

Mental Hygiene, Puericulture, and Cultural Politics of Childhood in Turkey, 1920s to 1950s:

Reforming the Nation through Reforming the Mind and Body of the Child

By

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(Curriculum and Instruction)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2016

Date of final oral examination: 05/12/2016

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ABSTRACT

This study traces the cultural politics of childhood during the two decades following the formation of the Republic of Turkey (1930s and 1940s), a period that marked the beginnings of the Republican biopolitics. Once the Republic was founded, a relatively small group of secular scientists, intellectuals, and policy makers, the self-declared guardians of the nation, assumed the tasks of fabricating a physically and mentally sound, stable, and productive Turkish citizenry. Discourses of the citizen were disseminated through education, childrearing practices and medicine to every corner of the republic as the ideal of a unified national identity. These ideals of the citizen were expressed through the population question (*nüfus meselesi*) and the child question (*çocuk meselesi*). The population question connoted two interrelated discursive lines of the Republican biopolitics simultaneously. One was to increase the population through pronatalist interventions, investments and policies. The second was to bring about fitter life through eugenically inspired public health and public education policies and interventions. These elements of biopolitics were seen as essential to the modernization and progress of the nascent Republic. The bodies and minds of the children of the Republic came to serve as the catalyst to address the hopes and fears embedded in both of these goals.

Two quasi-scientific discourses that incorporated principles from the eugenics movement were essential to this child-centered nation making process: puericulture and mental hygiene. Puericulture, the “science of infant management,” was put forth to produce fit and robust children. Puericulture made possible access to the privacy of the family and the body of women. It embodied “new” heteronormative (patriarchal) norms to regulate the family and women, putting them in the service of the nation. These norms masqueraded as “natural” or “scientific” facts were reproduced and normalized through puericulture education and the school curriculum.

Mental hygiene discourse, on the other hand, targeted the “abnormal” child populations in a psychiatric/psychological vocabulary, aiming to regulate and channelize their “disruptive” energy in the service of society through child protection and correction institutions with a labor-based curriculum. It constructed the abnormal body as the limit(s) of Republican solidarist notions of subjectivity and sociality (i.e. dutiful, obedient, and economically productive).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Over the course of this project, I have benefited from the generosity of many individuals who made this project possible by providing both professional and personal support. First and foremost, my sincere and most profound thanks go to Dr. Thomas Popkewitz, an exemplary advisor, a friend, and a colleague, who offered invaluable critical, thoughtful, and encouraging feedback on all versions of this undertaking, challenged me to argue with rigor and sharpen my thinking, while pushing me to articulate my arguments with confidence. Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee members: Dr. Julia Koza, Dr. John Rudolph, Dr. Uli Schamiloglu, and Dr. Li-Ching Ho, for their insightful comments and encouragement. Dr. Schamiloglu especially provided invaluable criticism that encouraged me to widen my current line of thinking from various perspectives.

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. İsmail Coşkun and Dr. Enes Kabakçı of İstanbul University for their hospitality and warm welcome during the initial phase of my research. The lively and profound intellectual conversations I had with them provided me with new avenues to explore, helped me rethink how to contextualize my work, and introduced me to various sources in the historiography of the social sciences in Turkey. The patient and helpful personnel at the Center for Islamic Studies (ISAM) and the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister's Office in Istanbul, plus the National Library and Directorate of Republican Archives in Ankara, provided essential assistance in navigating the archives and they deserve thanks for their time and assistance.

Graduate school colleagues, especially those in Dr. Popkewitz's "Wednesday Group," were profoundly influential throughout my intellectual journey and helped shape this project from its earliest formulation to its completion. Special thanks go to Dr. Licho Lopez, Chris and

Katie Kirchgasler, and Ji-Hye Kim for their friendship, support, and the many intellectually stimulating conversations we have had over the years.

I owe a particular debt of gratitude to my brother, Şahin Tunç, who generously spent many hours scanning and sending me the supplemental archival documents from Ankara that I needed to complete my writing. To my friends in Istanbul, Bilal Çelik, Hülya Akan, Mehmet Yılmaz, Ayşegül Mester, and Veysel Güneş, thank you for your hospitality and for opening up your homes to me during my stay in Istanbul.

Finally, I am especially grateful to my second family in the United States, my in-laws, a.k.a. the Kulows, for their constant and unwavering support during the ups and downs of graduate school. Special thanks to Robert Kulow, my father-in-law, who generously read the whole draft and offered constructive suggestions and feedback on my use of language. And, of course, the person who deserves the most thanks and acknowledgment is Torrey Kulow, my wife and partner. Your relentless encouragement kept my spirits up at times when I was about to give up. Thank you for your unconditional love, support, and belief in me.

I dedicate this work to my father, Niyazi Tunç, who passed away and to my daughter, Dilara Tunç, who was born while I was conducting this research.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction: Stating the Problem.....	1
Guiding Questions	14
Invocations of the questions: Some early methodological concerns	17
Organization of the study.....	21
Chapter I.....	25
Exploring the Historicity of Childhood as a Modern Category: Setting the Problem.....	25
1.1. Geographies of childhood: theorizing childhood as an archive.....	25
1.2. Theorizing childhood as a space of governmentality	30
1.2.1. The child on one end of the differential line of normality: Childhood as always already incomplete	36
Chapter II	39
History and Historiography of Childhood in Turkey: Children from Moral Subjects in the Empire to Nationalized Citizens of the State.....	39
2.1. Modernization theory and its discontents	39
2.2. The Islamized and moralized child of the Hamidian Era	44
2.2.1. School child	45
2.2.2. The child in need of protection	51
2.2.3. The child of popular discourse: Romantic/naturalist notions of childhood.....	56
Chapter III.....	65
Puericulture (Education) and the Contours of the Republican Child Question and Politics of Sexuality	65
3.1 Puericulture as the science of infant management.....	68
3.2. Puericulture in Turkey: Republican domestic politics and politics of sexuality	71
3.2.1. Puericulture and eugenics	73
3.2.2. Republican domestic politics I: Maternity as a social function and patriotic cause ...	77
3.2.3. Republican domestic politics II: Motherhood as the machinery of household and procreation	84
3.2.4. Puericulture education and feminization of domesticity	90
3.2.5. Puericulture through legislation.....	99
Chapter IV.....	101
Origins of the Mental Hygiene Movement In Turkey and the Contours of Republican Sociality and Subjectivity	101
Introduction.....	101
4.1. Epistemological origins of Mental Hygiene discourse in Turkey	105
4.2 The case of psychopathy and contours of Republican sociality and subjectivity.....	112
4.2.1. Equilibrium: From the biological to the social	112
4.2.2. Ideal Republican Subjectivity: Sociable, dutiful, and economically productive	118
Chapter V	129
Mental Hygiene and Fabrication and Regulation of “Abnormal” Bodies	129
5.1. Assistance: From charity to social obligation/duty.....	129

5.2. Medicalization of “abnormal” children	134
5.3. <i>Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu</i> and progressive efforts to govern “abnormal” children	140
Chapter VI.....	161
Anthropometrics, Biometrics, Psychometrics and Fabrication of the “Normal” Turkish Type.	161
6.1 Body and mind at the intersection of education, science and Republican national body politics.....	161
6.2 Anthropometrics and biometrics and the making of the normal Turkish type: Body as national archive.....	172
6.3 Psychometrics and the turn to the mind: Measuring and regulating difference	191
Chapter 7.....	202
Conclusion or Back to the Introduction: To Hold Things Together?	202

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter III

FIGURE 3.1 A FIGURE OF A MODERN REPUBLICAN WOMAN ON NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND CHILDREN’S DAY (APRIL 23, 1943).....	81
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Chapter V

FIGURE 5.1 “TWO PICTURES REPRESENTING THE ADMIRABLE ACTIVITIES OF THE DORMITORY.”	145
FIGURE 5.2 FIGURE AND DESCRIPTION OF ONE OF THE STUDENTS.	146
FIGURE 5.3 FIGURE AND DESCRIPTION OF ANOTHER STUDENT.	147
FIGURE 5.4 CHILDREN ASSEMBLED IN MILITARY STYLE ALIGNMENT.	150
FIGURE 5.5 PHYSICAL EDUCATION IN A SUMMER CAMP.	150
FIGURE 5.6 SHOEMAKING WORKSHOP IN THE INSTITUTION FOR DEAF, MUTE AND BLIND.	154

Chapter VI

FIGURE 6.1 THE DUFASSEL’S THORACOGRAPH.	163
FIGURE 6.2 VISUAL INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO USE ANTHROPOMETRIC TOOLS	178
FIGURE 6.3 DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY FOR THE ANTHROPOMETRIC STUDY.	181

Chapter VII

FIGURE 7.1 THE WINNER OF THE ROBUST CHILD COMPETITION ORGANIZED BY THE CHILD PROTECTION SOCIETY.....	207
FIGURE 7.2 A PICTURE OF “ROBUST” CHILDREN ON NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND CHILDREN’S DAY (APRIL 23, 1936).	208

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 5.2 DEONTOLOGY OF SOCIAL HYGIENE..... 132

Introduction: Stating the Problem

This dissertation aims to make visible the contours of a medical gaze that emerged during the formative years of the Republic of Turkey –1920s to 1950s –and fixed on the mind and body of the child. It explores the medical gaze in primarily two medico-psycho-pedagogical discourses: a) puericulture that was promoted largely but not solely by pediatricians and pedagogues, and b) mental hygiene discourse that was promoted by psychiatrists, psychologists and pedagogues. The primary context of investigation for both was the mind and the body of the child. While mental hygiene targeted street children and child delinquents as the epitome of “problem” child populations and school children, puericulture targeted children at home. In this sense, both cohered around and responded to the child question (ubiquitously termed as *çocuk meselesi* or *çocuk davası*), the quintessential component of the Republican population question (*nüfus meselesi*). The gaze, then, was necessarily a “childhood gaze”¹ insofar as it took the child as both the positive object and subject of its investigation.

This way of thinking about the gaze is developed through a reading of Michel Foucault, who traces the emergence of an empirical clinical gaze in the late nineteenth century that began to see and treat its objects in their positivity. That is, the objects of medical gaze (the body, the mind, the child) gained positive scientific value, no more seen as moral problems, and turned into a field of scientific investigation, and only “the gaze directed upon them would ... awaken them and make them stand out against a background of objectivity.” It was the reorganization, new distribution and definition of the world of objects that made the clinical experience possible

¹ The concept of “childhood gaze” is inspired by Theresa Richardson, who, as this study does, develops it through a reading of Foucault’s clinical gaze. See, Theresa R. Richardson, *The Century of the Child: The Mental Hygiene Movement and Social Policy in the United States and Canada* (Albany: State University of New York, 1989); Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

as a historical fact.² Similarly, childhood gaze as a historical fact and a historically specific terrain is identified here with a system of reorganizations or a tutelary system, borrowing from Jacques Donzelot – new psychobiological norms, definitions, concepts and categories, biographies, institutions, and political rationalities – as they appeared in relation to the discourses above.

Childhood gaze functions as a grid of intelligibility for heterogeneous practices during the designated time for this study. That is, it functions as a visual map and as a matrix where polymorphous claims for scientific truth (medical, psychiatric, psychological, anthropological, pedagogical etc.) and assumptions about the ontology of childhood coalesce in relation to the political rationalities of the Republic and its social and cultural entanglements. It is in this matrix that the epistemological order of truth as demarcated in scientific discourses overlaps with its objects (child, body, mind, nation). Childhood gaze also helps me to trace and make a site-based reading of the “century of the child” metaphor, locating it in the social and educational practices of the Turkish Republic.³ In this sense, it helps to make visible the socio-psycho-pedagogical investments in childhood and how childhood turned into an object of scientific investigations and national educational reforms, simultaneously demonstrating how this metaphor is nationalized. Therefore, it becomes possible to trace the child’s changing relationship to the State to the extent that the State’s biological and economic future and its progress were gradually linked to the health and well-being of its children.

Juxtaposition of mental hygiene and puericulture discourses seems, on the one hand, arbitrary because they emerged in heterogenous contexts and disciplines. The former developed

² *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, xiii-xix.

³ “The century of the child” is the translated title of a book by the Swedish writer Ellen Key. The book was translated into English in 1909 and played a major role in the child-study movements in North America and Europe. The title functions as a metaphor here to point to the emergence and the centrality of childhood as a category in modern nation states.

primarily in the field of psychiatry in the United States, responding to particular cultural anxieties and concerns of a rapidly changing society, characterized by industrialization, urbanization, and immigration.⁴ Mental hygienists here took up the task of bettering the mental conditions of the child and adult so that they could adjust to the harsh conditions of an industrial society and a liberal capitalist social order. As Pols argues, “theories and practices of mental hygienists were inextricably related to the changing ideology of American individualism.”⁵

The latter, puériculture, coined by a French physician named Alfred Caron, first appeared in France in the second half of the nineteenth century referring roughly to the health of the newborns in the general improvement of human species. The concept was adopted and given a new function by Adolphe Pinard (1844-1934), a French obstetrician. He defined it as “research and application of knowledge useful to the reproduction, preservation and improvement of the species.”⁶ Pinard, like the rest of the physicians and intellectuals of his age, was seriously concerned about the depopulation, demographic decline, and high rates of infant mortality in France. He put forth puériculture as a remedy to the problem, but it became more than that; puériculture got intertwined with eugenic assumptions, eugenic family ideals, and a state-sponsored pronatalism in the national context of France.⁷ The point here is not to provide an exhaustive account of these discourses, but to point to the fact that these discourses emerged in

⁴ For a history of the movement in the US see: Richardson, *The Century of the Child: The Mental Hygiene Movement and Social Policy in the United States and Canada*; Johannes Coenraad Pols, "Managing the Mind: The Culture of American Mental Hygiene, 1910-1950" (Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1997); Sol Cohen, "The Mental Hygiene Movement, the Development of Personality and School: The Medicalization of American Education," *History of Education Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (1983).

⁵ Pols, "Managing the Mind: The Culture of American Mental Hygiene, 1910-1950," 3.

⁶ William H. Schneider, "Puericulture and the Style of French Eugenics," *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences* 8, no. 2 (1986): 265.

⁷ For the history of the concept of puericulture in France and its mobilization in various national contexts see, for example: *ibid*; Marius Turda and Aaron Gillette, *Latin Eugenics in Comparative Perspective* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 33-41.

response to unique cultural and historical concerns, anxieties, and hopes before they turned into international movements.

On the other hand though, this juxtaposition makes more sense once one considers the global circulation of concerns and anxieties across emerging modern nation states in the first decades of the twentieth century about managing the health and well-being of their populations, their preoccupation with biological betterment of the social body and body politic, and thus, global and eclectic mobilization of scientific concepts and discourses to respond to these concerns. As Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine argue in their introduction to a comprehensive edition of international eugenics movements, this was a period of widespread nationalism, technological transformation, and transformation in the way the nations came to think of the citizenry and labor force.⁸ Particularly important was the emergence of the notion of population as a new problematic, as a biological phenomenon, transposed from the juridical-political realm into, what Foucault calls, a “technical-political object of management and government.”⁹

The population in the nineteenth century was neither an object of absolute monarchical power anymore nor an object of the panopticon disciplinary gaze, but of a new technology of biopower and governmentality that governed the population through investing in and regulating a set of life processes such as the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population, morbidity, longevity of life etc., using new mechanisms of power such as forecasts, statistical estimates and measures.¹⁰ In short, biopower of population was “a matter of taking

⁸ Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine, "Introduction: Eugenics and the Modern World," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics*, ed. Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 2.

⁹ Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 70.

¹⁰ *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 243-45.

control of life and the biological processes of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not disciplined, but regularized.”¹¹ Nikolas Rose identifies eugenics as a biopolitical strategy of this kind that infused five terms that constituted quintessential characteristics of eugenics discourse in various national contexts in its early twentieth century variation: population, quality, territory, nation, and race.¹² These five elements were at the core of eugenics discourse across nations whether it aimed at preventing life (through sterilization, for instance), bringing about fitter life (through environmental reforms, puericulture, public health), or generating more life (pronatalist interventions, treatment of infertility).¹³ In most national contexts, one, two or all of these strategies were at work. One important point to add here is that all of these phenomena that Rose delineates were quintessentially modern; therefore, eugenics and the two discourses in my study are necessarily about modernity.¹⁴

Nevertheless, the translation of these discourses (mental hygiene, puericulture, and eugenics) reflect a constellation of beliefs and practices diverse across nations, for each nation adopted, defined, and applied these discourses to suit local scientific, cultural, institutional, and political conditions. This is in line with Harry Harootunian’s “co-existing” or “co-eval modernity” –vis-à-vis “alternative” or “retroactive modernities” –that points to the experience of sharing the same temporality with other nations; that is, “whatever and however a society develops, it is simply taking place at the same time as other modernities.”¹⁵ Such formulation helps to avoid the sense of exceptionalism and uniqueness inherent in the concepts of alternative or retroactive modernities, yet it allows one to mark the difference in each experience. As

¹¹ Ibid., 246.

¹² Nikolas Rose, *The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 56.

¹³ Bashford and Levine, "Introduction: Eugenics and the Modern World," 2.

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ Harry D. Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton University Press, 2011), xiv.

Harootunian puts it, “What co-eval suggests is contemporaneity yet the possibility of difference.”¹⁶ (This is further explored in chapter II).

Mobilization of mental hygiene and puericulture discourses in Turkey embodies this contemporaneity with other nations yet marks its difference. What is evident is that in Turkey both mental hygiene and puericulture appear to have been hybridized in theoretical texts and policy documents along with eugenic assumptions; that is, although mental hygiene discourse, different from puericulture and eugenics, was a more systematic and organized movement in Turkey, formed under *Akıl Hıfzısıhhası Cemiyeti* (Mental Hygiene Society) with its own journal, scientific publications, annual conferences, and a close circle of researchers, all of these three movements were relatively unified and mobilized alongside each other, rather than developing as separate movements. Thus, in Turkey, there was not a single mental hygiene, puericulture, or eugenics discourse, but rather, a constellation of theories, assumptions, and practices that would oftentimes overlap under the banner of all these three discourses simultaneously. Turkish scientists and reformers did not critically reflect upon the differences between these discourses, but rather pragmatically and selectively employed them as needed for and fitted to the broader cause of modernizing Turkish society with new foundations based on modern scientific principles.¹⁷

Another important difference that needs articulation is that all these three discourses emerged –particularly in the industrialized West –as a response to problems that were linked to urbanization and industrialization and were put forth to eradicate the so-called negative effects of (urban) civilization as it was ubiquitously phrased. The civilization(al) problems included

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ In her analysis of eugenics discourse in Turkey, Ayça Alemdaroğlu brings up a similar point when she claims that Turkish eugenicists did not necessarily reflect upon the differences between French, German or North American variations of eugenics. Ayça Alemdaroğlu, "Politics of the Body and Eugenic Discourse in Early Republican Turkey," *Body & Society* 11, no. 3 (2005): 71.

immigration, venereal diseases, prostitution, alcoholism, feeble-mindedness and other mental abnormalities, an increase in problem populations such as child delinquents and other mentally diseased, an increase in working class population, and other social and moral crises.

Depending on the political, scientific, and cultural traditions in each national context, one or few of these problems would get prioritized over the others. Despite the differences in national practices in the industrialized nations, if one analyzes the eugenics rhetoric, for example, it is unequivocally clear that modern industrial and technological civilization –whose theoretical and practical underpinnings were traced to the Enlightenment –was viewed as one, if not the only, source of the majority of the pathologies afflicting these nations.

Being a predominantly agrarian society the majority of whose population was made up of peasants, Turkey did not necessarily fit in this category. That is, civilization(al) problems did not afflict, or at least should not have afflicted, Turkey as much as they did the industrialized nations. As we will see, however, mental hygienists and puericulturists frequently borrowed the language of the western medical community and fabricated problems of a similar kind such as alcoholism, child delinquency, moral degeneracy, etc., locating them chiefly in Istanbul, the most urbanized city of the Republic. To a certain extent, they were able to nationalize these problems. However, these discourses were primarily mobilized to modernize the country in the nationalistic vocabulary of the Republican regime headed by the Republican's People Party.

It was neither industrialization nor the modern civilization that posed a huge threat –as was believed by eugenicist scientists in the industrialized West –albeit both were invoked frequently in their rhetoric. The major problems afflicting Turkey were population decline due to wars and loss of lands, high rates of infant mortality and illiteracy, therefore an insufficient labor force, and finally the predominant peasant population that was not educated in modern style. In

this sense, these discourses were integrated into national politics that aimed at modernizing, rationalizing, and civilizing the body politic in Turkey to catch up and compete with industrialized nations.¹⁸ They gained a pedagogic as well as a regulative function: pedagogic in the sense that they were utilized to educate the populace in modern hygiene principles, and regulative in the sense that they were utilized to regulate hitherto moral and private spaces such as family and the reproductive capacity of women and so forth. Both of these strategies would go hand in hand.

With pedagogic and regulative functions, both mental hygiene and puericulture cohered around the common goal of formation of children as future republican citizens. In search of new foundations for the Republic, Republican scientists –regardless of their discipline –, reformers, and educators alike turned to children, who they thought held the key to the future of the Republic. They collaborated to improve the health of children based on modern hygiene principles so as to reinvigorate the Turkish “race” itself.¹⁹ Such interest in childhood was, of course, an index of more broadly based social and political concerns of the newly established Republic.

¹⁸ Ibid. see also, Orhan Aybers, "Eugenics in Turkey During the 1930s" (Middle East Technical University, 2003); Murat Ergin, "Biometrics and Anthropometrics: The Twins of Turkish Modernity," *Patterns of Prejudice* 42, no. 3 (2008). Puericulture and mental hygiene discourses have not been studied in Turkey as separate movements, but have been briefly referred to, sometimes in passing, in the studies above as a part of eugenics discourse.

¹⁹ The concept of race used by Turkish intellectuals did not have the same connotations nor was it as finely defined or fixed as the Anglo-American race. Although it was used to express similar concerns, what race connoted was closer to the concept of “nation” or “*millet*.” Although the concept of race, as it was operationalized by the Republican cadres during the single party period, shared anthropomorphic qualities with other races with a biological connotation, referring to “stock,” “species” or “human species” at large, it was different from the Anglo-American and Germanic conceptualizations, as Zafer Toprak argues, in that it was inclusive of all the ethnicities making up the population in Turkey, not necessarily exclusive. The people of Turkey were indiscriminately brachiocephalic. See, Toprak, Zafer. *Darwin'den Dersim'e: Cumhuriyet Ve Antropoloji*. Istanbul: Doğan kitap, 2012. (p. 15). At times the concept of race referred to vague ideas about the Turkish citizenry forming a national “body.” More often than not these concepts –nation, race, and citizenry –were used interchangeably across texts. I also agree with Sanem Güvenç Salgirli that the concept of race as the way it was used by Turkish scientists and intellectuals had an upper-middle class component to it as well. That is, whenever it was evoked in these texts, it connoted certain assumptions, ideals, tastes, and phantasies of this group. See, Salgirli, Sanem Güvenç. "Eugenics for the Doctors: Medicine and Social Control in 1930s Turkey." *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 66, no. 3 (2011): 281-312.

Childhood served as a particularly productive space during a period when Republicans, traumatized by both population and land losses in Balkan wars and World War I, and thus stricken by the fear of depopulation, and diseases along with excessive rates of infant mortality, high rates of illiteracy, and of course the dissolution of the six-hundred year-Empire, yet simultaneously revitalized by the War of Independence, needed to define and create a new Turkish citizenry capable of achieving and sustaining the principles of the “Revolution.” The child of the revolution was to carry a double burden: the fear of the past and the optimism created with the War of Independence.

(And this is probably what is different about the Turkish case; that is, the Republic took shape out of the demise of the long Ottoman Empire, thus necessarily out of death, while paradoxically always under the shadow of this death and out of the possibility of imagining a new life that was brought about with the War of Independence. Scientists and reformers, in this sense, turned to children with vigor to employ modern medical and hygienic principles to protect this new life of the Republican body politic against the backdrop of a dying Empire as well as to sustain and preserve it for future generations).

Mobilization of mental hygiene, puericulture, and eugenics towards fabricating ideal Republican children provided the Republican cadres with new incentives to address what they called the population question while creating a new space where the State was able to penetrate into the very center of the traditionally private institution of family, ordering and regulating it from inside and outside.

Childhood provided a critical bridge between private and public spheres, bringing what traditionally belonged to the private sphere in Islamic society of the Ottoman Empire to the public domain including but not limited to the family itself, the economy of the household,

motherhood, and child-rearing practices. This new blending of the State with family life is particularly evinced in the Republican politics of sexuality that involved rational administration of conjugality, childcare, parenthood, and reproductive capacities of women in the rural and urban areas. To respond to the population question, the republican cadres promoted pronatalist policies to increase the population while simultaneously intervening and regulating it. And childhood came to be pivotal in transmitting the Republican agenda in search of the ideal Republican citizen.

In the rest of this study, I attempt to demonstrate the simultaneous contemporaneity and difference in the Turkish case of translating two discourses briefly introduced above into Republican body politics by delineating, distinguishing and reconstituting the discursive and non-discursive lines that converged in the designated period to form these discourses and helped effectuate new notions of childhood and the child's body and mind. The period under review is particularly important in the sense that it marks the intensification if not the beginnings of Republican biopolitics, the fixation on regulating individual bodies and the population at large, the two registers where biopolitics found its resonance in Turkey similar to other contemporary nations. Childhood and the child's body and mind along with family and sexuality would comprise the intersection where the body met the population. Children's bodies and minds would be described, made visible, differentiated, and inscribed with new Republican ideals, metaphors and vocabulary.

I argue that mental hygiene and puericulture emerged in Turkey as complex discursive practices in relation to multiple global and local historical forces and should be read as a function of the following inextricably related processes: the rise and development of modern social hygiene theories and institutions; psychiatry and other scientific disciplines, and thus new

medical and psycho-biological metaphors and language; sacralization of children as biological and economic capital of the nation in the Republican discourse; professional aspirations of the emerging Republican scientists, their habitus, life styles, material experiences, tastes, and biographies; and finally the access of scientific experts to a large accessible population – particularly school children – to carry out their research, a condition that was made possible in line with the health and education policies and projects of the new Republican regime under the Republican People’s Party.

First, one constitutive condition of childhood gaze was the epistemological norms and standards derived from psychosciences and disciplines (psychiatry, psychology, psychoanalysis and others), borrowing from Nikolas Rose’s language, that made it possible to delineate the ab/normalcy of certain populations and behaviors, and played a critical role in inventing certain regimes of self and provided the rulers with epistemic tools and normative categories to govern the conduct of the population.²⁰ The mental hygiene movement was quintessentially an amalgamation of psychosciences and disciplines, particularly psychiatry and genetic psychiatrics, psychology, pedagogy, and to a lesser extent psychoanalysis. Mental hygienists would put the knowledge and norms they derived from these disciplines to practical uses, particularly in defining and tackling social and moral problems.

Another condition was the sacralization of children during the Republican period as biological and economic capital of the nation.²¹ This marked a transformation in the way the State came to see the family, which it viewed as the single most important unit for the future of

²⁰ Nikolas Rose, *Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood*, Cambridge Studies in History of Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

²¹ The concept of “sacralization of childhood” is borrowed from Viviana A. Zelizer, *Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

the nation. Starting in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1920) the relationship between family and the State was taking a new form. The family was to be rescued from the residues of tradition, Islamic mores, and negligence during the Empire, made modern, but would paradoxically be brought under a new tutelage where State would substitute the father and the Sultan as the proprietor of the child.

Third were the professional aspirations of emerging Republican scientists, their social habitus, life styles, material experiences, tastes, and biographies. In Turkey, medical doctors, particularly after the Republic was founded, took up a prominent role in the modernization of the country, actively participating in the political life and nation-building process.²² Foremost was their conviction that medicine as a science held the answer to the majority of the social and moral problems afflicting the nation and impeding its progress; it was seen as integral to the westernization and modernization mission of the nation state.²³ They were optimists compared to their European colleagues in the belief that positive sciences could develop and modernize the nation and lead it to a level where it could compete with the industrial nations. A second important point was the nature of the relationship between the expert, the university, and the State in Turkey. Particularly after the higher education reforms in 1933, the university was turned into a quintessential state institution and the professoriate into government officials. What the reforms made possible was that all the professoriate who did not comply with the agenda of the Republican People's Party were purged and young western-educated Republican scientists took their place. Republican scientists, thus, acquired new academic privilege and institutional power that only undergirded their scientific authoritarianism, and built their careers on the

²² See for example: Ayça Alemdaroğlu, "Eugenics, Modernity and Nationalism," in *Social Histories of Disability and Deformity*, ed. David Turner and Kevin Stagg (New York: Routledge, 2006); Sanem Güvenç Salgirli, "Eugenics for the Doctors: Medicine and Social Control in 1930s Turkey," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 66, no. 3 (2011).

²³ Ibid.

expertise they provided in the service of the State. Their scientific persona had already provided them with a favorable vantage point to speak from for the nation in the formative years of the Republic. The following depiction of modern *men* of medicine by historian Robert Nye applies well to the Turkish doctors:

Medical men had enough training in basic science to be credible as scientific mediators between the mysteries of the clinic and the vexing problems of everyday life. Doctors were also well organized, thoroughly secular and political in their outlook, and fierce defenders of their professional and social prerogatives.²⁴

One last point to underline here is that their scientific persona were intricately linked to their social and cultural habitus and the cultural and social values they attached to science were associated with their bourgeois outlook and secular morality. This has been demonstrated well by Sanem Güvenç Salgirli, who argues that daily routines and the patterns of reproduction among the medical community, as well as the self-conceptualization of professional work by this community were the conditions of possibility in the development of eugenics discourse in Turkey.²⁵ On the one hand, medical doctors were trying to raise the professional and intellectual status of their discipline to scientific medicine; on the other hand, they very arbiters of a particular modern and secular taste. Their professional space would frequently coincide with the social space.

Finally, another condition of possibility for these two main discourses was the availability of large populations to the scientific experts for testing and justifying their scientific claims. Particularly important were school children, whose mass visibility and availability were crucial

²⁴ Robert A. Nye, *Crime, Madness, & Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), xi.

²⁵ Salgirli, "Eugenics for the Doctors: Medicine and Social Control in 1930s Turkey," 284.

for the psychosciences and disciplines. Schools, thus, would turn into laboratories for these sciences.

I explore these discursive and non-discursive lines insofar as they cohere to effectuate the childhood gaze. Thus, I see childhood and childhood gaze as forming the backbone of the grid of intelligibility where these discursive and non-discursive lines cohere and assemble.

Guiding Questions

The centrality of the child to national politics is grounded in at least two *mythical* qualities attributed to modern childhood, both of which were provided by evolutionary and developmental theories of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century historical disciplines in the industrialized West:²⁶ First was the *evolutionary child*, understood as an index of the nation's past, repeating the microcosm of a race's entire developmental history (recapitulation theory), and the second was the *developmental child*, understood as embodying unlimited potentiality for the future of a nation. These seemingly contradictory ideas of childhood, i.e. the child as marked (and restricted) by racial and ethnic codes of heredity yet as a source of unlimited potentialities, constituted one of the organizing principles around which nineteenth and twentieth century national identities were imagined. These ideas would also form the pillars of modern psychology, psychiatry, pedagogy, and educational sciences including educational psychology.

In Turkey, particularly during the period stretching from 1923 when the Republic was founded to the 1950s, these ideas of childhood came into prominence against the backdrop of

²⁶ The use of "West" here does not refer to a geo-politically unified bloc (of nations) nor does it function as an unproblematic analytical category that establishes an empirical relation (as in "between the West and ...") for comparative purposes. It does, however, demonstrate certain discursive regularities for this study, particularly in the way the child came to be seen and acted upon as a "social problem" in the late nineteenth century governmental rationalities across Europe and North America, which is epitomized in the metaphor "The Century of the Child," the translated title of the book by the Swedish writer Ellen Key. The book was translated into English in 1909 and played a major role in the child-study movements in North America and Europe. The title functions as a metaphor here to point to the emergence and the centrality of childhood as a category in modern nation states.

emerging modern scientific disciplines. The body and the mind of the child were ascribed new social, cultural, and moral marks and meanings in the context of national rebirth.

This study traces modern cultural politics of childhood within the framework of the Republican social and educational reforms. Tracing cultural politics of childhood, as James and James put it, involves not only analyzing different cultural determiners and discourses that define the contours of childhood and through which the idea of child and childhood is produced but also the very political and techno-scientific mechanisms and processes through which these ideas are put into practice.²⁷ In this sense, the study engages in analyzing the scientific discourses designated above that provided the theoretical underpinnings of the politics of childhood while also analyzing the techno-epistemic and political mechanisms –schools, curriculum, anthropometric and psychometric measurements and so forth – that helped enact these theories. Indeed, the study traces the fuzzy line between theory and practice particularly with regard to politics of childhood in Turkey and assumes that there was never really a clear-cut line between the theoretical and the practical. This claim is grounded in the belief that construction of scientific knowledge, i.e. the theoretical, has always been closely tied to social ordering and governmentality, i.e. the practical.²⁸ What is meant is that “solutions to the problem of knowledge are embedded within practical solutions to the problem of social order.”²⁹ The problem of epistemology, i.e., generating knowledge, is wedded to the problems in politics and culture, thus the coupling of epistemology and social order. It is the coupling of power and

²⁷ Allison James and Adrian L. James, *Constructing Childhood: Theory, Policy and Social Practice* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

²⁸ For the relationship between the psychosciences and disciplines, and social ordering and the invention of modern subjectivities, see Rose, *Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood*. For the relationship between reasoning in educational sciences, educational reforms, and social regulation and ordering, see Thomas S. Popkewitz, *A Political Sociology of Educational Reform: Power/Knowledge in Teaching, Teacher Education, and Research* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1991); *Cosmopolitanism and the Age of School Reform: Science, Education, and Making Society by Making the Child* (New York: Routledge 2008).

²⁹ Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), 15.

knowledge in a configuration where the former produces the latter while the latter defines the contours of the former, an interactive relation in which neither is reducible to one another. And embedded in this coupling are new imaginations of national identity, society, citizenry, and subjectivities.

Overall, the following questions guide this study:

- How did the Republican child come about at the intersection of various discursive (scientific theories and practices) and non-discursive (judicial and other forms of institutionalization) practices?
- How did childhood and the child's mind and body function as spaces of governmentality, embodying assemblages of power relations and arrangements of knowledge in the political rationalities of the Republic in the designated period?
- What were the overlapping historical conditions and scientific practices whereby mind and body of the child were inscribed as an object of governance in the Turkish schools and curriculum?

In asking these questions, I aim to examine discursive production of the child, the body and mind, and how these objects became the sites of scientific investigation and cultural and political investment through what I call pedagogical knowledges and narratives of the Republican cadres.³⁰

³⁰ This is inspired by Homi Bhabha's characterization of nation as narrated in a double-temporality. On the one hand is the representational narration in which historical time is fixed, homogenous, and colonized by nationalist discourses that constantly objectify people through nationalist pedagogies, and on the other is the performative, the lived present of the people's history, where any form of signification is always in the making and incomplete; it is "a fluctuating movement which they [people] are just giving shape to," "a zone of occult instability," and "cultural undecidability." The latter challenges "the teleological traditions of past and present [expressed in the former], and the polarized historicist sensibility of the archaic and the modern." See Homi K. Bhabha, "Dissemination: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation," in *The Blackwell Reader in Contemporary Social Theory*, ed. Anthony Elliot (Madlen, MA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1999), 211-16.

My focus is not on the materiality of children's lives or their bodily experiences, nor what children *did* and how they *lived*; rather, I am interested in “what has been done with the ‘child.’”³¹ I am less interested in child as a biological figure and more in what ways this biological figure was taken up in science and culture and how concepts of this figure that emerged from these sources came to represent a particular regime of truth that attempted to govern the familial and other social practices in Turkey, and how they functioned as modes of identification and classification for the state apparatus.

Invocations of the questions: Some early methodological concerns

The questions delineated here invoke a constructionist concept as an analytical device to render visible what kinds of selves, identities, and subjectivities are fabricated by these discourses.³² In asking these questions, I aim to achieve at least two things. First, I aim to demonstrate that child, the body and the mind are not natural entities but constructed, or what Ian Hacking calls, “made up” at the intersection of various discursive and non discursive practices designated above.³³ By doing so, I hope to go beyond those studies done in Turkey that have primarily treated their objects (child, body, woman) as ideological constructions, overloading Kemalism –as a hegemonic ideology –both theoretically and methodologically as a major cause effectuating these objects.³⁴ I agree with Haraway that these bodies are historically and contextually specific, and “have a different kind of specificity and effectivity, and so they invite

³¹ Bernadette M. Baker, *In Perpetual Motion: Theories of Power, Educational History, and the Child* (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 3.

³² Donna J. Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 208.

³³ Ian Hacking, "Making up People," in *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*, ed. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986).

³⁴ See, for example, G. Gürkan Öztan, *Türkiye'de Çocukluğun Politik İnşası* [Political construction of childhood in Turkey] (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011).

a different kind of engagement and intervention.”³⁵ Such engagement requires exploring the historically specific terrains where the body is marked by cultural and political contestations, narratives, and techno-epistemic arrangements.

Second, I aim to demonstrate the polymorphous and ambivalent nature of scientific discourses. In asking these questions I am not attributing a panopticon or sovereign quality to discourses, for asking their conditions of possibility is necessarily to attempt to make visible any chances, myths, and irregularities in their formation, and to refer to their “lumpiness” as Haraway puts it. Haraway claims “scientific discourses are ‘lumpy’; they contain and enact condensed contestations for meanings and practices.”³⁶ Thinking with Haraway, I believe that myth, laboratory and clinic are intimately interwoven.

My particular concern is with those discourses that formed and transformed in relation with childhood gaze -that is mental hygiene and puericulture, which had their disciplinary lineage in such fields as pediatrics, (physical) anthropology, psychiatry, psychology, pedagogy, and educational psychology. I trace the intricate relationship between the scientific discourses in the Republican Period and the way they informed each other with regard to textualization of child symbols, images, and descriptions.

I do not necessarily focus on each discourse in its singularity, but attempt to trace them where their coordinates meet at the designated time and space, only temporarily. That is, I spatialize the emerging relationship as an assemblage on a map, and map being the body (child, mind). As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, tracing should be put back on the map so that we can show at what points the coordinates meet to form assemblages (childhood, scientific discourses,

³⁵ Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, 208.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 204.

political and civic body etc.).³⁷ I take childhood not as point of departure but as “a moving resultant,” an uncertain form that one can only render visible through studying the system of relations it maintains with other assemblages such as sciences, family, political organizations and law.³⁸

As noted earlier, this study traces the intelligibility of the child’s mind and body in Turkey in two scientific discourses and techno-epistemic arrangements during the formative years of the modern Turkish Republic.³⁹ Conceptualization of the problematic as such requires that we discard grand narratives and universals (state, sovereignty, subject, modernity) as essential categories of intelligibility in favor of events, singularities, practices, laying emphasis on micrology or micropolitics.⁴⁰ Thinking with micropolitics helps to approach childhood not as a natural category but a correlative of heterogeneous scientific, political and cultural practices. That is to say, before childhood is a category it goes through a process of objectification.⁴¹ As Paul Veyne has put it, “[w]hat is made, the object, is explained by what went into its *making* at each moment of history; we are wrong to imagine that the *making*, the practice, is explained on the basis of what is made.”⁴² Therefore, my analysis starts with the process of objectification, the

³⁷ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

³⁸ This is inspired by the mode of analysis preferred in Jacques Donzelot, *The Policing of Families*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979), xxv.

³⁹ Designation of the period (1920s-1950s) in this study is to a large extent pragmatic and for discursive convenience, for I believe that clear-cut temporal epochs mask continuities, transformations, mutations and borrowings between different temporalities (of the Empire and the modern Republic). My uneasiness with clear-cut temporal periods partly stems from the “progressive” and “developmental” qualities attributed to the most recent historical epochs in the prevalent historiography, which in Turkish context refers to the period after 1923 when the Republic of Turkey was founded. That said, however, the designated period does manifest discursive regularities that are neither developmental nor progressive in this account but are discernible mutations that are effects and functions of *new* practices of power and knowledge.

⁴⁰ Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France, 1978-1979*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

⁴¹ Paul Veyne, "Foucault Revolutionizes History," in *Foucault and His Interlocutors*, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

⁴² *Ibid.*, 160.

process of naming, the coming into becomingness in mechanisms of power and truth-knowledge games.⁴³

The style of thought introduced here makes it possible to think about the State, government, and similar institutions as a function of the changes in their practices, not as entities with inherent meaning or natural laws attached to them. I analyze the emergence of childhood as a function of changes in the micropolitics of governing and ordering the social with the emergence of multiple heterogeneous forces.

⁴³ Ian Hacking, *Historical Ontology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

Organization of the study

In chapter I, I lay out two axes of the theoretical grid for this study that provide forms and strategies of reading and analyzing the archival, or what is called the “historical evidence”: a) studies in history and sociology of childhood and b) studies in biopolitics and governmentality. The grid that I lay out here is to be understood as a function of the problem posed in the introduction of this study—*how did childhood, mind and body come to be and function as spaces of governmentality in the political rationalities of the Republic?* Delineating the problem as such calls forth a different engagement with the historical: data, context, archive, historical figures etc. The contours of the historical are more often than not a priori defined with reference to certain ubiquitous umbrella terms such as “theoretical framework,” or “methodology” which usually implies a closed system constituted of predetermined assumptions, propositions, and explanations in solving the problem asked. These frameworks and concepts rendered in them are typically made into a ready-made and easily accessible set of formalized and rule-driven procedures, methods, and/or approaches. In this sense, they become sole sites of epistemic authority and forms of collective representation that limit what is to be seen and thought. My engagement with the theoretical and the conceptual is not to stabilize an empirical gaze or secure an analytic perspective. On the contrary, I engage with certain concepts to look for passageways, exit strategies, lines of flight, and new and creative ways “of articulation, of cutting and cross cutting.”⁴⁴ Concepts are taken here as providing creative and critical forms of reading, seeing and saying, and as Ann Stoler puts it, as provisional “generative sites.”⁴⁵ Concepts, she suggests, “open new analytic space and new associations. Like *rhizomes* or *assemblages* or *biopower*,

⁴⁴ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

⁴⁵ "Ann Laura Stoler Interviewed by E. Valentine Daniel," *Public Culture* 24, no. 3 (2012): 498-500.

concepts can become political actors when they stretch our visions to new domains.” And as she warns it is important that we retain concepts in their provisional mode.

In chapter II, I explore history and historiography of childhood in Turkey, tracing the transformation of the relationship between the child and State from the second half of the nineteenth century (particularly the Hamidian Era, 1876-1908) till establishment of the Republic. This was a formative period when modern social state practices and modern notions of childhood were introduced into the Empire. Of particular importance are three modern sources/forms of childhood: the school child, the child in need of protection (“problem children”), and the innocent child of romantic/naturalist discourse that was increasingly gaining popularity among the Ottoman educated elite who had access to Western sources and media.

The rest of the analysis, which primarily draws on primary sources, traces childhood in three spaces that became the object of Republican governmentality: home (household), street, and school. I explore the contours of childhood in these three spaces through the discourses of puericulture and mental hygiene and the system of relations these spaces and discourses maintain with each other and other assemblages such as family, economy, and law.

