Is the *Ars Rhetorica* for the Good?

The Rhetorical Ethics of More, Shakespeare, and Bacon in the English Renaissance

By

Benjamin V. Beier

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The dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee:

David Loewenstein, Professor, English
Karen Britland, Professor, English
Elizabeth Bearden, Associate Professor, English
Michael Witmore, Director, Folger Shakespeare Library
Grant Nelsestuen, Assistant Professor, Classics

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Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam; De Maria Numquam Satis

Contents

Abstract

The dissertation argues that Thomas More, William Shakespeare, and Francis Bacon deliberate about the nature of rhetoric and the ethics that ought to govern it by dramatizing multifaceted acts of persuasion. In the English Renaissance, some thinkers believe rhetoric to be a byword for honeyed speech that conceals flattery and lies. This view coexists uneasily with a great enthusiasm for rhetoric, alternatively understood to be a justice-seeking art that only the morally good orator can effectively utilize. More, Shakespeare, and Bacon dispute these polarized views of rhetoric in their heuristic representations of speaking that appropriate aspects of both the influential classical Roman and Christian rhetorical traditions and that navigate between the Roman advocacy of a utilitarian ethic and the Augustinian insistence that falsehoods can never be justified as means of persuasion. The project first assesses the rhetorical ethics of Cicero, Quintilian, and Augustine, as well as the continuum of available opinions about rhetoric in the English Renaissance milieu. It then asserts that More depicts his master sophist, Richard III, as a perversion of the classical ideal orator in *The History of King Richard III*. Richard's surprising inability to persuade reveals the future Lord Chancellor's Augustinian confidence that sophistry is weaker than apt, true words. Initially, it appears that Shakespeare's *Richard III* and *Othello*, unlike More's *History*, suggest the superior power of unethical speakers in Shakespeare, but the project's examination of *Cymbeline* demonstrates that an ethical Shakespearean orator such as Imogen, in rhetorical situations that deliberately evoke the aforementioned plays, can forestall tragedy with Ciceronian words and pseudo-Augustinian piety. Finally, in the treatment of Bacon's *New Atlantis*, it is contended that, unlike the rhetorical ethic implied in More and *Cymbeline*, Bacon's representations advocate for the renewal of Quintilian's Roman ethic and

for a gnostic—rather than Augustinian—rhetoric in which the cooperative model of persuasion is rejected in favor of seductive words.

Introduction

In William Shakespeare's *Richard III*, Buckingham, co-conspirator in Richard's attempt to usurp the throne, assures the future King: "Doubt not, my lord, I'll play the orator / As if the golden fee for which I plead / Were for myself" (3.5.93-5).[1] Buckingham is no orator, who—by definition—should seek to guide an audience cooperatively by licit means toward good ends; rather, he is a sophist, a pretender who—in the present case—promises to move hearers to bad acts through illicit means. Shakespeare wrote these lines at a time when humanists sought to renew the commonweal and emphasized the need for citizens to be skilled in the *Ars Rhetorica* to achieve this end. This esteem of oratory, however, led to a debate among both humanists and their successors over whether it was possible (or likely) for there to be an ethical rhetoric aiming at the good. To ask this question was to revive inquiry into the fundamental issue at the foundation of an ethics of speaking, argued at least since Gorgias gave his defense of Helen and took money—as Shakespeare's language of 'golden fee' may subtly suggest—to teach Greek youths how to compel an audience with magical words. In the English Renaissance milieu, it is not only philosophers, divines, and courtiers who opine upon the question, but also authors of literary texts, who interrogate this matter in their representations of acts of persuasion.[2] This dissertation examines such acts in the fictive work of Thomas More, William Shakespeare, and Francis Bacon and seeks to determine where each would situate himself in the debate and what their literature suggests about the nature of rhetoric and ethics that govern it.

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[1] All quotations from Shakespeare's work are taken from Bevington's works, unless otherwise noted. All references to More, unless otherwise noted, are from the Yale *Complete Works of St. Thomas More*; references to the More volumes follow the standardized *Moreana* citation method in which, for example, *CW* 15, 422-423/11-12 indicates a reference from volume 15, pages 422-3, lines 11-2.

[2] I am appropriating Vickers's phrase "act of persuasion" ("Power of Persuasion" 418) to describe what others might call a suasion or a speech act.

Methodology

The importance of rhetoric to the English Renaissance, so well proven by T. W. Baldwin, Sr. Miriam Joseph, and Hanna Gray, has become a critical commonplace.[3] However, an appreciation for the dispute over rhetoric's nature and ethics, and explorations of how literary texts participate in this contest are only beginning to develop. Brian Vickers's 1983 essay "'The Power of Persuasion': Images of the Orator, Elyot to Shakespeare" first revealed that Shakespeare was exploring issues of rhetorical ethics, and Wayne Rebhorn helped critics appreciate that Shakespeare was not a lone questioner of a monolithic view of the nature of rhetoric, but part of a milieu in which various and mutually exclusive opinions about rhetoric coexist (*Emperor* 19-20; *Debates*). More recently, Scott Crider has persuasively shown the depth of Shakespeare's interrogation of rhetorical ethics, found not only in the play's formal speeches, but also in other uses of language and especially in moments where characters discuss previously dramatized acts of persuasion (*Persuasion* 2).[4]

These helpful studies are only a beginning; much work remains to be done in the area of literary explorations of rhetorical ethics in the English Renaissance. Not only does the conversation need to be broadened beyond Shakespeare (as this dissertation does), but Shakespeare himself needs further consideration. The principal contributions of this dissertation are its fresh understanding of the complicated ways in which classical Roman rhetoric and biblical-patristic rhetoric influence More, Shakespeare, and Bacon, and its positioning of each figure on a continuum of available opinions about rhetorical ethics.

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[3] Of course, our understanding continues to be deepened; see the more recent treatments listed in note 13.

[4] For a fuller account of scholarly writing on Shakespeare's rhetoric, see notes 13, as well as the first few notes in chapter 4.

To achieve these contributions, I rely on a literary-historical approach that some have begun to call historical formalism. As a historical study, I follow Quentin Skinner, who insists that we must "see things their way" (*Visions* I 3). Skinner's method has encountered many detractors, with whom I sometimes have sympathy.[5] Nevertheless, his longstanding and fundamental contention that "understanding of texts. . . presupposes the grasp both of what they were intended to mean, and how this meaning was intended to be taken" ("Meaning" 48) remains a balanced middle way between the mutually exclusive dogmas of "'text' alone" and "'context' alone," fulfilling what another critic has called "the scholar's obligation to understand the past as it understood itself, [rather than to impose] upon it his own canons of logic" (Kendall 447).

The fulfillment of this obligation requires an understanding of the historical moment(s) of the three authors, as well as of the important influences on their rhetorical ethical thought, the classical Roman and the Christian rhetorical traditions. While Rebhorn (*Emperor*) diversified Vickers' binary of possible, available opinions, my sustained examination of how authors integrate, favor, or reject parts of the period's two most influential rhetorical traditions provides a more adequate and textured view of More, Shakespeare, and Bacon in the English Renaissance. There is little doubt that the classical Roman influence is great in the English Renaissance, but the role of Christian ethical thought in the Renaissance discourse on rhetorical ethics has sometimes been particularly under appreciated in the field. Debora Shuger's work has helped correct this omission; she asserts that "sacred rhetoric is not a narrowly specialized compartment of the history of Renaissance rhetoric but its most vital and reflective branch" (*Sacred* 13). Shuger's own work, however, has looked especially at rhetorical manuals and theory (*Sacred*) and at the writings of English Renaissance clerics (*Habits*) to substantiate her claims about the

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[5] See Tully's collection for a series of thoughtful critiques.

ubiquity of Christian influence on most spheres of Renaissance life, including speculations about rhetoric. This dissertation builds on and goes beyond Shuger's work by looking more particularly at the role of Christian rhetoric (as well as classical rhetoric) in shaping fictive representations of acts of persuasion.[6] The project walks through a door that Shuger has opened, but has not passed through.

In addition to its historical dimension, my method requires a formalism that attends to literature as literature. The complicated narrators of More's *History of King Richard III* and Bacon's *New Atlantis,* and the dramatic dialogue of Shakespeare's plays do not give formal, discursive expositions on rhetoric or ethics. Nevertheless, as Michael Grossman reminds us, "Renaissance writers understood their work as part of an ethical pedagogy" (3). My method will blend literary analysis of particular passages and synthesis of patterns across a writer's work to discover the content of what is being taught, to understand how each author uses his Christian and Roman sources, and thereby to ascertain his rhetorical ethics and to situate each author on the continuum of available opinions about the nature and ethics of rhetoric.

When seeking to analyze an act of persuasion that an author represents, the dissertation relies on an hermeneutic that considers the following features: the speaking orator, the audience(s) spoken to, the issue spoken on, the ends sought, the means employed, and the situation in which words are spoken. While many of these variables inform contemporary

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[6] Shuger has published a reading of *Measure for Measure*, but her argument is centered on political theologies, not rhetoric. Jeffery Knapp believes that the role of Christianity has been overlooked because of "secularist bias among modern critics [which] has helped sustain the myth that piety and popular entertainments in Renaissance England were cultural opposites and waged war on one another" *(Shakespeare's Tribe* 2). While Crider's principal work (*Persuasion*) is largely concerned with Greek influences, he is a notable exception to those who divide the rhetorical ethical questions in English Renaissance literature from any the Christian discourse. See his accounting for the Roman and Christian influences in his "Eloquence Repaired" (250) and "Human Bond" (135).

speech and composition pedagogy, the hermeneutic is historically justifiable.[7] Assuming different situations and having addressed rhetorical means in his definition of rhetoric (*Rhetoric* 2.1), Aristotle explains that "[a] speech [situation] consists of three things: a speaker and a subject on which he speaks and someone addressed, and the objective [*telos*] of a speech relates to the last (I mean the hearer)" (1.3.1). These features, outlined by Aristotle, are taken for granted by Cicero and Quintilian whose understandings, in turn, are transmitted into sixteenth-century England.

Terms

When describing the rhetorical situation Aristotle calls the orator a "speaker," but elsewhere he calls the speaker a "rhetor" (1.1.14). In Shakespeare's *Richard III*, the sophist, Buckingham, promised to "play the *orator*." While the dissertation's opening lines sought to distinguish sophist from orator and while this distinction will become more clear after the first chapter's treatment of rhetoric and sophistry, it seems necessary before embarking on this study to offer some brief clarifications, distinguishing between my use of rhetor, rhetorician, orator, speaker, and sophist. All five of these figures are speakers of words. The "sophist" is by definition an unethical or evil speaker who either seeks an evil purpose and/or employs illicit means to achieve his or her purpose. The word "speaker," when not accompanied by an adjective that indicates an ethical judgment, can denote any sophistical or ethical user of words. Following George Kennedy (Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 35 note 32), Rebhorn (*Emperor* 6 note 7), and Crider (*Persuasion* 105 note 9), "rhetor" will be employed to indicate one who practices the art

[7] For example, see *Easy Access* (7-10), *Hodge's Harbrace Handbook* (404-22), *The Little, Brown Essential Handbook for Writers* (1-2), Crider's *Office of Assertion* (7-10), *Principles and Types of Speech Communication* (8-17), and Lindemann's *A Rhetoric for Writing Teachers* (10-21). *Hodge's* specifically links its thinking to Kenneth Burke's pentad (422).

of persuasion, whereas a "rhetorician" is a theorist of rhetoric. Of course it is not uncommon for the two categories to overlap in one theorist-speaker. Also, because the role of Roman rhetoric is so prominent in the inquiry, I will also often use "orator," whose speaking, like the "rhetor"/"rhetorician" is not necessarily limited to formal speeches. In Roman imaginings of an ideal orator and in Aristotle's definition of the sophist (1.1.14), the "orator" or "rhetor" is set opposite the sophist. This distinction, which makes the orator/rhetor a morally good speaker, will be largely respected, but in certain contexts, the dissertation will use rhetor(ican)/orator simply to denote any speaker.[8]

Another term that requires some explanation is philosophical anthropology. When I use this phrase I am talking about an author's view of the nature or constitution of the human person, what has sometimes been called the "philosophy of man" or "philosophy of human nature." A number of the figures that the project examines are deeply interested in the human being as human, and More and Augustine are even involved in controversies that surround the nature of the human being. While framing these concerns through the language of "anthropology" could be considered anachronistic, I will use the phrase, following the manner in which it is generally used in the discourse of the history of philosophy where it is not uncommon to see references to the anthropology of Aristotle, Augustine, et cetera.[9]

In addition, an inquiry into rhetorical ethics requires a note on ethical systems. Grounded in what I have called "available opinions," the evaluations of the rhetorical ethics of More, Shakespeare, and Bacon (as well as Cicero, Quintilian, and Augustine) will often allude to

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[8] These distinctions have avoided the question of rhetorical skill; Rebhorn and Kennedy make rhetor and orator equivalent, but the latter notes that orator can carry a connotation of "eloquence not necessarily present in" rhetor (Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 35 note 32). My use of orator does not intend to convey such skill, but is privileged since it derives from the Roman rhetorical tradition.

[9] For one example, see Duffy's entry on "anthropology" in *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*.

conceptions of ethics accessible to each figure. Two of these which will play a prominent role are realism and utilitarianism. It may be more proper to call the latter proto-utilitarianism; I do not use the term "utilitarianism" to denote the specific sense of that word that is associated with the thought of Bentham and Mill. Instead I use the term in a broader sense that is meant to indicate a consequentialist, proportionalist, or situational ethics in which emphasis is placed on the achievement of a result. While the fullest articulation of utilitarianism postdates the Renaissance, the greatest exponents of realism, Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, predate the period. When the term realism is employed, I mean to signify what Alasdair MacIntyre, in his *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*, calls the moral inquiry of "tradition." While realism sometimes has placed greater emphasis on law and, at other times, has emphasized nature and virtue, different strains of realism are united in their belief that first principles can be discerned in the natural order.[10] In the generic sense in which the project uses realism and utilitarianism, both ethical systems can be said to be "available" in the Renaissance. Each system has a different view of rhetorical ethics. In a realist rhetorical ethic, good ends never justify illicit means, and an epistemology is assumed in which aptly delivered truth is more persuasive than equally well delivered falsehood. In the utilitarian view, there is more ambivalence about the greater potency of well-spoken truth, and means are assessed not according to a moral standard, but according to their potential utility in achieving an end.

Chapter Abstracts

The first chapter of the dissertation reads Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* and Cicero's *De Officiis* and *De Oratore*. I contend that—in addition to providing the archetype of the ideal

[10] The claim to be able to discern first principles in the natural order can be said of Stoic ethics as well; this will prove notable in the investigation of Cicero's rhetorical ethics.

orator that becomes an exemplum, generative to the Renaissance imagination—these two influential Roman authors develop very different rhetorical ethics. Cicero gives an unsystematic account of rhetoric as a noble, justice-seeking art in which the expedient is always tethered to the honorable. While Cicero is often thought of as a skeptic, and while we have examples in his corpus that reveal him to be a man who did not always live up to the task of yoking the expedient with the honorable, his ethics are of the realist school. Quintilian admires Cicero and initially restates Cicero's epistemological optimism. However, Quintilian ultimately fails to define the relationship between moral goodness and skilled speech in the orator, leading to a surprisingly utilitarian ethic in which he encourages illicit means to a good end.

The second chapter focuses on Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*, the principle Christian intervention into the rhetorical tradition. Augustine rejects Quintilian's situational ethic, rearticulating a realist rhetorical ethic in its place. His emphases and orientation, though, differentiate his views from those of Cicero. The Bishop of Hippo always maintains the salvation of orator and audience as the ultimate end of any act of persuasion, insists that no falsehoods may be used as means of persuasion, and emphasizes the role of the passions of the audience when an orator seeks to persuade not only to intellectual assent, but also to action. The chapter then turns to Thomas Wilson's 1560 manual, *The Art of Rhetoric,* for an example of a text that is both deeply Christian (Augustinian and Calvinist) and highly Roman. Wilson articulates a common view that eloquence is a reliable indicator of a speaker's moral goodness and a guarantee of his rhetorical ethics. The chapter concludes by contrasting this view of rhetoric with another which claims, influenced by a caricature of Machiavelli, that not all speech is rhetorical and that rhetoric is inherently unethical, encouraging lying or concealment. This

hyper-cynical view and Wilson's naïve one provide two extreme answers to whether it is possible to have an ethics of rhetoric aiming at the good.

The naïve-versus-cynical binary that I lay out in the first two chapters provides a continuum on which I situate More, Shakespeare, and Bacon. Using More's *History of King Richard III*, the third chapter argues that More ironically employs language that evokes the Roman ideal orator tradition when describing Richard, a tyrannical sophist who seeks to scatter a gathered humanity through his words. This reversal, woven into the narrator's descriptions of the represented acts of persuasion, reveals More's epistemological optimism, which is nuanced by his Christian anthropology and Augustinian ontology. I contend that his epistemology not only values truth well spoken, but also—in its dramatic enactment—offers a reflection on how to see through a speaker's dissembling. Ultimately, he suggests the complementary workings of both an intuitive degree of discernment and a prudent eye, well trained by abstract thinking, as the best way to penetrate beneath a sophist's disguise; his difficult text is actually designed to improve a reader's faculty of sharp sight. In More, we find another proponent of realist rhetorical ethics; however, by removing rhetoric from the position of highest excellence, he avoids the naiveté of Wilson while reasserting a confidence that rhetoric can contribute to the personal and common good.

The next chapter looks at three Shakespeare plays—*Richard III*, *Othello*, and *Cymbeline*—and uncovers their rhetorical ethics. Shakespeare shows the real power of sophistry and concealment in the characters of Richard III and Iago. Especially in the latter, Shakespeare gives an example of a sophist whose façade is impenetrable and whose words are persuasive. I make an initial case that Shakespeare holds the cynical view of rhetoric and that he suggests that acquisition of authentic knowledge may be impossible. However, in *Cymbeline*, Imogen's

ability to discern the evil intentions of the honey-tongued Iachimo and to forestall tragedy nuances the chapter's argument. Shakespeare's negative view was a de facto suspicion predicated on the absence of an orator: skilled, virtuous, and devout. The Shakespearean ideal orator, as figured in Imogen, is both Ciceronian and religious (professing a pagan religion that Shakespeare inflects with Judeo-Christian, Augustinian elements). I conclude that Shakespeare believes that the species of ethical and apt rhetoric is more powerful than sophistry; Imogen's realist ethics and her faith, informing her apt words, allow her to discover means of persuasion wholly unavailable to the sophist. I further contend that Shakespeare deems the sharp-sighted agent, though limited and fallible, able to see through false appearances. In fact, Shakespeare reprises More's contention that there are complementary degrees of knowledge acquisition, including an intuitive mode, that work together to see through dissembling. However, *Othello* casts a long shadow; Shakespeare insists that sophistry is potent and that an Imogen-like orator is rare. Even while he gives rhetoric a privileged place in serving the good, Shakespeare clearly discerns the multifarious ways in which words can be abused.

The final chapter turns to Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis*. The citizens of New Atlantis often seek to persuade for ends of questionable value with illicit means. I show that Bacon, unlike More and Shakespeare, presents the sophistic citizens of the utopia as essential to the flourishing of the commonwealth, not as evil destroyers of the bonds that unite humanity. I argue not only that Bacon departs from Augustinian cosmology in his scientific works, but also that he rejects Augustine's ethics in this literary work. He revitalizes Quintilian's utilitarian rhetorical ethic and reveals his own epistemological pessimism: to be most persuasive one must use seductive force, not cooperative means. This coincides with Bacon's departure from the belief of More and Shakespeare in an intuitive degree of knowing that complements more

advanced degrees of knowledge acquisition. Bacon manifests little concern about the ability of people to see through false appearances, instead suggesting a more gnostic program in which the strong possess secret knowledge that the weak will never attain.

Chapter I

The Sixteenth Century Debate and the Roman Influence

"I am no orator. . . . / For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worth, / Action, nor utterance, nor the power of speech, / To stir men's blood. I only speak right on" (*Julius Caesar* 3.2.216, 220-2). So Shakespeare's Antony stirs the Romans, renouncing rhetoric via rhetorical tropes (paralipsis and polysyndeton).[11] Examples could easily be multiplied to show English Renaissance authors' sustained interest in the nature of rhetoric and the ethics that govern it.[12] This preoccupation is widespread, as rhetoric is often understood to include nearly all communication.[13] Most humanists thought cultivating the art of rhetoric in citizens was necessary for the renewal of commonwealths, and many of their successors considered rhetoric to be a (or, perhaps, *the*) privileged branch of learning that undergirds all other knowledge.[14] For many, rhetoric was considered not just a utilitarian tool to educate courtiers, but a liberal art, integral to the good, to the flourishing of the individual person and of society. Both the confidence of the liberal position and the potential political consequences (for good or ill) of the more utilitarian view incited in another group of observers an anxiety that rhetoric did not guarantee human flourishing and might be essentially flawed, actively promoting great ill. After

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[11] To use Lanham's definitions: In the paralipsis figure, "[a] speaker emphasizes something by pointedly seeming to pass over it" (*Handlist* 68), and in polysyndeton, a speaker uses a "conjunction between each clause" (*Handlist* 78).

[12] See note 15 for a representative sample.

[13] Ancients, such as Cicero (*De oratore* 1.22) and Quintilian (*Institutio Oratoria* 2.21), share this view which Rebhorn shows was prevalent in the early modern period (*Emperor* 1-5).

Among the many helpful studies that treat Renaissance rhetoric, see Gray, Kahn, (*Machiavellian Rhetoric, Prudence*), Plett, Rebhorn (*Debates*), and Shuger (*Sacred*). For studies that pay particular attention to England, see the magisterial writings of T. W. Baldwin and of Joseph; these two were among the first to emphasize the importance of rhetoric to Shakespeare. Also for more recent treatments of rhetoric in Renaissance England, see Altman (*Tudor Play*), Armstrong, Mack, Plett (415-75), Rebhorn (*Emperor*), Rhodes (3-65), and Vickers ("Power of Persuasion").

[14] Indeed, Hardison rightly argues that "Renaissance humanists made rhetoric the queen of the sciences" (24).

all, Antony's purpose is to stir up "mischief" (3.2.258) Those holding this view conceive of rhetoric in a more narrow fashion; to avoid being rendered mute, they assume that rhetoric is not a constitutive part of all speech.

What might initially appear to be an unquestioned enthusiasm for rhetoric in the period turns out to be an ongoing debate (both among humanists and between their successors) about whether or not it is possible to have an ethical rhetoric aiming at the good. This debate was argued in fictive texts (drama, prose, and poetry), histories, sermons, and treatises, and while many subtle positions emerge in this conversation, the opinions can be organized into two overarching categories: the confident and the suspicious. Furthermore, extreme positions, confident and suspicious, were not uncommon. On the continuum of available opinions, it is useful to note that, at one extreme, confidence can (and did) become idealized naïveté, and suspicion, an anxious cynicism. Despites variations and differences of degree, all those in the confident camp, naïve or not, believe that ethical rhetoric is essentially good, possible, and has the potential to be more persuasive than unethical sophistry, while all the suspicious believe that rhetoric is essentially no different than sophistry: unethical and worthy of suspicion. In other words, the confident camp would answer the titular question—"Is the *Ars Rhetorica* for the Good?"—with a resounding affirmation while the cynics would deny that rhetoric can be for the good.[15]

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[15] I will often allude to the diversity of opinions about and overarching concern with rhetoric in Renaissance England. Therefore, in chronological order, let me provide a series of examples (to which many more could be added) to substantiate my claim. Many of these statements have been interpreted by critics as ironic and meaning precisely the opposite of what they say, but as Rebhorn points out, the lengthy refutation of counter-arguments in pro-rhetoric texts, as well as any ironic anti-rhetorical texts can at least be said to articulate an anti-rhetorical sentiment that is "already available [in the discourse]" (*Emperor* 20 note 26). In his 1519 letter, Thomas More's mocks Edward Lee: "How you play the orator [*rhetoris*] here, heaping up words to exaggerate things which are basically petty" (*CW* 15, 170-117/25-27). (See Wegemer for a full account of More's comments on rhetoric ["Civic Humanism" 188].) Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa spent time in England, and his 1531 *De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum et Atrium* (translated into English in 1575) argues that " [t]o confess the truth, it is generally granted that the entire discipline of rhetoric from start to finish is nothing other than an art of flattery, adulation, and, as

Implicit in the question about the *Ars Rhetorica* is the whole history of rhetoric because two of the progenitors of the rhetorical tradition, Plato and Aristotle (at least seem to) disagree

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some say more audaciously, lying, in that, if it cannot persuade others through the truth of the case, it does so by means of deceitful speech (77 in Rebhorn's *Debates*). John Jewel's *Oratio Contra Rhetoricam* (c.1544-52) was not published until 1848. He advises the young not to "spend so much time and effort on a thing . . . which darkens a good cause, illuminates and adorns a bad one; which lays downs rules for deceits, frauds, and lies; which was devised and created for error, for profit, and for democratic heedlessness; which avoids judicious censure of the wise; which has overthrown great commonwealths; which the most ancient states rejected. . ." (391). Thomas Wilson's *Art of Rhetoric* (1560) concludes by insisting that "the good will not speak evil and the wicked cannot speak well" (244). In an introductory epistle addressed to the Ramist Gabriel Harvey, Edmund Spenser's E.K. (*The Shepheardes Calender*, 1579) discusses the use of archaic language with an eye toward rhetorical issues. "And firste of the wordes to speake, I graunt they be something hard, and of most men unused, yet both English, and also used of most excellent Authors and most famous Poetes. In whom whenas this our Poet hath bene much traveiled and thoroughly redd, how could it be, (as the worthy Oratour sayde) but that walking in the sonne although for other cause he walked, yet needes he mought be sunburnt; and having the sound of those auncient Poetes still ringing in his eares, he mought needes in singing hit out some of theyr tunes (14). In the early 1580s, though published in 1595, Sir Phillip Sidney, concerned with those preachers who use excessive figures and repetitions, notes: "Truly, they have made thee think of the sophister, that with too much subtlety would prove two eggs three, and though he might be counted a sophister, had none for his labor. So these men, bringing in such a kind of eloquence, well may they obtain an opinion of a seeming fineness, but persuade few, which should be the end of their fineness" (121). In 1589, George Puttenham registers both the naïve and cynical sentiments: "These and many such like disguisings do we find in man's behauiour, and specially in the Courtiers of forraine Countreyes. . . . Which parts, neuerthelesse, we allow not now in our English maker, because we haue geuen him the name of an honest man, and not of an hypocrite : and therefore, leauing these manner of dissimulations to all base-minded men, and of vile nature or misterie, we doe allow our Courtly Poet to be a dissembler only in the subtilties of his art : that is, when he is most artificiall, so to disguise and cloake it as it may not appeare, nor seems to proceeds from him by any studie or trade of rules, but to be his naturall. . . . (308). The second edition of Henry Peacham's *The Garden of Eloquence* (1593) fashions a series of similes to praise rhetoric: "For to possess great knowledge without apt utterance is as to possess great treasure without use; contrariwise, to affect eloquence without the discretion of wisdom is as to handle a sweet instrument of music without skill. . . . So mighty is the power of this happy union—I mean of wisdom and eloquence—. . . that [the orator] is in an manner the emperor of men's minds and affections and next to the omnipotent God in the power of persuasion by grace and divine assistance" (225-6 in Rebhorn's *Debates*). In 1619, Samuel Purchas argues that "*Rhetoricke* is yet worse. . . it is a swelling Poyson, it climbes into Pulpits, Tribunalls, Theaters, to proue a publike Pestilence" (72 in Plett). In 1624, John Donne argues that "*Invention*, and *Disposition*, and *Art*, and *Eloquence*, and *Expression*, and *Elocution*, and *reading*, and *writing*, and *printing*, are secondary things, accessory things, auxiliary, subsidiary things; men may account us and make account of us, as of *Orators* in the pulpit, and of *Authors*, in the shop; but if they account of us as of *Ministers and Stewards*, they give us our due; that's our name to you" (9). Many other English authors, such as Caxton, Colet, Hawes, Elyot, Ascham, Sherry, Marlowe, Harvey, Jonson, Rainolds, Garnet (and with him those, such as Barnes, Mason, Morton, and Southwell, on both sides of the mental reservation debate), Hobbes, Bacon, and Milton, as well as continental authors like Ficino, Pico, Castiglione, Machiavelli, Vives, Agricola, Erasmus, Ramus, Montaigne, and Melanchthon—some of whom are know in England—could be added to this catalogue of perspectives on rhetoric that includes moderate positions, as well as advocates for the naïve and cynical extremes.

In addition to Rebhorn (*Emperor*) and Vickers "Power of Persuasion," see Kahn (*Machiavellian Rhetoric* 87-92), Plett (67-73), and Rebhorn (*Debates*) for two synthetic accounts and a synoptic, primary text treatment of some of the "praise and blame of rhetoric" in the Renaissance (Plett 67).

about whether or not rhetoric is an art (*ars, techne*).[16] While classical Greek texts were less widely known in Renaissance England than classical Roman texts, the whole notion of the *Ars Rhetorica* evokes the debate between Plato and Aristotle on rhetoric's status which would have been known in some form in England, even by those who did not have direct access to the Greek texts.[17] In his *Gorgias*, Plato famously has Socrates argue that rhetoric is not an art (*techne*), but a knack, a branch of flattery akin to cooking and cosmetics (462b-466a). Socrates, at least partially, rehabilitates rhetoric by the end of the dialogue and in a work of greater maturity, the *Phaedrus*, he defines rhetoric as an art (*techne*) of soul leading [to the good] by means of language (261a).[18] Plato further expands his treatment in the *Sophist*. This text condemns sophistical speech on metaphysical, epistemological, and linguistic grounds and may maintain a space for true assertions of rhetoric.[19] Aristotle is less ambiguous. From the first chapter of his treatise *On Rhetoric*, he maintains not only that rhetoric is an art (*techne*), but that this fact is readily apparent to all (1.1.2). Generally speaking, Renaissance writers place Aristotle in the

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[16] I have no intention of rehearsing this history in the current study, but mention it only as it is applicable to understanding the view of rhetoric in Renaissance English culture. For a concise history of rhetoric, see Corbett (539-78).

[17] See Hope (1-39) for an illustration of how commonplace many of the ideas of Plato and Aristotle were for English Renaissance writers. Quite different from my focus, Hope attends particularly to the debate between Aristotle and Plato, concerning whether or not linguistic meaning is arrived at by custom.

[18] See Crider ("Art of Gathering" esp. 2-5) for one reading of the *Gorgias* which argues for Plato's rehabilitation of rhetoric.

[19] The *Sophist* (as well as the *Symposium* and *Timaeus*) prove particularly important in the Italian Renaissance as Marsilio Ficino finds in them a Neo-Platonic path by which to join classical thought with spiritual concerns and—at the same time—to address questions of rhetoric and ethics. While Hoby's translation of Castiglione gives a brand of Neo-Platonism to the English Renaissance, *The Book of the Courtier* focuses readers on typical Neo-Platonic ideas regarding metaphysics, knowledge, will, and eros over and against treating questions of rhetoric and ethics at length. Speaking is only one of the many arts a courtier must master in the text. Castiglione does introduce "sprezzatura," (a concept pregnant with rhetorical ethical significance), but such a notion is already present in the rhetorical tradition when Cicero, for example, recommends "careful negligence" (*Orator* 78). While we will see More, Shakespeare, and Bacon all grapple with the possible synthesis of classical and religious thought, Neo-Platonism is not a central player in their attempts to answer the *Ars Rhetorica* question in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England. For an account of how More's humanism incorporates spiritual concerns while differentiating itself from the Neo-Platonism of Pico, see Beier. See Marback (46-72) and Allen (*Icastes*) for two accounts of Ficino's interpretation of the *Sophist*.

confident camp, as one of the art's foremost defenders. Despite the strong evidence that Plato did not maintain a wholly suspicious view of rhetoric, his critique is so powerful and became so well-known that he is viewed by many writers as an opponent of rhetoric.[20]

In the Renaissance view of Plato and Aristotle and in the views of the period's many confident and suspicious theorists, one can discern a common belief that undergirds all the various available positions. All acknowledge rhetoric's power or force (*vis*, *dynamis*). The naïve branch of the confident camp believes that this force should not be feared, but respected, and all in the confident camp believe that rhetoric is used in the service of the common good to help create or sustain the social order by way of words which motivate an audience to think more clearly and to act well. This camp believes that all rhetoric is ethical rhetoric. To misuse rhetoric does not condemn the art, but the speaker, who is not a rhetor at all, but a sophist as manifest in his or her unethical means or ends, actions or intentions. The suspicious camp believes that rhetorical force cannot be constrained by ethics and is, in fact, inherently unethical because in its nature it lends itself to abuse of the audience. This abuse can be manifest not only in an act of persuasion's end (*telos*, *finis*), but its means. An unethical end is obvious: a speaker seeks to transmit a lie or create social chaos. However, even the seeking of a good end is liable to corruption in the eyes of the suspicious because the force of rhetoric does not cooperate with the hearers' reason, but dupes them by a sort of passionate magic.[21]

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[20] For example, see Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* in which he criticizes Plato and appears to assert a more epistemologically optimistic position (238).

[21] For a concise and helpful comparison of the competing views of rhetorical force, see Crider (*Office of Assertion* 1-4 and 119-20). Of course, the idea of words as magical comes from Gorgias himself in his "Encomium of Helen." Rebhorn, while his own view of power is deeply influenced by Foucault (*Emperor* 93-4), nicely sums up how a confident Renaissance thinker and suspicious one would view rhetorical power. The former would see rhetoric as "an instrument of politics," a "power responsible for creating and maintaining the peace and order of the state" while the latter would view it as a "dangerous source of social and political instability, as the cause of riots, rebellion, and civil war" (*Debates* 3).

In unpacking the question, "Is the *Ars Rhetorica* for the Good?", we have seen that a wide range of writers in the Renaissance agree that rhetoric is potent and that some believe it is an art, but it remains to identify what is "the Good" which rhetorical power may or may not serve.[22] The term "good" is, at best, abstract and, at worst, vague. Different figures examined in this dissertation will have different views on what the good is and how it is to be determined. As a starting point, let me lay out the Aristotelian view which would have had traction in the English Renaissance.[23] Aristotle thinks about the good both in terms of the commonwealth and the individual. The two goods are commensurate (*Politics* 7.2.), but to understand the community one must begin with the individual (7.1). For the individual person, then, the "human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue" (*Ethics* 1.7). While many in the Renaissance would assent to this view, it should be added that they would want to wed this claim to a Christian ethics and metaphysics in which the ultimate end and good to be sought is communion with God in time and in eternity.[24]

With characteristic terseness, Aristotle next asserts that "there can be no doubt" that the "happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state" (*Politics* 7.2). The common good, therefore, is found in a well-ordered and virtuous commonwealth that assists all in their

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[22] Again, cf. note 15 for examples of the wide range of opinions.

[23] There is, in Richard Foster Jones' word, a "revolt" from Aristotle in the later part of the period both in science and ethics, but before the advent of Hobbes and Bacon, my necessarily broad generalization holds. See Schmitt's treatment of John Case which shows the presence of Aristotelianism in England (13-76) and MacIntyre's account ("John Case") of how Case's Aristotelianism is "self-subverting." Schmitt notes that the Renaissance in England brought "a greater degree of emphasis" on works of moral philosophy, and he provides an account of the mixed fortunes of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in England between 1479-1634 which included a printing of Bruni's translation, a vernacular version by John Wilkinson, an "exposition" by Heiland, and Case's *Speculum quaestionum moralium* (23-4). Furthermore, while none of Aristotle's logical, metaphysical, or scientific works were translated in to English in these decades, the *Ethics* and *Politics* were (60-1).

[24] For an articulation of this ultimate end for which to strive, see More's reworking of Pico (*CW* 1, 123/5-12).

individual and collective quest to cultivate virtue.[25] Much in the same way that that the good of the individual is augmented by a Christian philosophical anthropology in Renaissance culture, the English Renaissance understanding of the common good is enlarged by Christian ethical thought. When one appeals to Aristotle's *Politics*, his ranking of the six types of regimes is evoked. Many English Renaissance thinkers would agree with Aristotle that the best among the six possible regimes is monarchy, but Aristotle himself might view some of the Tudor reigns as more tyrannical than monarchical.[26] Furthermore, lingering medieval notions of a king's divine right, paradoxically co-existing with a rebirth of republican ideals garnered from classical texts force Tudor England to recast ideas, near Aristotle's own, in new and various (and often incommensurate) ways while still maintaining that the common good is found in a commonwealth that provides the best conditions for the possession of virtue and wisdom (*Politics* 7.1) both in action and contemplation (7.2).

The titular question can now be restated: is rhetoric (which may be an art) for the growth of the individual in virtue and piety, and for the order and stability of a just society? Aware of the confident and suspicious answers to this question and with a better sense of what is meant by the good, it is necessary to gain a fuller understanding of what is meant by rhetorical ethics. It has already been noted that rhetoric for the Renaissance imagination encompasses not only formal speeches, but all persuasion. Furthermore, for English Renaissance humanists, all rhetoric was ethical rhetoric. The humanists "distinguished carefully between 'true eloquence' [rhetoric] and

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[25] While many words are available in Renaissance England to describe a society (*polis*, *civis*, *respublica*, kingdom), I prefer "commonwealth" because of the ethical concern stamped into the very word and because it will be used by More and Shakespeare. Rawley uses it in his note that introduces *New Atlantis*, but the work itself only uses commonwealth to describe and mock More's *Utopia*. The occasional use of more generic words such as "society" and "community" is not meant to suggest the Enlightenment ideas associated with a free or open "society."

[26] See Thomas Smith's *De Republica Anglorum* (published in 1583) which begins with Aristotle's regimes (1.1) and praises the English monarch as the head of the commonwealth (2.3).

'sophistry,' perceiving in the latter a perversion, not a consequence, of the former" (Gray 498). This is a distinction that is sometimes difficult to apply, but that Renaissance proponents of rhetoric will use time and again; to fail to meet the ethical standards was to be a sophist, not an orator.

If the rhetorical art is not just a hand list of rules to craft a speech, but instead bears on all persuasions, and if one accepts the distinction between rhetoric and sophistry, then an ethics of rhetoric becomes all the more important. While different ethical systems articulate different rhetorical ethics, a general account (that some might dispute) to introduce rhetorical ethics is necessary at the outset of the inquiry. A full ethics of rhetoric seeks to distinguish rhetoric (which by definition is always ethical) from sophistry. To do so is to discover the principles which when followed allow the orator, having discerned the particulars of a situation, to craft and deliver the best possible act of persuasion. This persuasion employs licit means and seeks good ends, including the moving of an audience to appropriate assent or action. These principles seek to ensure that an act of persuasion endeavors to move an audience not by deception, but by an awakening of an audiences own deliberative faculties toward the good end to which the orator seeks to persuade. Or to formulate an ethics of rhetoric in a negative and concise fashion: an ethics of rhetoric is a system which aims to understand what constraints need to be put on speaking and writing, so that good words lead toward the good, so that rhetoric properly motivates the hearer to act in accordance with the good.

It is the considerations of ends, means, and circumstance that are addressed in any system of rhetorical ethics and dominate any debate about the possibility of an ethical rhetoric aiming at

the good.[27] Aristotle, in the first chapter of the first book of his *Rhetoric* signals that the means selected will be part of all rhetorical ethical discernment, "for all sophistry is not a matter of ability but of deliberate choice [of specious arguments]" (1.1.14).[28] What will also differentiate rhetoric for the good from sophistry is the intention/ends of the speaking or writing agent and his or her character. In other words, not only are ethically licit means required for an ethical persuasion, but also a good end, intent, or purpose (*telos* or *finis*). In fact, most acts of persuasion have multiple ends, but an ethics of rhetoric can always discern at least two discrete but related ends, the external end of persuading one's audience and the internal end of speaking the best possible case.[29] This distinction, which Quintilian will articulate clearly (2.17.23), allows for the possibility of audience defect that might prevent a rhetor from persuading with his or her ethical case which has discovered and employed all the potent, available means of persuasion.[30] Circumstance emphasizes the fact that any rhetor will often have to speak in an extemporaneous fashion and within limits of human knowledge, exercising prudence or practical wisdom. However, it is not so much this reality that excites ethical concern, as much as the

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[27] Sometimes the language of "intention, action, and circumstance" is used to discuss ethics, but I will rely on the ends, means language because of the way in which the inquiry has framed an act of persuasion: a speaker speaking on an issue to an audience, using means to achieve ends in a particular circumstance.

[28] The translator, Kennedy, not myself, adds the parenthetical prepositional phrase.

[29] I am indebted to Garver for the vocabulary of "guiding/internal" and "given/external" ends (*An Art of Character* 22-41). His fine study shows that this distinction is present in Aristotle's corpus, including in the *Rhetoric*. This distinction is also implicit in Cicero's *De Inventione* 1.6 and *De Oratore* 1.138 and is explicit, though not directly applied to speaking, in the treatment of *utile* and *honestum* in *De Officiis*. Quintilian is most explicit in making the distinction: "Moreover, the real orator will always achieve [the end], because he will always speak well. However, this criticism may perhaps be valid against those who think that the 'end' is to persuade. My orator, and the art that I have defined, do not depend on the outcome. The speaker certainly aims to win; but when he has spoken well, even if he does not win, he has fulfilled the demands of his art. . . . [T]his art depends on the activity, not on the outcome" (2.17.23).

[30] Again, as with intention, one can see the indebtedness of the conversation to Aristotle, who defined rhetoric not only as an "art," but as "an ability [dynamis] in each [particular] case to see the available means of persuasion" (1.2.1); however, Plato's influence is also felt. Recall his definition that rhetoric as the art of soul leading [to the good] by means of language (261a) in the *Phaedrus*. Cicero and Quintilian's definitions will also prove useful, but will be treated at length later in the chapter.

aspect of circumstance that is sometimes labeled decorum, in which the rhetor aptly fits his or her case to the situation (note that this has linked considerations back to the means). Such a task is not only difficult, but also may tempt a rhetor to unethical means of persuasion. With a fuller knowledge of rhetorical ethics, we can reframe with greater precision what began as our question about the possibility of an art of rhetoric for the good: can a well intentioned orator in any circumstance produce an ethical act of persuasion (both in its means and end) with the potential of moving the audience toward appropriate assent or right action, and if so, then is such an act of persuasion more persuasive than a competing unethical act of persuasion (judged either by the orator's intention/ends or means)?

This foundational understanding begins to prepare us to understand the sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century views of rhetoric that are diverse and that are rarely simple or static. However, to more deeply comprehend rhetoric in the English Renaissance, one must comprehend the two Roman authors, Cicero and Quintilian, who were touchstones in the debates about rhetorical ethics and to whom More, Shakespeare, and Bacon all had access.

