti-Catholic legislation. This marked the beginning of the *Kulturkampf*, which sustained the Catholic cleavage. At its height, four out of every five Catholics voted for the Center party (Nipperdey, 1996).

Figure 5.1 illustrates the change in the political alignment of Catholics from 1863 to 1873. In 1863, when the cleavage was in decline, there appears to be no relationship between the percentage of Catholics and the vote share of the Liberal party. The relationship becomes positive in 1867 when Catholics began to vote for anti-government candidates regardless of party label although the anti-government candidates were more likely to be Catholic. In 1870 and 1873 the LPF gained fewer votes in districts with a high percentage of Catholics. The vote share of the Catholic Center party was high in districts with a high proportion of Catholics.

[5] I refer to all parties from the Liberal party family as Liberal.

Figure 5.1: Change in the Alignment of Catholics in Prussia 1863-1873



Note: Scatter plots with a fitted line with 95% confidence intervals of the percentage of Catholics and the vote share of the party-year listed above.

5.2 Conventional explanations for cleavage re-emergence in Prussia

Catholic entrepreneurs again attempted and failed to organize Catholic voters in 1861, when the Progressive Party (*Deutsche Fortschrittspartei*) was founded and gained the majority of legislative seats in the Prussian lower house. The success of the liberal Progressive party in Prussia mirrored the rise of Liberalism in other European countries, which threatened the position of the Catholic Church. In general, Liberals opposed to dominance of the Pope and the influence of the Church, which they saw as backward and a hindrance to social and economic progress.

Because some of the Prussian Progressive delegates opposed the Pope, the rise of the new party made Catholic leaders uncomfortable (Sperber, 1984, 123–124). To counter the Progressives, Catholic priests attempted to organize a critical number of parishioners in defense of the Church. But as long as the Progressives' initiatives were blocked by the Conservative government, which could veto the proposals of the lower house, and therefore did not pose a real threat to Catholics, the attempts to organize Catholics were unsuccessful.[6] During those years turnout was especially low in the Catholic districts compared to the state average.

The failure to organize Catholics was not due to the weakness of the Catholic mobilization networks. Since the 1850s, and especially during the 1860s, Catholics in Prussia have been undergoing a religious revival which renewed the authority of the priests and expanded the number of Catholic associations.[7] It was also not due to a lack of enthusiasm on behalf of the clergy. In 1862 and 1863, the clergy, alarmed by the success of the Progressives, attempted to organize Catholics by framing the elections as "a struggle of faith against disbelief" (Sperber, 1984, 126) and attacked freemasonry and atheism (Sperber, 1984, 124). However, as predicted by my theory, as long as the threat of anti-Catholic legislation by the Progressives did not materialize, attempts by political entrepreneurs to organize Catholic voters around the religious identity were unsuccessful. Instead, Catholics preferred to vote for anti-Government candidates that protested the military budget and called to

[6]Liberal deputies had attempted to reform Catholic schools but the bills were blocked by the cabinet before reaching the floor (Lamberti, 1989, 34–35).

[7]The Catholic Church saw the failure to organize the Catholic voters in 1848 and 1849 as a result of the lack of authority of the parish priest and worked to regain control over the parish (Sperber, 1984, 52).

expand political rights, issues that were more pressing at that time. In the elections of 1862 and 1863, the attempt to mobilize Catholics had not significance success: Catholic candidates manged to win seats based on an anti-government platform only where the performance of the incumbent was disappointing (Sperber, 1984, 139). See the discussion in chapter 3 about two other alternative explanations, critical junctures and the social structure.

5.3 Variation in cleavage strength across districts in Prussia

This section complements the qualitative analysis and exploits the subnational variation in the vulnerability of electoral districts to the impact of the policies. It demonstrates that where the impact of the policies was more severe, the cleavage was stronger. To explore how the anti-Catholic policies affected the voting behavior of Catholics, I collected election returns from Prussian state elections and indicators for the vulnerability of Catholics to the government policies as well as other district level covariates. The dataset includes four elections: one election before the formation of the cleavage, and three elections after the cleavage emerged. The dataset begins in 1863, the first year for which election returns were available, and ends in 1873.[8]

To ensure a clean comparison of the voting behavior of Catholics between the

[8] I exclude the 1866 Prussian state elections due to data availability. In the elections, which took place during the Austro-Prussian war, the center party won only 15 seats and consequently dissolved.

time periods, I analyze the change in the territories that were under Prussian rule since 1848, shown in the map in Figure 5.2. I exclude from the sample the non-German Catholic minorities in the Polish provinces Posen and Silesia that were already politically mobilized around an ethnic Polish identity. I also exclude the provinces Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hessen-Nassau, which became a part of Prussia only after 1864. Election results in Berlin were available at the city level and I aggregate the four constituencies into one district. In addition, I exclude Sigmaringen (Hohenzollern; insular dark gray in the south of Germany; one constituency) from the analysis because of data availability.[9] In total, the dataset contains observations from 128 constituencies.

Figure 5.2: The Territory of Prussia and the Sample



[9]The map was created from a shapefile of German administrative units in 1871, the earliest available year, and was adapted from the Census Mosaic Project (Hubatsch and Klein, 1975; MPIDR, 2011).

Recall that I define electoral cleavages as the social attributes that predict how people vote. Based on this definition, I expect to find in a statistical analysis a strong association between vulnerability to government policies and decrease in the vote share of the LPF. When there is no electoral cleavage, and the Catholic identity does not predict voting behavior, I expect to find no relationship between vulnerability to policies and vote choice. In the following analysis, I use OLS to estimate this relationship. OLS models are suitable for analyzing the subnational variation in the strength of the cleavage because they estimate how the change in the percentage of Catholics is associated with the change in the vote shares of the LPF.

The dependent variable: Change in the Liberal party's vote share

Because the dataset begins before the Catholic cleavage re-emerged and while the Catholic Center party was loosing seats, the dependent variable is the LPF's vote shares. This allows me to conduct a clean comparison between the voting behavior of Catholics before and after the cleavage emerged. Catholics were more likely to vote for the Liberal party when there was no Catholic cleavage or when the cleavage was in decline. Analyzing the change in the association between the percentage of Catholics and the vote share of the Liberal party allows me to examine the change in the party alignment of Catholics in response to the policies.

To construct this variable, I take election results from 1863 which were collected by Anderson (1968, 417) and captures votes cast by voters.[10] Anderson reports the

[10] As opposed to electors. The official statistics were published in the *Zeitschrift des Königlichen Preussischen Statistischen Bureaus* ('Journal of the Royal Prussian Statistical Bureau.' Author's translation) in March 1865 and included information about participation in the elections by class. Anderson

election statistics at the county level. To construct district level election returns, I average the Progressive[11] vote share across counties. I aggregate the counties to Prussian state electoral districts based on information from Kühne (1994). Election returns from 1867, 1870 and 1873 are coded from Kühne's (1994) handbook of the Prussian House of Deputies and capture indirect votes case by electors (direct votes for the electoral college are not available).