Chapter III traces the contours of childhood and emerging child question during the first three decades of the Republic through the concept of puericulture. I aim to demonstrate how *puériculture* emerged as a pedagogical and performative project for the nascent Republic to regulate and reform Turkish family and household as a function of ubiquitous child question where the child was conceived as a metaphor for the nation and embodiment of its future. *Puericulture*, understood as an assemblage of practices and knowledges related to the hygienic care and rearing of infants, was a complex discursive practice that brought together assumptions about sexuality, science, economy, politics, and national identity among others.

In chapter IV, I trace the foundation of Mental Hygiene Society in Turkey and epistemological origins of mental hygiene discourse through a discursive analysis of the work of Fahrettin Kerim, the founder of the Society. I particularly analyze two lines of inquiry in Fahrettin Kerim's work: his theory of psychopathy and the notion of evolution. The analysis in this chapter will help to conceptualize the rest of the chapters, for it will lay out major contours of the mental hygiene discourse that is explored further in the rest of the chapters.

Chapter V is organically tied to chapter IV. In this chapter, I focus on how "street children" were conceptualized in mental hygiene discourse and explore institutionalization efforts to control this population and their spaces (*sokak*), hoping to make visible the complex relationship between psychiatric/psychological theory of problem children, the moral and political outlook the scientists, and institutionalization of these ideas in conformity with Republican political rationality.

Finally in chapter VI, I analyze the contours of childhood gaze in the anthropometric and psychometric tests implemented among normal student population and population at large from 1930s to late 1940s. I analyze the politics of these tests and how these new testing apparatuses and technologies of measurement mediated and helped rearticulate the nationalist arguments and policies of the Republican People's Party. These what I call techno-epistemic arrangements were essential for the theorization of the "normal" Turkish identity as it was imagined by the Republican scientists. Particularly important were two large-scale anthropometric and intelligence tests carried out by anthropologists and (educational) psychologists respectively. Each with its own reasoning embodied the social and political imaginaries of Republican nationalism.

The last four chapters make use of a wide range of archival sources to construct the narrative including: visual materials, brochures and similar propaganda pamphlets produced and distributed by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and the Ministry of National Education, biographies and autobiographies of the scientists and political actors in the designated time period, legislative activities, and popular and scientific journals particularly *Yeşilay Mecmuası* (the Journal of Green Crescent Temperament Society) and *Tıp Dünyası* (the World of Medicine).

Chapter I

Exploring the Historicity of Childhood as a Modern Category: Setting the Problem

1.1. Geographies of childhood: theorizing childhood as an archive

As noted earlier, the approach taken in this study is grounded in a style of thought that depicts childhood as a social construction and a cultural invention,⁴⁶ understood as a complex interweaving of cultural and historical contexts, political and economic institutions, and literary scientific and legislative discourses.⁴⁷ This type of reasoning derives its initial insights from the seminal work of social historian Philip Aries on the history of modern European childhood. Aries was one of the first to maintain that modern childhood as a separate stage of life, with its own dynamics, ideals and institutions emerged in Europe between 15th and 18th century. The core of Aries argument was that our almost naturalized modern ideal of a safe, happy, and protected childhood is a historically limited Western creation and that the ways in which we perceive the child have changed significantly over time.⁴⁸ Treated as miniature adults in the Middle Ages, according to Aries, children in the next few hundred years would gain a physically and symbolically distinct social identity delineated and reinforced by segregated institutions, a distinct culture, and specialist forms of dress and attitudes. Seen as a precursor to adult life, they would increasingly be exposed to controlled development through carefully phased stages in rigorously organized social (family) and educational settings (school and curriculum). Since the

⁴⁶ The concept of invention here is inspired by Jacques Derrida, who points to the two registers embedded in the process of invention. First is “invention as fabulation” or “narrative invention” and the second is invention as “techne” or “techno-epistemic invention.” Although historically these two forms of invention have been thought as belonging two separate registers (literary versus material, for example), Derrida highlights “the unity or invisible harmony of these two registers.” See, Jacques Derrida, *Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume I* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 10-25.

⁴⁷ Alan Prout and Allison James, "A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood? Provenance, Promise and Problems," in *Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood*, ed. Allison James and Alan Prout (Washington, D.C.: Falmer Press, 1997); James and James, *Constructing Childhood: Theory, Policy and Social Practice*.

⁴⁸ Philippe Aries, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962).

publication of Aries' work, numerous studies from social history to anthropology and cultural studies have traced the almost evolutionary pathways childhood has taken in various contexts in response to unique cultural, national, social, economic, religious and political challenges of each context.⁴⁹

Although our modern perception of “universal” childhood is built upon numerous discourses and practices of childhood produced over the last three hundred years particularly in the West ranging from the “child of nature” of Rousseau, and Romanticized child of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to the medicalized and psychologized child of the twentieth century, it was only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that a “universal” model of childhood emerged and was recognized across a wide social and political spectrum.⁵⁰ As Hendrick claims, by the second decade of the twentieth century “a recognizably ‘modern’ notion of childhood was in place: it was legally, legislatively, socially, medically, psychologically, educationally and politically institutionalized.”⁵¹ The institutionalization of a “normal” and “standard” childhood was only possible through a combination of forces ranging from burgeoning psycho-sciences, mass schooling that provided budding experts an unprecedented opportunity to observe the body and the mind of children, the rise of middle

⁴⁹ See, for example, Hugh Cunningham, *The Invention of Childhood* (London: BBC Books, 2006); Harry Hendrick, "Constructions and Reconstructions of British Childhood: An Interpretative Survey, 1800 to the Present," in *Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood*, ed. Allison James and Alan Prout (Washington, D.C.: Falmer Press, 1997); Caroline F. Levander, *Cradle of Liberty: Race, the Child, and National Belonging from Thomas Jefferson to W.E.B. Du Bois* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Kristen E. Cheney, *Pillars of the Nation: Child Citizens and Ugandan National Development* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007); Öztan, *Türkiye'de Çocukluğun Politik İnşası*; Marianne N. Bloch et al., eds., *Governing Children, Families and Education: Restructuring the Welfare State* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Baker, *In Perpetual Motion: Theories of Power, Educational History, and the Child*.

⁵⁰ Erica Burman, *Deconstructing Developmental Psychology* (New York: Routledge, 1994); Hendrick, "Constructions and Reconstructions of British Childhood: An Interpretative Survey, 1800 to the Present"; Baker, *In Perpetual Motion: Theories of Power, Educational History, and the Child*.

⁵¹ Hendrick, "Constructions and Reconstructions of British Childhood: An Interpretative Survey, 1800 to the Present," 34. Similarly, Roger Cooter believes that what we hold as the “defining characteristics of ‘the child’ today, such as parental dependence, economic and sexual inactivity, and absence of legal and political rights[...]" emerged through transformations that took place in this period. See Roger Cooter, "Introduction," in *In the Name of the Child: Health and Welfare, 1880-1940*, ed. Roger Cooter (New York: Routledge, 1992).

classes with new social spaces and stretches of time for children to inhabit, to the political arrangement of modern nation states.

Late nineteenth and early twentieth century was a period when child became an object and subject of immense scientific and political attention and investment. While psycho-sciences and disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry and their cognates probed into the interiority of child's mind, disciplines such as pediatrics, anthropology and physiology directed their attention to the body of the child. This comprehensive shift towards the child was partly grounded in the historical mode of thinking of the era, epitomized in the belief that the identity of things lied in their historicity, or their developmental or progressive history. With a new consciousness of historical time, such historicity, as Reinhart Koselleck puts it, became not only a definitive quality of European identity but also "a cultural mode of living marked by a particular mode of temporality."⁵² Denaturalizing repeatable, static and divine conceptions of time common in religious cosmologies until the Enlightenment, Koselleck continues, this new experience of time –or *modernity* –contained certain qualities such as a conception of historical time that is dynamic, processual, and always in the making, an understanding of experiential world that is dynamic and temporalized, and a concept of future that is open for infinite possibilities, future seen as a "horizon of planning."⁵³ Thus, released from religious cosmologies, the concept of time, in all its forms, was dynamised and became an object of human reflection. And with such dynamization came a new conceptualization that historical time could be affected by human action and purposiveness, an Enlightenment ideal. This was expressed by the concepts of progress and development that tied together time in all its forms. These two categories came to occupy a new abstract space where human agency and purposiveness were inserted into the

⁵² Reinhart Koselleck, *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*, trans. Todd Samuel Presner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 168, 218-65.

historical time. Progress and development could only occur when people wanted it and panned for it.⁵⁴ The child came to occupy a central place in such historical mode of thinking, embodying a new sense of human agency and potentiality as well as fears and horrors.⁵⁵

According to Carolyn Steedman, the idea of childhood coincided with the historical mode of thinking and modern conventions of historical practice as the child came to epitomize the depths of historicity of modern self, and became “a central vehicle for expressing ideas about the self and its history.”⁵⁶ There are two important insights embedded in this suggestion. First is a spatial dislocation of the identity of modern self that was now interiorized, traced in the interiority, and placed inside, a condition that was only possible with making the interior of the child’s mind open to ideas of development and growth. The second was a temporal relocation as in seeking the identity of the self in “the laying down and accretion of our own childhood experiences, our own history, in a place inside.”⁵⁷ In both senses, the idea of childhood relates to the historical practice. Steedman draws an analogy between a historian’s tracing the history of an event in the archive and a psychoanalyst’s tracing the history of an individual’s psychic identity in her childhood. Childhood experience and child’s mind as archives for the psychoanalyst is more than a trope when we take childhood as a historical mode of thinking.

The centrality of child in and as a historical mode of thinking is best expressed in the recapitulation theory, which not only influenced the Child Study and Child Guidance movements in North America and across Europe but the eugenics movement, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, psychology and educational psychology. The premise of the theory was that embryonic

⁵⁴ Ibid., 120.

⁵⁵ Popkewitz, *Cosmopolitanism and the Age of School Reform: Science, Education, and Making Society by Making the Child*.

⁵⁶ Carolyn Steedman, *Strange Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea of Human Interiority, 1780-1930* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 5.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 12.

development of human brain and body proceeds from simple to complex, passing through stages that resembled those of simpler animals and reaching its most complex form in the human species. German evolutionary scientist Ernst Haeckel best expressed it in the dictum: “Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” that is, developmental history of an organism recapitulates the evolutionary history of that organism. In this sense, the child came to represent ancestral forms of human and animal species in its early developmental stages.⁵⁸ In this model, according to Shuttleworth, child was doubly burdened as “the carrier of primitive, animalistic passions, but also the attenuated nerves of an overdeveloped civilization and unbidden memories of the past.”⁵⁹ Therefore, the child became an embodiment of the savage past while preserving the codes of modern civilization.

American G Stanley Hall (1844-1924), a pioneer in the development of psychology and educational psychology as scientific disciplines and Child Study movement in America, was one of the first to study children based on recapitulation theory. Based on his observation and the questionnaires he developed and distributed among thousands of teachers and parents across the country, researching various aspects of children’s mind and body ranging from their sense of humor, appetites, collections, reactions to light and darkness, fears and dreams to their moral and religious experiences, he argued that “children passed through several distinct stages of mental and emotional development; that each stage corresponded to an era of human evolution; and that education should be based on the characteristics peculiar to each stage.”⁶⁰ While the idea that education should follow the natural development of children was not new, what Hall introduced was a “scientific research programme.” Hall and many of the early educational psychologists and

⁵⁸ Sally Shuttleworth, *The Mind of the Child: Child Development in Literature, Science, and Medicine, 1840-1900* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 353.

⁶⁰ Adrian Wooldridge, *Measuring the Mind: Education and Psychology in England, C.1860-C.1990* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 29.

curriculum theorist held the belief that children's mental processes and bodily growth could only be understood by following the rigorous method of natural sciences and that only such a "scientific" method could inform educational practices and policies.

Once the child's body and mind were historicized through emerging evolutionary and developmental psychologies, a strong link was established between the child, the race and the nation. For Eugenicists and evolutionary psychologists, for example, child's mind became a repository of the race's evolutionary history through laws of heredity; the developmental psychologists and educationalists, on the other hand, enjoyed the idea that child's body and mind hold a promise for the future by the fullest possible development of its power. In either case, the child increasingly came to represent the contours of the emerging nation states. As Caroline Levander claims the child became "an organizing figure or principle around which national memory" was constructed.⁶¹ The fate of the modern nations was increasingly tied to the fate of the child, so that child became a central figure of a nation's progress and development.

1.2. Theorizing childhood as a space of governmentality

The preoccupation with the child should be situated in broader transformations taking place in the ways the modern State came to "see" the life of its citizens in the second half of the nineteenth century with a "cultivated gaze" that would travel around the world, albeit metamorphosing into different forms. For these transformations, I draw on Michel Foucault who traces the emergence of new governmental rationalities in the nineteenth century. He notes a fundamental transformation from what he calls the "anatomy-politics of the human body" to the "biopolitics of the population"; from "disciplinary technology of the body" towards "regulatory technology of life"; from "the body-organism-discipline-institutions series" towards the

⁶¹ Levander, *Cradle of Liberty: Race, the Child, and National Belonging from Thomas Jefferson to W.E.B. Du Bois*, 6.

“population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State.”⁶² He traces such transformation in a new configuration of power, a new mechanism of power which is qualitatively different from the disciplinary power of the classical period: one that “controls life and the biological processes of *man as species* ... ensuring that they are not disciplined but *regulated*” (emphasis added).⁶³ The social body was no longer subject to old disciplinarian forms of punishment and repression but to more refined techniques of surveillance, investigation, and control. This marks the transmutation of the “old” sovereign function of the State. Foucault claims,

Beneath that great absolute power, beneath the dramatic and somber absolute power that was the power of sovereignty, and which consisted in the power to take life, we now have the emergence, with this technology of biopower, of this technology of power over “the” population as such, over men insofar as they are living beings. It is continuous, scientific, and it is the power to make live. Sovereignty took life and let live. And now we have the emergence of a power that I would call the power of regularization, and it, in contrast, consists in making live and letting die.⁶⁴

In this “new” configuration of “make live and let die,” we observe that the functions of the State transform from the sovereignty of the territory and the body to governance of the population. Such governance involves managing the population “in depth, in all its fine points and details.”⁶⁵ The State in this formulation is not just a disciplinary apparatus but it gains a positive bioregulatory function whose field of practice is every aspect of life ranging from birth and mortality rates, rates of reproduction, the fertility of the population, to public hygiene policies, public health, and new aesthetics of urban spaces.⁶⁶ It is the bare life that is the object of biopolitics, the bare life of the persons insofar as they are thought of as living beings. The sexual

⁶² Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-76*, 249-50.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 246-47.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 247.

⁶⁵ *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976*, 107.

⁶⁶ The bioregulatory State, however, does not exclude the disciplinary technologies of the sovereign state, “but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques.” See, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-76*, 242.

and reproductive conducts of the individuals blend with the national policies and power.⁶⁷ In this sense, indeed, the State becomes a function of a discourse of life that embodies what Agamben calls a “total politicization of bare life.”⁶⁸

Thinking along with Foucault’s concept of biopolitics, Agamben claims in this new configuration or discourse of life it becomes impossible to think life without its forms –juridical, political, medical etc. Indeed, bare life ceases to exist in a non-form. All we have is “form-of-life,” life as always already hyphenated. As he claims “natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and calculations of State power, and politics turns into biopolitics.”⁶⁹ This is the threshold of modernity in which bare life enters in the sphere of the polis; it becomes at once a political, scientific and ethical problem. In this sense, bare life does not really disappear but is included only to be excluded. It is at once inside and outside the realm of the modern nation states. The paradox presented in this configuration is basically that bare life constitutes at (least one of the) condition of possibility of modern states insofar as it is excluded from political and ethical forms of life, and its inherent dangers are cancelled out.

The positionality of the modern State vis-à-vis bare life constitutes one of the pillars of Western modernity. Indeed Foucault claims this is a constituting principle of modern nation-states and governmentalities. The modern governmentalities function as modern pastoral authorities that aim at protecting, prolonging, and controlling life, maximizing its productivity and fertility and regulating its conditions. Reading through Foucault, Colin Gordon notes this is the “‘daemonic’ coupling of ‘city-game’ and ‘shepherd-game’: the invention of a form of secular

⁶⁷ Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).

⁶⁸ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

political pastorate which couples individualization and ‘totalization.’”⁷⁰ The secular pastorate inherits the practices of religious pastorate through a sort of conversion or “alchemic absorption”, in Benedict Anderson’s terms, in the sense that modern governments assume the responsibility for people’s conduct and the economy of their souls.⁷¹ In these pastoral relations, the function and responsibility of the government with all its apparatuses is to make sure that the individuals making up the ‘flock’ “live together, reproduce, work together, exist and move in a space of circulation, taking responsibility of all the sociality.”⁷²

The modern State takes up a new “pastoral” function, one that aims at what James Scott calls *sedentarization* and *legibility* of the society.⁷³ According to Scott, these are two central problems of modern statecraft that the old sovereign and premodern states were blind to. The premodern state, Scott claims, had almost no knowledge of its subjects, their wealth, their living spaces, and their identity. “It lacked anything like a detailed ‘map’ of its terrain and its people.” More importantly, it did not possess the means to create a matrix by which it could “translate what it knew into a common standard necessary for a synoptic view” of both the social and the natural milieu. The modern statecraft, on the other hand, committed itself to have a hold on its subjects and their milieu, to rationalize and make legible their social and natural environment through disparate practices ranging from “creation of permanent last names, the standardization of weights and measures, ...[to] the standardization of language and legal discourse, the design of cities, and the organization of transportation.”⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," 8.

⁷¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983; repr., 1991).

⁷² Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976*, 326.

⁷³ James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

What apparatuses provided the statecraft with such a cultivated gaze over the social and the natural milieu? What helped the State see regularity and order in chaos and complexity? The answer to these questions is found in the history of scientific disciplines, a history that is closely linked to the history of modern politics and administrative practices of modern nations states, corresponding roughly to the second half of the nineteenth century when social sciences, endowed with scientific methods and notions of objectivity and purity borrowed from natural sciences, emerged.⁷⁵ As Porter claims, nineteenth century was the period when the State's administrative practices and reform policies drew increasingly on the practices of social sciences; indeed, these two realms were inseparable from each other. The political ideals of the state such as progress, social improvement, and social order were ideals *par excellence* of budding social sciences.

Through the alliance between the political rationalities of the state and those of the social sciences, the social became a site of intervention –thus the birth of the “social question.” The scientific approaches of the period that embodied this understanding of modern society sought ambitiously to understand the internal and external dynamics of this social question either through analyzing underlying law-like universal mechanisms that constitute the social or through historical and interpretive methods.⁷⁶ Using Rabinow's words, the social turned into an object of experimentation with spatial, scientific and social technologies that would continue until today.

The most dominant and ubiquitous forms of such experimentation with the social have been provided by modern sciences such as statistics, the “original” *science of the state*, which, as Alain Desrosières notes, is etymologically linked with the construction of the modern states, with

⁷⁵ Theodore M. Porter, "The Social Sciences," in *From Natural Philosophy to the Sciences: Writing the History of Nineteenth-Century Science*, ed. David Cahan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003).

⁷⁶ Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989).

their unification and administration.⁷⁷ The history of statistics is, no less than the other sciences, a history of the wedding of epistemology and social order, thus power and knowledge. As

Desrosières claims,

From its very origins, because of its demands, its rules of functioning, and its manifest goals, the administrative production of statistical information found itself in an unusual position, combining the norms of the scientific world with those of the modern, rational state, which centered on the general interest and efficiency.⁷⁸

Such history is emblematic of the sacred alliance between the objective and universal claims of the sciences, and their subjective use in the political realm, their “powerful conjunction with the world of action.” Two value systems provided by the sciences and the political, albeit distinct, are not antinomic; they are indeed inseparable from each other. It is because the former produces the objectifications that the latter draws on for its actions. “The bond linking the two worlds of science and practice,” Desrosières states, “is thus the task of objectifying, of *making things that hold*, either because they are predictable or because, if unpredictable, their unpredictability can be mastered to some extent, thanks to the calculations of probability.”⁷⁹ Such objectification requires mastering uncertainties, eliminating chance, and constructing norms and standards that constitute the *law* of normality, so that “administrative and political spaces of equivalence” and conception of social regularity are possible. Ian Hacking claims, with the erosion of determinism in the nineteenth century, a model of normal people with laws of dispersion substituted the idea of human nature. The world was made to seem less unpredictable through legitimation of the notion of chance, which made it possible to bring order out of chaos. “Data about averages and dispersions,” Hacking claims, “engendered the idea of normal people, and led to new kinds of

⁷⁷ Alain Desrosières, *The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning*, trans. Camille Naish (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 7-9.

social engineering, new ways to modify undesirable classes.”⁸⁰ Statistical tools and numbers rendered new concepts and classifications, and based on these classifications and concepts new kinds of people possible.

In this modern configuration, we have a new line of continuum on which the normal relates itself to the pathological through different curves of normality. On this line, normalization occurs when interplay between different distributions of normality is established, and when those who are further away on this continuum are brought closer to the curve of normality.⁸¹ The logic embedded in the line of normality engenders new processes of construction and governance of differences between the self and the non-self, functioning as “a map of systems of ‘difference’”, using Donna Haraway’s words.⁸² This practice of difference or politics of difference constituted a fundamental precondition of identity and subjectivity of the self and the other, the West and the rest, and the inner and the outer. Such differential construction of the subjectivity of the self had enormous consequences for the life conditions of the other, i.e., child, women, the colonized, the “oriental” among others.

1.2.1. The child on one end of the differential line of normality: Childhood as always already incomplete

The child assumed a central place on this line of continuum of normality where male adult selfhood was the ultimate norm. It was increasingly assumed, in emerging nation-states, that “normal” conduct of a rational and productive adult population, necessary for the national body politic, depended on the “well-organized” mind and “healthy” body of the child. If the child’s mind was organized and its body fit, the conduct would necessarily be “normal,” which in turn would contribute to national prosperity and growth. Conversely, a “disordered” mind and

⁸⁰ Ian Hacking, *The Social Construction of What?* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999).

⁸¹ Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976*.

⁸² Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, 204.

a “defective” body during childhood was to be the main cause of abnormalities and dysfunctions among adult population, which in turn could potentially cause degeneration and perishment of the nation. Thus, majority of adult “abnormalities” and “vice” ranging from criminality and alcoholism to prostitution and homosexuality were linked to childhood.⁸³ Conceptualized as such, the child came to embody what Popkewitz calls double gesture for modern cosmopolitan citizenship: the fear of degeneration and the hopes for progress and a prosperous future.⁸⁴

The child was conceptualized as a fundamental constituent of modern civic body and as Levander puts it, “the index and ‘threshold of democracy.’”⁸⁵ Investment in childhood was thought to be the only way to strengthen the body politic. If strengthened and supported, the child could contribute to national prosperity and modern democratic citizenship; if ignored, however, it would bring about degeneration.⁸⁶ Thus, the problem of the child was necessarily a national problem. Paradoxically, however, the child was simultaneously included in the rhetoric of collective political identity yet excluded from the adult political practices. This paradox would continue until today.

In this overview, my purpose was to trace and theorize the contours of childhood gaze and its object childhood particularly as it emerged in political and scientific rationalities of

⁸³ There were primarily two doctrines for the cause of normality/abnormality in childhood: Heredity (in Turkish sources *veraset*), or inheritance contained in germ-plasm, germ-cells –derived from Mendel’s law of heredity and Darwinian accounts of evolution of human species, and milieu/environment including family, home, school, in short everything that surrounds the child –derived from Lamarck’s account on the inheritability of acquired characters. The mental hygienists, eugenicists, educational theorists and practitioners derived most of their theoretical and practical insights for reform from these two doctrines although the extent to which they relied on each depended on their cultural beliefs, theoretical orientation, and national contexts among others. Two dominant assumptions emerged out of these doctrines. First, based on the doctrine of heredity, the purpose of reform was to make sure that children are born with good brains, promote the reproduction of the fit and deny the privilege of parenthood to those unfit who are likely to transmit bad nervous systems to their offspring; second, with a focus more on the milieu, the purpose of reform was to provide all individuals with the environment best-suited for their mental and physical welfare.

⁸⁴ Popkewitz, *Cosmopolitanism and the Age of School Reform: Science, Education, and Making Society by Making the Child*, 12-21.

⁸⁵ Levander, *Cradle of Liberty: Race, the Child, and National Belonging from Thomas Jefferson to W.E.B. Du Bois*.

⁸⁶ Shurlee Swain and Margot Hillel, *Child, Nation, Race and Empire: Child Rescue Discourse, England, Canada and Australia, 1850-1915* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2010), 58.

modern nation states, and in the complex interplay between scientific norms and political rationalities that produced new systems of interplay between the self and the other.

Chapter II

History and Historiography of Childhood in Turkey: Children from Moral Subjects in the Empire to Nationalized Citizens of the State

2.1. Modernization theory and its discontents

While the first chapter aimed to provide theoretical tools or strategies of “reading” and “conceptualizing” childhood gaze and its object, childhood, as a modern construct emerged at the intersection of various practices including those of psycho-pedagogical sciences, practices of selfhood, and biopolitics of the modern Nation States, the purpose of this chapter is to contextualize childhood gaze and its object in Turkey, providing an historical overview of the problematic until the designated Republican period. It delineates the history of childhood from the late nineteenth century to the Republican period based on secondary and primary sources. As the focus of this study is the early Republican period (1920s-1950s), this chapter functions as an introduction to the Turkish case. The chapter will begin with a brief discussion of Turkish modernity, and then move to the historical synopsis of the problematic with the hope to establish a grid where it is possible to trace both continuities and discontinuities between the late Empire –namely, second half of the nineteenth century –and modern Republic, a line of thought employed here to challenge the epistemological assumptions of modernization theory that had a hegemonic presence in the historiography of social sciences in Turkey until very recently.

While modernization theory, as a condition of its own possibility, fabricated a wide fissure between the late Empire and modern Republic with respect to their social, cultural, educational, economic and other practices, representing the former as obstinately anti-modern, obscurantist and traditional whereas the latter as necessarily modern and

originator of modernity in Turkey, scholars have recently questioned the major epistemological assumptions of this theory, pointing to the complex interplay of the traditional and modern in both the late Empire and the Republic, and tracing the “origins” of modernity in the late Empire.⁸⁷ The “origins” in the plural form is purposeful here; it helps to eschew the discourse of exceptionalism of Turkish modernity employed by both modernist-secularist theorists and their counterparts in the left and right by situating it in and along with global modernities, but it also allows for introducing differences and indigenous qualities of the Turkish case.⁸⁸

The power of modernization theory, as Harry Harootunian has argued, was its capacity as a comparative mechanism to produce “a single and normative temporality” to hierarchically classify experiences in a teleological order from *pre-modern* to *modern* and *first* in the West and *then* elsewhere. In this configuration, experiences were distributed on a continuum where the modern West represented the norm of modernity while the experiences of/in elsewhere were measured in relation to this norm.⁸⁹ As a result, “late developers” like Japan (in Harootunian’s study), India, Ottoman Empire, and others were categorized as derivations of the temporality of the modern West, and assumed to have

⁸⁷ There have been numerous studies challenging modernist theory and the paradigm of modernization; see, among others, Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999); Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline* (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

⁸⁸ In this sense, I am thinking of what Derrida calls “origin-heterogeneous,” an origin that is disordered, divided and severed by accidental and empirical events. Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989).

⁸⁹ Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan*. See also Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000); Avi Rubin, *Ottoman Nizamiye Courts : Law and Modernity*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

been “in a suspended state of growth,” lacking “full maturity and thus timeliness.”⁹⁰

Scholars in *Subaltern Studies* and those writing on modernities –in plural –have provided us with conceptual tools to challenge these historicist assumptions embedded in modernization theory without necessarily discarding the concept of modernity altogether.⁹¹ For example, in his article “On Alternative Modernities” Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar puts forth the idea of “thinking with a difference.”⁹² Thinking with a difference is to “privilege a particular angle of interrogation,” and to adopt a “site-based” reading of “career and dilemmas of modernity” across multiple cultural and national sites. One of the assumptions embedded in such a reading is that modernity is always already cultural, that is, it is not a value-neutral and universal ideal that all the people of world aim to reach at. A cultural and site-specific reading of modernity destabilizes universalist assumptions by historicizing and contextualizing the experience of modernity and renders it possible to trace modernity where it is experienced by people in their practices.⁹³

Approaching modernity through a site-based reading helps to identify what Homi Bhabha calls the coalescence/split of two ambivalent temporalities that constitute the modern experience simultaneously: the pedagogic time and the performative time. While the former is articulated in the imaginary construction of a continuist and accumulative

⁹⁰ Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan.*, XIV.

⁹¹ E.g., see among others Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*; Alev Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time*, ed. Dilip Gaonkar and Benjamin Lee, vol. 14, *Public Worlds* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," *Daedalus* 129, no. 1 (2000); Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, "On Alternative Modernities," *Public Culture* 11, no. 1 (1999); Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993); Thomas S. Popkewitz, "Inventing the Modern Self and John Dewey: Modernities and the Traveling of Pragmatism in Education-an Introduction," in *Inventing the Modern Self and John Dewey: Modernities and the Traveling of Pragmatism in Education*, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz (New York: Palgrave macmillan, 2005).

⁹² Gaonkar, "On Alternative Modernities."

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 14.

national past in homogenous empty time, the latter is the lived present of the people's history, where any form of signification is always in the making and incomplete; it is "a fluctuating movement which they [people] are just giving shape to," "a zone of occult instability," and "cultural undecidability." The latter challenges "the teleological traditions of past and present [expressed in the former], and the polarized historicist sensibility of the archaic and the modern."⁹⁴ The performative time allows to locate a sense of "doubling" always already embedded in the experience of modernity, that is a continual negotiation and struggle between the demands of modernity and capitalism and those of indigenous historical and cultural patterns.⁹⁵ And this sense of doubling was present in Ottoman modernization in its very early conceptualization by *Tanizmat* reformers and their successors.

There is an increasing focus on the complexity and fluidity of national and subnational narratives that transcend the narrow theorizations provided by Eurocentric scholars. By steering the focus towards multiplicity and complexity of practices and narratives of modernity and its travelling around the world, one might avoid the Eurocentric perspective that claims the ownership of modernity as well as other related concepts such as rationality, science, and knowledge. Such a reading rejects the idea that modernity is a top-down process (from the West imposed on the non-West) by showing that modernity metamorphoses into multiple forms, and is put to creative and strategic uses in the non-Western contexts. This is the performative aspect of the ambivalence. Moreover, it helps to make visible the instabilities of the nationalist narrative and its representational forms in the pedagogic form. Thus, it rejects any nationalist claims to

⁹⁴ Bhabha, "Dissemination: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation.", 215-216.

⁹⁵ The concept of doubling here is inspired by Harootunian's analysis of Japanese modernity, e.g., see Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan.*, XVII.

cultural supremacy, and eschews “going native,” “overlooking the ways in which local conditions have been altered and transformed by European influences.”⁹⁶

I approach Turkish modernity against the background of Harootunian’s doubling that I claim was embedded in the narrative of modernity. Indeed, starting in the modernization attempts in the first half of the nineteenth century, modernists in Turkey held an ambivalent, complex and shifting relationship with Western modernity. The two temporalities –pedagogic and performative- of Bhabha were deeply entrenched in the political and cultural career of modernity in Turkey. That is because it was simultaneously a performative act against the Western discursive production of Turk as barbaric and uncivilized, and a pedagogic act in the sense of construction of an imaginary national community with linear historical narrative, fixed and stabilized national identity, and imaginary unity.

Childhood gaze and concept of childhood, whose contours were delineated in the previous chapter, is an excellent case to demonstrate how the traditional and modern, and global and indigenous intermingled. As have been shown, by the first half of the century, already universal notions of childhood were free-floating as cultural practices, travelling around, deterritorializing and reterritorializing within the framework of the new socio-political and cultural patterns, and were brought into relation with indigenous social and cultural forms, gaining new meanings in Turkey, and elsewhere. Reading childhood as such helps us avoid the presuppositions of “modernization theory” (and its derivatives such as “secularization,” and “Westernization” in Turkey) that shaped the historiography of social sciences in Turkey, and elsewhere, until 1970s. It also helps to challenge the

⁹⁶ Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time*, 14, 1-2.

universality of childhood as a concept and practice by tracing the contours of its reterritorialization in the early years of modern Turkey.

2.2. The Islamized and moralized child of the Hamidian Era

The visibility of childhood as a modern category in Turkey dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century when major cultural and political transformations were taking place in the Ottoman Empire. As we have seen in chapter I, by modernity of childhood, it is meant that childhood came to be perceived as a separate stage of life, distinctive in its needs, and with its own dynamics, culture, and age-specific institutions separated from adult institutions.⁹⁷ In other words, child was to be perceived as child, as it was suggested in Rousseau's *Emile*.⁹⁸ Child in its modern demarcation was given a new sense of agency and potentiality, a subjectivity, as well as assigned a new capacity to represent and stand for certain values of a collectivity –middle class, nation state etc. The child gained an individual identity yet paradoxically that identity was always articulated by an adult population and stood for something more/other than itself. This, I dare to generalize, had taken a universal outlook by the early decades of the twentieth century. But what children represented and came to stand for differed significantly.

In the late Ottoman context, visibility of modern childhood and modern notions of childhood emerged in three –not closely linked –contexts: (1) modern schooling practices, (2) child rescue discourse regarding the regulation of (war) orphans, homeless, and beggars, and (3) educated urban families who had access to new printing culture and western style child-rearing practices –mainly in urban areas such Istanbul and European provinces of the Empire. The first two, developed together with the idea and practice of a

⁹⁷ Hugh Cunningham, *The Children of the Poor* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991), 3.

⁹⁸ Harry Hendrick, *Child Welfare: England 1872-1989* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 19.

bureaucratic and social State, were formal locations that would gradually be regulated by the State towards the second half of the nineteenth century while the third would keep its private domain relatively less touched by the State until the Second Constitutional period.

2.2.1. School child

While first modern schooling practices were introduced in the Empire during the *Tanzimat* period –the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839)- the focus of this section is on the second half of the century, particularly the Hamidian Era (Sultan Abdülhamid II, 1876-1908), for it was during this time that large-scale institutionalization efforts were undertaken towards a state education system, and children were to be perceived anew and be burdened with new responsibilities. A few conceptual clarifications are needed before we progress further. The concepts of modern schooling or Western-style schooling, ubiquitously used by historians of education in Turkey to differentiate between the traditional *maktab* and *madrasa*, and schools established by the State are problematic and do not yield to a clear distinction when applied to the Ottoman context during this period. Shaped by the assumptions of modernization theory, orientalist readings of the Empire, and nationalist-secularist historiography of the Kemalist era, the theoretical/analytical agenda put forth by these histories is grounded in a dichotomist strategy, through perpetual binaries of *modern/traditional*, and *secular/religious*, that assumes a gradual transformation towards secular/modern, thus essentially favoring the first of the binaries.

However, as Benjamin Fortna and other scholars have recently demonstrated, although the epistemological and organizational structure of “new-style schools” established in the second half of the nineteenth century was different, they shared many similarities with the traditional *maktab* and *madrasas*, the Islamic schools, in terms of

both the pedagogic content that was predominantly religious and moral, and the pedagogical style.⁹⁹ This is hardly surprising, for the single most encompassing frame of reference for –educational, social, political–reform movements of the time was still Islam, and would remain so until the Second Constitutional period. However, the power of Islam in shaping the modern reforms and practices has been calculatedly absent in modernist histories of education, or, if present, it was viewed as a hindrance to these practices and reforms. Şerif Mardin has articulated this as a characteristic of Turkish social sciences. “The fundamental gap in the analytical apparatus of the prevalent type of Turkish social science,” according to Mardin, “has been its inability to understand the power of Islam” in social change.¹⁰⁰

Interpreting Ottoman modernization movements of the nineteenth century as quintessentially religious, İsmail Kara argues that reformers saw a clear link between saving the Empire, the dynasty, and Islam from collapsing; this identification of the State and the Sultan with religion, an inextricable and necessary (*zaruri*) condition, was a presupposition of the style of thinking prevalent in Muslims’ cultural memory.¹⁰¹ Thus, modern reforms were carried out to simultaneously reform the State and elevate the religion. The reforms were to fit into the Islamic framework not only for legitimizing the practice of borrowing but also legitimizing the very existence of Sultan himself.

Presupposing this inextricable link between the State and religion, reformers were able to

⁹⁹ Benjamin C. Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman "Secular" Schools," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, no. 32 (2000); Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline*; Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*.

¹⁰⁰ Şerif Mardin, "Projects as Methodology: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science," ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Resat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Washington, D.C.: University of Washington Press, 1997).

¹⁰¹ İsmail Kara, "İsla Düşüncesinde Paradigma Değişimi: Hem Batılılaşım Hem De Müslüman Kalalım," in *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat Ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 237.

legitimize their borrowings from Western practices, for in the normative framework of Islamic law, Kara explains, imitating the infidel, i.e. the West representing *küfür* (heresy), was problematic. However, if it was a matter of life and death of *din ü devlet* (religion and state), a condition of necessity (*zaruret*) emerged, which helped eliminate religious objections, and, even if temporarily, turned the *haram* (that which is forbidden by religion) to *helal* (that which is religiously permissible).¹⁰² Thus, the reformers had to reinterpret all borrowings in an Islamic frame of reference, and rearticulate them in Islamic vocabulary, and, using Kara's words, fit them in the religious and cultural memory of Muslims.

Contextual conditions such as the intensification of separatist and nationalist movements –Bulgarian, Armenian among others –, encroachment of Western and Russian powers on the Empire, and other economic, financial, and political conditions creating this condition of necessity during the reign of Abdulhamit II have been studied extensively.¹⁰³ And it is not my purpose to do so here. What I want to discuss is the emergence of a renewed focus on education and children during the Hamidian era as salvation for the Empire, the Sultan, and religion.

Encroachment of European imperialism and hegemony had already encouraged certain other nations such as India and Japan to look inward to their indigenous traditions to come up with indigenous strategies as well as borrow Western ideas and institutions to modernize the national resources to challenge Westernization.¹⁰⁴ This was a conundrum

¹⁰² Ibid., 238.

¹⁰³ See among others: Benjamin C. Fortna, "The Reign of Abdülhamid II," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*; "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23, no. 3 (1991).

¹⁰⁴ Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 43.

that reformers in Turkey were faced as well, i.e. a “contradiction of adopting Western ideas and institutions while struggling against Western imperialism.”¹⁰⁵ However, as we have seen, they partially resolved this conundrum through the condition of necessity that fit into the Islamic religious and cultural practices. That is, it was necessary to rationalize and modernize national recourses to overcome the modernity of the West as well as save the Empire, the Caliphate, and religion.¹⁰⁶ Political and cultural agenda of Abdulhamit II embodied this modernization without modernity (of West) at its core to find solutions to hold things together and save the Empire from dissolution while challenging the corruptive ideas emanating from the West. Particularly important in this agenda was education.

Hamidian educational reforms, on the one hand, embodied performativity against the overwhelming presence of the minority schools and foreign missionary schools that were more organized and well-funded; these schools were viewed as representation of Western ideas, were feared to be turning young Ottoman boys and girls against their religion and State, and thus posing a great danger to the moral fabric of the Ottoman society.¹⁰⁷ Ottoman Muslim population, now constituting the overwhelming majority especially after the loss of western provinces after the Russo-Ottoman war (1877-1888), needed modern institutions of similar caliber to compete against these schools as well as disseminate Islamic values against morally corrupting Western values. The saying

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ In the Ottoman Empire a group known as the Young Ottomans (circa 1865) would be the first to attempt to harmonize the western ideas with Islamic and national traditions, and strive “to create a new Ottoman culture that would be modern without losing its identity in westernization.” Critical of the more shallow acceptance of Enlightenment ideas by the *Tanzimat* statesmen, Young Ottomans such as Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa sought to assess whether specific reforms were Islamically justifiable using Islamic jurisprudential method of reasoning by analogy (*kıyas*). Carter Vaughn Findley, "The Tanzimat," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 32.

¹⁰⁷ Benjamin C. Fortna, "The Reign of Abdülhamid II," *ibid.*, 50.

frequently cited among intellectuals of the time, *her köye bir mektep bir mescit* (a school and a mosque to every village), epitomizes the spirit of the time.¹⁰⁸ Modern schooling was to be taken to every corner of the Empire and to be complemented with Islamic and Ottoman values. The school and mosque, while seemingly distinct institutions, were seen as “fulfilling the same agenda— namely, strengthening the moral fiber of the empire’s Muslim subjects so that they could better withstand the onslaught of foreign missionaries and the lure of Western fashion, both cultural and intellectual.”¹⁰⁹ Education reforms, then, were shaped by what Fortna calls an “indigenous religio-cultural” spirit grounded in modern western models, particularly the French Third Republic, Islamic elements, and Ottoman elements, pragmatically fusing the modern and traditional.¹¹⁰ Fortna succinctly puts it in the following sentences:

Faced with an alarming array of adversaries on the educational front, the Ottomans did not roll over and accept what they considered to be a threat to the Ottoman way of life. Rather, they marshaled what recourses they could to combat the proselytizing foreign missionaries, the highly motivated nationalist educators of neighboring states, and the schools of the indigenous minorities, often taking note of their competition's more effective methods in the process.¹¹¹

On the other hand, the reforms were pedagogic in at least two senses: they aimed at creating a common Islamic identity among heterogeneous Muslim populations such as Turks, Kurds, Cerkes, and Arabs, and uniting these populations under the banner of Islam

¹⁰⁸ Gökhan Çetinsaya, "İslam Vatansverlikten İsla Siyasetine," in *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat Ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 271.

¹⁰⁹ Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman "Secular" Schools," 379.

¹¹⁰ Modern education structure had already taken some shape particularly with the Reform Edict of 1856, establishment of Ministry of Public Education in 1857, and finally the Regulation of Public Education (*Maarif-i Umumiyye Nizamnamesi*) enacted in 1869 that made primary education compulsory. The Regulation of Public Education was inspired by the education system of French Third Republic particularly reflecting the centralized and systematic quality of French style. For a detailed account of the reforms see, Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline*.

¹¹¹ Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 8-9.

(Islamism) to construct a Muslim nation,¹¹² thus veering towards Islamism as a constitutive identity vis-à-vis Ottomanism that had been put forth by *Tanzimat* statesmen and intellectuals as an attempt create a patriotic bond among heterogeneous Ottoman subjects. (While it is important to note that Ottomonness, inspired by French concept of Fatherland, would continue to be a strong discursive element until the Republican period, it would gradually lose its weight vis-à-vis Islamism and Turkish nationalism respectively first in the Hamidian era and then in the Second Constitutional period). Moreover, the reforms were carried out to consolidate the status of the Sultan by creating religiously and politically loyal subjects, emphasizing “the Sultan-Caliph as the main source of political and religious loyalty and the Islamic community as the only social unit of political and religious identity.”¹¹³ Somel has summed up this aspect of educational reforms as “ensuring the loyalty of the pupils to the state and the sultan, and to strengthen religious orthodoxy and conservative ethical values.”¹¹⁴

The Hamidian child came to embody this new performative and pedagogic agenda, viewed as the source of moral and educated manpower for the bureaucratic state and compete with and ward off the Western effects, as well as a source of unification of the Islamic nations (*millet*) under the Empire, and loyal moral and political subject to the Sultan. The primary site of fabricating this child was the public school curriculum that was modified and instilled with moral and religious education with a strong didactic purpose. The new curriculum made it possible for the State, as an extension of the Sultan, to directly contact its youngest subjects without the intermediary of family, for now the

¹¹² Gökhan Çetinsaya, "İslami Vatanseverlikten İslam Siyasetine," 270.