Marcus Tullius Cicero

While in the latter part of the period the Ramists will eventually challenge the Ciceronian and Quintilianic views and there are many Renaissance enthusiasts of Roman rhetoric who are amused and annoyed by the sycophantic hyper-admiration that some profess for "Holy Saint Cicero," it remains difficult to underestimate how influential Cicero and Quintilian were upon the Renaissance.[31] In England, in particular, critics such as E. Armstrong, T. W. Baldwin, Howard Jones, George Kennedy ("Cicero's Legacy"), Peter Mack, Russ McDonald (*Arts of*

[31] The quotation is taken from Erasmus and is found in T. W. Baldwin (II 588).

Language), and Skinner (*Reason and Rhetoric* 19-137) have shown the pervasiveness of Roman rhetorical theory and practice in spheres of education, literature, and public life.

This study could turn to various texts to discover Cicero's rhetorical ethics, but it will rely most heavily on Cicero's final work of moral philosophy, *De Officiis* and on his finest articulation of rhetorical theory, *De Oratore*. The former was written during the last year of Cicero's life and was ubiquitous in Renaissance England. It is largely a discussion of whether moral excellence (*honestum*) and the expedient (*utile*) are always, never, or sometimes in conflict with one another. The latter was not as widely read as other Ciceronian works on oratory, such as *De Inventione* and *Ad Herennium* (a pseudo-Ciceronian text that was considered authentic in the sixteenth-century). However, *De Oratore* was not unknown in the period and remains a more valuable source for Cicero's rhetorical ethics than *De Inventione* or *Ad Herennium*.[32] These two latter texts are rather conventional manuals. It is still possible to understand some of Cicero's rhetorical ethics from such manuals (as it will be with Quintilian's manual), and *De*

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[32] The full degree to which *De Oratore* was known in England is difficult to surmise. It was a common place among humanists and schoolmasters to quote Cicero's text as an authority on the pedagogical practice of translating a passage out of one language into another and then translating that passage back into the original language. T. W. Baldwin is littered with references to this development from Cicero's suggestion to "take the speeches of the great orators from Greece and reformulate them" (1.155). (In T. W. Baldwin, see I 263-5 and I 581.) Also, the Ciceronian dialogue was known to the English Renaissance for its treatment of humor which was relevant in English debates about the stage and the comedic genre (Galbraith 3-15). Yet it was only printed in England twice in the sixteenth century (T. W. Baldwin II 62). However, it is "very often found" in the lists of books from students who died in residence at university, suggesting it was part of a "basic reading list in rhetoric at both universities" (Mack 51-2). Furthermore, "of Cicero's rhetorical works, *De Oratore* is by far the most frequently referred to by English writers of the sixteenth century" even if not "the most widely used" (T. W. Baldwin II 62). For example, a study of references to Cicero's various rhetorical works in Wilson's *Art of Rhetoric* and Roger Ascham's *Scholemaster* reveals that both rely more heavily on *De Oratore* than on any other Ciceronian text (T. W. Baldwin II 64). Ascham calls *De Oratore* the "best book that Tully ever wrote" (quoted in Armstrong 1). *De Oratore*, at least in a limited fashion, was an important part of the English Renaissance discourse on rhetoric. See Armstrong, who (rightly) presumes Sidney and Spenser's knowledge of the text.

Among our three authors in particular, More clearly has *De Oratore* and *De Officiis*. For example, he alludes to the former in the *Historia* (*CW* 15, 422-423/20-22; cf. *De Oratore* 2.237-247) and to *De Officiis* in *Utopia* (for example, see notes on 51 and 69). Shakespeare knows *De Officiis*; see T. W. Baldwin II 578-616. His direct knowledge of *De Oratore* is less clear, but he would have some of its ideas through references in Sidney and Spenser, and he would have had *Ad Herennium* and, possibly, *De Inventione*. (See T. W. Baldwin II 69-107.) Bacon, like More, manifests his knowledge of *De Officiis* and *De Oratore* across his writings. In his *Advancement of Learning*, *De Officiis*, for example, is quoted on 175, and *De Oratore* is alluded to on 223. More's and Bacon's knowledge is not coming from commonplaces; many additional citations of their allusions to Cicero could be added.

Inventione has some important passages to which the study will give attention, but Cicero goes out of his way in the *De Oratore* to disclaim the *De Inventione*, explaining to his brother that:

> you have often told me, you would like me to publish something more polished and mature on this subject, since the sketchy and unsophisticated work that found its way out of my notebooks when I was a boy (or rather a youth) is hardly worthy of my present age and of the experience I have acquired from pleading so many momentous cases. (1.5)[33]

Indeed, Cicero had been about seventeen when he composed *De Inventione* (May and Wisse 58) and was about fifty-one when he finished *De Oratore*. Furthermore, Cicero's change of approach in the more mature work, composing a philosophical dialogue instead of a handbook, was "a rejection of the standard approach to oratory" in his own day (Wisse 376). Cicero is doing something in *De Oratore* that is unique and demands attention.

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 B.C. – 43), along with Demosthenes, is—to the present day—considered the greatest orator of the classical period. He was a new man who is remembered for his speeches, oratorical works, and philosophical writings. His political career was as tumultuous as the late Republican period in which he served. The two most famous episodes in his public life are probably his putting down of the Catilinarian conspiracy in 63 and his speeches against Antony which led to his murder and to the nailing of his head to the rostra at the forum in 43.[34] While Aristotle and Plato were quite concerned with the ethical questions that surround rhetoric, Cicero has a reputation for being less so (May and Wisse 12). It is true that he rarely touches directly on the topic, but as a moral philosopher (ethicist) in *De Officiis* and as one

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[33] All translations from *De Oratore* are from May and Wisse, unless noted otherwise.

[34] See May ("Cicero") and Glendon for brief biographies of Cicero. It is interesting to note that Glendon is holding Cicero up as a model for contemporary lawyers and politicians.

who sets out "to answer the challenge of the anti-rhetorical content [of Plato's early and middle dialogues]" in *De Oratore* (Fantham 50), one is able to discern something of his rhetorical ethics.[35]

The genre of these two texts will prove to be important background information for the present discussion. I have already noted that *De Officiis* was written during Cicero's last year of life, and as one might suspect from the title, the book concerns itself with a person's ethical duties. Additionally, it should be noted that *De Officiis* is composed as a lengthy letter from Cicero to his son Marcus, during the youth's residence in Athens to study philosophy. *De Oratore* is a dramatic dialogue, the first of this genre to survive in Latin (Fantham 49). The dialogue self-consciously evokes and, in many ways, seeks to outdo Plato's *Phaedrus*. The *Phaedrus* is Plato's only dialogue which takes place outside the city walls. Socrates and Phaedrus find a comfortable spot under a plane tree next to a stream, not far from the altar to Boreas, where they will talk of the love, divine madness, rhetoric, and the written word. In Cicero's dialogue the Roman statesmen Crassus, Antonio, and others remove themselves from Rome during the games to Crassus's estate where they will discuss oratory under the plane tree, at a remove from the dangerous affairs of the city. While one could enumerate many differences between Cicero and Plato's tales, Cicero's setting and explicit allusions to Plato's *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*, held in tension with his stated purpose to defend rhetoric, reveal that this text will be an apology for rhetoric which must engage the possibility of an ethical rhetoric, with Plato's supposedly pessimistic suspicion against the possibility of ethical rhetoric never far from the forefront.

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[35] Among the many treatments of Cicero, I have found a few especially useful for the current treatment. For discussions of *De Oratore*, see Crider ("Art of Gathering"), DiLorenzo, Fantham, May (*Trials of Character*, esp. 1-12), May and Wisse, and Wisse. For discussions of *De Officiis*, see Atkins, Frank, and Simpson (74-89). Also, for more general treatments, see Cape, Nicgorski, and Remer.

The dramatic dialogue genre of *De Oratore* presents some difficulties in interpretation of Cicero's actual position. Nevertheless, it is clear that Crassus is the most privileged voice of the dialogue. While taking Antonius and other's positions seriously, especially as articulations of points about which Cicero was unsure, we can generally take Crassus's opinion to be very nearly that of Cicero's within the *in utramque partem* discussions. The irony of Plato's dialogues (much like More's *Utopia*) presents an additional layer of difficulty which can "hamper interpretation" (Pieper, *Enthusiasm* 29); happily, Cicero is not as deeply ironic as Plato, but we must also be careful to discern when and in what way Cicero is in earnest when speaking through the voices of different interlocutors.

A number of episodes in the two texts bear upon rhetorical ethics. An obvious place to begin is with Crassus's definition of rhetoric. The definition is introduced by him with the tag: "so the rules say" (1.138). Indeed, the account reads like a textbook and draws on *De Inventione* 1.6 in which the young Cicero explains that rhetoric's duty (*officium*) is "to speak in a manner suited to persuade an audience" and its end (*finis*) is "to persuade by speech."[36] In *De Oratore*, Crassus does not speak about the art of rhetoric, but its practitioner's office: "the duty of the orator is to speak in a manner suited to persuasion [*primum oratoris officium esse, dicere ad persuadendum accommodate*]" (1.138).[37] In the division of office and end in the early text and in the winding treatment of the office in both texts, one finds a glance at the distinction between the internal end of speaking the best possible (and ethical) act of persuasion and the external end of persuading an audience. However, one does not find a full acknowledgement of the limited

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[36] Latin and English of *De Inventione* are taken from Hubbell's text.

[37] The Latin passages of *De Oratore*, unless noted otherwise, are taken from Sutton and Rackham's Loeb edition. For the definitive Latin edition, see Wilkins.

control which the orator has over the external end nor is there a clearly articulated commitment to seeking the ethically-bound internal end which would characterize an ethical rhetoric.

Nevertheless, the implicit distinction between the internal and external ends of rhetoric acknowledges that there may be unethical means of persuasion that might better secure the achievement of the external end at the expense of the internal. Yet Cicero famously is unsatisfied with formulations of ethics which pit that which seems expedient (in the present case the external end of an act of persuasion) against that which is morally good (the internal end). In his youthful *De Inventione*, he had formulated particular ends (*finem* at 2.155-6.) for the different kinds of speeches (2.155-178). All three genres of speech, he argues, seek the morally good (*honestum*) and/or the expedient (*utile*). He places much of his focus on deliberative oratory which seeks things morally excellent, expedient, or both, in which case "because honour [*vis honestatis*] is a higher quality, we may apply the better term to them and call them honorable, although it is understood that they are undoubtedly complex and belong to both groups" (2.158).[38] While Cicero handles the apparent tension between the two ends of the morally excellent and the expedient briefly in his youthful manual, he returns to the question and gives a full account of his position in *De Officiis*. Cicero's mature assessment is that while *honestum* and *utile* may appear to be in conflict, they never actually are. There are two levels upon which he argues this position. First, as a practical and honor seeking Roman, he submits that that which makes one risk the loss of his honor is not actually useful; "What is there that your so-called expediency can bring to you that will compensate for what it can take away, if it steals from you the name of a 'good man' [*boni viri nomen*] and causes you to lose your sense of honour and

[38] See Corbett (133-43) for a contemporary treatment of the three kinds of rhetoric which still maintains that "[a]ll of our appeals in [all three discourses] can be reduced to these two heads: (1) the worthy (*dignitas*) or the good (*bonum*) and (2) the advantageous or expedient or useful (*utilitas*)" (133).

justice" (3.82).[39] This statement at first seems to imply a calculation of risk in which one might choose to do that which is not *honestum* if he could avoid detection. But Cicero is not Machiavelli.[40] He explores the familiar story of Gyges ring and concludes that even if one's action is

> hidden from gods and men… [if] we put them as it were upon the rack: should they answer that, if impunity were assured, they would do what was most to their selfish interest, that would be confession that they are criminally minded; should they say that they would not do so, they would be granting that all things in and of themselves immoral should be avoided. (3.39)

This affirmation, that *honestum* and *utile* are mutually reinforcing ends which should help an agent determine what action is ethical, remains on the level of honor and law. One should never choose to do something not morally good even if apparently expedient because to do so is to risk one's reputation and, depending on the case, to break the law.[41]

Much in the way that Socrates argues against Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias* by introducing the prospect of punishment of the soul after death, Cicero is not content to leave his argument completely hidden from unworldly concerns. He elevates his argument to a second, metaphysical plain. "[I]f he believes that, while such a course [violating the laws of nature] should be avoided, the other alternatives are much worse—namely death, poverty, pain—he is

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[39] *De Officiis* translations and Latin come from Miller unless otherwise noted.

[40] Remer lays out with care the way in which Cicero "embraced the *honestum* and the *utile* (with the *honestum* as the ultimate end) [while] Machiavelli rejected the possibility of adhering to both. Instead, he argued that leaders must be guided by the useful; successful rulers cannot permit themselves to be hamstrung by moral considerations" (21). Cicero might respond "For what difference does it make whether a man is actually transformed into a beast or whether, keeping the outward appearance of a man, he has the savage nature of a beast within?" (3.82).

[41] cf. 3.82 which expands this idea. Also, this rejection of Machiavellian politics involves a belief that good faith (*bona fide*) is the attribute upon which "all the transactions" of "social relations. . . depend" (3.70). See Wegemer, *Young Thomas More* 121-5, for an account of how More will take up this Ciceronian topic.

mistaken in thinking that any ills affecting either his person or his property are more serious than those affecting his soul" (3.26). The grounds upon which Cicero bases this claim are significant; he invokes the natural law (variously *natura*, *lex naturae* at different places in the text[42]). It would go well beyond the concerns of our inquiry to give a full explication of how Cicero, with his Stoic sympathies and formation, advances natural law theory far beyond the thought of the Greeks and prepares a system from which Christianity could readily borrow (Gaffney 38).[43] Nevertheless, it should be briefly noted that Cicero will off-handedly and frequently comment that certain actions are not "in accord with Nature's law."[44] He continues: "[T]his principle [that a man shall not wrong his neighbor] follows much more effectually directly from the Reason [*ratio*] which is in Nature [*naturae*], which is the law of gods and men [*lex divina et humana*]" (3.23). This non-systematic account of natural law contains many of the aspects of natural law theory: a Divine law giver, intelligible nature, and an adequate human rationality and agency. Cicero invokes the gods, positing a divine moral law that is manifest in nature Human reason has the power to discover these laws and to base human actions and positive laws upon the principles of the natural law.[45]

From his early career, Cicero thinks of this moral system as a guide for speaking. In *De Inventione* his oratorical handbook clearly posits that "[t]he law of nature [*naturae ius*] is that

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[42] Cicero also treats the natural law in *De Inventione*, where he usually makes use of the phrase *ius naturae*. Koterski helpfully distinguishes between the usual use of *lex*, as applied to a particular principle, statute, or legislation and *ius*, as the general system (*Natural Law* 67).

[43] See Koterski ("Reading Guide" and "Panel") for an account of the development of natural law theory, as well as of Cicero's role in it. See Gaffney, Walter Miller, and Rand for three accounts of the relationship between Cicero and later Christian thinkers.

[44] The quotation is from 3.21; cf. 3.22, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 35, 75, 78.

[45] My understanding of the natural law is indebted to Koterski's formulation in which a higher law measures the justice of institutions and helps one understand what makes an agent virtuous. As he notes, many disparate theories are united under the natural law heading by their common "appeal to nature as in certain ways normative for human behavior" ("Syllabus" par. 1).

which is not born of opinion [*opinio*], but implanted in us by a kind of innate instinct: it includes religion, duty, gratitude, revenge, reverence and truth" (2.161). He states explicitly that the first principles of justice "proceed from nature" (2.160), and he goes on to explain that positive law proceeds from nature to various degrees while being "strengthened by custom, or any principle which lapse of time and public approval have made the habit or usage of the community" (2.162).[46] These passages make an important aspect of Cicero's ethics clear, one that will prove important for our investigation of Quintilian, Augustine, and Renaissance writers. Cicero grounds the just (and the good) outside of the individual agent, or in the case of rhetorical ethics, outside of the particular orator. This stabilizes the internal end of speaking the best possible, ethical case. The gods, the law of nature, and positive laws and customs (that are grounded in natural law) will provide the ultimate principles upon which to judge if an act of persuasion is ethical.

Cicero's natural law argument presumes human rationality and a universal human nature. He sees human beings united in their faculty of reason, their peculiar ability to search after wisdom and truth, and their capacity for leisure, all of which differentiates them from beasts (1.11, 13). Cicero's position has been provocatively called, by William Frank, a "civic metaphysics" in which "being rational and being social are equally ends of being human" (180).[47] This fits together Cicero's natural law argument with his constant insistence on a *via activa* (active life), lived in the service of the *res publica* (state) and the *communis utilitas*

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[46] Justice is the central virtue of *De Officiis*. See Atkins for an insightful exploration of Cicero's view of justice. See Rand, 36-8, for a discussion of Cicero's formulation of the natural law in comparison with Aquinas's.

[47] Frank "adapt[s] to [his] own purposes an expression [he has] found in Luca Del Pozzo's 'La ''metafisica civile'' di Augusto Del Noce: ontologismo e liberalismo'" (176 note 4).

(common benefit).[48] But, as was already seen in his appreciation for reason and belief in the natural law, for Cicero the bonds of human sociality extend beyond the state to all people.[49] This "universal brotherhood of mankind" (*communem humani generis societatem*), necessary for justice (*iustitia*) and goodness (*bonitas*), is a bond of fellowship established by the gods (3.28). This common bond is especially manifest in speech (1.12). Cicero is fond of turning a phrase by playing on the similarity of the words *ratio* and *oratio* (reason and speech) which together form the "bond of connection" which subsists "between all the members of the human race" (1.50).

This uniting power of speech is explored more richly in *De Oratore*. Crassus near the very beginning of the dialogue tells a story, that stimulated the imagination of many Renaissance writers, which Cicero had already told in *De Inventione* 1.2-5. It is worth quoting at length.

> For the one thing that most especially sets us above animals [*feris*] is that we converse with one another, and that we can express our thoughts through speech. Who, then, would not rightly admire [*non iure miretur*] this ability, and would not think that he should take the greatest pains in order to surpass other human beings in the very thing which especially makes humans themselves superior to beasts [*bestiis*]? But let us now turn to what is surely the most important point of all: what other force [*vis*] could have gathered the scattered members of the human race into one place [*dispersos homines unum in locum congregare*], or could have led them away from a savage existence in the wilderness to this truly human [*a fera agrestique vita ad hunc humanum cultum civilemque deducere*], communal

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[48] Cicero's understanding of the later is complementary with Aristotelian view of the common good; the *salute communi* (common good) is a society of virtue which supports individuals' virtue (cf. *De Officiis* 1.62).

[49] Critics (such as Crider, "Art of Gathering," 17) prefer to use the language of "sociality" while other critics (such as Breyfogle, "Citizenship" 504) use "sociability."

> way of life, or, once communities [*civitatibus*] had been founded, could have established laws, judicial procedures, and legal arrangements? And to avoid enumerating still more points (they are actually almost numberless), let me summarize everything in a few words: I assert that the leadership and wisdom [*moderatione et sapientia*] of the perfect orator [*perfecti oratoris*] provide the chief basis, not only for his own dignity, but also for the safety of countless individuals and of the State at large [*universae reipublicae*]. (1.32-4)

For Cicero, the art or faculty of speaking is a marvel. Speech not only maintains the bonds of human society, but was the necessary condition for society's creation. The proto-orator myth reveals how the faculty of persuasive speech created human society and formed individuals into citizens. More specifically, persuasive speech transforms the human race from ferocious beasts into possessors of *humanitas*.[50] Furthermore, it is of great importance that the passage points forward. The perfect or ideal orator is not a mere mythological ancestor, but an ideal that Crassus and his companions discuss in anticipation of a potential future figure who will use words to reform society further and to civilize humanity more deeply. There are varying degrees of confidence within the text about whether or not this perfect ideal is achievable, but it is held out as a goal worth seeking.[51] This ideal will be taken up by Quintilian and becomes an exemplum in the Renaissance.[52]

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[50] *humanitas* is a notoriously difficult word to translate. It means something like culture, learning, liberty, or the characteristics of (what May and Wisse translate as) a "gentleman." This word may suggest itself because of John Henry Cardinal Newman's powerful usage of it in *The Idea of a University*. For a popular history of the gentleman, which gives particular attention to *sprezzatura*, see Miner.

[51] See Crider ("Art of Gathering") for an examination of how the text advocates for an *orator perfectus* (17-8). Also, May and Wisse argue that the overarching concern of the whole text is the ideal orator and that the title's focus on skill rather than rules emphasizes this fact (3).

[52] See Gray for an account of the humanists' embrace of the ideal orator tradition (504).

In addition to his view of natural law and the ideal orator, Cicero's treatment of style (*elecutio*), given by Crassus in book three of *De Oratore* bears upon the Roman's rhetorical ethics. Crassus organizes his discussion on style by addressing its four qualities: correct Latin, clarity, *ornatus* [distinction], and *aptus* [appropriateness or decorum] (3.37). It is common to call these qualities virtues of style, and indeed Crassus goes so far as to call eloquence "one of the supreme virtues [*una quaedam de summis virtutibus*]" (3.55). While not uncommon to use the work *virtus* to refer to human excellences that are not specifically moral habits, the current usage is multidimensional because Cicero will argue that style is not value neutral in this section.[53]

The virtues of *ornatus* and *aptus* are especially suggestive. Cicero's view of the former will be particularly important in chapter 5 because Bacon's departure from the Roman's understanding affects the Englishman's rhetorical ethics. Concerning *ornatus*, Cicero argues that words (*verba*) and things (*res*) are inseparable and mutually dependent (3.19). "Discovering [*inveniri*] words for a distinguished style [*ornatum*] is impossible without having produced and shaped the thoughts, and. . . no thought can shine clearly without the enlightening [*luce*] power of words" (3.24). Raymond DiLorenzo's restatement of Cicero's position is clarifying: "*res* gives, as it were, *sedes*, seat or place, to *verba*" (250). This union is a large claim for which Crassus offers cosmological and historical proofs. First, he argues that the unity of words and things flows from and participates in the cosmos, the *uni*-verse which "is bound together by a single, natural force and harmony" (3.20).[54] This has an epistemological consequence: All the spheres of human investigation into and knowledge of the cosmos (the *doctrinarum* of the *artes*

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[53] DiLorenzo argues that this portion of the text "constitutes the climax of the whole work" (247).

[54] DiLorenzo helpfully traces an etymological connection between *kosmos* and *ornatus* (252-9).

liberales[55]) similarly partake in the "one common bond," an integrity founded on "an agreement and harmony [*consensus. . . concentusque*] . . . that is quite extraordinary [*mirus*]" (3.21).

After providing a cosmological rationale, Crassus turns to the difficult question of why his contemporaries own experience might not line up with the position being articulated. The answer, he claims, must be found in the developments of history. Primeval history suggests the unity of thought and speech. "For the old form of learning seems to have taught both right actions and good speech." (3.57) Different teachers were not needed to instruct philosophy and oratory; he recalls the famous ninth book of the *Iliad* in which Phoenix tells of his formation of Achilles as a "speaker of words and doer of deeds" (3.57). All of this history (further explored in 3.126-143) is leading to Crassus's most direct refutation of the Platonic tradition, or at least of its most privileged character: Socrates. The charge levied is that

> in his discussions [Socrates] split apart the knowledge of forming wise opinions and of speaking with distinction, two things that are, in fact, tightly linked . . . This was the source of the rupture, so to speak, between the tongue and the brain [*linguae atque cordis*], which is quite absurd, harmful, and reprehensible, and which has resulted in our having different teachers for thinking and for speaking (3.60-1).

The heart and the tongue, eloquence and wisdom have been severed. Socrates's divorce of the two has been appropriated by his many disciples, has been brought into the various schools of Greek philosophy (3.61-2), and may have even contributed to his capital condemnation.[56] Cicero wants to reunite the two for the benefit of oratory and philosophy. He sees the potential for

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[55] May and Wisse claim that this is what Cicero means though his words are actually *ingenuarum et humanarum atrium*.

[56] On the latter point, cf. Antonius's account of Socrates's trial in *De Oratore* 1.231-3.

eloquent communication of philosophical principles upon which an audience can shape their lives, as well as potential to secure better an ethical oratory that avoids illicit means and seeks that integrated good which is intelligible within the cosmos.[57]

These heady considerations turn practical when Cicero turns to his much briefer discussion of the fourth virtue of style, *aptus*. An apt style is an "obvious" necessity (3.210) and will depend on the exigencies of orator, audience, issue, and situation (3.210-2). *Aptus* is a learned "capacity" flowing from "art and natural ability [*artis et naturae*]" and governed by "intelligence [*prudentiae*]" (3.212). An orator uses the same "distinction [*ornamentis*]" in different situations, adapting his act of persuasion "to the problem at hand" (3.212). The orator must aptly fit his case to the circumstance. The invocation of *ornatus* which Cicero has already linked to wisdom (*sapientia*) and prudence (*prudentia*) provides some grounding for *aptus*. However, if a reader interprets prudence as an expedient practical wisdom (a sort of *utile*) divorced from the cardinal virtue of prudence (a type of *honestum*), decorum can become the occasion of employment of unethical means of persuasion. However, Cicero seems aware of this issue in as much as he firmly grounds decorum ("*decorum*," not "*aptus*") in justice in *De Officiis* (3.116-20). There he explicitly makes decorum inseparable (*non queat separari*) from *honestum* (1.94). The "deportment" of "propriety [*decorum*]" is linked to beauty and harmony (recalling the Ciceronian doctrine of *ornatus* [1.96-7]) and to the natural law (1.96, 100).[58]

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[57] DiLorenzo's language skills again provide insight; he reads Crassus's critique of Socrates and praise of pre-Socratic history against the backdrop of an etymological study of *kosmos* and *ornatus*, and illuminates the rich Crassian understanding of *kosmos* / *ornatus* as "the informing principle of the charge against Socrates." *Kosmos* / *ornatus* is not a mere cosmetic ornament of flattery (*kolakeia*) (257), but the universe (253), an "order of parts taken as a whole" (255), which "partakes of the nature of wisdom" (258).

[58] Cicero, however, does an unexpected thing in his treatment of decorum; he praises the master of guile, of decorum not necessarily linked to justice: Ulysses. The trickster is praised for having a self understanding of his temperament and for fulfilling his duties according to his abilities by the endurance of wanderings and insults (1.113-4). It should be noted that in book three, however, Ulysses is condemned for feigning madness because

Cicero's view of *aptus*, which is laid upon the foundation of justice, and his cosmic view of *ornatus* have ethical implications. In the beginning of his treatment of these two virtues of style, Crassus notes that the power (*vis*) which has unified "all-embracing knowledge" (*scientiam rerum*) with eloquence can drive an audience (*possit impellere*) at will. Therefore, if one lacks "integrity and the highest measure of good sense" (*magis probitate. . . summaque prudentia*" and is given this faculty, they will not be orators, but madmen with weapons (3.55). As May and Wisse point out, Cicero's ideal orator is not automatically upright; rather, eloquence must necessarily be joined to moral qualities (239).[59] This helps Cicero avoid a problem which we will encounter in Quintilian.

Nevertheless, for all of his writing on ethics and treatment of the ideal orator, a close examination of Cicero reveals moments in which Cicero, at best, falls short of his own ethics of rhetoric or, at worst, sets forth certain acts of persuasion as licit within his system which are actually sophistic and unethical. May and Wisse suggest that "in the harsh reality of Roman politics, [Cicero] will not hesitate to manipulate his audience, if [good purposes] demand it" (12). If they are right, then Cicero is in these instances not letting a normative ethic outside of an orator's subjective judgment determine what is just and good. It is true that the ideal orator, if *perfectus*, could be trusted to have all his subjective judgments perfectly align with the natural law, but May and Wisse seem to be attributing this discretionary power to both the ideal orator and to Cicero at the same time. The example which they cite as evidence is complex; Antonius, in *De Oratore*, provides a situation in which Rutilius criticizes those who stir "up pity in the

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though it seemed expedient, it was neither expedient or "morally right" (3.97). This contradiction may anticipate this project's discussion of contradictions and shortfalls within Cicero's rhetorical ethics.

[59] There is disagreement about the extent to which Cicero intends for the ideal orator's understanding of philosophy to have formed him as a virtuous agent. See May and Wisse's (11-12, esp. note 9).

hearts of people [*populi misericordian concitasset*]," and when unjustly accused himself, his own defense is argued with "no more embellishment [*ornatius*] or freedom than the plain truth of the matter allowed [*quam simplex ratio veritatis ferebat*]" 1.227, 229). Antonius complains that none of his advocates "uttered a groan or a shout, there was nothing that pained any of them, none complained or appealed to the Roman State or begged for mercy—why say more? During the entire trial, none of them even stamped his foot, for fear, I suppose, of being reported to the Stoics!" (1.230). This quotation implicitly introduces the three types of rhetorical appeals: the logical (*ratio, logos*), ethical (the appeal to one's character or reputation; *mores, ethos*) and emotional (*adfectus, pathos*) which Antonius treats in more detail in book two.[60] For Cicero, all three are legitimate; complementing Aristotle's insight that the best persuasions are enthymematic, Antonius observes that an audience is less likely to be persuaded by a "reasoned judgment" than by a "strong emotional impulse" (2.178; also see 2.211-6), but this is not a suggestion that it is licit to enflame an audiences emotions so that they act against their reason; rather, it is encouragement to use the best available means of persuasion, often emotional, in the service of that which is true. Rutilius seems to understand this in his insistence that the *ratio veritatis* must be rightly related to an *ornatus*. Style will enflame emotions and disclose an orator's *ethos* and must cooperate with reason in an ethical rhetoric. However, in matter of practice Rutilius fails to enact his own principle. A cursory reading of Cicero's own speeches initially shocks a 21st century reader (especially one only familiar with his more theoretical works) with their level of invective, but Cicero seems to be following Rutilius's principle (unless he seeks to go against reason), not his example. May and Wisse cited Rutilius's case as an

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[60] *Ethos* is a difficult word to translate into Latin; see May (*Trials of Character*), 4-12, for an analysis of the words that Cicero and Quintilian choose for *ethos*. Also, cf. *De Oratore* 3.211 for a linking of *ethos* and decorum; the investigation of More will reveal that *ethos* can also be important to *bona fide*. Cicero contends that the very "foundation of justice. . . is good faith" (*De Officiis* 1.23).

example of Cicero condoning the misleading of a jury, and in fact Antonius notes the juror's bias and perniciousness (1.230). However, while this gives a picture of the difficulties of certain rhetorical situations, I do not believe that any of the ethical and emotional means which Antonius lists and which Rutilius failed to employ are intrinsically unethical. In the present case, Cicero's ethics are clarified, but remain ethical.

Cicero goes on in the latter part of book three of *De Officiis* to take up many particular situations and to provide careful analysis of difficult cases. For example, he treats when promises ethically might not be kept: one must not keep the promise to return a sword to someone who has gone crazy (3.95). These casuistries fortify his system as consistent but sensitive to the particulars of difficult situations.[61] However, one does find moments in which Cicero condones unethical speech. A reader is told that one may argue on behalf of a guilty client because "a judge should always strive for the truth, but an advocate may sometimes defend what looks like the truth [*veri simile*], even if it is less true [*etiamsi minus sit verum*]" (2.51).[62] The orator is no longer to concern himself with *ratio* as Cicero reallocates ethical responsibility to the audience. This concurs with Quintilian's account of a no longer extant Ciceronian text in which he boasts of casting dust into the eyes of a jury to deceive them (2.17.21).[63] These instances may not initially seem too deviant, but they stand in opposition to Cicero's principle of personal service, that one never "take up a case in opposition to the right nor in defence of the

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[61] Though the word "casuistry" sometimes carries a connotation of specious reasoning, throughout this text I will use the word to note the way in which difficult case studies are resolved through the tedious task of applying a general principle to the particular case.

[62] This *De Officiis* translation comes from Griffin and Atkins.

[63] See Peterson's examination of how Cicero may have been deceiving the jury in the case which Quintilian references.

wrong. For the foundation of enduring reputation and fame is justice, and without justice there can be nothing worthy of praise" (2.71).[64]

When faced with these, at least seeming, contradictions, one must ask him- or herself the culminating question: what is Cicero's ethics of rhetoric? To this point I have examined Cicero's view of ethics and view of rhetoric, but now a classification of the whole, which exerted great influence on the English Renaissance is needed. It is a difficult task to summarize a large, not perfectly consistent corpus, but it will provide a valuable short hand throughout the remainder of the study. Cicero's system is not classifiable in one of the schools of Hellenistic philosophy of his own time. While he clearly rejects the Epicureans (3.116-20), he draws heavily from the Stoics, especially their natural law doctrine and their virtue theory which is similar to Cicero's yoking of the morally excellent and the useful.[65] But he is quick to show some sympathy for the Peripatetic belief that while not the highest good, material and natural goods remain real goods. He tells his son that either the Stoic or Peripatetic view is "sufficient" for the purpose of his ethical system (3.33). Furthermore, he is quick to take the position of an academic or skeptic throughout the text, insisting that his view is of the probable not the certain (2.7-8; 3.20).[66] Marcia Colish, however, rightly notes that Cicero "wants to take a definitive stand. . . . [He] posits and uses axiomatic ethical principles in the *De officiis* without raising any questions about their epistemological status" (144-5). Cicero may have some skeptical

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[64] cf. 2.41 in which Cicero clarifies that justice for sake of glory and not for its own sake is not justice.

[65] See Nicgorski for an examination of Cicero's critique of the Epicurean tradition that he relates not only to the Ciceronian idea of citizenship, but also to the American founding.

[66] See Griffin and Atkins for a helpful chart (xxxiv) and for a brief attempt to situate Cicero within the Hellenic schools (xxxv-xxxvii) to which this account owes a great deal.

sympathies, but they do not largely inform his rhetorical ethics in the texts being considered.[67] He fulfills his promise to draw from and synthesize these three schools into his own unique system (1.6), but "[w]hat emerges is a new Ciceronian amalgam in which Stoicism is a critical ingredient but in which it is subordinated to other philosophical insights, to traditional Roman values, and to Cicero's personal vision of politics" (Colish 145). What, then, is the best way to classify his synthetic doctrine? Crider's attempt is helpful: "Cicero defends a rhetoric as responsive to, and responsible for, both the souls of an audience and the truth of the matter at hand during contingent speech acts which constitute and nourish the human bond in the time of active life" ("Art of Gathering" 21). This formulation highlights the unique Ciceronian concern about the human bond and active life, as well as his focus on truth and sensitivity to the cooperative leading of an audience. This matches much of the evidence that we have weighed: Cicero's definition of rhetoric, understand of internal and external ends, theory of *honestum* and *utile*, belief in a natural law, portrait of an ideal orator, view of the cosmos (and constitutive belief in a unity of knowledge that is discernable in the universe), and thoughts on decorum. Collectively, these opinions suggest that Cicero holds a realist rhetorical ethic.[68] He believes that his moral principles are discernable in nature and that utility cannot justify use of illicit means.

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[67] Perhaps Cicero's skepticism was born out of his insistence on the active life, which requires a great deal of prudential judgment to apply the principles of ethics (rhetorical or otherwise) to particular circumstances. As Glendon suggests: "Following Aristotle [by no means a skeptic], who taught that, in the realm of human affairs, one can know only partially, and, for the most part, Cicero says he belongs to the school of thought that requires one to seek the highest possible degree of probability, recognizing that the limitations inherent in political life make certainty impossible. The statesman, unlike the philosopher, must act, and he must act within the range of what is possible, aiming for the best while realizing that he must often settle for less" (par. 32). Also, see Hadot for an excellent explication of how ancient philosophy involved a lived ethical (moral) dimension. On 141-6, Hadot treats skepticism generally and Cicero's in particular.

[68] If forced to classify Cicero as a Stoic or a Skeptic, it seems that—according to my reading—Stoicism is the better label. The term realist may seem anachronistic, but in as much as Aristotle could clearly be called a realist, the label remains appropriate in the present case.

His allowance of verisimilitudes by an orator when before a judge and brag about blinding a jury remain a difficulty. To speak knowingly that which is not true for the acquittal of the guilty, remains, in the realist view, a bad means to a worse end. This brief bit of utilitarian ethics hardly undoes his whole realist system; rather, it should be viewed as an inconsistency, one to which Cicero may even have been blind because of the highly practical and judicial character of Roman oratory. It is illuminating to set this deception against a moment in Thomas Aquinas (another ethical realist) where Cicero is invoked:

> It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by counseling, helping, or in any way [defending an unjust cause]. . . . [I]t is lawful for a soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says (De office. iii, 29).[69] Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue, but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood. (II-II q.71 a.3)

Aquinas provides the more consistent position which we would expect to flow from Cicero's ethics and to inform his ethics of rhetoric: one may never willfully choose to cooperate in evil.[70] This principle is latently present in Cicero's linking of the expedient to the morally good in what Simpson calls a "*constitutive* justice" (81) where "justice is good in and of itself and not for any consequential advantages" (80). Cicero's system avoids utilitarian consequentialism, and in its

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[69] Again note Cicero's insistence on good faith (even with a foe) which Aquinas appropriates.

[70] This echoes Cicero's insistence that one never "take up a case in opposition to the right" (2.71). It should be noted that Aquinas does not always agree with "Tully." See Rand (89 note 92) for a couple examples of disagreement.

insistence on the natural law, on a universal human nature, and on absolute ethical norms we can confidently call his system realist.[71]

If this still does not save Cicero from contradiction in his largely unsystematic treatment of rhetorical ethics, it should also be noted that "[b]y his own account there were occasions when he failed to live up to his own publicly professed standards, and in private correspondence he often berated himself for falling short of his own ideals" (Glendon par. 33). Perhaps these occasions of misleading judge and jury were things that Cicero ultimately regretted; if not, they are juxtaposed to a high vision of oratory. This greatest of Roman orators articulates for the English Renaissance a largely noble view of oratory for the good and the just. The cumulative effect of *De Oratore* and *De Officiis* is to provide an unsystematic, realist rhetorical ethic.

Marcus Fabius Quintilianus

With this understanding of Cicero's ethics of rhetoric, which would have been widely available in Renaissance England and influenced More, Shakespeare, and Bacon, let us turn to a great admirer of Cicero, another classical Roman (though of the empire not the republic) with great influence upon the Renaissance: Quintilian. As with many of Cicero's works, Quintilian's most notable work, the *Institutio Oratoria*, was known only in fragments in the Middle Ages. In 1416, Poggio Bracciolini rediscovered a complete text of the *Institutio Oratoria* in the monastery of St. Gallen. Quintilian was then read and praised by the continental humanists, and through Erasmus this enthusiasm was brought to England where not only the highly educated More and

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[71] See Simpson for a full and convincing prosecution of the case that Cicero avoids consequentialism. One could say that Cicero's system is situated between a situational and a Kantian ethic, neither relativistic or legalistic (cf. Kreeft, *Summa* 415 note 122).

The treatment of More, Shakespeare, and Bacon will investigate more fully the realist understanding of reasoning that allows a role for intuition that precedes and often informs logical reasoning. This principle may make Cicero's own defense of his position more intelligible: "For people expect it; custom sanctions it; humanity also accepts it [*vult hoc multitude, patitur consuetude, fert etiam humanitas*]" (2.51).

Bacon would have access to Quintilian, but also the grammar school boys across the island would study his *Institutes*.[72] Baldwin demonstrates that "at the pinnacle of [Shakespeare's] grammar school [curriculum]" was "the Rhetorician" or "supreme authority," Quintilian (II 197).[73]

Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (c.35 A.D. - 95) was born in modern day Spain, but spent most of his life in Rome where he was first a student and then a teacher of rhetoric. In his retirement he composed the *Institutio Oratoria*.[74] To appreciate his rhetorical ethics, one must focus on his understanding of the ideal or consummate orator, who Quintilian labels as the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* (good man skilled in speaking).[75] *Bonus*, in this instance, denotes ethical or moral character. Quintilian sees that skilled speech has an ethical dimension. However, his understanding of the good man skilled in speaking when explained more fully is surprising to a twenty-first century reader; Quintilian claims "that the orator must be a good man, but that *no*

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[72] For a concise, but full histories of Quintilian's influence, see Kennedy (*Quintilian* 139-41) and Russell (21-9). Some humanists even preferred Quintilian's style to Cicero's (Kennedy "Cicero's Legacy" 493). On Quintilian's role in English school curricula and, via vernacular manuals, the larger rhetorical culture, see T. W. Baldwin (II 197-238) and Mack (77-8) respectively. Scholarly editions of More's works point to an abundance of Quintilianic echoes and borrowings. (For example see 24 [note on 506], 34 [note on 509-510], and 170 [note on 557] of *CW* 15.) Bacon would have likely encountered Quintilian at Cambridge. At certain times, the *Institutio Oratoria* was one of the stipulated texts of the University where the entire first year "was devoted to rhetoric" (Mack 51); the work, like *De Oratore*, is "very often found" in the book lists of those who died while in residence at both universities (51-2). Furthermore, Bacon quotes and alludes to Quintilian; for example, see *The Advancement of Learning* 141.

[73] For a full account of Shakespeare's debt to Quintilian, see Baldwin (II 197-238).

[74] For a brief biography of Quintilian, see Russell (1-4) and Lopez (308). For a book length study, see Kennedy (*Quintilian*). For the place of Quintilian in the larger history of Roman rhetoric, see Kennedy (*Roman World*), esp. 487-514.

[75] Quintilian is quick to cite Cato the Elder (12.1.1) as the source of the phrase *vir bonus dicendi peritus*. When paired with Cato's other famous maxim—*rem tene, verba sequentur*, "seize the subject, the words will follow"—one can see Cato's idea clearly (see Kennedy, *Roman World* 38-60, esp. 55-7). Once an orator had a handle on the issue (*res*), he would be able to better articulate the concept than any sophist or court opportunist who had only superficial knowledge. Quintilian transforms the phrase to undergird his own concept of the consummate orator. Quintilian's dual emphasis on the orator's personal morality and technical competence not only distinguishes him from Cato, but also highlights the difference between his conception of the good orator from that of Plato, Isocrates, and Cicero who emphasize the role of political and intellectual leadership in their conceptions of an ideal orator (Kennedy, *Roman World* 509).

one can be an orator *unless* he is a good man" (12.1.3).[76] Unfortunately, Quintilian does not explicitly address this surprising point any further. He posits the interdependent character of eloquence and virtue in his orator and, more specifically, makes moral goodness a necessary condition for skilled speech, but he does not directly define the relationship between good character and skilled speech. An understanding of the relationship between the two is a prerequisite for ethical oratorical *praxis*. Therefore, to understand Quintilian's rhetorical ethics we will examine small moments throughout his manual that suggest an understanding of the relationship which he failed to define directly.