In the data collected by Anderson, all the votes cast for anti-government candidates were coded as votes cast for the Liberal party.[12] In my calculation of the vote share of the Liberal party between the years 1867-1873, I included any votes cast for any party in the LPF: The National Liberal Party, the Progressive Party, Left-Liberal Party.[13] Kühne reported the vote share of all the candidates that competed in each district and their party affiliation. Elections took place in multi-member districts with district magnitude ranging from 1 to 3. I coded the vote share of the LPF based on the following decisions: In case several LPF candidates competed against a non-LPF, I calculated the average vote share received by candidates of the LPF. In the several rare cases that LPF candidates competed against one another and against candidates of other parties, I included the highest vote share received by a

cross-referenced the official records with contemporary newspapers. The records were incomplete: In some cases they included the votes cast only for the winners; in other cases the votes for a right-Liberal who lost were recorded with the votes for the left-Liberal who won. Several times the votes cast for a right-Liberal were coded with the votes for a Conservative (Anderson, 1954, vii-x). The Prussian state collected the returns in order to assess the size of the opposition (see Magaloni 2006) and all of the votes that were cast for opposition candidates were counted together. Consequently, the election returns from 1863 overestimate the vote share of the Liberal party (Anderson, 1954).

[11]Called Liberal in the dataset.

[12]These election returns contain a systematic measurement error and therefore all of the regressions include random effects of administrative districts, the level at which the election returns were documented.

[13]The main political division in Prussia was between Conservative and Liberal parties.

LPF candidate. In case there were several rounds of elections, I coded the vote share in the first round, assuming the first round reflects sincere voting in comparison to the second round. When Left-Liberals competed against National Liberals in the same district, the vote share is 100%. When no LPF candidate competed, the Liberal vote share is zero.[14] In two districts more than one Liberal candidate competed in the elections but the vote share of one of the candidates was lower than 2%. In this case, I coded the higher vote share as the vote share of the Liberal candidate.

Explanatory variable: Vulnerability to anti-Catholic policies

To proxy for vulnerability to government policies, I use the number of Catholic pupils per Catholic capita. Because the planned anti-Catholic policies were designed to target religious instruction in elementary schools, constituencies with a high ratio of Catholic pupils should expect to bear a higher cost from the policies. To construct this proxy, I collected data on the number of Catholic pupils from a Prussian statistical yearbook (Preussische Statistik, 1901). The yearbook reports the number of Catholic pupils aged 6-14 who were enrolled in Catholic public elementary schools (*Volksschulen*) by administrative district (*Regierungsbezirk*; one level above the constituency) in 1864. This is a reliable data source: Elementary schools in Prussia were separated along confessional lines and school attendance was high; in 1864 as many as 93% of the schoolchildren attended school (Lamberti, 1989, 24). In 1861, only 2.7% of all schoolchildren in Prussia, Protestant and Catholic, attended private schools (Lamberti, 1989, 20). Because I am interested in the relative

[14] I repeated the analysis with those observations coded as missing, not reported here. The substantive results were similar.

share of Catholic pupils, I calculate this variable by dividing the number of Catholic pupils by size of the Catholic population measured in 1864, which I take from the ifo Prussian Economic History Dataset (iPEHD) (Becker et al., 2014).[15]

My research design addresses three concerns for endogeneity. By selecting plausibly exogenous cases, I address the concern for reverse causality, that is, that the political preferences of voters shape policymaking. All of the independent variables in the regressions were measured before the policies were initiated and therefore the costs that the policies imposed on the voters are largely predetermined. This strategy addresses the concern of measurement error, that is, that the districts who bore the cost of government policies were more likely to vote for opposition candidates. Because the independent variables were measured prior to the impact of the policies, they were not altered by them. To address concerns for omitted variable bias, all the models include random effects and controls for alternative explanations.

Because the proxy for vulnerability to government policies is measured at the level of the administrative district, the coefficient estimates the effect for that level of aggregation and this effectively reduces the number of observations. For this reason I generate a second proxy for vulnerability to government policies by dividing the number of all pupils in a constituency by the number of Catholics, which I take from the iPEHD dataset. This variable will allow me to generate estimates at the level of the constituency but it will be less precise because it captures both Catholic and Protestant pupils.

[15]The data are available at the county (*Kreis*) level. In order to aggregate the counties to Prussian state electoral districts, I use information from Kühne (Kühne, 1994).

My theory expects the voters who are vulnerable to the negative impact of the policies to vote for opposition candidate. The sheer size of Catholic community, and not vulnerability to government policies, can explain the poor performance of the Liberal candidate. Therefore, in the analysis I control for the percentage of Catholics, which is calculated at the same level as the ratio of pupils per capita. The source of this variable is iPEHD (Becker et al., 2014). The percentage of Catholics is calculated as the ratio between the number of Catholics measured in 1864 ("rel1864_cat") and the population in the county in 1864 ("pop1864_tot"). I include a second proxy for the percentage of Catholics because the share of Catholics in a district could also be the outcome of past persecution of Catholics in the Protestant Reformation and indicate a latent potential to abandon the Liberal party family. The Protestant Reformation spread in a circular pattern out of its origin in Wittenberg and exogenously determined the location of Catholics. to construct this variable, I calculate the distance between the geometric center of the each constituency and the town of Wittenberg.

In the analysis, I also control for the alternative explanation that the failure of the LPF candidate was the result of mobilization of Catholics and does not reflect a shift in voting behavior based on grievances. The Catholic clergy, which was a source of moral authority in Catholic parishes, played an active role in the mobilization of Catholic parishioners. The double role of clergymen, both as an influential figure and as a political entrepreneur that extensively organized Catholics could have an impact on the performance of the Liberal candidate (Anderson, 1993). The control for the parish priest is calculated as the logged ratio between the number of priests

and the number of Catholics, measured in 1849 and taken from iPEHD (Becker et al., 2014).[16] The second proxy for the authority of the parish priest is the level of industrialization, which is calculated as the share of people employed in industry in 1864 and is taken from iPEHD ("ipehd_1864_occ_indu."[17] Catholics in Prussia were concentrated in rural areas where the authority of the parish priest was high (Anderson, 1993) and in industrialized districts, the authority of the priest should be lower.

My analysis also controls for the impact of civic and confessional associations which served as vehicles for voter mobilization. If voters abandoned the Liberal candidate because of effective mobilization, this will support the elite-driven hypothesis for cleavage formation and weaken the support for the main claim of the theory: That voters change their voting behavior based on the grievances they experience. To control for the impact of associations, I exploit an exogenous border change that led to differences in the density of Prussian civil society. During Napoleon's rule, his army occupied territories in Prussia and replaced the existing legal system with a new legal system. The laws disassembled the large estates, guaranteed better protection of property rights, encouraged economic development, and led to the development of denser and more active associational life (Buggle, 2016). Almost all of the Catholic districts in the sample were occupied by Napoleon but the duration of the occupation varied across districts, which allows me to control for differential levels of civil society density. I take the duration of French rule from

[16] I took the number of priests "rel1849_cat_priest") by county from iPEHD (Becker et al., 2014), aggregated it to the level of the Prussian state constituency and divided it by the number of Catholics ("rel1849_cat"), both measured in 1849.

[17] The variable's description in German is: *Berufsverschiedenheit; Industrie*).

Acemoglu and Robinson's online appendix (Acemoglu et al., 2011). The borders of the territories held by Napoleon overlapped with Prussian administrative units. The longest foreign rule was in the Rhineland (19 years)[18] followed by Westphalia and Province of Saxony (6 years).[19] The rest of Prussia was never under French rule and received the value zero.

Looking at the graphs in Figure 5.3, one observes that the relationship between the ratio of pupils per capita and the electoral performance of the LPF over time is consistent with the qualitative evidence from the case studies. Further, while in 1863 there appears to be no relationship between Catholic pupils and the Liberal vote share, this relationship becomes negative after 1867.

Figure 5.3: Pupils Per Capita and the Liberal Vote Share 1863-1873



[18]The districts Aachen, Düsseldorf, Koblenz, Cologne, and Trier (30 constituencies)

[19]Arnsberg, Minden, and Munster (Westphalia province), Erfurt, Magdenburg, and Merseburg (Saxony province), a total of 37 constituencies.