¹¹³ Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline*, 180.

¹¹⁴ "Regulations for Raising Children During the Hamidian Period," in *Enfance Et Jeunesse Dans Monde Musulman*, ed. François Georgeon and Klaus Kreiser (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2007), 212.

child was taken out of the familial environment that was seen as the “world of ignorance,” with the parents’ role being reduced to the birth and early childhood development.¹¹⁵ The teacher, assigned a prominent role in the State’s moralizing campaign, was viewed as the one “who can rescue the student from the ignorant orbit of the family.”¹¹⁶

The moral values inculcated into the new child were predominantly religious. Fortna, in his analysis of one of the morality textbooks of the time enumerate these: religiosity (*diyanet*); laudable moral qualities (*ahlâk-ı hamide*); cleanliness (*nezafet*); effort (*mesai*); ascetic discipline (*riyazet*); sound management (*hüsn-ü idare*); contentment (*kanaat*); knowledge (*ilm*); patience (*sabır*); forbearance (*hilm*); and order (*intizam*).¹¹⁷ Primary objective of the curriculum was to implant principles of loyalty, duty, authority, and hierarchy in the child, all, as Fortna argues, were critical to the Hamidian neo-patrimonial agenda.

2.2.2. The child in need of protection

While modern school emerged as a major site for the visibility of the child as an object of the State, another site was, what I call, “child rescue” discourse that emerged in parallel with the development of modern welfare practices and modern forms of governmentality in Turkey roughly corresponding to the second half of the nineteenth century. As has been shown, in the Ottoman Empire starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, the State gradually began to regulate social spaces such as public

¹¹⁵ Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman "Secular" Schools," 374-85.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 385. The religio-moral curriculum incorporated predominantly Islamic elements such as compulsory Arabic, new courses on morality, religious sciences, the biographies and features of the Prophets, the historical deeds of the companions of the Prophet, and the biographies of the religious authorities and the famous ulema. Ibid., 376. See also, public school curricula published in Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy and Discipline*, 297-317.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 383.

health, child and family welfare, public safety, and education, and social groups such as the poor, homeless, orphans, vagrants, and beggars that had hitherto been invisible to the gaze of the State and had been handled by a complex network of traditional means such as family, *mahalle* system (the social neighborhood unit constituting an essential component of sociality in the Empire), kinship, communitarian (*cemaat*) relations, and religious schools, hospices, shelters, and soup kitchens (*gurebehane*, *tabhane*, *imarethane*) usually parts of a great mosque complexes (*külliyeye*) established by private pious foundations (*vakıf*) that were sponsored by the imperial family members, and/or the well-off members of the community.¹¹⁸ Majority of these groups were a part of the complex philanthropic *vakıf* network, and occasionally were helped by the State, in the framework of Islamic notion of *sadaqah* (charity, Islamic alms). While certain groups such as the poor, orphans, and widows were legitimately recognized in the discourse of “*muhtaç*” (those in need, deprived, or dependent), certain social groups such as the vagabonds (*serseri*), beggars (*dilenci* who were not employed in any sense and were not viewed as in need or dependent), and prostitutes were treated from the perspective of public order (*asayiş* or *nizam*), and were objects of various mostly exclusionary controlling techniques such as deportation to isolate them from the rest of the public (urban areas).¹¹⁹ Both of these discourses –seeing certain groups as in need and certain groups as threatening public order –would gradually overlap with more modern discourses such as discipline and productivity of social body in the second half of the

¹¹⁸ See, Nadir Özbek, "The Politics of Modern Welfare Institutions in the Late Ottoman Empire (1876-1909)," *International Journal of Turcologia* 3, no. 5 (2008): 46.

For a summary of the social welfare practices in the late Ottoman Empire and the transformation to the modern welfare practices, see, "Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Sosyal Devlet," *Toplum ve Bilim* 91, no. 2 (2002).

¹¹⁹ "Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Sosyal Devlet; "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nd 'Sosyal Yardım' Uygulamaları," in *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, ed. Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu and Halil İnalçık (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2006).

nineteenth century and transform with the notion of population during the Republic when the population and the state came to be identified with each other. The case of “children in need of protection” (*muhtaç çocuklar*) is symptomatic of this overlapping.¹²⁰

The visibility of children in need of protection in public and for the state dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century when there was an influx of refugees to the urban provinces of the Empire, and a significant increase in the number of orphans and homeless children in urban provinces as a result of this influx and other catastrophes such as the Russo-Ottoman war. While these contextual conditions help to explain the need felt to take immediate measures to protect these populations, they do not suffice to explain the complexity of discourses produced over/through these populations and the transformation in the way the State came to interact with the population at larger.

One of the most comprehensive measures taken to deal with the increasing numbers of vagrants, orphan, homeless or destitute (*bikes*), and poor children in the cities included establishment of *Islahhanes* in the provinces and later in the capital, the first of which was established in the early 1860s and by the early 1870s seventeen of them were established in various provinces of the Empire. Literal translation of these institutions as “correction institutions,” “reformatories” or as institutions for child delinquents is misleading; they had all these functions, with the primary goal of “the betterment of the conditions and education of Ottoman orphans,” but were more than that, as Nazan Maksudyan has shown.¹²¹ They functioned like modern orphanages with an industrial-focused curriculum (they would also be called *sanayi mektepleri* [industrial schools]) to

¹²⁰ The characterization belongs to Abdullah Karatay, "The Formation of Policies for Children in Need of Protection in the Republican Era" (Marmara University, 2007).

¹²¹ Nazan Maksudyan, "Orphans, Cities, and the State: Vocational Orphanages (Islahhanes) and Reform in the Late Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43(2011): 494. See also, Özbek, "The Politics of Modern Welfare Institutions in the Late Ottoman Empire (1876-1909)."

provide industrial skills and craftsmanship to these child populations with a goal of raising new generations of talented and skilled workers for local industry and to rejuvenate slowing economy.¹²² *Islahhanes* (and industrial schools) functioned like boarding schools that primarily housed orphan, destitute, and poor children between the age of five and thirteen. Analyzing the functions that were attributed to the *islahhanes* demonstrates the double working of exclusion and inclusion strategies that reflected both traditional State reaction towards protecting those in need and modern governmental rationalities that aimed at regulating a potentially risky population through positive forces of education and training. This double strategy of exclusion and inclusion was increasingly becoming the norm of the State towards the end of the century. As Maksudyan argues, “the belief that a modern state should both protect children from danger and protect society from dangerous children was becoming established in Ottoman administrative discourse and practice.”¹²³

First, *islahhanes* functioned with an exclusionary logic, for they primarily targeted a population of children –destitute and orphans, idle and vagrant poor children, and even child delinquents –that were being viewed as a potential risk to the public order and to the aesthetics and order of urban spaces that represented civilized way of life particularly for the Ottoman elite. In his analysis of popular discourse of the time, Özbek reveals the emerging of a new kind of sensibility among the elite that complained about the unsightly presence of “ugly” beggars and “idle” vagrants in public places, spoiling the “modern”

¹²² Maksudyan, "Orphans, Cities, and the State: Vocational Orphanages (Islahhanes) and Reform in the Late Ottoman Empire," 498.

¹²³ Ibid.

image of the Empire.¹²⁴ We learn that a number of regulative and punitive (legal) measures were taken to isolate these populations from the public such as collections of vagrant children from streets and their placement in the *islahhanes*, and the deportation of certain vagrant and idle groups to the provinces or to their respective cities of their residence.¹²⁵ In fact, one major goal of the *islahhanes* was to accommodate the target child population in their respective provinces, preventing them from migrating to major urban area such as Istanbul. It is important to highlight that it was usually the poor population that was viewed as the source of vice.

While the exclusionary strategy reflected the logic of disciplinary state, *islahhanes* also came to embody a new political rationality of the modern regulatory state; that is, the target child population was excluded only to be included as productive members of the collectivity and as active agents contributing to the economic activity of the State. Following Özbek, I call this regulation through labor insofar as labor came to function as a disciplining and regulative force that was increasingly viewed from a social and moral perspective.¹²⁶ Part of the reason for the transformation in the conceptualization of labor lies in the displacements taking place in the economic structure of the Empire, with traditional craft guilds (*lonca*) that constituted the backbone of urban economy in the Empire shrinking due to various reasons such as uncontrollable circulation of raw materials to Western Europe, increase in raw-material expenses, and administrative and

¹²⁴ Nadir Özbek, "'Beggars' and 'Vagrants' in Ottoman State Policy and Public Discourse, 1876–1914," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 5 (2009): 786.

¹²⁵ Ibid. Maksudyan, "Orphans, Cities, and the State: Vocational Orphanages (Islahhanes) and Reform in the Late Ottoman Empire," 496; Ferdan Ergut, "Policing the Poor in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 2 (2002).

¹²⁶ Nadir Özbek, "'Beggars' and 'Vagrants' in Ottoman State Policy and Public Discourse, 1876–1914," *ibid.* 45, no. 5 (2009): 787–88.

financial decentralization that gradually weakened state control over the guilds.¹²⁷ Thus, it was important to rejuvenate the urban economy and reform local industries with new class of skilled laborers, and *islahhanes* were seen as critical in this process.¹²⁸ Their curriculum incorporated both general courses taught in primary schools and classes and workshops in arts and crafts that took up majority of the school time.¹²⁹ In Maksudyan's words, *islahhanes* would play a corrective role for the rehabilitation of the domestic economy," yet they would simultaneously rehabilitate their inmates into productive agents of the society.

Institutionalization for care of the children in need would intensify during the last decades of the Hamidian era with the establishment of a poorhouse (*Darülaceze*) in 1896 with a capacity of hosting about a thousand inmates, an imperial orphanage (*Darülhayr-ı Âlî*) in 1902 in İstanbul and the Imperial Hospital for Children (*Hamidiye Etfal Hastahane-i Âlîsi*) in 1899.¹³⁰ What this institutionalization points to is that State gradually took up the task of rescuing the problem children that it had been blind to in the past.

2.2.3. The child of popular discourse: Romantic/naturalist notions of childhood

The early modern ideas of childhood along with notions of modern family and motherhood were introduced to the Ottoman Empire during this same period mostly through popular newspapers, magazines, journals, and modern literary genres such as novels, and translations of western sources by the educated elite and emerging

¹²⁷ Selçuk Aksin Somel, *Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 109. Selçuk Akşin Somel, in *Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Selçuk Akşin Somel (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2003), 109.

¹²⁸ Maksudyan, "Orphans, Cities, and the State: Vocational Orphanages (Islahhanes) and Reform in the Late Ottoman Empire," 498-99.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Özbek, "The Politics of Modern Welfare Institutions in the Late Ottoman Empire (1876-1909)."

bureaucrats who had habituated themselves to many Western values.¹³¹ The flood of ideas through these publications, according to Duben and Behar, “began to introduce into Istanbul society a new way of thinking and doing things –to be typified as '*alafranga*' (*alla franca*)”, referring to acting or doing things in modern, “civilized” or Western way.¹³² Pedagogical and didactic in nature and written in a strong moralizing authorial voice, these publications embodied early “critiques of traditional Ottoman family life and the treatment of women and children,” promoting new family ideal, domestic manners, new concerns about children's place in society and about child-rearing.¹³³ These early notions of childhood were more universalist, and mostly inspired by a romantic-naturalist discourse that conceptualized childhood as symbolizing this state of innocence, viewing children with a natural self. Children were seen as vulnerable, thus in need of protection in a physically and morally safe environment from harsh conditions of life. As we have seen in the previous sections, both modern public schools and *islahhanes* were put forth as new safe sites for children who were either in need of protection from the ignorance of the family or the harsh conditions of the street. The major socialization unit for children had hitherto been *mahalle*, the single most important social, cultural as well as administrative unit of the Ottoman society, that was a relatively insulated temporal-spatial arrangement of the communities (*millets*) in small neighborhoods that were not class, status or income based but on membership to a particular religious community.¹³⁴ Family and home were in an organic unity with *mahalle* to the extent that privacy was minimal and major events such birth, marriage and death were communally experienced

¹³¹ Alan Duben and Cem Behar, *Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility 1880-1940* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

¹³² *Ibid.*, 21.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Aile* (İstanbul: Pan Yayıncılık, 2000), 22-24.

and gained legitimacy through the testimonial of the *mahalle* members.¹³⁵ Child was an organic member of *mahalle* and received his/her (religious) education in the schools affiliated with it, was protected as well disciplined by parents, grand parents, relatives, community members, and everybody else affiliated with the respective *mahalle* s/he lived in.¹³⁶ Everybody was involved in one another's occupations, daily activities, and child rearing; it was as if *mahalle* were an extension of home but with relatively more freedom, which was controlled not by parents but the neighbors.¹³⁷

In part, the shift from *mahalle* towards schools as protected sites for socialization of children can be explained with transformations in the social structure of family in the nineteenth century particularly in the Ottoman capital along with the rise of an emerging bureaucratic and literate elite who came to embrace new domestic ideals such as respect, love, order, and affection for children. These literate, bureaucratic classes, argue Duben and Behar, “were quite definitely the ideological forerunners of modern western ideas and institutions which had their impact, albeit indirectly and most often unintentionally, on marriage, family and fertility.”¹³⁸ In part, the shift can be explained with changing images of *mahalle* as a source of sociality, for with influx of “dangerous” populations such as delinquents, beggars, and vagrants occupying streets, the *mahalle* was deemed unsafe and viewed as source of vice.

Growth in publishing industry in the second half of the nineteenth century and increase in the volume of works produced in this period for and about children, family, and women shows that a wider population had access to modern notions of childhood and

¹³⁵ Ibid., p.29.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 100.

¹³⁷ Bekir Onur, *Türkiye'de Çocukluğun Tarihi: Çocukluğun Sosyo-Kültürel Tarihine Giriş* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2005), 137-47.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 6.

family than ever before. The first literary and scientific publications on children emerged in popular magazines, translations, and children and women's magazines. The first children's magazine, *MümeYYiz*, was published in 1869 in Istanbul, and in over two decades over twenty children's journals and magazines debuted primarily in Istanbul, also in Bursa, Izmir, and Salonika.¹³⁹ These magazine and journals conveyed certain models of childhood through translations of children's literatures particularly written in a didactic style of the Enlightenment period including the adventure and exploration tales of Robinson Crusoe, Jonathan Swift, Jules Verne, and of course Rousseau's *Emile*.¹⁴⁰ This is not surprising because in all of these works children were featured as central figures. The content of the journal and magazines, as Öztan argues, was shaped by the political atmosphere of the period, and conveyed the "ideal child" images that fit in well with political and cultural framework of the late Ottoman Empire. While the literary representation of children in these magazines clearly marked them as a distinct group and childhood as a separate domain, the language itself was not accessible to the child; it was the language of adult written for and about the child.¹⁴¹

Modern notions and models of childhood conveyed in these publications embodied notions of rationalizing and regulating home life, family life, and the conduct of the family members based on burgeoning middle class -'alafranga' –values. While the State would not straightforwardly interfere in the privacy of the family life until the Republican period, popular publications would penetrate into every aspect of home life. Two such publications are worth mentioning: *Mothers and Fathers' Rights and Responsibilities for Children (Ana Babanin Evlat Üzerindeki Hukuk ve Vezai fi)* and *The*

¹³⁹ Cüneyd Okay, *Eski Harfli Çocuk Dergileri* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1999), 216-17.

¹⁴⁰ Öztan, *Türkiye'de Çocukluğun Politik İnşası*, 34.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

Art of Fatherhood (Peder Olma Sanati), both written in 1899 by Ahmet Mithat Efendi (1844-1912), a prolific writer and journalist of the late Ottoman Empire. These books are symptomatic of a discursive transformation materializing in the practices and ideas of the Ottoman educated elite regarding child rearing, home life, and family life, most of which would later be adopted by the Republican reformers and turn into state policies for regulating the family.

Ahmet Mithat Efendi, in both of the books, took upon himself the task of preparing Ottoman parents for modern parenthood, the most important component of which was the right bringing up of children and their early education. In giving advice to the parents on how they should bring up children, the author adopts an authoritative language, whose authority is grounded by the author in the scientificity and modernity of the ideas presented, not necessarily in his political or moral status. His thoughts on child rearing and education of children were very much in line with progressive educational theories of the day (what was called *maarif-i cedide* [modern or new style education] in the Ottoman context) such as arrangement of content knowledge from simple to the complex, classification of knowledge based on child's developmental age (*her çağa mahsus olan talimat ve telkinatı tayin etmek ve bahusus en küçük yaşlara ait şeyleri tamam o yaşlara çesban sadelik menzilesine indirebilmek*),¹⁴² non-coercive education, presenting and teaching objects in concrete forms using models and visuals (pictures), deferring abstract thinking to later ages, and making learning enjoyable and less wearisome for children, thus taking into account their psychological and physiological development. Herbert Spencer and French educationalist Gabriel Compayre are cited as

¹⁴² Ahmet Mithat Efendi, *Ana Babanın Evlat Üzerindeki Hukuk Ve Vezaiî* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2013), 70.

two sources among others that inform his ideas; particularly, the latter's *History of Pedagogy* seems to have been the major source.

Attacking established child rearing practices and negligence among parents towards children, Ahmet Mithat Efendi perceived parenthood as a sacred duty (*vezaiifi-i mukaddese*) towards the beloved children (*ciğerparelerimiz*) that could not be overlooked as something one already knew by default.¹⁴³ Mothers and fathers were to *learn* their responsibilities and duties toward children from modern pedagogical theories of child rearing (*ilm-i terbiyetü'l etfal*). Their moral responsibilities and duties towards children were not relative to their economic power or material investments in the child, but were relative to their knowledge of childrearing and education (*terbiye-i fikriye*).¹⁴⁴ Thus, modern knowledge of childrearing and education came to be the sole arbiter of moral and ethical behaviors of the parents towards children, and it included among other things knowing the nature of the physiology and psychology of the child (*mahiyet-i uzviye ve ruhiye*).¹⁴⁵

Although Ahmet Mithat Efendi entrusted both the mother and the father with the duty and responsibility of childrearing, the primary task was delegated to the fathers for two reasons. First, from the perspective of natural law, fathers were the primary source of the child insofar as it was the father who initiated the child's conception. Second, from the perspective of the progress of civilization, it was men who were everywhere more civilized and advanced than women, and were guiding women in the path to progress.¹⁴⁶ With regard to their level of civilization and progress, according to Ahmet Mithat,

¹⁴³ Ibid., 20-23.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 23.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 26.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 29.

women were still in the condition of perpetual childhood (*sabavet-i daime*)¹⁴⁷ and were dependent on men both economically and intellectually. Thus, in the family, it was the father who possessed the right to rule (*zimam-ı hükümet*), and held the right and responsibility for the education of the child.¹⁴⁸ Once the child passed through the ages of infancy and childhood and reached the age of higher education, thus leaving his natural family to join the larger “moral family called the community” (*ahali*) the rights and responsibilities were now entrusted to “the moral and political father called the government” (*hükümet denilen peder-i manevi ve siyasi*).¹⁴⁹ The father, thus, was not only responsible for the education of the child but also acted as a moral guide for the mother. Ahmet Mithat, then, reinserted patrimonial values of Hamidian era, but with a new twist by introducing modern knowledge as the new tool for controlling and regulating of the conduct of the family members.

In *The Art of Fatherhood*, Ahmet Mithat introduces the prevailing ideas of the time regarding childrearing and family, some of which were eugenically inspired although the term eugenics itself is never evoked. The primary goal of marriage (*tehhül*), according to Ahmet Mithat, was to produce mentally and physically healthy and happy children for the continuation of one’s family (*ibka-yi aile*) and nation (*ibka-yi millet*), and human species.¹⁵⁰ To do so, one needed to be a good father, for which loving one’s child would not suffice, for a good father needed to plan for the health and wellbeing of the child, his/her physical and moral and mental happiness before s/he was

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 31.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 38.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 38.

¹⁵⁰ Ahmet Mithat Efendi, *Peder Olmak Sanatı* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2013), 46.

born.¹⁵¹ The planning involved rational selection of the potential wife, examining her in terms of her mental, educational, physical, and moral qualities, checking if she could produce strong and bodily robust children with no hereditary diseases (*emraz-ı mütevaris*).¹⁵² It was important for the potential father as well to maintain his health and avoid venereal diseases such as syphilis and alcohol that would poison a father's blood, which would then pass to the child.¹⁵³

In the traditional Ottoman (Muslim) culture, homemaking was seen as the task of the mother (*yuvayı dişi kuş yapar*). However, considering the incompleteness of her knowledge and thus her intellectual dependency on the father, Ahmet Mithat assigned the task of homemaking to the husband and the wife together, seeing preservation and continuation of a healthy family in the harmony and union (*itilaf ve ittihat*) of the two. To achieve this harmony and union, essential for the family life, the husband needed to possess fair amount of knowledge of household and home life (*ahval ve maişet-i beytiye*) to the extent that he could prove his superiority over his wife in these matters as well. He was to know about these matters not to carry household activities himself but to have his wife perform them. Otherwise, he would be dependent on her on these matters, and lose his authority to give orders and to forbid (*emir ve nehy*) at home.¹⁵⁴ This is an uncommon evocation, but I believe Ahmet Mithat's strategy embodies the double logic that I mentioned earlier, i.e., introducing the modern –the necessity of the father to know about homemaking and child rearing –while preserving the traditional Islamic family norms – superiority of the husband over the wife.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 63.

While the space here does not allow for an in-depth analysis of these two sources, suffice it so say that reforming the household and the conduct of family members was viewed indispensable for the right bringing up of children. “Without regulating and reforming (*tanzim ve ıslah*) the household,” argued Ahmet Mithat, “whatever else done towards this cause would be of absolutely no use.”¹⁵⁵ What it involved was regulating one’s daily activities, leisure time, and planning one’s budget, interacting with one’s kids daily and investing in their education, emotional, physical and mental wellbeing in addition to aforementioned measures such as rational selection of mates. Not only do we discern a new conception of childhood in this discourse but also new rationalities of ordering familial conducts along with it. And this modernity did not override certain traditional norms but incorporated them with a new vocabulary. One last point to highlight here is that childrearing and notions of childhood introduced in this period were still perceived in the privacy of the family; that is, it was the task of the parents to bring up a healthy and strong child. This discourse would gradually be taken up by the State starting the Second Constitutional Period and would reach its zenith in the Republican period.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 72.

¹⁵⁶ The Second Constitutional Period (1908-1920) is not included in this historical narrative partly for mere practical purposes and partly for the fact that I aimed to trace emergence of “new” conceptions of childhood that corresponded to the second half of the nineteenth century, i.e., primarily the Hamidian Era, to allow for comparison between the Empire and the Republic with regard to discursive construction of childhood. Those interested in the images, notions, discourses of childhood in the Second Constitutional Period can apply to the following sources: Bekir Onur, *Türk Modernleşmesinde Çocuk* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2009); *Türkiye’de Çocukluğun Tarihi: Çocukluğun Sosyo-Kültürel Tarihine Giriş*; Ali Gurbetoğlu, “İ. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Çocuk Dergilerinde Çocukluk Anlayışı ” *Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri Dergisi* 40, no. 2 (2007); Cüneyd Okay, “War and Child in the Second Constitutional Period,” in *Enfance Et Jeunesse Dans Monde Musulman*, ed. François Georgeon and Klaus Kreiser (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2007); *Meşrutiyet Çocukları* (İstanbul: Bordo, 2000); *Meşrutiyet Dönemi Çocuk Edebiyatı: Şiir* (İstanbul: Medyatek, 2002); *Eski Harfli Çocuk Dergileri*; Füsün Üstel, “İ. Meşrutiyet Ve Vatandaşın ‘İcad’,” in *Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat Ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009); Öztan, *Türkiye’de Çocukluğun Politik İnşası*.

Chapter III

Puericulture (Education) and the Contours of the Republican Child Question and Politics of Sexuality

In an editorial in *Cumhuriyet* (The Republic), the newspaper that was ideologically a close ally of the Republican People's Party and proponent of Kemalist regime, the editor-in-chief Yunus Nadi put forth the population question (*nüfus meselesi*) as the single most important issue of Republican Turkey.¹⁵⁷ He first expressed his respect and admiration for the Fascist Regime in Italy under the leadership of Mussolini for the practical measures it was taking to deal with the population question, particularly with regard to the regime's rational and economic investment in children in the form of economic relief, tax exemptions, allowances and rewards introduced for families with children. He then lamented the lack of importance paid to the population question in Turkey: "We wish to clearly say that among European countries, the country that pays the least importance to the population question is Turkey. Nevertheless, we must add that the country that needs more population the most is Turkey."¹⁵⁸ He finally summed up the population policy of the new Republic as increasing birthrates and decreasing the mortality rates, particularly infant mortality. Thus, the population question was indeed nothing but the child question (*çocuk meselesi*).

In fact, according to pediatrician Besim Ömer (Akalın), the child lied at the very core of the Republican population question, for the child was the only source of the population insofar as he or she was mentally and physically healthy and robust. Besim Ömer tied the growth and progress of the nation to two indissolubly linked conditions: an

¹⁵⁷ Yunus Nadi Abalıoğlu, "En Büyük Mes'ele," *Cumhuriyet*, 05/23 1930, 1.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

increase in the population and betterment (*ıslah*) of the race (i.e., through eugenics), both of which were contingent upon rearing a mentally and physically robust Turkish child.¹⁵⁹ This was a challenge confronting the Republican medical doctors, scientists, intellectuals, and policy makers who now assumed the task of fabricating a physically and mentally sound, stable, and productive Turkish citizenry. That is, the child question was necessarily linked to the very process of nation-making itself.

Superficially, the child question referred to high rates of infant mortality,¹⁶⁰ which was frequently cited as one of the most worrying realities of the new Republic and an enormous obstacle to increasing the Turkish population, one of the two pillars constituting the foundation of the nation and the state and essential to its development and progress, the other being territory (*toprak*).¹⁶¹ On close scrutiny though, it amalgamated multiple discursive and non-discursive practices and assumptions, including among other things reforming the Turkish household (based on Kemalist bourgeois and patriarchal ideals) which comprised educating the mothers in modern hygiene principles and modern childrearing principles (puericulture), regulating the “abnormal” and “unproductive” child populations that included vagrants, delinquents, psychopaths, and the disabled, reforming schools in modern pedagogical styles and hygienic principles, and educating and imbuing the Turkish child with national ideals and Republican morality, thus helping with the fabrication and dissemination of the idea of nationhood. As a matter of fact, the editor of *İş: Felsefe, Ahlak ve İctimaiyat Mecmuası*

¹⁵⁹ Besim Ömer Akalın, *Türk Çocuğunu Nasıl Yaşatmalı? Nüfus Siyasetinde Çocuk: Sağlam Nesil, Öjenizm, Sağlam Irk, Kısırlaştırma* (İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan Basımevi, 1938), 9-10.

¹⁶⁰ In three major urban areas the ratio of infant mortality (of those 0 to 4 ages) to the general mortality rate was cited as drastically high compared to more industrialized nations. In Istanbul (from 1931 to 1935) the ratio of infant mortality was 21 %; in Izmir (from 1931 to 1934) 30.5 %; and in Ankara (from 1931 to 1934) it was 43 %. See, Ömer Celal Sarç, "Türkiye'de Çocuk Ölümleri," *İş: Felsefe, Ahlak ve İctimaiyat Mecmuası* 9, no. 34 (1943): 62-66.

¹⁶¹ Akalın, Besim Ömer. *Türk Çocuğunu Nasıl Yaşatmalı?*

(Journal of Philosophy, Morality and Sociology), in an issue that was dedicated to the child question, epitomized the Republican child question concisely: “the child [question] in Turkey,” it was argued, “was so to speak the epitome of the *Turkish question* itself” (emphasis in the original).¹⁶² That is, the very idea of a modern Turkish national identity was contingent to a large degree on the body of the Turkish child. The Turkish child came to be seen as the harbinger of Turkish nationhood; the identity of the child was closely tied to the identity of the nation. As such, childhood both literally and metaphorically was essential to conceptualizing (the future of) the Turkish nation.

As Sharon Stephens argues, similar to gendered spaces, childhood (i.e., age graded space) was an essential conceptual space for and integral to the fabrication of modern nation state and national identity and its dissemination throughout the society.¹⁶³ That is, the very body of the child came to represent and present the nation in its embodiment so much so that the biography of the child was impossible to think without the biography of the modern nation. This embodiment, of course, took different forms in different political rationalities (liberal, fascistic, socialist etc.). The concern here is how this embodiment took form in discourse of Turkish Republicanism during the single party rule until the late 1940s. The claim is that the concerted effort by Kemalist Republicans to fabricate a national identity and disseminate the idea of nationhood –to what extent it has been achieved is another question – was tied to nationalization and regulation and disciplining of three interrelated childhood spaces and their inhabitants: home; street; and school. This chapter will focus on Republican efforts to regulate Turkish household (and its inhabitants, the child and the mother) and family through the concept of puericulture.

¹⁶² "Yeni Türkiye'de Çocuk," *İş: Felsefe, Ahlak ve İktisadiyat Mecmuası* 9, no. 13 (1943).

¹⁶³ Sharon Stephens, "Children and the Politics of Culture in "Late Capitalism"," in *Children and the Politics of Culture*, ed. Sharon Stephens (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 15.

In the rest of this chapter, I will trace the contours of the child question of the Republic through the concept of puericulture, understood here as an assemblage of practices and knowledges related to the hygienic care and rearing of infants. Puericulture was a prevailing discourse that provided the State with novel incentives and means to administer the household space, an essential component of population question (*nifus meselesi*). I will first briefly explore the history of the concept of puericulture and then engage in how puericulture amalgamated multiple assumptions and practices regarding regulation of the Turkish household and Republican politics of sexuality.

3.1 Puericulture as the science of infant management

Coined by a French physician Alfred Caron, the word “puericulture” first appeared in France in the second half of the nineteenth century referring roughly to the health of the newborns in the general improvement of human species. The concept was adopted and given a fresh meaning and function by Adolphe Pinard (1844-1934), a French obstetrician and the chair of obstetrics at the Faculty of Medicine in Paris. He defined it as “research and application of knowledge useful to the reproduction, preservation and improvement of the species.”¹⁶⁴

Pinard, like the rest of the physicians and intellectuals of his age, was seriously concerned about the depopulation and high rates of infant mortality in France. Indeed, according to Pinard infant mortality was one of the main causes of depopulation and population decline in the country. He put forth puericulture as a remedy to the problem. For this purpose, with the help of some influential philanthropists and reformers he established a “refuge” on the Avenue Maine (*Refuge de L'Avenue du Maine*) to assist deprived pregnant women, particularly those awaiting delivery. As a result of the

¹⁶⁴ Cited in Schneider, "Puericulture and the Style of French Eugenics," 265.

comparative research he conducted between the women giving birth at the “refuge” and those at Baudelocque clinic, he realized that with good care and rest, the women at the refuge were more likely to deliver healthier and heavier babies than those overburdened mothers delivering at Baudelocque clinic because he thought the formers’ “intra-uterine life was not troubled and their incubation was complete.”¹⁶⁵ This led to the emergence of a new concept of hygiene and had strong implications for a new policy of social hygiene. In order to ensure the normal development of the fetus, Pinard highlighted the significance of *la puericulture intrauterine* (intra-uterine puericulture, or the hygiene of the fetus in the uterus). Intra-uterine puericulture needed to be followed by “*extrauterine puericulture*,” (that is, puericulture of the nursing baby and the infant, or maternal and infant hygiene) in order to increase the likelihood of the survival of the baby. That is, he insisted that the child be provided with every care both during the time it spends in its mother’s womb and the first years (particularly the first year) of its birth, thus highlighting both prenatal and postnatal care.

Pinard advocated what he called “conscious and responsible procreation” –which would be the credo of Republican doctors in Turkey. To this end, one must educate the “teeming mother” and the public at large in principles of nutrition, infant and child care, sanitation, better housing, domestic and personal cleanliness, mental health, and the potential effects of such “social vice” as prostitution, alcoholism, vagrancy, and feeble-mindedness, and such venereal diseases as syphilis and gonorrhoea on the future generations. The mother was to be reminded of her duty not just as an individual member of the society but also as the mother of the future generations of the State; thus maternity was conceived as a *public duty* with a social function. Such conceptualization turned

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, 268.

puericulture into what Schneider calls a “patriotic cause.” One significant aspect of this conceptualization was that puericulture made it possible to shift the gaze away from the mother towards the child.¹⁶⁶ That is, motherhood came to be perceived as a public duty towards a greater goal: management of infants and safeguarding their developing life, which was viewed essential to the future of the State.¹⁶⁷

As Schneider claims, Pinard’s puericulture was more than just a science of infant management and was deeply intertwined with eugenics assumptions. In Pinard’s conceptualization, puericulture of the infant was contingent on at least two conditions. First, the infant must have healthy progenitors (Darwinian version of heredity) and secondly s/he must be surrounded with a healthy milieu (with a more new-Lamarckian focus on culture/environment). The former was the task of eugenics and the latter the task of social hygiene/medicine. The success of puericulture depended on synergistic working of both of these agents in improving the means of feeding and rearing children and eradicating the negative conditions affecting pregnancy, prenatal care, and postnatal care.

Republican scientists in Turkey adopted this French version of puericulture without challenging its epistemological core. They promoted puericulture as a panacea to the population and thus child question of the nascent Republic, thanks to its appeal to modern scientific principles and its focus on the education and health of the infant and the mother, and thus its potential and capacity to increase the quantity and quality of the population. The quasi-scientific nature of puericulture made it possible to elicit a great amount of support among medical doctors, pedagogues, and policymakers. More importantly, it was advocated and promoted by the State as it fit well with the pronatalist

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ The concept of “infant management” is borrowed from Schneider, Ibid.

policies of the Republican People's Party that held the child and mother as the nucleus of the nation, and motherhood and family vital to the future of the Turkish race. Indeed, it constituted a central place in the child-centered health and welfare policies of the Republic. The strength and the future of the nation resided in the child and depended on generations with sound minds and healthy bodies that would boost economic and cultural productivity of the country.

3.2. Puericulture in Turkey: Republican domestic politics and politics of sexuality

Although the history of puericulture in Turkey could be traced to the early writings of the leading obstetrician Ömer Besim Akalın (1862 -1940), who had written extensively on nursing, childcare, obstetrics (modern midwifery), and marriage hygiene based on modern scientific principles, it was only in 1924 that puericulture was formally included in the curriculum of the Faculty of Medicine of Darülfünun (now Istanbul University). İhsan Hilmi Alantar (1888-1962), a pediatrician, was appointed to teach the class. With the efforts of İhsan Hilmi Alantar and Kadri Raşit Anday, a university chair for puericulture was established in the Faculty of Medicine in 1931. İhsan Hilmi Alantar was the first to hold the chair.¹⁶⁸

Alantar translated puericulture as the science of “child hygiene, child development, or child care.” It covered two interrelated areas: the individual and social hygiene of the children. The former defined who the child was, distinguishing him/her from the adult. It was the study of child nutrition and an account of various care the child

¹⁶⁸ Alantar graduated from Tıbbiye (Faculty of Medicine) in 1911. Upon his graduation, he was sent to France to work with Victor Henri Hutinel, who specialized in pediatric medicine and childhood diseases. He spent one year in France and returned to Turkey to work as a physician lieutenant. In 1916, he was sent to Germany to complete his graduate studies. In Germany, Alantar worked with Adalbert Czerny, an internationally known Austrian professor for pediatrics, also regarded to be one of the founders of modern pediatrics. See, Sezai Bedreddin Tümay, "Ord. Prof. Dr. İhsan Hilmi Alantar," (Istanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1962).

needed. The latter approached the child from a societal standpoint, explaining the important role the child played in the general population. It demonstrated the ubiquity of child mortality among children, and sought for ways to prevent this while exploring what kinds of institutions and assistance needed.¹⁶⁹

Although in his early writings Alantar emphasized the significance of puericulture both in the improvement of individual health and the betterment of the race, puericulture was particularly celebrated for its potential to solve the social problems. This shift was reflected in the various definitions of puericulture provided by other physicians as well. Kudsi Halkacı extended the definition with a closer focus on the social aspects of it. Drawing on Adolphe Pinard's interpretation, he defined puericulture as "a science that seeks to identify and carry out the principles of growing robust and healthy children, and [a science] that improves human race."¹⁷⁰ As a science, he claimed, puericulture aimed to preserve human race by identifying incidents related to birth and therefore breeding of the stock.¹⁷¹ Likewise, obstetrician Besim Ömer championed the science of puericulture as it maintained the health of children, protecting them from diseases and reducing their mortality. Considering the social and economic benefits of bringing up a healthy child that would defend the country in the future, he stated, we can comprehend the significance of puericulture that protects and helps to proliferate children.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ İhsan Hilmi Alantar, *Püerikültür: Ferdi Ve İçtimai Çocuk Hıfzıssıhhası* (Istanbul: Istanbul Devlet Matbaası, 1931), 6.

¹⁷⁰ Kudsi Halkacı, "Püerikültür," (Istanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1938), 3.

¹⁷¹ I translate "nesil" as stock here, although it is occasionally used to carry such meanings as race, rising generation and posterity.

¹⁷² Akalın, Besim Ömer. *Türk Çocuğunu Nasıl Yaşatmalı?*.

3.2.1. Puericulture and eugenics

Reading puericulture in relation with rearing robust and healthy children, childbirth hygiene, and proliferation and preservation of the race was a shared practice among physicians.¹⁷³ Such a common understanding was a result of their associating puericulture with eugenics as they thought proliferation and preservation of the race was contingent upon the fitness of the children and parents, particularly the mother.¹⁷⁴

The relationship between puericulture and eugenics was made clear in a paper Alantar presented at the Seventh National Conference of Medicine in 1938, whose theme was eugenics. The purpose of Alantar's paper was to discuss and support eugenics from the standpoint of pediatrics and child hygiene. In this paper, Alantar provided a broad definition of eugenics that challenged the Anglo-American and Germanic interpretations. He cited heredity, sex, milieu (education), economy, social status, literacy level of parents, parents' diseases, their exposure to "poison" (syphilis, alcohol, nicotine, cocaine, and other diseases) and their life styles as main sources affecting the quality of a race. These were important issues to consider both before procreation, i.e. in the premarital

¹⁷³ Akalın, *Türk Çocuğunu Nasıl Yaşatmalı? Nüfus Siyasetinde Çocuk: Sağlam Nesil, Öjenizm, Sağlam Irk, Kısırlaştırma*; İhsan Şükrü Aksel, "Modern Irk Hıfzıssıhası," *Poliklinik*, no. 51 (1937): 75-76; İhsan Hilmi Alantar, "Pediatri Köşesinden Öjenik" (paper presented at the Yedinci Ulusal Türk Tıp Kurultayı, Ankara, 1938); Kudsi Esencan, "Kız Okullarında Çocuk Bakımı Dersleri" (paper presented at the Onikinci Milli Türk Tıp Kongresi, İstanbul, 1952); Kudsi Halkacı, "Çocuk Bakımı Ve Halk Sağlığı Bilgileri," ed. Sıhhat ve İctimai Muavenet Vekaleti (Ankara: Hapisane matbaası, 1938); "Puerükültür."

¹⁷⁴ These medical doctors took the lead in translating the eugenics assumptions into social and political reforms in Turkey. They understood eugenics as *ırk ıslahı* (the betterment of race) or *ırk hıfzıssıhası* (race hygiene). They started to use *ırk hıfzıssıhası* (race hygiene) particularly after the Germans enacted the sterilizations laws and the Laws for the Preservation of the Aryan Race in 1933. Detailed descriptions of these laws with their rationale and the scope of their application got circulated in newspapers and the writings of these physicians. See, for example, Akalın, *Türk Çocuğunu Nasıl Yaşatmalı? Nüfus Siyasetinde Çocuk: Sağlam Nesil, Öjenizm, Sağlam Irk, Kısırlaştırma*; Mazhar Osman Uzman, *Eugenik, İdiş. Kısır: İyi Çocuk Yetiştirme Hakkında İki Konferans* (İstanbul: Kader Matbaası, 1935); "Almanyada Tababet Mesleğini Yeniden Tanzim Eden Bir Kanun Layihası," *Poliklinik*, no. 63 (1938); Fahreddin Kerim Gökay, "Milli Nüfus Siyasetinde (Eugenique) Meselesinin Mahiyeti [the Question of Eugenics in the National Population Policy]," *Ülkü* 3, no. 15 (1934). They approached these laws with admiration as well as with skepticism and doubt.

phase –particularly those of heredity and exposure to social diseases –and after procreation, that is, when the child is born.¹⁷⁵

Alantar challenged the parochial interpretations of eugenics that simply underscored the hereditary aspects of it. Such “superficial and narrow-minded” interpretations, he claimed, would not perceive the centrality of eugenics in the post-procreation phase when the child was born. According to Alantar, the advocates of heredity were only interested in the procreation phase that included concerns about fitness of the mother and father, hereditary traits, fertilization, pregnancy, and birth. When a healthy child was born from a healthy mother and father, they would think that the role of eugenics was complete. On the contrary, he argued, eugenics was particularly important after the child was born. This was because infant mortality was one of the main causes of population decline, making it crucial for a country’s population policy.

Therefore, he continued,

From the point of view of pediatrics, child is the center in eugenics. Everything starts in the center and moves towards centrifuge; a circle has a center; a room, the world [and] everything has a center; while the center of our country is Ankara, the center of our nation is the child; everything will take its future and origin from there [the child].¹⁷⁶

Insofar as the child came to constitute the central object of attention in the population politics of the country, Alantar was able to strategically tie puericulture to eugenics and conceptualize the former as a significant step to achieve the latter. Doing so, he extended the definition of eugenics to transcend the dominant hereditarian approach while simultaneously legitimizing and consolidating the status of puericulture as a scientific

¹⁷⁵ Alantar, "Pediatri Köşesinden Öjenik," 88.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

approach to respond to the ubiquitous child question.¹⁷⁷ In fact, puericulture was not *just* another area of specialization among medical sciences. It was directly related to the wellbeing of the society and the nation for the mere fact that it targeted the hygiene of the child, which gave it a great advantage in the fight among medical doctors.¹⁷⁸ For, as Kudsi Halkacı put it, puericulture was a “very important and grandeur undertaking regarding the future of the society.”¹⁷⁹

Halkacı wedded puericulture to eugenics more explicitly from the point of view of modern child protection. Modern child protection, according to Halkacı, had at least two components. First, it had to be conceived as a national goal (*milli ülkü*) for everyone just like national defense and should constitute a major part of public health policy as it was in the rest of the civilized nations. Insofar as the ideal of a civilized nation was to increase the rate of natality and decrease the rate of mortality so as to increase the population, and create a body politic that was physically, morally, and mentally healthy, argued Halkacı, the protection of the child had to be perceived as a significant element of a nation’s population and health politics.¹⁸⁰

Second, modern child protection had to be based on rigorous scientific bases that were to be provided by sciences of *biotechnie* (sciences of life). Among them were the

¹⁷⁷ Similar to Alantar, most of the puericulturists and eugenicists in Turkey adopted a strategic approach to extend the definition of eugenics to include environment or milieu as a strong agent in shaping the physical and mental wellbeing of the individuals and the nation. Although there were hardline champions of hereditarianism such as Ali Esat Birol and physiologist and hygienist Server Kamil Tokgöz, most embraced a more hybrid version of eugenics. For one reason, their concern was less about the degeneration of the race by blending with other “inferior” races, a concern in the Anglo-American countries, Germany and South America, as there was no such threat in Turkey. In absence of a racial counterpart, they did construct other anxieties, diverting their attention to threats inside such as hereditary disables, alcoholism, prostitution and venereal diseases, malaria, tuberculosis, and rarely pauperism.