This examination will yield a surprising possibility: despite Quintilian's lofty ideal of the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, Quintilian's good man may not have to be an ethical orator, but might conceivably be a skilled sophist who maintains only a mere hope for the good of society. To explore this prospect, it will first be necessary to examine two theoretical (and ethically licit) points in Quintilian's treatise—his epistemological confidence in truth and his definition of rhetoric—which are contradicted in his practical account both of how an orator is to act in certain moral dilemmas and of how *adfectus* (*pathos* or emotion) is to drown *ratio* (*logos* or reason) to gain a sought outcome. An examination of these contradictions will reveal Quintilian's rhetorical ethics or lack there of.

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[76] All trans. of Quintilian are Russell's unless otherwise noted. Kahn argues that Quintilian deals with the "the ambivalent moral status of rhetoric. . . [by subordinating] rhetoric as a skill to moral judgment, and thereby identify[ing] rhetoric with the moral use of rhetoric" (*Prudence* 42). Quintilian, however, explains: "The mind is never at liberty even to study this noble art [oratory], unless it is free of all vices" (12.1.4), and perfect orator "must understand the language of honour and [subsequently] have the courage to use it" (12.2.31). In this case, "subordination" may not quite capture it; virtue becomes a necessary prerequisite to discern when and how to put one's eloquence into action. Brandenburg recognizes that, to a modern reader, Quintilian's claim may seem absurd. From the starting point of Quintilian's thought, Brandenburg asks whether contemporary rhetorical critics should make good character a requisite for the great speaker. His surprising 1948 conclusion was that moral character should and does remain a requirement for a good orator.

Quintilian's *vir bonus dicendi peritus* has received ample critical attention. Some scholars seek to illuminate the element of moral formation in the *Institutes* by tracing philosophical influences upon Quintilian. For example, Arthur Walzer ("Stoic Wise Man") and Prentice Meador believe Roman Stoicism is the key to understanding Quintilian's *vir bonus*. Another camp believes that situating the text in its historical circumstances is the key to understanding the training of a virtuous orator. Michael Winterbottom ("Quintilian") suggests that Quintilian was simply "led to a moralistic view of the function of rhetoric by what he saw going on around him." He is "swimming against the tide [of other oratorical trends] in proclaiming a new Ciceronianism" (94-6). Aubrey Gwynn agrees that Quintilian's program for training the virtuous orator was a response to oratorical decadence (240). Walzer also recognizes a historical dimension in Quintilian's program. He argues that Quintilian was an opportunist who criticized and appropriated moral philosophy within his rhetoric-centered curriculum during the time when Domitian had exiled all philosophers ("Honor and Expediency" 264-6). Unlike the current investigation, these models of analysis are not meant to attend to Quintilian's rhetorical ethics. In fact, examinations of Quintilian—including A. Craig Baird (103-4), Lester Thonssen and Baird (154), and Gwynn (230-241)—gloss over the question of his ethics of rhetoric for the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*. Only Alan Brinton ("Quintilian"), Meador, Walzer ("Honor and Expediency"), and Winterbottom ("On Impulse") have engaged fully the rhetorical ethics question. Other critics offer only passing judgments. For example, Clarke notes Quintilian's willingness to allow his good man untruths, but then avoids directly confronting this problem by simply stating that motive, not act, matters (115-119).[77]

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[77] Kennedy, however, perceives what is at stake. He observes that "[t]his orator must be a good man, but he belongs to what we have called the sophistic tradition, not the philosophical" (*Classical Rhetoric* 102). Also, see Kennedy (*Quintilian*), esp. 123-132.

Quintilian clearly believes that the truth is more easily discernable to a good man and more persuasive to any clear-sighted audience. He argues in the section on the lucidity of narrative: "Now the real orator speaks best when he seems to be speaking the truth" (4.2.38). One should not infer that "seems" discloses Quintilian having doubts about the efficacy of the truth. Rather, in the full context of the passage, Quintilian argues that orating true facts believably without excessive show is most persuasive, while he condemns orators who disdain the task of simply stating facts. Further confirmation of Quintilian's epistemological confidence in truth is found in Book 12: "One could surely not concede intelligence to people who are offered the paths of virtue and vice and then choose the worse—nor indeed prudence either, because, owing to the uncertain outcome of events, they often become exposed by their own doing to the heaviest penalties of the law, and *always* to those of a bad conscience" (12.1.3, emphasis original). Like Aristotle before him (*Rhetoric* 1.2.6), Quintilian maintains that when all things are equal, the truth is more persuasive than falsehood. When an orator is faced with a falsehood that he could present with verisimilitude to achieve his end, Quintilian's epistemological confidence has additional ethical consequences. The truth, compellingly presented, will always be most persuasive. This conviction, on behalf of the truth, points to an intersection between the consummate orator's skill in speaking and his moral choices in how to speak. It is morally good and pragmatic to speak the truth.

This treatment of the truth, however, does not distinguish between the two discrete ends of oratory. Quintilian's definition of rhetoric helps to draw this distinction. In Book 2 of the *Institutes*, he offers a catalogue of the ways in which previous writers have defined rhetoric and concludes by adding his own: "Rhetoric is the science of speaking well [*Rhetoricen esse bene dicendi scientiam*]" (2.15.38). *Bene* implies "both artistic excellence and moral goodness"

(Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 101); the moral element of the good man skilled in speaking is reinforced by Quintilian in his definition of rhetoric. He continues: "[rhetoric's] end [*finis*] and highest aim is 'to speak well'" (2.15.38).[78] Building upon this definition, Quintilian makes a helpful distinction between the internal and external end of oratory, ethically solid footing for the *vir bonus dicendi peritus.*

> Moreover, the real orator will always achieve [the end], because he will always speak well. However, this criticism may perhaps be valid against those who think that the "end" is to persuade. My orator, and the art that I have defined, do not depend on the outcome. The speaker certainly aims to win; but when he has spoken well, even if he does not win, he has fulfilled the demands of his art. . . . [T]his art depends on the activity, not on the outcome. (2.17.23)

The success of an act of persuasion is not primarily judged by the outcome of the persuasion (the external end). Rather, the act is assessed by "speaking well." This distinction is much more explicit in Quintilian than in Cicero and remains particularly important because a speech act judged solely by the success of the act of persuasion would allow an orator to use any means to achieve his end. Since "speaking well" has an element not only of eloquence, but also of moral goodness (2.15.33-35), the latter demands that the orator only use good means to seek the end of the activity itself (internal).

Quintilian adds a further dimension to this discussion in Book 11. He elevates Socrates as the supreme example of one who sought the end of speaking well above mere persuasion, choosing to be remembered by posterity and to lose his life rather than his past (11.1.10-11). And, I would add, if we take Socrates's own words seriously, as recorded by Plato in both the

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[78] In different places, Quintilian uses *finem*, *summum*, or *ultimum* (and in one place all three collectively, 2.15.38) to capture the Greek term: *telos*.

trial and death dialogues, and the *Gorgias,* Socrates thought that he was saving his soul at the cost of his life. This offers readers a metaphysical reason never to seek persuasion by speaking with moral and stylistical iniquity. Distancing himself from Cicero's critique of Socrates for a lack of oratorical prudence, Quintilian innovates with his praises of the proto-moral philosopher.

Quintilian, however, maintains Cicero's moral and aesthetic linking of *virtus*. In the famous book 10 which provides a long book list of poets, historians, and philosophers to be read, a reader is told that it "is from these and other authors worth reading that we must draw our stock of words, the variety of our Figures, and our system of Composition, and also guide our minds by the patterns they provide of all the virtues [*virtutum*]" (10.2.1). The beginning of the sentence is a review of the reasons outlined in 10.1 for students to read. Future orators must increase their lexical capital, and see how others use enthymemes and disposition. It is only the last clause that is an exhortation to let these sublime works of antiquity not be read strictly through the lens of oratorical utility. Quintilian, with brevity, states the obvious that almost goes assumed: students should read these works to be formed morally, as well. The key word, *virtus,* was employed by Quintilian throughout the discussion of 10.1, referring to stylistic excellences to be imitated. The elastic word makes a bolder claim for moral virtue in the present instance.

But it is not just that *virtus* is used in a wider sense in this passage. 10.1 began by instructing the reader that students must acquire a habituation (*facilitas,* or as Quintilian himself says, the Greek *hexis*) for making good stylistic choices. The acquisition of the artistic virtues of style, now provides a "pattern" for the student to follow in seeking moral virtue as well. This suggests the Ciceronian (and Horatian) idea that style itself is not value neutral, as found in Crassus's argument to unite eloquence and wisdom. To make Horace's poet of the *Ars Poetica* into Quintilian's oratorical student of the poets, the student of rhetoric must blend "profit and

pleasure, at once delighting and instructing the [hearer]" (Horace 343-4). By hinting that speech has a moral function, Quintilian unites the heart and the tongue; for Quintilian, style will disclose, and help cultivate, the *vir bonus*.[79]

In this view of virtue, in Socrates' example, in the *Institutio Oratoria*'s own theoretical explanation of internal and external ends of oratory, and in Quintilian's epistemological optimism, he maintains space for ethical oratory, seemingly providing a point of intersection for eloquent speech and moral action in the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, but this ideal gets much murkier as Quintilian treats practical matters. He addresses moral dilemmas in a questionable, or at least ambiguous, fashion and—in his treatment of *adfectus* and *ratio*—may reveal his support of skilled sophistry in his "good" man. In Book 2, having just finished a retelling of Cicero's myth of the proto-orator (2.16), Quintilian addresses moral dilemmas that will face his *vir bonus dicendi peritus*. In this context, he argues that the consummate orator may use his power to assert falsehood, but only for the public interest (*communis utilitas*) (2.17.36). He is quick to add that this can be done only because his orator is inseparable from the good man (2.17.43).[80] Again in Book 12 Quintilian invokes the *communis utilitas* (12.1.37) as a license for the orator to lie, protesting too much: "I am not arguing that the orator I am shaping will often have to do this, only that, if some such reason compels him to do so, the definition of an orator as 'a good man skilled in speaking' still holds good" (12.1.44). We see the naiveté in Roman rhetoric that

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[79] However, Quintilian remains frustrating to his readers in as much as the relationship between moral and rhetorical imitation is never defined. In 12.2 Quintilian does suggest that virtue is a prerequisite to discern when and how to put one's eloquence into action (12.2.31), but even in this the relationship remains unclear. Lanham (*Electronic*), beginning from this difficulty in Quintilian which he calls the "Q question" has provocatively interrogated what presently might be called the crisis in the humanities and the role of the university in society. Lanham sets the rhetorical paideia against the philosophical, with the former merely a "mixture of play, game, and purpose" in its "product," if not always in its "avowed purpose" (187). In this characteristically Derridian move and much of the practical analysis which follows from it, I think that Lanham is mistaken.

[80] Colson's quotes Voltaire's response to the *Institutes*; he believed it was a treatise on "lying as a Fine Art for those fully conscious of their own rectitude" (xxviii). Voltaire's levity adds insight into what's at stake in Quintilian's formulation.

Augustine will react so strongly against exemplified in this passage.[81] Quintilian believes that the training of a future orator will purge him of any self-interest and ambition. There is no Augustinian sense of a darkened intellect, weakened will, and disordered passions clouding the consummate orator's ability to verify independently that his end is selfless and truly for the *communis utilitas*. Additionally, it seems credulous to believe, as Quintilian claims, that instances where lying might serve the public interest are rare.[82]

These warrants for lying on behalf of the public interest are peppered throughout the text. In Book 3, for example, Quintilian explains that "[w]e should be prepared to replace words by their nearest neighbors, calling the foolhardy man brave, a prodigal generous, a miser thrifty. The procedure also works the other way. It is true that the real orator, the good man, will never do this, unless led into it by the public interest [*communi utilitate*]" (3.7.25).[83] Quintilian again gives the good man permission to deploy questionable means for a useful end. Though it is tempting to join Augustine in dismissing this attitude, embodied in Quintilian, without further inquiry, a deeper exposition of the *communis utilitas* reveals that Quintilian is grappling with the question at the foundation of all rhetorical ethics. Quintilian mounts his own apology, offering many examples to defend his position: "[With] sick children, for example, we pretend many things for their good and promise to do many things which we are not going to do; even more

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[81] Augustine is a famously harsh critic of rhetoric and of classical Rome, but in chapter two his full and complicated position on rhetoric will be articulated.

[82] When Quintilian discusses the potential conflict in speaking expediently and honorably, the word often chosen for expedient is *utilitas*. Quintilian takes up the expedient and honorable in Book 3 and 11. He contradicts himself, at times—like Cicero—allowing that the two never contradict and are inseparable, while at other times admitting conflict. When he admits conflict, he sometimes insists that the honorable way must always be chosen, while at other times he is not so insistent. Walzer ("Honor and Expediency") seeks to reconcile the conflicting accounts of honor and expedience, maintaining that Quintilian's ethic is situational (274-5, 277).

[83] However, Quintilian's treatment of hyperbole provides a potentially more ethical justification in which one should use this "bolder kind of Ornament" to describe that which "transcends the ordinary limits of nature [*naturalem modum excessit*]" (8.6.67, 76). Also, it should be noted that in *De Oratore*, Antonius allows for exaggeration as well (1.221). Augustine, as chapter two shows, condemns all lying.

justifiably, we lie to stop an assassin from killing a man, and deceive an enemy to save the country" (12.1.38-9).[84] These last three examples are important because they prevent a hasty condemnation of his system on legalistic grounds. However, when these three are paired with the other allowances for lying, guided not by the natural law but by the judgment of the consummate orator, Quintilian reveals that his rhetorical ethic is utilitarian, and more specifically situational.[85] This situation ethic and—to borrow Prentice Meador's formulation—a more traditional Western framework of ethics (such as Cicero's realism) would likely agree that an act of denying the truth to the sick child or assassin is the appropriate action.[86] The situational or circumstantial ethicists, like Quintilian insist that the lie is permitted because of a greater good or useful outcome. While the realist camp of ethicists may agree that an act of denying the truth to the sick child or assassin can be the appropriate action, this camp insists that such a speech act is not a lie at all because a lie is always wrong in itself.[87] Though this may seem like a mere verbal

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[84] Socrates raises a similar dilemma in the first book of the *Republic* when he asks if one should lie or return weapons to a friend who has lost his mind (331c); recall that Cicero also introduced this example in *De Officiis* 3.95), and Aquinas, in an example similar to Quintilian's, allows for ambush in a just war (II-II q.71 a. 3).

[85] While there may be some disagreement that situation ethics is a form of utilitarianism, based on my reading I will assume this is the case.

[86] Golden insists that the situational ethics of Quintilian was typical of Roman morality (47). Meador does not explicitly join the "traditional western ethic" to the school of realism.

[87] It is the realist ethicist Aristotle who first insists that lying is wrong "in itself" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1127a 29) and that the "man who loves truth, and is truthful where nothing is at stake, will still more be truthful where something is at stake" (1127b 4-5). Nevertheless, legalism is avoided and Quintilian is somewhat anticipated: "We are not speaking of the man who keeps faith in his agreements, i.e. in the things that pertain to justice or injustice (for this would belong to another virtue), but the man who in the matters in which nothing of this sort is at stake is true both in word and in life because his character is such" (1127a 34- 1127b 3). Aquinas's conclusions are not at variance with Aristotle but are articulated in a different idiom (MacIntyre, "John Case" 77). He claims that the "essential property of a lie is that it is the intentional utterance of a false statement" with the "intention to deceive as an additional evil of almost all lies" (77). Aquinas (II-II q. 110) frequently calls on Augustine, who condemns all lies, in his texts.

Realists in the Christian tradition have been particularly concerned with this question. For contemporary articulations of the Christian argument against situational ethics, see Grisez and Shaw (102-11), and Von Hildebrand, *Morality*. For a complementary and concise account of proportionalism, consequentialism, and situation ethics, see Erlandson (153, 136, 157). See J. Smith, as well as responses from Reno, and Tollefsen and Pruss, for contemporary ethical realist arguments for and against the permitting false assertions, as distinguished from lies, to achieve certain goods.

disagreement, the differences in principles that determine the licitness of an action in a particular case is important to both sides when they seek to adjudicate the tension between prescriptive ethical norms and prudence on related questions, such as if an innocent human life can ever be willfully taken.

Quintilian is at least partially successful in shielding his position by providing examples in which the situational and realist ethicist find something close to common ground. These examples act as emotional appeals (an ailing child or endangered country), case studies that can only be explicated by casuistries. But the measures Quintilian allows his good man to persuade for the public interest get even murkier throughout Book 12.[88] Quintilian allows his good man to "undertake the defense of the guilty" (12.1.34); he encourages consideration of "how one may speak for a falsehood or even for an injustice" (12.1.34). The latter allowance is admittedly for detecting and refuting "such things more easily," but one questions if this is the only reason an orator is allowed to defend the guilty, especially recalling our difficulty with Cicero's transfer of responsibility from advocate to judge (*De Officiis* 2.51). For Quintilian, also, the consummate orator may hide the truth from the judge or use slightly fraudulent means to help his case (12.1.41); he can seek release of the guilty if convinced of the guilty one's conversion "to a right way of thinking" (12.1.42). For Quintilian, all of these actions may be done, "so long as our intentions [*voluntate*] are honourable [*honesta*]" (12.1.45). Notice that Quintilian has removed the means employed from the ethical judgment of the act of persuasion. These means no longer need to be *honestum*, so long as an orator's intention is *honestum*. This rejection of the need for ethical means and founding of the ethicality of an action solely upon intention is typical of situational, utilitarian ethics. Quintilian makes the consummate orator's whim, not the natural

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[88] See Meador's helpful chart which lists the actions Quintilian outlines for the *vir bonus* in Book 12 (164).

law, the adjudicator of what is good. It is in fact quite remarkable that this follower of Cicero so deeply undoes the relationship of *honestum* and *utile*.

The contradictions within the *Institutio Oratoria* accumulate. Quintilian's understanding of rhetorical ethics in moral dilemmas for his consummate orator seems incongruous with his epistemological confidence and previous treatment of internal and external ends. Even if we grant Quintilian's apparently situational ethic for adjudicating moral dilemmas, the question remains: Is he intentionally taking on the mantle of contextual ethics for his good man, or is his developing formulation just opaque, ambiguous, or even unintentional? This question can be answered with an examination of how Quintilian addresses the interaction of *adfectus* and *ratio* in Book 6, revealing Quintilian's good man to be a skilled sophist, who maintains only a mere subjective hope for the public interest.[89] The Quintilianic *vir bonus*, preserving this hope, does not deserve to be placed as equal to the thuggish Callicles of Plato's *Gorgias*, but his sophistry does place him in the Gorgian tradition.[90]

In 6.2, Quintilian begins his treatment of *ratio* and *adfectus* by implicitly reducing all ends to the outcome and blurring the distinction between internal and external ends: "But where force has to be brought to bear on the judges' feelings and their minds distracted from the truth,

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[89] Unlike when he introduces *adfectus* and *mores* by talking about their Greek equivalents, Quintilian does not actually spend time talking about *logos*, the Greek antecedent to *ratio*. However, in Book 6, he—at least sometimes—uses *ratio* when talking about the third of the classical rhetorical appeals. (See 6.2.6.) In my text, I will most often use *ratio* to refer to the logical appeal in Quintilian.

Furthermore, recall that the sophist intentionally uses words deceitfully, only putting on the appearance of truth (Crider, *Office of Assertion* 4).

[90] While some sophists care more for their fee than for the good or use illicit means in their acts of persuasion, Callicles of Plato's *Gorgias* and Thrasymachus of Plato's *Republic* are fine examples of sophists of a distinct degree, who seek to exercise verbal force over others, using an arsenal of words. These figures delight in manipulating words to gain power over people. Thrasymachus anticipates aspects of the thought of Machiavelli and even Nietzsche.

there the orator's true work begins" (6.2.5). 2.15.4).[91] It has been noted that both those who do and do not believe rhetoric to be ethical think that it is a force. However, in the present case the language used excludes the cooperative view. In this instance of deceiving the judge, power is certainly exercised primarily toward the external end of persuasion, even to the extreme of distracting from the truth, and thus subordinating "speaking well"—in its moral, not stylistic sense—to the external end, persuasion.

This passage where Quintilian contradicts his own previously stated position—that the orator will not only discern and articulate that which is true, but also not subordinate necessary truths when seeking to persuade one's audience—altogether ignores the *communis utilitas*. Quintilian may agree with Cicero's comment that it is the judge's, not the orator's, task to discern the truth, but no mention of bending the truth for the public interest is made in this passage; he does not articulate even a principled situational ethic. Nor does he acknowledge that some judges may also seek the common utility. Quintilian offers something more sinister: The orator's "*true* work begins" with the manipulation of the judge's feelings over and against truth. This is a realization of Rutilius worst fear. "Just as lovers cannot judge beauty because their feelings anticipate the perception of their eyes, so also a judge who is overcome by his emotions gives up any idea of inquiring into truth; he is swept along by the tide, as it were, and yields to the swift current" (6.2.6-7). This passage addresses how the orator is to make use of "a special aspect of *mores*" (*ethos*) and *adfectus* (*pathos*) (6.2.8-9). Quintilian's account of these two

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[91] Quintilian further complicates his view of rhetorical force (he makes *vis* synonymous with *dynamis* in 2.15.4) by his frequent use of martial similes to describe it. The Renaissance largely appropriated Quintilian's fondness for rhetoric as martial. See Rebhorn (*Emperor*), esp. 23-79. Later writers, such as Pope, in his "An Essay on Criticism," also perceive Quintilian's fondness for thinking of rhetoric as martial; see 51. Nor is Cicero a stranger to this *topos*. He opens *De Inventione*, exhorting the use of "weapons of eloquence" (1.1). However, in *De Officiis*, he stress that war be not undertaken, except if its "object" is "secure peace" (1.80), and that the "achievements of war" are less "important than those of peace" (1.74). cf. Cicero's description of the *princeps* as a helmsman (*gubernator*) 1.77, 1.87 to which More will be attracted. See Wegemer, *Young Thomas More* (175 note 60), for a catalogue of More's uses of *gubernator*.

appeals is distinct and adds to the disturbing nature of the passage. Quintilian opposes *adfectus* to *ratio*, as one sees in the exhortation, to distract the judge from the truth. If *adfectus* is used to lead audiences away from the truth, then it can no longer be considered a proof—as Aristotle held—but as an anti-proof which clouds reason, a "repair" for sufficiently clear proofs.[92] Quintilian's own rhetoric further illuminates the passage. He uses two tropes: the simile of the lovers and the metaphor of the torrent. Quintilian claims that the lovers lose the capacity for judgment because the power of feelings. Even rightly ordered emotions cannot assist *ratio* in the simile; emotions preclude reason. This is made even clearer in the metaphor: the judge has no choice but to yield to the current.[93] The rational faculties of the judge cannot help but be swept away in a flood of emotion.

This treatment of *mores* and *adfectus* in the *Institutio Oratoria* is particularly distinct because Quintilian joins them as two sides of one coin. They "are sometimes of the same nature, and differ only in degree" (6.2.12), with *adfectus* characterized as vehement and volatile, while *mores* is described as calm and distinguished, "having goodness." One questions if the orator must possess this goodness, as the *vir bonus* formula demands, or if the orator only must appear good. Regardless, Quintilian also tells a reader that "the life and soul of oratory, we may say, is in the emotions [*adfectibus*]" (6.2.7). To summarize then, one may say that Quintilian innovates by conflating *mores* and *adfectus*. However, he then breaks these emotions—the lower of which he considers the life and soul of oratory—away from *ratio*, pitting them against reason.

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92 Such a manipulation of emotions is dramatized by Shakespeare in Antony's funeral oration for Caesar. See Crider for a reading of Brutus as unwilling to use licit emotional appeals and Antony as unwilling to make his emotional appeals licit (*Persuasion* 45-65).

93 Winterbottom ("On Impulse") carefully and skillfully examines the 6.2 torrent episode, expressing reservations about the supposed moral goodness of Quintilian's orator.

Though it is unclear how much of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* Quintilian knew directly, Quintilian innovates away from the Aristotelian and Ciceronian tradition by conflating *mores* (*ethos*) and *adfectus* (*pathos*) and in pitting reason (*logos*) against the two.[94] Aristotle argues that "by using [words] justly one would do the greatest good and unjustly, the greatest harm" (*Rhetoric* 1.1.13) and that "sophistry is not a matter of ability but of deliberate choice [of specious arguments]" (1.1.14). Further, Aristotle believes that emotions can either assist or challenge reason. Therefore, the appropriateness of an appeal to *adfectus* is a moral choice on the part of the rhetor, who must relate the particulars of an individual rhetorical situation to ethical norms. The rhetor is then able to choose ethically appropriate appeals for the circumstance, applying an objective standard by exercising virtues that, as an agent, he has already habituated in himself. Quintilian, when he makes his own formulation, at best, did not know of these counter opinions, or, at worst, refuses to engage these questions. He does not make these Aristotelian distinctions, all the while further allowing for emotional proofs that contradict reason. He wants judges to be distracted by untruths and to have their reason swept away to achieve an external end. Speaking morally has been subordinated to the outcome of persuasion. Clearly contradicting his previous statements on the end of rhetoric, Quintilian in his treatment of *ratio* and *adfectus* places persuasion as the primary end in Book 6.

Quintilian's discussion of moral dilemmas in Book 12 at minimum exercised a situational ethic and left many questions as the consummate orator violated the realist moral principle of the ends never justifying the means, a surprisingly utilitarian development from one who had confidence in the persuasiveness of truth. But this allowance of false means was never given a

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[94] Both Gwynn and Russell are confident in Quintilian's deep reading of Plato, but they question his direct knowledge of Aristotle. Crider insists that Quintilian knew some Aristotle, as manifest in *Institutio Oratoria* 2.15.13-6 (*Persuasion* 41).

further treatment beyond the reminder that he who will exercise such means is the *vir bonus*. As with Cicero, the highly judicial character of Roman rhetoric may account for how Quintilian came to this conclusion, but Quintilian's silence leaves one to question if Quintilian is sophistic or superficial. The placement of *mores* and *adfectus* against *ratio*, however, is unambiguously sophistic. While Quintilian maintains belief in a good end and, therefore, avoids the moniker Calliclean, no longer is it simply a matter of equivocating for an uncorroborated conception of the *communis utilitas*. It is now clear that reason may be deliberately suppressed. The particulars of the moral dilemmas and Book 6's examples of the lovers and the drowning judge contradict the abstract principles that Quintilian argues should guide the consummate orator. Quintilian's great educational text is one that supports sophistry in the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* while maintaining only a vague moral hope that ethical norms will only (and rarely) have to be violated for a greater good. These instances are to be prudently discerned by the good man. The relationship between moral goodness and skilled speech that Quintilian outlines reveals a hopeful, but ultimately sophistic consummate orator. Quintilian's ethics of rhetoric are unethical.

Both Cicero and Quintilian are inconsistent. Nevertheless, in articulating a principled rhetorical ethic and acknowledging his inability to always live up to the ethic, Cicero provides the Renaissance with a realist rhetorical ethic. Quintilian gives a system that helpfully articulates complementary ethical principles (such as the distinction between external and internal ends) and provides commentary on the good orator that those who are naively confident about rhetoric in the Renaissance will build on. However, his emphasis on outcomes and entrustment of authority to orators rather than to a natural law supplies the Renaissance with a utilitarian outlook whose arguments and examples devolve into an unethical support for sophistry. Furthermore, both Romans emphasize the ideal orator, a figure that will capture the Renaissance imagination.

Chapter II

The Christian Influence and the Sixteenth Century Debate

The Roman rhetorical tradition is not the only tradition which informs the English Renaissance debate about rhetoric. There is also the Christian rhetorical tradition. The Hebrew Bible and New Testament are filled with powerful language, coming from a diverse series of speakers in varied rhetorical situations and genres. This collection of specimens of rhetoric grows into a more self-conscious tradition with post-biblical apostolic preaching, the reflections of the early fathers of the Church on rhetoric and biblical hermeneutics/exegesis, certain spiritual and mystical writings, particular theological speculations of the schoolmen (which in their origin come from lively lectures and debates), certain Christian-humanist writings on rhetoric, and the reflections of many of the English and Continental reformers on oratory. The figures in this wide-ranging tradition are usually aware of the classical rhetorical tradition and many, like Paul, Justin Martyr, Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Basil, and Gregory of Nyssa, Thomas Aquinas, Thomas More, Erasmus, and Calvin seek, in some measure, to appropriate it. But such a project is filled with tensions, well captured in Jerome's account of his feverish vision of Christ the Judge, who condemns the future saint as too attached to the pagan world: "*Ciceronianus es, non Christianus* (You are a Ciceronian, not a Christian!)" (Letter 22).

Given this broad and deep tradition, our investigation into the Christian rhetorical tradition will have to be partial. Jerome's friend, St. Augustine of Hippo, is an appropriate locus of our investigation. He personifies the tension between the classical tradition and the Christian, as a teacher of rhetoric who, after his conversion to Christianity wrote both in seeming condemnation and praise of the *Ars Rhetorica*. He is the most important extra-biblical figure in

the Christian rhetorical tradition and was of particular importance to the English Renaissance and Reformation.

However, before beginning our investigation into his rhetorical ethics, let us take the occasion of this transition between two figures of classical Rome and a Christian patristic author to emphasize the understudied intersection of classical and Christian thought in the English Renaissance. To reconstruct the sixteenth-century debate about rhetorical ethics in a way that its participants would recognize dual emphases must be placed on the role of Christian thought and of Roman thought.[95] Usually the Christian influence is the more underemphasized element in inquiries into what Plett has called "rhetoric and Renaissance culture." For example, Victoria Kahn's project of "historical poetics" on prudence (*Prudence*) is in many respects exemplary, but the focus of her study upon the renewed interest in classical rhetoric and its relationship to Aristotelian prudence in the Renaissance does not always sufficiently acknowledge Shuger's previously mentioned insight that "sacred rhetoric is not a narrowly specialized compartment of the history of Renaissance rhetoric but its most vital and reflective branch" (*Sacred* 13). Indeed, Shuger has done an excellent job of showing the importance of religion in Renaissance England, rightly arguing that Renaissance English culture

> comprehend[s] the essential nature of its preoccupations. . . . Renaissance religious discourse enfolds more than such specifically theological concerns as the manner of eucharistic presence, the necessity of church elders, or the fourfold senses of Scripture. Religion during this period supplies the primary language of analysis. It is the cultural matrix for explorations of virtually every topic: kingship, selfhood, rationality, language, marriage, ethics, and so forth. . . . [All

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[95] Again, cf. Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric* (7), "Meaning," and *Visions* I (3) on "seeing things their way."

> these topics] are considered in relation to God and the human soul. (*Habits of Thought* 6)

Shuger is correct in this analysis, and she masterfully demonstrates her thesis. Yet, she proves her claim that religious discourse provides a hermeneutic for all analysis of the period, largely by way of the writings of "religious" personages (clerics) such as Andrews, Hooker, Herbert, and Donne, whom one would expect to have recourse to such a religious hermeneutic. While Shuger does not compartmentalize the role of the sacred, she does not extend it explicitly to less obviously sacred realms such as humanism and the stage which were also deeply enfolded in the religious meta-discourse of the period.[96] I intend to emphasize this point which largely remains a potentiality in Shuger.[97]

Also, the deeply classical reforms to the English grammar school curricula instituted by humanists rightly lead critics to focus on the Ciceronian character of curricula. Nevertheless, it remained a deeply Christian educational program. The tripartite ends of piety, wisdom, and eloquence (Mack 11) were sought with full recourse to explicitly Christian elements in the curricula. The petty school, which precedes the grammar school would have provided students with "a leaf of paper on a wooden tablet covered with a sheet of translucent horn, which featured the alphabet, numbers, and the 'Our Father'" (Miola, *Shakespeare's Reading* 2). The quintessential Christian prayer was to be as foundational to education as letters and numbers.

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[96] It is true that Shuger (*Political Theologies*) has produced a study of *Measure for Measure*. Nevertheless, her concern in that book becomes the intersection between sexual morality, Tudor-Stuart politics, and "political theologies;" my work on the Christian inflected rhetorical ethics of the stage extends the scope of Shuger's earlier work while addressing a different set of questions regarding Shakespeare.

[97] I noted in the introduction that Knapp has undertaken to account for the Christian influence on the stage and that Crider's investigations of rhetoric in literature acknowledge the dual touchstones of the classical and Christian for many Renaissance authors. Nevertheless, the field has yet to grapple fully with the various English Renaissance attempts at a renewed classical, Christian synthesis in which, for example, Thomas More can recommend to his children's tutor the patristics and Sallust in the same breath without hesitation (Wegemer and Smith 200).

The petty and grammar school built on this foundation and included teaching of catechism, the New Testament, the Psalter, and the Book of Common Prayer (T. W. Baldwin I 432-3). Christian formation and education was not overlooked by the schools, despite their highly Latinate character and emphasis upon Ciceronian rhetoric.

The failure to emphasize the dual importance of Christian and Pagan thought in the Renaissance often begins with a simplified understanding of the Renaissance humanists' rejection of scholasticism; this inadequate understanding universalizes the objections of some Renaissance figures to scholastic epistemology and metaphysics. In fact, the more universal humanist objection to scholasticism was focused on its aesthetics (or lack there of) and its greater interest in casuistries than wisdom.[98] Such critiques do not necessarily disclaim a Christian metaphysic or even the scholasticism of the High Middle ages vis-à-vis the pseudo-Thomistic scholasticism of pre-Renaissance Cambridge and Oxford. In fact, on the continent and in England, a vibrant part of the Renaissance was its return not only to classical sources, but to biblical and patristic ones as well.[99]

The influence of Augustine, in particular, on the Renaissance is well documented. He deeply influences Petrarch and the Italians, is very frequently printed, and his "influence can be measured across a variety of verbal and visual media—not only. . . [in Petrarch and many paintings,] but in the interstices of poetry and aesthetics, of theology and philosophy, of religious polemic and humanistic oratory" (Gill 1).[100] Erasmus's edition of Augustine's works helps bring the texts north, but it is not that these works were ever lost and then found, like Quintilian and

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98 As I noted before, Gray (499) highlights the concern about aesthetics and wisdom.

99 Wegemer and Smith note More's attentiveness to classical authors, and the bible and Church fathers (xxi).

100 On his continental influence, see Quillen (153) and Gill (1-2). For more on the availability of Augustine, see Kristeller (355-72) and Monfasani ("*De doctrina*" 172; "Renaissance Humanism" 713-6).

some of Cicero.[101] Rather, the great renewal of interest in Augustine came from its existential and affective qualities that are usually absent in scholasticism. Among the large corpus of his works being circulated, my attention in uncovering Augustine's rhetorical ethics will draw chiefly from *De Doctrina Christiana*, but to enlarge our understanding of this former teacher of rhetoric's Christian ethics of rhetoric, it will be necessary also to look at parts of the *Confessiones* and *De Civitate Dei*.

English Renaissance rhetorical culture is deeply, but not always directly, influenced by the writings of Augustine. For the present purposes, one can be certain that More knew Augustine well, even to the point of giving lectures on the historical and philosophical aspects of *De Civitate Dei*. More alludes to Augustine with frequency.[102] With the intervention of the English Reformation, Augustine becomes an authority that both Catholics and reformers claim for their sides.[103] Because Augustine is not important to the post-Henrician grammar school, Shakespeare's direct access to Augustine is unclear and debated by scholars.[104] Nevertheless,

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[101] Pinckaers, for example, claims that Augustine is cited more than any other figure in the *Summa Theologica*'s Secunda Pars (17).

[102] One of these allusions, found in *A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation* may be a reference to *De Doctrina Christiana*: "Actually, Nephew, that saying like so many other sayings in Scripture, as Saint Augustine points out—needs interpretation" (2.17). The quotation comes from the modern English rendering (1998 180). The editors of *CW* 12 note difficulties with this passage in the various manuscripts and suggest, not *De Doctrina Christiana, but De Sermone Domini in Monte* as a possible source of the allusion (405-6). The reference is general enough that *De Doctrina Christiana* could also be considered a possibility.

[103] Augustine's thought is indirectly and partially transmitted to England through figures like Calvin (Bouwsma, *Calvin* 123). With the Reformation in view, Bouwsma holds out a type of Augustinianism as one of the two faces of Renaissance humanism ("Two Faces" 1-73). Monfasani, though, believes that Erasmus and the continental Reformers "used Augustine when and where it suited then. For Protestantism, Augustine was not so much a creative force as a found of authority to be exploited after pivotal doctrines had been determined. . . .[And] Erasmus cited Augustine primarily as a historical source and as a way of shielding himself from scholastic critics" ("*De doctrina*" 174).

[104] An obvious possible evidence of Shakespeare's access to Augustine is *The Rape of Lucrece*. Bullough's treatment of sources omits Augustine's account of Lucrece in favor of Chaucer, Ovid, and Painter. Duncan-Jones's recent Arden edition of *The Rape of Lucrece* holds out the possibility that Shakespeare may have been aware of "the Augustinian debate," but avoids the issue of direct knowledge (44, 306). Also, Roe's recent Cambridge edition of *The Poems* treats the history of Lucrece and Augustine's role in it without claiming Augustine as one of

even if one cannot prove Shakespeare's direct access to the works of Augustine, Augustine's thought—including his thought on rhetoric—is accessible in the English discourse of Shakespeare's time and can at least be an inter-text or "tradition" that finds its origin in Augustine and about which Shakespeare knows.[105] The university educated, Bacon provides fewer difficulties. He no doubt encountered some Augustine in his education and the bishop is

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Shakespeare's sources (23-41). He believes Augustine's opinion is available in Tyndale (25) and—in a distorted way—in Chaucer (36). Miola sets up his treatment of Shakespeare's poem (*Shakespeare's Rome*) with the generalization that the Elizabethan "who studied Latin sententiae in school, who came upon intriguing Roman examples in the pages of reference books could easily acquire further information from numerous chronicles and biographies. Livy and Tacitus told the story of Rome in the original language and in translation; Saint Augustine and Orosius offered a Christian reading of the history and achievements of the Earthly City" (7). From this starting point he goes on to rely upon Augustine in some of his sections on *Lucrece* (20, 36-7).

In addition to treatments of *Lucrece*, what follows is a number of other critical reflections on Shakespeare's access to Augustine: Hankins (114) believes that the manner in which characters speak about friendship in multiple Shakespeare plays echoes *Confessiones* 4, but I believe (and Hankins may too) that this could just as likely come from a common place as from an Augustinian text. Slightly more compelling is a moment in *Henry V* that Anders suggests "was known to the Elizabethans only from St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* II, 21" (278), but this most likely reached Shakespeare "through a collection of [similitudes]" (T. W. Baldwin II 601). Battenhouse reads both Shakespeare and Chaucer as sharing Augustine's "moral vision" (*Shakespearean Tragedy* 9-10); he analyzes two "Augustinian Echoes," one in *Hamlet* and another in *Othello* (*Shakespearean Tragedy* 377-84). Battenhouse further argues that Shakespeare's art is deeply influenced by Augustinian thought ("Augustinian Artistry" 44-9), in a volume where Walter suggests that Augustine's views of scriptural interpretation inform some of the motifs in the *Tempest* (272-3). While Frank Kermode believes that *Macbeth* reveals Shakespeare's knowledge of the *Confessions* (205), Plumer—representing many critics—finds no evidence that Shakespeare read Augustine (63), but he believes that Augustinian ideas were pervasive in the period. This allows for his Augustinian reading of *Hamlet*, which "though not exhaustive of the play's meanings, can throw light on depths and coherences of the play that many other readings leave in shadows (63-4). Freinkel reads Shakespeare's sonnets as built upon a foundation of ideas coming from Augustine, Petrarch, and Luther while taking care to distance herself from a methodology, like my own, which hinges upon "source and influence" (xix). Altman's reading of *Othello* has recourse to the "ironic echo of Augustine" in Iago (*Improbability* 172).

[105] See Miola, *Shakespeare's Reading* (12-7) on the source and inter-text or, as he calls it, texts and traditions distinction. Even if Shakespeare does not have Augustine's texts, the bishop's "tradition" is palpable for Shakespeare among many humanists, religious apologists, and others. For example, Richard Sherry refers to Augustine in his 1550 *Treatise of Schemes and Tropes* (Mack 87). Wilson, who Shakespeare likely read, had clearly read Augustine and, more specifically, *De Doctrina Christiana* (Pendergast 30). Mack believes that Wilson expects readers of *The Art of Rhetoric* to want to return to Latin texts (perhaps including Augustine) to look for tropes (97). Also George Puttenham, Thomas Campion, and Samuel Daniel engage with Augustine's theories about versification (Pahlka 36). The Southwell-Sibthorpe Commonplace book includes all of book eight of Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* (Mack 104). "[I]t is practically certain that Marlowe. . . had firsthand acquaintance with [Augustine's] work" (Cole 195). This exposure would have been initiated at university, where the collection was primarily theological (H. Jones 227). See McConica for an account of Oxford's history which often touches upon books taught and read. Plett notes the Augustinian synthesis of Christian and pagan thought in *De Doctrina Christiana*, which the humanists took as an authorization for their inquiries, and he looks to Andreas Gerhard Hyperius's treatise (translated into English in 1577) as both an Augustinian based instrument for sermon invention and an Augustinian tool for textual interpretation (27-8). *De Civitate Dei* with Vives's commentary was translated into English in 1610, but the *Confessiones* was not translated into English until after Shakespeare's death in 1620 (Battenhouse, *Shakespearean Tragedy* 379).

often cited in his corpus.[106] Augustine, including his thoughts and ideas on rhetoric, is important to all three figures in this dissertation, and English Renaissance culture more broadly is deeply imbued with his thought.

Saint Augustine of Hippo

While Cicero had lived in the Roman republic and Quintilian in the Roman empire, Augustine (354-430) would live to see the empire crumble. His own life was one of searching. By his own account, Cicero's *Hortensius* "stirred" him at a young age to the "study of wisdom" (*Confessiones* 8.7), but he went through many positions before settling for a time with the Manichaeans and then finally having his well known conversion to Christianity in a garden.[107] After this change, he went on to become a priest and bishop who wrote voluminously in defense of his new found Christian faith.[108]

Augustine's rhetorical ethics are complicated because he seems to speak powerfully against rhetoric in the *Confessiones*, placing himself with those in the sixteenth-century who are suspicious of the *Ars Rhetorica* and who believe all rhetoric to be fundamentally unethical. Augustine gives up his position as a teacher of rhetoric after his conversion, content to characterize himself as a teacher of "lying follies" (9.2). Furthermore, while Cicero is only explicitly mentioned twice, both times in connection with his *Hortensius* which Augustine recalls as a positive influence, the Roman orator seems implicitly grouped with Virgil and

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106 To take one example, the *De Civitate Dei* is alluded to in *The Advancement of Learning* (152).