Results

Table 5.1 shows results from OLS regressions that use the change in the vote share of LPF candidates from 1863 to 1870 as the dependent variable. Because the 1863 election returns contain a measurement error, all of the regressions include random effects for administrative districts, which is the administrative unit that compiled the election results. The standard errors are clustered by province and the unit of observation is Prussian state districts. To allow for a meaningful comparison across coefficients, the coefficients in the table are standardized. In all of the models the key variable of interest is the ratio of pupils per capita. Across the six models, the coefficient of the effect on the number of pupils per capita is negative, as expected, and in models 1 and 6 it is statistically significant at conventional levels.

The coefficient is the largest in column 1, which uses the ratio of Catholic pupils per Catholic capita at the level of the administrative level. Here, an increase of one standard deviation in the number of pupils per capita is associated with a decrease of 31% in the LPF's vote share from 1863 to 1870. The coefficient is the smallest in column 3, when the ratio of pupils per capita is included with the percentage of Catholics and falls short of statistical significance. When controlling for the percentage of Catholics, an increase of 25 pupils per capita is associated with a decrease of 14% in the LPF vote share.

In models 4-6, when the ratio of pupils per Catholic capita is used, the coefficient of the ratio of pupils per capita takes its expected direction, however it substantially stronger and statistically significant only when the percentage of Catholics is added to the model. Part of this result is may be driven by the fact that it captures

both Catholic and Protestant pupils. The Liberals' anti-Catholic agenda affected Protestants as well ad Catholic because it threatened religious freedom.

Finally, the coefficients of pupils per capita in models 3 and 6 are negative even when the percentage of Catholics is added to the model. These results support the argument that in districts that were more vulnerable to the impact of the policies, the cleavage emerged more strongly.

Table 5.1: Change in Voter Alignments in Prussia 1863-1870

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Pupils per Capita	-0.307*		-0.137	-0.139		-0.182***
	(0.8)		(0.9)	(0.1)		(0.0)
% Catholics		-0.526***	-0.419***		-0.621***	-0.652***
		(0.1)	(0.1)		(7.0)	(6.6)
Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Random Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Clustered SE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
R^2	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.04	0.22	0.24
Observations	128	128	128	128	128	128

Notes: OLS models with administrative district random effects. Models 1-3 use pupils per capita measured at the administrative district level. In models 4-6 the ratio of pupils per capita is measured at the level of the constituency. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Additional policies and the expansion of the cleavage in Prussia

Next, I exploit the exogenous border change, the French occupation of German territories that cut across predominantly Catholic regions, to asses the argument that when voters are aggrieved by government policies, they begin to vote for opposition candidates. Before 1871, the proposed policies were expected to exert a cost on Catholic institutions, especially the elementary schools and religious

orders. Rural Catholic voters were therefore expected to bear the highest cost from the proposed policies because of the central role of the parish priest in agrarian communities, which acted as the school inspector, teacher, and a source of moral authority (Anderson, 1993). After 1871, however, the policies were expected to bear a cost on all Catholics. In 1871, the first national elections to the Reichstag of the German Empire, the National Liberals, Bismarck's allies who were openly anti-Catholic won 31% of the Legislative seats. In 1872, Bismarck ordered to draft anti-Catholic legislation and started the *Kulturkampf*–an episode of a "Civilization Struggle" between the state and the Church that lasted several years. After 1872, the policies were expected to bear a cost on all Catholics, including urban Catholics who saw themselves as members of the Prussian middle class and had previously voted for the LPF.

The Napoleonic rule implemented reforms that encouraged the development of a middle class: It diminished the power of old elites, divided the large estates and introduced greater political freedoms. Among its implications are greater economic development, the proliferation of universities, and a denser civil society, all contributed to the rise of a Liberal middle class (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Buggle, 2016). Because the duration of Napoleonic rule varied across the Prussian provinces, the province that spend more time under Napoleon (19 years) is expected to have a more substantial middle class than the provinces that spent fewer years under Napoleon. My analysis uses these spatial differences to asses the argument that voters changed their coalitions, in this case from a broader Liberal coalition to a Catholic coalition, when the grievances from policies increased their identification

with the social identity that is targeted by the policies.

In the regressions, the dependent variables are the change in the vote share of the Liberal party from 1863 to 1867, from 1867 to 1870, and from 1870 to 1873. To assess the voting behavior of different subgroups within the Catholic population, I interact the percentage of Catholics with the duration of Napoleonic rule, which takes the value of of 1 for the provinces that spent 19 years under the French occupation and 0 for the constituencies that spent 6 or no years (0) under Napoleon. I use the same control variables as in Table 5.1.

Results

Table 5.2: Voter Sorting in Prussia 1863-1873

	Change 63-67 (1)	Change 67-70 (2)	Change 70-73 (3)
% Catholics	0.1	-0.2	-0.3***
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)
19 Years Napoleonic Rule	0.9	7.4	-17.3***
	(6.4)	(5.6)	(4.1)
19 Years Napoleonic Rule × % Catholics	-0.1	-0.1	0.1*
	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.1)
Controls	yes	yes	yes
Random Effects	yes	yes	yes
Clustered SE	yes	yes	yes
R^2	0.02	0.08	0.28
Observations	128	128	128

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5.2 shows results from models that use the change in the vote share of the LPF as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 show a positive association between the percentage of Catholics who spent 19 year under Napoleon and the

change in the vote share of the Liberal party between 1863-1867 and 1867-1870. Districts with a high proportion of liberal middle-class Catholics continued to support the LPF in 1870. Column 3 shows a negative association between the percentage of Catholics in the districts that spent almost two decades under Napoleonic rule and the change in the vote share of the LPF, as expected. On average, in districts that spent 19 years under Napoleon, from 1870 to 1873, the LPF's vote share decreased by 17.5% compared to the districts that spent 6 years or no time under the French occupation.

Overall, the temporal order in which different groups within the Catholic population shifted their voting behavior is consistent with my argument that voters begin to vote based on a an identity when it is targeted by government policies. The Catholic party captured the votes of two groups of Catholics who differed in their social class and occupation (Loth, 2015, 37). The first group are the rural parishioners who were heavily influenced by the ultramontane movement, which believed in the superiority of the Pope, and was under the authority of the parish priest. Those voters were the first to shift their behavior in response to the threat of the policies in 1867. The second group were the Catholic Bürger, the Catholic middle-class who until the 1860s saw no tension between their religion and liberal politics (Mergel, 1996). When the National Liberal party gained legislative power and the attacks on Catholics affected the entire Catholic population, middle-class Catholics began to vote for the Catholic party.

5.4 Austerity measures and regional disparities after 1960 in Belgium

The cleavage re-emerged in Belgium in 1961 in response to government policies that differentially affected linguistic regions. Already after WWI, Flanders began to surpass Wallonia in economic development but after 1945 the regional disparities in wealth were becoming even more noticeable. Between 1945-1958 the ideological divisions in two main conflicts within the Belgian society–the first conflict about the place of the Belgian king in postwar Belgium and the second conflict about Church authority over education–overlapped with regional and linguistic divisions. By the middle of the 20th century Belgians thought about linguistic differences as ethnic and perceived linguistic identities as distinct social groups.[20] However, as long as language was not linked to concrete government policies that created incentives for voters to begin coordinating around the shared language and fight for a common goal, political parties did not mobilize voters based on linguistic appeals. This changed in 1960, when parties began to organize in response to government policies that reinforced the regional and linguistic divisions and again linked the fates of individuals who spoke the same language.