¹⁷⁸ Alantar, İhsan Hilmi. "Çocuk Hekimliği " Paper presented at the Altıncı Ulusal Türk Tıp Kurultayı, Ankara, 1935. İhsan Hilmi Alantar, "Çocuk Hekimliği " (paper presented at the Altıncı Ulusal Türk Tıp Kurultayı, Ankara, 1935).

¹⁷⁹ Kudsi Halkacı, "Çocukları Esirgemenin Modern Tekniği," ed. Türkiye Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu (Istanbul: Milli Mecmua Basım Evi, 1937), 10.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 3, 11.

science of race hygiene (eugenics) that investigated the conditions that ensured the production of a better posterity and puericulture that sought and applied the principles of rearing robust and healthy children, and thus was necessarily the science of improving human race. In this sense, puericulture was directly tied to betterment of race (*ırk islahı*). Halkacı constructed the link between eugenics and puericulture through the concept of *zootechnie humaine (insana mahsus zootechnie)*,¹⁸¹ which mainly meant the application of modern breeding techniques in human species in order to yield the most return (*randıman*) possible. *Zootechnie humaine* included rational selection of the reproducers (breeders, the parents), puericulture, and organization of culture-physique and labor.¹⁸² In fact, puericulture was comprehensive enough to include the process of rational selection of mates (reproducers) as well. Drawing on Sicard de Plauzoles's work, Halkacı identified three phases of puericulture:¹⁸³

- a) Prenuptial puericulture (or what he calls "pre-pregnancy puericulture") that helped to regulate conscious procreation and breeding and assured the physique and moral robustness of both genders.
- b) The puericulture of the uterus (or "internal puericulture") that provided necessary conditions for the fetus to receive good nutrition.
- c) Postpartum puericulture that assured the health and robustness of the born baby.

He further extended this classification from the standpoint of social medicine to include puericulture of the virginal period, pregnancy period, laboring period, infants (from birth until age 2.5), preschool children (age 2.5 to age 7), and school children. It was essential

¹⁸¹ The concept was borrowed from French physician of public health and eugenicist Sicard de Plauzoles. It will be further explored in the next chapter.

¹⁸² Halkacı, "Çocukları Esirgemenin Modern Tekniği," 3-12.

¹⁸³ "Püerükültür," 9.

that both working mothers in the urban areas and mothers in the rural areas were educated about every phases of puericulture that covered principles of marriage hygiene and child hygiene, nutrition, better housing and sanitation, and ways to protect against such “social vice” as syphilis, gonorrhoea and other venereal diseases, and tuberculosis.

What is important here is that puericulture was linked to race betterment (eugenics) and population increase, both of whose main source was childhood. And puericulture was put forth as a comprehensive science with the major goal of improving the conditions of childhood (both before and after the child was born). For Republican puericulturists the major spaces of childhood were home and the body of the mother. Thus, they fixed their attention on reforming these spaces, both of which became the primary objects of signification, of power and desire, and sites where assumptions of masculinity and femininity were reinserted, constructed, normalized; family life redefined, gender roles and along with them other social and cultural behaviors prescribed. Home and maternity became the quintessential sites of Republican domestic politics and politics of sexuality.

3.2.2. Republican domestic politics I: Maternity as a social function and patriotic cause

From the standpoint of puericulture, maternity and reproductive capacities of women constituted essential components of politics of sexuality promoted by the Republican medical doctors. They attributed two primary functions to maternity. First, maternity was necessarily a “public and national duty” (“*sosyal hizmet*,” “*vatani hizmet*,” “*milli bir vazife*”) and social function insofar as the mother had the capacity to reproduce. Doing so, they relegated women to the private sphere to serve a public duty. Motherhood was viewed as a political task in the service of the state. Hygienist and

eugenicist Server Kamil Tokgöz expressed the link between motherhood and the state as “the dignity of motherhood pertains to the dignity of one’s country.” This dignity was the greatest goal that every child of the country would have to conceive.¹⁸⁴

This was an ambivalent conceptualization considering the fact that the premise of the Republican discourse was the emancipation of women from the constraining “traditions,” residues of the Islamic past. Drawing on Victoria De Grazia’s conceptualization, this was a conflict between the demands of modernity and the desire to reinstate certain traditional-patriarchal norms.¹⁸⁵ Attempting to “liberate” women from tutelage of the tradition and patriarchal family structure so that she became an active and productive member of the society, Republicans paradoxically constructed a new tutelary system where father-centered family patriarchalism is destroyed only to be replaced by a patriarchy of the state, thus the state substituting the father.¹⁸⁶ In this sense, the emancipation of women from the father is curbed by the responsibility to carry out their “natural duty” in their best capacity in service of the nation. And State came to acquire the hegemonic role of fabricating, delimiting, and regulating “new” gendered boundaries.

Republican discourse of sexuality, then, on the one hand, was contingent on construction and dissemination of the emancipation hypothesis. That is, women were emancipated from the “veil” of the Islam –veil as a metaphor representing any sorts of constraints imposed during the “traditional” Ottoman Muslim society –and allowed to the public space, which was “only” made possible with the foundation of the Republic.¹⁸⁷ In

¹⁸⁴ Server Kamil Tokgöz, “Öjenizm: Irk Islahı,” (Ankara: Sümer Basımevi, 1938), 8.

¹⁸⁵ Victoria De Grazia, *How Fascism Ruled Women: Italy, 1922-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

¹⁸⁶ Donzelot, *The Policing of Families*.

¹⁸⁷ Fatmagül Berktaş, “Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Feminizm,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (Istanbul: İletişim, 2009).

the Ottoman Empire, according to Berktaý, public space was sharply demarcated and separated based on gender differences. The visibility of women, who were seen as *mahrem* (*mahram* in Arabic), in the Ottoman public space was limited to obligatory conditions (*zorunluluk halleri*) and was strictly regulated when allowed.¹⁸⁸ The Republicans disrupted this notion of gendered public space by opening it up to women, who were now viewed as modern and independent subjects granted political rights, liberty and visibility.¹⁸⁹ However, doing so, on the other hand, they simultaneously reinforced and underwrote the “traditional” practices and notions of sexual difference and heteronormativity by assigning the mothers the “traditional and natural” duties of motherhood, which according to Berktaý manifested patriarchal cognitive and structural continuity with the Ottoman normative familial values.¹⁹⁰

The transformation was from Islamic patriarchalism that was embodied in the persona of the Sultan during the Empire to nation-state patriarchalism.¹⁹¹ While the republican regime granted women political rights and visibility in public space, it simultaneously made them objects of state-centered paternalism.¹⁹² Moreover, as Serpil Sancar argues, women’s visibility in the Republican public space was restricted to the cultural and social tasks (motherhood, teaching, social assistance etc.) of disseminating and mobilizing Kemalist transformations. That is, women did not participate in the public

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 353.

¹⁸⁹ Some major legislative transformations were introduced after the Republic was founded. First and foremost was the enactment of Civil Code (inspired by Swiss Civil Code) in 1926 that replaced *Shari‘a* law (Islamic law) with secular law (indeed the code involved a total displacement of anything Islamic); it outlawed polygamy and granted each partner in marriage equal rights in case of divorce, child custody, and inheritance. In 1930, women were granted the right to vote in local elections and in 1934 in national elections. See, Deniz Kandiyoti, "End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism, and Women in Turkey," in *Women, Islam and the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (New York: Macmillan, 1991), 23-24.

¹⁹⁰ Berktaý, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Feminizm," 353.

¹⁹¹ Fatmagül Berktaý, " (2001), 353.

¹⁹² Berktaý, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Feminizm; Alexandros Lamprou, "Halkevi Sahnesinde ‘Yeni Türk Kadını’: 1930’lu Ve 1940’lı Yıllarda Kadınlı-Erkekli Yeniliklerin ‘Sahnelenmesi’," *Toplum ve Bilim* 2, no. 130 (2014); Ece Öztan, "Türkiye’de Ailecilik, Biyosiyaset Ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet Rejimi," *ibid.*

space as equal political subjects as men.¹⁹³ Kudsi Halkacı epitomized succinctly the roles assigned to women in the Republican discourse. According to Halkacı, a woman was a wife, a mother, and a teacher respectively. He continued, “it was the mother who inscribed the first impression into the brain of the child. Civilization begins with the mother’s education [of the child]. It is the mother’s education that is the primary agent in the consolidation of democracy and republic.”¹⁹⁴ It was the mother who was burdened with the task of providing the children of the nation with the knowledge of the nation and the Republic.

Feminist scholars have pointed out the double burden the Republican woman was made to bear. On the one hand, she was “tossed into the public space” to embody the modernist reforms introduced by the Kemalist regime –i.e. receiving modern education, participating in the workplace, embodying the civilized ways of life etc.¹⁹⁵ The “new woman” Kandiyoti argues, was not only to embody the modern but also symbolize the very break with the past (at least the Islamic past).¹⁹⁶ Her body was inscribed with a new Republican memory demarcated by the Kemalist Republican elite. However, her visibility was contingent upon her ability to carry out her “traditional and natural” duties (as a mother), as I mentioned earlier. In this sense, the Republican regime did not necessarily challenge the patriarchal norms of the traditional social morality; rather imposed on her a new “symbolic veil” through gendered violence.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Serpil Sancar, *Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyeti: Erkekler Devlet Kurar, Kadınlar Aile Kurar* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), 9.

¹⁹⁴ Halkacı, "Çocukları Esirgemenin Modern Tekniği," 14.

¹⁹⁵ Fatmagül Bertay, (2001), 353; Kandiyoti, "End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism, and Women in Turkey," 23-24.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 23-24, 41.

¹⁹⁷ Kandiyoti, (1997), 161.




Figure 3.1 A figure of a modern Republican woman on National Sovereignty and Children's Day (April 23, 1943).

The sword in her left hand has "national sovereignty" inscribed on it. The figure is supplemented with a couplet by Nedim (1681-1730), a well-known lyric poet in the Ottoman Divan poetry tradition. Courtesy of National Library (visual archives).

Puericulturist and eugenicists reproduced this double image of modern republican woman in their medical language. Hygienist Zeki Ragıp Yalım reflected this ambivalence in his essay titled "*The ideal of wellbeing in modern societies: Health.*" He criticized participation of women in modern workplaces only to deprioritize their "primary job," *yuva kurmak* (homemaking). Acknowledging and appreciating women's valuable contributions to national and social economy, he nevertheless warned that one should not overlook how this was pejoratively affecting the society. He feared that there was an

increase in the professional and educated community who favored career over homemaking and produced few or no children. He sarcastically pointed out “if one were to seek ways to sterilize the most selected and intellectual class of a nation, one would not be able to find a better way than educating this group in higher professional [educational] institutions for a certain period of time.”¹⁹⁸ Professional and educational career was a fashionable addiction among the women of our age, he continued, arguing, “obviously the path to take to increase the economic and social capacity of a nation is not to sterilize the gentlefolk.”

What was the solution then? As far as Yalım was concerned, the solution laid in “reconciling the desire of society and that of the individual” without retreating into the egotistical thinking of our ancestors who believed that “the world was created by man.” Thus, he strongly opposed to the idea that girls should be prevented from receiving modern education and having a career. He continued:

In the modern societies of our age, there is a need for women with higher education as much as need for men. Shortage of either of the sexes will debilitate our civilized fabric (*bünye*). BUT in order to progress in the path we have taken towards revolution and civilization, the most important condition is the existence of women who are homemakers. (emphasis original).¹⁹⁹

At this point, Yalım spoke out the “ideal woman” for the Republic: One “who abandons her ease and comfort and dedicates herself to homemaking and to her children in spite of her *tahsil* (educational status) and *terbiye* (education).”²⁰⁰ Indeed, he argued, she should be educated so that she manages the household better. “For women, homemaking was the

¹⁹⁸ Zeki Ragıp Yalım, "Modern Cemiyetlerde Saadet Ülküsü: Sağlık [the Ideal of Wellbeing in Modern Societies: Health]," in *C.H.P Konferansları Serisi* (1939), 80.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Both *tahsil* and *terbiye* do not translate into English easily. While the former refers to the process of acquisition of knowledge, the latter means education in a more general sense while also referring to cultivation of good manners, habituation, and nourishing.

principal occupation while higher level of education” was to assist with this occupation.²⁰¹

As such, Republican discourse strategically fused economic and social demands of a modern society with the norms of patriarchal society by promoting a well-informed motherhood as a national task. Part of the effort to help the mother so that she focused on raising children for the national cause was to oppose women in politics, labor and in any other realm for that matter that deviated her from fulfilling her national and public duty. In this sense, Republican discourse relegated men and women to fulfill separate but complementary functions in the civil (the former) and domestic (the latter) domains. While the former became the guardians of the nation, the latter became its biological and symbolic reproducers.²⁰² Fahreddin Kerim Gökay articulated this perspective in the following way. According to Gökay, housewifery and motherhood were a “hereditary art” (*irsi sanat*) in women. He argued that women should refrain from participating in public life (*umumi hayat*) because the struggles of life exhausted them much more, deteriorating their “natural qualities.”²⁰³ Although in industrial countries with high a population it is recommended that working mother not procreate, he continued, “in countries like ours where there is a much need for population, working mothers too should marry insofar as they are provided with comfort during pregnancy and their children are taken care of in dorms.”²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Ibid., 79.

²⁰² Alemdaroğlu, "Politics of the Body and Eugenic Discourse in Early Republican Turkey," 67. Also, Kandiyoti, "End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism, and Women in Turkey."

²⁰³ Gökay, "Milli Nüfus Siyasetinde (Eugenique) Meselesinin Mahiyeti [the Question of Eugenics in the National Population Policy]," 211.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

3.2.3. Republican domestic politics II: Motherhood as the machinery of household and procreation

Puericulturists undergirded the view of maternity as a national task with biological vocabulary particularly calling attention to the procreative capacities of women. More often than not, they introduced procreation as the sole function of matrimony. Biologically speaking, the woman was the main agent of reproduction, argued psychiatrist İhsan Şükrü Aksel: “Today’s race movements have shown that it is the woman who plays the most important role in elevating the posterity. A strong *döl* (semen, progeny) primarily comes from a strong mother.” By a strong mother, he did not mean “a ruddy faced, fat woman,” but a “woman who fits a doctor’s measure, does sports, works with her body, [and] works her mind.”²⁰⁵

As such, women were necessarily situated at the very center of a populationist doctrine and propaganda for more birth. Republican medical doctors continuously admonished the public about their “national” obligation to get married and produce children, the economic and biological capital of the nation’s population and the main source of the country’s progress. However, they simultaneously warned against the differential birth rates among the educated and uneducated classes, a fear that reflected their elite and bourgeois habitus. The followings passage from eugenicist Ali Esat Birol epitomizes the centrality of woman in the populationist doctrine of the Republic as well as the fears of the Republican elite:

A nation that is constituted of families with two children is destined to perish in 300 years.

Therefore, we should make clear the risks of a two-children system. Some of these children will grow and die without reproducing, and some will remain bachelors. In this case, ...we need to

²⁰⁵ Aksel, "Modern İrk Hıfzıssıhası," 75.

make sure that *worthy and fit* families produce 4-5 children. From a physiological perspective, this number is not much at all. Because a married woman is able to make 20 children considering that she gets pregnant every one and a half years during her [active] sexual life. What we are asking is just one-fifth of this number. (emphasis added).²⁰⁶

In this discourse, first, the female body is reduced (by a male medical gaze) to its biological function; the body is seen as a machinery of procreation. The biological function is furthermore tied to the future of the nation, thus is de facto in service of the patriotic cause. Secondly, in this discourse procreation is not to be carried out recklessly and blindly, but calculatedly and rationally, and only by those “worthy and fit” families.

(In a specific sense, the worthy and fit families in the Republican discourse referred to a select and educated class, also called *münevver ve memur tabakaları* (the class of intellectuals and civil servants) and *mümtaz bir sınıf* (a select class), an informed bourgeois elite that assumed the task of leading the cultural and political transformations and consolidating the social and moral order in the new Republic.²⁰⁷ The select class, according to Akil Muhtar Özden (1877-1949), a well-known physician who also wrote considerably on morality and gave speeches on the issue, was not to be constituted of the political representatives of a nation but of men of sciences, particularly medical men.²⁰⁸ Medical men, the quintessential embodiment of the secular outlook, had access to the biological sciences that brought about new conceptions of life and social order, and using Robert Nye’s characterization, were “fierce defenders of their professional and social

²⁰⁶ Ali Esat Birol, "Öjenik Tatbikatı [Implementation of Eugenics]" (paper presented at the Yedinci milli Türk Tıp Kurultayı Ankara, 1937), 9.

²⁰⁷ In a broader sense, it referred to any healthy and (preferably) somewhat educated families (rural and urban). While it is important to take into consideration both of these connotations that challenge a precise analytical categorization of a class in the traditional sense, the analysis that follows helps to delineate the habitus of a relatively homogenized group of people, and it leans towards the specific connotation rather than the broad one.

²⁰⁸ Süheyl Ünver, "Dr. Akil Muhtar Özden'in Moral Üzerine Çalışmaları," (Istanbul: İsmail Akgün Matbaası, 1949), 4.

prerogatives.”²⁰⁹

The Republican scientists at large and medical scientists in particular came to embody new scientific and cultural-moral authority rendered possible by the transformations in the political rationality of the new Republican regime as well as their positivist scientific persona. The Republican scientist fused *his* scientific authority with the cultural and moral authority granted by the political regime that made it possible for *him* to speak for and produce the truth for the Turkish nation.²¹⁰ In this sense, the Republican scientist simultaneously embodied the double persona of a cultural and moral expert, imbued with a strong sense of obligation, duty and social responsibility in the service of the state. The ethic of State service galvanized the scientific community and undergirded “the calling” (in a Weberian sense) in this community for the nationalist revival and moral rehabilitation of the society).

The moral-scientific authority of the scientist was deeply embedded in the discourse of puericulture particularly regarding the issues of reproduction and

²⁰⁹ Nye, *Crime, Madness, & Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline*, xi.

²¹⁰ More than ready to dedicate their lives and careers to the interests of the state, the Republican scientists ardently embraced the task of educating the public, and socially, economically and morally reconstituting the nation. In absence of civil societies in Turkey, the task of educating the public could only have been achieved with the help of the State. Thus, from the beginning Science and State were intimately fused. Indeed, that science should be in the service of the State was already taken for granted. Doing so, they achieved few goals simultaneously. Affiliating their professional goals with the ideals of the state, they secured and consolidated their professional careers. Also, most of the leading medical doctors had either governmental jobs or were members of the Republican Public Party. Fahreddin Kerim, for example, was the mayor and governor of Istanbul from 1949 to 1957, and became the Minister of Health and Social Welfare in 1963. Physiologist and eugenicist Server Kamil Tokgöz was elected to be a member of parliament for the city of Denizli in 1943. Eugenicist Ali Esat Birol was elected to be a member of parliament for Istanbul in 1965.

This form of analysis fits in well with recent studies such as the one by Sanem Güvenç Salgirli, who traced the close linkages between the daily routines of the members of medical community in Turkey with its patterns of social reproduction, their cultural manners, and their efforts to institutionalize modern medicine, and the rise and development of eugenics movement. As she puts it, the cultural manners of the members of the medical community and their urbanite upper-class identity went in hand with the scientific techniques and the knowledge of medicine produced in their respective fields that informed their eugenic agenda. In this sense, their sociopolitical and cultural habitus is viewed to be tightly interwoven with the goals of their scientific research. See Salgirli, "Eugenics for the Doctors: Medicine and Social Control in 1930s Turkey."

procreation. As a component of prenuptial puericulture and eugenics, puericulturists promoted conjugal prudence, promoting responsible and conscious procreation so that the child the parents produce was bodily, mentally and morally healthy and so that “he” could in the future contribute to the economic and cultural development of the country. They argued that conjugal union should not be carried out haphazardly; it needed rational intervention and regulation.

One of the measures encouraged by puericulturists was rational selection of mates –selective breeding (*istifâ*) –by giving both sexes education to elevate their social conscience with regard to conjugality. Conjugality and procreation were thought of as a conscious will that required that an individual make conscious decision in choosing his/her mate as these acts constituted a moral and social duty and were not to be seen as a refuge of egoism or of blind passion or chance. They complained how passions, sentiments and material needs rather than intellect, logic, and reason constituted the incentive for many in choosing their mates. Fahreddin Kerim recommended that couples examine each other in detail, inquiring detailed information of each other’s family, and paying great care to each other’s physical and mental health. Denouncing worthless the viewpoints and advice of other people, he claimed “a marriage based on reality forms the essence of race hygiene.” Prioritizing reasoning (*muhakeme*) over sentiment, he argued “matrimony based on mere excessive love and materialism does not yield good results.”²¹¹

Pedagogue Selim Sırrı (Tarcan) similarly complained about the willy-nilly approach towards matrimony. According to him, people primarily think about money, secondarily their *mevki* (social, economic or symbolic status), and honor; however, they

²¹¹ Gökay. "Milli Nüfus Siyasetinde (Eugenique) Meselesinin Mahiyeti, 212.

hardly ever think about health and beautification of the race.²¹² Ali Esat Birol argued “it is wrong to view matrimony simply as an individual matter...and as [simply] fulfilling a physiological need.” As the institution of family formed by a woman and man constituted the source and foundation of the posterity and state, he continued, it would be thoughtless to leave matrimony to chance.²¹³

Although “conscious procreation” constituted an important aspect of puericulture and eugenics rhetoric in Turkey –similar to that in the West –Turkish case offered an ambivalence that is embedded in the cultural and political tradition of modern Turkey. Historically there has been a persistent distrust and therefore fear of un- or less-educated lay people (*halk*) among the secular educated elites who have always regarded themselves as the true founders and guardians of the Turkish Republic. As such, they have adopted a possessive disposition towards all those other elements constituting the population. Guided by their “civilized” life styles, tastes, habitus as well as fears and anxieties, this possessive disposition led the statist elites to subject all areas of social life to state supervision and regulation. This has been evinced in the “conscious procreation” rhetoric that I have described so far. Mazhar Osman (Uzman), one of the founders of the discipline of psychiatry in Turkey, demonstrated this statist possessive disposition in the following paragraph:

As the Republican government knew the ignorance of people, particularly their negligence with regard to conjugality, and [knew that] they would easily be beguiled by vanity, it turned this matter [conjugality] into a matter of government, a matter of population, a matter of national

²¹² Selim Sırrı Tarcan, "Bakımsız Çocuklar: Yetimler, Öksüzler, Kimsesizler, Piçler [Neglected Children: Orphans, Destitute Children, Bastards]," *Gürbüz Türk Çocuğu* 1, no. 1 (1926).

²¹³ Birol, "Öjenik Tatbikatı," 6-9.

defense, a social, economic [and] political matter [;] it [the government] interfered in people's heartily desires (*kalbi dilek*) where they are to thought to be the most liberated.²¹⁴

Mazhar Osman expressed a sense of anxiety and distrust towards the public, emblematic of how secular elite have positioned themselves vis-à-vis people. They most conspicuously expressed their distrust toward home and castigated mothers for their negligence of her "duty," i.e., the cultivation of future generations.

On the one hand, they felt blessed because fertility was not a problem for Turkish woman; she was indeed quite fertile, some argued. On the other hand, she was haunted by a perpetual ignorance of modern hygiene and of scientific principles of child rearing. That is why despite the high rates of natality, infant mortality rates were said to be higher in Turkey compared to more advanced Western nations. Thus, her training and education was thought to be of paramount importance. According to Kudsi Halkacı, "A woman who has assumed her personality [*benlik*] and received good education performs such womanhood tasks as breastfeeding, child rearing, and educating the child" effectively, and by doing so she accomplishes critical social tasks to ensure the normal and physique hygiene of the family. Her training and education, he continued, serves effectively to protect against problems pertaining to health and morality such as child mortality, tuberculosis, prostitution, alcoholism, and vice.²¹⁵ Only puericulture could provide the mother with such education, he argued. What was needed urgently was educating the mother in the principles of puericulture.

²¹⁴ Uzman, *Eugenic, İdiş. Kısır: Eyi Çocuk Yetiştirme Hakkında İki Konferans*, 40.

²¹⁵ Halkacı, "Püerükültür," 4-5.

3.2.4. Puericulture education and feminization of domesticity

Discourse of puericulture primarily concerned the children, who belonged to the State as much to their parents, so the task of rearing them could not be performed arbitrarily. That is, motherhood could not possibly be left to the mothers alone, majority of whom were thought to have been ignorant of proper methods and modern knowledge of infant care, hygiene, child rearing and so forth. They needed guidance and training in the most recent scientific principles that only medical doctors could provide. This way medical doctors assumed the par excellence pedagogical function of the State: educating the mothers and then the nation at large in principles of modern medicine and biological sciences.

The leading obstetrician Ömer Besim highlighted the centrality of mothers and significance of educating them, saying: “for the betterment of the race, the criterion is progress (*terakki*) in not only the wellbeing of the body but also the mind and the intellect.” In order to improve the race, he pointed out, children, youths, and particularly girls should be given proper physical and mental education. He believed, “girls have a higher status in race issue, as it is the mother who inscribes the first impression in the child’s mind.”²¹⁶ Pediatrician Kutsi Esencan went a step further and tied the future of the nation’s modernity and its path to civilization to its mothers’ education. As he put it, women held the key to revolution in health, robustness, and morality. “A mother’s education,” he argued, “leads a society either to civility or barbarity.”²¹⁷ Motherhood thus was tied to the nation’s modernity and its progress toward civilization, which made it essential that maternity and its functions be protected and improved.

²¹⁶ Akalın, *Türk Çocuğunu Nasıl Yaşatmalı? Nüfus Siyasetinde Çocuk: Sağlam Nesil, Öjenizm, Sağlam Irk, Kısırlaştırma*, 6.

²¹⁷ Esencan, "Kız Okullarında Çocuk Bakımı Dersleri," 238.

The most noticeable step towards educating the potential mothers was making the teaching of puericulture mandatory in the national curriculum that was legislated through *Umumi Hıfzıssıhha Kanunu* (Public Hygiene Law) enacted in 1930. *Article 169* of Law required a one-hour mandatory puericulture class for girls in the curricula of Girls' Institutes and middle schools. To this end, compulsory puericulture classes for girls – taught under the titles such as *home economics*, *hygiene*, and *childcare* – were added to the primary, middle school, and high school curriculum and to the curriculum of Teachers' Training Colleges and Girls' Institutes through the curricular reforms in the early 1930s.

Home Economics (*Ev İdaresi*) was integrated into the primary school curriculum at fourth and fifth grades and was taught once a week. The primary objectives of the class were “to provide our girls who are going to be *ev kadını* (housewives) with thorough knowledge and ideas about their potential [housewifery] duties,” “to impart to them duly what a good home looks like and what a good housewife should be like... .”²¹⁸ The curriculum of the Child Care Class (*Çocuk Bakımı*) taught at Girls' Institutes had a similar objective: “to teach the young girls who are going to be mothers in the future how to rear robust and healthy children.”²¹⁹ The classes primarily covered instruction in domestic management that included childcare, sanitation, and knowledge of various household tasks etc., all which were the responsibility of *ev kadını*.

Home Economics II, a class taught in the sophomore year of Girls' Institutes listed among duties of *ev kadını*: being orderly, being cleanly, being frugal, being knowledgeable and prudent, possessing a fine taste, being cheerful and courteous, and

²¹⁸ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Maarif Vekaleti, *İlkmekte Programı* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930), 128.

²¹⁹ *Kız Enstitüleri Müfredat Programı* (1935), 119.

loving her work. *Ev kadını* was the source of an orderly and decent way of living; the wellbeing of the Turkish household depended on her skills and knowledge of how to best manage the household.²²⁰ In an updated version of the same textbook, the author established an organic tie between the family and the society, seeing the former as the nucleus of the latter. In fact, society was nothing but a large family. In this configuration, the orderliness and character of the family mirrored that of the society at large. Thus, “for example, a society that is made up of healthy families is itself healthy.”²²¹ As such, the society’s health and wellbeing was bound to the healthy and regular arrangement of the nuclear family and the conduct of the family members.

The puericulture curriculum as a site where the “mothers of tomorrow” were to be cultivated first embodied and disseminated images of ideal modern family and household fabricated by the Republican men of science. The ideal modern family in Home Economics II was compared to the working of the parts of the body and a machine. The member of the family were to function in solidarity, harmony, and cooperation with each other just like various components of a machine for the broader social order and harmony.²²² The seamless working of the members of the family depended on a clear vision and understanding of division of labor by each member.

In his *İlk ve Orta Tedrisatta Hususi Tedris Usulleri* (Teaching Methods in Primary and Secondary Education) that was published in 1932 to teach teacher candidates how to teach various individual subjects mandatory in primary and secondary curricula, Cemil Sena (Ongun, d. 1981), a teacher of philosophy, sociology, and pedagogy,

²²⁰ Süheyla Arel, *Ev İdares İi* (Ankara: Güney Matbaacılık ve Gazetecilik T.A.O., 1948).

²²¹ Arel, Süheyla. *Ev İdares İi*. Ankara: İstiklal Matbaası, 1955. Pp. 5-9. *Ev İdares İi* (Ankara: İstiklal Matbaası, 1955), 5-9.

²²² *Ibid.*, 6.

suggested the teaching of division of labor, one of the most important characteristic of modern civilization, as an essential component of Home Economics class.²²³ According to Cemil Sena, responsibilities of men and women had increased and gotten more sophisticated in the modern age, so it was necessary that each gender acquire somewhat different habits and skills relative to their physical and mental constitution.

In this configuration, everything associated with the management of the household and the family was consigned to women. A woman, he argued, “was not only the most effective agent in a child’s mental and physical health but also the primary host of the household and the minister of [household related] rituals and relationships.”²²⁴ Different from the traditional woman who was the captive of her husband and passive recipient of orders to carry out household related chores, the modern woman (*asri kadın*), he asserted, was entrusted to manage the household; she was responsible for the overall economy of the household that included rearing and educating children, managing its budget, providing the means of health and joy for the family among other duties.²²⁵ The modern woman, he continued, was the one

who knows how to rear children, possesses sufficient knowledge about the health and joy of the family, whose intelligence and civility have developed enough to adapt to the society she lives in, who is capable of handling visitors well, who is as much a teacher as she is an artist.²²⁶

Home Economics, in this sense, was the means to cultivate such a modern woman with integrity and dignity, which was a prerequisite of modern civilization. She, in return,

²²³ Cemil Sena Ongun, *Ilk Ve Orta Tedrisatta Hususi Tedris Usulleri* (Istanbul: Kanaat Kütüphanesi, 1932), 315.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 316.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 316-17.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 317.

was to cultivate the modern and civilized Turkish citizen.²²⁷ Understood as such, Home Economics held the link between modern household and modern society. As far as Cemil Sena was concerned, it not only helped our girls adapt to the necessities of life at home but also helped them learn and adapt to the conditions and necessities of modern society and a civilized way of life.²²⁸

He portrayed a realistic and secular vision of modern home. Similar to the aforementioned author of Home Economics II, Cemil Sena perceived home as a miniature of the society at large. Home (*aile ocağı*), he claimed, was not a place of “pleasure and profligacy” (*zevk ve sefahat*) but it was a reality (*şeniyet*), a fact (*hakikat*) in which laundry was done, dishes washed, food cooked, children reared and so forth.²²⁹ Such a realistic conception of home helped him strategically point out the gravity of the task of the management of the household, the significance of the division of labor and necessity for women to be educated in the task managing the household, and finally to portray home as a reflection of the reality of the conditions of modern life.

The puericulture curriculum by organically linking the practices of the family and the household to those of the society at large, turned home into a public space, thus providing the state an unprecedented right to intervene in its functioning. For home and household practices concerned public health and modern social order.

Moreover, the curriculum reproduced, normalized, and disseminated the existing heteronormative structure by reinforcing the difference between the sexual natures of men and women through the practice of feminizing domesticity as a function of division of labor. That is, the economy of home and childrearing and everything associated with it

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

were consigned to female domain. While this was doubtlessly a reinsertion of the traditional heteronormative hierarchy, a different aspect of the essentialization of heteronormativity in puericulture discourse was that the difference between the two sexes was now articulated not through the language of religion or morality but through the language of science, or more precisely, through the language nature, using Jordanova's words.²³⁰ Kudsi Halkacı, for example, explicated the difference between two sexes by alluding to the evolutionary law of sexual selection (*cinsel istifâ kanunu*), according to which a woman was first and foremost a mother who was entrusted with the task of giving birth and rearing and educating children while the man was entrusted with the task of fathering children and providing the means of support.²³¹

Cemil Sena provided a more comprehensive view of this difference in his book *Yeni Kadın (Modern Woman)*. Drawing on Gina Lombroso's *The Soul of Woman (L'anima della donna)*, the third section of the book entitled "General Condition and Psychology of Women" attempted to explicate the physiological and psychological differences between men and women. The main argument was that men and women were not equal (*müsavatsız*) and inequality was not just a social phenomenon but also a ubiquitous natural phenomenon relative to inequality and difference of needs and functions between each sex (and among species). That is, inequality was nothing but a function of difference between physiological and psychological needs of each sex. Understood as a function of difference in needs and functions, inequality did not necessarily mean that one sex was superior or inferior to the other nor was it the same

²³⁰ Ludmilla Jordanova, "Naturalizing the Family: Literature and the Bio-Medical Sciences in the Late Eighteenth Century," in *Languages of Nature: Critical Essays on Science and Literature*, ed. Ludmilla Jordanova (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1986).

²³¹ Halkacı "Püerükültür," 6.

thing as inequity or injustice (*adaletsizlik*). In fact, superiority and inferiority were relative to one's perspective. For example, "in African deserts, a European man would be inferior to a primitive man and in Europe a primitive man would be inferior to a European man."²³² The same could be applied to the difference between men and women. Women's lack of participation in politics, for example, was not necessarily a matter of inequity or a matter of rights or their inferiority but a matter of their lack of interest in and need of politics.

He, then, explained what the main physiological and psychological differences between men and women were. The rest of the narrative was replete with both popular and quasi-scientific beliefs about the difference between men and women prevalent in both popular and scientific discourses. Particularly important was the argument that women were by nature altruistic and dependent while men were egoistic and independent. This argument is important in that it provided the rationale for how Republican men of science attempted to circumvent yet paradoxically reinserted the old religious and moral language of their predecessors who relegated women to the domestic realm based on norms derived from Islamic jurisprudence. The source of the normative conduct of women, for example, as it manifested in their domesticity, was, in the secularist scientist's discourse, the very physiology and psychology women. Because she was an altruist and dependent, claimed Cemil Sena,

a woman's gayest moment is when all of her bodily and mental power is absorbed and exhausted by the family and the society. A woman who cannot find a force and subject that she can devote herself to, that is, when she does not have a matter such as [taking care of] children, siblings, a husband ... is morally and spiritually broken. One can see as soon as one first encounters a lonely

²³² Cemil Sena Ogun, *Yeni Kadın* (Istanbul: Vakit: Gazete, Matbaa Kütüphane, 1936), 59.

woman, a widow, or an unmarried woman how this condition [of being independent] has caused suffering in them.²³³

As such, the cause of her domesticity and submissiveness was not necessarily an effect of malicious social laws, but an inevitable consequence of tasks and duties assigned to her by her physiological and psychological constitution.²³⁴ Another idiosyncrasy of this constitution, as opposed to that of men, according to Cemil Sena, was that “women enjoyed suffering and torment” as manifested in their desire to have children despite being cognizant of how painful a process it was. In fact, there were only few women who did not long for having children, he asserted; and a woman who did not want a child was abnormal and spiritually shattered.²³⁵

As such the psycho-biological discourse (biological determinism), delineated above, constructed the domesticity of modern Republican woman (*asri* or *yeni kadın*) as a function of the difference of her physiological and psychological constitution and as a function of division of labor that consigned men and women complimentary roles to play for the overall normal functioning of the collective. In a sense, what the “scientific” discourse made possible was that the existing cultural images attributed to men and women were now rearticulated as “natural” images. Mustafa Şekip Tunç, the renown psychologist, put it concisely when he argued that these two sexes were complementary elements born out of the division of labor in *nature* and this complementarity transcended the human values we attributed to them, i.e., it transcended the cultural.²³⁶

Strategically rearticulating the heteronormative gender dichotomy in the language

²³³ Ibid., 68.

²³⁴ Ibid., 71.

²³⁵ Ibid., 75.

²³⁶ Mustafa Şekip Tunç, *Yeni Türk Kadını Ve Ruhi Münasebetleri* (Ankara: Türkiye Harsi ve İçtimai Araştırmalar Merkezi, 1939), 5.

of nature, Republican men of science on the one hand were able keep their distance from their predecessors' moral and religious norms, thus safeguard their modern and secular outlook. On the other hand, as I mentioned before they reinserted the cultural and social meanings onto the female body. This time, precisely thanks to the language of nature, they were able to conceptualize the female body in such a way that her sexuality was equated with her reproductive capacity.²³⁷ This equation was the new norm(al) and a refusal to perform her reproductive capacity, for example, necessarily distorted the norm(al) as claimed by Cemil Sena (above). Moreover, they associated the female body with the domestic, the private, domain, and paradoxically removed the body from the private domain and turned it into a positive object to be known. "The modern Turkish woman," as Şekip Tunç put it, "was a [modern] question (*mevzu*) whose contours are not yet determined" due to her modernity just like the modernity of the time.²³⁸ She was a phenomenon yet to be made visible. Like Cemil Sena, he set out to make known the psychology of this *Modern Turkish Woman* (the title of his book).

Puericulture curriculum, in the meantime, helped to reproduce, disseminate, and normalize this discursive construct in public schools. And it was not just home economic class, but psychology, biology, and hygiene classes of the period contained similar notions that division of labor between men and women had evolved from the *natural* physiological and biological differences between them. In *Modern Hygiene*, for example, a class taught at the senior year of teacher colleges, the author argued "the difference between male and female organs and bodies has prepared them for different tasks, the

²³⁷ Similar to Romantic-naturalists like Rousseau, see, Jordanova, "Naturalizing the Family," 114.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.3.

tasks of fatherhood and motherhood” respectively.²³⁹

3.2.5. Puericulture through legislation

While puericulture education was an important component of the Republican People Party’s populist campaign toward cultivating the modern woman, the symbolic and material source of the population and its progress and modernity, another important component of the campaign was to protect maternity and its functions through rigorous institutionalization and legislative activity particularly in the first three decades. In this period, myriad laws and regulations were devised and many institutions were established. From the standpoint of puericulture, particularly important is the Public Hygiene Law of 1930 (*Umumi Hıfzıssıhha Kanunu*).

Among the most cited laws directly pertinent to puericulture and eugenics measures are the *Articles 122, 123, and 124* of the Public Hygiene Law enacted in 1930. *Article 122* required premarital examination of the couples and certificates of fitness for marriage by a medical doctor while *Articles 123 and 124* prohibited those afflicted with syphilis, gonorrhea, tuberculosis and those with a mental disability from marriage until these diseases proved cured by a medical report.

In addition, articles 151 through 169 in the Public Hygiene Law concerned the hygiene and protection of children and youth. These articles contained a wide range of measures to be taken including the establishment of institutions addressing child hygiene and child mortality (*Art. 151*), prohibition of importation and sale of medical tools and supplies that could be used for abortion (*Art. 152*), ameliorating the conditions of maternity by limiting of days of work and improving working conditions (*Articles 153, 155, 156, 177*), rewarding the mothers with six and more children with financial support

²³⁹ Behaddin Faik, *Yeni Hıfzıssıhha* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1932), 191.

and a medal (*Art. 156*), and a one-hour mandatory puericulture class for girls in the curricula of high schools for girls and middle schools (*Art. 169*). While the list is not exhaustive, it suffices to claim that puericulture education and legislative and institutionalization efforts went hand in hand in disseminating and implementing the principles puericulture.

...

With its focus on scientific rearing of children, puericulture fit in well with the population policy of the new Republic that involved rapid multiplication of the population to reconstitute the nation. What made it appealing for the Republican ruling class was its premise with regard to educating mothers, children, and public at large in principles of modern hygiene, decreasing infant mortality while fabricating a healthy and fit generation. As such, it fulfilled the patriotic and pedagogic desires of the ruling elite while providing them with means to aestheticize the public with their “civilized” middle-class ways of living. The precepts of this new aesthetics were driven from eugenics and biological laws and were exploited to administer and discipline the social arena, particularly the family and the household. This way the state interfered in the most private areas of family life, which is particularly evinced in the Republican politics of sexuality that involved rational regulation of conjugality and reproductive capacities of women in the rural and urban areas.

Chapter IV

Origins of the Mental Hygiene Movement In Turkey and the Contours of Republican Sociality and Subjectivity

Introduction

The mental hygiene movement was organized under the Mental Hygiene Society (*Akıl Hıfzıssıhhası Cemiyeti*) that was founded in 1930 with the efforts of Fahreddin Kerim Gökay. Its board members comprised the leading psychiatrists, psychologists, and physicians of the time along with pedagogues and teachers. In fact, the Society maintained this interdisciplinary core until it merged with the Turkish Neuropsychiatric Society in 1968. Among the prominent board members were psychiatrists such as Hüseyin Kenan Tunakan, İhsan Şükrü Aksel, Nebahat Hamit, Aliye Rıza Tanzıl, Cevat Zekai, physicians such as İbrahim Zati Öget, who was also the chief physician of Penal Courts in Istanbul and a forensic doctor, and teachers and pedagogues such as certain Latif Nevzat, Hilmi Ziya, and Ali Rıza Bey.