107 All English quotations are from Sheed's beautiful and rigorous translation, unless otherwise noted. Latin from the *Confessiones* will come from the Loeb edition.

108 For a full version of Augustine's biography, see Brown's account, updated in 2000, which remains the standard treatment. For general treatments of Augustine's thought, among an enormous body of literature, see D'Arcy, Fitzgerald, and Gilson (38-62).

Terrence, who are "woeful" to study (1.16). Augustine's provides his opponents claim that "'[b]y these studies words are learned and the eloquence acquired which is so necessary for persuasion and exposition' [. . . as if there is no other way to learn certain ideas and concepts except by Terrence's profligate plays]." This prepares the way for his refutation: "The words are not learned one whit more easily because of all this vileness: but the vileness is committed all the more boldly because of the words" (1.16).

Nevertheless, this jeremiad against classical studies, in general, and something like rhetoric, in particular, is complicated throughout the text. A reader is given many moments where Augustine is influenced by pagan learning and his own text often has inconspicuous appropriations of these texts, such as his mirroring of Aeneas as he steals to Rome.[109] Augustine does not reject pagan learning out of hand. Furthermore, in the present passage there is an allusion to an unnamed man (*hominem*) who offers a Platonic critique that "Homer invented these stories, ascribing things human to the Gods." In Sheed's translation, this figure is more explicitly identified as Cicero. The preeminent Roman orator and theorizer of oratory who Augustine praises in the text is also an implicitly ally in his critique. Additionally, this critique does not seek to make "accusation against the words, which in themselves are choice and precious vessels, but against the wine of error that is in them, and is poured out to us by teachers already drunken with it" (1.16). Augustine provides the Aristotelian distinction between those who misuse words and words themselves which are potent and "precious." This distinction

[109] The depth of these contradicting parallels was brought to my attention by Michael Foley in a lecture on "The Use and Abuse of Books: The Literary Unity of Augustine's *Confessions*." Also, it should be noted that Augustine invokes a commonplace whose source he would have likely known to be Terrence in support of one of his position in *De Doctrina Christiana* 2.140.

anticipates Augustine's fuller (though still qualified) acceptance of pagan texts in the education of Christians in *De Doctrina Christiana* 2.72, 145.[110]

The *Confessiones* bring into focus the fact that while Augustine relies on many pagan classics, his Christian view of the world has radically altered the content of certain classical ideals. While he shields Cicero and makes an important distinction as regards rhetorical ethics, the view of his spiritual autobiography is fairly pessimistic and suspicious.[111] Augustine began to compose *De Doctrina Christiana* in the 390s, roughly the same time that he wrote the *Confessiones*. But he did not complete this work until 427 (Green ix-xiv). This more mature and confident text provides a fuller understanding of rhetoric and articulates a Christian rhetorical ethics which while it finds existing pagan models insufficient, "legitimizes Ciceronian rhetoric" and "achieves a synthesis of Christian doctrine and pagan rhetoric" (Plett 27).[112]

It is useful to begin my examination of this text with Augustine's definition of rhetoric. He explains that the "relevant observations and rules, which, together with a skillful manner of speaking that uses an abundance of words and verbal ornament, constitutes what we mean by

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[110] *De Doctrina Christiana* citations hereafter will be *DDC.* It is true that other patristics and Jews of the Diaspora such as Philo had also sought to appropriate aspects of pagan learning to Judeo-Christian ends. (See Quinn ("Donne's Sermons" 1-85) for a helpful history of exegesis from Philo through Augustine). But a concern remained, in the famous words of Jerome's vision, that one might be a Ciceronian, rather than a Christian. Augustine's acceptance is so powerful and thorough that it becomes normative and a potential problem for Renaissance rhetorical theorists.

[111] Vickers ("Territorial Disputes" 247) makes a useful, but limited distinction between Augustine in the *Confessions* and Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana* with the former an "attack" on rhetoric and the latter a defense. Tell actually goes so far as to read Augustine's resignation from teaching rhetoric as an "act undertaken on behalf of rhetoric itself" (405).

[112] As is clear in Plett's treatment, these two accomplishments are important to the Renaissance humanist project. For a treatment of the relationship of Cicero and Augustine as manifest in *De Doctrina Christiana*, see C. S. Baldwin (51-73), Fortin, and Primmer.

Among the many treatments of Augustine and rhetoric, I have found Cavadini, Copeland, Green, Kennedy (*Classical Rhetoric* 149-60), Murphy ("St. Augustine" 203-19 and *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* 43-64), and O'Donnell helpful. See note 121 for treatments of lying, some of which bear more directly on the question of Augustine's rhetorical ethics.

eloquence [*eloquentia*]" (4.6).[113] But he is quick to add that "these should be learned independently of this work" and that "I do not rate [eloquence] so highly that I would wish people's mature or advanced years to be devoted to it" (4.6-8). From the moment of definition, we see that Augustine does not consider rhetoric the queen science and that rhetoric is not even the primary concern of his text. While he will address rhetoric, pagan learning, semiotics, and more, the end of his text is to provide clergy a hermeneutic for interpreting scripture both in controversies and in formation of Christians.[114] Augustine is inventing a new genre of rhetoric. Not only is there the epideictic, the judicial, and the deliberative; there is preaching, what will come to be known as the *ars praedicandi* or *ars concionandi*. Furthermore, Augustine seems to take a less Ciceronian (at least less Crassian) and Quintilianic view of acquisition of rhetorical skill. One does not need rules (4.7-9). One must pray for help (4.87), read books both wise and eloquent, and imitate them (4.22).

To the end of providing a hermeneutic for biblical interpretation, Augustine organizes his text with the first three books examining "the process of discovering [*inveniendi*] what we need to learn" and the fourth setting out how to present (*proferendi*) "what we have learnt" (1.1). The fourth will address the ethics of acts of persuasion most fully. Interestingly, it begins with an allusion to the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*. Augustine reminds readers that what follows will not be a manual of rhetorical rules, but that these can be useful to learn separately, "assuming that a person of good character [*bono viro*] has the time to learn them on top of everything else" (4.3).[115] In this passage we find an allusion and subversion. There is no ambiguity in

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[113] All *De Doctrina Christiana* passages (Latin and English) are from Green's editions. Also, see Sr. Sullivan's Latin-English commentary on Book 4.

[114] The hermeneutic principle becomes one of faith, hope, and love. cf. *DDC* 1.95.

[115] Green's note (196) agrees that this moment is "reminiscent" of Quintilian, but his translation "person of good character" does not capture the depth of the allusion.

Augustine's ethics about the relationship between the good man and skilled speech. Neither is goodness a necessary requisite for skilled speech (in the sense of speech that enacts rhetorical rules appropriately) nor is there a guarantee that because one is a *vir bonus dicendi peritus* he will always and easily choose to speak ethically for the good and on behalf of the *communis utilitatis*.

Augustine wants to encourage the morally good to use speech, but the speech and goodness are separate. The rules of eloquence "are valid in spite of the fact that they can be used to commend falsehood. Since they can also be used to commend the truth, it is not the subject itself that is reprehensible, but the perversity of those who abuse it" (2.132). This passage begins a fuller account of the idea which Augustine began to undertake in the *Confessiones*. He gives examples of how one can use a narrative and variety to assist an act of persuasion and that these things are "discovered" and "true whether applied to true matters or false" (2.132). Furthermore, Augustine insists that a Christian orator craft persuasions that use these weapons to avoid sounding "dull and indifferent" (4.4) when "fight[ing] for the truth" (4.5). Augustine's rhetorical ethic includes an imperative to be not only ethical but rhetorical to give the best possible act of persuasion. While this may sound obvious, Augustine in a brief stroke has rehabilitated much of classical rhetoric for his Christian ends.

While it is useful to make an ethical distinction between the use and abuse of rhetorical rules, perhaps more interesting is Augustine's disdain of the naïve Quintilianic guarantee that a good man skilled in speaking will necessarily speak that which is ethical and that which benefits the *communis utilitatis*. As with Cicero, for Augustine, the human agent is not the ultimate arbiter who can decide what is good and speak on its behalf. Augustine grounds the good (common and individual, which for Augustine are not in conflict) in the Christian God. The two

keys to Augustine's view are found in his view of natural law and his philosophical anthropology. Both are understood only with an understanding of Augustine's belief that the "ultimate good [*summum bonum*] [of life] is eternal life [*aeternam vitam*] (*De Civitate Dei* 19.4, 122-3).[116] This belief provides a teleology in which eternal life is the ultimate end. With this end in view, Augustine distinguishes between useful (*uti*) and the enjoyable (*frui*) things (*DDC* 1.7-9). The enjoyable makes us happy (*beatos*) while the useful assist us toward happiness. To enjoy a thing which is to be used, to make a means into an end, is to "impede" our "advance" toward beatitude, *aeternam vitam*. This ordering of goods, much like Cicero's distinction between the expedient (*utile*) and the morally good (*honestum*), can be applied to rhetoric to avoid a utilitarian (consequentialist) ethic. For Augustine to make a means an end is not only idolatry, but also unethical. In speech craft an unethical means may present itself as useful, but it is never so because it forestalls both the rhetor and the audience's advance towards the ultimate, enjoyable end of life.

With Augustine's final end of life clear, let us return to his view of the natural law and of philosophical anthropology which help reveal the relationship of an orator to the good. St. Augustine's view of the natural law while influenced and related to the Stoics derives primarily from scripture (Dougherty 582). "[I]n St. Augustine one discovers the flourishing of the conception of natural law in the Christian sense, initiating a consideration of the personal nature of God, mixed with the identification of a strict moral code that cannot be violated under any circumstances without retribution" (582). As with Cicero, Augustine's account is not systematic and uses a variety of terms, but across all the texts we are considering, and many others, he

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[116] English and Latin of *De Civtate Dei* are taken from the Loeb edition unless otherwise noted. The citations include book, chapter, and page numbers because of the length of chapters paired with inadequate line numbering in this edition.

invokes God as giver of a law which can be seen in nature and which is at least partially accessible to human reason (583).[117] He is quite insistent on a universal moral norms and a shared human nature which transcends cultural differences (*DDC* 3.52-3), placing the just and the good outside of the individual agent. However, his understanding that human nature is radically different, paradoxically more and less noble, than Quintilian and Cicero's. In understanding both what constraints to place on orators and how best to persuade audiences, his understanding of the person is key. Augustine believes that the human being is a body-soul composite formed in the image and likeness of God (cf. Genesis 1:26). Nevertheless, while his Roman predecessors have great confidence in the ability of the person to choose the good, Augustine believes that human beings suffer the effects of original sin: a weakened will, darkened intellect, and disordered passions. The difficulty which will be fought about by Reformation adherents and opponents is the degree to which these effects of the fall corrupt the human being's goodness and free will, his or her ability to see the good and choose it. Both sides will wield Augustine as an authority in their apologetics and to this day there is disagreement between Catholic and Protestant commentators about Augustine's actual position and his relative authority.[118]

For the present account, I will assume that Augustine's position—while it emphasizes a human being's fallenness—is that human beings have a free will and remain, at the core, good even if suffering from concupiscence. Therefore, they can see the good and with some difficulty, choose it. Luther's view, which More will dispute and which Shakespeare and Bacon will

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[117] I'm indebted to Koterski, who argues that the Augustinian view about the degree to which nature and human nature are wounded limit his development of a robust natural law theory ("Panel").

[118] See Marrou and articles in Fitzgerald—"Calvin" (116-20), "Augustinianism in the Reformation" (705-7), "Renaissance to the Enlightenment" (716-22, esp. 718-9)—for a helpful primers. Marrou suggests that the conflict lies in a moderate or extreme interpretation of St. Augustine's anti-Pelagianism (165).

know, is often called Augustinian, but it is certainly darker than the position I have put forth for the bishop of Hippo. One need only to point to Luther's religious formation and his allusions to Augustine in print to show that Luther's negative view of fallen human nature is indebted to Augustine. However, Luther may fail to appreciate the rhetorical situations within which Augustine is sometimes speaking. When battling the Pelagians or defending Christian belief "against the pagans" in *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine speaks about human nature in a darker way than when fighting the Arians or articulating his Christian rhetoric in *De Doctrina Christiana*. In balancing inconsistencies and/or appreciating various rhetorical situations, one can at least make a cogent case for my reading of Augustine that is sunnier than Luther's and still available in the Renaissance.

Augustine's conception of the human person differs from Cicero and Quintilian, and the view of the natural law shares much with Cicero, but is distant from Quintilian. But Augustine's view of eternal life as the good of every person paired with an emphasis on the effects of the fall that plague human beings transforms his understanding of the orator's relationship to society and the common good (*communis utilitatis*). Augustine is not interested in developing a civic metaphysics or in baptizing the Ciceronian idea of socio-orationality. With invaders at his doorstep, he offers view of the political sphere, often called his "political realism" (not at all related to our use of the word realism in the realm of ethics) that is neither Ciceronian nor Machiavellian. In *De Civitate Dei*, he recalls Cicero's use of Scipio to insist that a state must be governed with justice.[119] Augustine quotes Cicero's Scipionian definition of the state (*rei publicae*) as "the people's estate [*rem populi*]" (2.21, 220-1) and adds "that by a people

[119] My reflections on *De Civitate Dei* and reading of Augustine as rejecting Cicero's view of political life are deeply influenced by John Boyle's helpful study questions that were developed for the Center for Thomas More Study's 2011 Summer Seminar on "Augustine's and More's Use of Cicero."

[Cicero/Scipio] means, not every gathering of a throng, but a gathering united in fellowship by a common sense of right [*iuris consensus*] and a community of interest [*utilitatis communione*]" (2.21, 220-1). By this definition then, the state exists only where "there is good and lawful [*bene ac iuste*] government whether in the hands of a monarch, or of a few nobles or of the whole people" (2.21, 220-1). This Ciceronian valuing of justice as a virtue which can never be violated for a perceived expedience places Augustine firmly against the Thrasymachian politics or Calliclean rhetoric (both of which somewhat anticipate Machiavelli) that share "a false conception of right, commonly maintained by certain erring thinkers, that it is the interest of the strongest" (19.21, 206-7). Yet, by using Cicero's definition, Augustine wants to show that Rome, even the Rome of the wise ancestors (*maiores*) for which Cicero longed, was not a state (though he makes a concession to its status as a common wealth (*res publica*) "of a certain sort" by "definitions easier to justify" [2.21, 224-5]). In Augustine's program the only state, "if you please to call it. . . a republic" with true justice is the City of God whose "Founder and Ruler is Christ" (2.21, 224-5). This view leads Augustine to a view of politics which is well summed up by Stephen Duffy:

> Earthly endeavors could not hold ultimate significance. About this fleeting life one ought not be overly concerned; hope for the best, take what comes, as long as one is not required by the regime to act immorally (*civ. Dei* 5.17). One may, with restraint, avail oneself of procedures and methods effective in the secular city, but one should not be surprised when they disappoint. Augustine's political realism is grounded in a nonutopian view of human history and in the conviction that the virtues and skills demanded by life in the earthly polis are dominated by the ultimate values suffusing then, the horizon of one's loves. Hence they must be

> assessed under two norms, one ultimate, the other proximate; viz., how they stand in the eyes of God and of fellow citizens. In all its joys and miseries life in the secular city is permeated by motivations pregnant with spiritual life or death. (Duffy 30-1)

Augustine rejects Cicero's view of political life and citizenship. Cicero held that the morally good (*honestum*) was never in conflict with the expedient (*utile*) on both a temporal and metaphysical level. Augustine believes that if eternal beatitude is the ultimate end to be enjoyed, politics is not a limited and complimentary proximate good to help the pilgrim along the way, but rather a means (to be used, not enjoyed) of which to remain skeptical since the only just regime is otherworldly.

With this view in mind, it becomes clearer why Augustine's rhetoric is aimed at Christian preachers and apologists. The speaker is now an agent who cooperates with God, both in the discovery and delivery of arguments (4.59, 87, 89-94) and whose words "are only beneficial [to the audience] when the benefit is effected by God" (4.95). Within all the various rhetorical situations befitting such a Christian orator (cf. 4.14, 102), Augustine provides a clear rhetorical ethics. But to understand his view of the ends of an act of persuasion and the ethical means, we first must look at his most substantial invention. He takes Cicero's passing comment about the need to instruct (*docere*), delight (*delectare*), and move (*flectere*) listeners (4.74) and constructs a whole system in which the end is to be listened to with understanding, with pleasure, and with obedience (4.87).[120] Each bears a resemblance to the Ciceronian divisions of a high, middle, and low style (4.96), but is reinterpreted with an urgency based on the belief that every act of persuasion has potential salvific consequences.

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[120] Also, there is surely an echo of the Horace passage that exhorts the poet to blend "profit [*prodesse*] and pleasure [*delectare*], at once delighting [*iucunda*] and instructing [*idonea*]" (*Ars Poetica* 343-4).

Of these three external ends, Augustine places the most emphasis upon the third because while instruction is necessary (4.76), it is rarely enough. His treatment of delight reveals his epistemological optimism (similar to Aristotle and Quintilian's) that "truths themselves. . . do produce delight by virtue of being true" (4.77). When all is equal, truth will win the day. But Augustine believes that even delight may fail to gain an audience's assent to the truth or movement toward good action, especially if some auditors are unwilling or stubborn. Therefore, while not always needful (4.76), it is most often necessary to move an audience. Augustine allows that styles be mixed, but the third, which he calls the grand style (*grandi eloquentia* 4.75; *granditer* 4.104) is emphasized as an orator seeks the surest way to gain "assent for things which are spoken of for the general good and with honourable intent [*ut rebus quae utiliter honesteque*]" (4.142).

Beyond the ends of instructing, delighting, and moving an audience towards the good that is God, Augustine's robust rhetorical ethics is beginning to become clear. One sees the nuanced view of rhetorical force which, even while emphasizing emotional appeals respects the audience, not duping them but cooperatively seeking to persuade them to assent and action. In another passage, we see Augustine carefully distinguish between the external and internal ends of an act of persuasion: "the general function [*officium*] of eloquence. . . is to speak in a manner fitted to persuade, and the aim [*finis*] is to persuade people" (4.143). His "function" is the internal end, speaking the best possible ethical case, while his "aim" is the external end of persuasion. Additionally, Augustine leaves no ambiguity about his prohibition against unethical means of persuasion, both in general condemnation of dangerous (4.17, 81) and evil speakers who want to appear good (4.161) and in his proscription against lying (1.86, 2.130, 4.99). We do not find Cicero's inconsistency or Quintilian's sophisms; "lying is always useless" (1.86). It is unjust and

therefore, while it may seem useful, this "is impossible" (1.86). The ethical Christian rhetor will never lie.[121] While Quintilian invokes the *communis utilitatis* to justify lying, Augustine viewed the *utilitatis communione* of the state as linked to justice (*De Civitate Dei* 2.21) in such a way that lying, which is always unjust, can never be used for a just cause (cf. *DDC* 4.99). In chapter one's treatment of Quintilian, it was suggested that both the realist and situational ethicist allow for certain false assertions with only the latter calling such assertions lies. While Augustine seems to be on the realist side, he develops a certain strain of rhetorical ethical realism (with which other realists have sometimes disagreed) that not only disallows lies, but also false assertions in every case without exception. His treatment of difficult cases makes this clear, condemning, for example, the "lie which is harmful to no one and beneficial to the extent that it protects someone from physical defilement" (*De Mendacio* 14 (25)).[122]

In the previous paragraph the peculiar juxtaposition of a rhetoric which emphasizes the emotions but does not seek to dupe was noted. While the emotional appeal could be cognitive and licit for Aristotle and Cicero (and while Quintilian used it to his own sophistic purposes), Augustine fashions something different than these pagan rhetorics. He gives greater legitimacy to the role of the emotions in acts of persuasion because of a different anthropological view of audience members as people whose hearts are potentially hardened (4.150) and because of his repositioning of the ultimate end of any act of persuasion in light of Christian revelation. Shuger

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[121] Augustine expanded his treatment of this topic with many examples in *De Medacio* (395) and *Contra Mendacium* (420) both of which articulate the same prohibition against any and all lies (Ramsey, "Mendacio" 555). Commentators continue to discuss what is at stake in Augustine's account; see Brinton ("Augustine" 1983), Feehan ("Morality" and "Examples"), Ramsey ("Two Traditions"), and Swearingen (175-214).

[122] Augustine's ethical, honest orator cannot help but have his honesty strengthen his *ethos*. Augustine places emphasis on *ethos*, not in the limited Aristotelian sense of the way in which the rhetor is presented within an act of persuasion, but in the larger view of a rhetor's character. Augustine believes that the orator "must become a man of prayer before becoming a man of words" (4.87). One cannot simply appear good, but must be good (4.161) because the "life of the speaker" is the most eloquent proof (4.151). As Crider's note rightly points out, this emphasis on humility would be rejected by all ancient rhetors (*Persuasion* 174).

captures the full import of this development. "Ancient thought tends to set reason and emotion in opposition, with the result that passionate oratory appears inherently deceptive, a device for bypassing and negating rational argument" (*Sacred* 44-5).[123] She continues by showing that Augustine offers two solutions to this dilemma. First, he places *pathos* as "arousing the will" subsequent to "rational conviction;" secondly, his psychology argues that "affectivity, instead of being an irrational perturbation,. . . [is at] the center of spiritual existence" (46). In the ability of the emotions to move the heart, there was potential illumination of the truth, not deflection away from it (Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric* 105).

While the emphasis in the present analysis of the Christian Grand Style has thus far been focused on its grandeur and how it works, one should also note the obvious that the emotions are particularly disposed to the influence of style. Augustine is explicit in his tripartite formula of instructing, delighting, and moving, that the first is concerned with "subject-matter" while the latter two are concerned with "style" (4.74). We have seen that the primary ethical question which bears upon style is decorum.[124] Augustine readily notes that various types of eloquence will be appropriate for different audiences (4.26) and emphasizes more than his classical

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123 She places Plato firmly in this camp while identifying Aristotle as more complicated. She then places Cicero (by way of Antonius's words and Crassus's silence) and Quintilian (with recourse to the torrent passage which we have examined at length) also in this tradition of "bifurcation." As is apparent from my own invocation of Aristotle and Cicero, I do not agree with all the details of her genealogy. Nevertheless, it provides a helpful road map and synthesis.

124 For Cicero, ethical style surrounded decorum and *ornatus*. Augustine does not discuss Crassus's linking of the tongue and the heart, of words and things, but I suspect that given his neo-Platonic tendencies, distrust of political life, and semiotics which differentiates between words and things, Augustine might be better grouped with those who "imagine an ideal philosopher who is beyond language and its consequent sociality" (Crider "Art of Gathering" 19). This, of course, is complicated by Augustine's zeal to win converts, by his ecclesiology, and by his belief that the mixed style "is not so much embellished by verbal ornament as inflamed by heartfelt emotion. It has no room for almost all those ornaments, but if they are not there they are not missed. It is borne along by its own momentum, and derives its beauty of expression, if indeed this emerges, from the power of its subject-matter, and not the pursuit of elegance" (4.118). cf. 4.105 which separates "ornament" and "argument" to a degree. Nevertheless, Murphy notes the Augustine maintains "a union between meaning and expression" as a refutation of the second sophistic (*Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* 48).

precursors that "style. . . depends on function, not subject. . . . [And, therefore, he] created a decorum based on a Christian sense of value" (Shuger, *Sacred* 44, 49). This value is the guiding force in Augustine's clarity prohibiting injustice and lying, despite any perceived expediency that they might offer, and this value reveals how Augustinian decorum circumvents temptations to illicit means of persuasion while being subsumed into Augustine's assumption that the humble orator cooperates with God in seeking to move others toward salvation. As he explains, God is the ultimate judge of ethical decorum, for "who can know what it is expedient for us to say or our audience to hear at a particular moment but the one who sees the hearts of all?" (4.88). Augustine discerns one of the difficulties of the utilitarian rhetorical ethic; it requires one to project probable results without full knowledge of what will happen.

Because the ultimate end of any Augustinian act of persuasion is to bring the audience closer to the good and just triune God, his ethical system, which we have discerned, falls systematically into place. Again, though very different from Cicero in orientation and emphases, Augustine's view is a largely realist (and more internally consistent) rhetorical ethic that accounts for the act of persuasion's means, for the orator's ends, and for the circumstance. Augustine requires ethical ends sought by ethical means, and—even while emphasizing the role of the passions and emotions—is careful to maintain a model in which orator and audience cooperate and in which the good is held to be objective and based outside any one human person. What is left untreated by Augustine is how his ultimate end functions in mundane "forensic cases" because he limits his scope to "ecclesiastical matters" (4.97). Augustine is convinced that the ultimate end which he articulates should be the final end in any act of persuasion, even in secular matters which touch less directly upon divine things because "justice is not diminished when small matters are performed with justice" (4.99). However, his refusal to work out

explicitly the details of how an ethical Christian rhetoric engages the larger public sphere will be an inheritance with which the English Renaissance will have to grapple.[125] Nevertheless, Augustine's text articulates a hermeneutics of love for God and neighbor in which (ethical) rhetoric assists interpretation, an astounding reworking of Cicero that shapes the rhetorical praxis and ethical discernment of the Middle Ages and Renaissance.[126]

The Sixteenth-Century Debate

The final section of this chapter completes the modified chiasmus found in the first section of this dissertation: Sixteenth-Century Debate: Roman Influence:: Christian Influence: Sixteenth Century Debate. I am not simply walking in the same river twice as a way to conclude the treatment of background material. Rather, revisiting the debate is valuable as a way to return to where the dissertation began, having better understood the rhetorical ethics of Cicero, Quintilian, and Augustine, available opinions within the English Renaissance discourse about rhetoric, a discourse that included lively debate about whether or not the *Ars Rhetorica* is for the good. The dissertation has not outlined a full history of rhetoric or even a full account of the Roman and Christian rhetorical traditions, but it has laid out important texts and ideas to which More, Shakespeare, and Bacon will respond.

The primary purpose of this sub-section is to give a fuller account of the competing and mutually exclusive views of rhetoric (naïve confidence and hyper-cynical suspicion) that are on the extremes of the continuum of available opinions in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century

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125 Similarly, Shuger suggests that "Augustine's own description of the grand style often seems narrowly forensic and accusatory, while the balances he sought between art and grace, style and subject proved fragile" (*Sacred* 49-50).

126 See Schaublin for an argument that *De Doctrina Christiana* is a "classic of Western culture."

England. Before charting these developments, let me first offer a brief note on the religious upheaval during the English Renaissance that will influence the views of rhetoric and practices of speaking since "Renaissance religious discourse enfolds… virtually every topic" (Shuger, *Habits of Thought* 6), including rhetoric and ethics. The continental and English Reformation have an effect on changing views of rhetoric and rhetorical ethics. It has been argued that the English reformation has four theological factors: the "Wycliffite, Erastian, Lutheran and Reformed elements" (Nichols 19). As scholars have emphasized, this makes the English Reformation very complex. However, Reformed Calvinism "by the 1560's" is "the most important single factor in the making of a new orthodoxy" (31). Calvin had a humanist training, which proved "crucial to his thought" (Bouwsma, *Calvin* 113). Like Augustine, he saw the potential of rhetoric as a scriptural hermeneutic (121,123). This affirmation of Augustine provides Reformation Protestants from many different camps with permission to be rhetorical, to be humanists, to adapt the classical grammar school program of a priest (Colet) and former monk (Erasmus) to their new orthodoxies. However, with so many different humanistic syntheses of the Christian and pagan thought based on different forms of Christianity and different degrees of willingness to let classical Rome (and Athens) intermingle with Jerusalem, it is hardly surprising that the period ends up with an abundance of views concerning the *Ars Rhetorica*.

One of the two extreme views is the naively confident view that is well articulated by the courtier, Thomas Wilson, in *The Art of Rhetoric*. Wilson's text was read widely and went through eight editions between 1553 and 1585 (Mack 76); it received praise from Richard Rainolde, and Gabriel Harvey gives us a hint at the influence of Wilson's book, lamenting that it was the "daily bread of our common pleaders and discoursers" (Medine, "Introduction" 8-9 and *Wilson* 55). The book was one of the few vernacular rhetorical manuals that individually

"exercised much influence in transmitting doctrine" (76). Wilson's text is most often examined by contemporary critics because it was likely read by Shakespeare, but in addition to containing all the usual schemes of tropes and figures with instructions for inventing and organizing speeches, it is filled with fascinating moment such as a Christianizing of Cicero's proto-orator myth (41-3) and an explanation of synecdoche or "intellection" which becomes a catechesis upon the Calvinist doctrine of the Eucharist as much as it is an explanation of a trope (199).[127] For our purpose, the text's most interesting feature is its conclusion:

> But here an end. And now, as my will hath been earnest to do my best, so I wish that my pains may be taken thereafter. And yet what needs wishing, seeing the good will not speak evil and the wicked cannot speak well. Therefore, being stayed upon the good and assured of their gentle bearing with me, I fear none because I stand upon a safe ground. (244)

Wilson brings his work to an end with a simplification of the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* tradition. While it may be true that the persuasive wicked speaker is still not speaking "well" in the sense of morally good, Wilson means something more. He believes that the morally good orator must necessarily speak well and the wicked will be unable to speak well in the sense of persuasively or with skill. Russell Wagner observes that this conclusion to Wilson's text "seems to be Wilson's only comment on the speaking of wicked men" (Vickers, "Power of Persuasion" 422).

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[127] The first of these two moments is inescapably attractive to critics. For example, see Crider ("Eloquence Repaired" 2009) and Vickers ("Power of Persuasion" 413-4). Crider captures Wilson's humanism nicely. "Wilson employs Augustine's rhetoric not only as a hermeneutic, but also as a poetic; that is, our early modern rhetorician will not only interpret scripture, but also rewrite it, hereby fusing it with Ciceronian texts" ("Eloquence Repaired" 255). See Rebhorn for a discussion of the widespread interest in the orator-as-founder myth (*Emperor* 25-31). For a more general treatments of Wilson, see Mack (76-102), Medine, and Shrank (182-219).

As regards Shakespeare's access to Wilson, Crider—prosecuting an argument about Shakespeare and Aristotle—offers an even less tenuous hypothesis: "From Aristotle to Cicero, from both Aristotle and Cicero to Quintilian, and from Quintilian to Shakespeare: the genealogy is highly probable, even if Shakespeare never heard of or read either Wilson's *Art of Rhetoric* or Rainolds's lectures on the *Rhetoric*, or studied with someone who did (*Persuasion* 41).

Such a naive idealization of the confident view of rhetoric minimizes the need for rhetorical ethics. Instead of only making rhetoric (which by definition is ethical) good, Wilsons position, shared by many of the manualists, makes all "language. . . good," with a "striking inability, or unwillingness, to conceive that language could be applied to evil ends, or used to deceive or corrupt" (Vickers, "Power of Persuasion" 412).[128] Wilson's is the extreme confident position, and it can stand in contrast other confident views. For example, Erasmus provides a view of rhetoric that is quite confident, but which is keenly aware that words can be abused and become sophistry instead of rhetoric. Erasmus's letter to Dorp discerns the potential unethicality of Quintilian's system and complains that "Quintilian knew this trick [to pluck words of the accused out of context, but]. . . [m]y enemies have learned [it], not from Quintilian, but from the resources of their own malice" (240).

While Wilson was printed much and was read widely, his view is contravened not only by those who have a more tempered confidence in rhetoric, but also by those who are anxious about the power of words. As Wayne Rebhorn points out in a corrective to Brian Vickers' comments on the naïve manualists, there was also a great fear of rhetoric as a powerful tool to be used by the bad for ill in Shakespeare's England (*Emperor* 20, note 26) that can be discerned well before Shakespeare wrote. This suspicion, in its most cynical and anxious form, is captured by John Jewel in his *Oratio Contra Rhetoricam* (written c. 1544-52). He asserts that one should not pursue

> something [i.e. the art of rhetoric] that. . . renders good causes obscure and adorns evil ones and makes them resplendent; that teaches treachery, fraud, and lying; that was found out and brought into existence for the sake of error, for profit, for

[128] Recall note 15, and see Vickers for an excellent survey of manuals' articulation of this idealism which he calls "optimism" ("Power of Persuasion" 422).

> popular recklessness; that flees away from the grave vision of the wise; that has overturned the greatest commonwealths; that the most ancient states have booed from the stage; that philosophers of all ages and nations have repudiated; that our ancestors despised. . . and that, finally, rhetors themselves are ashamed to profess after they have learned it. (Rebhorn, *Debates* 172)

The oeuvres of both Wilson and Jewel reveal that each is deeply rooted in both the classical Roman rhetorical tradition as well as in biblical and patristic rhetoric, yet they arrive at mutually exclusive conclusions.[129] While there is debate about whether or not Jewel is in earnest (Rebhorn, *Debates* 161), this position, clearly a polar opposite of Wilson, is available and captures the intensified fear of words—as an unconstrainable force that is likely to abuse audiences. Perhaps this fear was occasioned by the initial reception in England of the ideas of Niccolo Machiavelli. His *il Principe* gained a reputation in England as a handbook teaching concealment and lying and reinforced the suspicions of the anxious cynics. Shakespeare's *The Third Part of King Henry the Sixth* captures Machiavelli's reputation in England as the future King Richard III reveals: "I can add colors to the chameleon, / Change shapes with Proteus for advantages, / And set the murderous Machiavel to school" (3.2191-3).[130] The prospect of such a speaker terrified many in England.[131]

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[129] For Wilson, the classical Roman and Christian influences are apparent in *The Art of Rhetoric*; Jewel's text is filled with Roman allusions, but one has to turn to works such as his *Apology for the English Church* to see the influence of biblical and patristic rhetoric. In that text Jewel immediately addresses the false "persuasions" that lead to persecutions of the prophets, Paul, and Christ (9). He also references figures like Jerome, Augustine, and, Ambrose (e.g. 19), as well as classical figures like Aristotle (105) and Sophocles (20).

[130] See Grady (26-108, esp. 26-57) for a sustained treatment of Shakespeare's "Machiavellian Moment" in which he argues that from 1595-60 Shakespeare's plays interrogate "a secular, realpolitik understanding of political power as a force for both good and evil, a view that is widely identified with the discourse of Machiavelli's 1513 *The Prince*" (26). Also, see Rebhorn (*Emperor* 54-63) for an examination which finds similarities between Machiavelli and the second tetralogy.

[131] The Shakespeare passage also may be revising Pico's view of humans as chameleons in more sinister fashion.

The essential aspect of this anxiety is a "nervous[ness] about the divorce of rhetoric from ethical considerations" (Kahn, *Machiavellian Rhetoric* 88). Current critical treatments of Machiavelli are eager to note that the English view is a caricature of Machiavelli's thought and that the Italian was relevant in his "analysis of the dilemmas of *fortuna* and *virtu*" (92) and original in his articulation of "the origins of pluralism" (Garver, "After *Virtu*" 67).[132] These works show his originality as a thinker, but the anxiety motivated by Machiavelli's reputation is not wholly unfounded in his actual writings. He develops an ethical system that allows the reasons of the state to "prevail over ordinary moral reasons" (Copenhaver 269). In a departure from Cicero and Augustine, the end can clearly justify unethical means for Machiavelli (*Prince* 18) and in a departure even from a utilitarian system the end need not necessarily be morally good.[133] At the heart of this departure is his concept of *virtu*.

> Christian moral theology, with its roots in Greek and Latin terminology, had long since developed its own taxonomy of virtues and vices, an ethical vocabulary that was part of the common lexicon of early modern Europe. Machiavelli debases that language. . . in ways from which political and moral discourse in the West has not recovered. . . . One can scarcely exaggerate the violence done by Machiavelli's language and ideas to the discourse of virtues and vices that early modern Christians took for granted." (Copenhaver 278-80)

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[132] On Machiavelli and prudence, see Garver ("After *Virtu*" and *Machiavelli*).

[133] Copenhaver offers a chilling example drawn from the *Discourses*: "If the deed [of Romulus's fratricide] "accuses him, the result excuses him." Augustine knows the Livy text from which Machiavelli draws, and his view of the fratricide and deification of Romulus is quite different. cf. *De Civitate Dei* 2.15, 3.5-6, 22.6. Also, recall Remer's discussion which notes Cicero's influence on Machiavelli and Machiavelli's ultimate break "with Cicero on the political role of the *honestum*" (20).

This is a radical ethical system that deservedly provoked some anxiety. Machiavelli avers that "it is necessary for a prince, who wishes to maintain himself, to learn how not to be good" (*Prince* 15). In a "seductive" style that makes use of gestures to ancient and contemporary texts like a humanist (Copenhaver 281), he subverts the humanist preference for peace over war (279) and "forget[s] legitimacy and morality" (280). Instead, the prince is a fox and lion, master of seeming and violence (*Prince* 18) who must be cunning and willing to "conquer" Lady Fortuna "by force" (*Prince* 25). This episode of domestic violence that concludes *il Principe* reveals a politics of verbal and physical force. Clearly, an ethics of rhetoric as we have conceived of it using cooperative force has no place in Machiavelli's system. His rhetorical ethics are sophistic, and not just in the genial manner of Gorgias in Plato's dialogue of that name. Rather, Machiavelli's ethics are Thrasymachian and Calliclean with the Florentine further emphasizing the Renaissance audacity of Pico whose "exaltation of the will" is "given its final performance by Nietzsche" (Quinn, *Iris Exiled* 171).

The invocation of Pico and his *Oration on the Dignity of Man* provide the occasion to talk about a final aspect of Machiavelli's thought, his philosophical anthropology. As Peter Kreeft has argued, while Machiavelli and Hobbes break radically from the common traditions of ethics in the West (partially articulated in our account) that precede them, they do base their ethics on anthropology in a way that Bentham and Mill's Utilitarian or Kantian ethics will not. However, their anthropology views human persons as "essentially evil." Therefore, they center their ethics on power and "institutions to check human nature." Presuming the inability of humans to choose the good, they effect a "revolution" against the common Aristotelian view that the "aim of society . . . is [moral] virtue," that politics are social ethics (Kreeft, *Moral Thought*

2d-2e).[134] In Machiavelli's anthropology, rhetorical ethics, and politics, one can see that it is not wholly without reason that anxious Englishmen "represented this anxiety about rhetoric, and about Machiavelli's rhetorical politics in the Machiavel" (Kahn, *Machiavellian Rhetoric* 88).[135] But the degree to which this anxiety is justified depends not only on Machiavelli planting the idea of deception in the heads of politicians and villains, but also on whether or not his philosophical anthropology is correct.

The cynical-suspicious and naïve-confident strains of thought about rhetorical ethics have a complex co-existence with the latter assuming that one who appears good is good and the former fearing false appearances. In their most extreme forms one presumes upon a false sense of security while the other borders on paranoia.[136] These views are not simple, and it appears that some who hold to idealized confidence are becoming more naïve and some who are cynically suspicious are becoming more anxious as the sixteenth century unfolds, but even this trajectory is not static: some refuse to allow their confident view to become idealized or their suspicious view to become anxious, and many books and cultural beliefs combine the incommensurate idealized and anxious views to a degree.[137] There is a continuum of opinion.

This complexity in the landscape of sixteenth-century English rhetorical culture provides a rich background to assist in our understanding of Thomas More, William Shakespeare, and Francis Bacon. We have seen how preoccupied their culture is with rhetoric and rhetorical

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134 Also, see Kreeft (*Moral Thought*) 8a-8g.

135 In addition to Kahn's helpful study of 'English Machiavellism' (*Machiavellian Rhetoric* 3-12, 85-166), also see Praz (90-145) on the view of Machiavelli in England.

136 Interestingly, both seem like they could learn from a closer reading of their Augustine that there is a potential difference between appearance and reality, but that the life of the speaker has potential to reveal the reality of a dissembler (cf. 4.151, 161). See note 242 for fuller development of the five possible types of rhetors as suggested by Plett and Crider, "Through Nurture."

137 Even Wilson, who seems oblivious to Machiavellian anxiety in *The Art of Rhetoric*, has Machiavellian "traces" in his other works (Shrank 201).

ethics. This preoccupation was mutually reinforced by continental humanism, by the classical grammar school curricula, by the well-known ideas of Cicero, Quintilian, and Augustine, by idealistic English-language rhetoric manuals, and by an anxious posture towards potential Machiavellian sophistry. All of these influential ideas, texts, and institutions exist within a framework which, despite intense religious controversy, insists upon the need to view all things through the lens of the Christian faith and to order all things according to God's will while holding pagan, and especially Roman, learning in the highest esteem. In the chapters that follow, one will see how three of the most important figures of the English Renaissance are shaped by and respond to this cultural milieu as each self-consciously formulates his own answer to the question is the *Ars Rhetorica* for the good?

Chapter III

"Colour" that Fails "To Set": Unethical Persuasion and the Nature of Rhetoric in More's *History of King Richard III*

Thomas More (1478-1535) is a figure to which titles as various as merry, angry, earthy, religious, martyr, heretic, free-thinker, dogmatist, proto-communist, and saint have been applied.[138] Despite this disagreement, there is little question that he was both a man of broad and deep learning and an active public servant. The present account of More will attempt to discover how he would answer the question "Is the *Ars Rhetorica* for the Good?" and where this answer places him upon the spectrum between the most extreme naive and cynical answers available in Renaissance England. While many scholars turn to *Utopia* as the best way to understand and examine More, I will attend primarily to his prose, dual language *History of King Richard III* which is a work of political theory, a humanist puzzle, and a poetic fable. Such a choice is justified on practical and historical grounds.[139] Practically, the powerful sophist Richard provides an obvious locus for understanding More's rhetorical ethics in a work that is made up of 40 to 50 percent "speeches, direct or reported, and . . . orations comparable in brilliance to those in Shakespeare's plays or *Paradise Lost*" (Logan, "Introduction" xxxiii). Also, there is a historical precedent for privileging the *History* over *Utopia*. As Gerard Wegemer observes:

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[138] All biographical study of More begins with Roper. See Wegemer and Smith (3-160) for early accounts of More including Roper's. Also, see Stapleton. Later biographies, largely based on these sources and More's own corpus, reach the diverse conclusion listed above. For three accounts which both overlap and diverge, see Curtright, Greenblatt (*Self-Fashioning* 11-73) and Wegemer (*Portrait of Courage*). The fundamental difference between the three is that Greenblatt's picture of More is one of discontinuity (within himself and over time) while Curtright and Wegemer see greater unity in More's life and thought.

[139] Furthermore, the *History* stands in need of further study. As Logan notes, only 13 pages of Geritz's bibliography concern the *History* compared with *Utopia*'s 97 ("Development" 135). Especially rare are book length studies of the *History*. I have found McCutcheon ("Differing Designs" and "More's rhetoric") and Wegemer ("Civic Humanism" and "Educating Citizens") to be very helpful starting points. I am especially indebted to Wegemer whose reading of the *History* deeply influenced my own thought first in a graduate seminar, then at the 2007 Thomas More Studies Conference, and finally in his scholarly writing.