[20]The expansion of the franchise and the rise of mass politics created a powerful incentive for the Flemish movement to reorient itself and appeal to the workers. The Flamingant leaders realized that in order to advance the movement's goals—the political and cultural emancipation of Flemish speakers—it needs the electoral weight of the workers. Since 1900, it began to tie language with broad economic issues (Strikwerda, 1982). At that time, Flanders and Wallonia were, on average, at the same level of economic development; there was a greater variation in the level of industrialization between provinces than between linguistic regions (see (Murphy, 1988, 83—84)). But wealth was concentrated in Wallonia because of the banking sector and Walloon firms, and the Flemish movement used this division to tie linguistic identities to disparities in regional affluence. Therefore, it socially constructed linguistic regions as political units (Murphy, 1988, 96-97).

In 1960 the Belgian government, ruled by the Christian Democratic party (formerly the Catholic party), initiated a fiscal austerity program called the Unitary Law (*Eenheidswet*) in order to reduce the national debt, increase indirect taxation, and reduce social spending (Witte, 2009b, 277). The policies created grievances for both Walloons and Flemings. Wallonia was forced to accept the austerity measures and it economy was to be directed by the state. Because the Flemish population in Belgium was larger than the Walloon population, the majority of legislative seats were elected in Flanders. This gave Walloons the impression that their affairs are run by a pro-Flemish government. In Flanders, the policies aroused opposition because the increase in taxes placed a heavier burden on the more affluent Flanders, and the money that was raised was meant to be invested in Wallonia in order to rebuild its economy.

The catalyst for this law was the economic crisis that was caused by the loss of the Congo that same year and the continued deterioration of the industry in Wallonia and the limited capacity to attract substantial investment. Unlike other countries in Western Europe, Belgium was still in an economic recession in the post-war period. But the center of the economic crisis was in Wallonia, which had an aging industry that could not compete with international markets. Flanders, on the other hand, continued to industrialize and prosper while the economic situation in Wallonia deteriorated.

The government policies are plausibly exogenous to the formation of the new electoral cleavage because they were responding to international pressures. Decolonization and the loss of overseas markets affected Belgium's key industries—coal

mining, metal, and textile—the majority of them were concentrated in Wallonia. The location of these industries was determined by proximity to natural resources in the 19th century (Ronsse and Rayp, 2015). During the Great Depression in the interwar era, the coal-mining and metal industries in Wallonia have not been significantly upgraded. After the war, these aging industries struggled to compete with the cheap German and American coal (Thomas 1990, 39).

In response to the austerity program, the workers began to organize against the government. The General Federation of Belgian Labor announced a general strike that lasted for six weeks. Although it began as a national strike, the Flemish workers went back to work after several days. The austerity measures were expected to bear a high cost on workers in Wallonia who faced structural changes to the industrial sector in the region that threatened their future employment. Because the industry in Flanders did not face similar changes, the Flemish workers broke the strike. The lack of solidarity within the working class was a key moment for the development of the Walloon consciousness (Murphy, 1988, 131; Witte, 2009c, 362). It demonstrated that the linguistic divisions surpassed the unity of the working class and that Flemish and Walloon workers do not have shared interests. This insight formed the basis for the mobilization of the workers in Wallonia.

The new electoral cleavage began to emerge in the national elections of 1961, several weeks after the austerity program was eventually voted into law. Regional parties emerged in Flanders and Wallonia and pressured the existing parties to take a position on the new cleavage. Like the linguistic electoral cleavage that emerged and declined several decades earlier, the new electoral cleavage was not just based

on linguistic divisions, although it was understood as such. As Murphy observed, "When specifically ethno-linguistic concerns once again surfaced as the premier political issue around 1960, the electorate was predisposed to think of political and electoral patterns in ethno-regional terms" (Murphy, 1990, 237). At the center of the debate was cultural and fiscal autonomy for linguistic groups, and the opposition of both Flemings and Walloons to the decisions of the central government in 1960. However, the new cleavage did not only create divisions between voters based on language, it also created divisions within Flemings and Walloons, who took different positions on the new cleavage. Eventually, these divisions put pressure on political parties to split into linguistic fractions their when they could no longer adopt a policy position that appeased their voters in Flanders and Wallonia.[21]

The formation of the new cleavage in Belgium led to a change in the party system. The Flemish nationalist party, the People's Union (*Volksunie*), which managed to win only a single legislative seat in 1954 and 1958, campaigned in 1961 on a single issue, federalism, and won five seats (De Winter, 2003, 33). As predicted by the theory, the popularity of the *Volksunie* pushed the Catholic party to address the linguistic conflict and adopt a moderate position on the issue (Lecours, 2001, 225; Philippart, 1966, 67; Witte, 2009c, 366). In Wallonia, the Socialist party faced opposition from local parties that pushed for a regional autonomy, arguing that Wallonia should be able to manage its own affairs (Murphy, 1988, 131-132). The Walloon wing of the Socialist party, which was frustrated by the absence of solidarity in the general strike of 1960-1961, broke away from the Flemish wing and called for greater autonomy for

[21]Brussels began to develop a local party system that concentrated on local issues, including language. It is not included in the analysis.

Wallonia. In the short term, the party was able to handle the regional competition by taking a poplar position on the issue. The Liberal party, which had abandoned its anti-clerical position after 1958, adopted a platform of low taxation and unionism and attempted to appeal to the voters who opposed regionalism.

Without a resolution on the linguistic issue, the cleavage persisted and voting in the national elections of 1965 were understood by contemporaries as opposition to the government's economic policy (Philippart, 1966). The core issues in the elections were the distribution of government spending by regions, the cultural autonomy of each region, and the linguistic profile of Brussels. In the short term, the formation of the new cleavage dealigned the party system. Electoral volatility in 1965 tripled compared to 1958 and 1961 (De Winter et al., 2006, 935). After winning only a single legislative seat in 1954 and 1958, the pro-Flemish *Volksunie* increased its seat share to 5% in 1961 and 12% in 1965. By 1971, it won 18% of the votes in Flanders (De Winter, 2003, 30). In Wallonia, too, regional parties emerged and competed with the Socialist party, which until 1961 was dominant in Wallonia. In 1965, *Parti Wallon*, a Walloon socialist party that was established from a merger of a few smaller parties, won 3.3% of the votes in Wallonia. In 1968, it won 10.5% of the votes and in 1971, 20.9% (Buelens and Van Dyck, 2003, 52). The Christian, Liberal and Socialist parties eventually split along their linguistic wings in 1968, 1972, and 1978, respectively (De Winter et al., 2006, 934). The cleavage was eventually institutionalized: between 1971-2001, Belgium began to federalize by transferring power to subnational councils representing linguistic communities.

5.5 Conventional explanations to cleavage re-emergence in Belgium

Political entrepreneurs organize voters

Flemish nationalists attempted to re-activate the linguistic conflict after World War II when they founded the Christian Flemish People's Union (*Christelijke Vlaamse Volksunie*), a pro-Flemish party in 1951. Several developments preceded this decision: The Flemish issue has been gaining attention in the 1950, as evidenced by the increase in the number of Flemish associations and the government's decision to appoint a committee to investigate the issue during those years (Murphy, 1988, 129). Second, some time had passed since the Flamingant movement, which was associated with the Nazis, was morally discredited after the war and it slowly began to recover from the scandal (Witte, 2009c, 361). Finally, after World War II, it has become clear that Flanders has surpassed Wallonia in economic development and birth rates (Buyst, 2011). Belgians had begun to think about the differences between Flanders and Wallonia in ethnic terms before the World War I. After the second World War, they observed that regional divisions overlap with ideological orientations; after the war Wallonia became more socialist and Flanders became dominated by the Catholic party. However, despite these differences, the Flemish nationalist party largely failed to create a voting block based on linguistic appeals. At the polls, it managed to win only a single legislative seat in the national elections of 1954 and 1958 and its vote share ranged between 1-5%.[22] In fact, between

[22]This is calculated from election returns from CLEA (Kollman et al., 2016).