The Society emerged as a function of both international and national anxieties and concerns regarding the management of the mental and physical health and well being of the population particularly in the interwar period (i.e. 1920s and 1930s), which was collectively expressed with the term “mental hygiene” until after world war II when it was gradually replaced by other concepts such as “mental health.”²⁴⁰ The term “mental hygiene,” as Tina Besley puts it, initially connoted both mental and moral cleanliness as it was first used in the United States in the late nineteenth century.²⁴¹ While preserving both of these aspects, mental hygiene turned into a far more comprehensive and

²⁴⁰ Tina Besley, "Social Education and Mental Hygiene: Foucault, Disciplinary Technologies and the Moral Constitution of Youth," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 34, no. 4 (2002): 419.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

organized movement in the first half of the twentieth century with the establishment of national mental hygiene societies around the world.²⁴² The first mental hygiene society was founded in the US in 1909 as the National Committee for Mental Hygiene (NCMH), and when the first international mental hygiene conference was held in Washington, DC in 1930, fifty-three countries were represented in the conference with twenty national mental hygiene societies actively participating.²⁴³

The mental hygiene movement seemed to acquire a somewhat international character by the 30s with the establishment of the International Committee for Mental Hygiene in 1930, which identified the initial goals of global mental hygiene as “the promotion and conservation of the mental health of the people of all nations...the study, cure and prevention of nervous and mental disorders and mental defect and ... the promotion of the welfare of mankind.”²⁴⁴ However, the overtly nationalistic character of each society, differential pace of socio-economic and political modernization of nations along with lack of normative definitions of what mental hygiene really was posed a paradox to the internationality of the movement and its chimerical goals.²⁴⁵ As Thomson argues, “the flexible nature of a normatively defined mental health” rendered the concept manipulable by each national culture and ideology and embodied a potentiality for each society to “turn inwards, manipulating the normative basis of mental health as a tool of

²⁴² Mathew Thomson, "Mental Hygiene as an International Movement," in *International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918-1939*, ed. Paul Weindling (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

²⁴³ See the list of the countries and participating societies, Williams, Frankwood E., ed. *Proceedings of the First International Congress on Mental Hygiene*. 2 vols. Vol. 1. New York: The International Committee for Mental Hygiene, INC, 1932.

²⁴⁴ Williams, Frankwood E., ed. *Proceedings of the First International Congress on Mental Hygiene*. 2 vols. Vol. 1. New York: The International Committee for Mental Hygiene, INC, 1932.

²⁴⁵ Thomson, "Mental Hygiene as an International Movement," 283-84.

nationalism.”²⁴⁶ In addition to the idiosyncrasies of each nationalistic and political context, lack of normativity partly stemmed from different, and more often than not, competing psychiatric and psychological epistemologies that provided differing views of subjectivity and sociality.²⁴⁷ Mental hygiene discourse thus transmuted into different forms depending on the social, cultural and political context, and epistemological traditions; and as a result, the type of normal and pathological subjectivities and sociality imagined in each mental hygiene discourse differed significantly. The Turkish mental hygiene movement, similarly, turned inwards, took a nationalist character, and was territorialized to serve the national culture and the ideology of Republicanism, a Kemalist version promoted by Republican People’s Party.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ The mental hygiene movement in the US, for example, embraced the dynamic psychiatry of adjustment whose philosophical underpinnings were provided by psychiatrist Adolf Meyer. Meyer’s psychobiological concept of adjustment viewed mental ab/normality (mental illness, mental disorder, maladjustment) in terms of the interaction between the individual and his or her environment. The increasing maladjustment and adult dysfunctioning in the American society, according to mental hygienists, was caused by complex demands of a society characterized by industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. The task of mental hygiene was to develop new theories of personality and devise therapeutic methods to enhance the adjustment skills of individuals so that they can fit the requirements of such a rapidly changing modern and capitalistic society. In this sense, mental hygienists’ goal was to ensure normal functioning of individuals and eliminate factors interfering with this “normal” state of adjustment. Mental hygienists’ concerns were also reflections of greater cultural transformations in the American society, and as Pols argues, mental hygienists theories and practices were intricately related to the changing ideology of American individualism. See Pols, "Managing the Mind: The Culture of American Mental Hygiene, 1910-1950," 2-3.

On the other hand, mental hygiene discourse in Germany was primarily shaped by genetic and hereditary psychiatry and embraced restrictive eugenics measures and practices such as sterilization, segregation, and prevention of marriage of the mentally ill (Thomson, "Mental Hygiene as an International Movement.") While the American mental hygiene inclined towards explicating mental abnormality in terms of environmental factors (conditions interfering with normal adjustment of the individual), German mental hygiene discourse adopted somatic and hereditary theories, seeking the roots of mental abnormality in the brain dysfunctions and degeneration of nerves. In the latter discourse, personality disorders were caused by morphological and somatic malfunctioning of the body (degeneration), and more importantly they were viewed as inheritable, which had major implications for the “nonproductive and dangerous elements” in German society such as the insane, the criminal, the feeble-minded, the homosexual, and the alcoholic. It is important to mention that mental hygiene in Germany, like eugenics, was indissolubly linked to racial hygiene discourse that was grounded in nationalistic, statist, and Kulturist vocabulary. It reflected the ideals of an educated middle class bourgeoisie (*Bildungsbürger*) of a well-ordered, harmonious, and conflict-free society. See, Sheila Faith Weiss, *Race Hygiene and National Efficiency: The Eugenics of Wilhelm Schallmayer* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

The Society carried out clinical research to distinguish between normal and backward school children and proposed policy changes and establishment of special facilities for the “abnormal children” as they were labeled by the medical community. With its propaganda, the society played an important role in the introduction of the law in 1931 banning publication of suicidal news in the media. It did research on juvenile delinquents and prepared guidelines for the justice system to establish juvenile courts.²⁴⁸ Fahrettin Kerim and İbrahim Zati played prominent roles in the foundation of the first Criminology Institute. Members of the society gave lectures on radios and in People’s Houses and *Türk Ocağı*, published and disseminated propaganda booklets, pamphlets, brochures, and organized educational campaigns to educate the public on the conditions and the necessity of sound mental health for the well being of the nation and the individual; they propagated eugenic measures such as marriage between mentally and physically sound while advising the public to prevent the mentally ill from getting married or at least from reproducing. The society guided the policies of the Ministry of National Education in introducing modern sex education and mental hygiene education at schools. It was one of the most organized movements fighting against alcoholism, drugs, venereal diseases, and everything that mental hygienists thought impaired the mind.²⁴⁹

Already in these far-reaching activities we can see emerging a complex network of relations between mental hygiene, social medicine, and nationalist discourse. Indeed, mental hygienists positioned themselves in that middle space between the scientific and public, the clinical and the social, the theoretical and the practical. Fahrettin Kerim articulated that intermediary space in the very definition of the science of mental hygiene,

²⁴⁸ Despite the effort of the Society, the first juvenile court would only be established in 1979.

²⁴⁹ Fahreddin Kerim Gökay, "Bizde Ve Diğer Memleketlerde "Hygiene Mentale" Mesaisi," (Istanbul: Istanbul Kader Matbaası, 1931), 6-8.

which was an interdisciplinary applied science that drew on the principles of psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, pedagogy, ethics, and religion. With the essential goal of reforming the condition of the mind (*haleti ruhiyeyi ıslah*) and preventing the occurrence of mental diseases, according to Fahrettin Kerim, this science “guarantees the individual’s personal wellbeing and regulates the collective harmony of the society s/he is a member of.”²⁵⁰

The link between the reforming the condition of the mind and collective (national) harmony of the society was, in fact, the epitome of mental hygiene discourse in Turkey. It was necessarily the link between the epistemological underpinnings of psy-disciplines and a solidaristic discourse of society underpinning the Republican rationality during the single party period. In this chapter, I explore this link between the epistemological and the social through a discursive analysis of the work of Fahrettin Kerim, the founder of the Society. I particularly analyze two lines of inquiry in Fahrettin Kerim’s work: his theory of psychopathy and the notion of evolution. I hope to render visible how the psychiatrist re/articulated “the problem” of “abnormal” populations in conformity with Republican political rationality. Tracing how the abnormal was theorized in mental hygiene discourse will help to trace particular evocations of Republican subjectivity and sociability, and norms and standards for normal conduct based on certain interpretation of morality evoking both positivist sciences and traditional norms.

4.1. Epistemological origins of Mental Hygiene discourse in Turkey

Fahrettin Kerim graduated from the Faculty of Medicine in 1922 with a degree in psychiatry (*Emrazi Akliye ve Asabiye mutehassisi*), and in the same year went to

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 3.

Germany to work with Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926), the eminent German psychiatrist with a worldwide reputation, and spent seven months in Vienna working with Julius Wagner-Jauregg (1857-1949), a well-known physician and psychiatrist. His work in Kraepelin's experimental psychiatry laboratory and in the experimental psychology laboratory of *Forschungsanstalt für Psychiatrie* (German Institute for Psychiatric Research, also known as The Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute of Psychiatry) in Munich provided the epistemological underpinnings of his psychiatric-psychological approach to mental illness as well as social and moral crises in Turkey.²⁵¹ Like his teachers Rasit Tahsin and Mazhar Osman, he was trained in what was called the Kraepelin school of thought that established the intellectual link between German psychiatry and Turkish psychiatry.

Kraepelin is believed to have laid the foundation of psychiatric classification of mental illnesses. Besides his contribution to psychiatric nosology (classification), he is known to be one of the first psychiatrists to have employed experimental psychological research and promote the primacy of clinical method in psychiatry. Kraepelin's psychiatric outlook should be grounded in the idiosyncrasies of the psychiatric tradition in Germany that drew on three theories of the time: somatic etiology of mental diseases, hereditarianism and its neighboring theories of degeneration and *neurasthenia* (nervous

²⁵¹ The Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute of Psychiatry was established in 1917 as the German Institute for Psychiatric Research by Kraepelin. The institute was one of the most prestigious and influential scientific and academic institutes in the world in the field of psychiatry and neurology. Particularly under the leadership of the Swiss-born psychiatrist/geneticist Ernst Rüdin, one of the leaders of racial hygiene and German eugenics movement, the Institute would play important roles in the development and implementation eugenic and racial hygiene policies of the Hitler's regime in pursuit of the goal of improving the people's health (*Volksgeundheit*). The institute would become a major academic eugenic center during the Hitler period. See, William E. Seidelman, "Science and Inhumanity: The Kaiser-Wilhelm/Max Planck Society," (2001), http://www.doew.at/cms/download/b1c46/en_seidelman_max_planck_society.pdf. See also, Weindling, p. 384. Paul Weindling, *Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 384.

disorder or nervousness), and finally Darwinian biology.²⁵²

The first was the somatic etiology of mental diseases, epitomized in somatist Wilhelm Griesinger's dictum that "every mental disease is rooted in brain disease."²⁵³ Somatic psychiatry sought the etiology of mental diseases in the brain dysfunctions or defective nervous system of the patient, thus relating the pathological states of mind to the pathological states of the brain. In this sense, insanity, imbecility, delinquency, alcoholism, sexual "perversions" such as transvestism and homosexuality, and other "deviant" behaviors were viewed as disordered brain functions. As to where these physical and psychic degenerations originated, the psychiatrists of the late nineteenth century increasingly leaned towards explanations in hereditarianism, the second theory underpinning this psychiatric tradition. While the more liberal psychiatry of the first half of the century sought the causes in the physical and social environment, thus turning to education, economic prosperity and liberal social reforms to thwart these causes, the psychiatrists favored biological heredity as the cause of pathological behaviors, viewing mental deviations as having a biological basis, primarily genetic, representing mutations that were unsuccessful adaptations for survival in the environments in which they appeared.²⁵⁴

By the early decades of the twentieth century, it was already an established fact in psychiatry that the origins of mental disorders were closely connected to hereditary processes. As Paul Weindling puts it, psychiatrists began explaining abnormality in

²⁵² In fact, as Shepard argues, for Kraepelin the most important "inner cause" (*innere Ursache*) of psychosis was "hereditary degeneration" (*erbliche Entartung*). Although he was not a fierce proponent of racial hygiene, he was active in German nationalist circles during World War I and openly supported some of the ideas of social Darwinism. See, M Shepherd, "Two Faces of Emil Kraepelin," *The British Journal of Sociology*, no. 167 (1995): 175.

²⁵³ Quoted in Roy Porter, *Madness: A Brief History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 144.

²⁵⁴ Weindling, *Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945*, 81.

“biological and positivist terms of an evolutionary throwback or reversion to a primitive state of savagery” and it is at this point where principles drawn from Darwinian biology could be used to uphold theories of mental and physical degeneration.²⁵⁵ August Forel (1848-1931), the German psychiatrist whose work on biological origins of sexuality would be translated into Turkish in 1942 (see note below) and would be frequently referred to by Fahrettin Kerim, most conspicuously fused the Darwinian principle of natural selection into hereditarianism in the following passage:

Everything gets inherited: imagination, conscience, artistic sense, malice, scheming, strong or weak passions, as much as red or black hair or a crooked nose. But it is clear that for man the hereditary disposition of the brain is the most important. The lesson is that in the generation of successors there should be a careful selection, the sound and capable should multiply, but not the sick and incapable or abnormal; for all efforts of education or adaptation go to pieces when the proper tendencies are lacking in the germ.²⁵⁶

Once psychiatry was placed on evolutionary foundations, the major inexplicable and incurable mental diseases of the day such as *neurasthenia* were now easily located in the evolutionary line with the help of degeneration hypothesis. Degeneration hypothesis, as Sheila Weiss points out, “provided an ‘explanation’ for why the insane were so often incurable. Degenerates, it was argued, did not respond to treatment because they were part of an inherently diseased strain of the human race.”²⁵⁷ As Weiss clearly

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Forel, Auguste. *Hygiene of Nerves and Mind in Health and Disease*. Translated by Herbert Austin Aikins. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1907. P. 123. Auguste Forel, *Hygiene of Nerves and Mind in Health and Disease*, trans. Herbert Austin Aikins (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), 123. The book was translated into Turkish in 1942 by İhsan Unaner, a student of Fahrettin Kerim, who also wrote the preface. We learn from the preface that August Forel visited Turkey during the Second Constitutional Period, and his visit corresponded to the initiatives to establish the Green Crescent Temperament Society, which was finally founded in 1919.

²⁵⁷ Weiss, *Race Hygiene and National Efficiency: The Eugenics of Wilhelm Schallmayer*, 21-22.

demonstrates, in addition to serving scientific purposes, degeneration hypothesis and its neighboring ideas offered biological solutions to solve socio-political problems.

Psychiatrists began viewing social problems as well as those problems that traditionally would fall under morality and ethics such as sexuality as the manifestation of degenerative forces. Weiss succinctly reveals in the following paragraph how degeneration hypothesis was mobilized by German psychiatrists to respond to social and political problems of the German nation:

The concept [of degeneration] was essentially a classificatory system—a social classificatory system. Degenerate became the generic term for Imperial Germany's nonproductive or otherwise dangerous elements: the insane, the criminal, the feeble-minded, the homosexual, and the alcoholic. Such individuals ... were viewed as part of Germany's much-discussed *soziale Frage*. They detracted, at least psychologically, from the *Bildungsbürger's* idea of a well-ordered, harmonious, and conflict-free society. ...[B]y employing the socially stigmatic and scientifically pretentious world [*sic*] degeneration, German doctors possessed a useful means of classifying, separating, and ultimately controlling those who offended their social, political, and cultural sensibilities.²⁵⁸

What is made explicit here is that deviant behavior –be it moral or social –that was identified and defined both scientifically and politically increasingly came under the tutelage of biological discourse. And indeed, psychiatry with its biological underpinnings would soon extend its scope to include the “normal” behavior and the populace at large as its laboratory and propose elaborate and highly differentiated strategies to regulate and govern the entire lifestyle of “normal” populace in addition to the deviants.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 22.

²⁵⁹ Psychiatrists' increasing penchant for proposing deterministic explanations such as degeneration hypothesis for social, political and moral problems was of course driven as much by the socio-economic and political context as it was by their scientific endeavor. In case of Germany, psychiatrists were convinced that their science had important role to play in solving the sociopolitical and moral issues of the

Fahrettin Kerim's psychiatry is grounded in the principles of hereditarian psychiatry identified above and is best manifested in his book *Akıl Hastalıkları (Mental Diseases)*, the second edition of which was dedicated to his German mentor and colleague, Emil Kraepelin.²⁶⁰ The book replicates –at times translates verbatim –the same line of logic applied in *Manuel of Psychiatry* by French psychiatrist J. Rogues de Fursac in providing the etiology, symptomology and classification of mental diseases based on Kraepelinian paradigm.²⁶¹

The book applies an organicist definition of mind (*ruh*), according to which mind is a function of physiological processes of the brain (*dimağ*).²⁶² Distinguishing between reason (*akıl*) and mind in order to circumvent philosophical and religious interpretations, Fahrettin Kerim views brain as the central organ of thinking and mind where our personality, emotions, and consciousness are constituted. "It [brain] is everything," he would declare.²⁶³

In explaining the etiology of mental diseases, Fahrettin Kerim acknowledges the multiplicity of hereditary and environmental causes that bring about a mental disorder, a line of thought that incorporated both Lamarckian principle of transmissibility of

nation such as urbanization and industrialization, increase in criminality, prostitution, insanity, alcohol consumption, and could be mobilized for national political unification to ensure a kind of uniform conduct for German people. These contextual forces in German context are explored in the following sources: Weiss, *Race Hygiene and National Efficiency: The Eugenics of Wilhelm Schallmayer*; "The Race Hygiene Movement in Germany, 1904-1945," in *The Wellborn Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia*, ed. Mark B. Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Weindling, *Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945*.

²⁶⁰ Fahreddin Kerim Gökay, *Ruh Hastalıkları [Mental Diseases]*, Third ed. (Istanbul: Vatandaş Matbaası, 1931).

²⁶¹ J. Rogues de Fursac, *Manuel of Psychiatry*, trans. A. J. Rosanoff, Second ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1908). The narrative of etiology, symptomology and classification of mental diseases here is important, for it helps to gain insights into the style of reasoning that shaped the perceptions of medical community at large and psychiatrists in particular, their research and socio-political projects, their notions of public health, morality, their understanding of social and educational reforms.

²⁶² Gökay. *Ruh Hastalıkları*, 12.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 14.

acquired characteristics, and hereditarianism and degeneration theory. In this sense, it avoided deterministic hereditarianism of some of the genetic psychiatrists, but heredity still held a dominant explanatory power in his epistemology. As he would put it regarding the role of heredity in mental diseases: “our 20 years of clinical life has demonstrated the infallible effect of heredity in mental diseases.”²⁶⁴ He classified the causes of mental diseases into two groups: (1) predisposing causes (*hazırlayıcı sebepler*) and exciting causes (*amil sebepler*).²⁶⁵ Predisposing causes included such heterogeneous factors as heredity, the conditions a mother is exposed to during fertilization, pregnancy, birthing, and breastfeeding, age, sex, civil condition, education, climate, civilization and race, arts, and war. Exciting causes were classified into three sub-categories: (a) physiological conditions such as puberty and menstruation, (b) psychical causes such as violent emotions, prolonged anxiety, and (c) pathological causes such as harm to psychological, physical and reproductive processes, irregularities in secretory glands (internal secretions), and intoxication.²⁶⁶

Fahrettin Kerim, understood the psychopathic processes (what Kraepelin designated by the term *dementia praecox*) as a result of the disorders of physical, psychological and morphological composition of the entire organism. In this sense, like Kraepelin, he viewed mental disease not solely as the effect of brain dysfunctions but also the effect of the physical and morphological dysfunctions. The morphology of internal secretion glands, for example, played an important role in his overall epistemology. A disorder or irregularity in the functions of these glands, according to

²⁶⁴ Fahreddin Kerim Gökay, "Ruh Hastalıklarının Tekevvinde İrsiyet Ve Bünye Noktasından Yapılan Araştırmalar" (paper presented at the Yedinci Ulusal Türk Tıp Kurultayı, Ankara, 1938), 523.

²⁶⁵ Translation of the terms is based on Fursac's *Manuel of Psychiatry*.

²⁶⁶ Gökay. *Ruh Hastalıkları*, 12.

Fahrettin Kerim, would cause bodily and mental disorder. These glands functioned in equilibrium (*muvazenet*); disturbances in any of the internal secretion glands would disturb this equilibrium.²⁶⁷

4.2 The case of psychopathy and contours of Republican sociality and subjectivity

4.2.1. Equilibrium: From the biological to the social

Fahrettin Kerim transposed this notion equilibrium (between physical, morphological and psychological processes) to the social realm in his delineation of constitutional psychopaths whom he would somewhere else designate as morally diseased (*ahlak hastaları*)²⁶⁸ that comprised a large “pathological class” and wide spectrum of “dysfunctional personalities” that disturbed the moral, social and economic equilibrium of the society. In the following paragraph, he clearly demonstrates the link between the biological, morphological, and the social:

It is important to acknowledge the significant role that internal secretion glands play in the mental and bodily equilibrium. If this equilibrium exists, the relationship between the individual and the society is smooth (regular). Once this equilibrium is disturbed, [those] morally diseased arise [out of the disequilibrium]. The fundamental characteristic in this picture [in the case of morally diseased] is [their] indifference and disrespect towards the sacred value judgments of the society.²⁶⁹

The concept of equilibrium is important not only because it held important epistemological power in Fahrettin Kerim’s scientific approach, but more importantly it functions as an organizing principle in establishing the onto-epistemological linkages between the scientific gaze and the moral-social-political discourse of the Republican

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Gökay, Fahreddin Kerim. "Ahlak Hastaları." Istanbul: Kader Basımevi, 1944. Fahreddin Kerim Gökay, "Ahlak Hastaları," (Istanbul: Kader Basımevi, 1944).

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 6.

regime. This linkage was nowhere as evidently established as it was in delineation of psychopathy, the quintessential form of mental abnormality that was epistemologically elastic and vague enough to include a wide-spectrum of “abnormal bodies” including child delinquents, criminals, vagrant children, homeless children, and alcoholics (etc.).

For Fahrettin Kerim and other psychiatrists such as Mazhar Osman the case of the constitutional psychopaths, also called superior degenerates or *diséquilibré*, was important from moral and social standpoint, not merely because they posed a bigger threat to the moral harmony of the society but also because their very pathological condition was associated with their social and moral dis/malfunctioning.²⁷⁰ These were normal –or even super normal in the case of the genius –in terms of their intellect or mental endowment, but demonstrated character, judgment, and conduct anomalies and weaknesses. They lacked the moral integrity and disposition of a normal adult, therefore were childlike in their moral composition, which, according to mental hygienists, made them “the most harmful components of the society.”²⁷¹

Mazhar Osman, Fahrettin Kerim’s teacher and an eminent psychiatrist in the history of the discipline in Turkey, evoked the infant-likeness of psychopathy in his differentiating between inferior and superior degenerates (psychopaths). He identified the former in a perpetual condition of childhood or infantilism (*umumi çocukluk*) because they had lost their mental faculties or abilities whereas superior degenerates, the psychopaths, were characterized with “arrested childhood” (*mahdut çocukluk*), i.e., child-like in terms of their moral quality (*seciye*) and will (*irade*). According to Mazhar

²⁷⁰ The concepts of superior and inferior degenerates were offered by French psychiatrist Valentin Magnan (1835 – 1916).

²⁷¹ İhsan Şükrü Aksel. *Cumhuriyet*, 01/16 1948.

Osman, superior degenerates were those arrested in a wide spectrum swinging between normality (*tabiiilik*) and insanity.²⁷² At the basis of what mental hygienists would call defective adult personalities was this condition of child-likeness, infantilism.

Following this line of thought provided by Kraepelin, Karl Birnbaum, and Mazhar Osman, Fahrettin Kerim designated psychopathy as a character disease, characterized by perversities of the character and conduct and degeneration of personality.²⁷³ In his *Clinical Psychiatry*, a quintessential textbook in the field of psychiatry, Kraepelin had identified six constitutional psychopathic states, all characterized with certain form of degeneracy in thought, feeling, will, and moral conduct and capacity: a) nervousness, b) constitutional despondency, c) constitutional excitement, d) compulsive insanity, e) impulsive insanity, and f) contrary sexual instincts.²⁷⁴ He further classified psychopathic personalities into four groups: *Born criminals*, characterized by moral incapacity and morbid degeneracy with a predisposition to criminality.²⁷⁵ Certain symptoms of born criminals included such moral defects as lack of sympathy, selfishness, and egotism that expressed “itself in vanity, braggadocio, peevishness, love of idleness, excesses, foolish prodigality, and often in weak sentimentality.”²⁷⁶ They were characterized by moral incapacity to harmonize with the general will of the society. Like other psychopathic groups, born criminality demonstrated itself in childhood, particularly in families with a record of alcoholism. The second group included *the unstable* that were characterized by a weakness of will in all their activities. The third group was *the morbid liar and*

²⁷² Mazhar Osman Uzman, *Yüksek Dejenereleler* (Istanbul: Kenan Basımevi ve Klişe Fabrikası, 1942), 210. The concept of arrested childhood and the classification of the psychopaths are borrowed from Emil Kraepelin.

²⁷³ Gökay. *Ruh Hastalıkları*, 171. (section II)

²⁷⁴ Emil Kraepelin, *Clinical Psychiatry*, trans. A. Ross Diefendore (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1907), 485.

²⁷⁵ The category of born criminal was first developed by Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso.

²⁷⁶ Kraepelin. *Clinical Psychiatry*, 518.

swindler, and the final group comprised *the pseudoquerulants*.²⁷⁷

While the language and vocabulary employed to identify and categorize the psychopathy and psychopathic states is quintessentially psychological (*nervousness, excitement, the unstable*), it is obvious that categorization is also socially and morally driven once one further analyzes the language that employs moral and social norms along with the psychological ones to differentiate between certain forms of normal subjectivity and sociality and aberrations from these norms. The concepts ubiquitously employed by both Kraepelin as well as Fahrettin Kerim such as *inability to withstand the misfortunes of life, moral incapacity, lack of perseverance and sense of duty, egotism, irregular sexual instincts and behaviors, rebelliousness and disorderliness, neglectfulness and indifference towards social and moral norms* (etc.) were not only psychological concepts, but concepts that connoted certain understanding of morally and socially normal subjectivity (morally righteous, dutiful, social, respectful of social and moral norms and so forth). Indeed, the use of social and moral vocabulary common to all of the categories demonstrates the blurriness of the lines between these categories while also showing how the category of psychopathy posed epistemological challenge to the psychiatrist.

Kraepelin acknowledged the epistemological challenge in the following paragraph:

Those psychopathic conditions which develop on a morbid conditional basis include *an extensive borderland* between pronounced morbid states and mere personal eccentricities which are wont to be regarded as normal. We consider personal deviations from the regular course of mental development as morbid only when they are of special consequence to the physical and mental life; *but the distinction is one of degree and is to a certain extent arbitrary*. ...They [the morbid conditions] *are not characterized by any definite disease process*, but rather by a general deviation

²⁷⁷ Ibid, 518.

from the normal mental life.” (Emphasis added).²⁷⁸

It is the scientist who had the authority to identify what morbid characters or conditions were “of special consequence to the physical and mental life,” and what constituted the “normal mental life.” The epistemological challenges of category of psychopathy and the arbitrariness of the categorization employed implies that psychiatrist’s notions of normal mental life were as much shaped by his social and moral outlook and ideals as his clinical practices, for the clinical practices, it seems, did not suffice to epistemologically explicate the contours of psychopathy. The following brief characterization of *the unstable* by Kraepelin demonstrates the blurriness between the moral, the social, and the scientific:

They [the unstable] start out zealously, but soon grow weary and are, therefore, unable to complete any course of education. They never probe to the bottom of things and their knowledge is superficial and fragmentary. . . . Their interests center on sports and on frivolous pleasures, and they do not respond to more serious matters. They often have propensity to dream, to poetical or dramatic efforts, etc., but they are never earnest or thorough.²⁷⁹

Fahrettin Kerim’s designation of psychopathy as a character disease and degeneration of personality feeds on the epistemological ambiguity and elasticity of the concept. The concept, furthermore, was empirically fruitful and culturally useful (for Fahrettin Kerim as it was for Kraepelin) to include a wide spectrum of socially, politically, and morally deviant who were viewed –not coincidentally –as economically the least useful. It was indeed the cultural and moral usefulness of the concept of psychopathy that evoked the interest and gaze of the mental hygienists, for it helped them to delineate the limits of normality of Republican sociality, and morally righteous and economically productive Republican citizen. The pathological character of psychopathy

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 515.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., 522.

was the basis from which the main lines of normal characters were to be delineated.²⁸⁰

In the quotation above from a short booklet titled the “Morally Insane,” I have already pointed to Fahrettin Kerim’s moral and social reinterpretation of psychopaths in Turkish context, characterizing them with “indifference and disrespect towards the sacred value judgments of the society.” He continues,

Some of these [morally insane] ignore their duty towards their self (*nefs*). Some are overcome by pathological egotism (*marazi hodgamlık*). A severe indifference, [and] callousness towards sacred interests [of the society]. Nonchalant about the love for the family, [and] motherland. These types, typically constituting those disregarding the social milieu, are overcome by a mindset characterized by egocentrism. They do not possess social fabric. They are in a condition of mental ataxia.²⁸¹

The morally insane delineated here came to symbolize not necessarily a medical threat, even though the category is quintessentially medicalized, but a moral and social threat to the fabric of the society. It is important to underscore a particular notion of social morality (*cemiyet ahlakı*) undergirding this way of thinking. Expounding the ways to protect the society and fight against the morally insane, Fahrettin Kerim suggested taking prophylaxis measures during childhood when pathological predispositions of moral insanity found their early expressions. According to Fahrettin Kerim one way to prevent the disease of moral insanity was to eradicate the egocentrism and jealousy in the child. It was particularly necessary, he suggested, to induce in children a strong sense of individual and social morality and to strengthen their sense of altruism (*diğergamlık*), self-denial (*feragat*) and envy (*gıpta*).²⁸²

Moral insanity such as jealousy, which as far as Fahrettin Kerim was concerned

²⁸⁰ Gökay. “Ahlak Hastalari,” 5, 17.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 6.

²⁸² Ibid., 7.

was unique to the East, was particularly threatening to the social fabric, for the psychology of jealousy involved preventing the successful working of others in order to conceal one's own failures, and increase in this type of jealousy would discourage them and thus harm the community. "Only by reacting against [such] moral decadence can a society save itself," he would proclaim.²⁸³ Thus, the fight against the morally insane was necessarily (for) a social cause (*cemiyet davası*) and involved strengthening the willpower of these weak-willed characters.²⁸⁴ For he would somewhere else claim that it is these character weaknesses as epitomized by the psychopaths that imperil a society and a country.²⁸⁵ They were, in fact, viewed as the main sources of criminality,²⁸⁶ and "enemies of the society" (*cemiyet düşmanları*) that brought about crimes and disrupted the public peace (*umumi huzur*).²⁸⁷ What emerges in this discourse is a construct of weak character embodied by the category of psychopathy that was delineated vis-à-vis a notion of organic sociality and communitarian morality (*topluluk ahlakı*).

4.2.2. Ideal Republican Subjectivity: Sociable, dutiful, and economically productive

When it is the public health that is at issue, no individual can act without limits. In the Republican regime where the doctrine of *one for all and all for one* rules, an evil that afflicts one of the individuals making up the Turkish society affects all of us. Particularly if this evil is in such a

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 8.

²⁸⁵ Gökay, Fahreddin Kerim. *Karakterolojinin Terbiye Sahasındaki Yeri*. C.H.P Konferansları Serisi. Vol. 2, 1939. P. 60. Fahreddin Kerim Gökay, *Karakterolojinin Terbiye Sahasındaki Yeri*, vol. 2, C.H.P Konferansları Serisi (1939), 60.

²⁸⁶ Gökay, Fahreddin Kerim, and Cihad Atasev. "Cürümlerin Mediko-Sosyal Tedkiki." In *22 Mayıs 1948'de İstanbul Etibba Odasında toplanan Türkiye Akıl Hıfzıssıhhası Cemiyeti'nin 19'uncu yıllık kongresinde tebliğ edilen raporlar*. İstanbul, 1949. P.14. Fahreddin Kerim Gökay and Cihad Atasev, "Cürümlerin Mediko-Sosyal Tedkiki," in *22 Mayıs 1948'de İstanbul Etibba Odasında toplanan Türkiye Akıl Hıfzıssıhhası Cemiyeti'nin 19'uncu yıllık kongresinde tebliğ edilen raporlar* (İstanbul 1949), 14.

²⁸⁷ Gökay. "Ruh Hastalıklarının Tekevvününde İrsiyet Ve Bünye Noktasından Yapılan Araştırmalar," 517.

manner that is likely to harm our social existence [and] racial makeup, our affliction aggravates.²⁸⁸

The evil Fahrettin Kerim is referring to was psychopathy, which mattered as much as –if not more than –other evils because it directly related to sociality and national health. Fahrettin Kerim established an organic link between the individual and the national to the extent that the health of the individual became indissociable from the health of the nation. No pathology in sense was considered a personal matter insofar as any pathology subverted some aspects of the health of the national body, which in turn made it necessarily a social matter. In this organic link, if there was a conflict between the individual and the national from an ethical perspective and from a higher social standpoint, the national always had precedence over the individual although the ideal was to harmonize the desire of the individual with that of the nation.

Onto-epistemological underpinnings of this organic link were implied in the discourse of corporatist-solidarism, a fascistic variety of which was appropriated by Republican People's Party. It was Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), the founder of Durkheimian sociology in Turkey and one of the most powerful ideologues of Young Turk movement and modern Turkish Republic, who first theorized the Turkish version of corporatist-solidarism drawing on Durkheimian positivist epistemology and cultural idealism based on Turkish nationalism and Islamic morality.²⁸⁹ In its essence, corporatist solidarism was both an analytical model of society and economy and a social political philosophy that opposed to the individualistic vision of Western liberalism and the class-based vision of

²⁸⁸ Gökay, Fahreddin Kerim. "Milli Nüfus Siyasetinde (Eugenique) Meselesinin Mahiyeti," 206.

²⁸⁹ In fact, according to Taha Parla, most of the dominant political ideologies and public philosophies in Turkey from Unionism of the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) and single party Kemalism (1923-1950) to various contemporary Kemalisms were partly or thoroughly predicated in Gökalp's political and social philosophy. See, Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985).

society and social transformation of socialism.²⁹⁰ The social order imagined in this discourse was a classless society that demanded each member of the social act in harmony and cooperation much like the harmony and cooperation of the parts of a biological organism.²⁹¹ Opposed to Social Darwinist and Sepencerian notions of competition, Gökalp's solidarity held interdependence and association as the predominant characteristic of social life.

While Gökalp sought to establish solidarity on a synthesis of "genuine values" out of Ottoman values (Islamic morals), Turkish (national) values along with technological and scientific knowledge from the West,²⁹² the Republican scientists focused less on Islamic morality more on rejuvenating the nationalist sentiments elicited by Gökalp and other early nationalist theorists along with the ideals of positivist epistemology. And they attempted to historicize both solidarity and its ethical and moral elements in the overall theory of evolution that held that the progress of society depended on cooperation and interdependence more than competition.

We can trace the hints of this notion of evolution in Fahrettin Kerim's narrative of evolutionary developmental line from childhood to adulthood where he drew an analogy between ontogeny of the child and phylogeny of human species. Fahrettin Kerim provided a comprehensive idea of the child by historicizing it in the totality of human history, drawing analogy between the developmental phases of the child and that of the modern civilizations; that is the phases the child went through resembled to the stages of

²⁹⁰ Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp*, vii.

²⁹¹ The space here does not allow for a comprehensive analysis of Turkish corporatist-solidarism. See, among others, Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924*; Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (New York: Syracuse Univ Press, 2004); Andrew Davison, "Secularization and Modernization in Turkey: The Ideas of Ziya Gökalp," *Economy and Society* 24, no. 2 (1995).

²⁹² Ziya Gökalp, "New life and Values," in Ziya Gökalp, ed. *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 59.

human society.

First was the pre-social phase in which the child belonged to the mother, and people lived only to reproduce and meet their material needs, similar to tribes currently living Amazonia. There was no social life. Second was the patriarchal phase that entailed obedience to the leader of a clan and imitation of nature; people living in the Tibetan plateaus were in this stage. Third was the revolutionary and reformative period where individualism revolted against submissions from without; such events as religious reforms in the Middle Ages, political reforms, and economic liberalism were effects of this stage. Finally, the fourth is our current phase of solidarism, according to Fahrettin Kerim, marked by freedom of thought, sociality (*ictimai tazzufl*), the notion of rights, harmonizing individual ideas with common laws, and self-restraint. The child's development, Fahrettin Kerim argued, symbolizes these stages. Between the ages of 1-6, the child demonstrates the egocentric mental dispositions of the first period and is predominately dependent on the mother. Between 6-12, the child needs an authority, a father figure, and seeks mental, familial, and social order through rules, obedience, and imitation. Next is the individualistic period (12-18 ages) when the child revolts against the authority; and finally is the age of maturity and mental reformation (18-21) in which the individual conforms to the norm of solidarity, contemplates notions of rights, gets involved in youth organizations, and in activities pertaining to the country.²⁹³

The final phase of developmental process according to Fahrettin Kerim was characterized by *solidarity (tesanüt)*, *sociality/socialization (ictimai taazzuv)*, harmony between one's will and universal laws, *self-restraint*, absence of egotism, and a process

²⁹³ Fahreddin Kerim Gökay, *İnkıla Çocukunun Terbiyesinde Ruhi Ve Ameli Esaslar* (İstanbul: Kader Matbaası, 1933), 13-14.

of free thought.²⁹⁴ (In psychoanalytical terms, it would correspond to the phase of superego, or rather, the tutelage of superego). The normal individual would gradually shed the animalistic, primitive, and egocentric self of the earlier phases and reach the level of normal adulthood insofar as s/he could harmonize his/her will with that of the society. Thus, individual as well as the society were located within a spatial and temporal solidarity with each other and with history. Solidarity and its neighboring concepts such as cooperation and interdependence were, then, historicized and made scientifically verifiable in the history of human species.

Similarly, morality was seen as historical and continually evolving phenomenon. According to physician Akil Muhtar Özden morality and moral principles were products of human brain, which in turn was the product of evolution.²⁹⁵ He identified three instincts as the source for morality in human species: the instincts of preservation of the individual; the instincts of preservation of the race; and finally those instincts that were the products of and depended on the “force of evolution” (*elon d’evolution*). The final group included the social instincts such as the sense of mutual help, sense of duty, the need for coordination, discipline, the love for one’s country; altruistic moral sentiments; those sentiments that depended on cognitive functioning of the mind such as curiosity; and finally aesthetic sentiments.²⁹⁶ While “true happiness depended on gratification of all these sentiments and desires in harmony,” the power of those instincts that were the product of evolution was to be held greater. For while the first two lead humanity to egoism, the instincts that are the product of evolution lead people to altruism.²⁹⁷ Thus,

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 13.

²⁹⁵ Akil Muhtar Özden, *İli Bakımından Ahlak* (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan Basımevi Ltd., 1942), 20.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 100-102.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 103.

Akil Muhtar Özden, similar to Fahrettin Kerim, identified the directionality of evolution from egoism towards an altruistic phase characterized by solidarity, cooperation, and sociality.

The normal adult in this solidarist phase was sociable. *Sociability* was both an ethical and social obligation of the individual, and the criterion of his/her normality. Indeed, the common thread underlying the phase of normality was sociability; “criterion of [normal] character is social,” asserted Fahrettin Kerim.²⁹⁸ He, for example, identified the initial goal in educating the child of the Revolution as gradually eradicating the egocentrism in him/her, imbuing him/her with a collective and solidarist education based on national principles.

Fahrettin Kerim, furthermore, transposed the doctrine of social solidarism from Ziya Gökalp, with a new twist into the medical language: “*Fert yok, cemiyet var*” (No individual but society) and “*birimiz hepimiz; hepimiz birimiz*” (One for all and all for one).²⁹⁹ In Gökalp’s version of solidarism, sociality was characterized by appealing to the notion of duty. The moral conception of duty had been absorbed into a social obligation to such an extent that it transcended the notion of rights. Gökalp’s “*Fert yok, cemiyet var; hak yok vazife var*” (No individual but society; no rights, but duty) was an epigrammatic representation of the style of thinking of the first three decades of the Republican rule, characterized by social harmony and despotic solidarity. While Gökalp had, albeit unsuccessfully, sought a synthesis between individualism and collectivism, his

²⁹⁸ Gökay, “Ahlak Hastalari,” 4.

²⁹⁹ Gökay, *İnkılap Çocuğunun Terbiyesinde Ruhi Ve Ameli Esaslar*, 16-17.

Republican successors leaned increasingly towards the latter, emphasizing the obligation of each individual to conform to the rules and standards of the society, the collective.³⁰⁰

The psychiatrist appealed to sociability and solidarity with a new twist by medicalizing the interdependency between the individuals making up the society. Fahrettin Kerim formulated this (moral, social, and economic) interdependency from a mental health perspective. According to Fahrettin Kerim, mental health took it as a given three social norms: “1) Taking responsibility, 2) coordination (*insicam*), 3) mutual contribution (*müşterek yardım*).”³⁰¹ “These,” claimed Fahrettin Kerim, were “the essential duties of a citizen. In most cases of mental maladaptation,” he continued, “all these three lacked.”³⁰²

As I briefly mentioned earlier in this chapter, psychopathy, the quintessential case of maladaptation, was characterized by the psychiatrist as a moral and social disease precisely because it disturbed the normal functioning of this interdependency between individuals. Psychopaths were viewed as morally incapable personalities, characterized by moral incapacity, and were in disharmony with any social environment, thus in constant conflict with the society. Psychopathy disturbed the discipline and wellbeing of the social body, for the psychopaths, according to the psychiatrist, were not able to carry out their duties in an orderly fashion; they would be afflicted with tuberculosis, syphilis, alcoholism and other vice because of their disorderliness, with some being led to prostitution.³⁰³ Characterized by weak and infantilized willpower, psychopaths were not able to show strength against the difficulties of life, could not adjust to the norms of

³⁰⁰ Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp*.

³⁰¹ Gökay, and Atasev. "Cürümlerin Mediko-Sosyal Tedkiki," 15.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Gökay. "Milli Nüfus Siyasetinde (Eugenique) Meselesinin Mahiyeti," 207.

society and the communal life, could not control their emotions and discipline their passions.³⁰⁴

Psychopathy, then, constituted the limits of normal sociality in so far as it disturbed the ideal healthy and productive citizen imagined in the Republican solidarist discourse. The ideal citizen was the one who could conform to the rules of the society, to the norms of collective conscience and ideals of national culture, who could govern their egotistic passions and discipline their intellect, and sympathize with other people's emotions and opinions. A pamphlet distributed by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare gives some hints as to the ideal type in relation to mental hygiene:

The types that mental hygiene is desirous of are those who can pull themselves together in their excitements, tremors, passions; who think insightfully and with moderation; who do not look down on others, nor treat them with a lax attitude; who know how to conform to the society without limiting their conscience and freedom.³⁰⁵

Similarly, according to psychiatrist Kenan Tunakan normal person was the one who brought his primitive dispositions into agreement with the rules of the society, and thus attained equilibrium.³⁰⁶

The ideal character from the mental hygiene perspective demonstrates two psycho-moral dispositions. First was modesty (*tevazu*) and acting with moderation (*ölçülü davranma*). As Sanem Güvenç Salgirli has demonstrated, Republican medical doctors were strong champions of a moderate life style, which they embodied in their middle class bourgeois habitus.³⁰⁷ What is different here is that modesty and moderation are rearticulated in a psychobiological language. Physician Akil Muhtar Özden

³⁰⁴ Gökay, and Atasev. "Cürümlerin Mediko-Sosyal Tedkiki," 14.

³⁰⁵ Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekaleti. "Akıl Hıfzıssıhhası." Ankara: Recep Ulusoglu Basımevi, 1943, 8.

³⁰⁶ Hüseyin Kenan Tunakan, "Mektepte Ruhiyatın Rolü," *Tıp Dünyası* 13, no. 5 (1940): 5.