> Especially by its profound influence on Shakespeare, *Richard III* may well be More's most important and most influential political writing. Shakespeare studied More's work so closely at the beginning of his career that not only did he structure his first four plays around it, but he continued wrestling with the issues it posed, dramatizing his own conclusions only in the last of his thirty-seven plays at the end of his life.
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> That influence is also seen in Ben Jonson, who owned (illegally) a copy of More's Latin Works. Significantly, *Utopia* "is nearly unmarked," yet there are over 1600 markings in Jonson's distinctive hand throughout "the roughly 3000 total lines of print" in *Historia Richardi*. ("Educating Citizens" 39)

More's use and view of rhetoric has been studied by a few critics.[140] In 1943, Nelson showed More to be a student of grammar who cultivated the power of rhetoric, but he does not examine in-depth More's understanding of the nature and purpose of rhetoric. More recently, scholars have sought to discover More's view of rhetoric's purpose and have come to different conclusions. Daniel Kinney, for example, suggests that More's seeming insistence upon grammar as an art greater than rhetoric functions to shield his privileging of rhetoric, the "new governing science," "without mentioning its much-abused name" (lxvi, lxii). Wegemer disagrees with Kinney and takes More at his word that rhetoric is not the governing discipline. He argues that More intentionally "deflates the importance of rhetoric," worried about its power to do "great harm." More "points out the need to foster public deliberation and to seek counsel that looks to existing laws and traditions as their starting point, and to truth and justice as their objective" ("Civic Humanism" 188-90). Both Kinney's and Wegemer's positions emphasize

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[140] More possesses a general knowledge of the rhetorical tradition. This is well documented by Logan ("Deliberative Rhetoric") and McCutcheon ("More's rhetoric").

that More is engaged in reflection about the nature and ethics of rhetoric, topics that are much debated in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England.[141] My study of the *History* is positioned more closely to Wegemer's view than Kinney's, but improves on critics' understanding of More by focusing particularly on how More's engagement with the classical Roman rhetorical tradition in *The History* discloses something of his rhetorical ethics. These analyses of More's engagement with classical Roman rhetoric will then provide an occasion for a synthetic discussion of how Christian rhetorical ethics also influence the future Lord Chancellor. Ultimately, this chapter argues that, for More, rhetoric is not the privileged discipline and should be viewed with caution, but he remains somewhat confident in rhetoric: Ethical acts of persuasion can motivate hearers to right belief and good action.[142]

To substantiate this claim, the examination of the *History* will begin with an analysis of Richard and his allies that reveal More's deliberate engagement with the classical ideal orator tradition in his representations. This engagement will shed new light on More's view of the role of words—both their power and limitation—in the achievement of tyranny. Sections will follow that develop a nuanced understanding of More's epistemology and that note his philosophical anthropology and ontology. It is especially in the latter two that More's reliance on and interpretation of the Christian rhetorical tradition will also become clear. Taken together the three parts will prepare us to answer more definitively whether or not More believes the *Ars Rhetorica* to be in service of the good and to suggest what sort of system is assumed in his ethics.

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[141] In addition to works that make synthetic arguments about More's view of rhetoric and rhetorical ethics, see the following studies that examine particulars of More's own use of rhetorical figures and strategies: Carney, Hosington ("English Proverbs"), McCutcheon ("Denying the Contrary" and "Notes on Litotes"), Story Donno, and Wegemer and Curtright (11-25).

[142] While I will interrogate *The History*, Brendan Bradshaw's reflections on *Utopia* similarly assert that More, following Cicero, saw rhetoric as a bridge between "rational idealism" and "practical politics," allowing for the pursuit of the ideal within the world of *realpolitik* (112-113).

The Anti-Ideal Orator(s)

In the first chapter, both Cicero's and Quintilian's views of the ideal orator were addressed. For each of the Romans, the *vir bonus dicendi peritus* [good man skilled in speaking] is able to rule society for the good by means of rhetoric.[143] Renaissance humanists made this figure an exemplum and sought to renew the commonweal by training citizens in the art of persuasion.[144] More, however, was acutely aware that skilled speech need not be ethical and that it can be used in the service of both statesmen and tyrants. In *The History of King Richard III*, More fashions Richard and his henchmen with surprising recourse to the Roman exemplum as his villains seek to usurp the English throne by force of words and arms.

In his first introduction of Richard, More suggests that he is thinking through the ideal-orator tradition. Richard, "by nature" as uncle and "by office" from his oath, is to protect King Edward IV's two heirs, but he "vnnaturallye contriued" to kill his nephews with "al the bandes broken that binden manne and manne together, withoute anye respecte of Godde or the worlde [*ruptis omnibus humanae societatis vinculis / contra ius ac fas*: ruptured all bonds of human society; in defiance of man's law and God's]" (*CW* 2, 6/3-7; *CW* 15, 320-321/11-12).[145] Note the emphasis that is only present in the Latin upon the laws of God and of human society. This

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[143] See Cicero's *De Oratore* 1.32-4 and *De Inventione* 1.2-5, and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* Prooemium of 1, 2.15-8, 12.1-2.

[144] More calls Richard an "example" (*CW* 2, 86/22). See Grant (158), Kincaid.(231-2), Schuster (477-80); and Sylvester (cii) for accounts of the content of the exemplum. Story Donno provides a synthesis of critics' many views of the genre(s) employed in the *History*, along with her own assertion that the work can best be understood as an instance of *vituperatio*.

[145] I will sometimes quote from both More's English and Latin texts. Taken together, the two texts can illuminate one another. When both are cited, the English will usually be given first, with the Latin and its translation following in brackets. The translation of the Latin is Kinney's from *CW* 15. Because of this use of brackets, clarifying synonyms for archaic English words will be put in French brackets in this chapter and are often formulated in consultation with Logan's "Reading Edition."

emphasis and More's formulation of the "bonds of human society" evoke the Ciceronian proto-orator who gathers and civilizes a scattered humanity (*De Oratore* 1.32-34; *De Inventione* 1.1-5) and picks up on Ciceronian language in *De Officiis* in its discussion of the "universal brotherhood of mankind [*communem* ***humani*** *generis* ***societatem***]. . . [a] fellowship which the gods have established between human beings [*constitutam inter homines* ***societatem***]" including a most close "bond" of "fellowship" (***societatis*** *artissimum* ***vinculum***) based on a shared "conviction" about justice (3.28; emphasis added).[146] From the beginning of More's text, the narrator reveals to the audience that Richard is a *vir malus dicendi peritus*, a potent anti-ideal orator ("anti-ideal" in the sense of not morally good, but still highly skilled); he is "close and secrete, a deepe dissimuler" (*CW* 2, 8/7), the scatterer of a gathered humanity who creates a chaotic environment in which "a man could not wel tell whom he might truste, or whom he might feare" (*CW* 2, 43/27-28).

The sophistic acts of persuasion of Richard and his allies reveal the depth of their skill in speaking and their malice. Some of these acts are narrated and others are monologues. In order to better appreciate the anti-ideal orators that More has created, let us first examine Richard's persuasion after Hastings is killed, second Dr. Shaa's sermon, and finally, Buckingham's address at the Guildhall. After Hastings is executed, Richard, addressing city leaders, attempts "to set some colour vpon y^{e} {that} matter [*suam culpam*. . . *velaret pallio*: to palliate his guilt]" (*CW* 2, 52/25-26; *CW* 15, 420-421/11) to enervate the many (true) rumors surrounding the murder that are moving swiftly about London (*CW* 2, 52/23) and which might endanger the control he has secured through homicide.[147] His means (lies) are illicit, and his end (to conceal guilt),

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146 The text and translation of *De Officiis* in this chapter come from the Loeb edition.

147 Such a use of words provides an inversion of Quintus Maximus; Cicero, quoting Ennius, praises Quintus for putting the safety ("*salutem*") of the state before self-interest in combating rumor ("*rumores*") (*De Officiis* 1.84).

corrupt.[148] He ignores Aristotle and Quintilian's distinction between ends, having no internal end of an apt and ethical case, and only seeks the external purpose of persuading the audience that Hastings was justly killed. Further, Richard attempts to persuade them that they must spread abroad his version of the story that Hastings had spearheaded a large conspiracy against the good protector.

Because this accusation is absurd, Richard fashions a particularly powerful means to conceal the truth with a cover ("*velaret pallio*"): physical proof. The protector and Buckingham appear "harnesed in old il faring briginders" (*CW* 2, 52/28), as the former explains that they grabbed whatever armor was at hand to defend against the conspirators. The Latin narrator adds a parenthetical statement that makes explicit Richard's motive for choosing such attire.[149] "[T]o lend these words some appearance of truth they stood there wearing armor so shabby that not even the lowest footsoldier would be likely to put it on except in an emergency" (*CW* 15, 420-421/15-18). Richard hopes that the sight of them in armor will lend credibility to his tale and will strengthen his *ethos* as a heroic warrior, but he is not content to look simply martial. He goes on to explain that, while they captured "many of the plotters [*coniurantium*], they had generously chosen to content themselves with the punishment of Hastings alone (since his malice was incorrigible) and to spare all the rest for repentance" (*CW* 15, 420-421/19-21). Richard crafts a tale that presents himself as merciful, as well as strong.

While the passage shows the interworking of an impressive act of persuasion, the narrator's tone in describing it provokes the reader to laugh at the absurdity of the scene. It

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148 As McCutcheon puts it, Richard habitually "misuses rhetoric for perverse ends" ("More's rhetoric" 54).

149 One will recall that Aristotle singles out "*choice* of specious arguments" as the key in distinguishing the sophist from the ethical rhetorician (emphasis added). See, his *Rhetoric* (1.1.14).

seems that this absurdity is not lost on Richard's audience for "no man beleued" the story (*CW* 2, 53/10). Nevertheless, Richard partially accomplishes his end because they universally praise his "fortitude [*fortitudinem*]" and "forbearance [*clementiam*]" (*CW* 15, 420-423/22-1), apparently willing to spread his lies among the public and causing flying rumors to be tamed. In the Latin, the narrator adds a provocative conclusion that the audience members both "gave thanks for their safety" and "secretly wished [*tacite. . . secum*] each of them on the gallows" (*CW* 15, 422-423/1-2). They perceive Richard's malice and wish him ill, but either because of apathy or for the sake of self-preservation, they go forth to act on his behalf.

This same mixed result is achieved in an extension of this act of persuasion, addressed to a different audience, which immediately follows Richard's plea. He sends out a proclamation filled with "slaunder" (*CW* 2, 53/20) and adds "allegations" to tell the "people" or "commons" ["*populum*," "*plebe*"] of Hastings's alleged coup d'état (*CW* 15, 422-423/3, 5-7). Hastings is criticized as an evil counselor to Edward IV and a profligate whose licentious conduct not only influenced the former king to similar immorality, but also was the cause of Hastings's apprehension and execution because Shore's wife "with whom he lay nightly" snitched on him.[150] (Of course, in reality, it is Catesby who has told Richard that the lord chamberlain's circle is beginning to distrust Richard [cf. *CW* 2, 46].) Even in the third person retelling, one can see the masterful craft of Richard, whose calumnies paint Hastings as a long standing "vniuersal hurt" to the realm, who reaped what he sowed as "vngracious liuyng brought him to an vnhappy ending" (*CW* 2, 53/23, 28-29). Furthermore, Richard emerges as the savior of the realm which

[150] After the description of Richard's proclamation and the people's response, there is a long section on how Richard subsequently treats Jane Shore. She becomes yet another 'proof' in Richard's performance which is meant to persuade. He imprisons her and accuses her of witchcraft and complicity in Hastings supposed plot. When this "colour" will not "fasten" upon her, she is forced to do public penance for her sexual sin. However, this proof seems to backfire, as "many good folke. . . [that] hated her liuing, & glad wer to se {see} sin corrected: yet pitied thei more her penance, then reioyced therin, when thei considred that y^{e} protector procured it, more of a corrupt intent then ani vertuous affeccion" (*CW* 2, 54-55/20-7).

according to the English: "shold bi gods grace rest in good quiete and peace" (*CW* 2, 54/2-3) and according to the Latin: should "live peacefully and quietly under their excellent prince [*principe*]" (*CW* 15, 422-423/11-12). Of course, Richard's more distant end of the crown will require not peace but chaos, yet it is important that fears be calmed at this point when he might still be vulnerable to the uprising of others. Nevertheless, the people, much like the nobles, reject Richard's pose because "eueri child might wel perceiue, that [the proclamation] was prepared before" (*CW* 2, 54/6-7). Richard's calculations omit consideration of decorum; the manner in which his case is delivered does not fit the circumstance under which it was supposedly composed.[151] The citizens see through the appearance (the Latin word used to describe their perspicaciousness is from *video* [*CW* 15, 422/18]); a schoolmaster playfully remarks that the document is "a gay goodly cast, foule cast awai for hast {a fine, excellent trick, spoiled by haste[152]}" (*CW* 2, 54/12), and a merchant suggests that perhaps the proclamation was written prophetically (*CW* 2, 54/13).[153]

Especially because it is mediated by the narrator, the picture of Richard that is emerging seems to belie my claim that he is a skilled sophist, an anti-ideal orator. His acts of persuasion do not actually persuade the citizens of London. However, it is helpful to place these particular

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[151] See McCutcheon for an account of More's own care as regards decorum ("More's rhetoric" 50). Aristotle discusses decorum in *Rhetoric* 3.7; Cicero discusses it in *De Oratore* 3.210-112 and *De Officiis* 1.94. In the latter text, he takes care to ground all efforts to speak aptly upon the foundation of justice, thereby anticipating and circumventing many ethical difficulties. Quintilian deals with decorum in 11.1 with additional comments on decorous diction in 10.1.8-9 and 10.2.13, and on decorous delivery in 11.3.69-70, 150-174.

[152] The gloss is taken verbatim from Logan's edition (63 note 96).

[153] While the merchant's statement is ironic for the reader, it is admittedly ambiguous whether the merchant is in earnest or is being sardonic. However, since the narrator comments that "eueri child might wel perceiue" the truth, I assume the latter. More's choice of professions for these two speakers is intriguing; the educator is clearly sharp-sighted and the merchant may be.

In the Latin version, the teacher's remark is prefaced with the Ciceronian question of whether or not the "crafty stupidity of the edict" [*solertem edicti stulticiam*] is "too atrocious. . . for witticisms" (*CW* 15, 422-423/20-22; cf. *De Oratore* 2.237-247). cf. the note of *CW* 15 on the Ciceronian echo (622).

speeches within the context of the whole. Richard has no care for the internal end of persuasion (speaking an apt and *ethical* case), but he maintains a hierarchy of proximate and ultimate external ends. His ultimate end is to become king. His acts of persuasion may not fool his audiences (the proximate external end), but the crowds are still influenced by the rhetorical force of Richard to the extent that the people do not forestall Richard's progress toward his ultimate end. This is all that the tyrannical Richard requires.[154] To put it another way, the audience members are not duped; they withhold their full mental assent but act in violation of their convictions. Richard first sought to divide the nobles into factions (*CW* 2, 9-10/26-9; *CW* 15, 328-329/6-23), and now he has divided each auditor within him- or herself. Each of Gloucester's acts of persuasion is calculated to allow him to move one step closer to the throne, and he rarely experiences setbacks. In this respect, he is a frightening anti-ideal orator with potent rhetorical skill.

Richard is also careful to surround himself with other powerful sophists who extend his program and act on his behalf when the achievement of Richard's ultimate end is best served by his own absence. The most notable of these speakers are Dr. Shaa and the Duke of Buckingham. The former gives a sermon at Paul's Cross on the illegitimacy of Richard's brothers and nephews which would prohibit them from being rightful heirs to the throne. He wields means of persuasion like a skilled rhetor: he uses "for the proofe & confirmacion of this sentence, certain enamples [*exemplis*] taken out of the olde testament & other auncient histories" (*CW* 2, 67/5-7; *CW* 15, 450/15). The Latin narrator adds that he used "great assertiveness, not only with probable signs and suspicions but also with falsely named witnesses" (*CW* 15, 451/24-25). He then goes so far as to associate himself with John the Baptist, "not unaware [*non ignarum*] of

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[154] See Baumann, who includes an account of More's use of Cicero, and Logan ("on tyranny") for two explications of More's engagement with classical conceptions of tyranny in the *History*.

how dangerous it was for him to be giving [this] speech," but insisting that when speaking from the pulpit the "truth should be held to be more important than even life itself" (*CW* 15, 450-453/25-2). This is quite a flourish. His invocation of John the Baptist is a figure of anamnesis which increases his *ethos*, as does his appeal to truth with its implied risk of damnation for one who would dare to speak lies from the pulpit.[155] His knowledge of this reality is emphasized by the doubly negative litotes with which he begins, emphasizing his "awareness" of the situations potential gravity. (Of course, More—and perhaps the narrator—intends this to be highly ironic.)

Buckingham—"neither vnlearned, and of nature marueilouslye well spoken" (*CW* 2, 69/9)—is an even more polished speaker than Dr. Shaa. Let us examine the latter's address at the Guildhall. He goes to this "forum" of London (*CW* 15, 454-5/17) and addresses the commons (*populo*) of the city with the mayor and city aldermen ("*nobilibus et sentatu Londinesnsi*: nobles and the aldermen of London") "assembled about him" (*CW* 2, 69/6; *CW* 15, 454-455/17-19).[156] Apparently a master of the rhetorical canons of memory and delivery, he begins in a voice "loude" and "clere" (*CW* 2, 69/10). What follows is a well-crafted classical oration with exordium, narration, division, proof, and peroration. As Carney has noted, Buckingham omits refutation of arguments against Richard.[157] This, no doubt, is calculated; when Buckingham's end is unethical and his words are mostly untrue, he realizes that it is dangerous to introduce the truth of the matter to the audience.

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155 Shaa's use of this figure was brought to my attention by Carney (par. 4). See McCutcheon ("Denying the Contrary" and "Notes on Litotes") on More's use of litotes.

156 In addition to my analysis of this sophistical act of persuasion by Buckingham, see Koterski's treatment ("Dirty Hands") of Buckingham's act of persuasion against the inviolability of sanctuary in which the Duke sophistically manipulates the distinction between formal and material cooperation in evil.

157 See Carney (par. last) whose divisions of the speech I follow.

Logan's note calls Buckingham's speech an "extraordinary production;" as he comments elsewhere, "More was a particularly adept and enthusiastic practitioner of the fictional oration."[158] For our purposes, let us briefly examine only the exordium of Buckingham's speech:

> Frendes, for the zeale & heartye fauour that we beare you, we be comen to breake vnto you, of a matter ryghte great & weighty, and no lesse weightye, then pleasing to God and profitable to al the realm: nor to no part of the realm more profitable, then to you the citezens of the noble citie. For why, that thyng that we wote {know} well ye haue long time lacked and sore longed for, that ye woulde haue geuen great good for, y^{t}{that}ye woulde haue gone farre to fetche, that thynge wee bee comme hyther to bringe you, withoute youre labour, payne, coste, aduenture or ieopardie. (*CW* 2, 69/11-20)

This is a remarkable passage. Buckingham begins by positioning himself as a person of good will, in a sentence that is copious and that builds to a climax. He concludes the sentence by descending from high-minded appeals to God's will and the common profit to an appeal to the self-interest of the auditors, which he makes consonant with the higher things. The copiousness of the first sentence is punctuated by the variety that follows in a laconic rhetorical question. Buckingham is smart enough to know that he must provide the audience with his ideal response to this question. His anaphoric answer plays upon the desires of the people, and—again with copiousness—promises the fulfillment of their desires without any exertion or risk. Furthermore, Buckingham leaves some ambiguity about what exactly is the issue (or, as the Romans would call it, the *status*) of the speech. This keeps the attention of his audience as he transitions into the narration of the facts.

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[158] See Logan's note in and introduction to his edition of *Richard III* (80 note 63 and xxxiii).

Despite Buckingham's skill in crafting this act of persuasion, both he and Shaa—like Richard—end up appearing foolish after initially appearing potent. Dr. Shaa fails to execute the planned dramatic entrance of Richard at the conclusion of the portion of his sermon dedicated to Richard's legitimacy. When Richard finally arrives, Shaa "out of al order, & out of al frame" repeats some of his fulsome praise of the protector (*CW* 2, 68/14), but it has the opposite effect of Shaa's intent with the people not crying out "king Richard king Richard," but instead "turned into stones, for wonder of this shamefull sermon" (*CW* 2, 68/5, 25-26). As with Richard himself, Shaa has great rhetorical power but fails to persuade. Furthermore, Shaa's own conscience is so affected by his despicable actions and his reputation is so publicly shamed that he dies "w^{t}in [a] fewe daies" (*CW* 2, 68/33).

Buckingham's attempt to persuade the people to proclaim Richard king is only slightly more successful. He assumes that the audience has been "framed [*preformasse*: conditioned]" by the mayor ["*prefectum*"] (*CW* 2, 75/1-2; *CW* 15, 468-469/17), but his oration is met with silence. Buckingham then undertakes a "somewhat louder" restatement of his case "so wel and ornately [*dilucide ornateque*: clearly and elegantly]. . . that euery man much meruailed that herd him, and thought that they neuer had in their liues heard so euill a tale so well tolde" (*CW* 2, 75/9-14; *CW* 15, 468-469/23-26). Nevertheless, all remain silent, as they do again when the mayor and Buckingham require the recorder to restate the speech, as is customary.[159] The narrator's presentation of these repetitions is darkly comic. A bewildered Buckingham finally adds to his persuasion a more threatening postscript that concludes by requiring a yea or nay answer. The Guildhall then buzzes with deliberations and eventually a few allies of Richard call for his coronation. The mayor and Buckingham willfully interpret these few shouts as representative of

[159] cf. *CW* 15 which uses the word "*moris*" (470/4).

the "hole mindes" of all (*CW* 2, 76/29), a "perfect consensus [*consensu*]" (*CW* 15, 472-473/24). The majority goes away sad, including some of the Duke's company, among whom are some that are "not able to dissemble theyr sorow" (*CW* 2, 77/4). While Buckingham's speech is potent, the majority easily sees through his appearance to the "euill" intent of his "tale so well tolde." Some lack the ability of Richard and Buckingham to dissemble their true feelings (*CW* 2. 77/1-6), but as with Richard's act of persuasion that was previously examined, the anti-ideal orator's sophistic proxy succeeds in strong-arming nearly all of the people if not to assent, at least into the submission necessary for Richard's rise.[160] The following day, "a large throng of nobles and citizens [*nobiles civesque*]. . . all the lords and the council and people of London [*proceres omnes senatum populumque Londinensem*]" go to ask Richard to assume the throne (*CW* 15, 474-475/3-5; cf. *CW* 2, 77/7-10).

These (partially) successful acts of persuasion, from speakers who are described using language borrowed from accounts of the classical ideal orator, present a difficulty. How can a 'marvelous' speech, like that of Richard or of Buckingham, be both deeply unpersuasive and—simultaneously—instrumental in Richard's ultimate achievement of tyranny?[161] The epistemology, implicit in the *History*, as well as a note on More's Christian philosophical anthropology and ontology both of which complement his epistemology, will help to provide a coherent answer that can lead us to understand fully More's rhetorical ethics in the work.

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[160] It is debatable whether or not silence is a submission, but this silence at least reveals another occasion when, having been muted, an auditor is divided within him- or herself. If it is a submission, then the later "stage play" and "scafoldes" metaphor (*CW* 2, 80-81) suggests that many submit out of feelings of fear and/or powerlessness.

[161] While the word "marvelous" is never itself used, the narrative communicates the amazing quality of the speeches. For example, "euery man much *meruailed*" at Buckingham's restatement of his case (*CW* 2, 75/12 emphasis added). Richard's proxy is not linked to the Roman rhetorical tradition by virtue of his association with Richard alone. More's description relates Buckingham to the Roman ideal more directly, inasmuch as the Romans characterize their model orator as worthy of such admiration. See, for example, *De Oratore* 1.31 and *Institutio Oratoria* 12.10.77, 12.11.25-26.

More's Epistemology in *The History*

Written in the same decade as Machiavelli's *Il principe*, More's work reflects a widespread interest in whether or not unethical acts of persuasion are more persuasive than ethical ones and in how (or if) one can see through false appearances.[162] It is precisely an assumption that unethical acts are stronger that is at the foundation of the suspicion and anxiety manifest in some sixteenth-century cynics. More's account initially suggests that epistemological confidence found explicitly in Aristotle, Augustine, and Quintilian. Richard's propaganda fails to create a cult of personality, even in the absence of an equally well-crafted case on behalf of the truth of the matter.[163] Buckingham's unwillingness to refute counterarguments suggests that, in the poetic representation of reality that More is fashioning, these counterarguments would prove more persuasive than any refutation. Also, the sharp-sightedness of the common people—who see through not only the stunning oration of Buckingham, but also through Richard's well-crafted proclamation and Dr. Shaa's sermon—suggests that More thinks ethical acts of persuasion in the service of the good are more persuasive than unethical ones.[164]

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[162] In his brief treatment of *The History*, Greenblatt notes More's interest in whether or not one can "see beneath" a "manipulated" "appearance" and rightly remarks—the often forgotten point—that the "charade" of Richard rarely "deceive[s]" (*Self-Fashioning* 13-5).

[163] Equality of craft is key. When weighing answers to the question of whether or not an ethical act of persuasion is more potent than an unethical one, I am assuming equal skill or aptness. This was not always assumed in Tudor England; recall, for example, that in 1560 Wilson will take epistemological confidence to a naive extreme arguing that "the wicked cannot speak well" (244). In *The History*, More repeatedly dramatizes the fact that well-spoken, sophistic acts of persuasion can be potent, and his *Letter to Brixius* and Brixius epigrams seem to reaffirm a deep concern (and, in the Brixius affair, many critics would claim over concern) with the power of false words. Nevertheless, More's very act of responding to the *Chordigera* or *Antimorus* (even if the *Letter* was quickly withdrawn) exhibits a measure of confidence that his skilled defense, in its veracity, will be more persuasive than Brixius's calumnies and divergent account of historical events.

[164] More ironically uses the phrase "sharp-sighted" in his second letter to Giles (*CW* 4, 248/23; 249/28).

Two additional places in the text where More's epistemological optimism can be inferred are in the early episode of River's execution and in the response of Richard's acceptance of the throne.[165] In the latter moment, the response to Richard's acceptance is universal: "wel wist {knew} there was no man so dul that heard them, but he perceiued wel inough, y^{t} {that} all the matter was made {prearranged}" (*CW* 2, 80/22-24). In the former, Richard must get rid of Rivers so he can become protector of the young king, his nephew. The Duke of Gloucester lays a trap for Rivers, but as soon as Rivers realizes he is among those that Richard and Buckingham have deluded, with "suretie of his own conscience" he begins an oral defense of himself. They fear him because he is "very well spoken" (*CW* 2, 18/17, 23-24), and when "they ran out of arguments and causes [*quum ratione causaque deficerentur*]" for their "speech [*orationem*]," they turn "to force [*ad vim*]" first imprisoning and then beheading him (*CW* 15, 346-347/20-24). The beheading is overseen by Sir Richard Ratcliffe, who we learn is "rude in speche" (*CW* 2, 57/25; cf. *CW* 15, 430/22). He is clearly no match for the honey-tongued Rivers and is unwilling even to give him due process of law because it would open up an opportunity for the accused to speak publicly. Richard, Buckingham, and Ratcliffe cannot craft orations that are a match for Rivers, so like new Antonys they behead a potential Cicero. The villains know well the power of speech, and within the narrative they give a tacit acknowledgment that the true, ethical act of persuasion from one who is well spoken endangers their plans.

Nevertheless, More's account of human knowing includes many moments in which false appearances are not seen for what they are. The common people are twice distinguished from the wise for their inability to see through empty gestures (*CW* 2, 24/10-15; 82/1-2; cf. *CW* 15,

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[165] Yet another instance is found when the duchess is not persuaded by false words (*CW* 2, 64/20).

358-359/7-14; 484-485/15-16).[166] In one instance, just after Hastings seeks to persuade that Rivers and his companions meant harm to the young princes, Richard arranges a visual proof of Rivers mal-intent, but "[t]his deuice all be it that it made the matter to wise men more vnlykely, well perceyuying that intendours {plotters}. . . wolde rather haue hadde theyr harneys on theyr backes {weapons close by}. . . yet muche part of the common people were therewith verye well satisfyed, and said it wer almoise {a good deed} to hang them {the perpetrators}" (*CW* 2, 24/10-15; cf. *CW* 15, 358-9/7-14). In the second instance, on the day after Richard accepts the people's request to be king, Richard addresses them, expressing his desire to be a clement ruler. As with the action that follows Hastings's speech about Rivers and as with Richard's speech after Hastings execution, there is again recourse to physical proof. He rehearses his "deceitful clemency" by forgiving his enemy, Fogg, who he has arranged to be present at the event (*CW* 2, 81/26). As before, the "wise men" or "prudent judges considered [the gesture] empty" (*CW* 2, 82/2; *CW* 15, 484-5/15-6) while the "common people reioysed" (*CW* 2, 82/1-2). Notably, Richard feels himself no more secure after having delivered the speech (*CW* 15 484-5).[167]

Additionally, the nobles are blind to Richard's ambition in its earliest moments (e.g. *CW* 2, 14-16/16-3), and the Queen goes from blindness to clear sight, seeing men's dissembling and "damning the time" when sophistic words caused her own dissuasions (*CW* 2, 20/27-28; cf. *CW* 15, 384-385/13-23 which also uses *video*), only to fail ultimately (and inexplicably) to see that she is handing over her second son to imminent death. Furthermore, twice the narrator laments

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166 Furthermore, More distinguishes "comen people. . . that waue with the winde" (*CW* 2, 45/7-9) and who "are easily provoked to all sorts of snap judgments" (*CW* 15, 402-403/13-17) from "wise men" [or "*prudentes*"] in a passage that includes both parties in sharp-sightedness. The passage distinguishes the wise from "lordes" [or "*proceres*"] as well, but mockingly groups a few of these nobles with the wise; however, these nobles are moved to debate rather than to action.

167 This psychological state is much more fully explored in the English edition which goes on for many pages after this episode while the episode concludes the Latin version.

that Richard has succeeded in clouding perception and disorienting *all* the people (*CW* 2, 43/26-28; 58/6-8; *CW* 15, 398-399/18-20; 432-433/6-8), and in response to Hastings's foolish confidence in his own security (and in Catesby), the narrator opines: "O good god, the blindnes of our mortall nature [*O densam mortalitatis caliginem*: The dense blindness of mortal existence!]" (*CW* 2, 52/13-14; *CW* 15, 418-419/24-25).

How can we piece together moments of sharp-sightedness and of blindness into a coherent Morean epistemology? It seems that More maintains that, all other things being equal, the apt and ethical act of persuasion will be more persuasive than one which is unethical or sophistical, agreeing with Aristotle that "the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites" (*Rhetoric* 1.1.12). But our large catalogue of episodes reveals that rarely will all things "be equal." The moments of blindness reveal More's belief that persons are not only fallible and have varying degrees of blinding pride or enabling wisdom, but also will sometimes simply not have enough data by which to make a full assessment of a speaker's honesty. This can be due to lack of exposure or to the sustained fraud of a skilled deceiver. Therefore, the moral character of the speaker (*ethos* or *mores*) becomes important not only as an element of proof in an orator's act of persuasion, but also as a point of orientation for the right discernment of the audience. This fact helps account for the persuasive power of both Hastings and the Cardinal.[168] The possibility of such thorough disorientation, however, does not lead More to

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[168] For Aristotle, *ethos* is limited to the manifestation of character within the speech, but for More it takes on a larger dimension. This idea of a speaker's *ethos* as orienting to an audience is influenced by and overlays nicely with the recent discussion of *bona fides* in the *History* by Wegemer (*Young Thomas More* 121-5). The extra-Aristotelian view of *ethos*/*mores* clarifies the interworking of the moment when Hastings (himself knowing that his persuasions are partly sophistical) seeks to exonerate Richard's treatment of Rivers (*CW* 2, 23/24-26); he "offered his word of honor [*suam fidem*] (which everyone trusted completely)" and his "speech [*oratio*] had a considerable influence because of the speaker's honorable reputation [*fidem magnam*]" (*CW* 15, 356-357/3-5, 18-19). His *ethos* is key to persuasion. Similarly, the Queen's move to give up her son hinges on the Cardinal's invocation of his good faith (*bona fide*).

As Wegemer points out (*Young Thomas More* 122), Cicero thought good faith to be the "foundation of justice" and the republic (*De Officiis* 1.23). In a society without good faith, there is chaos. This is one of the

epistemological skepticism (pyrrhonist or academic). A skeptical reading of More simply cannot account for episodes in which some or all see the truth of the matter. Those instances in which some see and others are blind reinforce that one can hone his or her faculty for seeing through false appearances. For More, these seers, often contrasted with the common people (and also distinguished from the nobles[169]), deserve the appellation "wise" (e.g. *CW* 2, 45/8). Furthermore, the existence of the multitude of episodes wherein everyone sees through false appearances suggests that More does not view insight as the sole province of the sapient and the educated; instead, More, in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, believes that knowledge acquisition begins in trustworthy intuition, a perceiving "somewhat" or a "secret instinct of nature" (*CW* 2, 44/25-28; cf. *CW* 15, 402-403/1-6).[170]

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reasons that Quintilian so desperately desires that his ideal orator be morally good (12.1). But his unwillingness to define fully the relationship between such goodness and skilled speech seems to open the door to just such abuses of *mores* as that of Hastings in which a once good man dupes the people who only know his past for which he has justly won repute.

169 See note 166.

170 The partial nature of this seeing implies that intuition can be cultivated and honed. More suggests this in the Latin when the narrator describes the Lord Stanley as "old in years and in the experience of many things" as well as "prescient [with] mistrust of these circumstances [*prouidenter illa suspectans*]" (*CW* 15, 402-403/17-19).

Aristotle gave intuition (*nous*) a real role in understanding (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1141a-1142b) and is presumably among those "ancients" who posit that knowledge acquisition proceeds by complimentary degrees: poetical, rhetorical, dialectical, and scientific (in the pre-Cartesian sense), as argued in Taylor (8). Thomas Aquinas and other scholastics develop this idea through their examinations of connatural knowing (*Summa. Theologica* II-II, q.45, a.2) and *synderesis* (*Summa Theologica* I q.79 a.12), and through the distinction they make between *ratio* and *intellectus*. See Pieper (*Leisure*, esp. 8-26), for a full explanation of the latter distinction. Also, see Maritain (*Range of Reason* 22-9) on connaturality. Taylor provides a full history of the idea of the intuitive or poetic mode of knowing (not limited to poetry), and explains that

> [p]oetic experience indicates an encounter with reality that is nonanalytical, something that is perceived as beautiful, awful (awefull), spontaneous, mysterious. . . . [It is] found in common experience, when the mind, through the senses and emotions, *sees* in delight, or even in terror, the significance of what is really there. . . . [To put it in a slightly different fashion, p]oetic knowledge is. . . a spontaneous act of the external and internal senses with the intellect, integrated and whole, rather than an act associated with the powers of analytic reasoning. It is . . . a natural human act, synthetic and penetrating, that gets us *inside* the thing experienced. It is, we might say, knowledge from the inside out, radically different in this regard from a knowledge *about* things. (5-6 emphasis original)

As with More, Taylor cannot help but talk about knowledge acquisition in terms of seeing.

The passage from which these two quotes are drawn is worth examining more fully. It follows the assertions that no one can "wel tell whom he might truste" and that the "state of" chaos is partially succeeding in clouding the "eies & mindes of men, from perceiuing" (*CW* 2, 43/26-28; 44/10-11). Nevertheless, despite the protector's plans being

> very secret: yet began there here & there about, some maner of muttering amonge the people, as though al should not long be wel, though they neither wist {knew} what thei feared nor wherefore: were it that before such great thinges, mens hartes of a secret instinct of nature misgiueth them. As y^{e} {that} sea w^{t}out {without}wind swelleth of himself sometime before a tempest: or were it that some one man happely somwhat perceiuing, filled mani men w^{t} {with} suspicion, though he shewed few men what he knew. Howbeit somwhat the dealing self {itself} made men to muse on the mater, though the counsell were close. " (*CW* 2, 44/22-30; cf. *CW* 15, 400-403/21-8)

While the reader is faced with the two parts of a dialysis between which he or she must choose, both halves of the disjunct offer a singular view of knowing. Either a single man intuitively perceives with many more intuiting the truth second-hand from him, or a whole mass of people by an "instinct of nature" see Richard's malice. In either case, these seers appear to be common people, and they come to know by intuition.[171] Furthermore, the sea simile nicely reinforces the intuitive nature of the knowledge acquisition being described, and the natural image of the storm has the potential to remind a reader of how one, starting from perception of particulars via the senses (cf. *De Anima* 431b; *Metaphysics* 980a-982b), can discern a coming storm regardless of rank or formal education. The metaphor and the sharp-sighted commoners who inhabit both

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[171] In the Latin, the word used for those described is the broadly inclusive "*populus*" (*CW* 15, 400/23).

sides of the division reveal that More's epistemology has an enlarged view of reasoning in which intuition is valued.

In the end, More believes that truth well-spoken is stronger than falsehood and that all people have potential to see things as they are. Nevertheless, this knowing is difficult; impediments abound. Concupiscence, pride (*superbia*), attachments, sin, human regard, malice, and desire for power or esteem head the inventory of obstructions which More would have readers seek to conquer in themselves and to be aware of as things that potentially (mis)guide other orators.[172]

A Note on Philosophical Anthropology and Ontology

The awkward picture of Richard and his proxies as anti-ideal orators, whose successes are not nearly as universal as was foreseen by Quintilian for his *vir bonus* or Cicero for his proto- or ideal orator is not based solely on More's epistemological confidence. It should also be noted that More comes to the conviction that the well-spoken truth is stronger than eloquent sophistry by way of his philosophical anthropology and his ontological understanding of evil. These are informed in a particular way by the Christian tradition, and most particularly, the Christian rhetorical tradition.

More's anthropology or view of the nature of the human person has been anticipated in the catalogue of impediments to knowledge acquisition that has already been listed and in the tension between blinding human vices and human intuition that has already been discussed.

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[172] Wegemer repeatedly contends that pride is "the central and most pervasive theme in More's entire corpus." See his *More on Statesmanship* (30-6), "Civic Humanism" (189-90), and "Educating Citizens" (47). Also, for accounts of *Utopia* that emphasize More's concern with pride, see Voegelin (209-13) and White (1982 341-54 and 1989). The admittedly complicated Edward calls pride an "odious monster" in the *Historia* (*CW* 15, 224-335/14-15).

However, it is primarily More's depiction of Richard and his henchmen that reveals he is not as sanguine about human goodness as is Quintilian. As Samuel Gregg has made clear, while More writes in a classical historiographic mode, "the moral universes of many [of the *History*'s] primary characters" illustrate an "understanding of human identity" and "action" that is thoroughly Christian and particularly Thomistic (215, 222). Indeed, as his later writings against Luther make clear, More's view of human beings as fallen does not terminate in the view of human depravity that is common to many of the reformers.[173] But More's willingness to use a historiographic mode that highlight's Richard's faults, albeit while stressing Richard's agency, seems to borrow from Augustine and Aquinas. It enacts St. Thomas's moral theology while dramatizing how seductive sophistic speech can be and how corrupt a human being can become. More's synthesis of Augustine and Aquinas places his view of fallen human nature between that of Luther and of Quintilian.

One might also think profitably about this Morean middle way in terms of education. Erasmus has great confidence in the "ruler's educability [and] the schoolteacher's powers" (Copenhaver and Schmitt 273) while Machiavelli or, later in the early modern period, Hobbes believes that human beings are, in some sense, unteachable.[174] More makes a distinction between learning the right course of action and doing the right thing (Wegemer, "Civic

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[173] For example, More judges the human being to possess a free will and perceives Luther's view of the person to be that "he hathe no fre wyll of hys owne / by which he can with helpe of grace eyther worke or praye" (1 *CW* 6, 373/18-20).

[174] Framing the anthropological question around educability returns us to epistemology, inasmuch as Plato inquired whether or not virtue is knowledge and if virtue can be taught (*Meno* 70, 89c). See Kreeft for a helpful reading of the *Meno*'s opening lines which Kreeft believes provides four alternative views of virtue which anticipate the four powerful positions articulated in Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Machiavelli (*Moral Thought* 3g). Plato believes virtue can be taught; Aristotle thinks it can be gained by habit; Rousseau believes that it is natural; Machiavelli thinks it is against nature. According to this formulation of categories, I would place More with Aristotle. However, Copenhaver and Schmitt distance More from Erasmus by grouping him with Luther and Machiavelli (273). This formulation risks misinterpretation because Luther seems to deny the possibility of virtue and Machiavelli seeks to replace it with world-wise *virtu*.

Humanism" 194), and his humanist texts—including *The History*—try to educate readers with a pedagogy that, concerning a student's educability, is not as presumptive as Erasmus's was nor as coercive as Hobbes's might have been. More attempts to help the reader cultivate his or her power to act well by presenting puzzles that, in order to be solved, require the reader to accept More's invitation to engage actively his text. This unforced engagement can begin to habituate a reader in intellectual virtues and encourages (but certainly does not guarantee) the cultivation of moral excellences.[175] The text as a whole can be thought of as a meta-act of persuasion in which More seeks to engage and cooperatively guide a reader rather than dupe him or her. More does not desire to be a pedant nor does he desire that his readers' faculties be flooded like those of Quintilian's judge.

More's epistemology is complemented not only by his philosophical anthropology, but also by a view of ontology which he shares with one of the fiercest critics of Roman naïveté, Augustine. The Doctor of Grace argues that "evil has in itself no substance [*[m]ali. . . nulla natura est*]; rather the loss of what is good has received the name evil [*sed amissio boni mali nomen accepit*]" (*De Civitate Dei* 11.9).[176] This solves the Manichean problem for Augustine: if evil is only a privation, "all things are good [*bona*] which thou hast made, nor is there any substance [*substantiae*] at all, which thou hast not made" (*Confessiones* 7.12). More, like Augustine, is acutely aware of evil, and is clearly of the Augustinian mind when, for example, in the *Dialogue of Comfort Against Tribulation*, Anthony says that "as euery evill mynd cometh of

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[175] cf. More's belief in *A Dialogue Concerning Heresies* that "[r]eason is by study / labour and exercyse of. . . [the] lyberall artes corroborate and quickened / and. . . iudgement. . . moche ryped" (1 *CW* 6, 132/3-16), but that "good wyttes" can fall victim to "the dampnable spyryte of pryde" (1 *CW* 6, 122-123/26-6). On More's humanist pedagogy in an earlier work, see Beier (34-8); on this pedagogy in *The History*, see Wegemer (*Young Thomas More* 125-38, 176-90). Referencing More's second letter to Giles, Wegemer thinks about the issue of educating readers in terms of "'sharp-sighted' judgment" (126).