1945-1961 the Belgian party system was the least fragmented since before WWI and electoral volatility was at a record low (De Winter et al., 2006).

Electoral cleavages reflect the social structure

After World War II and until 1958, three conflicts dominated Belgian politics: the first conflict, between workers and employers, was resolved in 1945 with the creation of a general social security system. The second conflict was about the legitimacy of the Belgian King, and whether he would be allowed to resume his position or forced to resign for not actively resisting the Nazi occupation. The third conflict was between the Liberals and the Catholics about the education system.

Although the ideological divisions in the so-called 'Royal Question' and the 'School War' overlapped somewhat with linguistic divisions, the tensions did not center around a linguistic or communal conflict. Nevertheless, they were understood by fractions of the Belgian public as signs for the differences between Flemings and Walloons. In the referendum about the fate of the Belgian king, the majority of Flemings supported his return while the majority of Walloons opposed it. Private schools in Belgium were controlled by the Catholic Church and were more prevalent than the public secular schools. Because the Catholic party was associated with Flanders, the conflict about education was seen by contemporaries as representing a greater divide between Flanders and Wallonia (Witte, 2009d, 112). However, despite the increasing social distance between Flemings and Walloons, there was no linguistic electoral cleavage in Belgium between 1945-1960.

My analysis engages with two additional alternative explanations for the forma-

tion of the cleavage in Belgium that are related to the social structure. The first is that the formation of the linguistic cleavage is rooted in the process of modernization. By this logic, the cleavage emerged at the end of the 19th century in a cumulative process that began with the expansion of the franchise. This institutional change encouraged political entrepreneurs to seek new ways to mobilize Flemish speakers who were previously disenfranchised. The increase in literacy rates and the improvement in education, so the argument goes, led Flemings to recognize their political interests and seek parties that represent those issues. Inasmuch as it accounts for the timing of cleavage formation in the 19th century, modernization theory does not explain why after the cleavage dissolved after 1945 although voters were even more educated and gained more experience with the democratic process. Neither does it explain why a language-related cleavage re-emerged after 1960.

The second explanation is found in Gellner's (1983) theory of nationalism which also does not explain why the cleavage declined and then re-emerged. The theory expects ethnic and national identities, once they crystallize, to remain salient and politically meaningful. But linguistic identities in Belgium did not predict voting behavior throughout the country's history. Instead, as my analysis shows, linguistic identities came to predict voting behavior only when charged with a political meaning by government policies.

5.6 Change in voter alignments after 1961 in Belgium

To explore how voters responded to the policies, I use national election returns from CLEA (Kollman et al., 2016) as well as indicators for the occupational, economic and linguistic profile of electoral districts from the Belgian censuses of 1947 and 1961. The dataset includes 9 national elections: 5 before the cleavage emerged and 4 thereafter. The dataset begins in 1946, the first elections after World War II, and ends in 1974, after the first legislation that transferred power to linguistic communities. The sample excludes the German-speaking population in Eastern Belgium (one constituency), which was not a part of the cleavage, and the Brussels region, which developed a local party system after 1960. The dataset includes observations from 43 constituencies. Because the policies affected constituencies within each linguistic group differently, I analyze the changes in Flanders and Wallonia separately. In my analysis, I estimate the impact of the policies on voters in OLS models. To address concerns for endogeneity due to omitted variable bias, all regressions include province random effects and variables that control for alternative explanations.

Wallonia

In Wallonia, two groups were expected to bear a cost from the policies. The first group were the workers because the austerity measures were scheduled to re-arrange the industrial sector and influenced their future employment and benefits. The second group is the unemployed, who expect to remain unemployed given the new policies which closed factories and did not create new jobs in the short term.

Because the Socialist party did manged to move to the position of the workers, I expect to find a positive association between the percentage of manual workers and the change in the vote share of the Socialist party from 1946 to 1974. Figure 5.4 illustrates the change in the vote shares of the left parties in Wallonia and shows that the Socialist party's vote share decreased as the vote share of regional parties increased over time. The statistical analysis explores whether the party lost the votes of two groups: the workers and the unemployed.

Figure 5.4: Change in Voter Alignments in Wallonia After 1961



Notes: The graph shows the change in the vote shares of the Socialist party, Walloon regional parties (Walloon Front for the Unity and Freedom of Wallonia (*Front Wallon pour l'Unité et la Liberté de la Wallonie, FW*) and Democratic Front of Francophones (*Front Démocratique des Francophones, FDF*)), and 'Other' (local) parties in Wallonia between 1946-1974. Source: CLEA (Kollman et al., 2016).

I calculate the percentage of manual workers based on the occupational census of 1961 by dividing the number of manual workers by the total population in the constituency. The percentage of unemployed is calculated as the sum of all

unemployed men and women divided by the active population. The source of the data is the 1960 census. In the regressions, I control for the percentage of French speakers, which I calculate from the language census of 1947. To control for the alternative explanation that all the lower social classes were affected by the policies, and not just manual workers, I include the socio-economic ranking of the constituency (logged), measured in 1938, which I calculated as the average ranking of all the municipalities that are included in the constituency. To control for district level competition, I include the district's magnitude and the vote share of the regional parties, which is the sum of the vote share of the FW and FDF, or their joint lists in some elections. See the tables in the Appendix for descriptive statistics by region. My case selection addresses concerns for heterogeneity due to reverse causality. To address the concern for omitted variable bias, I include in all the models province random effects and controls for alternative explanations. These regressions do not address concerns for endogeneity due to measurement error since the independent variables were measured after the policies were initiated.

Table 5.3 presents the results of the regressions. In column 1, the association between the percentage of manual workers and the change in the vote share of the Workers' party is positive and statistical significant, as expected. Looking at the cumulative effect of the interaction between the percentage of manual workers and the interaction term in model 2, the association is positive although the interaction has no substantive effect. The association between the percentage of unemployed and the change in the vote share of the Socialist party is positive in column 1. In column 3, the interaction term is positive.

Table 5.3: Voter Sorting in Wallonia 1946-1974

	(1)	(2)	(3)
% Manual	0.4***	0.4**	0.4***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
% Unemployed	2.4***	2.4***	1.6
	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.9)
% French Speakers	0.1	0.1*	0.1*
	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Year>1960=1		-0.0	-0.1
		(0.1)	(0.0)
Year>1960=1 × % Manual		0.0	
		(0.2)	
Year>1960=1 × % Unemployed			1.3
			(1.1)
Random Effects	yes	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes	yes
R^2	0.56	0.57	0.58
Observations	146	146	146

Notes: OLS regressions with province random effects. The dependent variable is the change in the vote share of the Socialist party. Standard errors clustered by province. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Flanders

In Flanders, I expect voters with high income to bear the cost from the policies. Because the Christian Democratic party faced competition from regional parties, I expect to see a negative association between the socio-economic ranking of a district and the change in the vote share of the Christian Democratic party. In the regressions, I include the percentage of Flemish speakers. To control for the alternative explanation that all social classes were affected by the policies, I include the parentage of service workers and manual workers. To control for district level competition, I include the district magnitude and the vote share of the regional

party, the People's Union party. Figure 5.5 illustrates the decline in the vote share of the Christian Democratic party and the electoral success of the *Volksunie*.