³⁰⁷ Salgirli, "Eugenics for the Doctors: Medicine and Social Control in 1930s Turkey," 307-08.

categorized modesty as one of the social instincts developed through the evolutionary process and deemed it to be one of the high virtues of modern civilized societies.³⁰⁸ For the psychiatrist, it was a virtue of a normal character. That is, lack of moderation and modesty, which –in psychopathic cases –demonstrated itself in outburst of feelings, abrupt changes in emotional attitude, egotism, vanity, braggadocio, peevishness, moodiness, sexual extravagancies and excesses (etc.) was a psychological anomaly, a character disease. These excessive behaviors in psychopaths, according to the psychiatrist, interfered with the rationality that (should) govern one's activities. Thus, the psychiatrist advocated for a rational and calculated way of acting that did not allow for extravagances and excesses in any form.³⁰⁹

Second was the idea of duty and being a useful member of the society (*cemiyete faydalı olmak*), which was accompanied by other concepts such as self-denial (*feragat*), harmony (*ahenk*), order (*nizam*), obedience/compliance (*itaat*), and equilibrium (*muvazene*). All these terms evoked a strong sense of sociality and maintenance and preservation of social and public order. The mental hygiene project had a strong role in the mental and moral reform of the individual so that s/he could be a useful member of the society, which is articulated in the pamphlet in the following way:

The purpose of mental hygiene is not only to protect an individual's mind but also to educate people in ways that they do not have conflicts with regard to their emotions, thoughts, habits, and morals so that the social body is honest, well-organized, and useful to the country. Mind is only useful to perceive truth and facts. Those sane people with treacherous, vicious and bad temperaments do not count as mentally sound from the perspective of mental hygiene.³¹⁰

³⁰⁸ Akil Muhtar Özden, *İlim Bakımından Ahlak*, 144-46

³⁰⁹ In this sense, I agree with Salgirli that medical doctors were the embodiment of bourgeois rationality.

³¹⁰ Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekaleti. "Akıl Hıfzıssıhhası," 2.

Thus, for example, it is clear why psychiatrists as well as other medical doctors relentlessly attacked egotism and selfishness and viewed those demonstrating these “infantile abnormalities” as morally diseased.

Being a useful member of the society necessitated contributing to the economic growth of the State. The Kemalist solidarist-corporatist economy had embraced Durkheimian organic solidarism that deemed it a moral obligation of each member of the society to make contributions to the collective unity through his/her specific activity. In this sense, each member of the collective was dependent on the activities of the others, which was expressed through the idea of division of labor.

In modern societies, according to Durkheim, division of labor was organized by differences and specializations in each sub-divisions; that is, labor was more divided, more personal and specialized, which was different from the mechanical solidarity of traditional societies in which individuals were tied directly to the society without any intermediaries and the relationship among the members was characterized by resemblances in the activities the individuals carried out.³¹¹ He used an organic analogy to characterize the modern organic solidarity: “The solidarity resembles that which we observe among the higher animals. Each organ, in effect, has its special physiognomy, its autonomy. And, moreover, the unity of the organism is as great as the individuation of the parts is more marked.”³¹² A similar analogy for organic division of labor was provided by Akil Muhtar Özden, who cited the interdependency among the systems of the body as a form of organic division. According to Özden, duly development and progress of a society depended on the seamless functioning of the division of labor;

³¹¹ Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, trans. W.D. Halls, Reprint ed. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Free Press, 1984), 129-31.

³¹² Ibid.

therefore, it was important to make each individual conscious of their dependence upon others by developing in them strong feelings of social obligation, and conscientiousness.³¹³

This idea of division of labor was embraced by medical community, for whom each individual was deemed to be the most profitable capital for the organic economy of the State. “From a eugenics perspective,” argued Fahrettin Kerim, “we are obliged to manage and protect this capital very well,” which was rendered critical for the national wealth and economy.³¹⁴ One strategy to manage and protect this capital comprised attacking those groups deemed economically less/unproductive. For the mental hygienist, “street children” comprised a major component of these less/unproductive classes.

In the next chapter, I explore how mental hygienists transposed the notion of psychopathy (as embodiment of abnormality) to rearticulate the notion of street children, namely child delinquents and vagrant children (among others), and will analyze *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu*, a modern institution to rescue children, as an effort by the Republicans to reform the street (*sokak*), a space representing the fears of the Republicans of the “unproductive” bodies.

³¹³ Akil Muhtar Özden, *İlim Bakımından Ahlak*, 160-162.

³¹⁴ Gökay. "Milli Nüfus Siyasetinde (Eugenique) Meselesinin Mahiyeti," 207.

Chapter V

Mental Hygiene and Fabrication and Regulation of “Abnormal” Bodies

5.1. Assistance: From charity to social obligation/duty

One major line of inquiry in mental hygiene movement was to investigate, make visible, and improve the conditions of “street children” (*sokak çocukları*), an umbrella term that more often than not referred to child delinquents and vagrant and homeless children in urban cities like Istanbul and Izmir.³¹⁵

The two decades following the establishment of the Republic witnessed the growth of the pervasive fear that the vagrant and homeless children (*serseri ve başıboş çocuklar*) and child delinquents (*mücrim çocuklar*) presented a threat to the physical, mental and economic wellbeing of the Turkish nation. Newspapers of the period regularly touched upon the issue, alerting the public and the State officials to the increase in the number of vagrant and homeless children in the streets of Istanbul, and in crime and other troubles caused by these “little miserable” (*küçük sefiller*) as a deputy from Istanbul called them.³¹⁶ The language of these newspaper articles was an amalgam of humanitarian sentiments such as showing charity and mercy (*şefkat ve merhamet*) to these groups and fears that necessitated their social and moral control in order that they become productive citizens of the new Republic.

Certain Safaeddin Karanakcı of *Cumhuriyet*, for instance, was saddened by the miserable condition of vagrant children frequenting the streets of Istanbul, sleeping under the bridges and in bed-sitting rooms, begging and creeping along the streets rubbing their

³¹⁵ In the rest of this chapter, I use the term to primarily refer to child delinquents and vagrant and homeless children, and secondarily to all “problem child” populations.

³¹⁶ Alaettin Cemil Topçubaşı. "Sokak Çocukları: İstanbul Belediyesinin Tesis Ettiği ‘Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu’na Bir Tetkik." *Cumhuriyet*, 07/29 1934.

freezing backs to the walls of the bathhouses and bakeries to warm up.³¹⁷ Using a medical analogy, Karanakçı viewed the child as “the protoplasm of the individuals making up the cells of the society.” “Just as an organ made up of healthy protoplasm is strong,” he continued, so would be a society made up of strong and robust children.³¹⁸ In this sense, these children were viewed as unhealthy organs of the social body.

Hıfzı Veldet (Velidedeoğlu), a renowned professor of law, epitomized the humanitarian and social control approach in his article published in *Cumhuriyet* in as late as 1945 when for the first time comprehensive State-initiatives were undertaken to regulate vagrant and homeless children. Hıfzı Veldet was distraught by the use of *başiboş* (“homeless,” or more literally, “stray”) for these children, for the term was reminiscent of stray dogs and stray cows.³¹⁹ These children, according to Hıfzı Veldet, “were victimized (*mazlum*) human offspring by the cruelty of their destiny and negligence of the society. They were victims today,” he continued, but have a predisposition to disrupt the social order, to be contaminated and to contaminate [the society], to certainly be unruly in the future.³²⁰

As we have seen in Chapter II, starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, certain child populations designated under such labels as “*muhtaç çocuk*” (those in need, deprived, or dependent; typically orphans), *bikes* (destitute), *serseri* (vagabonds), and *dilenci* (beggars) gained a new visibility in the Ottoman public space. While some were designated as “*muhtaç*” (in need of help) others were treated from the perspective of public order (*asayiş* or *nizam*). However, they were all turned into objects of various

³¹⁷ Ibid., 5.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Velidedeoğlu, Hıfzı Veldet. “Başiboş Çocuklar.” *Cumhuriyet*, 02/22 1945, 2.

³²⁰ Ibid.

disciplinary and controlling techniques such as deportation to isolate them from the rest of the public (urban areas) and labor to turn them into productive bodies. Nevertheless, these populations still constituted primarily a moral problem for the Ottoman social state.

The visibility of these child populations in the Republican period embodied both of these discourses simultaneously –i.e. in need of help and a threat to the public order – yet in a new nationalized public space and supplemented with a new discourse that was invisible to the gaze of the Ottoman social state. In a series of translated articles published in *Tıp Dünyası*, Kudsi Halkacı revealed certain elements of this discourse.³²¹

In the third article of the series, the “original” author and the translator (Sicard de Plauzoles and Kudsi Halkacı respectively) stated that until recently assisting the patients and the disabled was a matter of charity (*şefkat*) and alms-giving (*sadaka*) in the name of Allah. They argued,

once the modern sciences have taught us the law of solidarity, the outcome of the law of universal determinism, it has been understood that assistance is not just a means of charity, but is simultaneously a duty and a calculated endeavor towards social interest.³²²

In this formulation, the notion of charity was replaced with the principle of duty and the principle of social interest, both essential to the law of solidarity. Once duty and social interest were articulated as principles of the law of solidarity, which was viewed as an outcome of evolutionary determinism (partly explored in the previous chapter as well), they were removed from the sphere of religion and were situated in positive (scientific)

³²¹ The articles were translated from French eugenicist Sicard de Plauzoles’s *Principles d’hygiene sociale* (1927) and were published under the same title in Turkish. Except for the first article, there is almost no reference to the original author in the subsequent publications, and the division between the original author and the translator gradually disappears. In fact, Halkacı appropriated most of the ideas presented in these articles in a pamphlet he authored for and distributed through Çocukları Esirgeme Kurumu. See, Halkacı, “Çocukları Esirgemenin Modern Tekniği.” Thus, here I take it problematic to differentiate between the first author and the translator.

³²² Halkacı. “İçtima Hıfzıssıhha Prensipleri Iii,” *Tıp Dünyası* 7, no. 6 (1934): 2477-78.

and normative (secular) ethics. The positivity and normativity of duty and social interest were enunciated in a new deontology of social hygiene that established a reciprocal relationship between the individual, the family, and the society. This solidaristic relationship is expressed in the following *Table*.³²³

Table 5.1 Deontology of Social Hygiene

Individual:	Hygiene: Individual's obligations towards himself/herself Prophylaxis: Individual's obligations towards others
Family:	Eugenics/ Eugennetique: Individual's obligations towards his/her species and posterity
Society	Puericulture: A mother's obligations to her child Society's obligations towards the mother and the child Protection and Assistance: Society's obligations towards the individual Productivity/work and products/works (<i>eser</i>): Individual's obligations towards society

One implication of this table is that individual's conduct toward himself/herself and towards the collective was to be regulated based on the principles of social hygiene. In this sense, social hygiene simultaneously embodied the principles of social morality and hygienist was but a moral teacher (*ahlak hocası*).³²⁴

The deontology (social morality/social hygiene) laid down the obligations of the individual to the collective and vice versa as: the former was obliged to (1) produce/work and (2) reproduce to perpetuate the race while the latter was obliged to (1) protect (*himaye*) and (2) assist (*yardım*) the former. In this formulation, the relationship of the individual to the collective, that is his/her social value, was expressed through his/her total capital value relative to his/her productivity and reproductivity.³²⁵

Productive and reproductive power of the individual as two essential components of his/her social value were expressed in Sicard's concept of *zootechnie humaine*, which

³²³ Halkacı, Kudsi. "İçtima Hıfzıssıhha Prensipleri I." *Tıp Dünyası* 7, no. 4 (1934): 2398-404. P.2402.

"İçtima Hıfzıssıhha Prensipleri I," *Tıp Dünyası* 7, no. 4 (1934): 2402.

³²⁴ Ibid., 2401.

³²⁵ "İçtima Hıfzıssıhha Prensipleri Iii."

he defined as “the art of procreating, perfecting and utilizing man as a work-producing machine.”³²⁶ In this definition, individual was viewed simultaneously an instrument of work, a producer, an element of force, of national wealth, an element of reproduction, of life and future, and a component of human capital.³²⁷ Thus, it was essential that this capital was protected and assisted both for its social capital value and economic value. To this end, Sicard viewed the task of eugenics/ eugennetique as improving the conditions of reproduction, and the task of social hygiene as improving the conditions of production in order to ensure the best possible return on this capital.³²⁸

In this configuration, the patient or the pathological was no more an ill-fated in need of help but an unproductive and unprofitable burden (*hasılat vermeyen, temettü temin etmeyen bir yük*), whose treatment was a cost to the society and whose death was viewed as wasted capital.³²⁹ Seen from this perspective, the child populations were now viewed as diseased and unproductive parts of the social and economic body.

What we have here is a new language that evoked biological and economic utility of the body for the Republic. If the body was unserviceable, economically and socially useless to the causes of the Republic, or –putting it in Fahrettin Kerim’s words – if it was disturbing the organization and comfort of the social life, it deserved to be jettisoned or was in need of comprehensive reform. For “the increase of mentally disabled and diseased in a country exacerbates the burden of life of the fit. [It] adds more to their [the fit’s] obligations [and] causes shrinking of the budget.”³³⁰

³²⁶ William H. Schneider, "The Eugenics Movement in France 1890-1940," in *The Wellborn Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia*, ed. Mark B. Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 89.

³²⁷ Kudsi Halkacı, "İçtima Hıfzıssıhha Prensipleri Ii," *Tıp Dünyası* 7, no. 5 (1934): 4235.

³²⁸ Schneider. "The Eugenics Movement in France 1890-1940," 89.

³²⁹ Halkacı. "İçtima Hıfzıssıhha Prensipleri Iii," 2478.

³³⁰ Gökay, Fahreddin Kerim. "Milli Nüfus Siyasetinde (Eugeniique) Meselesinin Mahiyeti," 207.

Thus, the body of the street children was rendered visible in a new discursive configuration that viewed them as organic component of the national body and as individuals with rights of being protected and assisted by the society (deontology of social hygiene), yet it simultaneously made this notion of right contingent upon the individual's social and economic re/productivity (as an obligation/duty/debt to the collective). In this sense, the inclusion of the street children in the national body politic depended on the reformation of their body so that it was re/productive.

5.2. Medicalization of “abnormal” children

Mental hygiene movement was probably the most organized movement that systematically worked toward bettering and reforming the bodies/conditions of street children so that they became re/productive citizens of the Republic. A glance over the research and studies carried out by mental hygienists demonstrates how invested mental hygienists were in the problem of street children. Physician İbrahim Zati worked on child delinquents, nervous children, establishment of juvenile courts; Cevat Zekai on degenerate (*mütereddi*) children, Kenan Tunakan on nervous children, the mental hygiene of school children; Fahrettin Kerim on abnormal children and child delinquents, school hygiene, character types and criminality, biological causes of suicidal personalities; Nevzad Ayas on the social causes of delinquency; Fahrettin Kerim, Mazhar Osman, and Aliye Rıza on psychological causes of delinquency and criminality; Aliye Rıza on mental hygiene among teenage girls. The subjects and objects of these studies would overlap and be cited across texts frequently. While the list is not exhaustive, it suffices to claim that children that posed a particular threat to the social, moral, and economic order were one major target of the mental hygiene discourse.

Mental hygienists in their conceptualization of delinquency embraced a hybrid theory of heredity and environment in the production of delinquent behavior. Some such as Aliye Rıza Tancıl inclined toward the former. Tancıl advocated prophylactic analysis of child criminals that involved studying the biological behavior as the causative agent of criminality. She denounced Gustav Aschaffenburg's criminology as old style, which tied the causes of criminality to the societal agents such as race, religion, urban or rural milieu, economic condition and education. "Much as these causes are important," she argued, "they do not suffice to isolate the entirety of a crime. They only provide general and social information."³³¹ What she suggested was an in-depth analysis of individual complexes that develop at childhood. Although applying prophylactic principles in identifying the pathological behavior of the delinquent and resorting to prophylactic measures and protections to eliminate the delinquent behavior was commonly accepted among mental hygienists, most tended to view the etiology of the delinquent in both biological and social terms.

Others such as Fahrettin Kerim and İbrahim Zati Öget provided a broader etiology of the criminal behavior in their analysis of child delinquents. Both were sympathetic to Aschaffenburg's theory of criminality.³³² While both viewed mental and psychological condition of the offender as one of the main causes of child delinquency, social milieu particularly familial milieu and education played a decisive role in producing or preventing child delinquencies.

Mental hygienists overall discarded the pessimistic hereditarianism of Italian

³³¹ Aliye Rıza Tancıl, "Ruh Hastalıklarından İleri Gelen Cürümler Üzerinde Bir İstatistik," *Yeşilay Mecmuası* 7, no. 73 (1939): 7.

³³² Fahreddin Kerim Gökay, "Türkiye'de Çocuk Cürümleri İii," *Tıp Dünyası* 11, no. 5 (1938): 3806-07; İbrahim Zati Öget, *Mücrin [Sic] Ve Serseri (Antisosyal) Çocuklar* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1941).

criminologist and physician Cesare Lombroso, who put forth the idea of “born criminals,” because it did not allow for positive and constructive forces of education and preventive medicine to better and improve the pathological behavior, the delinquency. Such pessimistic and deterministic narratives, according to mental hygienists, did not allow for hopeful and forward-looking educational programs to correct and reform the delinquent behavior. Accepting such principles as a universal law, according to İbrahim Zati, would render one powerless and his/her hand’s tied against catastrophes, crimes, and murders committed by these children, thus causing one to lose all the hope of reforming them.³³³ He cited multiple statistics from studies done in France to demonstrate the limitation of hereditary theory and the effect of social milieu, particularly family, and education on the delinquent behavior.

Indeed, what hygienists suggested was an analysis of combined effect of inheritance –the biological –and education –the social –on the delinquent behavior. According to Fahrettin Kerim, “when looking for the causes of a crime, it is essential that one examines the personality of the delinquent [the biological] along with [social] agents.” And once these causes were established, it was a matter of education and training rather than punitive mechanisms to cure the pathological behavior.³³⁴

Forgoing deterministic hereditarianism, mental hygienists turned to the family and home environment as the seedbed for child delinquency. For family was not only the source of the natural and the biological in hereditary sense since one inherited their bad genes and their pathologies from their parents, grandparents, and earlier progenitors, but also the source of acquired characters since it was in the family where one received their

³³³ Ibid., 10.

³³⁴ Gökay. "Türkiye'de Çocuk Cürümleri Iii," 3806-07.

first training, moral character, and manners that would determine the course of their development into adulthood. They emphasized delinquency's relations to inheritance on the one hand and to the early environmental period of the offender on the other. Thus, family became a context of explanation for delinquencies derived from both the psychogenetic composition of the offender as well as the insufficiencies of their home environment.

İbrahim Zati's metaphor borrowed from French physician and forensic scientist Alexandre Lacassagne is quite explanatory of the prevalent reasoning of the mental hygiene discourse: the child delinquent, according Lacassagne as cited in Öget, is a microbe, but the social milieu functions as the culture medium of the microbe and provides the broth for its development.³³⁵

İbrahim Zati continued the biomedical language of Lacassagne, viewing child delinquency as a public disease (*umumi hastalık*), as a social affliction (*içtimai dert*) that was manifestation of a mental, physical, social, and moral pathological condition, and needed immediate treatment.³³⁶ All these pathologies could be traced to the home environment. For İbrahim Zati the social milieu was nothing but the home environment. He believed that the home influences that surrounded the child were potent in forming her character so much so that every delinquency could be traced back to the insufficient and dysfunctional family conditions.³³⁷

First and foremost factor was heredity. In most cases, most of which were cited from Western sources, offenders were associated with some sort of mental abnormality, deficiency in intelligence, or character defects that were effects of a pathology of

³³⁵ Cited in Öget. *Mücrin [Sic] Ve Serseri (Antisosyal) Çocuklar*, 10-11.

³³⁶ Ibid.; İbrahim Zati Öget, *Suçlu Çocuklar Ve Islah Evleri* (İstanbul: Sühulet Basımevi, 1937), 4.

³³⁷ Ibid., 11.

inheritance. The pathology could be through slow accumulation of inherited defects from her progenitors and/or an effect of ontogenetic disturbances to the reproductive glands particularly during fertilization and during one's development from embryo to early childhood period. Highly important was this latter condition because while it was hard to find out the exact relationship between crime and heredity no matter how expert one was in studying the psychogenetic processes of an individual, it was relatively easier to study and observe the correlation between ontogenetic disturbances such as alcoholism, syphilis, gonorrhoea, and criminality.

Numerous national and international studies were cited in the mental hygiene and eugenics literature arguing that there was a strong correlation between say alcoholism, and criminality and other vice. Kudsi Halkacı cited studies done in Germany tracing the genealogy of an alcoholic mother. Out of 834 members of her pedigrees, 181 were prostitutes, 142 beggars, 83 criminals, and one vagrant.³³⁸ Similarly, İbrahim Zati and Fahrettin Kerim cited studies done in France with findings that majority of child offenders were from alcoholic parents or families with some sort of decadence.³³⁹ Thus, family was burdened with double pressure: to preserve the good inheritance one received from their progenitors while simultaneously warding off environmental and artificial means that harmed one's ontogenetic development.

The second major factor in child delinquency was familial milieu or the home environment. Many psychopathic offenders and delinquents, according to mental hygienists, originated in a family environment that was corrupted in one way or another.

³³⁸ Kudsi Halkacı, İckinin nesil üzerindeki tesirleri, *Yeşilay* 5 (54), 1937. P. 4. Kudsi Halkacı, "İçkini Nesi Üzerindeki Tesirleri," *Yeşilay Mecmuası* 5, no. 54 (1937): 4.

³³⁹ Gökay. "Türkiye'de Çocuk Cürümleri İii," 3806-07; Öget. *Mücrin [Sic] Ve Serseri (Antisosyal) Çocuklar*.

İbrahim Zati cited French physicians Emmanuel Régis and Etienne Martin's studies to justify the effect of home environment on child delinquency. In Martin's study, out of 100 child offenders 77 were from families whose social composition and harmony was broken, some with their parents divorced, living apart, remarried, or widowed and some without any parents. Even among the 22 lawfully normal families of child delinquents, parents demonstrated some sort of abnormality, with mentally diseased mothers, one or both of the parents being alcoholics, one or both of the parents imprisoned etc.³⁴⁰

Fahrettin Kerim, citing French sources and based on his own research, related child delinquency to parents' lack of education. Large percentages of child offenders that were coming into the hands of institutions for homeless, claimed Fahrettin Kerim, were uneducated and did not have any formal schooling.³⁴¹

As much of the foregoing discussion suggests, mental hygienists viewed juvenile delinquency and criminality as an effect of biological, social, and moral degeneration originating in the family. More than anything else, they were able to medicalize and psychologize criminality. As such, they reoriented their focus towards taking prophylactic measures to correct and reform the milieu and the pathological behavior based on modern hygiene principles. The best course of action, according İbrahim Zati, was to act in time to lead the child to a normal conduct before the child turns to a criminal. It was hard if not impossible to correct a child once they commit a crime, for "the worm had entered inside the fruit."³⁴² If the family was already in a morbid condition, particularly those stricken with poverty, immorality, social disorderliness, which was the case for most juvenile delinquents according to mental hygienists, they

³⁴⁰ Öget. *Mücrin [Sic] Ve Serseri (Antisosyal) Çocuklar*, 12-13.

³⁴¹ Gökay. "Türkiye'de Çocuk Cürümleri İii," 3806.

³⁴² *Mücrin [Sic] Ve Serseri (Antisosyal) Çocuklar*, 12-13.

suggested taking away the child from their noxious environment and placing them in a pension or boarding school that was healthier for their correction and rehabilitation.

What mental hygienists saw when they gazed at the problem child was not the same child seen by a sociologist, a moralist, or a pedagogue. The medical gaze saw the biological body. The child in this gaze was little sick whose condition was an effect of his/her pathological nature and an effect of the milieu. This conceptualization, ignored by most scholars analyzing the political and cultural discourse of Kemalist regime and the preoccupation with the child question, was integral to how medical doctors at large and mental hygienists in particular perceived national problems, whether they were social, moral, or political. Their scientific discourse of pathological childhood was inseparable from how they conceived the health and well being of the nation itself.

5.3. *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* and progressive efforts to govern “abnormal” children

Hıfzı Veldet, in his article cited in the introduction of this chapter, identified one major problem of the Republican regime’s response to the street children as lack of institutional efforts to control these groups and address child question at large, which according to Hıfzı Veldet received the least attention from the government. To a certain extent, this claim held true in terms of the lack of state-centered institutionalization towards street children, which remained limited until after WW II.³⁴³ Nevertheless, there were efforts particularly by local municipalities that were given more authority by the

³⁴³ Majority of the institutions for orphans, vagrants, and homeless children established during the first two decades of the Republic were by private foundations or private initiatives that received some or no funding from central government and/or local municipalities. Some of these institutions such as *Darıüşşafaka* (a major institution for the poor and homeless children) were established during the late Ottoman Empire, while others like *Himaye-i Etfal Cemiyeti* (Child Protection Society, 1921) were established in the first decade of the Republic. For a comprehensive list of institutions for children during the first two decades for the Republic, see, Hüseyin Sapmazlı, *Çocuk Hakları Ve Himaye Müesseseleri* (Ankara: Yeni Cezaevi, 1943), 221-23. The table provided by Sapmazlı demonstrates the coexistence of modern and traditional institutions dating back to the late Ottoman Empire for children in need of protection.

Municipal Act and Public Hygiene Law of 1930 to shelter and protect homeless, poor, vagrant, and delinquent children.

Particularly important were three institutions from the mental hygiene perspective: A modern Juvenile Correction Institution (*Çocuk Islah Evi*) that was established in Edirne in 1937, and then transferred to Ankara in 1940; İmralı Agricultural Colony, a labor-based penitentiary founded in 1935 on İmralı Island, designed after modern farm colonies that had been gaining popularity across Europe, North America and beyond; and the *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* (The Child Rescue Institution) that was established in 1933 in Istanbul. All these three institutions were effects of institutionalization efforts –albeit limited – to control and regulate problem children and youth in modern vocational education, incorporating modern pedagogical techniques and principles of modern psychology. These institutions, in their own ways, intended to educate and train the problem populations in agriculture, crafts, and small industries so that they become self-sufficient, productive, and fully functional citizens of the modern Republic. While the space here does not allow to provide a comprehensive history of these institutions, I will analyze the establishment of *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* as a representation of the style of reasoning governing the institutionalization efforts in this period.

The Municipal Act of 1930 that was put into effect along with other legislative reforms after the Republic was founded authorized local governments and municipalities to take the initiative in providing protection, shelter, medical help, financial support, and education for the orphan, poor, and homeless and desolate children and women (particularly articles 17, 18, 34, 45, 48, and 69 listed duties and responsibilities of the

local governments towards these populations).³⁴⁴

In response to legislative changes, Istanbul Governorship and Municipality appointed a commission in 1932 to investigate conditions of homeless and vagrant children and come up with solutions to manage these populations.³⁴⁵ The commission constituted physicians, psychiatrists, and pedagogues including Fahrettin Kerim and İbrahim Zati, who –through the Mental Hygiene Society –had already been pressing for reforms in the care of problem children, introduction of child labor laws, and in establishing reformed institutions for vagrant children and juvenile delinquents.³⁴⁶

After a few gatherings, the commission recommended the establishment of an institution for the homeless and vagrant children, and reported that an entrepreneur named Kazım Zafir, a psychiatrist and a teacher, offered to undertake the task of establishing the institution.³⁴⁷ To this purpose, the Governorship bought a building in Galata neighborhood that was previously used as a British school. This was a central location strategically recommended by the members of the committee, for it was commonly frequented by homeless and desolate children and close to the small handicraft industries that would play a crucial part in the vocational aspect of the institution.

The name of the institution was as strategic as the location itself. Traditionally, as we have seen in chapter II, the institutions established for homeless and vagrant children were called *Islah evleri* or *Islahhane* (roughly translated as correction or reformatory institutions) along with other institutions such as *Darülaceze* (literally the house of the

³⁴⁴ *Belediye Kanunu*. 1580. 3/4/1930.

³⁴⁵ Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu, "Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu," *İş: Felsefe, Ahlak ve İctimaiyat Mecmuası* 9, no. 34 (1943).

³⁴⁶ A governmental Decree issued in 1933 mentions Fahrettin Kerim and İbrahim Zati as two experts in the commission. *Cumhuriyet Arşivi*, 16.7.1933, (sayı) 14722, (yer numarası) 38.53..1.

³⁴⁷ Fındıkoğlu. "Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu," 206.

destitute or helpless) or *Darüşşafaka* (literally the house of mercy). These names connoted Ottoman institutional tradition and Islamic values that involved the practice of “helping” the poor and the destitute (usually those viewed as incapable of supporting themselves) as a part of the *sadaka* (almsgiving) culture. The name “*kurtarma*” (literally “rescuing”) transcended the notion of help in the traditional sense and connoted a predominantly modern notion of saving the child, educating him/her, and enabling him/her to become a productive and able citizen (*istihalci vatandaş*) according to the norms of the society.³⁴⁸

Kazım Zafir made it unequivocally clear that *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* was not simply a poorhouse for the orphans, the poor and destitute children, nor was it simply an institution of protection and mercy (*himaye ve şefkat*). He continued,

our institution is for the education and correction of those rebellious and antisocial children who revolted against their household, evaded the control of the society, [and] are exerting their energy to the detriment of the society. *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* will socialize these degenerate (*mütereddi*) children, [and] correct their degeneracy –that is due to pedagogical negligence –in a systematic way and by relying upon the most recent pedagogical style. [It] will prepare them to [fit into] the positive and prolific working mode of the society [and] will ensure to harvest good crops from them by channelizing their overflowing and destructive energy.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁸ Kazım Zafir, *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* (İstanbul: Matbaacılık ve Neşriyat Türk Anonim Şirketi, 1933), 3.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

In this sense, one aspect of the modernity of the institution involved an epistemological distinction of its target population. The distinction is clearly demarcated by the norms and vocabulary of psychiatry and psychology, and reiterates the psychiatrist's demarcation of psychopathy that I have explored in the previous chapter, which also shows that mental hygienists were very much involved in the establishment of the institution.

Kazım Zafir repeatedly highlighted the fact that this institution was not for those with severe mental diseases such as idiocy, imbecility, feeble-mindedness (*sahif*), and epilepsy, nor was it for the disabled such as deaf, blind, and mute. He warned against the danger and propensity to view the institutions for these populations and *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* as identical. According to Zafir, the reason for this propensity lied in the fact that similar to the other institutions, children of *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* possessed abnormal and degenerative characteristics. However, these children, cautioned Zafir, never demonstrated the severe mental and physical disability of the kind common to idiocy or imbecility. "Our children," he continued, "are ordinary psychopaths. The pathology that produces our children's idiosyncratic characteristics is a convulsion of subconscious."³⁵⁰ The psychopaths demonstrated such bad habits as derangement based on aggressive egocentrism (as a result of deprivation of the education to live collectively), greediness, idleness, kleptomania, and masturbation among others.³⁵¹ They included the antisocial, fugitives, and delinquents with a mildly retarded mental, physical and moral condition what was educable and correctible.

The delineation of psychopathy very much corresponds to how mental hygienists identified it in the previous chapter. As a result, the first step involved a clear

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 4.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 8.

epistemological delineation of the target population. Although it is not clearly articulated (at least among the sources I analyzed) how the target students were selected, it is obvious that psychometric tests were utilized in the selection process. According to a news article from *Cumhuriyet*, psychometric tests were used to relocate some students to other institutions depending on their skills and propensity to further education.³⁵²

The institution, headed by Kazım Zafır with a specially selected team of teachers and pedagogues, began its first year in 1933 with seven children who were meticulously picked from Galata neighborhood, some by Zafır himself. The first child, a twelve-year old Ali, was told to have been a vagrant and hashish addict for seven years (see figure II).



Figure 5.1 “Two pictures representing the admirable activities of the Dormitory.” The pictures compare the condition of seven children when they were first accepted to the institution (on the left) to their condition a year after (on the right with their instructors). Source: Topçubaşı, “Sokak Çocukları,” 3.

³⁵² “Kimsesiz Çocuklar,” *Cumhuriyet*, 08/17/1935: 1-3.



Ali,
Müessesenin ilk çocu-
ğu; kendisi 1 numaralı-
dır. kendi yaşında so-
kak çocuklarının ele
başısıdır. Yaşı 12 dir,
yedi senelik serseri ve
esrarkeştir.

Figure 5.2 Figure and description of one of the students.

“Ali, the first kid of the institution, and a gang leader of vagrant children of his age. He is 12 years old, and is a seven-year vagrant and hashish addict.”

Reprinted from Zafir. *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu*, 6.

A fourteen-year old Remzi is described as an exemplar degenerate with his body and mind exhibiting destructive effects of drugs. Another child named Hakkı is described as belligerent yet tough with a positive spirit. The commonality among them, as narrated in the text, is that they all demonstrate some sort of psychopathic abnormality; however, the pathological language is more often than not balanced with constructive vocabulary; for example, children are characterized as adventurous, physically strong, cheerful and full of energy.³⁵³

³⁵³ Zafir. *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu*, 8.



Figure 5.3 Figure and description of another student.

“Remzi, 14 year-old, an exemplar degenerate of the institution, [and] a miserable that best reveals the mental and physical damage of hashish.” Reprinted from Zafir. *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurd*, 6.

The constructive language is invoked to highlight the power of positive education to correct their abnormalities and channelize their energy in the right direction. This was clearly highlighted by Kazım Zafir when he was responding to a hypothetical critique that once these children were confined to an institution, they would be pacified and subdued and would lose their energy. Kazım Zafir responded to the critique arguing “our goal is to improve the energy and regularize it and shape it in accordance with the ideal of the society.”³⁵⁴ Thus, one of the primary goals of the institution was to regularize and discipline the abnormal flow of the energy of these children and “order their will power” (*irade kuvvetlerini tanzim*) so that their energy was exerted according to the social ideals.

For this purpose, the institution adopted a progressive pedagogical approach that involved regulating the behaviors of these children through establishing a positive milieu where children were positively reinforced when they demonstrated a particular progress.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., 7.

This progressive method was contrasted with the punitive method of juvenile courts. In an article comparing juvenile courts and modern child rescue institutions, Kazım Zafir offered some insights into why child rescue institutions should be favored over juvenile courts. While the latter offered primarily two solutions to the problem of delinquency, i.e. fine penalty or imprisonment, the former possessed the capacity to know the psychological and social conditions producing the crime and to know the criminal, and thus the ability to make her a useful citizen.³⁵⁵ In this sense, the program of the child rescue institution was prophylactic rather than punitive in the sense that it attempted to treat and better the potential “prison candidates of tomorrow” (*yarının hapislane namzetleri*) before they turned criminals.³⁵⁶ Zafir was very much convinced that through such reformed child rescue institutions it was possible to prevent delinquency and criminality before they occurred and transform existing delinquents into upright, dutiful, and economically productive members of the society.

The program devised for the institution consisted of a moral education and vocational education component, which was similar to the program of other institutions established for “abnormal” children such as the Institution for Deaf, Mute and Blind (1923) and Juvenile Correction Institution (*Çocuk Islah Evi*). What is unique to the program of *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* is the borrowing of psychotherapeutic methods of confession and catharsis (*méthode cathartique*) from psychoanalysis.³⁵⁷ Application of these psychotherapeutic techniques to pedagogy was a novel practice, and shows that

³⁵⁵ Kazım Zafir, ""Çocuk Mahkeme Ve Cezaevleri" Mi "Çocuk Kurtarma Yurdları" Mı?," *İş: Felsefe, Ahlak ve İktisadiyat Mecmuası* 9, no. 34 (1943): 197-200.

³⁵⁶ *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu*, 5.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu was indeed an experiential idea that incorporated the principles of modern psychology and progressive pedagogy.

The program was designed based on four principles: (1) developing a sense of aesthetic sensibility in children through constructive feedback, positive words, music and fine arts; (2) teaching them cleanliness and health by instilling in them the habits of bath taking and exercising; (3) incorporating the element of fun into working and studying and other practices; (4) and finally imbuing them with regular working habits. The program, in this sense, intermingled the moral and vocational components, both seen as essential to correct and make better the “completely irregular” (*tamamile gayri muntazam*) bodies and habits of these children.³⁵⁸ To this end, one of the objectives was to eradicate the habits of egotism, idleness, and lying, namely the “street habits” (*sokak itiyatları*), in these children by fostering the sense of sociality, responsibility, and habits of getting along with each other through activities involving socialization such as forming and working in clusters and doing daily physical exercises. Physical education constituted one of the main components of the curriculum to discipline the bodies of these children and to foster other social skills. For, these children, according to Zafir, lacked social education (*cemiyet terbiyesi*) and senses of sociality (*cemiyet duyguları*) and were indifferent to regular working conditions.³⁵⁹ Socialization exercises could help develop all these social skills.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., 13.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., 9.



Figure 5.4 Children assembled in military style alignment. It must be a morning assembly that was a common practice in public schools as well. Reprinted from Fındıkoğlu. "Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu," 210.



Figure 5.5 Physical education in a summer camp. Reprinted from Zafir. *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu*, 11.

The program aimed to achieve two ideals simultaneously through the moral and vocational components. First, the moral component helped to reproduce and maintain the normal social order by disciplining these “psychopaths” who were thought to have stepped outside or challenged social and moral boundaries of the society. It did so not through coercion or fear but through incorporating such modern educational practices as freedom, play, and fun into every activity. (Children’s life at the institution, although mildly regimented under the surveillance of pedagogues and mental health experts, was not firmly structured, which would be one of the reasons the government officials would capitalize on to takeover the administration of the institution in 1939.)

Second, it aimed to reproduce and maintain the economic order of the nascent Republic by imbuing these children with solidarist work ethics and teaching them functional skill and training them in small industries that were essential to the economic development of the Republic. The necessity of functional skills and training in small industries was clearly articulated in the initial report Zafir submitted to the Governorship. According to Zafir, Turkish society was not the type of society that required intensive division of labor and specialization that were characteristics of higher industrial societies, so it needed “a (polytechnic) vocational education to create small industrial centers with little capital.” The goal of the vocational education, then, was to equip the child with craftsmanship and artisan skills according to the existing production sources and market conditions in the society. The main small industries that were in need of labor and manpower were smithery, carpentry, mechanical work, stove making, farriery, plasterwork, transportation etc.³⁶⁰ One of the goals of the vocational training was to place these vagrant children in one of these small businesses, which was simultaneously

³⁶⁰ Cited in Fındıkoğlu. "Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu" 206-207.

viewed as a quintessential strategy of their socialization and disciplining.³⁶¹ Training methodology was quite progressive in the sense that it aimed to construct little workshops in the institution that would be led by craftsmen and artisans from the real market. Thus, the institution literally reproduced the existing economic condition through workshops and working units.

The primacy of teaching functional and artisanal skills through a labor-based curriculum was in line with the economic priorities of the Republican economy that was primarily rural and agricultural until after the World War II when the economy started to get relatively more urbanized and industrialized.³⁶² While agriculture continued to be the largest sector of the economy until quite recently, as Pamuk has demonstrated, in the urban areas it was the small-scale private enterprises that accounted for about 75 percent of employment in manufacturing.³⁶³ As such, educational priorities of the Republican regime mirrored the economic priorities as was evinced in the concentrated efforts to establish Village Institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri*) in 1940s to educate the rural population that still made up around two-third of the population and revive and to modernize agricultural production in the rural areas. The curricula of what was called “institutions for abnormal children,” on the other hand, reflected urban economic priorities that involved training a workforce for existing small industries and crafts cited above and emerging state-centered industries such as textiles, sugar, iron and steel, glass works, cement, and utilities and mining. A governmental decree issued in 1940 clearly expressed the urgency of “rescuing the children of the country who are destitute and live in misery from living

³⁶¹ Fındıkoğlu. "Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu," 207.

³⁶² Şevket Pamuk, "Economic Change in Twentieth-Century Turkey: Is the Glass More Than Half Full?," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, 278.

like a parasite on the social body and train them for industry and mining...’’³⁶⁴ Deeming vagrant children as a threat to the health and public order of big cities, the same decree cited the social and economic benefits of employing these children in industry and mining, and requested to increase the capacity of *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* to a 1000 children, thus create a “labor source” (*işçi menbaı*) for these industries.³⁶⁵ As such, the body of the psychopaths and vagrant children –or the abnormal body as it was marked – came to have a unique economic value for the State.

The labor-based curriculum was not unique to the *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu*. The programs of both the Institution for Deaf, Mute and Blind, and Juvenile Correction Institution were heavily labor-based. Juvenile Correction Institution held five main workshops for crafts and small industries: shoemaking, tailoring, carpentry, textile, and smithery. Children were placed in one of these workshops after the initial inspection of their health and social condition and examination of their literacy levels.³⁶⁶ The Institution for Deaf, Mute and Blind housed smithery, carpentry, shoemaking, embroidery, musicianship, and tailoring workshops among others. Out of the 73 graduates of the latter institution by 1937, 30 had specialized in carpentry, 13 in embroidery, 13 in shoe-making, 9 in musicianship, 5 in tailoring, and 3 in textile.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁴ Cumhuriyet Arsivi, 9/10/1940. Dosya 18754, yer numarası: 174.201.6.

³⁶⁵ Cumhuriyet Arsivi, 9/10/1940. Dosya 18754, yer numarası: 174.201.6.

³⁶⁶ Sapmazlı. *Çocuk Hakları Ve Himaye Müesseseleri*, 192.

³⁶⁷ Sıhhat ve İctimai Muavenet Vekaleti, *Sağır Dilsiz Ve Körler Müessesesi* (İzmir: İtimat Basımevi, 1938).




Figure 5.6 Shoemaking workshop in the Institution for Deaf, Mute and Blind.
Reprinted from *Sağır Dilsiz Ve Körler Müessesesi*, 31.