[176] In this chapter, quotations and English translations from Augustine's *Confessiones* and *De Civitate Dei* are from the Loeb editions; those from *De Doctrina Christiana*, from R. P. H. Green's edition.

the world & our selfe and the devil / so is euery such good mynd. . . inspirid into mans hart by the goodnes of god hymselfe" (*CW* 12, 16/25-29). In *The History*, one finds suggestive passages, such as a line from King Edward's deathbed oration, that may well complement the explicit view of the *Dialogue of Comfort*.[177] While the text emphasizes Edward's faults, his speech is rather sapient, perhaps influenced by his proximity to death.[178] He astutely observes that his children's safety is best secured by unity among the nobles (*CW* 2, 11/18-19) and that "a pestilente serpente is ambicion" (*CW* 2, 12/21-22). While within the context of trying to prove the ultimate inexpediency of flattery and the advisability of "good plain wayes," the king makes a general statement: "euer at length euil driftes dreue to nought" (*CW* 2, 12/3-4). Primarily, this maxim speaks to the specific context, but the language, crafted by one who had lectured on *De Civitate Dei*, also evokes Augustinian ontology. Evil, lacking substance, is always "nought." This ontology, in harmony with his philosophical anthropology and epistemology, undergirds More's belief that a good act, such as the truth skillfully spoken, is more persuasive than an anti-ideal orator's sophistic speech which is without substance in every sense.

Conclusion

Thomas More's ironic refashioning of the ideal orator, his epistemology, anthropology, and ontology position us to assert that he would certainly answer "Is the *Ars Rhetorica* for the

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177 Admittedly, some of these suggestive passages could easily be read as putting forward a different ontological view. For example, when the narrator opines that "god neuer gaue this world a more notable example. . . [in] what mischief worketh the prowde enterprise of an hyghe heart" (*CW* 2, 86/21-23), I believe the narrator suggests that God gives free choice that allows for but does not create evil; however, one could insist that the narrator has God make and 'give' an evil example.

178 Edward, building his own *ethos*, does not fail to note his proximity to death (*CW* 2, 12/7-12), and he may even be sincere (though the oath he uses is a favorite) when he swears that if he would have foreseen the resulting factions, he "woulde neuer haue won the courtesys of mennes knees, with the losse of soo many heades" (*CW* 2 13/3-6).

Good?" in the affirmative. While the art of rhetoric is not the highest excellence for More, it can contribute to the personal and common good and its absence or corruption can assist the tyrant. More's view puts him among the confident upon the spectrum between the most naive and cynical answers to the question of the *Ars Rhetorica* in the English Renaissance. However, More's demotion of the virtue of skilled, ethical speech to a lesser place in the hierarchy of excellences might have surprised some Italian and trans-alpine humanists as a dissent from a common and more sanguine belief. More's anthropology and epistemology help him avoid the naïve, idealized strain of confidence (the furthest extreme of one end of the spectrum) which Wilson will articulate so clearly later in the century and position More closer to the cynics than some of his humanist peers.[179]

Having provided More's answer to the *Ars Rhetorica* question, all that remains is to assert what system of ethics informs his answer. More, like Cicero and Augustine, has a realist rhetorical ethic. It is more difficult to ascertain More's ethic in the *History* than in Cicero's or Augustine's texts not only because he is presenting his ethics through a literary form, but also because the acts of persuasion almost exclusively make use of illicit means, seeking bad ends. If characters which one could argue to be the ideal rather than anti-ideal used bad means to a good end then one could make an argument that More's ethics are situational or utilitarian.[180] Instead, one is given a picture of the abuse and misuse of rhetoric creating chaos and the conditions necessary for tyranny. While More's uses a provocative, humanist method in which fiction (or

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[179] The account of educability revealed that Erasmus, for example, is more sanguine than More on the issue.

[180] Some interpreters recalling Morus's exhortation to make as little bad as possible what you cannot turn to good, see More as one who believes in a situational ethic. For example, this view is implicit in Grant's reading of Fox (which I'm not sure Fox would grant) that "More comes to see that any engagement with politics necessarily forces us to compromise with evil" (Grant 171-2 note 12). Koterski's reading of the *History* ("Dirty Hands") offers a helpful corrective which shows how More could uphold an ethical realism in the midst of the dirty business of politics by distinguishing between formal and material cooperation with evil.

to put it more harshly seeming or lies) gives access to truth, this method addressed to the reader of the text remains in the cooperative rather than forceful mode, the former being foundational to realist rhetorical ethics. A legalist, whether Lutheran or Kantian, might object to More's method, but such a hypothetical objection only helps to illustrate that More's ethics are realist.[181] Also, if one can trust More's narrator, then the whole text reliably points to the existence of natural law, a component of so many articulations of realist ethics.[182] Among the references to natural law, there are many which are ambiguous, positioned on one half of a dialysis (such as the sea storm figure that we have examined), invoked by an unsympathetic character, or used as evidence on both sides of an issue (such as sanctuary), but readers are also given direct moments such as when the narrator introduces Richard as one who defies the laws of man and God ("*contra ius ac fas*") (*CW* 15, 320-321/12). The more ambiguous allusions seem designed as part of More's pedagogy, focused on inviting readers to learn how to apply and interpret the natural law, but the latter assertion firmly grounds the whole text in a realist ethic, including a realist rhetorical ethic.[183]

Furthermore, the text seems frequently to critique those like Hastings who have some measure of good will, but ultimately privilege *utile* over *honestum*. Such figures could attempt to justify their actions with a utilitarian or situational ethic that might place self-preservation and self-advancement over moral action However, it is not figures who use this reasoning, but others such as Justice Markham (*CW* 2, 70/10-20; *CW* 15, 458/3-11) who seem to receive

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181 In this statement I am not meaning to invoke Kant's aesthetics, but his ethics.

182 On the difficult question of the narrator's good faith, see Wegemer ("Educating Citizens" 43-7).

183 See Pawlowski and Wegemer (13-16) for a full list of references to natural law in the *History*. The ones to which I allude are a dyalisis at Richard's birth (*CW* 15, 324-325/1) and at the sea storm (*CW* 2, 44/26), as well as Edward's deathbed plea (*CW* 15, 334-335/11-14; *CW* 2, 12/21) and the invocation of natural law arguments by Buckingham and the Queen in their dispute about sanctuary (*CW* 2, 32/4-5, *CW* 15, 372-373/25-28; *CW* 2, 39/26).

Morean approval.[184] More's Augustinianism and (non-reformed) Christian anthropology place him within a tradition that has long denied that the end can ever justify the means or, in Pauline language, that evil may be done so good may come of it (cf. Rom 3:8).

Thomas More's *History of King Richard III* presents a tyrant whose skill in speaking (perhaps because of Shakespeare) we take for granted. More, however, links Richard and his cronies to the ideal orator tradition while having them deliver speeches that often fail to persuade audiences toward their short-term ends; their "colour" will not "set" (cf. *CW* 2, 52/25-26; 24/3; 54/20-21; 59-60/24-2). These partial failures, however, incrementally bring about their ultimate goal of Richard's tyrannous rule. Such an awkward combination presents a puzzle that, when pieced together, reveals More's view of the power of words. True and well-spoken words are always more powerful than sophistic falsehoods; evil is only a privation. Furthermore, every human being possesses an intuitive sight that can be sharpened and that allows one to see through false appearances. Nevertheless, both true and false words have their limits; sophistic speech (with its mixed achievements) is only one of the many instruments necessary for Richard's tyrannous ascent, and while More—like the Queen—damns times when a human being is sophistically manipulated (either fully duped or divided within him- or herself) by a tyrannical deceiver, one senses that More—unlike Quintilian and Cicero (in his oratorical writings)—does not believe that the good words of an ideal orator can alone turn the tide against tyranny.[185] Rhetoric is not the queen science for More.[186] He, like Augustine, not only desires

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[184] Wegemer, for one, puts forth this view of Markham as a Morean "hero" (*Young Thomas More* 137, 156).

[185] See Logan ("on tyranny" 182-4), McCutcheon ("Differing Designs" 11-2 and "More's rhetoric" 54) and Wegemer ("Civic Humanism" 191-6, 2007 48, and 2011 130-8) for—to borrow Logan's word—the "lessons" of More that these critics draw from the text. In particular, Wegemer is explicit in his belief that More does not view ethical rhetoric as sufficient to forestall tyranny.

[186] One should recall that this was the primary point of contention between Kinney and Wegemer with which the chapter began.

apt and ethical speech (listened to with care), but also asks orators and audiences to cultivate character prior to an act of persuasion and to act virtuously after words have been spoken; to do all three creates an environment in which potential tyrants can be forestalled and "human institutions vital to the cohesion of society" can be sustained (*DDC* 4.87; 4.151-55; 2.139-40).

Chapter IV

Poured Pestilence vs. Tender Air: Richard III, Iago, and Imogen's Contest of Oratory

A study of representations of acts of persuasion in the literature of the English Renaissance cannot omit Shakespeare. Despite all the upheaval and change that characterized the years between More's death and Shakespeare's plays, there is continuity of concern about rhetorical ethics, about whether or not the *Ars Rhetorica* is for the Good. Shakespeare was rhetorically trained and dramatizes acts of persuasion throughout his corpus.[187] In fact, the representations of acts of persuasion are so common in Shakespeare's works that it is a challenge to determine on which plays to focus. Ultimately, a study that does not limit itself only to Shakespeare must select a few representative works. Three such works are *Richard III*, *Othello*, and *Cymbeline*.[188] In them, one finds a play from the beginning, middle, and end of Shakespeare's career. The first two texts provide two of Shakespeare's most effective sophists, Richard and Iago. Much in the same way that More's sophistic Richard could teach us about More's rhetorical ethics, these two figures begin to reveal something about Shakespeare's rhetorical ethics.[189] In addition, the former provides continuity between our discussion of More

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[187] cf. the latter half of note 13 for accounts of Renaissance rhetoric and treatments of rhetoric in England that often have Shakespeare in view. For accounts particular to Shakespeare, also see Adamson, Hope, Magnusson, Rhodes (195-204), and Trousdale.

[188] In this chapter, references to *Othello* and *Cymbeline* are drawn from the New Cambridge editions; *Richard III* from Bevington; all other plays, from Greenblatt's *Norton*.

[189] As the introduction to the dissertation suggested, critical inquiry into Shakespeare's rhetorical ethics can be said to begin with Vickers ("Power of Persuasion"). Also see Altman (*Improbability*), Crider (*Persuasion*), Hunt, McDonald (*Arts of Language*), Platt, Plett (415-75), and Strier. The thesis which this chapter will develop suggests that while qualified by the highly suspicious view of rhetoric presented in *Richard III* and, especially, *Othello*, Shakespeare ultimately offers a nuanced, confident vision of the *Ars Rhetorica*. My thesis shares Crider's conviction that Shakespeare is concerned with the ideal orator and that the late plays are important to understanding Shakespeare's view, even while I approach the topic through a different late play than Crider and while my set of questions, while complementary to Crider's, are different. In greatest contrast to my position is Strier who claims that moral questions are irrelevant to Shakespeare and that a villain like Richard is simply portrayed as having fun, a fun in which the audience can share (206-9). (On the audience sharing in the 'fun' of Shakespearean tragedy, cf. note 202.) This view makes Shakespeare into a proto-Nietzschean and perpetuates the mistaken distinction that

and our examination of Shakespeare while the latter needs to be addressed as a figure who is the focus of much of the scholarship on Shakespeare and rhetoric. For example, in no small part because of Iago, Joel Altman singles out *Othello* as a most intimate portrait of "rhetorical anthropology" (*Improbability* 22). Vickers has even gone so far as to rank Iago as "Shakespeare's greatest rhetorician and greatest dissimulator" ("Power of Persuasion" 434). While *Othello* and especially its arch-villain merit the sustained attention that critics have given, an exclusive focus on this play and the other celebrated tragedies (*Hamlet*, *King Lear*, *Macbeth*) too often has given a distorted picture of Shakespeare's view of rhetoric. While some critics broaden their scope when seeking to understand Shakespeare's outlook, this chapter will argue that an unexplored and a fruitful way to deepen our understanding of Shakespeare's view of rhetoric and rhetorical ethics is to consider Shakespeare's most potent sophist, Iago, side-by-side with Iachimo, to weigh *Othello* with *Cymbeline*.[190] Shakespeare invites the connection by evoking the former villain in the latter's name.[191] Furthermore, *Cymbeline* demands attention

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limits rhetoric to play and philosophy to seriousness. Altman is indispensible in his discussion of probability in human choice, esp. as dramatized in *Othello*. Nevertheless, Altman only makes a "gesture" toward Shakespearean romance, admitting the need of a fuller investigation than he offers (*Improbability* 339). I hope to have provided that fuller investigation. Furthermore, while we both use an Aristotelian poetic as a hermeneutic, my view of the marvelous in *Cymbeline* is that such Shakespearean wonders do not transgresses against the Aristotelian view, but confirm it. Altman wants to make a strict distinction between the universe of *Othello* and of *The Winter's Tale* (*Improbability* 367), between the world of probability and the world of the admirable which I believe risks confusing Shakespeare's rhetorical ethics and circumscribes the possibility of wonder in real life which Aristotle (and Shakespeare) allows for. On Shakespeare stirring up wonder in his audience, see Cunningham and Harp.

[190] Treatments of Shakespeare's rhetoric in addition to those by Altman (*Improbability*) and Vickers, "Power of Persuasion," that turn to *Othello* include Crider (*Persuasion* 101-21), Desmet (95-101), Greenblatt (*Self-Fashioning* 232-54), Lyne (163-97), McDonald (*Arts of Language* 185-8), Parker ("Shakespeare and rhetoric" 54-74), Plett (454-75), Rhodes (197-204), and Trousdale (160-72). Most of these studies are not limited to *Othello*, but some privilege the play; only Lyne and Plett directly link *Othello* and *Cymbeline*. Lyne offers a brief contrasting of the two plays (163-4, 196-7), and Plett looks only at Iachimo's persuasion of Posthumus in 2.4 in what he terms a "digression" (468-9). While *Cymbeline* criticism frequently makes comparisons between the play and *Othello*, it is not with an eye toward the role of rhetoric in the plays.

[191] Crider's useful word to characterize Shakespeare's evocations is "retraces" (*Persuasion* 6). *Cymbeline*, as a late play, also merits attention in an examination attentive to rhetoric because of its ornate style. On this phenomenon in the late plays, see Adamson, Hunt, McDonald ("Late Style" and "You speak"), and Palfrey.

because it provides a potent non-sophistic speaker, a type notably absent in *Richard III* and *Othello*. An examination of these connected plays, as well as of *Richard III*, provides a richer understanding of Shakespeare's view of the nature and ethics of rhetoric, allowing one to situate him more precisely on the continuum between the naïve and cynical extremes and providing a fresh perspective on Shakespeare's epistemology.

To achieve this fresh perspective and to place Shakespeare on the continuum, the chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section undertakes a parallel examination of Shakespearean anti-ideal orators, Richard III and Iago. These villains then, in the second section, are situated within their respective plays, *Richard III* and *Othello*, to determine provisionally Shakespeare's answer to the question of whether ethical and skilled acts of persuasion are more or less persuasive than sophistic ones and to investigate Shakespeare's view regarding whether it is possible to see through false appearances. The third section turns to *Cymbeline* to examine the sophistical speech of Iachimo and ethical rhetoric of Imogen. This inquiry leads to a larger evaluation, in the fourth section, of Shakespeare's view of epistemology within the late play. Faced with seemingly irreconcilable conclusions regarding Shakespeare's epistemology within the three plays, the conclusion seeks to discern a unified rhetorical ethics between the plays that helps provide insight into how Shakespeare might answer the project's titular question.

Parallel Lives and Endangered Wives: Anti-ideal Richard and Iago

It is no accident that two of Shakespeare's most effective, memorable, and evil villains, Richard III and Iago, are both skilled in speaking. Like More's Richard, these two antagonists

figure the ideal orator in the negative.[192] With the Morean Richard, we saw More draw direct linguistic parallels, in a way that was fitting to his humanist discourse, between the classical Roman ideal orator and his Richard. Shakespeare knows his Cicero and Quintilian, but his anti-ideal orators are created not only in dialogue with recovered Latin texts circulating between humanists, but—as chapter two suggests—in a milieu where there is a bizarre coexistence of an overly idealized, naïve position (that a skilled speaker is necessarily morally good) and a cynical point of view (that human beings are by nature bad and often lie for the sake of their own advantage, and that skilled speech may even indicate that a speaker is dissembling), concerning rhetoric's status. While this milieu would not be unfamiliar to More, it develops considerably by the time that Shakespeare writes. Many of the sixteenth-century, vernacular rhetorical manuals are published between the time of More and Shakespeare, and Machiavelli's reputation (if not his works) is much more widely known.[193] While proponents of the cynical view feel confirmed in their outlook by what Machiavelli has written, the manuals often give a version of the naïve position which idealizes the consummate orator even further than the Romans.[194]

It is within this context that Shakespeare creates his arch villain, anti-ideal orators: Richard III and Iago. They explode the most naïve view and give power to the cynical view.[195]

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[192] See Fox, Gurr, and the Shakespeare and More themed June 2011 *Moreana* (ed. Phelippeau) for comparative accounts of More's *History*/*Historia* and Shakespeare's *Richard*. For two account of Shakespeare's Richard, see Strier and Targoff ("'Dirty' Amens").

[193] For example Wilson is published in 1560; Puttenham, in 1589; Peacham, in 1593. See the second part of Kahn's *Machiavellian Rhetoric* which is focused on "English Machiavellism" (85-165).

[194] Recall the discussion of the first two chapters. Wilson, for example, takes Quintilian's undefined relationship between moral goodness and skilled speaking to the extreme by presuming that skilled speech is always a trustworthy sign of moral goodness. In fact, Quintilian also suggests this idea. cf. 12.1.3-4. Puttenham (as Kahn points out in *Machiavellian Rhetoric* 88) registers anxiety about Machiavelli in his mention of the "disguisings. . . [of] Courtiers of forraine Countreyes" (308).

[195] As was laid out in a more general way at the start of the project, Vickers has argued that "Shakespeare knew more about the power of persuasion than did its [sixteenth-century] theorists" ("Power of Persuasion" 435) while Rebhorn—insisting on the presence of the cynical strain—believes that Shakespeare is "not so much

Let us begin with an examination of each figures' rhetoric which brings their sophistic powers into focus. In *The Third Part of King Henry the Sixth*, the future King Richard calls himself a chameleon, a Proteus, and a Machiavel, and his titular play fulfills his brag (3.2191-3).[196] The opening scene of *The Tragedy of King Richard III* begins with a display of Gloucester's rhetorical skill in which he confesses to the audience his determination "to prove a villain" (1.1.30). As with More's Richard, all this villainy is ultimately ordered toward gaining the throne. To that end, he twists an ambiguous prophecy to ensure the murder of his brother Clarence. In an interview with Clarence he shows his ability to speak equivocally promising that the matter touches him deeply (112) and that "I will deliver you, or else I lie" (115). Indeed, this is true, but not in the sense in which Clarence receives it because Gloucester does lie and is touched deeply by the matter because it bears upon his ability to ascend to the throne. The audience is always assisted in the discovery of Richard's duplicity and malice by the frankness with which he speaks to the fourth wall. This technique draws in a particular way on the tradition of Vice characters in medieval morality plays.[197] Richard's rhetoric will pervert Christian and classical traditions of rhetoric. His soliloquy which ends the first scene reports that he will woo Lady Anne (but not for love) and that he will ensure Clarence's demise "with lies well steel'd with weighty arguments" (148). With only the first scene finished, there is no question that Richard is highly skilled in speech and morally evil. As with the Morean Richard,

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[replying] to positive image of rhetoric," as he is "modeling. . . the negative image already available within it, though never so fully realized—unfolded and developed—as in Shakespeare's text" (*Emperor* 20 note 26). Taken together, Vickers and Rebhorn provide an excellent reading of Richard and Iago as concerns rhetoric. However, their comments seem intended for the whole of Shakespeare's body of work. The present discussion of *Cymbeline* may complicate their view(s).

196 In *Richard III*, Richard adds to this catalogue of descriptors that he is a traditional Vice figure (3.1.82). See Alvis ("Shakespeare's Hamlet"), Grady (26-108), and Schlueter for three treatments of Shakespeare's engagement with Machiavelli.

197 On Shakespeare's use of this tradition, see Miola (*Shakespeare's Reading* 63-71) and Spivack.

we are presented with a clearly sophistical character who has not only bad ends for his acts of persuasion, but who wields illicit means (thus far lies and equivocations) to achieve his ends. Furthermore, Richard has no internal end of speaking the best possible case in a way that is appropriately constrained by ethics. His only concerns are with results, with external ends.

Shakespeare's Richard can rightly be called an anti-ideal orator because he is chillingly successful in achieving his many proximate and one ultimate external end. The very next scene provides one of Richard's most frightening achievements, the successful act of persuasion in which he woos Anne. Anne begins as a rightly hostile, if not intractable, audience. She calls Gloucester a devil and fiend, and she has a powerful retort to each of Richard's honey tongued advances. She tries to slow the momentum of his persuasion by uncovering the corpse of Henry VI for whose death Richard is responsible. Her visual counter-proof does not affect Richard at all. The rapid exchange of acerbic dialogue appears it will end in a stalemate as it proceeds, but then Gloucester, admitting his guilt, gives Anne the opportunity to slay him. She cannot. Her first words suggest that she will remain rightly hostile to Gloucester: "Arise, dissembler. Though I wish thy death, / I will not be thy executioner" (1.2.184-5). But it quickly becomes clear that she is relenting: "ANNE: I would I knew thy heart. / GLOUCESTER: Tis figur'd in my tongue. / ANNE: I fear both are false. / GLOUCESTER: Then never man was true" (1.2.192-5). Anne's feisty self-preserving defense is gone. She is giving entry to Richard's overtures. Her tone is now one of dismay, exhaustion, and caution, a caution which will ultimately yield to him despite all the obvious reasons not to do so. Richard, of course, has no intention of reforming. His tongue and heart are not just compartmentalized, the divorce effected by Socrates according to the lament of Cicero's Crassus. Rather, his disfigured heart is disguised by his tongue, a necessary condition for his sophistical act of persuasion to succeed. His wooing includes a mix

of lies with admissions of guilt for things which Anne knows he has done. Admitting the truth provides him the opportunity to recast his motives for his past crimes in a more positive light. The proof of his alleged love which is ultimately persuasive to Anne is his putting his life into her hands, which was risky enough as to appear to Anne to be a sign of real repentance or to be a sign of authentic vulnerability upon which to build a marital relationship. While the wooing is filled with overtones of violence, it is truly the rhetorical force (albeit sophistic and not cooperative), not any political or physical force, to which Anne submits. When the interview is over, Gloucester has manipulated speech for evil so well that he cannot help but boast in what has become a famous anaphora: "Was ever woman in this humor woo'd? / Was ever woman in this humor won?" (1.2.227-8).

After only two scenes, one sees just how powerful a sophist, how much of an anti-ideal orator, the future King Richard is. Equally terrifying to his rhetorical potency is the success toward gaining the throne. He continues to hide his corrupt heart with his honeyed tongue through most of the play's action. He fools Rivers by clothing naked villainy in holy writ in 1.3 (335-6), and he successfully sets the Queen's allies and enemies against one another (1.3-4). He continues to equivocate not only to achieve his ends, but to amuse himself with the irony of his double meanings (cf. 3.1.81-3). Hastings proves totally blind to Gloucester's dissembling, believing that "there's never a man in Christendom / Can lesser hide his love or hate than he; / For by his face straight shall you know his heart" (3.4.51-3). In addition, unlike More's power-hungry mayor, Shakespeare's more ambiguous mayor seems fooled by Richard in 3.5 and 3.7. In the latter episode (3.7), Richard is persuasive, in part, because he constructs a physical proof that makes him appear a pious, prayerful Christian who is fit for the throne and surrounded by clergy who can offer him good counsel. In 4.4, Shakespeare gives an episode which in its

rhetorical situation is a deliberate parallel to the persuasion of Anne. The two princes have just been killed and their mother, Queen Elizabeth, mourns and rants. Richard enters wanting to persuade the Queen to be his intermediary to her surviving daughter whom Richard desires to wed. As with the interview with Anne, the Queen goes from immovable to relenting after the exchange with Richard.[198]

Richard's skill in sophistic speaking which uses illicit means to achieve bad ends, however, is matched by perhaps the most terrifying anti-ideal orator in Shakespeare's canon, Iago.[199] The first act of *Othello, the Moor of Venice* concludes with the villain's first long aside. The audience learns with terror that he does not know if Othello has cuckolded him, but he will act as if he is sure. Iago's malice is emphasized by the way his lines articulate the stops and starts of his discursive invention, of his plan to destroy Othello (which grows into a plan to drive Othello mad and to destroy Cassio and others). Iago delights that Othello "holds [him] well" and is "of a free and open nature, / That thinks men honest that but seem to be so" (1.3.372, 381-82). Iago is very aware of his audience and how to "abuse" his "ear" (377); as he put it elsewhere, he'll "pour. . . pestilence" through the "ear" (2.3.323); he will seek to appear good, so his eloquence may effect evil.

The next four acts unfold his discursive plan. Within a larger matrix of all sorts of manipulations, one finds many acts of persuasion. Let us briefly analyze a passage that sets forth Iago's self-understanding as sophist and then examine the three acts of persuasion that Iago addresses to Othello on Cyprus. Iago's self-understanding is well expressed in 2.3 when he

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198 This (at least) partially discredits other moments where Queen Elizabeth seems to see through Richard's sophistry such as 2.4.54 and 1.3.40-1. The insightful Girard reads both Anne and Elizabeth not as audiences duped unethically, but as willing audiences with an unethical desire for power (254-5). This reading relies, in part, on Richard's interpretive authority which may prove problematic.

199 See note 190 for a list of treatments of Iago and rhetoric.

explains to viewers his plan to put a plague in Othello's ear that will cause him to misinterpret Desdemona's advocacy for Cassio.

> I'll pour this pestilence into his ear:
> That she repeals him for her body's lust;
> And by how much she strives to do him good,
> She shall undo her credit with the Moor.
> So will I turn her virtue to pitch,
> And out of her own goodness make the net
> That shall enmesh them all. (2.3.323-29)

Iago makes clear the end that will guide all his speaking; it is to "enmesh," to bring Othello to madness or ruin, as well as anyone else that his net can capture. This is an unethical end that guarantees his acts of persuasion will be sophistical. Furthermore, in his eager boast, Iago points to his unethical means, pestilence. The metaphor is potent, linking a general notion of how words are received through hearing with the fact that Iago will try to infect Othello's judgment in such a manner that he will misinterpret Desdemona. While this will be accomplished with words, the passage is largely ambiguous as to exactly how Iago will make good on his brag.

The mention of Desdemona's "credit," however, gives a clue that *ethos* and—by extension—the rhetorical appeals will serve as pestilent means. However, Iago is not interested in all the appeals. Given the sophistic character of his speech (in this case, evil ends sought by unethical means), he has no use for the logical appeal and will rely primarily on ethical and emotional evidence. Looking beyond the present passage, one can say that ethical appeals allow Iago to establish his seeming *ethos* among all the various characters he orchestrates toward his desired enmeshing. The play resounds with the refrain of "honest Iago," issuing forth from the

mouths of Othello and Cassio.[200] But this *ethos* is not something achieved only before or outside of the attempts to persuade Othello that Desdemona has been unfaithful (the real end of the act of persuasion being Othello's madness or death). In his moments of persuasion, Iago reinforces his reputation through the ethical appeal. For example, in 3.3.90-259, Iago's guarded way of speaking about Cassio's honesty to Othello suggests to the Moor both Iago's fidelity in friendship and his honesty and discretion, as manifested in his care with words (118-25). Much later in 3.3, Iago references his own "honesty and love" as the reasons he is impelled to tell Othello the alleged truth about Cassio and Desdemona, effectively reinforcing his seeming *ethos* within a moment of persuasion (413).

As the 2.3 passage makes clear, however, Iago needs not only to fortify his own *ethos*, but also to diminish Desdemona's. While Iago does not manifest any concern about actualizing this reversal, tarring Desdemona's "credit" (which should rightly be informed by her virtue and goodness) appears to be a difficult task. Iago's confidence comes from a belief that his words will attack like a pestilent disease and that he can make Othello particularly susceptible to becoming the virus' host by creating "a jealousy so strong / That judgment cannot cure" (2.1.282-83).[201] This indeed sounds like the disconcerting way in which Quintilian proposed to flood the judge's *ratio* with *adfectus* (6.2). Iago has sized up his intended audience well, and while it is unsaid in Iago's brag, it becomes clear that twisted *pathos* appeals will be powerful means of persuasion by which to plague the Moor, who is not only trusting, but given to passion.

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[200] For example, cf. 1.3.280, 1.3.290, 2.3.6, 2.3.158, 2.3.228, 3.3.119, 5.2.147, 5.2.153 from Othello and 2.1.97, 2.3.302, 3.1.38 from Cassio.

[201] It should be noted that Iago also holds out cuckolding Othello as another potential avenue of destruction, but such an "achievement" appears highly unlikely.

When speaking more nobly about persuasion, Quintilian often relates rhetoric to healing medicine (cf. 4.5.5 and 5.13.3). Iago distorts this idea in his formulation of words as pestilence. However, according to Iago's twisted logic, his words are actually disease and medicine. For example, the knave exclaims: "Work on, / My medicine, work! Thus credulous fools are caught" (4.1.42-43).

The general acknowledges as much when trying to adjudicate in the Montano-Cassio-Roderigo affair: "Now by heaven / My blood begins my safer guides to rule, / And passion having my best judgment collied, / Assays to lead the way" (2.3.185-88). Othello is vulnerable to Iago's pestiferous sophistry which manipulates his emotions and—as a disease—self-consumes, corrupting Othello's ability to judge both what he hears and sees. Iago does not seek to justify ethically his lies that arouse and improperly direct Othello's emotions, and his dishonest and intelligent employment of them helps to reveal the Roman naiveté in sometimes permitting such means. His lies are meant to convince viewers of the danger and injustice of seeking to "appear good" when one is in fact vicious, an incongruity that Augustine decried (*DDC* 4.161).[202]

Having gained a feel for the texture of Iago's poisonous sophistry in his use of the *ethos* and *pathos* appeals that are means used to achieve the end of destroying Othello, let us turn to the three important acts of persuasion that Iago addresses to Othello in Cyprus. Each of these exchanges progressively moves Iago toward the fulfillment of his singular purpose.[203] To that end, the first act of persuasion, in 3.3, introduces to Othello the idea that something is purportedly amiss. Seeing Cassio depart from his interview with Desdemona (an encounter that Iago recommended to him) in which the former lieutenant petitions her to help him regain his lost rank, Iago mutters "I like not that" (35). This is followed by a denial to Othello that he said anything, to which he adds a provocative "or if—I know not what" (36) and a commentary on how it could not have been Cassio sneaking away "guilty-like" (39). This sort of exchange,

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[202] Vickers, "Power of Persuasion" 430, notes that the soliloquies of Iago in a way make an audience member a "privileged" viewer of his plot. Crider, *Persuasion* 121, goes further, suggesting that until very late in the play, the audience derives pleasure from their semi-omniscient perspective. Perhaps overly influenced by knowledge of how the play will end, I agree with Vickers that this experience, by design, is "rather unpleasant."

[203] Plett, 457-70, argues that Iago conducts a classical, judicial oration, "distributed over several scenes and acts" (458). While one may be able to discern a prologue, a body of formal proofs, and a conclusion across the three exchanges under investigation, I will present the exchanges as three acts of persuasion, sharing a singular purpose, but temporally separate.

making use of *reticentia* (aposiopesis), continues after the two soldiers are again alone.[204] Iago simultaneously discourages jealousy in Othello and plants the seeds of jealousy (167-72, 174-78). As Quintilian explains, *reticentia* "will ensure that the judge himself searches for something which perhaps he would not believe if he heard it, and then believes what he thinks he has found out for himself" (9.2.71). Othello, like Quintilian's judge, is duped by the use of *reticentia*.

Othello's initial resolve (which his immediate speech and behavior will not match) is to withhold judgment: "I'll see before I doubt" (192). In this he suggests to Iago that the kind of rhetoric needed will be judicial, and he provides Iago with the standard of proof that the knave must meet to be persuasive when he presents the proofs of his judicial case. But by the time Iago departs from this interview, Othello is already vacillating between certitude ("I am abused" [269]) and contingent thinking that privileges Desdemona's guilt over her innocence ("If I do prove her haggard. . ." [262] and "If she be false. . ." [280]). This doubt within Othello is all accomplished in Iago's initial act of persuasion. He has not yet offered developed proofs, but he has increased his *ethos* and has enflamed Othello with doubts and false passions through the appeals to *pathos* that make use of the *reticentia* figure.

The next time Iago and Othello encounter one another (3.3.335), the knave constructs a second act of persuasion that develops proofs that move him closer to the achievement of his purpose. Before giving any proofs, however, Iago addresses the standard of proof put forth by Othello which is too high for Iago to effect his intended tragedy. Othello again insists on "ocular proof" (361), but with little more than an interjection by Iago, he lessens his standard from seeing his wife cheat to at least having proof beyond doubt (365-67). Iago has already procured the handkerchief, a "trifle" which he believes Othello's jealousy will twist to a proof equal in

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[204] Vickers, invoking Quintilian, first brought to my attention that Iago employs aposiopesis (*Appropriating Shakespeare* 82). The figure is also treated by Trousdale (165-6).

weight to divinely inspired scripture (322-25). He, therefore, takes this occasion of Othello's restatement of the standard of proof to imagine explicitly what the adultery of his wife might look like while at the same time persuading Othello that it is too "tedious" of a "difficulty" to obtain ocular proof (398-99) and that "imputation and strong circumstances. . . [w]ill give you satisfaction" (407, 409).

Having established a new, lesser standard of proof that Iago knows he can meet with his deceit, the villain begins a series of formal proofs. The first proof includes Iago's characteristic false *ethos* of honesty, in which he confesses that he does not like having to tell what he knows. He proceeds to give a vivid account of when he allegedly saw Cassio having a dream in which the former lieutenant insists aloud to an imagined Desdemona that they must "hide" their love from the Moor and which included the sleeping Cassio kissing Iago and throwing his thigh over Iago's leg, all the while dreaming that it was Desdemona. The proof further confirms for Othello what he has already decided: his wife is guilty. Iago counsels caution that it is just a dream, a "thin" proof. As a skilled sophist, Iago's disposition of proofs within this exchange is not random. Contrary to his statement, he must think the proof that occupies the primary position is quite persuasive to his audience who is already being "eaten up with passion" (392), but he claims it thin to sustain his audience's attention.

Iago then offers the second and final proof of this exchange; he inquires if Desdemona owns a strawberry-spotted handkerchief which—of course—the ancient already knows she was given by her husband. This technique again leaves unsaid those things which Othello might not believe from another but which seem certain when self-discovered. Once Othello confirms that the handkerchief was his first gift to her; Iago says he has seen Cassio with it. Iago claims that this "speaks against her with the other proofs" (442). Of course there has only been one other

proof, but Othello is overwhelmed. He asserts that "Now do *I see* 'tis true" (445; emphasis added). There has been no ocular proof, just hearsay, but Othello thinks it enough, swears death for Cassio and his wife, and raises Iago to lieutenant, never considering that Iago had something to gain for himself in his false report.[205]

Iago has nearly achieved his external end by the conclusion of the second exchange, but in 4.1 we find the knave pushing his case forward. Iago begins by insisting to Othello, in a double-edged fashion, that Desdemona's essence cannot be seen (4.1.16). Othello is already going mad, falling into fits, but Iago desires to give copious proofs to secure a stronger certainty that has the potential both to destroy Othello and to strengthen the general's resolve to ruin Cassio and Desdemona. The first proof of this exchange is brief. Iago, using his characteristic reserve, eventually causes Othello to draw out of him that Cassio has confessed his profligacy. This leads to the second proof in which Othello will finally receive ocular confirmation of a sort, witnessing—from a distance—Iago questioning Cassio about his sexual exploits. Shakespeare's audience realizes that Cassio speaks of his courtesan, but Iago's audience, Othello, is deaf to this as he "marks" Cassio's facial expressions and gestures (79-85). Ocular evidence divorced from auditory evidence might prove tenuous, even for credulous Othello. However, the episode is lent credence by the arrival of the courtesan, Bianca. Iago could not have hoped for a better way for Othello to see Cassio with the general's handkerchief, as a love token which Cassio carelessly gave to a prostitute. Iago turns this into his ultimate proof of his final act of persuasion. It deserves the terminal position because for Othello it is the desired physical evidence. It is still

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[205] Samuel Taylor Coleridge famously was vexed by Iago's motiveless malignity (230-34, esp. 231), and—indeed—Iago is unsure that Othello has cuckolded him. Nevertheless, Iago has something to gain in military rank by his malignity, even if what is gained is not commensurate with the evil undertaken or the pleasure the evil gives Iago.

nowhere near his original standard of witnessing an act of adultery, but among all of Iago's half truths and lies, it is most tangible; it is enough.

With the proofs presented, Iago still has many people to orchestrate to their appropriate locations to effect as many deaths and downfalls as possible, but his acts of persuasion addressed to Othello are almost finished. With his purpose nearly achieved, he fashions something like a conclusion for this last act of persuasion. As if following Aristotle's advice, he is brief (*Rhetoric* 3.19), mediating for Othello everything he has just witnessed as a summary or restatement of the facts that confirms a fictive dialogue between Cassio and Iago which Othello already had provided for himself. Othello responds to the conclusion with certainty (4.1.184); Iago's conclusion of the third exchange effectively finishes all three acts of persuasion that collectively have cast a sophistic spell. Having persuaded Othello of his wife's guilt and having won his favor, Iago even gains for himself a space to propose further evils without proof. His suggestion that poison is too impersonal of a way to kill Desdemona and his promise to kill Cassio are received warmly (195-200).

Epistemological Tragedies: Situating Richard and Iago

Having closely followed Iago's deceptive speech and Richard's evil wooing and other sophistic episodes, one can see, as Vickers has argued, that, in creating such powerful sophists (anti-ideal orators as I have called them), Shakespeare rejects the extreme of naïve position concerning rhetoric's status ("Power of Persuasion" 435). The addition of an examination of *Cymbeline* will provide more clarity about Shakespeare's position, but before we add that play to the discussion, it is useful to ask some provisional questions about *Othello* and *Richard III*, and to offer some exploratory remarks. Let us assume for the current time that the mimetic universe

created by Shakespeare in the two plays and the characters within both are adequate to real life. If this is so, then do the texts and their respective sophistical villains suggest that unethical acts of persuasion are more persuasive than ethical ones, as the cynics fear? Furthermore, what is suggested about Shakespeare's view of epistemology, especially about the ability of persons to see through false appearances?

In the earlier of the two plays, *Richard III*, the answers to these two questions are complicated. Despite the extraordinary success of its anti-ideal orator, Richard does encounter a few failures, or at least counterpoints, along the way in Queen Margaret, Clarence, a perceptive citizen, the events following Hastings' death, and the speeches before the battle of Bosworth Field. In 1.3, Queen Margaret sees clearly through Richard's false appearances. At first, she keeps her insight to herself in a series of asides, but she finally is moved to speak and greets Richard with curses. She demands that those who are present attend more closely to Richard, whom she often characterizes as a devil or a dog, and excoriates nearly every one, cursing many who fail to attend to her "gentle counsel" (296). All of her prophecies will come true, and everyone who received a curse from her will recall it at their time of demise. But at this moment, despite her sharp sight, she persuades no one. Of course, Richard knows that she speaks truly, but why do all the others fail to attend to her perspicacious counsel? In part, it is because of Gloucester's skilled speech, but it is also because her counsel is not as gentle as she claims. She is aware of her audience to the extent that she sees the divide parties unified against her as a scapegoat (189). But she subsequently fails to attend to each audience member's needs.

She is more concerned to remind them that they have pillaged her (158) than to persuade them. For example, she could try to connect with Queen Elizabeth on a level of shared personal experience (much like they will in 4.4 where "sorrow admit[s] society" (38)). But instead she

mocks Elizabeth's folly (240-5). Ultimately, she discloses her disposition: "Uncharitably with me have you dealt / And shamefully my hopes by you are butcher'd / My charity is outrage, life my shame, / And in that shame still live my sorrow's rage!" (274-7). The insight she has into Richard's character and the freedom she has to speak openly, as one who fears death less than banishment, are both squandered by her unwillingness to let her outrage be overtaken by charity or at least by a practical concern to craft the best possible persuasion for her audiences. In the case of the latter, she would be fulfilling the Aristotelian and Ciceronian requirement in their respective definitions of rhetoric, forming the best possible case "in a manner suited to persuasion" (cf. *Rhetoric* 1.2.1; *De Inventione* 1.6; *De Oratore* 1.138). In the case of the former, charity, she would be fulfilling an office that would be less comprehensible to Cicero and Aristotle.[206] Rather, it is the Platonic (or erotic, in the word's original sense) leading of souls taken to a level that forgives ills committed against oneself. This *caritas* is largely introduced to the west by Christianity. It fits the Augustinian view of rhetoric in which the ultimate end is always the salvation of the audience and speaker (cf. *DDC* 1.7-9; *De Civitate Dei* 19.4, 122-3), a view which moves the orator to prayer for understanding and for guidance in invention, and which privileges *caritas* as a scriptural hermeneutic (cf. *DDC* 3.134, 4.87, 3.33-8).[207] Queen Margaret is not tempted to illicit means or a bad end as found in Richard's unethical acts of

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[206] cf. Cicero's *De Inventione* 2.161 as well as Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 2.2 and *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.