Figure 5.5: Change in Voter Alignments in Flanders After 1961



Notes: The graph shows the change in the vote shares of the two main political parties in Flanders after 1961, the Christian Social Party and the People's Union Party in Flanders.

Against my expectation, the coefficients in models 1 and 2, presented in Table 5.4, do not take their expected direction. A possible explanation is that in Flanders, the cost of the policies was not limited to a particular occupational group. By contrast, the policy preferences of manual workers in Wallonia were similar and more clustered together. Future iterations will address the concern for endogeneity due to measurement error and include independent variables measured before 1960. In addition, future analysis will address the concern for omitted variable bias and will include a proxy for attitudes on linguistic divisions, which might condition the relationship between demographic traits and a shift in voting behavior.

Table 5.4: Voter Sorting in Flanders 1946-1974

	(1)	(2)
Socioeconomic (logged)	0.1	0.2
	(0.1)	(0.2)
% Flemish Speakers	-0.2***	-0.2***
	(0.1)	(0.0)
Year>1960=1		0.1
		(0.2)
Year>1960=1 × Socioeconomic (logged)		-0.1
		(0.2)
Random Effects	yes	yes
Controls	yes	yes
R^2	0.51	0.58
Observations	128	128

Notes: OLS regressions with province random effects. The dependent variable is the change in the vote share of the Christian Democratic party. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

To summarize the Belgian case, the cleavage Belgium re-emerged in response to government policies which reinforced regional and linguistic divisions by linking these divisions to grievances from the state. As the case of Belgium demonstrates, although linguistic identities were salient and politically meaningful, voters began to coordinate on these identities only in response to government policies.

5.7 Appendix 3

Appendix 3A Descriptive statistics Prussia

Table 5.5: Summary Statistics Prussian Elections

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Liberal Vote Share Change 63-70	-23.752	23.888	-99.19	34.95	129
Pupils (C)	11.699	4.864	0.651	17.686	129
% Catholics	0.324	0.378	0.001	0.995	129
Priests (log)	-9.966	4.097	-16.118	-5.357	129
% in Industry	0.146	0.06	0	0.342	129
KM from Wittenberg (thousands)	337,031	177,903	0	712,533	129
Years Napoleon[23]	6.434	7.677	0	19	129

Table 5.6: Correlation Table Prussian Elections

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Pupils (C)	1.000						
(2) Pupils (P)	-0.171	1.000					
(3) % Catholics	0.643	-0.181	1.000				
(4) Priests (log)	0.604	-0.104	0.529	1.000			
(5) % Industry	0.218	0.193	0.139	0.159	1.000		
(6) Distance from Wittenberg	0.293	-0.560	0.416	0.221	-0.144	1.000	
(7) Years Napoleon	0.523	-0.164	0.614	0.429	0.351	0.223	1.000

Appendix 3B Descriptive statistics Belgium

Table 5.7: Summary Statistics Belgian Elections (Postwar)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Flanders					
Christian Democratic Vote Share	0.499	0.114	0.286	0.805	192
Socioeconomic (logged)	1.46	0.117	1.253	1.609	192
% Manual Workers	0.49	0.074	0.294	0.582	192
District Magnitude	6.75	4.157	2	20	192
Flemish Nationalists Vote Share	0.123	0.061	0.017	0.244	128
% Flemish Speakers	0.704	0.149	0.145	0.91	192
Wallonia					
Socialist Vote Share	0.388	0.101	0.187	0.602	146
Socioeconomic (logged)	1.487	0.13	1.099	1.609	156
% Manual Workers	0.444	0.081	0.217	0.618	156
% Unemployed	0.023	0.009	0.007	0.046	156
District Magnitude	5.538	3.307	2	14	156
Walloon Regional Parties' Vote Share	0.077	0.086	0	0.383	156
% French speakers	0.86	0.121	0.102	0.966	156

Table 5.8: Correlation Table Belgium (Postwar)

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Flanders										
(1) Christian Democratic VS	1.000									
(2) Socioeconomic (logged)	0.124	1.000								
(3) % Manual	0.226	-0.619	1.000							
(4) % Service	-0.172	-0.244	0.099	1.000						
(5) Turnout	0.232	0.000	0.208	-0.008	1.000					
(6) % Unemployed	-0.150	0.282	-0.544	-0.249	-0.232	1.000				
(7) DM	-0.159	-0.347	0.298	0.425	-0.117	-0.190	1.000			
(8) Urbanization	0.049	-0.790	0.825	0.448	0.090	-0.339	0.552	1.000		
(9) Flemish Nationalists VS	-0.551	-0.181	0.136	0.025	-0.267	-0.047	0.092	0.163	1.000	
(10) % Flemish Speakers	0.054	-0.268	0.308	-0.134	-0.061	-0.045	0.044	0.233	0.281	1.000
Wallonia										
(1) Socialists VS	1.000									
(2) Socioeconomic (logged)	-0.480	1.000								
(3) % Manual	0.577	-0.563	1.000							
(4) % Service	0.217	-0.368	-0.027	1.000						
(5) Turnout	0.105	0.077	-0.045	-0.039	1.000					
(6) % Unemployed	0.277	-0.110	0.204	0.071	-0.054	1.000				
(7) DM	0.367	-0.478	0.554	-0.112	-0.080	0.148	1.000			
(8) Urbanization	0.522	-0.616	0.794	0.197	-0.115	0.194	0.711	1.000		
(9) Walloon Regional VS	-0.322	-0.014	0.042	0.010	-0.213	-0.085	0.058	0.067	1.000	
(10) % French Speakers	-0.122	0.368	-0.463	0.206	-0.003	-0.075	-0.401	-0.254	-0.071	1.000

Chapter 6

Electoral Cleavages in Western Europe and Beyond

For more than half a century, scholars have sought to understand what explains the formation and persistence of electoral cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rae and Taylor, 1970; Rokkan, 1970; Zuckerman, 1975; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Dix, 1989; Chhibber and Petrocik, 1989; Kitschelt, 1995; Chhibber, 1999; Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005). The puzzle of cleavage formation touches upon the very nature of the political struggles that are fought between groups within societies and the reasons that they emerge, persist, and decline. Explaining cleavage formation and persistence has benefits that go beyond the narrow focus on cleavages themselves; strong cleavages are associated with low electoral volatility and high political stability and shape the structure of the party system. Electoral cleavages often inform decisions about resource distribution and public service policies and have

implications for the salience of political identities and the organization of civil society. Gaining a better understanding of what electoral cleavages are and how they emerge and persist has benefits for understanding related political puzzles.

Despite the importance of cleavages in contemporary democracies, the debate about how cleavages emerge and persist is still ongoing. In this dissertation, I developed a novel theory that cleavages emerge in response to government policies. The state, I argue, is a powerful actor that can charge social identities with a political meaning by dividing society into winners and losers. My theory argues that both voters and political entrepreneurs organize in opposition to the policies in order to gain legislative power and influence policymaking. To test the theory and control for reverse causality, I selected cases with plausibly exogenous government policies. This allowed me to trace how voters and political entrepreneurs respond to the policies. Based on the method of process-tracing, I gained additional analytical leverage from comparing outcomes of formation to nonformation. In three of the case studies, where subnational data were available, I analyzed how voters and entrepreneurs sorted in response to the policies. This strategy allowed me to establish that the cleavages were more pronounced where the grievances from the policies exerted greater cost. Finally, In the next section, I use Mills' method of agreement and difference to test the main hypothesis: the electoral cleavages emerge from government policies.