The curricula for abnormal children embodied a style of reasoning that aimed to produce better minds and better characters according to the moral and social norms of the society, and economically productive citizens as imagined by the Republican regime. This constituted the essence of the discourse of saving the child during the early Republican period. The abnormal body –whether it was embodied by a psychopath, vagrant, delinquent, or deaf –became an object of fear in this rhetoric insofar as it was viewed as economically unproductive and morally and socially disordered. Necati Kemal (Kip), the principal of the Institution for Deaf, Mute and Blind, worded the fear as follows:

The fact that abnormal children live an idle life is a heartbreaking thing in every respect. An abnormal vagabonding in the street is a threat to the order, safety and honor of a society while those children who are backward with respect to their will and morality are a catastrophe for the

normal social etiquette.³⁶⁸

He pointed to the differential effects of leaving various abnormal bodies unattended, distinguishing between the abnormality of the deaf, mute and blind and that of the psychopaths:

Negligence and disfunctioning of the former group of the abnormal is only harmful to these unfortunate individuals themselves and [it] reveals the poverty situation of a society. However, weeding out [*sic*] the second group will disturb the very essence of social fabric, [and] will produce a condition in which the degenerates are left stray in a normal life.³⁶⁹

He reiterated the psychological and medical language used by mental hygienists to characterize psychopaths in order to distinguish them from other abnormal bodies. Psychopaths were the true enemies of the society, as had been expressed earlier, for they threatened the moral, social, and economic fabric of the society more than any other class. In this sense, the abnormal bodies were differentiated based on their relative social, moral and economic effects for the society, which was evinced in the language of *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* that took diligent care to distinguish its target population from other institutions. And the fear of the psychopathic body explains the overwhelming fixation on supplementing the curricula for these abnormal bodies with strong moral education. The Regulation of Penal and Correction Houses for Juvenile Delinquents, for example, stipulated that basic literacy, and frequent mental and moral suggestions be provided to the delinquents in order to increase their cultural level and moral development.³⁷⁰

The fear, nevertheless, was almost always juxtaposed with the hope of correcting

³⁶⁸ Ibid., 14.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Çocuk Suçlulara Mahsus Ceza ve İslah Evleri Hakkında Umumi Talimatname, Yeni Cezaevi Matbaası, Ankara 1952.

and reforming these bodies through scientific education so that they are included in the normal social and economic life. Necati Kemal, as was Kazım Zafir, was convinced that these abnormal bodies could be reformed and integrated to the normal social and economic activity through a scientific and progressive education. He claimed:

The courage that I have gained through treatments I have carried out on hundreds of disabled, idiot, distorted, deaf, mute, unbalanced, vagrant, [and] psychopath children and individuals makes me say that: there is not a single skill and intelligence category that cannot be fixed through education and mental practice and the method of constant exercise. It is possible to treat and make better [even] the most incurable mental indications, [and] the most obtuse mental faculties.³⁷¹

A labor-based curriculum, as that of the *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu*, was thought to contain solutions that modern vocational education offered to reform the abnormal bodies. The institution caught the attention of national media and success stories of the psychopaths-turned good citizens circulated in the news. Speaking proudly of the institution's accomplishments, one article stated that almost all of the 79 children picked from the street were "today capable of earning an honorable living, being useful to the society."³⁷² Sociology professor Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu cited the stories of many ex-psychopaths that were rescued, reformed, and put into normal work and social life.³⁷³ The most dramatic characterization of the transformative power of the institution was expressed by Istanbul Deputy Alaettin Cemil Topçu. Topçu expressed his greatest admiration for the current conditions of the children in the Institution, and continued, these children, who were "little beasts" before, would have otherwise been potential gangsters of their respective cities.³⁷⁴

³⁷¹ *Sağır Dilsiz Ve Körler Müessesesi*, 31.

³⁷² "Kimsesiz Çocuklar," *Cumhuriyet*, 08/17/1935: 1.

³⁷³ Fındıkoğlu. "Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu," 208-209.

³⁷⁴ Topçu, "Sokak Çocukları," *Cumhuriyet*, 7/29/1934: 3.

Nevertheless, the control of the institution was taken over from Kazım Zafir and his team, who had enjoyed relative freedom so far in administrative and academic affairs of the institution despite being financially depended on the local Municipality, and handed over to the Ministry of National Education in 1939. The rationale of the change of power first indicates that Zafir's progressive vision of the institution's purpose and function competed with that of the State's and secondly it points to the statization efforts of the Kemalist regime particularly in 1940s to be the sole source of public assistance. For despite the pervasive political rhetoric in the early decades of the Republic, as I have pointed out before, majority of the institutions for orphans, vagrants, and homeless children established during the first two decades of the Republic were by private foundations or private initiatives.³⁷⁵ In this sense, the rhetoric did not match the almost invisible state presence in public assistance particularly with regard to "abnormal children" until after World War II.

The decree issued regarding the abolishing of the current administration of the institution and its transfer to the Ministry of National education clearly expresses both of these points. Based on the inspectors' report, it is said that the institution had not been able to develop a methodical and well-regulated (*programlı ve disiplinli*) working system suitable for its purpose and that the important task of educating the destitute children that relates to the whole country cannot be left to a one or few institutions with limited staff and local municipal budgets. It continued:

In order to ensure the education of the destitute children, who pose a threat to our social fabric, and to ensure that they're trained so that they can be benefitted from in industrial and mining jobs,

³⁷⁵ See also, Karatay, "The Formation of Policies for Children in Need of Protection in the Republican Era."

there is a need for numerous such institutions with a large number of personnel in various parts of the country.³⁷⁶

The matter of educating the destitute children, it elaborated further, had not been achieved with private administrations and local municipalities and could only be accomplished through radical measures taken by the government. To this end, first comprehensive and state-sponsored systematic analyses regarding condition of destitute and vagrant children in big urban cities were done in 1940s. A decree issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1943 stipulated establishment of a child bureau in Istanbul and Izmir comprised of municipal police force and officers to “detect the number and the condition of these [destitute and vagrant children] and to control them so that they are not free of supervision...”³⁷⁷

In response to the decree, Istanbul Governorship submitted a report summarizing their findings, according to which there were about 2516 male and 332 female destitute and vagrant children in Istanbul, majority of whom originated in the working class families of the far regions of Anatolia who have migrated to Istanbul for work.³⁷⁸ Two major measures recommended by the report were to take prophylactic measures to prevent the burgeoning of these children and to remove current children from streets through such measures as exclusion (*tecrid*), education, and correction. The latter measure required the establishment of a disciplinary institution of a larger capacity based on the principles of social psychology that would eradicate completely from the social and national body the “spirit of vagrancy that originated from inferior and miserable inheritance...” What the report proposed was a colony for destitute children (*metruk*

³⁷⁶ Cumhuriyet Arsivi, 9/10/1940. Dosya 18754, yer numarası: 174.201.6.

³⁷⁷ *Kimsemez ve serseri çocukların terbiye ve ıslahı için alınması gereken tedbirler*. Cumhuriyet Arşivi, 2/7/1943. Dosya 203114. Yer numarası. 179.236.5.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

çocuklar kolonisi) in a remote and rural region so as to exclude these children from the “normal” social milieu; according to the report, a detailed plan and regulation for its implementation were being prepared. The overwhelmingly labor-based curriculum proposed for the institution was similar to other institutions for “abnormal children” with a focus on training children in agriculture, small industries and crafts, and livestock breeding.

The proposed institution, in this sense, did not go beyond the existing discursive and non-discursive practices regarding vagrant and destitute children; on the contrary, the proposal to remove these children from streets and place them in a remote institution, thus physically excluding them so that their “inferior and miserable vagrant spirit” does not disturb the social and national body, was far from the more progressive vision of Kazım Zafir and *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu*. The discourse produced regarding the vagrant children in the 1940s reinserted the traditional insofar as it viewed social assistance or public assistance not from the perspective of rights of the individuals but from the perspective of the State as the ultimate keeper and giver. In this sense, the State became the source of charity and mercy that had once been the task of multiple private networks and foundations.

To sum up, *Çocukları Kurtarma Yurdu* amalgamated numerous –at times competing- discourses that fixated on the bodies of vagrant children, with the goal of fabricating mentally and physically sound and economically productive Republican citizens out of these “abnormal bodies.” The mental hygiene discourse, blending the principles of modern psychology, progressive vocational education, and humanitarianism, underpinned one component of the pedagogy of the institution. The

mental hygiene discourse provided a scientific language and models to correct and govern the behaviors and conducts of what was called “abnormal” children. Republican notions of morality and sociality and economic priorities, which were not quite antithetical to the mental hygiene discourse, constituted another component of its pedagogy.

Chapter VI

Anthropometrics, Biometrics, Psychometrics and Fabrication of the “Normal” Turkish Type

This chapter attempts to render visible the nodal point where modern technologies of measurement and testing such as anthropometric and psychometric tests implemented by Republican scientists intersected with the Republican political rationality. I analyze the cultural politics embedded in certain anthropometric and psychometric tests carried out in Turkey from 1930s to late 1940s on the body and the mind of “normal” school children and the population at large. I hope to trace the contours of the “normal Turkish identity” as it was *assembled*³⁷⁹ in a network of various human and non-human actors including modern techno-epistemic arrangements, scientific theories, mobilization of state apparatuses and sponsorship, and scientists’ biographies.

6.1 Body and mind at the intersection of education, science and Republican national body politics

In his *School Hygiene*, hygienist Server Kamil Tokgöz viewed the goal of education as “to cultivate people, i.e. to create a perfect personality whose physical, intellectual and moral qualities have developed equally.”³⁸⁰ He was of the opinion that it was impossible to separate these three qualities and that it was important that all these three qualities develop in equilibrium for the vitality of the nation and the society, for

if [the school and the society] are content with developing only the mental faculties [of the child] [and] do not concern themselves with [their] physical growth, the school, thus the society are not fulfilling their duty against the child ... if physical activities are not sufficiently included in

³⁷⁹ Using Rose’s characterization, Nikolas Rose, “Assembling the Modern Self,” in *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present*, ed. Roy Porter (New York: Routledge, 1997), 238.

³⁸⁰ Server Kamil Tokgöz, *Okul Sağlık Bilgisi* (Ankara: Hapishane Matbaası, 1938), 82.

schools, the equilibrium between the child's physical movement and intellectual movement is disrupted. Eventually, with his/her nervous system being fatigued, the child becomes neurasthenic. Such personalities become incapable of demonstrating effort towards work and turn into useless characters both for themselves and for the society.³⁸¹

School age (7-16) was particularly important in the developmental history of the child, for it was in this period that children underwent exponential physical, intellectual, and moral development. For that matter, in order to manage this development in favor of the students and the society at large, Tokgöz thought, teachers and physicians were obliged to examine each child's physical, mental, and moral hygiene and monitor their normal development throughout this age.³⁸² The initial examination was to be carried out by the school doctor upon the student's entering school, was to be recorded in each student's health report card, and would involve: (1) an anthropometric examination that involved the measurement of the general physical development of the student (i.e. his/her height and weight), measurement of the child's vital capacity and muscular development; (2) a pathological and physiological examination of the child's organs; and (3) a medico-psychical examination that involved measuring each student's intellectual level, morality and character, bio-pathological condition, and finally social condition.

The measurement tools of each examination were detailed, some with visual representations. The anatomic-physiological examinations were to be carried out with anthropometric apparatuses and tests such as the Dufastel's Thoracograph (Figure 6.1), an apparatus designed to obtain diagrams showing the movement of the chest during inspiration and expiration and the Burcq's dynamometer, which was devised to measure the muscular strength of the body through measuring the strength of contraction of the

³⁸¹ Ibid., 65.

³⁸² Ibid., 51.

flexor muscles in the fingers. The medico-psychical examination, on the other hand, was to be carried out with psychometric tests, the most practical of which, according to Tokgöz, were Binet-Simon intelligence tests.³⁸³ In this sense, what Tokgöz recommended was a comprehensive and detailed study of the body and the mind of school children through observing, weighing, and measuring them, documenting their physical, psychological, social and moral condition.




Figure 6.1 The Dufastel's Thoracograph. An instrument that was used for plotting and recording the horizontal contour of the chest and its change during inspiration and expiration. Reprinted from Tokgöz. *Okul Sağlık Bilgisi*, 88.

³⁸³ Ibid p. 84-101.

On the one hand, “knowing the child” had major implications for numerous school-related activities ranging from hygienic organization of learning spaces and time schedules to restructuring of the program. It also would help teachers classify children based on their aptitudes thus guiding them to professions fitting their skills. Medico-psychical examination, for example, would help teachers identify those “retarded” school children with certain mental deficiencies and those asthenic and unstable children with moral and character disorders, so that the children could be sent to special institutions, or special programs could be designed for them.³⁸⁴ In the words of Wilhelm Peters, the head of the Institute of Pedagogy of Istanbul University, all of these conditions were contingent upon “knowing thoroughly the singularity of the Turkish child in different social classes and the course of his/her mental development.”³⁸⁵

Furthermore, Tokgöz and others viewed scientifically informed education, i.e. education informed by modern knowledge of the child’s body and mind, as one of the essential positive eugenics measures to be taken.³⁸⁶ They believed schools organized based on this knowledge would not only increase the productivity of school children, as they would be engaged in activities and work fitting their mental and physical aptitudes, but also would ensure their normal mental and moral development for the vitality of the Turkish nation.³⁸⁷ Physiologist Sadi Irmak listed the perceived eugenical benefits of education informed by modern psychology and biology. According to Irmak, equipped with modern knowledge of biology and psychology, a teacher would be able to identify early the psychological and biological traits a child inherited, ensure the optimal

³⁸⁴ Ibid., 94-100.

³⁸⁵ Wilhelm Peters, "İstanbul Üniversitesi Pedagoji Enstitüsü," in *Studies in Psychology and Pedagogy from the Institute of Pedagogy University of Istanbul*, ed. Wilhelm Peters (Istanbul: Türkiye Basımevi, 1940), 6.

³⁸⁶ See, Tokgöz, "Öjenizm: Irk Islahı."

³⁸⁷ "Mektep Çocuklarında Akıl Hıfzıssıhhası," (Ankara Sümer Basımevi, 1937), 24.

development of those inherited traits that were beneficial to society, detect those negative traits and take necessary precautions so that these negative traits would have minimal effects on society, and channel each individual's skills and aptitudes so that they were suited for particular tasks.³⁸⁸ The teacher, thusly informed, would know about the workings of the body and brain development and of the laws (of inheritance) that regulate that development, and would be able to detect and prevent the evils that harm the quality of the body and mind and the good hereditary traits of the Turkish race. It was important to detect and prevent as early as possible the preludes of bodily and mental abnormality, which necessarily brought to the forefront the welfare and importance of the child in national hygiene policies and body politics.

This discursive configuration held the child as a key figure in (rationally) planning the future of Turkish society through education informed by biological and psychological laws, so one aspect of knowing the biological and psychological characteristics of the Turkish child was necessarily about the future. However, there was another important point in Irmak's text that tied the child to the past of the Turkish race. Irmak favored hereditarianism (over milieu) probably more fervently than the majority of the other Republican scientists of his day in explaining psychological and biological phenomena. And he sought the "superior" hereditary traits of the Turkish race in the rural parts of Turkey, in the villages, with the country folk, who, according to Irmak (and other Republican anthropologists), were less tainted by racial blending and other vice than those living in larger urban areas.³⁸⁹ However, Irmak complained, "we have ignored the

³⁸⁸ Sadi Irmak, *Veraset Ve İctima Ve Terbiyevi Neticeleri* (Istanbul: Kader Matbaası, 1934), 78.

³⁸⁹ We will see in the next section that Republican scientists fabricated a mythical representation of the rural, particularly of the Central Anatolia where majority of relatively "pure" Turkish nomadic tribes (*yörük*) were thought to be living.

folklore [of our nation]” and “thus, each of us has disparate ideas about our nation,” while “in other countries research has been done not only on the common national type but on the type of each class and [social] stratum constituting [that] nation.” The knowledge of the folklore was essential, for the social order and organization could only be built on such knowledge.³⁹⁰ Thus, he advocated comprehensive folkloric studies to investigate the “genetic load” (*irsi hamule*) and cultural origins of the Turkish nation among the common folk.

From the second half of the 1920s through the 1940s, numerous anthropometric, biometric, and psychometric tests and surveys were implemented in Turkish schools and on the population at large to *scientifically* delineate the contours of Turkish national identity. This was a period in Turkey that historian Zafer Toprak identified as the “cultural revolution” when there was a turn to identifying the cultural and historical essences/origins of the identity of the Turkish race *vis-à-vis* modern Western races, in order to both locate it among these races, thus to confirm its modernity, commonality and parity (if not superiority), and –paradoxically – to trace its singularity to position it against these races, thus to come up with what Murat Ergin calls an “authentic modernity,” when Western modernity itself had been shedding its universalistic claims.³⁹¹ It would not be an overstatement to characterize this period as when the “archeology of Turkish nationalism” crystallized.³⁹²

³⁹⁰ İrmak. *Veraset Ve İctima Ve Terbiyevi Neticeleri*, 79.

³⁹¹ Zafer Toprak, *Darwin'den Dersim'e: Cumhuriyet Ve Antropoloji* (Istanbul: Doğan kitap, 2012), 13-14; Ergin, "Biometrics and Anthropometrics: The Twins of Turkish Modernity," 281-82.

³⁹² This is borrowed from the historian François Georgeon, who used the phrase to characterize the emergence of nationalism among Turks during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. See, François Georgeon, *Osmanlı-Türk Modernleşmesi 1900-1930: Seçilmiş Makaleler* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2000), 24.

To trace the nature of Turkish identity, Republican scientists and intellectuals ardently appealed to modern sciences such as anthropology, archeology, history, and linguistics. It was during this period that major national scientific institutions were founded and put to the service of the State and its cultural and political needs, most under the very directives of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself, the first leader of the Republic of Turkey, who was commonly referred to as “*Ebedi Şef*” (Eternal Chief) of Turkish nation.³⁹³ These institutions and the scientists affiliated with them were to work passionately to fabricate a modern national-ethnic identity grounded on (mostly mythical) linguistic and historical roots and anthropological traits.³⁹⁴ While historical and archeological studies aimed to trace the identity of the Turk in paleontological and archeological excavations—for example through studying the skulls of cadavers from ancient Turks and well-known Turkish persons – anthropological and psychological studies traced the history of that identity on the body and the mind of the Turkish child.³⁹⁵ In this sense, the body and the mind of the child became the archeological archives from

³⁹³ Turkish Language Institution was founded in 1932 under the name of Society for Research on the Turkish Language (*Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti*); Turkish Historical Society was founded in 1931 under the name of *Society for the Study of Turkish History (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti)*; the Turkish Institute of Anthropology was founded as Center for the Study of Turkish Anthropology (*Türkiye Antropoloji Tetkikat Merkezi*) in 1925. The institution that would bring together all these studies on Turkish culture, history, and language was the Faculty of Language, History and Geography, founded in 1935 in Ankara.

³⁹⁴ One of the major historical theses fabricated by historical and paleontological studies was “Turkish Historical Thesis.” For a comprehensive discussion of this thesis, see Büşra Ersanlı, *İktida Ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2003). Historian Bernard Lewis summed up the main assumptions of the theory quite succinctly: “The theory propounded by Kemal and his disciples was, briefly, that the Turks were a white, Aryan people, originating in Central Asia, the cradle of all human civilization. Owing to the progressive desiccation of this area, the Turks had migrated in waves to various parts of Asia and Africa, carrying the arts of civilization with them. Chinese, Indian, and Middle Eastern civilizations had all been founded in this way, the pioneers in the last named being the Sumerians and Hittites, who were both Turkic peoples. Anatolia had thus been a Turkish land since antiquity. This mixture of truth, half-truth, and error was proclaimed as official doctrine, and teams of researchers set to work to “prove” its various propositions.” Lewis (1961) cited in Paul J. Magnarella and Orhan Türkdoğan, “The Development of Turkish Social Anthropology,” *Current Anthropology* 17, no. 2 (1976): 265.

³⁹⁵ For a list of studies carried out by the Turkish Institute of Anthropology, see Şevket Aziz Kansu, *Türk Antropoloji Enstitüsü Tarihçesi* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940).

which to trace the anthropological and psychological traits of the Turkish race. The Turkish child was not just an embodiment of the future but also carried the ancestral traits of the Turk on his/her body, thus represented and presented the nation.

(Con/sub-text) There were a few conditions of possibility for the Republican scientists' concentrated efforts this "turn to culture," that is tracing the cultural essences and origins of the nation on the body and mind of the Turkish child. First was the very availability of modern apparatuses and technologies of measurement including anthropometric, biometric and psychometric apparatuses briefly mentioned above, hundreds of which were implemented from 1920s to 1940s that recorded the physiological, morphological and mental characteristics of the Turkish child and population in fine details. These new visual apparatuses and technologies of measurement mediated the psycho-biological gaze that objectified the child's body and mind and provided the gaze with new forms of representation (in the form of numbers, tables, graphics, maps and so forth) that translated the body and the mind to numbers, expressed through statistical averages of, say, cephalic index through anthropometric scales, blood types and finger prints through biometric tests, and Intelligent Quotient through psychometric tests.

Predominantly visual, these techno-epistemic arrangements were essential for the theorization and fabrication of the normal type. The normal type was an effect, "an abstraction, fantasy, a fiction, a production of" such techno-epistemic arrangements.³⁹⁶ In these arrangements, norms and scales were not just discovered, but "they were forced into existence by the apparatus themselves."³⁹⁷ In this sense, these were necessarily technologies of normation and normalization and were critical in formulation of the normalcy of the child and the nation as much as the theoretical formulations themselves.

What made the implementation of these techno-epistemic apparatuses on mass student populations was availability of schools as modern laboratories where researchers had an unprecedented opportunity to observe and study a large number of children. Like other institutions such as army and factory, modern schools functioned as "huge laboratories for the assessment, calibration and quantification of human

³⁹⁶ Burman, *Deconstructing Developmental Psychology*, 16-17.

³⁹⁷ Thinking along with Rose. "Assembling the Modern Self."

capacities.”³⁹⁸ These two conditions emerged alongside each other in an age where social sciences embraced numbers, measurement and quantification in their methodology to know the individual and social capacity of the national body.

More importantly, both of these conditions corresponded well with the political rationality of the Republican regime that had embraced positive sciences to “discover” the “true” nature of the Turkish national identity and modernize and thus increase its capacity vis-à-vis industrialized nations. In this sense, the ideals of nationalization (the cultural) and modernization toward advanced (Western) civilizations (technical and scientific) were aligned with the methods and theories of positive sciences. Sadrettin Celal Antel pointed out the harmony between the Republican national and cultural ideals and positive sciences, contrasting with Ziya Gökalp’s earlier epistemological distinction between the cultural and the civilizational.

Gökalp had epistemologically distinguished between the cultural, which he understood as that which embodied a nation’s historical essence and individual ingenuity, and the civilizational that which embodied a nation’s material progress and technical and economic development.³⁹⁹ While the cultural was *sui generis*, embodying moral, religious, aesthetic, and judicial value judgments of a nation, the civilizational was universal and “represented the shared creativity of many different peoples.”⁴⁰⁰ Although Gökalp did not put forth the latter as the antithesis of the former (different from German romantics, for example), according to Antel, Gökalp did not appreciate enough the value of positive sciences (the civilizational) quoting the following excerpt from Gökalp:

Young minds that are nurtured with positive sciences will necessarily harbor deep suspicion towards value judgments, which essentially belong to the social conscience, for they will evaluate these value judgments through the logic of positive sciences. Youth crises are agonies brought about by these suspicions.⁴⁰¹

With a parochial reading of Gökalp, Antel put forth the Republican harmony between the cultural ideals and positive sciences as follows:

Our national leaders and our party [Republican People’s Party] that have accomplished the revolution understood that there

³⁹⁸ As Rose has pointed out. *Ibid.*

³⁹⁹ Enes Kabakci, "Durkheim Ve Ziya Gokalp: Tarih, Ideoloji Ve Sosyolojinin Ozerkligi," in *Ziya Gokalp* ed. Korkut Tuna and Ismail Coskun (Ankara: T.C. Kultur ve Turizm Bakanligi, 2011), 210; Magnarella and Türkdoğan, "The Development of Turkish Social Anthropology," 264.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰¹ Quoted in Sadrettin Celal Antel, *Maarifimiz Ve Meseleleri* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1939), 143.

is no disagreement whatsoever between national culture that acquainted the individuals with their national identity and make them embrace the national ideal, and the positive sciences..., and that on the contrary, these two complement each other[; they have thusly] designed their programs and methods to cultivate youth who are fervent in longing for bringing the power acquired through positive knowledge and scientific analysis and thinking into the service of the national ideals.⁴⁰²

Antel epitomized quite succinctly the Republican political discourse mobilizing positive sciences in service of the national culture. Two fundamental goals characterize this discourse; the first was nationalization, i.e., delineating and establishing the national identity of the Turkish nation vis-à-vis other advanced nations and the second was modernization-civilization paragoning these nations, both of which now were fundamentally contingent on positive sciences.⁴⁰³

It was not just positive sciences put in service of the State to achieve these national ideas, but the very scientific community itself, whose academic and political career was tied to the career of the Republic (and vice versa). The line between science and politics was and indeed has always been quite fuzzy in Turkish context, more often than not the former being made the handmaiden of the latter. In fact, this fuzziness was nowhere as evident as in the career of Republican scientists (briefly explained in Chapter III, in the main text and footnotes), who never shied away from coalescing their scientific authority with moral, cultural and political authority *granted* to them during the single party period.⁴⁰⁴ Psychiatrist Mazhar Osman manifested this murky line between the scientific, moral and political (authority) when he professed his allegiance to the Republic in his call for action to the medical community: “We [the republicans intellectuals] will enlighten every conscience. We will inculcate faith into every heart; we will make everyone believe that Republic is the only remedy for saving the country and the nation.” He urged the

⁴⁰² Ibid., 144.

⁴⁰³ Murat Ergin and others have pointed out a paradoxical doubleness embedded in the political mobilization of the eugenics discourse in Turkish politics, i.e., first to nationalize and modernize the body politic after the Western-style modernity by establishing the “innate capacity” of the Turkish race, and second –paradoxically –to “fight against equally racialized perceptions in the West of their [Turks’] barbarity, vulgarity, and incivility.” Ergin’s work particularly demonstrates well how Republican scientists mobilized biometrics and anthropometrics in service of these two paradoxical functions. Ergin. “Biometrics and Anthropometrics: The Twins of Turkish Modernity”: 282. See also, Alemdaroğlu. “Eugenics, Modernity and Nationalism,” 143.

⁴⁰⁴ For the link between science and politics as they manifested in the academic and political careers of the Republican scientists, see Nazan Maksudyay, “The Turkish Review of Anthropology and the Racist Face of Turkish Nationalism,” *Cultural Dynamics* 17, no. 3 (2005). Salgirli. “Eugenics for the Doctors: Medicine and Social Control in 1930s Turkey”; Ergin. “Biometrics and Anthropometrics: The Twins of Turkish Modernity.”

medical community to imbue other citizens with their national and political faith. Only thus could they show their love for the Republic. This was a public duty.⁴⁰⁵

The university “reforms” in 1933 was one of the events that helped to consolidate the power of this class of academic bourgeoisie in the nationalist cause and granted them unprecedented access to the public space.⁴⁰⁶ By purging majority of the faculty representing the “old system” and “old habits” and appointing a new and young generation of Republican scientists, the reformers consolidated the alliance between *men* of science and the State. The professoriate, viewing themselves as dutiful servants of the nation state, would serve the ideological needs of Republic and perform their functions under the auspices of the state, for they were essentially *hired* civil servants. End of con/sub-text

Against the background of such a complex network (of science, culture and politics), the rest of this narrative aims to explore this network in the micropolitics of anthropometric and psychometric tests, tracing the surface linkages between power, knowledge, institutions, scientific discourses, intellectuals, and the modern State as they all intersected in the making of what anthropologists called the “normal Turkish type.”⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁵ Mazhar Osman Uzman, ed. *Sihhat Almanakı* (Istanbul: Kader Matbaası, 1933), 36.

⁴⁰⁶ The reform process was set in motion in the late 1920s when new republican reformers believed that a reformed university could perform valuable political and ideological service. During the early few years after the Republic was founded, reformers steered their focus toward reforming the primary and secondary education, introducing the Law of Unification of Education in 1924 and terminating the dual system that hitherto allowed the Islamic schools (*Medreses* and Islamic primary schools) and modern secular schools to coexist. With the law, the institutions providing religious education were abolished and all educational activities were centralized under the Ministry of National Education. In fact, the social and educational reforms resulted in unprecedented state centralization in every realm.

The ideological standpoint of the new Republican cadres held that *Medreses* belonged to the old system and represented old habits and were incapable of adapting to the needs of the modern Republic. It was not long after that they would launch a campaign of vilification towards *Darulfünun*, the only modern-style university in Turkey by then; they repeatedly attacked *Darulfünun*, which they thought embodied scholasticism and obscurantism of old system, and was indifferent to developing positive sciences essential for the moral consolidation the Republic, therefore, retarding the progress and development of the nation. More importantly, according to Republican reformers, the university and the faculty were not sympathetic to the causes and achievements of Republican revolution (*devrim*). Masquerading their political intentions as objective and scientific evaluations of the programs, curricula, and faculty efficacy, the reformers seized the reform opportunity to restructure the university in 1933, purging their political opponents, particularly the Islamists and sympathizers of the Empire.

⁴⁰⁷ The tests implemented in Turkish could be broadly divided into two major types. First were anthropometric and biometric tests carried out primarily by anthropologists and medical doctors that

6.2 Anthropometrics and biometrics and the making of the normal Turkish type: Body as national archive

While hundreds of anthropometric and biometric tests were implemented from late the 1920s to the late 1940s, I will selectively focus on analyzing a few major ones that “represent” the style of thinking embedded in the micro-politics of their implementation. Part of the reason for selecting only a representative few is that in most cases the studies were literally replications of each other both methodologically and analytically and with regard to their assumptions, conclusions, and implications. For example, Sadi Irmak’s biometric studies on the dominant blood types and fingerprints of the Turkish race had almost the same conclusions as Nureddin Onur’s biometric studies on blood types and Seniha Tunakan’s studies on fingerprints and handprints.⁴⁰⁸ In most cases, there was only a change in the number of subjects included in the sampling in order to increase the reliability of assumptions and conclusions about the Turkish race that were already commonly accepted among the Republican scientific community. Afet İnan’s gigantic anthropometric survey of 64,000 people was primarily conducted to substantiate historical theses, claims, and assumptions about the Turkish race concluded from similar studies carried out by Şevket Aziz Kansu and his students on 2,597 Turkish children from 1930 to 1937.⁴⁰⁹ For this study, I particularly focus on Afet İnan’s study on

measured the physical, behavioral and morphological domains of Turkish children and population at large such as their height, weight, head length, head breadth, bust, arm span, and blood types, finger types and so forth. The second were psychometric tests –primarily Stanford-Binet IQ tests and Army Alpha and Beta tests implemented by (educational) psychologists and pedagogues that measured students’ mental processes and other psychological phenomena such as their intellectual and emotional functioning.

⁴⁰⁸ Sadi Irmak. "Türk Irkının Biyolojisine Dair Araştırmalar." İstanbul Devlet Basımevi, 1937. Onur, Nureddin. "Kan Grupları Bakımından Türk Irkının Menşei Hakkında Bir Etüd." İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937; Seniha Tunakan. Türklerde parmak ve el izlerinin antropoloji bakımından incelenmesi / Ankara : Ankara Üniversitesi, 1948, (Güney Matbaacılık ve Gazetecilik T.A.O.)

⁴⁰⁹ Kansu like majority of other anthropologists had a medical training from Darülfunun and was sent to France to specialize in anthropology where he worked in the Broca Laboratory of Anthropology of the

the anthropological characteristics of Turkish people, a study that demonstrates the surface linkages between various heterogeneous (human and non-human) actors constituting the network mentioned above. While the study discussed in this chapter did not necessarily focus on children (although children were included in the sample), it embodied the reasoning of the hundreds of other similar studies done on children during the designated time.

Afet İnan, one of the first female anthropologists and historians of the young Republic and a founding member of the Turkish Historical Society, in an interview conducted in 1976 recalled an anecdote from the days when she was a student at the Lycée Notre Dame de Sion in Istanbul (1928-1929), then an all-girls French high school founded in 1856 by French missionaries. When she reminisced about her experience at the Lycée, one thing that struck her was that the French history books taught there left out almost completely the history of Turkish civilization, and geography books held Turks as a barbaric and secondary race. When she first encountered this information, which she thought was meant to degrade Turkish people, she immediately protested to the teacher expressing her disapproval of the characterization of Turks as such and arguing that Turks had a civilization and were not a secondary race. She would, later, bring the book with her to Ankara to show to Atatürk.⁴¹⁰

Paris Anthropology Institute in the École des Hautes Études under the supervision of Georges Papillault. Upon his return to Turkey, he was first appointed as an associate professor in the Faculty of Medicine and after the university reforms, he joined the faculty of Istanbul University. In 1935, upon Atatürk's request he was appointed a full professor at the Faculty of Language, History and Geography in Ankara. His work was instrumental in importing into Turkey the racial theories and ideas of European physical anthropologists.

See, Nazan Maksudyan, *Türklüğü Ölçmek: Bilimkurgusal Antropoloji Ve Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Irkçı Çehresi 1925-1939* (Istanbul: Metis, 2005), 193-94; Zafer Toprak, "Dolikosefalden Brakisefale Türk Irkı: Şevket Aziz Kansu Ve Antropolojinin Evrimi," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 207 (2011): 19.

⁴¹⁰ Kocatürk, Utkan. "An Interview with Prof. Dr. Afet İnan." Published on <http://www.atam.gov.tr/dergi/sayi-03/prof-dr-afet-inanla-bir-konusma>.

The experience left a long-lasting and agonizing mark on her memory and had a tremendous effect on her academic career as she stated in the interview, a career that was burdened with the tremendous pressure of locating Turks among civilized races. Hers was an epitome of the agony marked in the very memory of Republican nationalism, which was partly constructed on this reactionary spirit fueled by classifications by the West of Turks as a secondary race.⁴¹¹ As we will see, İnan and others on the one hand challenged the exclusionary classifications of the West to expand it so that more races were included, yet by doing so they paradoxically perpetuated that very classificatory reasoning, often perpetuating the racist vocabulary of the West.

There was another earlier event that had had a momentous effect on İnan's career and would pretty much open the career doors for her for the rest of her life. She met Atatürk in 1925 during one of his visits to İzmir, where she had just started her teaching career. She was among the crowd who went to greet him and later would find herself sitting next to him at a tea party, where a more intimate conversation took place between İnan and Atatürk. The fact that her family was among the émigrés from Macedonia, a Western province of the Ottoman Empire, drew Atatürk's attention. His family had emigrated from Salonika, another Western province. After this first acquaintance, Atatürk was able to persuade İnan's parents that he wanted to have her continue her education. He would be personally involved in her academic career from then on.⁴¹² She was, in a

⁴¹¹ Toprak. *Darwin'den Dersim'e: Cumhuriyet Ve Antropoloji*.

⁴¹² She was first sent to Switzerland to learn French and upon her return to Turkey was sent to Notre Dame de Sion. After her graduation, she started teaching history and civics at a high school in Ankara. Even though she did not have a graduate degree yet, she joined the Committee of History of Turks –that would later form the Turkish Historical Society –along with leading Turcology experts, anthropologists, and historians of the time such as Yusuf Akçura, Sadri Maksudi Arsal, and Zakir Kadiri Ugan. In 1936, she went to study at the University of Geneva in Switzerland, where she worked with Eugène Pittard. She received her doctoral degree in Sociology in 1939. The biographical narrative is based on, İnan, Arı, ed. *Prof. Dr. Afet İnan*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2005.

sense, the chosen one. Her close ties with Atatürk paid off during the implementation of her doctoral research she conducted under the supervision of Eugène Pittard on investigating the anthropological characteristics of Turkish people.⁴¹³ This was the largest anthropological survey in Turkey and one of the largest in the world with 39,465 male and 20,263 female subjects included. In his preface to the publication of the study, Pittard himself extolled the study for the massive data collected -38 registries for each subject totaling 2,432,000 registries for the total sample. It was particularly unprecedented in the world, according to Pittard, in terms of the number of female subjects included, for it allowed for the first time the comparing of anthropological characteristics of genders on such a massive scale.⁴¹⁴

The process of the implementation of the survey makes visible the process of fabricating the *normal Turkish type* through intertwined linkages between the various sources of power in play. In fact, what went into the making of the survey was as important as the survey itself. The survey was not just any doctoral research. The researcher was a young Republican scientist who was a close acquaintance of the leader of the Republic; she was indeed his “spiritual daughter.” In fact, the very directive of carrying out such a huge anthropological study was apparently from the “*Ebedi Şef*”

⁴¹³ Pittard was a prominent Swiss anthropologist and prehistorian known for his *Races and History: An Ethnological Introduction to History* –translated into English in 1926 –that classified races based on their somatic characteristics such as build and height, color of hair and eyes, craniological and facial forms. Pittard was well known by Turkish anthropologists particularly for his classification of Turks among white brachycephalic European races based on the research he carried out in Turkey and on Balkan Turks; therefore, a few of his articles and excerpts from his work were translated and published in the Turkish Review of Anthropology and other journals. See, for example, Pittard, Eugène. "Türk Irkı Hakkında." *Ülkü* 8, no. 45 (1937): 196-202.

⁴¹⁴ See Pittard's preface in Afet İnan, *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri Ve Türkiye Tarihi: Türk Irkının Vatanı Anadolu* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1947).

Atatürk himself.⁴¹⁵ İnan corroborated this point when she expressed her gratitude to Atatürk, stating “had it not been for him, had it not been for his interest in these studies, had it not been the authority of his directives to conduct these studies, the science of anthropology would most likely have been deprived of such a survey.”⁴¹⁶

İnan had expressed her desire to Atatürk to conduct a massive scale survey in 1936, and with his approval and encouragement she contacted İsmet İnönü, then the Prime Minister. He, in turn, gave directives to the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to help with the implementation.⁴¹⁷ The Ministry of Health took over the task of conducting the survey from start to finish, which involved assembling a measuring team, organizing the implementation of the survey and collection and analysis of the data, and providing reimbursement for the travel expenses of the measuring team.

The successful implementation of the anthropometric survey was contingent upon massive mobilization of state resources and central and local government agencies.⁴¹⁸ The three ministries were collectively involved in the selection of the measuring team, which consisted of twenty-three state officers. The Ministry of Defense commissioned five army doctors at the rank of lieutenant and other military health staff; the Ministry of Health assigned five civilian doctors and health personnel; the Ministry of Culture

⁴¹⁵ Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü. *1937 Türkiye Antropometri Anketi* İstanbul: Hüsnütabiât Basımevi, 1940. P.iii. Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü, *1937 Türkiye Antropometri Anketi* (İstanbul: Hüsnütabiât Basımevi, 1940), iii.

⁴¹⁶ İnan. *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri Ve Türkiye Tarihi*: 9. Particularly in 1930s, Atatürk showed a great interest in studying the history and language of Turks scientifically and would dedicate most of his time to this cause. See Toprak. "Dolikosefalden Brakisefale Türk Irkı: Şevket Aziz Kansu Ve Antropolojinin Evrimi": 25.

⁴¹⁷ İnan, Afet. *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri Ve Türkiye Tarihi*.

⁴¹⁸ For a detailed analysis of such mobilization see, Toprak. *Darwin'den Dersim'e: Cumhuriyet Ve Antropoloji*, articularly pp. 90-146.

assigned four physical education teachers.⁴¹⁹ To train the measuring team in procedures of taking anthropometric measurements of the subjects, a nine-day training program was developed by the supervisors of the project at the Institute of Anthropology of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography in Ankara. The training program included both theoretical and practical information and was directed by Şevket Aziz Kansu, the professor of Anthropology at the Faculty and the head of the Institute of Anthropology. Kansu additionally prepared a handbook for taking anthropometric measurements to serve as the primary instructional guide for the measuring team; the manual contained detailed information about measurement apparatuses that were ordered from Switzerland, and written and illustrated instructions on how to use these apparatuses for marking and measuring the subjects.⁴²⁰ Organization of the data and data analysis was done by the Public Directorate of Statistics under the supervision of Celal Aybar, the director of the office, and more than 250 officials were assigned to these tasks in the Directorate over the course of ten months.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁹ Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü. *1937 Türkiye Antropometri Anketi*.

⁴²⁰ Şevket Aziz Kansu, *Antropometri Tetkikleri İçin Rehber* (Ankara: Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekaleti, 1937).

⁴²¹ İnan. *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri Ve Türkiye Tarihi*.



Figure 6.2 Visual instructions on how to use antropometric tools
The figure demonstrates how to use a sliding caliper to measure the vertical *distance* from trignon to *vertex*.
Reprinted from Kansu. *Antropometri Tetkikleri İçi Rehber*, 29.

With such enormous state-sponsorship and her access to the ruling cadres of the Republican People's Party that made possible the mobilization of multiple bureaucratic and scientific institutions and personnel, the researcher had the country's whole population at her disposal, and not just figuratively. As one of the objectives of the study was to identify the "true" ethnological characteristics of the whole Turkish nation, it was important that the sample population be representative enough of the whole population. In the end, 64,000 was indeed a humungous number, so big a number that the difference between population and sample got blurry. As far as İnan was concerned, the studies done by then on the distinctive morphological characteristics of Turks had focused on only a few of these characteristics and on only a small number of the population, thus could not have identified the true character of the ethnology of the Turk. As a result, knowledge of the characteristics of the Turkish race had been in disarray and insufficient, she stated. However, she announced, this study would give her an unequivocal objective notion of the anthropology of the Turkish race.⁴²²

The objectivity of the study depended not only on the massive size of the sample population but also on the very measurement apparatuses themselves that, according to Pittard, eliminated errors resulting from one's emotions and compensated for the inadequacy of one's observational power. For "measurement tools [and] photographs do not possess preconceived ideas."⁴²³ Therefore, old subjective observations and ethnographic descriptions, stated İnan, were now replaced with impersonal numbers. And the numbers and measurement apparatuses were not used just to mediate the anthropomorphic gaze but to produce the truth, independent of that *subjective* and *erratic*

⁴²² Ibid., 178.

⁴²³ Cited in Ibid., 63-4.

gaze. However, the relationship between the (politics of the) gaze, the numbers, and measurement apparatuses, as we will see below, was more problematic and intertwined than what İnan and Pittard wanted it to be.

For the purpose of data collection, the country was divided into ten regions with various districts in each region (see Figure 6.3). The division, although seeming arbitrary at first sight, was indeed far from it, embodying a classificatory and comparative reasoning embedded in Republican nationalism and the major (fabricated) assumptions it was based on. The division made possible multiple analytical comparisons simultaneously and helped prove/disprove major anthropological assumptions about the Turkish race made in various other studies (at home and abroad).

1937 ANTROPOMETRE ANKETİNİN YAPILDIĞI MINTAKA VE KAZALAR
 Régions et districts soumis à l'enquête d'anthropométrie de 1937




Figure 6.3 Division of the country for the anthropometric study.
 The map shows the regions and districts identified by the researchers for data collection. Reprinted from Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü.
 1937 Türkiye Antropometri Anketi, 167.

The borders of the regions were delineated partly based on the density of different ethnicities making up the population in those regions (e.g. Kurds in regions IX and X, Lazes in region VII and parts of region X, Anatolian Turks (*Yörüks*) particularly in regions V, VI and VIII). However, in Republican discourse these people were not of different ethnicities but were seen as “tribes” of Turkish origin.⁴²⁴ Therefore, inclusion of a somewhat similar number of subjects from these different regions was meant to substantiate the notion that all people living in Turkey belonged uniformly to the Turkish race (anthropologically defined), in İnan’s words to prove that there was a “racial unity” (*ırk birliği*) in Turkey, an assumption that was at the core of the fictional “Turkish Historical Thesis.”⁴²⁵ This was a dominant assumption among the Republican ruling elite, but there had not been any major scientific studies with large representative samples from each of these “tribes” (Kurds, Lazes, Circassians) to “prove” that they were of Turkish origin and thus constituted a unified race.

This form of representation buttressed the Republican idea of a unitary Turkish race, which was initially a politico-cultural fabrication serving the Republican People’s Party’s corporatist-solidarism that was based on the idea of a unified nation. It disregarded ethnic and linguistic differences among the people of Turkey. However, the anthropologist’s notion of unity originated in the sciences of racial classifications (physical anthropology and ethnology) that transcended linguistic differences and ethnic characteristics, and delineated the notion of race based exclusively on the somatic characteristics of a race. This ethnological-anthropological, rather than ethnographic, approach to racial classification was clarified by Russian-born French anthropologist Joseph Deniker (1852–1918), whose racial classification system was one of the reference points for this study. According to Deniker,

⁴²⁴ Ibid. 181.