[207] Augustine's hermeneutic also privileges the "rule of faith." See 3.3, 3.33-4. As I invoke Aristotle and Augustine, it is necessary to recall from our discussions in the first two chapters that while it is unclear if Shakespeare knew any of Aristotle's *Ethics* or *Rhetoric* directly, he would have had access to the Peripatetic's ideas. See Schmidt (3-76) and Crider (*Persuasion* 5, 41). Similarly, Augustine is not an unreasonable intertext for Shakespeare and a rhetoric of charity was available to him in Wilson's Calvinist Augustinianism and in manuals for the *ars praedicandi*. Strier, recalling T. S. Eliot, reflects on "how little Shakespeare required to absorb 'all he needed' of various traditions" (224). Indeed, I have already suggested that Augustine is not a source, but an inter-text for Shakespeare, but he certain absorbed the possibility of a rhetoric of love that is so prominent in Augustine. Additionally, Girard—quite insightful, but rarely given to understatement—finds Augustine to be a "better guide for a sound understanding of Shakespeare [and, especially, Iago] than Freud and his entire comet tail of postmodern epigones" (296).

persuasion, but is lured by her anger away from the most apt means. She is ethical, but not successful in offering the best possible case (the internal end) which diminishes her ability to persuade her audiences (the external end). The scorn for charity which Shakespeare places in her mouth suggests that if she had possessed such charity, admittedly difficult to obtain, she might have been able to translate her prudent sight into affective acts of persuasion that could help stop Gloucester's tyrannous plans.

This absence of charity which could have proved so important is reinforced by Clarence's execution which follows on its heels. After Queen Margret exits, Richard orders the murderers of Clarence to "be sudden in the execution / Withal obdurate, do not hear him plead; / For Clarence is well-spoken, and perhaps / May move your hearts to pity if you mark him" (1.3.345-8). Indeed as death approaches, Clarence does not have the Margaret-like scorn of one wronged (though he is), but possesses the repentance of one who has wronged many (which he has). This mourning creates a charity mixed with the oratorical excellence (which Richard feared) that proves powerful and actually persuades the second murderer not to be party to the killing. Nevertheless, Richard quickly kills his brother, who was potentially the most powerful counter-orator to himself (just as he did with Rivers in More's *History*) and continues his quest for absolute power. The episode reinforces how effective Queen Margaret could have been if she combined her ability to see through false appearances and to speak without fear with a Clarence-like combination of charity and apt speech.

Shakespeare, drawing on his source of More's *History* but lacking the mediation of a narrator who can illustrate characters' private sharp-sighted thoughts, goes on to provide a semi-private conversation among citizens. As Vickers has argued, we have some access to Shakespeare's intentions (notoriously difficult to "reconstruct") through what he "included,

omitted, [and] changed" from his sources (*Appropriating Shakespeare* 147), and this episode, especially by what it includes, teaches us something of Shakespeare's epistemology.[208] The nameless, third citizen proves particularly sharp sighted. As soon as the king's death is confirmed, he laments, saying: "look to see a troublous world" (2.3.10). Shakespeare hints at his perspicacity by giving him the verb of sight. The others challenge him by historical exemplum: Henry VI was crowned as a child, and it proved no ill. But the third citizen retorts that Henry had virtuous uncles while Edward's children have a bickering family and a dangerous uncle in the Duke of Gloucester, all of whom need "to be rul'd, and not to rule" (30). When the first citizen accuses the third of pessimism, the third citizen gives a series of proverbial examples, much like More's narrator, to illustrate that his political realism is based on observation (his faculty of observation being quite keen). Then the second citizen, also echoing More's narrator, notes that "the hearts of men are full of fear" (39), to which the insightful citizen adds that "by divine instinct men's minds mistrust / Ensuing danger; as, by proof, we see / The water swell before the boist'rous storm" (43-5). Shakespeare even makes use of More's sea image (cf. *CW* 2, 44/22-30; cf. *CW* 15, 400-403/21-8).

The overall effect of this dialogue is that it gives a sense of differing degrees of sharp sight among people, some more sharp-sighted than others. The third citizen, who has been given obvious credibility by Shakespeare, since he proves to be correct in his predictions, provides again the idea of a poetic or intuitive degree of knowledge, a "divine instinct." The epistemology which Shakespeare is developing appears to be set against what Bacon or Descartes will develop in favor of a larger view of reasoning and knowledge posited by Plato,

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[208] Vickers' method will assist our examination of Shakespeare all throughout the chapter. On Shakespeare's sources, see Miola (*Shakespeare's Reading*).

Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas.[209] This epistemology is reinforced in the wit and reason of the doomed child princes, who lack the full development of their faculties and who ultimately cannot defend themselves against Richard, but in whom Richard fearfully and rightfully recognizes wisdom (3.1.79) and "sharp-provided wit" (3.1.132, 154-6).[210]

There is one more moment, before Richard secures the crown, which is relevant to my inquiry, the moment after Hastings' execution in which Gloucester seeks to reign in rumors. One will recall that in More's account of Richard, this episode revealed the sharp sight of nobles and then, upon the publishing of a proclamation, of many of the commoners. In Shakespeare the initial proof that Richard invents is the same. He and Buckingham dress in "rotten armor, marvelous ill-favored" (3.5) so as to "counterfeit the deep tragedian" (3.5.5), claiming self-defense in their murder of Hastings. Unlike More's account where many nobles are assembled, Shakespeare's Richard primarily has to persuade the mayor, who is easily duped and takes the news to the other citizens. Buckingham accompanies him to the Guildhall, intending to "play the orator" (3.5.95), in acquiescence to Gloucester's command. Indeed, while the audience only learns of the Buckingham's Guildhall speech through Richard's instructions in how to craft the sophistical act of persuasion (3.5.72-94) and through Buckingham's report after the fact (3.7.1-43), the latter includes the same elements as More's account with all mute to the act of persuasion, except for ten of Buckingham's party (3.7.36). Clearly, despite the powerful sophisms that Richard provided to Buckingham, the citizens at the Guildhall see through to the

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209 This is not to say that Plato's and Aristotle's epistemologies do not have notable differences, even while they share the view of the poetic degree of knowing. See notes 170 and 239 for a fuller account of Aristotle and Thomas's view.

210 I will continue to develop this argument on behalf of Shakespeare's epistemology throughout the chapter. It is certainly a view which is contrary to a whole body of literature which, extending Shakespeare's *disputatio in utramque partem* habits of mind, has made Shakespeare into a Montaignian skeptic. Nevertheless, my reading of *Othello* could be characterized as sympathetic to the Montaignian reading. See note 239 for a fuller account of the literature on both sides of this question.

protector's evil intention. Furthermore, while Shakespeare omits More's reading of the proclamation of Hastings death to the people of London, he instead creates a scrivener who has been given the task of composing the public "indictment" (3.6.1). He confesses that he has been working on the document longer than Hastings has been dead and laments:

> Here's a good world the while! Who is so gross
> That cannot see this palpable device?
> Yet who so bold but says he sees it not?
> Bad is the world, and all will come to nought
> When such ill dealing must be seen in thought. (3.6.10-4)

The scrivener's suggestion complements the Guildhall report. Many see through the "gross" devices of Gloucester, but almost all remain silent. As in More's text, many an audience member is split within him- or herself. They are not persuaded like Anne (1.2) or Elizabeth (4.4), but they refuse to speak up, allowing Richard to continue toward his ultimate end.

Once Richard reaches his goal of kingship, his skills notably diminish. Catesby easily sees that he is angry and ill at ease (4.2.27). Richard may think he need not maintain the façade of his dissembling once he has secured power for himself, or perhaps his insecurity about maintaining his illicitly won power is a pressure which he cannot bear well. Or more simply, without an evil end to be actively achieved, he may no longer know how to behave. Most especially, he no longer wields words like an anti-ideal orator. His speech, clearly set in juxtaposition to Richmond's before they take the field at Bosworth, is disordered and haphazard; he is still distracted from the parade in his dream the night before. He speaks in a tone of desperation and focuses almost entirely on the enemy, expect for a bit of *pathos* fear mongering focused on the enemy overtaking the lands, wives, and daughters of his soldiers. Richmond's act

of persuasion to his troops is not the most excellent specimen of rhetoric, but it is better than Richard's. It is measured and inspires confidence in his leadership, while praising his soldiers, entrusting his cause to God, and discrediting the enemy.

Taken together, these episodes of Margaret, Clarence, the third citizen, the aftermath of Hastings's death, and the speeches of the battle of Bosworth combined with Richard's many real and horrifying acts of persuasion that achieve their external end of persuasion and assist him toward his ultimate end recommend a nuanced view of Shakespeare's epistemology (both if one can see through false appearances and whether unethical acts of persuasion are more persuasive than ethical ones). The latter question remains unanswered because Richard finds no match in skilled speech who is ethical. Richmond's rhetoric is average; Clarence—who had real potential to be Richard's equal in speaking while constrained by ethics—is killed; most especially, one has seen that Queen Margaret fails to craft a series of apt acts of persuasion. If she had, then we could view more clearly if her words where more or less effective in the achievement of their external ends than Richard's speech. Richard's concern about Clarence suggests that the anti-ideal orator himself believes in a measured epistemological optimism: that the true case, well presented, would potentially preempt his rise and empty his words of their sophistic power. But despite this potential optimism, reinforced by the chorus of the 3rd citizen, the scrivener, and the Guildhall auditors, Richard's real sophistic successes—while by no means total—really dupe and overwhelm some of his audiences in a way that More's Richard never achieves. The anti-ideal orators in More often fail to persuade their respective audiences and were only successful enough to move events toward Richard's ultimate goal of the crown. In *Richard III*, Shakespeare provides some similar limited successes, but he mixes them with other darker moments where Richard's sophistic speech is wholly effective. Shakespeare's view on a greater power of

truthful, ethical words well spoken cannot be discerned fully in this play, but it is clearly a darker view than More's, and it portends a cynical view of rhetoric.

One reason, however, that Shakespeare's position is ambiguous is because the evidence regarding a human being's ability to know, to see through false appearances (which one would expect to favor a skeptical conclusion based on Shakespeare's potentially darker view of the power of sophistry vis-à-vis ethical and apt rhetoric), is actually hopeful. Shakespeare's introduction of the intuitive degree of knowing by the perceptive third citizen, the wisdom of the youths, and the sharp sight of Margaret (despite the flaws in her acts of persuasion), the prudential judgment of the Guildhall audience, and the ability to see through "palpable device[s]" which the scrivener extends to all but the most "gross" is a strong case in favor of a person's ability to see through false appearances. Shakespeare, of course, is sensitive to the fact that not all possess the faculty of sharp-sight to the same degree (e.g. the first citizen) and that Richard's sophistic speech is difficult to penetrate (e.g. Anne, Elizabeth), but these facts are outweighed by the supermajority, identified by the scrivener, who see through appearances at the Guildhall.

Shakespeare allows sophistic speech greater power than More, but seems to agree with him that in a world where everyone cannot discern reality well and where some deliberately seek to conceal the truth, all people possess an intuitive faculty to assist them in authentic knowledge acquisition and that education in prudence ever assists a person in the difficulties of seeing through false appearances. The prospect of education highlights Shakespeare's belief that one's sharp sight is not a static matter. Experience, the passage of time, and especially imminent death are all particularly educative in the play. These circumstances develop and extend the correct intuitions of some characters. Shakespeare dramatizes Samuel Johnson's insight: "Depend upon

it, Sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully" (Boswell 849). Thus far we have referred to the play as a tragedy in loose terms, pinning the tragedy upon the fact that a tyrant rises to power, an event which proves "woe, woe for England" (3.4.80). However, the play is not only a tragedy of regime, but also a series of individual tragedies in which characters possess degrees of blindness, well suited to the Aristotelian tragic formula. Clarence, Rivers, Grey, Hastings, Anne, and Buckingham (and even, to a degree, Richard) experience a reversal of fortunes which brings about a "change from ignorance to knowledge" (*Poetics* 11, 1452a 31).[211] Their newly gained sight comes not only from this reversal but also is combined with pangs of conscience for evils committed and—excepting Clarence and Anne—an awareness that Margaret's curses directed toward them were at least prophetic if not affective. For example, Hastings finally learns to see through Richard's seeming: "Who builds his hope in air of your good looks /Lives like a drunken sailor on the mast, / Ready, with every nod, to tumble down / Into the fatal bowels of the deep" (3.4.98-101). The metaphor is particularly apt since Hastings failed to see, in the words of the third citizen and More's narrator, the "water swell before the boist'rous storm" (2.3.45) because of his metaphorical drunkenness.[212] Similar to Hastings' discovery, Anne exclaims upon her discovery of the truth: "my woman's heart / Grossly grew captive to his honey words / And prov'd the subject of mine own soul's curse" (4.1.78-80). It is of particular note that she accuses herself with the word "gross" for indeed she belonged within the category which the scrivener provided for those few who fail to see through Richard's "virtuous visor" (2.2.28). Even Buckingham

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[211] Admittedly, the tragedy is above all Richard's. He too will end the play with a reversal of fortunes and—at least—a partial discovery, though he battles against the pangs of conscience that confront him to the end.

[212] The metaphor also suggests England's need for a *gubernator* or skilled steersman, an office which Hastings failed to fulfill. cf. Cicero's *De Officiis* 1.77, 87. Shakespeare knows this text well.

repents, condemning his dallying against the All-Seer (5.1.20). The divine authority invoked is a Christian one, and Buckingham raises the stakes of knowledge to a metaphysical level, acknowledging, like Augustine, the "one who sees the hearts of all" (*DDC* 4.88). A villain may be able to sustain a partial or temporary occlusion from the sight of human beings, but the omniscient God will always see. All of these discoveries, these sharpenings of sight are predicated on the progress of Richard's rise and the pending death of the character. They reinforce the already strong case for human being's limited but real ability to know and further suggests not only that experience and nearness to death can often improve one's prudential judgment, but also that the passage of time presents difficulties to sophistic dissemblers who can only orchestrate the concealment of truth for so long before it becomes clearly seen.

Shakespeare in *Richard III* suggests that there is great potential in human beings to see through false appearances while also giving a darker view than Thomas More, albeit ambiguous, on the ability of ethical and apt rhetoric to be more persuasive than sophistry. In turning to *Othello*, however, we discover a complementary picture, but one which will terminate in an even darker picture of human knowledge and of the potential of primacy of sophistic acts of persuasion over an ethical and skilled rhetoric. In the case of *Richard III* one is able to find many examples of people who either specifically see through Richard's dissembling and sophistic rhetoric or who have credibility and articulate an understanding of how one generally can see to the heart of a matter. While there are occasional episodes in *Othello* (like when Roderigo momentarily argues that Iago's "words and performances are no kin together" [4.2.180-81] and when Emilia is puzzled by why Iago desires the handkerchief so ardently [3.3.315-21] or when she notes that "some eternal villain" has devised a slander of her lady [4.2.129-43]) that glance at the possibility of seeing Iago's true self, no one in the play sees his

villainy clearly until after Desdemona is dead, and Emilia and Othello are brought into frank conversation. Until this point Iago's façade has been impenetrable to sharp sight.

This ultimate conclusion to *Othello* does allow us to reprise our claim that sharp sight improves at the very end of a villain's course or at the end of one's life. Iago is revealed, and Othello and other survivors have their moments of discovery. More's dictum: "time tryeth truth" (cf. *CW* 7, 135) can be brought to bear on this tragedy as well as on *Richard III*. However, these developments that conclude the play, do not brighten the epistemology of the play precisely because such events were not unforeseen by Iago. When he boasts that he will make Othello mad while, at the same time, making the general "thank me, love me, and reward me" (2.1.289), Iago sees the endgame: "Knavery's plain face is never seen till used" (293). Knavery of his sort will be revealed once it achieves its end; it cannot be sustained indefinitely.[213] Notice that Iago moves from the particular of his end to the universal principle (289-93). Ultimately, Iago tries to prove the exception to the universal rule because once he has gained Othello's thanks, love, and reward, Iago has created the condition of possible future advancement for himself in addition to increasing the sinister pleasure he takes in the Moor's destruction. His wife's tongue, however, prevents this greater obfuscation of the truth.

Nevertheless, Iago, unlike Richard III, is totally impenetrable until the moment when he foresaw he would become vulnerable by the very fact that his ends had been achieved. It would be premature to address this impenetrability by simply saying that there are no characters of sharp sight in the play; in fact, the play goes out of its way to suggest that meaningful knowledge

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[213] There is also a belief articulated by various Shakespearean characters (including Othello [5.2.271-76]) that all will be made known on the Day of Judgment, even if concealed until then. While Iago gives lip service to this eschatological view, he is not concerned by it. He may see himself as immune, as not being a human liable to judgment, but as a metaphorical devil or animal as he is named by himself and, eventually, others. Shakespeare's late plays, including *Cymbeline*, particularly figure eschatological concerns. See Marshall (12-37) and Fitts.

acquisition is, at best, thorny or at worst, impossible—even for the most perspicacious—when faced with an Iago. The topic is introduced with the juxtaposition of Brabantio to the other senators and the Duke. The latter group possesses a degree of prudent sight, taking care not to trust false reports and to exercise their reason during a crisis which circumscribes full understanding of the Turks' intentions (1.3.9-12, 17-19). Brabantio, however, warns the audience that one cannot trust minds only by actions seen (1.1.169-73). Once the scene turns to Cyprus, there is not even the limited sight of the city fathers. One's first view in Cyprus is of Montano and the other gentlemen trying to perceive what is going on at sea between the Turks and the Venetians. But there is such a "foul and violent tempest" that they can "discern. . . [n]othing at all" (2.1.34, 1-2). This motif of blindness is extended in the playful, but ominous dissembling of the clown to Desdemona (3.4), in the frequent ironic references to seeing through false appearances by those who are blind to Iago's plan, and in Iago's own ironic claim to be one whose "nature's plague" is "[t]o spy into abuses" (3.3.147-48). In fact, the sophistical speaker effects an epistemological anti-miracle, in Othello's words: "a huge eclipse of sun and moon" which frightens and shakes the foundations of the globe (5.2.100-02). Iago is not just seductive to the protagonist within the play and to the audience outside of it; he is a Vice character who is ultimately not conquered by the action of grace. Iago's false words may bring Othello beyond redemption.

In Cyprus one cannot see through false appearances until the moment at which the orchestrator of the whole heinous charade allows the possibility of revelation. The false appearances of Iago cannot be penetrated in *Othello*. It is no surprise, then, that in *Othello* the sophistic seducer's acts of persuasion are de facto more powerful than the apt and ethical orator, even if the play does not definitively answer the question *de iure*. No one suspects Iago,

precluding the emergence of an orator who can provide a counter-rhetoric by which one might judge which is more powerful and persuasive.[214] Iago is even more effective than Gloucester. He fools everyone and has no opponents.[215] If Gloucester provided a dark, but ambiguous view, the complement of the more skilled and more deceptive Iago (still presuming upon a shared mimetic realism in the plays) suggests a real cynicism in Shakespeare about the ability of ethical and apt speech to be equally or more affective than sophistry.[216] If this is Shakespeare's view, it contravenes not only Wilson's naïveté, but also that more tempered confidence of Aristotle, Quintilian, and Augustine.[217]

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[214] The rare species of ethical rhetoric in Cyprus before Desdemona's death are from Desdemona and Emilia (4.2.11-93) to Othello in Desdemona's defense. These do not assist in the discernment of whether skilled ethical or skilled unethical rhetoric is more effective because Iago has already severely corrupted their audience, Othello. Perhaps if their dialogue in 3.4 had included an ethical persuasion by Desdemona rather than a mutual dance of (possibly) unethical dissembling (also assisted by Emilia lying about the status of the handkerchief [3.4.20]), then we could judge the strength of ethical oratory in the play. As it is, the dissembling in 3.4 is a lost opportunity in which the real accusations that might have deflated the workings of *reticentia* are suppressed. In 4.1, Othello slaps Desdemona, but he continues to be unclear about why he acts in this fashion (4.2.75). Only in 5.2 just before he murders her, does Othello speak his accusation. Desdemona's defense is powerful (5.2.49-85), but it is "too late" (84); he is too far gone.

[215] It is notable, though, that the audience gets to see Richard across a longer stretch of time following the achievement of his ultimate end, the crown, than we are allowed to see of the apprehended and mute Iago after his achievement of Othello's madness and crimes.

[216] One can see in this view of *Othello*, the fulfillment of my claim that my reading shares something with critics who make Shakespeare into a Montaignian skeptic. Shakespeare would also know skepticism of a more academic sort from texts like *De Officiis*, even though—as Colish has argued—Cicero is not always consistent with his claim to be an academic skeptic and uses "axiomatic ethical principles. . . without raising any questions about their epistemological status" (144-5).

[217] Aristotle asserts that "the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites" (*Rhetoric* 1.1.12). Quintilian agrees at 4.2.38 and 12.1.3. Augustine adds that "it is not the aim of the eloquence or the intention of the speaker that the truths or the eloquence should in themselves produce delight; but the truths themselves, as they are revealed, do produce delight by virtue of being true. Similarly the exposure and refutation of falsehoods generally give delight. They do not give delight because they are false, but because it is true that they are false delight is given by the words in which this truth is demonstrated" (*DDC* 4.77).

Iacomus Parvus?

In the examination of two of Shakespeare's most potent sophists, Iago and Richard III, it appears that on the continuum between the naïve and cynical extremes, Shakespeare may fall on the latter side. Shakespeare invents a mimetic universe, shared by the plays, in which sophistic acts of persuasion appear more effective than apt and ethical ones and where the difference between the two cannot even be discerned—especially in *Othello*—because it is difficult, if not impossible, to penetrate to the heart of the sophist's intentions beneath his honeyed speech. In his creation, Shakespeare seems to assert that the *Ars Rhetorica* is not for Good and that an ethical rhetoric may be impossible. But this reading will not accommodate the final play of our study, *Cymbeline*.[218]

The key figure for our purpose is Iachimo. Let us first link him to Iago and then examine his most significant sophistical act of persuasion in 1.6. Shakespeare's romances frequently include action that evokes his earlier plays, with *Cymbeline* alone re-presenting aspects of *Othello*, *Romeo and Juliet*, and *The Merchant of Venice*.[219] The link to *Othello* is especially visible in Iachimo. Much in the way Othello is abused by Iago about his wife's fidelity, so Posthumus is gulled by Iachimo.[220] The similarity, however, is more than just another example

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[218] While sustained treatments of rhetoric in *Cymbeline* are rare, the topic has been addressed by Desmet (59-83), Lyne (132-62), and Parker (*Literary Fat Ladies* 132-40).

[219] On Shakespearean romance, among the many studies, see Felperin, Hunt, Knight, Palfrey, and Uphaus. Nosworthy, xi-lxxxiv, provides a discussion of Shakespeare using his plot in *Cymbeline* to allude to his own earlier plays (lxxvii).

[220] Critics often pair their examination of *Othello* with *The Winter's Tale*. Girard, though, helpfully characterizes Posthumus as the "luminous 'missing link' between Claudio and Othello on the one hand and Leontes on the other" (319). As Bevington ("Introduction" 1415), observes, both Othello and Posthumus are similarly fooled by physical evidence (the bracelet and handkerchief). However, Posthumus is denser than Othello inasmuch as he is offered insightful counsel by Philario but fails to heed it. The two husbands utter similar despairing repetitions: "OTHELLO: Cold, cold, my girl, / Even like thy chastity. / O cursed, cursed slave. . . / O Desdemon! Dead, Desdemon! Dead! O! O!" (5.2.273-79). "POSTHUMUS: Oh, no, no, no, 'tis true!" (2.4.106). Joseph, 87-88, argues that these are instances of diacope.

of an alleged cuckoldry among many in early modern drama. Shakespeare invents an unmistakable allusion to *Othello* through the naming of his villain.[221] Iachimo is a diminutive form of Iago. From a strictly linguistic perspective, it might be inferred that Iachimo will be less evil and less powerful than Iago. While critics argue both for Iago's and for Iachimo's superiority in villainy, the more widely-argued former position often fails to consider on their own merit the skill and evil of Iachimo in the first two acts before he undergoes radical transformation. When one considers only the words and deeds of pre-penitent Iachimo, it is fair to consider him at least as evil and as skilled as Iago.[222] If Shakespeare replicates similar circumstances to those in which Iago effected tragedy by speech with an equally potent villain who is meant to evoke Othello's ancient, then *Cymbeline* gives particular assistance in deepening our understanding of Shakespeare's view of rhetoric, which we have provisionally characterized as suspicious, perhaps to the point of anxious cynicism.

In the first two acts, Iachimo appears four times, twice in conversation with Posthumus in Italy (1.4 and 2.4) and twice interacting with Imogen in Britain (1.6 and 2.2). In the former

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[221] Shakespeare's intentionality can be seen, in part, because his invention of the name departs from the name of the villain in his two sources, the *Decameron* and the *Frederyke of Jennen*, where the Iachimo figure is named Ambrogiuolo and Johan of Florence, respectively. All references to these two sources are drawn from Bullough. See Vickers for an account of how sources can reveal Shakespeare's intentions (*Appropriating Shakespeare* 147).

[222] Harold Bloom argues that Iachimo is "a mere trifler compared with the more-than-Satanic greatness of Othello's destroyer" (616) while Nosworthy believes that there is little ground to justify a comparison between the two: "Iachimo is less a symbol than a stock figure, a reduced pattern of the Italian villain. . . . [he] is a vainglorious, self-dramatizing rouge, but his acts of villainy do not carry real conviction. He lacks the personality, the insistent malice, the cue to revenge, the long-term policy of evil which tragic villains undoubtedly possess" (lviii). However, Knight submits that Iachimo "is a re-creation of Iago as a creature of Italian cunning. . . . He is, as an individual, more convincing. . . [and] more rounded out, more analyzable as a person, can stand on his own feet" (142). While Knight may be overstating matters, his point helps to reveal that Nosworthy and Bloom are basing their assessments, at least in part, on ultimate results. They remove "conviction" or "greatness" from Iachimo because he undergoes change in fortunes and outlook. A better reading of Iachimo distinguishes between the Iachimo of the first two acts and of the last three; he undergoes a transformation. (It will remain outside the scope of our inquiry to give a full account of how a villain so Iago-like undergoes such a change.) Admittedly, Nosworthy may be correct that Iachimo's knavery starts out more as a game than as deep-seated evil. However, by the time he violates Imogen's chamber his self-understanding is more sinister; as he says, "hell is here" (2.2.50). To diminish the malice and skill of devilish Iachimo in the first two acts based on *post hoc propter hoc* reasoning is not justifiable.

episodes Iachimo speaks to a husband on the issue of his wife's fidelity, just as Iago had done to Othello and with equal success. His actions fit his name. He manipulates his audience, achieving his external end of persuasion without any concern for an internal one or for ethical means.[223] However, it is the interaction between one as potent as Iago and the princess of Britain that adds a dimension to our understanding of Shakespeare's view of rhetoric. Let us examine the sophistical act of persuasion that Iachimo performs in 1.6 in which he seeks to seduce Imogen both to win the wager which Posthumus has imprudently entered into with the Italian and to make her into the demeaned object of his sexual desire.[224] This double, evil end is sought by illicit means: lies, half-truths, and calumnies. In Iachimo's means and ends, one again witnesses sophistry from a speaker with absolutely no care for ethics or internal ends.

However, his audience—Imogen—requires an introduction. The princess of Britain, while imperfect, is an "earthly paragon" (3.6.43): pious, virtuous, and skilled in speech.[225] Our examination of one moment of her listening (and speaking) will follow, but one must note that her religious piety is a wellspring and her virtue a safeguard of the ethical praxis of her own skilled speaking. She is pious but wholly unlike Henry VI in the first tetralogy. While there is inevitable overlap between her virtues and her piety, one might say that her moral character is

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223 In 5.4, Iachimo himself characterizes his means as unethical, "similar proof[s]" (5.4.200).

224 Not all critics agree with me that Posthumus is imprudent. See Lehman for a refutation of the view that Posthumus is right to make the wager (14 note 13).

225 I use piety in the Christian rather than Roman sense. Felperin notes that Imogen connects every level of action in the play: domestic, national, and international (179, 194). While she is imperfect (e.g. not using all the available means of persuasion when angrily haranguing her father [1.1.130-50] and misjudging certain realities in Wales [4.2.290-331]), Imogen is a paragon. This view of her is disputed by Butler (25-6), but asserted by many, including Lehman, Van Doren (268), and von Hildebrand (*Nature of Love* 311-7). Van Doren gives particular attention to her fidelity. Bamford's account (51-61), which reads Imogen's suffering as redemptive for the diseased polity, (51) also largely complements my own. Marsh also emphasizes the importance of the "virtues" of piety, love, and self-knowledge in the play (12). Thompson, however, reads Imogen's plight as one in which she loses agency in the face of a resurgence of patriarchal authority and in which she can only flourish when her sphere of operation has been diminished to the domestic (76-87). Palfrey argues that she is "defiant," "ambitious," and "violent," even after she has suffered a great deal (213-21).

seen—for example—in her chastity and fidelity in the encounter with Iachimo (1.6) and her courage and prudence in confronting Cloten (2.3). Her piety is manifest in her promise to pray (1.3.31-33, 4.2.390) and her actual prayers (2.2.8-10), in her concern with honoring her father, not stealing, and burying the dead (1.1.87, 3.6.47, 4.2.386-88), in her theological reflection upon whether or not a false assertion is a lie and a sin before she persuades Lucius to allow her to enter his service (4.2.376-78), and in the two occasions in which she is tempted to suicide, but—with reference to the divine "prohibition" against it (3.4.75)—chooses to write herself not as a suicide like Dido (implied in her comparing her husband to "false Aeneas" [3.4.56]) or Juliet (whose situation parallels her own in 4.2), but as a mourner like Hecuba (4.2.312). As the avoidance of suicide, honoring of a parent, and burying of the dead point out, though her devotion is to the pagan gods, Shakespeare has given her religion a pseudo-Judeo-Christian character.[226] In the Roman ideal orator, the *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, the relationship between moral goodness and skill in speaking is ambiguous, allowing for the possibility of illicit means to good ends and for making subjective the standard by which good ends are judged. This impressive woman is less Roman and more Augustinian. Her moral character is strong, and she is seen habitually allowing prayer and moral/theological deliberation to shape her words and actions (cf. *DDC* 4.3, 7-9, 87).

Iachimo marvels upon meeting this paragon that she is as beautiful as Posthumus reported and worries that his report of her wit and virtue might also be unexaggerated (1.6.15-

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[226] Of course, the nature of her religious belief is complicated. She is a faithful devotee to the pagan, Roman gods. Nevertheless, this may be in part because of the 1606 statute of the revel's office which greatly censored explicitly Judeo-Christian references to and representations of God. Therefore, instead of God, we are given Judeo-Christian overtones throughout the play which are too many to be mere accidental anachronisms. To name only a few allusions in the play: The Decalogue is invoked for its prohibition of adultery; suicide is forbidden by the gods, but it is the Christian God not the Roman gods who object to self slaughter; holy water and grace are invoked. Redemptive suffering is interrogated.

For examinations of Judeo-Christian elements in *Cymbeline*, see Arbery, Battenhouse ("Augustinian Artistry" 216-31), and Fitts. For more general treatments of Shakespeare's use of Christian elements, see Batson (*Christian Tradition* and *Protestant and Catholic*), Battenhouse (Shakespearean Tragedy and "Augustinian Artistry"), Bevington (*Shakespeare's Ideas* 106-42), Greenblatt (*Hamlet*), Knapp ("Preachers and Players" and *Shakespeare's Tribe*), Miola ("Shakespeare's Religion"), Richmond, and Targoff ("Performance of Prayer").

21). He girds himself: "Boldness be my friend! / Arm me, audacity, from head to foot" (18-19). The martial language highlights the sophistical, uncooperative rhetorical force which Iachimo intends to use and which he must use if he is to have a chance of seducing Imogen. There are sexual undertones in his language of force, but he seems to realize that unconstrained physical force (rape) has too much potential, to paraphrase Iago, to reveal knavery's plain face too soon (*Othello* 2.1.293). This would jeopardize his potential victory in the wager and endanger the superior "accomplishment" and evil satisfaction he would take in persuading Imogen, albeit unethically, to indulge his perverse sexual pleasure. Having achieved such an act, he would not only win the wager, but also be positioned to bring further ruin to Imogen and Posthumus.[227]

Iachimo's reaction to Imogen suggests that he has encountered a different character, a rare woman, who is unlike any of Iago's victims. The Italian knave, however, has arrived in England furnished with letters of introduction from Posthumus and with news that Leonatus "is in safety" (1.6.12). This piece of good news and the letters provide Iachimo with authority and assist his development of a trustworthy *ethos* at the outset of his interview with Imogen.[228] Just like "honest Iago," Iachimo begins from a position of strength. Imogen has previously been sharp-sighted to false appearances. For example, she saw the evil intentions of the Queen that her highness sought to mask (1.1.84-5). But in this episode she begins at a disadvantage, her sight initially clouded because her dear and foolish husband has given her a false account of Iachimo (1.6.22-25).

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[227] He does not make this last desire explicit, but as a little Iago—who brings "hell" with him to Cymbeline's court (2.2.50)—he may very well desire it.

[228] Shakespeare complicates and develops the narrative well beyond his two sources in which there is no such encounter, but in which both Iachimo-like villains despair of their chances to seduce the Imogen character. Shakespeare invents a moment, pregnant with tragic potential, in which apt, ethical speech and a sophistical act of persuasion will have a direct confrontation. See *Decameron* (54); and *Frederyke* (66).

In a similarity to Iago's first exchange with Othello, Iachimo begins with *reticentia*. He offers three statements which function like an extended tricolon. First, he discourses on the wonders of the universe, but inserts a rhetorical question that seeks to distinguish "fair" Imogen from that which is "foul" (38). He blathers a second time, distinguishing her from "[s]luttery" (44). Finally, the third part of the series laments the "cloyed will" which after enjoying the lamb turns to garbage (47-50).[229] The last, of course, is Iachimo's most specific preparation for the charge he will make against Posthumus: that Imogen's love is no longer faithful to his lamb, but feasts on garbage. Imogen is puzzled by each statement and interjects questions, concerned that Iachimo may not be of stable mind. Iachimo, however, having planted the reticent seeds of Posthumus's infidelity now excuses Pisanio, presuming that if alone with Imogen he can actualize his sought ends.

While continuing to arouse suspicion in Imogen concerning Posthumus's infidelity by what he omits in his account of Leonatus, Iachimo now moves through formal proofs which he hopes will obliquely serve his dual ends. His first proof is his report, in answer to Imogen's questioning, that Posthumus is quite merry in Italy. Imogen seems to have opened herself to Iachimo's plan, to his suggestion that Posthumus does not miss her. But while she notes that such mirth does not fit the melancholic temperament of the man she knows, she—unlike Othello—is not immediately led to assume that he has found new pleasures in infidelity. In fact, Iachimo's masked suggestions lead her to reassert partially her trust in her husband (77). Iachimo then turns to a second proof, linked to his initial tricolon. He wonders that the heavens gave Posthumus such a marvelous bride. The proof has potential both to compliment the lady he is trying to seduce and to suggest what her father has already insisted: that she is too good for

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[229] While many of the Christian undertones invoke particularly Catholic images, this use of cloyed will recalls the teaching of Luther and Calvin.

Posthumus, especially if he is base enough to be unfaithful. Still making use of *reticentia*, all of this is implicit. Having complimented her, the third proof, using the same reticent means, renews glancing accusations of Posthumus's alleged infidelity.

Imogen's prudential judgment and spoken questions continue to slow each of Iachimo's proofs. Rather than allowing the poison to be poured into her ear to work beneath the surface, one might say that she suspends the poisonous words in the air and confronts them, judges them in a direct way that Othello did not. The difference is not in the sophist, but in the audience. Instead of finding out for herself (in error) what she "would not believe if" told directly (cf. *Institutio Oratoria* 9.2.71), she critically evaluates the bearer of the news and his intentional ambiguity. This care shifts the dialogue from being exclusively Iachimo's act of persuasion to a sparring between two skilled speakers: one, a sophist; the other, an ethical and apt orator. Her counter-oratory makes Iachimo into an audience that she will persuade to be more open, to abandon the shadowy method of Iago's *reticentia* technique.

Innogen: I pray you, sir,
Deliver with more openness your answers
To my demands. Why do you pity me?
Iachimo: That others do—
I was about to say, enjoy your—but
It is an office of the gods to venge it,
Not mine to speak on't.
Innogen: You do seem to know
Something of me, or what concerns me. Pray you,
Since doubting things go ill often hurts more

> Than to be sure they do—for certainties
> Either are past remedies, or, timely knowing,
> The remedy then born—discover to me
> What both you spur and stop. (1.6.87-99)

Imogen's initial effort to take rhetorical control is ignored by Iachimo (87-9). He proceeds to speak vaguely and offers a new reason for his technique, submission to the gods. Perhaps aware of Imogen's religious piety from the praises which her husband offered of her person (1.4), he tries to cover himself in a humble piety of his own, much as Iago had fooled Othello concerning his pretended love and honesty by making a show of supposedly weighing words before giving them and by speaking with supposed charitable reserve (cf. 3.3.106-55). This pretend piety has potential to increase further his *ethos* in Imogen's eyes and to provide a justification for why Iachimo both hints at and conceals a supposed secret that he keeps out of alleged concern for Posthumus and Imogen. Imogen, who can speak with the authority of one who is truly pious, rejects the office of silence which Iachimo has constructed. His pretend piety fails to increase his *ethos* or to maintain his silence. Imogen immediately seeks to discover the full truth, rather than to provide her own false conclusions to fill up his silence (93-99). Her reasoning seems to be of one who is wise, of one who—it might be said—has read and learned from *Othello*.[230] She refuses to fall under the spell of Iachimo's magical words and defends herself with her own skilled speech.

Iachimo takes this victory of Imogen as his opportunity to be bold. He pays her another compliment, stating that it is only by her graces that the secret is charmed from him (115-17),

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[230] The play is deeply interested in the question of book learning and experience, about nurture and nature. In the present case, perhaps assisted by her education, Imogen reads Iachimo's malice; however, she will also assert: "Experience, O, thou disprov'st report!" (4.2.34); "To write and read / Be henceforth treacherous!" (4.2.315-16).

and bluntly lies that Posthumus is a companion of Rome's prostitutes. Such news could be met with any number of emotional responses by a scorned spouse: anger, denial, sorrow, rage. The *pathos* appeal arouses and directs emotions, so Iachimo attempts to lead her to the "appropriate" response for his purposes: "Be revenged, / Or she that bore you was no queen, and you / Recoil from your great stock" (126-28). His directing actually includes fallacious appeals to *logos* in a potent enthymeme; the mixing of a terse imperative with the 'or' conjunction suggests to Imogen implicit categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive claims. All spurned princesses seek revenge is the categorical assertion, but of course, the major premise is fallacious; the hypothetical assertion—if a spurned princess, then you must enact revenge—is equally specious; lastly, Iachimo's reasoning provides a false disjunct in which she must either choose to be royal (and legitimate, which necessitates taking revenge) or a bastard, not fit to rule.

Despite its clear logical inadequacy, Iachimo's concise command is powerful and is addressed to Imogen at a moment when she is reeling and filled with emotion. Imogen, however, takes her own royal authority—the same to which Iachimo has appealed—and mitigates the rising tension by her speech.

Revenged?

How should I be revenged? *If this be true*—

As I have such a heart that both mine ears

Must not in haste abuse—*if it be true*,

How should I be revenged? (128-32; emphasis added)

Imogen's "if" reveals her exercise of prudence, not trusting a complete stranger's word about one she knows intimately.[231] Also, she seeks—either out of disbelief or perplexity—a definition

[231] Desmet building on the work of Madeleine Doran, suggest that Iago uses "if" to remove Othello from reality (98); Imogen uses conditional "if" clauses to restore it.

of what Iachimo means by the term "revenged." Iachimo happily replies. He attempts, once again, to reclaim rhetorical control not only by explaining how Imogen can be sexually revenged, but also by seeking to fool her into thinking that she is in control and he merely dedicated to her "sweet pleasure" (136). With terms now clarified, Imogen sees through his appearances and calls out for Pisanio, her attendant. While awaiting his arrival, she once and for all claims control of the situation condemning the ears "that have / so long attended" Iachimo (141-2). She clearly articulates his lustful and ignoble intention as a "base" and "strange" "end" (144) which wrongs her husband. She condemns his lack of virtue (143), calling to a viewer's attention her own temperance and courage. She compares him with the devil (a powerful rhetorical expression of her own piety and another link between Iachimo and Iago, who like Richard III often is labeled a devil) and plans to acquaint the King, her father, with the attempted assault. Iachimo, like Richard and Iago, is a Vice, but he meets a rare, pious opponent and ends the play conquered (and reformed), something more like his medieval predecessors. Imogen's continued questioning of Iachimo has brought into plain sight his end of seducing her which he had hoped to cloak in vague, reticent language. Furthermore, if Iachimo is incarcerated by Cymbeline, he will surely fail to be able to deceive Posthumus in such a way as to win the wager.

Iachimo is a skilled sophist, and he goes on to exercise successful damage control, persuading Imogen that he was only testing her and explaining that Posthumus is actually living a virtuous life in Rome. Nevertheless, Imogen as audience-turned-orator has exercised skilled speech to render Iachimo's sophistic act of persuasion fruitless. Had she believed Iachimo and been led into adultery, Iachimo would have immediately achieved both of his ends. The heroine succeeds through her careful words, distrustfully addressed to her audience, Iachimo. Iachimo who hoped to wield sophistical force, has been obliged by Imogen to explain more precisely how

an action of revenge could be accomplished, revealing his own lustful purposes which she wholeheartedly rejects.

Epistemological Romance: Situating Imogen

Iachimo, like his namesake Iago and like Richard III, is a deft and successful sophist in the absence of an ethical speaker of equal skill. He inflames foolish Posthumus to the bet (1.4) and is especially effective in his sophistry when he convinces Posthumus that he not only has been in his lady's chamber, but also has seduced her (2.4). In these successes, Iachimo seems to foretell a similar view of sophistry's superior power in *Cymbeline* as in *Othello*. But when the villain—using techniques similar to those of Iago to achieve similar ends on similar issues—address the audience-turned-orator Imogen, she succeeds in parrying his attempted seduction and in gaining the truth of how Posthumus lives in Rome. Her ethical rhetoric, even to such a defective and intractable audience, suggests at least as great a power in truth-well-spoken, as in lies-well-hidden. However, it is notable that Iachimo is able, after Imogen's great victory, to persuade her that he has only been testing her, that he is not himself evil. Imogen's willingness to believe him (when reluctance is called for) shows typical Shakespearean nuance. The good well-spoken is at least equal to and often stronger than sophistry, but it is never that simple. All things are rarely equal and a skilled and quick-witted sophist will seldom be completely undone by a single apt, ethical persuasion. Sophists will continue to attack human goods, which will always be precariously endangered not only by those who execute sophistic acts of persuasion, but also by villains of all stripes.