6.1 Cleavage formation in Western Europe

Table 6.1 pulls together all of the case studies analyzed in this dissertation. Following Ziblatt and Slater's (2013, 1312–1313) advice, I employ a strategy of "typological representativeness" that includes all potential outcomes and relaxes the need to include the full universe of possible cases. The selected cases allow me to control for the rival hypotheses that cleavages emerge from institutional change and critical junctures, elite agency, or social structural positions.

The cases are sorted by the configurations of the independent variables from the six case studies. In addition to the binary outcome variable *New Cleavage*, I include three controls for competing explanations. *Mobilization* tests the second hypothesis that attempts by political entrepreneurs to organize voters without grievances from policies will not lead to the formation of a new cleavage. Mobilization captures religious organizations like the Pius Associations in Prussia or the Casinos in Baden and Bavaria or cultural-linguistic organizations like the *Wilemsfond* in Belgium. The deliverance of passionate sermons at Churches (Prussia), political campaigning in public places (Bavaria), the publication of open letters and newspaper articles (Prussia and Bavaria), and party campaigns, either official or informal (in all of the case studies), are all considered as mobilization attempts.

The second control variable, *Increased Suffrage*, captures institutional change, specifically an expansion of the franchise. Both the elite-driven and social-structural theories of cleavage formation expect a new cleavage to emerge following the expansion of the franchise. Elite-driven theories expect the institutional change to create incentives for voters and political entrepreneurs to organize and form new

coalitions. The social-structural approach expects the expansion of the franchise to lead to the formation of a new cleavage because the new voting rights allow previously muted political preferences to be represented in elections. The third control, *Existing Social Divisions*, captures pre-existing social divisions before the electoral cleavage emerged and is coded as "Yes" in all of the cases. The fourth variable is my key explanatory variable, *Grievances from Policies*. It includes all tangible (Baden, Prussia 1852, Belgium 1870) or anticipated (Prussia 1867, Belgium 1961) costs from government policies. In the cases whereby policies were not likely to reach the floor for a vote (Prussia 1863) or the cost of the policies was not felt (Belgium 1830-1870), *Grievances from Policies* was coded as "No."

Table 6.1: Configurations from the Case Studies

Type	**Outcomes in Case Study**	**Causal Factors**				**Outcome**
		Mobilization (Before Policies)	**Increased Suffrage (Before Policies)**	**Existing Social Divisions**	**Grievances from Policies (Tangible or Anticipated)**	**New Cleavage**
1	Baden (1860-1863)	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
1	Prussia II (1862 & 1863)	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
1	Belgium II (1954 & 1958)	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
2	Baden (1864)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
2	Belgium II (1961)	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
3	Bavaria (1863-1866)	No	No	Yes	No	No
3	Belgium I (1830-1870)	No	No	Yes	No	No
4	Belgium I (1870)	Yes	Yes$\oplus$	Yes	Yes	Yes
5	Prussia I (1848)	Yes	Yes$\ominus$	Yes	No	No
6	Bavaria (1868)	No	No$\otimes$	Yes	Yes	Yes
6	Prussia I (1852)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
6	Prussia II (1867)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: $\oplus$: Franchise expansion in local elections. $\ominus$: Equal but indirect. $\otimes$: Equal and direct.

In Table 6.1, one immediately notices that because *Existing Social Divisions* takes the same value in all of the cases, it does not explain the formation of new cleavages.

Neither does *Mobilization*, which is coded as "Yes" in three of the six cases. As the qualitative analysis in chapters 3-5 demonstrated, when grievances from the policies are tangible or anticipated, voter mobilization is a part of the mechanism of cleavage formation. However, mobilization without grievances from policies does not lead to the formation of a new cleavage. In only one of the three cases that *Increased Suffrage* is coded as "Yes" a new cleavage emerged. This happened in Belgium, where the improved suffrage at the local level allowed voters to express their political preferences. However, blocked social mobility, which resulted from government policies, was the cause for the new cleavage. Notably, across the twelve cases, only *Grievances from Policies* (types 2, 4, and 6) is perfectly correlated with the formation of a new cleavage, as predicted by my theory.

My findings have implications for understanding how electoral cleavages emerged in Western Europe. In all of the case studies, the new cleavages formed in response to government policies. The factors which conventional explanations identify as the causes for cleavage formation, the social structure, the actions of political entrepreneurs, and large-scale changes in Western Europe, are not necessary conditions for cleavage formation. But although neither of these variables caused the formation of the new cleavages, once voters experienced grievances from government policies, social-structural positions, the actions of elites, and the implications of the national and industrial revolutions were a part of the process of cleavage formation. In the next paragraphs, I revisit the conventional theories for cleavage formation and discuss them based on the insights from this analysis.

Across the six case studies, religion in the German states and language in Bel-

gium were distinct social attributes that were charged with a cultural and social meanings before the electoral cleavages emerged. However, they became the basis for a new electoral cleavage only when they became tied to grievances from policies. My theory makes this distinction between social divisions and electoral cleavages and proposes that government policies are what connects social attributes, which Bartolini and Mair (1990, 215) called the social-structural reference ("the empirical element" of social cleavages) to the second and normative element ("that is the set of values and beliefs which provide a sense of identity and role to the empirical element, and which reflect the self-consciousness of the social group"). As my theory predicted, once the policies had an effect, they created cohesion between those who shared the social attribute, reduced the ambiguity about group membership, and produced strong incentives for voters and political entrepreneurs to organize around those attributes. I find that the structuring of social and political groups, a process which Rokkan called the vertical organization of society, starting at the mass level, through civic associations, and finally in the political party, resulted from the formation of a new electoral cleavage. This causal direction runs opposite to what the "bottom-up" approach to cleavage formation suggests, that is, that electoral cleavages emerge based on coherent social groups. Furthermore, I find that electoral cleavages, once they persist, crystallize the boundaries between identity groups and deepen the vertical organization of civil society along the politicized identities. This suggests that electoral cleavages can create institutional legacies that shape the social structure itself.

My analysis, which draws its insights from failed as well as successful cases of

ethnic and religious mobilization, illustrates how fluid the political significance of identities can be in response to government policies. In both Prussia and Belgium, the cleavages endured as long as the policies persisted and declined when the grievances were reduced. This demonstrates that while policies can cause social attributes to predict how people vote, once they are removed, the link will be severed and the electoral cleavage will decline. Of course, even when the electoral cleavage declines, the social divisions can persist, but they lose their power as predictors of voting behavior. In both of the cases, social attributes became again the basis for a new electoral cleavage when they were the target of new government policies that again linked the fates of individuals.

Based on the analysis of the outcomes of formation and nonformation, I can reject the competing explanation that the cleavages emerged as a result of voter mobilization by elites. My analysis finds that when voters did not experience grievances from government policies, political entrepreneurs failed to form a new cleavage. Despite campaigns calling on Catholics in Prussia and Baden to defend the Catholic Church and although Flemish speakers were aware of linguistic differences decades before the two cleavages emerged, religious and linguistic identities shaped voting behavior only when voters experienced grievances from policies. Moreover, the dissertation questions the notion that elites craft cleavages in a deliberate and selective process. In all of the case studies that I analyze, elites did not introduce the policies in order to create the cleavage or strengthen pre-existing mobilization networks. Instead, both voters and political entrepreneurs shifted their behavior in response to the actions of the state.