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

while ethnic groups were distinguished by linguistic differences and “ethnic characters,” racial classification required strict attention to “physical” or “race-characters”: hair, skin, and eye color; hair form; stature; cranial forms (“mesocephalic,” dolichocephalic,” and “brachycephalic”); and facial features.

426

In this sense, as Zafer Toprak has rightly pointed out, the Republican ruling elite and their version of nationalism had an “inclusive” notion of race, at least from an anthropological point of view, according to which people living in Turkey were indiscriminately brachycephalic and belonged to the white races of Europe.⁴²⁷ This characterization shows that Turkish nationalism embraced a fair amount of racial vocabulary from primarily European anthropological ideas, especially the races of Europe theories.

The map, therefore, was a form of “cartographic generalization” to include or rather to assimilate the ethnic and linguistic differences and complexities in the make-up of the population (that is now reduced to massive numerical data) to substantiate the fabrication of the idea of a unitary Turkish nation.

However, as noted above representation/presentation of the population as such (Figure 6.3) made possible multiple tiers of comparison that were not always inclusive per se. That is, the inclusionary narrative was almost always complemented with an exclusionary reasoning, which was particularly evident when the researcher attempted to explicate the morphological discrepancies in the data collected from the subjects. Although there were multiple morphological features measured such as height, weight, cephalic index, facial index, nasal

⁴²⁶ Bruce Baum, *The Rise and Fall of the Caucasian Race* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 151.

⁴²⁷ Toprak. *Darwin'den Dersim'e: Cumhuriyet Ve Antropoloji*, 15.

index, the color of eyes, hair and so forth, I will exemplify this double reasoning with a focus on the interpretation of the ratios of the cephalic index.⁴²⁸

The cephalic index, born out of the craniological research (i.e., research on the structure of the skull) of the nineteenth century, was one of the most common and influential craniometric techniques in anthropometric measurement. It came to become a common denominator of racial classification and a marker of racial identity, for it was believed that through analyzing the variations in the size and the shape of the skulls of various races, one was able to determine the position of races on the evolutionary scale. More importantly, leading anthropologists of the day believed that there was a correlation between the cephalic index and cranial volume, therefore the size of the brain. Thus, by identifying this correlation, believed French anthropologist Paul Broca, for example, the scientist would be able to determine the “intellectual value of the various human races.”⁴²⁹

This was a prevailing view among the scientists of the day. Scientists like Alfred Binet, the French (educational) psychologist and the designer of the modern intelligence test, spent a

⁴²⁸ Cephalic index was calculated by dividing the breadth of a skull by its length and then multiplying the result by one hundred. It was first used by Anders Retzius, a Swedish professor of Anatomy, to trace the origins of European races. Retzius classified European people broadly into two major racial groups based on their somatic characteristics: broad-headed or brachycephalic races and (with an index of 80 and more) and narrow-headed or dolichocephalic (with an index of eighty or less). While the former denoted the Eastern European races, the latter primarily Western European races. To the end of the nineteenth century, other European anthropologists would come up with more precise classifications. Particularly the classifications by British physician John Beddoe (1826–1911), U.S. economist William Ripley (1867–1941), and French anthropologist Joseph Deniker (1852–1918) caught on among both scientific community and popular culture. Beddoe and Ripley classified the European races in three major racial categories: 1) the “Teutonic” race (Ripley) or the “northern or blond longheads (Beddoe); these were races of northwestern Europe; 2) the “Alpine race (Ripley) or the “broad- heads (Beddoe); these were races of Eastern Europe, including parts of France, Spain, Italy, Germany; and finally, 3) the Mediterranean race (those with North African affinities). Deniker identified six European races: Littoral-European, Ibero-insular, Western European, and Ariatic, Northern and Eastern-European. See Baum. *The Rise and Fall of the Caucasian Rac*, 141-151. Applying the cephalic index, the shapes of head corresponding to each racial category were classified as dolichocephalic (with cephalic index up to 74.9), mesocephalic (with cephalic index between 75-79.9) and brachycephalic (with cephalic index between 80 and above). While the “Teutonic” races and the Mediterranean races were dolichocephalic, the Alpine races were primarily brachycephalic.

⁴²⁹ Quoted in Stephen Jay Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 114-15. Broca was a professor of clinical surgery in the faculty of medicine, a physical anthropologist, the founder of the Anthropological Society of Paris in 1859, and one of the pioneers in cranial research. Ibid.

considerable amount of his early career researching the correlation between physical processes, psychophysiological processes and mental capacities among abnormal and normal populations. Although Binet himself was not so much interested in the classification of races based on this correlation, the view was prevalent in the scientific racialism of the nineteenth century –the idea that human races differed physiologically, which more often than not led to and/or resulted from the notion that these races differed in terms of their cultural and intellectual capacity.⁴³⁰ It is important to note that the majority of these assumptions on racial difference and the emergence of the “sciences of race” to account for these differences, as Bruce Baum accurately puts it, were “integrally connected to Europeans’ assumptions about their own physical, intellectual, cultural, religious, and moral superiority.”⁴³¹ And to the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century these assumptions were very much intertwined with cultural, political, and economic upheavals in the industrial West that would lead to the rise of “new” nationalisms across Europe and North America, producing/reproducing new and perpetuating old “natural” social, political, and economic hierarchies within and between these nations.⁴³²

Seeing the cephalic index as a marker of racial identity and a race’s place on the evolutionary scale, Republican anthropologists such as İnan and Kansu devoted a considerable amount of their research to measuring, analyzing, and interpreting the cephalic index of Turkish subjects.⁴³³ Before İnan’s study, the first relatively large-scale anthropometric survey was conducted by Kansu and his students on a total of 2,597 children from Istanbul, Ankara, and various Anatolian cities and villages –from 1930 to 1937. Based on Deniker’s classification of races according to their cephalic index, they found that Turkish male children had a cephalic

⁴³⁰ Baum. *The Rise and Fall of the Caucasian Race*, 96.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁴³² *Ibid.*, 116, 121-128.

⁴³³ For a graphic summary of research done on the cephalic index, see İnan. *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri Ve Türkiye Tarihi*, 65

index of 87-88 and female children had a cephalic index within the range of 84 to 88. With these ratios, concluded Kansu, Turkish children demonstrated almost exceedingly a brachycephalic skull shape. These findings, he continued, were hardly surprising if one considered that Turks belonged to the brachycephalic Alpine races of Europe.⁴³⁴ The classification of Turks as brachycephalic was already a preconceived view among Republican scientists, as noted above, so the new anthropometric data only substantiated this view, as İnan's study would do with massive anthropometric data.

In İnan's study, the cephalic index of male subjects was calculated and demonstrated a predominant brachycephalic shape (63.88 percent) and, to a lesser degree, a dolichocephalic shape (24.37 percent). The national average of the ratio of the cephalic index was found to be 83.33, which verified the Turks' brachycephalic classification but was lower than what previous studies had found. To account for the slight drop in the average ratio of the cephalic index and for the slightly high percentage of the dolichocephalic shapes, İnan made a deeper geographical comparison, which indicated certain anomalies that led to interesting hypotheses. Initially, ten regions were compared to each other; the comparison indicated that the eastern regions (VIII, IX and X on the map above) and western regions (particularly I, III, IV) had relatively lower ratios of brachycephalic to the dolichocephalic and mesocephalic head shapes than the central Anatolian regions (V, VI, and VII), which were almost exclusively brachycephalic. Then, these ten regions were merged to form three broad geographical regions (west, central Anatolia, and east), whose boundaries were delineated by grouping the data with similar cephalic index ratios – otherwise it was a merely geographical classification. That is, except for the similarity in the data patterns, there were no major distinctive characteristics unique to each region (at least from the

⁴³⁴ Şevket Aziz Kansu, "Kız Ve Erkek Türk Çocukları Üzerinde Antropometrik Araştırmalar," (Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1939), 75.

data set) to make such a geographical classification possible unless the researcher had preconceived notions, which became evident in the interpretation that followed.

The data now consolidated under three regions showed clearly the discrepancy in the relative brachycephalic levels of each region: cities consolidated in the western region had a 76.69 percent brachycephalic rate, cities in the Central Anatolia a 93.16 percent rate, and cities in the eastern Anatolia a 62.61 percent rate. This anomaly in the data set led the researcher to try to account for the differences in the anthropological constitutions of the people living in each region. The data, according to the researcher, indicated that people of central Anatolia were more homogenous and that this region could be regarded as the “racial center” and “national racial territory” of Turkey (thus the subtitle of her publication: “Anatolia: the Homeland of the Turkish Race”) while the relatively higher level of dolichocephalic rates in the western and eastern regions *might* indicate racial blending, particularly racial effects resulting from the mixing with neighboring races. It was not that the researcher was arguing people in the western and eastern regions were not Turkish, which would have shattered the whole “racial unity” thesis, but rather they were *less* Turkish in terms of their brachycephalic “purity” than the people of central Anatolia. In a way, the inclusive narrative constructed its internal exclusion, yet so subtly (in the form of absence-presence) that it actually left the researcher herself in a predicament hard to get out of. She could not have alluded to ethnic differences as did certain European anthropologists, for all the “tribes” living in Turkey were of Turkish origin as far as Republican nationalists were concerned. Therefore, the only explanation had to be the degree of racial purity; all were Turks but some were more. How the so-called racial mixing among the “tribes” of eastern and western regions might have occurred, she left to further archeological and anthropological research.

But the “racial purity” of the central Anatolian Turks was hardly a novel hypothesis, for nationalist researchers, since sociologist Ziya Gökalp’s initial research into the folkloric characteristics of various Turkic groups in Turkey, had been tracing cultural and territorial reference points among what they perceived as more “autochthonous” peoples of Turkey (particularly the *Yörüks* of central Anatolia) to determine the contours of the identity of the modern Turkish nation.

There was, however, a qualitative difference between Gökalp’s sociological-ethnographic approach and anthropologists’ ethnologist-anthropomorphic approach. The former sought to identify the nation and thus national unity based on “shared education, culture, and emotion, with language as the primary medium.” As Parla puts it, Gökalp identified the nation as “a social group or collectivity consisting of individuals who have received the same education, and who have a common language, emotions, ideals, religion, morality and aesthetic feeling.”⁴³⁵ With a focus on linguistic, literary, religious, and cultural commonalities as markers of nationality, Gökalp aimed to avoid both the anthropologists’ and ethnic nationalists’ reductionism –while the former reduced a nation into people’s appearances and features (to the biological), the latter identified a nation based on mere kinship relations and hereditary origins.⁴³⁶ Gökalp did not live long enough to see that such anthropological reductionism would become one of the constitutive lines of Republican nationalism in the 30s and 40s. Much as it is important to note there were philosophical differences between them, Gökalp and his Republican followers operated in the same system of reasoning with regard to their search for origins in an idealized/romanticized autochthonous pastoral culture (for the former) and body (for the latter). Thus, İnan’s findings

⁴³⁵ Parla. *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp*, 36.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, 35-36.

regarding the anthropomorphic purity of the people of Central Anatolia were a sort of quantitative substantiation of the cultural nationalists' search for origin in pastoral Turkey.

Physiologist Sadi Irmak's biometric study on the blood types and finger types of *Yörüks* of central Anatolia shared a similar reasoning. The very choice of selecting the representative sample (of 400 people) from among *Yörüks* was itself the result of the preconceived notion among Republican nationalist scientists that the "true" racial origin of the Turkish identity was to be found in the pastoral Turkic people. Irmak's interpretation of his findings epitomized quite succinctly Republican scientists' national imaginary buttressed with racial vocabulary.⁴³⁷ According to Irmak –albeit with a caveat that the sample size might not be representative enough-, the high rates of type O among *Yörüks* indicated their relative purity and minimum racial mixing with other races. In this regard, *Yörüks* were compared to "purer races" such as Mayans (97 percent type O), Eskimos (80 percent O type) and contrasted with more "mixed races" such as Gypsies (34 percent O type) and Hindus (31 percent O type). This comparison might have located Turks among older civilizations, but did not suffice to relate them to advanced modern civilizations. Thus, Irmak appealed to the frequency of type A among *Yörük* Turks to make the latter point. With regard to their relatively high rates of type A, argued Irmak, Turks could be compared to Western races such as English (43 percent type A), Germans (44 percent), Bulgarians (43 percent), Greeks (47 percent) and contrasted with Oriental races such as Arabs (32 percent), Iranians (30 percent), Druzes (36 percent), Hindus (23 percent) and Gypsies (26 percent). Thus, he concluded with regard to their blood types, Turks could be identified among Western races and diverged from Oriental races.

⁴³⁷ 51.5 percent of the subjects were type O, 40.5 percent type A, 6 percent type B, and 2 percent type AB. Irmak. "Türk Irkının Biyolojisine Dair Araştırmalar," 3.

İnan's and Irmak's studies, among others, thus amalgamated major discursive lines of Republican nationalism and simultaneously provided it with new tools. First, the national averages of the ratios of cephalic index and other morphologic characteristics of people of Turkey helped to substantiate the imaginary "national unity" assumption –thus assimilationist policies –that was at the core of Republican corporatist-solidarism. In a sense, as Maksudyan argues, the ideological arguments and imaginary stories of the Republican People's Party were now "scientifically" legitimated and retold as *scientific* facts.⁴³⁸

Second, the studies, now with massive data, *were forced* to locate Turks among "civilized" white (European) races, which was simultaneously a challenge to European race theories and the rearticulation of these racial theories in the local context. That is, Republican nationalists challenged the onto-epistemological categorizations of the supremacist racial theorists of Europe, not to deconstruct the reasoning of classification altogether, but rather to expand it so that it was more "inclusive." However, as we have seen in Irmak's case, for example, their notion of inclusion had its limitations and clearly excluded such "lower" races as Arabs, Gypsies, Hindus and so forth. Therefore, the Republican scientist was called upon or rather was assigned to locate the status of the Turkish race not just in the broader history of humanity (which was one of the main reasons cited for the establishment of the Institute of Anthropology in 1925, i.e., "to establish the status of our race among the nations and races of human beings"),⁴³⁹ but also to locate it more specifically among modern white (European) races,

⁴³⁸ Maksudyan, Nazan. "The Turkish Review of Anthropology and the Racist Face of Turkish Nationalism": 314

⁴³⁹ Kansu. *Türk Antropoloji Enstitüsü Tarihçesi*, 1.

for the “normal Turkish type” as fabricated by İnan and others belonged indisputably to these white races.⁴⁴⁰

What this narrative makes visible is that the making of the “normal Turkish identity” emerged in a network of the techno-epistemic arrangements (anthropometric and biometric surveys, racial sciences), cultural practices and notions, political actors and state apparatuses.⁴⁴¹ And the body (of the child and the population at large) served as a catalyst and central node in the mobilization of these heterogeneous power sources.

6.3 Psychometrics and the turn to the mind: Measuring and regulating difference

While anthropology was made to serve its “national purpose” in “achieving” the racial ideals of Republican nationalism, according to İnan it could serve more practical –albeit no less national –purposes as well, such as the classification of workers, soldiers, students, and sports teams based on their morphological characteristics, making seating arrangements at schools based on students’ skelic index (brachyskelic, mesatiskelic, makroskelic) and so forth.⁴⁴²

However, anthropometric studies in Turkey would maintain their (idealist) racial focus until after World War II.⁴⁴³ It was (educational) psychologists, psychiatrists and pedagogues who would take up the latter task though; and they would turn to the mind and the apparatuses to measure mental capacity, particularly the IQ tests and Army Alpha Tests.

The IQ tests were derived from the psychometric scales devised by Alfred Binet, a French psychologist and one of the first educational psychologists, in 1905 in collaboration with

⁴⁴⁰ İnan’s “normal Turkish type” had a height slightly over the average, was makroskelic with regard to his/her skelic index, mostly brachycephalic (cephalic index), had fair hair and hazel eyes, and belonged to white European race of Homo Alpinus. İnan. *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri Ve Türkiye Tarihi*, 180.

⁴⁴¹ The idea of network here is inspired by Latour. Bruno Latour, *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

⁴⁴² İnan. *Türkiye Halkının Antropolojik Karakterleri Ve Türkiye Tarihi*, 10.

⁴⁴³ See the change of focus in Kansu’s work Kansu, Şevket Aziz. “İnsa Gücünün Tayininde Antropolojinin Önemi.” edited by Araştırma ve Geliştirme Başkanlığı, 13-26. Ankara: Gnkur Basımevi, 1963.

his colleague Théodore Simon.⁴⁴⁴ While there had been other psychometric scales until then, Binet's scale was the first to utilize age-based standards to compare the intelligence of a given individual with the normal performance of children of different ages, thus being able to locate his/her respective level of intelligence relative to her chronological age.⁴⁴⁵ This "discovery," according to Lewis Terman, the American educational psychologist who adapted and revised the tests for American students and popularized the tests globally (later known as Stanford-Binet Intelligence Tests), "ranks, perhaps, from the practical point of view, as the most important in all the history of psychology."⁴⁴⁶

There were two other novelties introduced with the tests. The tests were designed to measure higher and more complex mental processes and psychological phenomena, which according to Zazzo was an "epistemological break."⁴⁴⁷ Second, they were designed to test "general intelligence"; that is, the tests were thought to be culturally and socially neutral and would only test general intellectual abilities including comprehension, invention, and censure.⁴⁴⁸ The tests in this sense were thought to have satisfied the ideal of objectivity and universal applicability pursued by the positive sciences of the age, making universal comparison of intelligence possible, a thought that Terman euphorically expressed in the following way:

⁴⁴⁴ Martin S. Staum, "Ribot, Binet, and the Emergence from Anthropological Shadow," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences* 43, no. 1 (2007); *Nature and Nurture in French Social Sciences, 1859–1914 and Beyond* (Montreal, Quebec: McGill Queen's University Press, 2011).

⁴⁴⁵ The test took its final shape in 1908 and 1909 and consisted of 54 tasks graded in difficulty and related to everyday problems of life and was administered in the following way. Each child was given the test starting with the simpler to the more complex tasks that were standardized for each chronological age. The child would complete the tests and continue up the scale until no more successes were possible. Then, his/her performance was compared with the performance of the normal children of the same age, and his/her mental age was determined. A normal, average child was supposed to test "at age; that is, the average 5 years old must show a mental age of 5 years, the average 8 years old a mental age of 8 years..." Lewis M. Terman, *The Measurement of Intelligence: An Explanation of and a Complete Guide for the Use of the Stanford Revision and Extension of the Binet-Simon Intelligence Scale* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), 39-47.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁴⁴⁷ René Zazzo, "Alfred Binet," *Prospects: The quarterly review of comparative education* 23, no. 1 (1993). Reprinted as "Alfred BINET (1857-1911)." UNESCO: International Bureau of Education, 2000, 6.

⁴⁴⁸ Terman. *The Measurement of Intelligence*, " 42. Staum. *Nature and Nurture in French Social Sciences*, 133.

One of the most vital questions which can be asked by any nation of any age is the following: How high is the average level of intelligence among our people, and how frequent are the various grades of ability above and below the average? With the development of standardized tests we are approaching, for the first time in history, a possible answer to this question.⁴⁴⁹

Although the first translation of Binet-Simon tests into Turkish was done as early as 1915 by İbrahim Alaadding Gövsa, a pedagogue and educational psychologist, it was not until the late 1930s that the tests were implemented in schools to mass student populations. By then, the tests had been adopted, revised, and standardized in the United States by Lewis Terman and his colleagues at Stanford, using more than 2,000 school children of various age groups. The first Stanford revision of the tests was translated by Sadrettin Celal Antel and published in 1934 with little modification. It was implemented in Turkish schools –primarily in Istanbul –starting in 1937 by the Institute of Pedagogy of University of Istanbul, established in the same year under the directorship of Wilhelm Peters, a renowned professor of psychology from the University of Jena of Germany.⁴⁵⁰ Even though it took more than three decades to finally implement the intelligence tests on a large-scale in Turkey since their first translation in 1915, the tests had been commonly known and used by psychiatrists, psychologists, and physicians alike –albeit on a smaller scale and mainly for diagnostic purposes in individual practices.

From 1938 to 1943 the Stanford revision of the tests, also called the Stanford-Binet tests, were implemented on 1,078 Turkish children, 903 of whom were primary and middle school students. The majority of these students were selected from schools in Istanbul that were chosen from various socio-economic neighborhoods, so that sampling was “representative” enough of the make-up of the population. In addition, 25 children from an institution for homeless children

⁴⁴⁹ Terman. *The Measurement of Intelligence*, ” 65.

⁴⁵⁰ For a brief history of psychology in Turkey, see Beğlan B. Toğrol, "History of Turkish Psychology," *Psikoloji Çalışmaları/Studies in Psychology* 15(1987).

and child delinquents in Istanbul were included in the target population. Outside Istanbul, the tests were given to 50 children in Adana and 100 students at a Village Institute. As the primary objective of the tests was to learn about the mental condition(s) of Turkish children, children of non-Turkish origin were excluded.⁴⁵¹ (I assume what they meant by non-Turkish children were those from schools that belonged to religious minorities (Christians) and ethnic minorities such as Armenians).

The tests were both for comparative and classificatory purposes, a point made clear by Wilhelm Peters, the head of the Institute of Pedagogy of Istanbul University. According to Peters, there were primarily two objectives in implementing the tests. The first was to identify aptitudes of an individual child, adolescent, or adult in order to determine his/her fitness for school or work, or more precisely, as he put it in his preface to Refia Uğurel-Şemin's Army Alpha Tests, to select "the most fit students for school and college." The second objective was to compare and contrast the aptitude of groups based on socio-economic status, ethnicity and/or race, gender, literacy level and so forth, a point that he highlighted in the same preface arguing "whatever we know of the distribution and frequency of skills and aptitudes, ...of the psychological differences between men and women, social and occupational groups, nations, [and] races, we owe it to the intelligence tests."⁴⁵² While Peters had the second objective in mind, the tests served both purposes.

First, the testers aimed to demonstrate the normalcy of the mental condition of the Turkish students vis-à-vis the students of other nations. To this purpose, the first comparison was

⁴⁵¹ Wilhelm Peters, "Bin Türk Çocuğu Üzerinde Yapılan Zeka Testi Araştırmaları," in *Studies in Psychology and Pedagogy from the Institute of Pedagogy University of Istanbul*, ed. Wilhelm Peters (Istanbul: Pulhan Matbaası, 1952), 94.

⁴⁵² Refia Uğurel-Şemin, *Ordu Alfa Testleri: Alfa Testlerinin Türkçe'ye Adaptasyonu, Çevrilmesi Ve Üniversite, Yüksek Mühendis Okulu Ve Bazı Liselere Tatbiki* (Istanbul: Rıza Koşkun Matbaası, 1943), v. Peters, Wilhelm. "Bin Türk Çocuğu Üzerinde Yapılan Zeka Testi Araştırmaları," 93.

between 903 Turkish school children and 905 American children tested by Terman and his colleagues. The second level of comparison was among Turkish students based on gender, plus the socio-economic and literacy levels of parents; it also compared child delinquents and homeless children with “normal” students, and urban students with rural students.

As for the first comparison, it seemed as though Turkish psychologists and pedagogues were responding to and confirming Terman’s pronouncement above that for the first time in history with the help of standardized tests we were close to identifying the average level of intelligence across and among various people and nations. What this pronouncement implied was that tests transcended complex national cultural and linguistic differences and other complex issues and problems underlying differential levels of aptitude across various groups. In this sense, as noted above, the tests were thought to be objective and universally applicable and were designed to measure and reveal general intelligence that was thought to be universal. Tests were thus attributed a sort of metaphysical quality.

Turkish researchers took for granted the universality and cultural neutrality of the tests and translated the tests with little modification and initially with no need for standardization.⁴⁵³ The tests, however, were not just testing intelligence, but doing so in a particular way that was not always universal, for it embodied certain cultural reasoning as to what counted as “normal” skills, particularly with its focus on verbal expression in the form of picture descriptions and interpretations and word definitions that were probably less familiar, if not totally unfamiliar, to the majority of Turkish students. Although the researchers did not report any major difficulties during the implementation of the tests, the results of a test done among 125 students in Istanbul

⁴⁵³ Standardization of tests would be done only in late 1950s by educational psychologist Refia Uğurel-Şemin and her students at the Institute of Pedagogy of the University of Istanbul. See, Uğurel-Şemin, Refia. *Zekanın Değerlendirilmesi: Binet Stanford Testlerinin İstanbul Çocuklarına Standardizasyonu*. İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaası, 1958. *Zekanın Değerlendirilmesi: Binet Stanford Testlerinin İstanbul Çocuklarına Standardizasyonu* (İstanbul: Çeltüt Matbaası, 1958).

are suggestive of the embeddedness of the cultural in these tests. To the dismay of the researchers, Turkish students did surprisingly low (far below normality range)⁴⁵⁴ in certain relatively *simple* items such as giving the date (for nine-year olds), repeating a sequence of numbers backwards (nine-year olds), constructing sentences using words (nine-year olds), and naming sixty words (ten-year olds).⁴⁵⁵ Perplexed by the low scores on these items, the researchers attributed the “failure” of Turkish students in expressing the date to lack of focus on expressing time in the instructional time and material and students’ indifference to dates. The rest, according to the researcher, were hard to explain. The researcher did not challenge the logic of the tests themselves and had no doubt whatsoever about the possibility that the date item, for example, was testing a rational awareness of temporality that Turkish students might not have been brought up with (considering that the country had only recently adopted the Gregorian calendar) and that the other items were testing particular linguistic and verbal skills that might not necessarily have had to do with students’ literacy levels. This was just one aspect of the politics of intelligence tests, which were integrated into national politics in multiple other ways.

The tests embodied a similar reasoning to those anthropometric tests introduced above, i.e., to identify the status of Turks among other nations with respect to their mental normalcy. Only now what was tested was not the morphological characteristics of the body but the quality of mind through intelligence, which as Gould puts it, was abstracted as a single entity, with a clear location within the brain, made quantifiable (measurable), representable with numbers, and thus necessarily classifiable.⁴⁵⁶ In both cases, numbers -cephalic index and intelligence quotient

⁴⁵⁴ The normality range for IQ scores was finalized by Terman and the scores were classified as follows: IQ scores above 140 (near genius or genius); IQ scores between 120-140 (very superior intelligence); 110-120 (superior intelligence); 90-110 (normal or average intelligence); 80-90 (dullness); 70-80 (borderline deficiency); and below 70 (definite feeble-mindedness). See, Terman. *The Measurement of Intelligence*, 79.

⁴⁵⁵ Peters, "Istanbul Mekteplerinde Yapılan Test Araştırmaları," 22.

⁴⁵⁶ Gould. *The Mismeasure of Man*.

scores –came to represent/present these entities that were now being considered as genetically fixed, constant, and unitary; and these measurable entities were seen as stable and reliable markers of one’s (racial, socio-economic and so forth) identity (physiologically and/or psychologically defined).

The idea of comparability assumed a homogeneous national identity. That is, the idea of comparability of Turkish children *vis-à-vis* American children already assumed that there was a homogenous group of children that could be identified as Turkish, considering that the Republic –and thus the idea of a unified and homogenous Turkish nation – was still in the making. While this was the broader function of the tests, at home they were intertwined with different politics, and the classificatory reasoning was not the same as the one employed by the anthropologists. The tests particularly translated and rearticulated two overlapping discourses, i.e, rationalization discourse (particularly in education) and selection discourse (of students, workers etc).

At home, the tests helped to propagate rationalization in the education system so that it yielded the most return with more effective planning, and, as I have discussed in the introduction of this chapter, this rationalization reasoning was eugenically inspired. While the country was undergoing high modernization, the need for systematic and scientific methods to rationalize education was felt more than ever. What rationalization meant was designing the education system so that it attended to the needs of heterogeneous student groups, an idea that was shared by pedagogues, psychologists, and psychiatrists alike. Although there were people like Tunakan who favored a strict Taylorist system in the rationalization of educational programs,⁴⁵⁷ most viewed the purpose of rationalized education in terms of attending to the differences in students’ mental and physical capacities and aptitudes, for whom the purpose of education was to

⁴⁵⁷ Tunakan. "Mektepte Ruhیاتın Rolü": 4409.

determine, classify, and foster these capacities and aptitudes.⁴⁵⁸ According to Antel, “the principal condition for success in education was to organize education according to children’s distinctive intelligence and their levels.”⁴⁵⁹ What that implied was determining those differences and classifying students based on their respective skills and aptitudes, i.e., rational selection of students with similar skill sets –homogeneity in differences.

Tunakan clarified this need to rationalize the education system when he recited the complaints he frequently received from teachers about the difficulty of teaching a class in which a smart child was sitting next to an idiot, an imbecile next to an apathetic, and an irritable next to an unstable child, at the same desk. In such a predicament, observed Tunakan, the teacher had difficulty teaching the pedagogic content knowledge and it was, hard if not impossible, to maintain order, stability, and love for one’s school. Sympathizing with the teachers, Tunakan found fault neither with the teacher nor with the psychiatrist. He decried the poor condition of the education system of the day for the predicament. In such a system, Tunakan asserted, “the teacher is forced to work a material whose nature is not measured or determined. As such, today’s teacher is crushed under a heavy burden.”⁴⁶⁰ In other words, the teacher was forced to work with the child, the material, whose psychological and physiological composition s/he was not fully aware of. An impossible task, for how could a school whose function was to nurture and develop a child’s intelligence and skills proceeded to educate them without knowing their mental condition? Once there existed numerous and easy-to-apply intelligence tests and psychotechnics, it was a big shortcoming of schools to not have determined students’ intelligence levels and skills, complained Tunakan.⁴⁶¹ Schools and teachers needed to know the mental make-

⁴⁵⁸ Tokgöz. "Mektep Çocuklarında Akıl Hıfzıssıhhası," 95-96.

⁴⁵⁹ Antel. *Maarifimiz Ve Meseleleri*, 154.

⁴⁶⁰ Tunakan. "Mektepte Ruhıyatın Rolü": 4408

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.

up of the normal child, and the laws of mental development to regulate his/her personality and determine his/her character, then needed follow an education system designed accordingly. And theoretical input derived from intelligence tests regarding the mental equipment of the child could serve the purpose.

The selection discourse primarily targeted “feeble-minded” (*zayıf akıllı*) children and other “abnormal” child populations such as child delinquents and homeless children.⁴⁶² Peters openly advocated the separation of feeble-minded children and those with borderline deficiency.⁴⁶³ The high number of middle school students scoring lower than average in the larger study, according to Peters, had to do with lack of selection based on students’ intelligence levels. He continued, if those scoring lower than average were selected either by their parents or by teachers, they would avoid failure in higher grades that were beyond their capacities. According to Peters, this “should result in a higher frequency of good and medium intelligence and in a much lower frequency of intelligence below the average in the middle schools.”⁴⁶⁴

As we have seen in the previous chapter, “abnormal” bodies were viewed in terms of their relative benefits -or lack of it –to society. And the best way to guarantee that they contributed to the economy and adapted to the social norms of the society was to train them in occupations that fitted their skills, which was to be achieved through a labor-based curriculum that focused on functional and artisanal skills. The intelligence tests, thought scientists like Peters, could help identify these populations at an early age and fit them to appropriate (primarily

⁴⁶² In this sense, this discourse paralleled the reasoning in most other countries, particularly the US and Britain; however, it never reached the level of extensive racial classification (as in the US) or class-based classification (as in Britain). The most probable reason, I think, has to do with the reasoning embedded in the core arguments of Turkish nationalism and Turkish version of corporatist solidarism, i.e., the fabricated theses of national unity and classless society. As I have tried to show so far, both of these theses were profoundly problematic and indeed embodied internal classifications.

⁴⁶³ These constituted about 10 percent of the students in the first study (done with 125 students) and almost 23 percent in the larger study (done with 1078 students) if dull category was included—from normal schools for their own sake and for the sake of normal children. Peters. "Istanbul Mekteplerinde Yapılan Test Araştırmaları," 24.

⁴⁶⁴ Peters. "Bin Türk Çocuğu Üzerinde Yapılan Zeka Testi Araştırmaları," 97.

vocational) tracks. The researchers, though, had a preconceived idea as to who these populations were and the scores *were made* to corroborate this idea. This was evinced in the case of the 25 criminal and homeless children and 100 students from rural Village Institutes.

The researchers' preconception was constructed partly by findings of international studies⁴⁶⁵ that classified these populations as less intelligent compared to, say, urban students from relatively well-off neighborhoods. Thus, the phrase "It is already known that" in Peters' narrative already presumed the results. However, there was another major problem that the researcher did not mention at all, which is that the majority of homeless children must have been illiterate or had very minimal literacy skills considering the high rates of illiteracy (at least in modern Turkish) among the population at large and the fact that compulsory education was only limited to primary education, which the majority of these children could not have had access to. Thus, the researchers' conclusion had to be forced into existence unless they used a non-verbal test (which does not seem to have been the case).⁴⁶⁶ Similarly, one can argue that children from the Village Institutes, who *foreseeably* scored lower than children in more urbanized cities (Istanbul), must have had minimal experience with, not only the format of testing, but also what it was testing (academic skills such as verbal expressibility).

The reason I mention this case is not to question the "reliability" of the test per se, which I think is no less an important task, but my concern is the reasoning governing the tests and the researcher, which I think was epitomized in psychologist Sabri Esat Siyavuşgil's brief biography of Alfred Binet, in which he characterized Binet's intelligence scale as an "effective diagnostic tool that has availed to bring equilibrium to the life of the society and the individual."⁴⁶⁷ How

⁴⁶⁵ These were not cited but I assume majority of them were from the US.

⁴⁶⁶ They concluded, "only two of the [criminal] boys proved as being fully normal or [with] average intelligence, 16 were dull, or borderline cases, 7 feeble-minded, and none above average." Ibid., 97.

⁴⁶⁷Sabri Esat Siyavuşgil. "Alfred Binet (1857-1911)." 11-20, n.d.

could tests possibly bring equilibrium to the social and the individual life? What this characterization connotes is that the tests (numbers) were made to function like cultural institutions trusted to bring stability to the society and maintain the social and economic order by consolidating a person's and a group's (feeble-minded, criminal, rural, poor) societal position and economic value. The tests in this sense reproduced the "naturalness" of each group's societal position in the overall hierarchy of the society. In our case, the tests were made to rearticulate this "natural difference" that usually held such groups as child delinquents, homeless, poor, and rural children on the other side of the dichotomy, and were meant to help with regulating these groups by putting them on appropriate tracks so that they became productive citizens of the new Republic.

Chapter 7

Conclusion or Back to the Introduction: To Hold Things Together?

[T]here is a fundamental ambivalence –a double image– in the adult symbolization of childhood and children. Both sides of the image turn on the child as a liminal form of life, i.e. a being at the threshold, still connected with “other worlds” whether it be the world of the animal or of the god.⁴⁶⁸

What the narrative did so far –at times beyond my intentions –was to trace this ambivalent double potentiality attributed to modern childhood in the way it played out in the Turkish context, i.e., childhood embodying the threat (the fear) of the primitive as well as the potential (the hope) towards a modern civilization. Childhood was demarcated as a “liminal form of life,” using Kennedy’s words, always-already incomplete, being at a perpetual threshold, representing multiple worlds simultaneously, shifting back and forth between worlds of reason and rationality, and instincts, insanity, and animality.⁴⁶⁹

In his *A Dictionary of Critical Theory*, Ian Buchanan defines liminality as

A ritual space or phase of transition in which a person is no longer what they were, but is not yet what they will be. The liminal is the in-between, the neither one thing nor the other. The term was coined by Anthropologist Arnold van Gennep in his classic work *The Rites of Passage* (1908), which describes the variety of rituals performed by so called primitive tribes which facilitate the passage of children to adulthood.⁴⁷⁰

Thinking of childhood as a liminal form of life, as liminality, helps to locate it at the very center of the concept of change. Kennedy argues modern preoccupation with childhood was a “staple of Western modernism” insofar as childhood came to embody the very idea of change embedded in

⁴⁶⁸ David Kennedy, *Changing Conceptions of the Child from the Renaissance to Post-Modernity: A Philosophy of Childhood* (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), 22.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁷⁰ *A Dictionary of Critical Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. P. 294. Ian Buchanan, in *A Dictionary of Critical Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 294.

modernism. For, he continues, “children inhabit that section of the life cycle in which change is most dramatically evident and compelling.”⁴⁷¹

In the first chapter, I attempted to discuss, with reference to Koselleck and others, this notion of change as a quintessential component of the secular time of modernity. Modern time, once released from religious cosmologies, became more dynamic and an object of human reflection. One important aspect of this dynamic secular time was that historical time could be affected by human action and purposiveness, an Enlightenment ideal. Concepts of progress and development came to occupy a new abstract space where human agency and purposiveness were inserted into the historical time. And I argue(d) that the notion of childhood was essential to this historical mode of thinking, which now embodied a new sense of human agency and (negative and/or positive) potentiality precisely because of the sense of liminality attributed to it.

However, while the “primitive” tribes in Arnold van Gennep’s *The Rites of Passage* might have celebrated liminality because of the unknowability it embodied or its *yet-to-be* ’ness, for modern states the liminality of childhood came to embody fear and hope (progress and development) and was viewed as a space to be made visible and rationally controlled to eliminate the former (the fear) so that the latter is fully achieved. Thus, the process of control was partly contingent upon making the liminal life (the child, the yet-to-be adult) knowable so that its yet-to-be is predictable. And I tie(d) this desire to control the liminality (i.e childhood) and thus necessarily plan the future to the biopolitics of modern states (*à la* Foucault), the practice of objectifying the life (of the population) as a positive biological entity (for example, viewing life in terms of reproductive capacities, with statistical terms such as rates of mortality, natality and so forth), not only to make every aspect of life known but also to develop and

⁴⁷¹ Kennedy. *Changing Conceptions of the Child from the Renaissance to Post-Modernity*, 1.

increase its capacity. And as I discussed with reference to eugenics, for example, biopolitics depending on various national contexts took various forms such as preventing life (through sterilization, for instance), and/or bringing about fitter life (through environmental reforms, puericulture, public health), and/or generating more life (pronatalist interventions, treatment of infertility).

While all three strategies were at work in the way biopolitics unfolded in Turkey, it was particularly the latter two strategies (generating more life and bringing about fitter life) that constituted the main discursive lines of Turkish modernity and nationalism in the 30s and 40s, the period of “cultural revolution” (*à la* Zafer Toprak) when the Republican cadres turned inwards to delineate the contours of Turkish national identity and define the contours of Turkish nationalism vis-à-vis other modern national movements. And what other phase of life could be more essential than childhood to not only generate more life, but also bring about fitter life!

These two discursive lines of biopolitics in Turkey, i.e., generating more life and bringing about fitter life, unfolded along with other discursive and non-discursive practices delineated in each –relatively independent –chapter. The catalyst of this discursive unfolding was the body and mind of the child marked at a particular space (home, street, school). In each chapter (III, IV and V, and VI) the unfolding followed a particular reasoning. In chapter III, the child was seen as the biological source to multiply the population; puericulture was put forth as the “science” to produce fit and robust children. What puericulture made possible for the Republican *men* of science, the secular elite and the now self-declared guardians of the nation, was that they had access to the privacy of the family and the body of women and were able to produce “new” norms to regulate them and put them in the service of the nation. The newness was grounded in the biological determinism of the age that reproduced the heteronormative values of the

patriarchal society, masquerading them as “natural” or “scientific” facts. These heteronormative values were reproduced and normalized through puericulture education.

Chapters IV and V traced the unfolding of mental hygiene discourse in Turkey as it objectified the “abnormal” child populations (child delinquents and homeless children) in a psychiatric/psychological vocabulary (*à la* psychopathy). I discussed the construction of the abnormal body as the limit(s) of Republican solidarist notions of “normal” subjectivity and sociality (i.e. dutiful, economically productive, social and so forth). The citizen as demarcated in Republican solidarism (a sort of anti-leftist, anti-liberal, “third way” modernity) was subordinate to the collective. S/he was not to be taught in isolation; s/he was responsible for and had a duty towards the society. His/her personal conduct and ideal was only complete insofar as s/he recognized his/her obligations to society and toward the nation. Child delinquents and street children, rearticulated as psychopathic, constituted the very limits of this solidarist discourse, whose energy needed to be regulated and channelized in the service of the society. The relatively modern child protection and correction institutions were meant to do precisely so through a predominantly labor-based curriculum.

Chapter VI sought to make visible the fabrication of the “normal” Turkish type through a network of modern technologies of measurement (anthropometrics and psychometrics), scientific discourses, scientists, and Republican political rationality. The body and mind of the “normal” school child was measured to delineate the contours of the Turkish race (anthropometrics) and its mental normalcy (psychometrics).

What the chapters collectively show is that children were in fact worthy of unique consideration for the Republican cadres, who placed enormous expectations upon their bodies and minds, now seen as the biological and economic source of the Turkish nation. The

preoccupation with the child was so ubiquitous during the first two decades of the Republic that the child was turned into a foundational myth, a cult as it was ritualized in various forms, for example, in *Ulusal Egemenlik ve Çocuk Bayramı* (National Sovereignty and Children's Day). This was a festival declared to be dedicated to children of the nation, in which children would appear in special outfits and national costumes and attend ceremonies and perform various symbolic activities. The 1930s and 40s also witnessed “robust child competitions” (*gürbüz çocuk müsabakası*) organized by local municipalities, news agencies and other national and local foundations, in which the “fittest” child would be selected by a jury usually composed of medical doctors. The child and his/her parents would receive some sort of material and/or symbolic gift/rewards, and the winners would be announced in national newspapers (see Figure 7.1). The body of the child thusly advertised represented the aesthetics of the body of the whole nation (as it was delineated by the Republican medical gaze).

Maybe the preoccupation with the child was because the Republic itself was in its early (childhood) period; therefore, the fears and hopes attached to childhood were indeed the very fears and hopes of the fledgling Republic itself. Could the ubiquitous phrase of the day, i.e., “elevating the country to the level of modern civilizations,” be interpreted as helping the country transition from the level of childhood to the level of maturity (modern Western civilizations)? Was the nation in its liminal form, too, when the Republicans were distancing themselves from their Ottoman past and positioning the country on a path toward modern (Western) civilization, thus neither one thing nor the other (yet)? Maybe it is this perpetual condition of liminality that has been the very identity of Turkey until now (as might be evinced in the way things are unfolding at present).

Gürbüz çocuklar

**Bugün de Halkevinde
müsabaka yapılack.**



*Himayeetfal Cemiyetinin müsabakasında
birinciliği kazanan Harika Kapanıcı H.*

Figure 7.1 The winner of the robust child competition organized by the Child Protection Society.
Reprinted from *Cumhuriyet*, 4/27, 1932.



Figure 7.2 A picture of “robust” children on National Sovereignty and Children’s Day (April 23, 1936). The caption reads: “The merry day [April 23, 1920] when the Turkish nation declared its independence...is the ... day we depend upon to breed and multiply robust, fit, and cheerful posterities.” Courtesy of National Library (Visual Archives).

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