My findings support the argument made by several scholars that civil society played a critical role in translating conflicts into electoral cleavages (Sartori, 1969; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986; Chhibber, 1999) but I find that civic organizations were not a necessary or sufficient condition for cleavage formation. As evident from the case of Prussia in 1848, the presence of civic associations does not explain cleavage formation. In Baden, civic associations faced considerable limitations and yet a cleavage emerged. In the majority of the case studies, civil society associations, where they were present, played an important role in the process of cleavage formation because they were used by political entrepreneurs to organize and recruit voters. Civic associations, therefore, contributed to the process of cleavage formation by serving as mobilization networks. Equally important were less traditional forms of mobilization networks, like the lower clergy in the German states and in 19th century Belgium, who mobilized their parishioners, and the local press, which helped to spread political information and coordinate political activity.

My analysis also challenges the conventional wisdom that cleavages emerge from critical junctures (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). While the national and industrial revolutions provided the content for the conflicts that emerged in the case studies, what explains the timing of cleavage formation is whether the conflict was made active by the actions of the state.[1] For example, in Prussia, the Church and the state were allies after 1848. A series of decrees activated a short conflict in 1852 after which the Church and the state regained their mutual understanding. Lipset

[1]Rokkan recognized that the process of cleavage formation is connected to state and nation-building but the idea that the state is an actor that can powerfully shape society remains underdeveloped in his work.

and Rokkan (p. 37) expected Catholics in Prussia to cooperate with Conservative party after 1848 but Catholics were split between the Conservative and the Liberal parties. In 1852, when the cleavage emerged, a new Catholic party was established separately from the Conservative party and captured the votes of Catholics. In Bavaria, the state and the Catholic Church maintained a good relationship and a conflict emerged when the influence of the Liberals grew. In Belgium, the cleavage in the 19th century emerged because of the dominance of French in politics and administration. In the 20th century, the government's austerity measures kindled the conflict between the linguistic groups. In the case of Belgium, Lipset and Rokkan expected a cleavage to emerge between Wallonia and Flanders based on a primary-secondary conflict (p. 37). But I find that the cleavage emerged in the 19th century following the industrialization of Flanders and that the first supporters of the Flemish movement were Flemings from the new middle class. In the 20th century, the cleavage cut across the linguistic groups, whereas Lipset and Rokkan expected the center-periphery and primary-secondary cleavages to overlap.

As for the role of franchise expansion on the formation of cleavages, I find that the cleavages in Prussia or Baden emerged before the expansion of the franchise. The cleavage in Belgium II (1961) emerged 15 years after the transition to universal suffrage. The outcome of nonformation in Prussia in 1848 and Belgium in 1954 and 1958 demonstrate that attempts by political entrepreneurs to organize voters following an institutional change but without the threat of policies are expected to fail. The broadening of the linguistic cleavage in Belgium after 1894 illustrates that the expansion of the franchise can broaden an existing cleavage by increasing the

number of eligible citizens who were affected by the policies but it is not the cause for cleavage formation.

6.2 New theory: Cleavages beyond Europe

This dissertation developed a new theory that can be used to explain how new electoral cleavages emerge in contemporary democracies. Compared to conventional theories of cleavage formation that center on political institutions and social structures, features that often change slowly and rarely, the policy-driven theory that I developed offers greater analytical leverage in explaining why cleavages emerge, persist, and dissolve. As a dynamic framework, it allows the connection between the social base of cleavages and the political meaning of social divisions to change, gaining and losing political salience in response to changes in the political context. Moreover, my theory does not assume the existence of a coherent social group before a new cleavage emerges. Instead, it is government policies that push individuals with similar social attributes to see each other as a part of the same group. For this reason the theory also better explains change. It assumes that when a new cleavage emerges, another cleavage weakens or dissolves. It treats cleavages as coalitions of voters that come together in response to government policies and fall apart when policies are removed or when the conflict subsides. Then, voters coordinate around more salient issues and form new coalitions. In contrast to conventional explanations that focus exclusively on positive cases of cleavage formation (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) or assume that entrepreneurs have sufficient knowledge and

therefore once they chose a strategy, cannot fail (Schattschneider, 1960), my theory considers the possibility of failed cases of cleavage formation. By adding variation to the dependent variable and including outcomes of nonformation, my research design is better able to identify the cause for cleavage formation (King et al., 1994, 129). Finally, the policy-driven theory proposes a mechanism for the persistence of cleavages. It suggests that cleavages endure because they are sustained by political parties that produce public policies that sustain certain lines of conflict.

My theory unpacks the mechanisms that lead to the emergence of a new cleavage and can therefore be used to evaluate competing theories that stress the role of the social structure, elite agency, and critical junctures and institutional change. Because the theory breaks down the process of cleavage formation into multiple and consecutive stages, it can better explain the timing of cleavage formation.

This policy-driven theory of cleavage formation adjudicates the perceived dichotomy between "bottom-up" and "top-down" theories (Boix, 2007; Evans, 2010). Instead of arguing that cleavages emerge from above or from below, my theory suggests that both voters and political entrepreneurs are drawn to the new focal points–the new policy issues–and coordinate around them. By pointing to grievances from policies as the necessary condition for cleavage formation, the theory also bridges the tension between "top-down" theories which suggest that elites craft electoral cleavages (Schattschneider, 1960; Lipset, 1960; Zielinski, 2002; Torcal and Mainwaring, 2003) and research in political behavior that demonstrates the limitations to elite influence and suggests that voters are selective in adopting messages from elites (Zaller, 1992; Druckman, 2001; Chong and Druckman,

2007b,a).[2] In the case studies, I find that mobilization by elites was effective only when voters experienced or anticipated grievances from government policies.

6.3 Pathways of party system change

The case studies illustrate three ways in which the formation of new cleavages can affect the structure of party systems. In the first pathway, the existing party system contained the new cleavage. This happened in 19th century Belgium, when individual Liberal and Catholic politicians managed to adjust their policy positions to the position of the voters and maximize their vote share in districts. Belgian parties consisted of loose internal structures that allowed individual legislators to adopt their district's preferences without breaking away from the party's constituency. Later, in the age of mass politics with the expansion of the franchise, the Catholic party could easily adjust its position to fit the political preferences of voters because of the close overlap between the Catholic and the Flemish issues. The Liberal party managed to shift its position only when the power of the pro-Flemish faction within the party increased.

In the second pathway, existing parties split along the new lines of the cleavage. In 20th century Belgium, the new cleavage cut across the existing electoral cleavages and split the constituencies of the Socialist and the Catholic parties. Because after the policies the voters of each party developed conflicting interests according to their linguistic region, the Socialist party in Wallonia and the Catholic party in

[2] See also the discussion in Boix (2007).

Flanders could not find an ideal position that will satisfy voters in both regions, and they split along regional lines.

In the third pathway, none of the existing parties moved to the new policy space and a new party emerged, as was the case in the three German states. This happened when none of the existing parties adopted the new issue (Meguid, 2005) either because the party's internal structure constrained the party's leadership (May, 1973; Kitschelt, 1989), the delegates themselves did not support the issue, or because none of the existing parties could move to the new policy space and keep their core supporters.

My analysis also finds that new parties, whether they emerge externally or internally, that is, as an opposition movement or by incumbents (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966; Hofstadter, 1969), emerge in order to protest the policies of the state and gain access to its special privileges. And they do so in order to influence state intervention in the future. Scholars have suggested that whether parties form inside or outside of legislatures determines their goals (Duverger, 1954; LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966; Shefter, 1994). By this logic, parties that are externally mobilized are founded by individuals who want access to the resources of the state while internally mobilized parties emerge when the elite is split on a new issue (Shefter, 1994). By contrast, I find that the new parties emerged because the political elite was split on a new issue *and* wanted to gain access to the state. In addition, while entrepreneurs responded to both of these incentives, they also responded to a demand from voters, who sought parties that can represent their interests.

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