While the exchange between Iachimo and Imogen in 1.6 is most revelatory about Shakespeare's view of the power of ethical rhetoric versus sophistry in *Cymbeline*, it is only one

of many aspects of the play that inform our understanding of Shakespeare's view concerning the ability to see through false appearances.[232] Much like in *Othello*, the question is introduced as a motif near the play's beginning. The first gentleman notes that many at court feign sorrow about Imogen's marriage, though they approve (1.1.8-10, 12-5). One quickly learns that Imogen is keen-sighted. She sees through the false appearance of the dissembling Queen (1.1.84). This perspicacity is confirmed in her episode with Iachimo. Even while one's view of her sharp sight is tempered by Iachimo's successful shielding of himself at the very end of their interview, her ability to thwart a villain who came bearing letters that fortified his false *ethos* impresses. When she receives the ambiguous love letter from Posthumus in 3.2, she is excited but notes that she is entering a fog that she "cannot look through" (3.2.81). While she is referring primarily and metaphorically to the blinding power of her love for Posthumus (which she states can smother the senses [3.2.59]), this comment foreshadows the course of events which will present even greater difficulty in seeing through false appearances than Imogen experienced at court.[233] Nevertheless, by the time Pisanio and Imogen arrive in Wales, Imogen sees clearly that something is bothering her servant (3.4.1-10). Once Pisanio reveals to Imogen the truth and begins his plan, she runs ahead of his words to the end of his proposal (165-6). Also, she sees rightly the nobility of the royal rustics, even against the report of her court education, against

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[232] See Cynthia Lewis (343-64) for an account of misperception in *Cymbeline* that focuses especially on the way in which the play raises and paradoxically resolves epistemological difficulties for the audience. Also, see Desmet (59-83), Harmon (150-4), Sanders (49-70, esp. 56-67), and Simonds (300-33) for four additional views on what Simonds calls the "limits of perception" in *Cymbeline*.

[233] Her first-hand experience of rustic life will contradict report (4.2.32-34), but her major disorientation comes from the pill-induced stupor and, subsequent, discovery of the dead, headless Cloten in Posthumus's clothes.

authority of teachers and parents, one of the earliest and fundamental ways in which one comes to know (4.2.33-34).[234]

Despite all this perspicacity, the fog that she foretold descends. When she awakens next to a beheaded man in her husband's clothes, she thinks that she identifies Posthumus based on the clothes and the deceased's leg, hand, foot, thigh, and brawn. She wrongly thinks that Cloten and Pisanio have conspired against Posthumus and herself. She questions her previous sharp sight that judged Pisanio as trustworthy, assuming that he forged the letters in which she had rightly discerned her husband's hand. She exclaims: "To write and read / Be henceforth treacherous!" (4.2.315-6). In fact, she has read well up until now; she has seen through many false appearances and is in the midst of writing herself, exercising her own moral agency with reference to exempla, as a new Hecuba instead of as a Dido or a Juliet.[235] Her own life suggests that one should write (and speak and act) responsibly and read with discernment, but she is too blinded to appreciate this in the moment. As her false conclusions reveal, Shakespeare depicts even the most sharp sighted as fallible.[236] Despite her education at court, royal nature, virtues, and piety, Shakespeare emphasizes that Imogen is neither perfect nor omniscient. Her circumstance acts as a dense fog, reminiscent of the sea storm in *Othello's* Cyprus, that impairs her prudent sight. But unlike Othello, it is precisely in her continued "writing" of herself that she overcomes her blindness. She continues to act with integrity. The extreme circumstance

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234 As Thomas Aquinas, quoting Aristotle, puts it, in a maxim that could easily have been known in the period: "*oportet addiscentem credere* [*'every learner must first be a believer*]" (II–II q.2 a.3,).

235 Sanders gives an account of Imogen that highlights her as a perceptive reader of texts and reality.

236 Behind this fallibility lurks the Queen's ill will. While the situation is one particularly given to error because of the powerful drugs and powerful emotions that afflict Imogen, the princess (who previously saw the Queen's veiled malice) took the pills—which Pisanio told her were from the Queen—without hesitation (3.4.186-90). Pisanio too, despite seeing the Queen for what she is (she makes a failed attempt at gaining him as an intermediary in her plot to marry Cloten to Imogen in 1.5), is blind to the fact that the pills she gives may be dangerous (3.4.184-91).

ultimately (and amazingly) improves her ability to discern the available (apt and ethical) means of persuasion to convince Lucius to enlist her in his service.[237] She does not yet have the benefit of hindsight to sort out her current misperceptions, but the pressure of the extreme situation sharpens her ability to engage in ethical and theological discernment about her actions (4.2.376-78), to find appropriate outlet for her feelings of mourning (4.2.386-93), and to persuade well (4.2.366-93). The occasion of fallibility reinforces the need for her habituated virtue and piety which help her to act well, even when—as she ironically and without full understanding states truly—"[o]ur very eyes /Are sometimes like our judgments, blind. Good faith" (4.2.300-01). Her awareness of her own fallibility and her *bona fides* act as conditions of possibility for the recovery of sharp seeing and, even in the interim, for responsible action. When one next sees Imogen in 5.4, she has not only regained keen sight, but also has further sharpened it as a result of her temporary blindness. This helps her to be a major force in the shaping of the romantic ending of the play.

In addition to Imogen, many other figures show degrees of sharp sight or blindness that help one to discern Shakespeare's view. The Queen, early in the play, reveals that she is able to fool the king and persuade him to her evil designs through false appearance (1.1.103-06). The dull King is only enlightened by the Queen's unrepentant deathbed confession to which he foolishly replies: "Who is't can read a woman" (5.4.48). Cloten's lords, in their asides, are always seeing through Cloten's poses and making light of the Queen's son (1.2, 2.1) while he is blind to the fact that he is being mocked (e. g. 2.1.23). In Italy, Philario often sees through Iachimo and counsels the intractable Posthumus to doubt the knave (1.4, 2.4). But Posthumus,

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[237] While too far outside of our current scope to examine in detail, I acknowledge that it is debatable whether or not Imogen's false assertions are licit means of persuasion, especially according to the Augustinian standard that forbids all lies.

like Othello, is largely blind to the Italian's wiles. Cornelius sees through the Queen's pose and refuses to give her the poisonous pills she desires (1.5.33-44). Pisanio, when ordered to kill Imogen, quickly discerns that a "poisonous tongued" Italian has put a "strange infection" in Posthumus's ear which is "too ready [in] hearing" (3.2.3-6, cf. 3.4.118-21).[238]

In addition, Shakespeare fashions characters that reaffirm the more Aristotelian-Thomistic view of epistemology (that was also seen in *Richard III*) at the moment when Bacon and (a generation later) Descartes argue vigorously for very different views.[239] Shakespeare suggests this intuitive mode or degree of knowing in the two princes and in Lucius. Belarius first tips off the audience that Guiderius and Arviragus, though uneducated, "prince it much" (3.3.85). While intertwined with Shakespeare's interrogation of nature and nurture, their "sparks of nature" suggest something about their ability to know intuitively (3.3.79). When Imogen arrives, the two princes immediately see the nobility of the disguised Imogen and remark that they will love Fidele like a brother. They somehow see, though incompletely, that she is "[a]n earthly paragon" and deserves love such as that which is given to a sibling (3.6.43, 66-72; 4.2.2-3, 16-24, 30). Albeit with Imogen's act of persuasion as a gentle cooperative guide, Lucius possesses

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238 Not only does this metaphor echo Iago's, but also it offers a faint echo of the poisoned ears in *Hamlet*. For one account of ears and poison in that play, see Reina Green. (All other references to Green indicate R. P. H. Green.)

239 Cavell claims that Shakespeare's epistemology is an anticipation of Cartesian skepticism. This view (which includes a reading of *Othello*, 125-42) has deeply influenced the discussion of Shakespeare's epistemology. My argument—which is limited inasmuch as it addresses only the ability to see through false appearances—takes an alternative stance that Shakespeare's view of knowledge acquisition is more Aristotelian. See Schmitt (13-76) on the circulation of Aristotelian ideas in Renaissance England. Beauregard (*Virtue's Own Feature*), A. Kinney (1-24), and Lockerd provide accounts that link Shakespeare to the Aristotelian tradition. I am especially concerned with the role of intuition. As mentioned in note 170, Aristotle's view of intuition can be found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1142a 23-31). In the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas expands on the notion of intuition in his treatment of connatural knowing and *synderesis* (II-II q.45 a.2; I q.79 a.12), as well as in the distinction he makes between *intellectus* and *ratio*. On this distinction, generally, see Pieper (*Leisure* 8-26). For a specific examination of how Shakespeare dramatizes it, see Lockerd. Also, Taylor provides an insightful history of the intuitive/"poetic" mode of knowing (5-57). For two additional views that provide counterpoints to Cavell, see Beauregard ("Against the Skeptics") and Quinn (*Iris Exiled* 212-5). Also, see Altman (*Improbability*) and Marra for further interrogations of Shakespearean epistemology.

the same intuitive faculty as the two princes. He sees clearly the true virtues of the disguised Imogen. Pisanio, when recommending the Roman's employment to Imogen, had noted Lucius's holiness and honor which would lead him to see Imogen's virtues and to embrace her (3.4.171-78). More specifically, Pisanio states that Imogen's telling of her skills (her act of persuasion) "will make him know / If that his head have ear in music" (173-4). David Bevington's gloss suggests that Lucius will be persuaded by appreciation for her voice (1437).[240] This is true; she will not use the uncollaborative magic of a sophist but the cooperative means which are musical. Nevertheless, there is something much deeper being said about knowledge acquisition than that Imogen's voice is the instrument of the persuasion. The passage is also affirming a harmony between the knowing agent and reality, and between Imogen and Lucius because the latter, as well as the former, to paraphrase Lorenzo in *The Merchant of Venice* (a play also evoked by Posthumus's lack of appropriate care for Imogen's ring), hath music in himself and can be trusted.[241] The motions of his spirit are luminous; he can "[m]ark the music," can see sharply and intuitively (5.1.69-87). This intuition is not the mark of the free and open (in other words, naïve) nature of the easily duped Othello, but a degree of knowing which Shakespeare again associates with nature (in other words, it is not dependent upon book learning) but which is

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[240] Butler's note in the *New Cambridge* edition offers a similar gloss of the passage: "which [Lucius] will quickly discover if he has the smallest ear for music."

[241] I am not suggesting that the deeply flawed Lorenzo and Jessica necessarily have this "music," this ability to know intuitively in themselves. As is so often the case in Shakespeare, it may be that a flawed character is partially blind to the truth which he is speaking. However, de Alvarez argues that, unlike Lorenzo, Pericles may have the music in him (197-215, esp. 210-1). See Furness for a brief history of the music of the spheres in western thought as it relates to *Merchant of Venice* (237-53, esp. 248-9). Of course, *Cymbeline* has also been remembered for the actual music that is performed within the play; while Cloten uses music in 2.3, see esp. the funeral song of the rustic brothers in 4.2 and their comment on Imogen's heavenly singing (4.2.48). Also, see Simonds, 300-63, for an account that may help reveal how the musical mode of knowing intersects with *Cymbeline*. In particular, she links *Cymbeline* to Orpheus (334-63). Music and persuasion often overlap in the Renaissance imagination because Orpheus is proto-orator and proto-poet/musician.

sharpened by the honor and holiness, the virtue and piety available to all and which can be built upon by additional degrees of knowing (including modes that rely on nurture or education).

The possession of the intuitive mode of knowing by some characters, as well as the various degrees of sharp-sightedness and blindness in many of the play's characters intimate that sharp sight, while assisted by intuition, is not easy to possess and will not be possessed by all. Nevertheless, there are rare examples of characters with sustained sharp sight, such as Imogen; while she is shown to be human (neither omniscient nor infallible), she is truly able, on the whole, to see through false appearances and to realize her own limits. She affirms both the difficulty in seeing rightly and the possibility of seeing through false appearances. In *Cymbeline*, contrary to *Othello*, it is not impossible to see through false appearances and to acquire reliable knowledge.

Conclusion

There seems little doubt that Shakespeare invites readers and viewers to make a connection between the villainy of Iago and Iachimo, two highly skilled sophists and the additional link to Richard III is merited on account of the sophistic skill all three possess. But what does this connection mean for an understanding of Shakespeare's view of rhetoric and rhetorical ethics? It is outside of the current scope for me to prosecute a full argument that Othello's and Britain's tragedies and Imogen's romance (admittedly labeled the tragedy of King Cymbeline in the first folio) share the same mimetic world, but I believe that they do. Shakespeare, in a work of mature poetic realism, has fashioned a single cosmos shared by all three plays that is meant to be neither fantastic nor literal. If this is true, then how does one resolve the contradictory accounts of epistemology and of sophistry's power in the three plays?

In *Richard III* and *Othello*, Gloucester's and Iago's success devastates the naïve idealized view of rhetoric and suggests skilled sophistry is more powerful than apt and ethical speech. Furthermore, Iago's triumph goes well beyond Richard's and implies that it may be impossible to acquire knowledge when a sophist intends to hide truth behind a constructed façade. In *Cymbeline*, Imogen suggests that apt and ethical rhetoric is at least equal to, if not more powerful than sophistical speech, and—deepening the suggestions in *Richard III*—many characters possess varying degrees of sharp sight that—taken together—provide a picture in which a universally available intuitive sight can be honed in such a way that one like Imogen can often penetrate false appearances.

The apparent contradiction is reconciled—above all—in the *dramatis personae*.[242] Regarding the epistemological question, it is no longer premature—having considered Richard, Iago, and Iachimo—to say that one cannot see through false appearances in *Othello*, simply because the play lacks sharp-sighted characters. Based on Shakespeare's whole catalogue, I suspect that he thought such characters rare. *Othello* emphasizes a rather melancholic view that is still present in *Cymbeline.* Impediments to sharp sight abound, but blindness and its subsequent tragedy can be forestalled through the efforts of the eloquent, ethical, virtuous, and pious Imogen and of additional wise and honest agents/counselors (Pisanio and Cornelius), as well as through the intuitive knowing of many characters, the providence of Jove (5.4.99-110),

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[242] Plett is helpful in his account of the various types of orators in Shakespeare (418). A Shakespearean character is either "Type 1: A person who is a good orator and a good character as well. Type 2: A person who is a good orator but a bad character. Type 3: A person who is a bad orator but a good character. Type 4: A person who is a bad orator and a bad character as well." Iago and the Iachimo of the first two acts belong to the second type. Imogen belongs to the first and there is no similar type one orator in *Othello*. Crider deepens Plett's insight by more fully articulating the limits of this typology ("Through Nurture" 17-36): "[For example,] Paulina moves from Type 2 to Type 1, but these types must. . . be used flexibly not to reduce moral character and action , which, even if mimetic, is not merely typological" (33 note 1). Iachimo, who speaks remorsefully and with a degree of eloquence in 5.4, similarly moves from two to one.

fate (which Shakespeare seems to suggest changes, to an extent, with a person's character[243]), and the passage of time which agents seem to see as a requisite to preserve lives and to let truth come to light without catastrophe (3.4.180-81). Taken together, Shakespeare provides a difficult, but real remedy for how both to forestall tragedy and see through the thick darkness that envelops Cyprus. While *Richard III* was able to propose the possibility of perceptive sight, it did not give the fully developed picture, found in *Cymbeline*, for what is required to transmute tragedy. In addition, Iachimo—a new (or, at the very least, a little) Iago—is not only read by Imogen for what he is, her speech is more potent than his. Sophistry appears more powerful than apt, ethical oratory in *Othello* and *Richard III* both because Shakespeare rejects the naïve, hyper-idealized view of rhetoric and because Imogen, or one like her, is not present. The deliberate revising of *Othello* in *Cymbeline* suggests that Shakespeare does not hold a suspicious view of rhetoric after all. Rather, he positions himself within the tradition which extends back to Quintilian and Aristotle that believes that well-spoken truth is more persuasive than sophistry. On the continuum between the naïve, hyper-idealized and anxious, hyper-cynical extremes, Shakespeare positions himself on the confident side of the confident-suspicious division.

Furthermore, while our greater focus on Iachimo over Imogen has limited our ability to see the extent to which it is so, Shakespeare revises the Roman ideal orator.[244] Not only does Imogen sustain the bonds of human fellowship (domestic and communal) as foreseen for the ideal orator by Cicero and Quintilian (cf. *De Officiis* 1.53, 3.28; *De Oratore* 1.32-4; *De*

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[243] Sallust, in *The War with Catiline*, had insisted that "fortune. . . changes with character" (2.5). On the use of Sallust in Renaissance England, see Wegemer (*Young Thomas More* 126-9, "Educating Citizens" 39).

[244] See Cicero (*De Oratore* 1.32-4; *De Inventione* 1.2-5) and Quintilian (*Institutio Oratoria* prooemium, 2.15-8, 12.1-2) for discussions of the classical ideal. Crider is attentive to Shakespeare's appropriation and refashioning of the ideal in *The Winter's Tale*, as well as to Thomas Wilson's use of it in the *Art of Rhetoric* (*Persuasion* 152-62). On the latter point, see his piece on Wilson ("Eloquence Repaired" 248-65).

Inventione 1.2-5), but also this imperfect, but highly potent speaker is female,[245] has a more clearly defined sense of the relationship between goodness and skilled speech than do the Romans (cf. *DDC* 4.3, 2.132, 4.87),[246] and exhibits the Augustinian development in the rhetorical tradition that goodness encompasses both natural and theological virtues.[247] In her later acts of persuasion—not addressed to Iachimo—she illustrates that the apparent constraints of ethical rhetorical means, as well as ethical ends, need not be disadvantageous to a skilled orator. Instead, her own life becomes a proof (cf. *DDC* 4.151), and her faculty of speaking discovers ethical and potent means of persuasion to which the sophist has no access. While Shakespeare certainly does not believe that moral character guarantees skilled speech, one sees that he does not believe ethical means and ends must be a hindrance; for Imogen, they are assets that assist the orator in achieving her external ends and that help her forestall tragedy. Iago may enact an anti-miracle by speech, but Imogen effects romance.

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245 Kennedy argues that Quintilian's ideal forces a speaker to be "perfectly good or perfectly villainous" (*Quintilian* 124). Imogen's imperfection makes her a more believable, but still impressive ideal. As Quintilian's phrase, *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, suggests, the Romans imagine the ideal orator as a man. In the face of a tradition which, as a whole, usually thinks of orators as men and often speaks of the power of words in martial terms, Shakespeare frequently presents viewers with the unique persuasive power of women. His female orators can be particularly discerning, bold (sometimes overly so, such as in Imogen's indecorous words to her father in 1.1 and Queen Margaret in *Richard III*), and effective. Imogen's sex does not limit her rhetoric to the domestic sphere; she is a public rhetorician, a *mulier bona dicendi perita*.

246 The Augustinian orator has a clearly defined relationship between his tongue and the virtues of his heart (*DDC* 4.3, 2.132); he is "in no doubt that any ability he has and however much he has derives more from his devotion to prayer than his dedication to oratory. . . . [H]e must become a man of prayer before becoming a man of words" (*DDC* 4.87). Augustine insists on the orator's preparation and development of skill as well (*DDC* 4.89), but piety is first. Imogen's clarity allows her to navigate the world of *realpolitick* without the impediment of Quintilian's naïveté.

247 Shakespeare incorporates the theological virtues in a fashion that allows for a pagan, Catholic, or Protestant reading. See Crider's analysis (*Persuasion* 162-78) of the statue scene in *The Winter's Tale*, in which he suggests an intentional ambiguity in that play which allows for skeptical, pagan, Protestant, and Catholic interpretations. Altman (*Improbability* 371-72), however, insists on a Protestant or fideistic reading of the statue scene. While Marrapodi is right that Christian virtues triumph over masculine *virtu* in *Cymbeline* (217-8), the play argues for an integration of theological and cardinal virtues.

The revision of the Roman ideal into a figure who is attentive to licit means and who possesses a more clearly defined understanding of the relationship between moral goodness and skilled speech suggest that Shakespeare may have some sympathy for a realist ethic. With the given dramatic evidence, I do not believe that any definitive assertions about the playwright can be made, but he creates a heroine who's guiding ethical principles, that are a condition of possibility for her oratorical and political success, are of the realist school.[248]

Despite the inability to label Shakespeare's ethical school with complete clarity, at this point it can be asserted that Shakespeare indeed believes the *Ars Rhetorica* to be for the good. Nevertheless, Shakespeare has a peculiar sort of confidence, a hard won trust in the *de iure* strength of ethical rhetoric. The rarity of an Imogen and the potency of a Richard and, more especially, an Iago nuance his vision. Imogen's oratorical achievement in 1.6 is immediately diminished by Iachimo's recovery; the accomplishments of the ethical orator are not static, but must be tirelessly defended. Human goods are fragile, and, in Shakespeare's view, the rarity of apt and ethical oratory that can work powerfully to defend, preserve, or achieve such goods still gives sophistry something of a de facto advantage. Even so, in fact and in principle, tragedy has been forestalled in *Cymbeline*; sophistry is ultimately less potent, and the sophist has been unmasked.

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[248] The obvious objection to labeling Imogen as an ethical realist is the false assertions that she uses in the episode with Lucius. However, while the focus on Augustine in the dissertation has emphasized his opinion that a lie is never justified, the use or allowance of a false assertion would not automatically make an agent or theorist into a utilitarian. As both the account of Augustine in chapter two and Quintilian in chapter one noted, there is a longstanding disagreement within the realist school about whether false assertions (as distinct from lies) can ever be justified. In Tudor and Stuart England, the question is taken up in an earnest and urgent way by Jesuits, like Garnet and Southwell, as they consider the question of mental reservation. Shakespeare is clearly interested in such questions; for example, cf. the porter's comments in *Macbeth* (2.3.1-20).

Chapter V

"For our own we conceal": A Rhetoric of Use in Bacon's *New Atlantis*

When this study began, it was noted that the ubiquitous influence of Cicero among humanists would be challenged by the followers of Peter Ramus, the Frenchman who sought to dismember rhetoric, giving over *inventio, dipositio,* and *memoria* (invention, disposition, and memory) to the province of logic or dialectic while ignoring *pronuntiatio* (delivery) and making *elecutio* (style) the sole concern of rhetoric. The likes of Spenser and Sidney directly challenge this mutilation of the traditional canons of rhetoric, and Shakespeare, educated in the more Ciceronian way, evinces his commitment to the five integrated canons that make up the rhetorical art in his creation of Imogen as an ideal orator.[249] All the while maintaining a Ciceronian view of the rhetorical canons, Shakespeare's style in the late plays grows progressively more ornate. However, in reaction to such a style and in agreement with Ramus's identification of style as the sole task of rhetoric, a great number of both Puritans (reformed Christians) and scientists began to call for a sparse or "plain" style, so that words would not get in the way of things. Sir Francis Bacon is well trained in ornate humanist rhetoric, deeply committed to the project of the new science, and often associated with a push toward plain style.[250] His commitment to science informs the counsel he gives to Fulke Greville to avoid

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[249] Ong remains an extremely helpful guide to Ramus; see esp. 270-92 for a treatment of Ramus and rhetoric. See Armstrong for an account of the poetics of Sidney and of Spenser in which he shows that both authors self-consciously resists Ramist reductionism.

[250] Vickers gives a full treatment of Bacon's style (*Francis Bacon*) and has shown that Bacon cannot be easily placed with those who are against rhetoric, or—in Vickers' account—those often associated with being against rhetoric who actually are not ("The Royal Society"). At moments, however, Bacon certainly gives lip service to the "plain style" which while a rhetorical choice seeks to appear "naked and unarmed" (*Advancement* 299). Furthermore, even if Bacon never claims to be anti-rhetoric, he is not one who merely wants to tame florid styles; he, instead, shares the assumption of many new scientists that rhetoric can be of "some hindrance" (*Advancement* 139) and that supra-rhetorical language communication is possible and necessary to give scientists data via observations that are "set forth briefly and concisely, so that they may be nothing less than words" (*Parasceve* 297-304). Vickers reads the latter exhortation as a matter of rhetorical decorum not as a rejection of rhetoric ("Bacon

poetry: "For poets, I can commend none, being resolved to be ever a stranger to them" (*Major Works* 105). Yet this resolution is surely not one in which Bacon endured. His writings are littered with allusions to the classical poets and orators.[251] Like More and Shakespeare before him, he is deeply influenced by the Roman classical tradition and also by Christianity, even if he rejects or disclaims some of the principles he encounters in classical and Christian rhetorical texts as in conflict with his scientific project. Furthermore, Bacon's counsel to Greville to avoid poets is especially striking because, ultimately, Bacon himself is not able to resist the urge to represent his scientific project in literary form in *New Atlantis*. Even science, apparently, needs defended by recourse to a poetic-rhetorical art.

This chapter examines the representations of acts of persuasion in *New Atlantis* and considers the text, as a whole, as a piece of persuasive rhetoric with a clear rhetorical purpose which we will have to identify.[252] Together these local acts of persuasion and Bacon's larger one will reveal Bacon's rhetorical ethics—his answer to the question "Is the *Ars Rhetorica* for the Good?" that I will situate on the continuum between the idealized, naïve and anxious, cynical extremes.[253] Bacon's ethics, as with More and Shakespeare, are shaped vis-à-vis the Roman and

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and Rhetoric" 224). Nevertheless, whether or not Bacon rejects rhetoric in this instance, he still manages to offer credence to the anti-rhetoric assumption that a-rhetorical communication is possible. This stands in marked contrast to the sixteenth-century view that rhetoric is present in nearly all communication (Rebhorn, *Emperor* 4).

References to page numbers from *New Atlantis*, *Essays*, and *The Advancement of Learning* are drawn from *The Major Works*, unless otherwise noted. All translations cited from the *Parasceve*, *Novum Organum*, and *Instauratio Magna* come from Urbach and Gibson's edition.

[251] It is helpful to remember that for many Renaissance thinkers rhetoric and poetics where two parts of one art of language.

[252] cf. my brief articulation of the pedagogical purpose of More's *History* in the section on More's anthropology; this goal could be thought of as the persuasive aim of the text as a whole.

[253] For treatments of Bacon and rhetoric, see Briggs (*Rhetoric of Nature*), Corbett (557-9), Harrison, Howell (364-88), Jardine, Johnstone, Vickers ("The Royal Society," "Bacon and Rhetoric," and "The myth"), K. Wallace, and Zagorin (175-83). Briggs (*Rhetoric of Nature*), Johnstone, and Vickers ("Bacon and Rhetoric") give particular attention to Bacon's rhetorical ethics. Vickers argues that Bacon's rhetorical ethics are a noble accomplishment that use and complement the Aristotelian rhetorical ethic. Bacon's rhetoric "fuses ethics and psychology, the Aristotelian and the Galenic traditions, into a triumphant unity, a model of persuasion that has considerable

Christian influences. To reach these conclusions, the chapter must first undertake two preliminary sections before turning to the *New Atlantis*. The former will establish Bacon's understanding of his scientific project and epistemology. This section will also manifest an understanding of how Bacon is engaging, generally, with Christian epistemology and cosmology. The latter section will define the relationship of Bacon to Roman—and especially Ciceronian—rhetoric, drawing on Bacon's non-literary writing.

Bacon's Epistemology and the New Science

The renaming of the Renaissance period by some scholars as the early modern period reminds us that this epoch of rebirth was not just a time of renewal of ancient customs and mores, but also a time, to borrow Richard Foster Jones's phrase, of "revolt from Aristotle and the Ancients" and rebellion against the scholastic (pseudo-Thomistic) method of the universities. Bacon's project of science seeks to discover new, useful knowledge by a reliable method. In the process, he revolts against the Aristotelian concept of form, laboring to narrow the range of human reasoning, and he rehabilitates curiosity, toiling to expand the scope of those natural phenomena which are open to inquiry.[254]

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explanatory power" ("Bacon and Rhetoric" 221). Johnstone also labors to bring out the similarities between Aristotle and Bacon, noting the latter's effort to link rhetoric and ethics (118, 168-70, 355-7). While these Aristotelian elements so carefully outlined by Vickers and Johnstone are present in Bacon, my view is much more sympathetic with Briggs, who finds Bacon's rhetorical ethics filled with tensions and contradictions. He sums up his position that Bacon's new learning "is an exorcism of falsely coercive magicians, alchemists, and astrologers, which yet seeks to accommodate their modes of persuasion. . ." (*Rhetoric of Nature* 12). Bacon may earnestly speak of an Aristotelian rhetorical ethic, but ultimately he is willing to use sophistic magic that is 'coercive,' that does not guide an audience to choose freely to move themselves (in assent or action).

[254] I draw the phrase "range of reason" from the title of a book by Maritain, an excellent twentieth-century commentator on Thomistic epistemology.

Before showing how Bacon attacks Aristotelian ideas, it is necessary to articulate briefly a part of the peripatetic's project.[255] In the treatments of both More and Shakespeare, we have seen how each has a realist epistemology that could be labeled Aristotelian. Both early modern figures value intuition and conceive of human rationality broadly with knowledge acquisition proceeding by degrees: poetical (or intuitive or connatural), rhetorical, dialectical, and scientific (in the Aristotelian, pre-Cartesian sense).[256] They believe that there is a real world which can be known through these modes. Taylor characterizes the intuitive, poetic mode of knowing, as involving "a spontaneous act of the external and internal senses with the intellect, integrated and whole, rather than an act associated with the powers of analytic reasoning. It is . . . a natural human act, synthetic and penetrating, that gets us *inside* the thing experienced" (6). Aristotle's thought can be seen in this definition. In *De Anima*, he argues for a correction of Plato's dualism by placing form within a given object. This form is perceived intuitively by the mind which then abstracts universal ideas from the particular object.[257] Jonathan Lear summarizes Aristotle's conception well: "Because the universal is embedded in the particulars, a person's first exploration among particulars will naturally lead him toward a grasp of the embodied universal" (2-3).

This conception of cognition is complemented by two of the peripatetic's famous observations at the opening of the *Metaphysics*. He begins, proposing that

> all men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses. . . . We do not regard any of the senses as Wisdom; yet surely these

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255 Recall the influence of Aristotle in Renaissance England shown by Schmitt (13-76) and MacIntyre, "John Case."

256 See Taylor, who quotes Senior regarding these degrees of knowledge (8).

257 See especially 431b, in which Aristotle summarizes his whole argument. Also, see Vickers, esp. 213-22, for an account of Bacon's knowledge and use of *De Anima* ("Bacon and Rhetoric").

> give the most authoritative knowledge of particulars. But they do not tell us the "why" of anything—e.g. why fire is hot; they only say that it is hot. (980a-981b)

Sense perception is basic; it does not give wisdom or reasons "why," but is the foundation for answering why, for acquiring knowledge. The poetical mode is nearest and most directly related to the experience of perception. Poetic learning, for Aristotle, begins in the experience of wonder:

> For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about greater matters. . . . A man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders). . . . For all men begin, as we said, by wondering that things are as they are. (982b)

Sense perception is nourished and propelled beyond itself by the passion of wonder. Wonder is not just perception, and yet—as Taylor insists—it is "not yet philosophy" or a part of the higher degrees of knowing. Rather, it is pre-rational knowledge which is part of the first degree of knowing (the poetic, intuitive degree).

This tradition of form and wonder in Aristotle's epistemology is variously developed by many subsequent thinkers, and while it is challenged by late scholastic nominalists, it is largely in tact in the early 17th century.[258] Descartes' *Principia Philosophiae* in 1644 and Robert Boyle in 1666 will fully reject the idea of substantial forms (Perez-Ramos, *Ideas of Science* 68), but Bacon offers one of the first influential challenges to Aristotle:

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[258] Examples of subsequent thinkers both before and after the 17th century include Thomas Aquinas, Henri Bergson, and Jacques Maritain.

> Bacon's Forms are prior in *esse* or in the scale of being, with regard to their sensory perception by man, whose sense organs provide him only with particular *naturae* or qualities. The 'substantial forms' were, partly at least, the result of sense perception and of the ordering of its contents; the Baconian Form, on the other hand, is a purely intellectual construct. The enquirer has to posit an individual Form in the case of each individual quality, in accordance with a particulate matter-theory, built on certain analogies with what he observes in sense experience. (Perez-Ramos, *Ideas of Science* 96)[259]

Such a program is a radical departure. Bacon rejects the Aristotelian insistence upon sense perception and offers his own alternative. In his *Novum Organum*, Bacon reveals what is at stake. He believes that Aristotle "corrupted natural philosophy with his dialectic" (68, aphorism 63).[260] Hence, the logic-heavy old *Organon* is insufficient and a new method based on aphoristic insights is proposed.[261]

Bacon's concern for and development of natural philosophy is, in fact, also the source of his arguments to lift any prohibition against curiosity. Hans Blumenberg has argued that Francis Bacon is the finest apologist of curiosity's rehabilitation in the early modern period and that his justification of curiosity opens the way to the Enlightenment. The precedent which Bacon had to overturn is well articulated by Augustine. The bishop of Hippo had argued, via scripture, that to be curious was to be prideful, seeking knowledge beyond oneself not for the sake of learning

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[259] In addition Perez-Ramos (*Ideas of Science*), see Funari (1-37), Jardine (76-108), Kusukawa, Perez-Ramos ("Bacon's forms"), Vickers ("Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge"), and Zagorin (183-7) for explications of Bacon's epistemology.

[260] This snippet captures the essence of Bacon's many references to Aristotle and the Scholastics throughout the *Novum Organum*.

[261] See Vickers for an account of Bacon's use of aphorism (*Francis Bacon* 60-95).

the truth, but for an exultation of one's self (cf. *Confessiones* 10.35). But Bacon addresses this scriptural and Augustinian objection to human beings seeking hidden knowledge by "taking the biblical 'tree of knowledge' literally[. In doing so] Bacon reserves the realm of morality for religion but gains nature as the harmless object of . . . inquiry" (Blumenberg 387). This "gain," in Bacon's mind was perhaps double: Not only was he able to justify his new method of scientific inquiry, but also he consigned all religious belief to a pure fideism.[262]

Nevertheless, Bacon remains especially fond of trying to ground his justification for curiosity upon a reading of the biblical text. Bacon improves his *ethos* by appealing to a text that was, for many in his audience, *the* authority. His favorite proof text within the Bible comes from 1 Kings:

> And God gaue Solomon wisdome, and vnderstanding, exceeding much, and largenesse of heart, euen as the sand that is on the sea shoare. . . . And he spake three thousand prouerbes: and his songs were a thousand and fiue. And hee spake of trees, from the Cedar tree that is in Lebanon, euen vnto the Hyssope that springeth out of the wall: hee spake also of beasts, and of foule, and of creeping things, and of fishes. And there came of all people to heare the wisedome of Solomon, from all kings of the earth, which had heard of his wisedome. (4:29, 32-34)[263]

In the dedicatory epistle of the *Instauratio Magna* (5-6) and the opening lines of the first book of *The Advancement of Learning* (120), Bacon flatters King James by making him into a new

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[262] Sommerville brought this obvious fact to my attention. Also, see Lampert (65). Briggs ("Bacon's science") gives a refined account of the relationship of faith and reason in Bacon that seeks to show he is not in favor of limiting religious belief to fideism.

[263] Biblical citations in this chapter come from the 1611 King James Version, unless otherwise noted.

Solomon while also giving biblical precedent for his inquiry. Also, *New Atlantis* contains an allusion to this passage, seeking to link King Solamona and the scientific project of the isle of Bensalem to King Solomon (469). Of course, the biblical text does not indicate that Solomon was vicious (curious in his natural philosophizing), but Bacon's exegesis wants to expand Solomon's wisdom and knowledge of the natural world into a justification for the curiosity that Bacon believes is requisite for the new science.

In the Christian tradition, the vice of curiosity is traditionally opposed to the virtue of studiousness. Furthermore, curiosity is also often viewed as an impediment to wonder, which — in Aristotle's formulation—is necessary for poetic knowing.[264] Once curiosity is no longer considered a vice, but a virtue, wonder is no longer thought to be a pre-rational knowing which can lead to seeking further degrees of knowledge that are in concord with poetic knowledge. Instead, in *The Advancement of Learning*, Bacon characterizes wonder as "broken knowledge" (2002 125). Historian of wonder, Dennis Quinn explains that "What [Bacon] seems to mean by calling wonder 'broken knowledge' is that when one attempts to contemplate nature as a means to know God, wonder ceases to be the seed of knowledge and the mind is arrested in its search for knowledge" (*Iris Exiled* 197). For Bacon, this arrest is not even the beginning of a *via negativa*, but a belief that wonder forestalls learning and should be avoided and replaced with curiosity.[265]

In charting these two examples, the restoration of curiosity and the struggle of Bacon to change the Aristotelian notion of form without doing away with form altogether, one sees that

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[264] See Quinn (*Iris Exiled* 25-9) for a concise discussion of the relationship between wonder and curiosity.

[265] In addition to Quinn, see Daston and Park (220-31 and 303-28, esp. 316-21) and Jalobeanu (esp. 214-5) for two accounts of Bacon's relationship to wonder. See Fisher for an account of change in attitude toward wonder in the period that looks to Descartes rather than Bacon. See Blumenberg, to whom I have already alluded, for Bacon's role in rehabilitating curiosity (377-401).

the previously-understood relationship between intuitive (poetic) knowledge, abstract learning, and experimental science is in crisis in the early modern period. Bacon's epistemology—that will bear on his rhetorical ethics—is very different than his predecessors in this study. He sees his scientific project as an "instauration," a renewal in which "a path must be opened to man's understanding entirely different from that known to men before us. . . so that the mind can exercise its rightful authority over the nature of things" (*Instauratio Magna* 7).[266] Bacon summarizes his whole scientific project with its insistence on a new method, change in view of form, and rehabilitation of curiosity in the image on the title page of his *Instauratio Magna* (1620) which depicts ships passing through the Pillars of Hercules.[267] The columns, of course, represent the rocks of Gibraltar that were long thought to be the boundary of the world; but Bacon, fifteen years before, in the opening to book two of *The Advancement of Learning*, had already made them metaphorical, as he impatiently petitions the King "why should a few received authors stand up like Hercules' Columns, beyond which there should be no sailing or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a star as your majesty to conduct and prosper us?" (169). Bacon wants to create a space in which he can undercut received authors, such as Aristotle. Just before this renunciation of untouchable authorities in *The Advancement of Learning*, Bacon blames Ulysses for choosing to return to Ithaca rather than become an immortal; Bacon opines that this episode stands as a figure for choosing "custom and habit" over "excellency" (168). There is a deep, unintended irony present in his use of this passage. Bacon is so intent to tear down the confining walls of Aristotle's natural philosophy that he forgets to be

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[266] Bacons language of dominion can be read as his attempt to fulfill the command of God in the book of Genesis or as an exercise of power that emphasizes dominance over care and stewardship.

[267] The pillars are also mentioned in *New Atlantis* in a context where Bacon suggests that long ago it was common to pass beyond the pillars and that the ideal Bensalemites still go back and forth between the pillars with ease to gather knowledge secretly from various societies (467).

a stranger to the poets, using Homer. Furthermore, he forgets that Ulysses is an exemplum of the sort of curiosity he seeks to rehabilitate. While only implicit in Homer, in the Dantesque tradition, Ulysses is condemned to the inferno for a voyage of curiosity past Hercules's pillars, undertaken after finally arriving back in Ithaca. Bacon words on Ulysses that conclude book one of *The Advancement of Learning*, fall short of illustrating what the frontispiece does. The latter represents Bacon's voyage of the new science as progressing past the pillars that represent Aristotle and the ancients; in so doing, one may join the company of Ulysses without any fear of the eternal damnation to which the man of many ways was consigned for his curiosity by the God of Dante because, to the God of Bacon, curiosity is not sin but excellence.

Bacon's Anti-Ciceronian Ciceronianism

While Bacon justifies his project by way of creative exegesis of scripture and by razing the pillars of old scientific authorities (with consequences, as we shall see, for his rhetorical ethics), he is also explicitly concerned with the subject of rhetoric in a variety of his works. While Cicero is not given the direct rebukes that natural philosophers of old, such as Aristotle, receive, Bacon's writing on rhetoric, especially in his treatment of the office of rhetoric and in his view of the relationship between words and things, suggests that Cicero is also among those "received authors" who despite a tradition of veneration should be passed beyond.

Let us begin by attending briefly to Bacon's view of the office of rhetoric and then turn at greater length to his view of words and things. In the former case, he begins by citing both Biblical and classical praise of rhetoric and then exhorts that "[[t]he duty and office of Rhetoric is to apply Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the will" (*Advancement* 238). He adds to this formulation in the *De Augmentis*: "Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as

Logic is to the understanding" (455).[268] While Bacon often positions himself as one who is influenced by and agrees with the Judeo-Christian and Classical view of rhetoric, interpreters of this passage vary in what they have seen as either a standard restatement of the Aristotelian position with sensitivity to both the peripatetic's psychology and rhetoric (Vickers, "Bacon and Rhetoric" 210-22) or as a division of faculties that goes beyond Aristotelian and medieval distinctions to assert strict division between imagination and reason as "distinct faculties," an innovation that places Bacon well within the Ramist camp and allows for the further removal of invention from rhetoric (Corbett 558).[269] This latter view is opposed, for example, to the psychology of Augustine in which sense, imagination, and intellect are "understood as distinct kinds of vision," but which are all active participants in "the conjoint" movement by which "the soul acquires knowledge" (Breyfogle, "Imagination" 442).

Corbett goes on to observe that the reason-imagination distinction reveals Bacon's desire to privilege things over words (558-9). In his treatment of the relationship of words and things in *The Advancement of Learning*, the full extent of Bacon's dismissal of Cicero becomes apparent. Bacon famously critiques Ciceronianism and the "almost deif[ication]" of both Cicero and Demosthenes (139). Such a critique was not new. Erasmus provided an earlier, biting critique of Ciceronianism (quoted by Bacon in this section of *The Advancement*), and More's Latin style was uncharacteristic of many of his contemporaries in its deliberate rejection of a pure

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[268] When I refer to *De Augmentis* in Latin, I am referencing *Works*, volume I; when speaking of its English translation, *Works* volume IV.

[269] Vickers ("Bacon and Rhetoric") is quite convincing in his corrective case against those who have made Bacon into an absolute opponent of rhetoric. However, the way in which he orders his argument allows him to present Bacon in two rather dissimilar ways. On the one hand, Bacon is first characterized as a strong proponent of a classical conception of rhetoric in which persuasive speech collaborates with logic. On the other hand, Bacon is then shown to place emphasis on things (*res*) to such an extent that he ultimately has little confidence in rhetoric, believes that rhetorical invention cannot discover new knowledge, and sees words getting in the way of reality rather than potentially imaging and conducing toward it. Vickers seems content to let these two coexist, but I believe that the latter may trouble the former.

Ciceronianism.[270] Bacon finds unusual allies, both having died about 60 years before *The Advancement*, who also sought to destroy (either in word or action) the stylistic idol of Ciceronianism. However, Erasmus and More both admired the words and thoughts of Cicero himself while Bacon, despite moments of praise, seems not only to want to tear down Ciceronianism, but also the "received author" from whom this movement takes its name.

Cicero, after all, wants to make words and things inseparable: "words (*verba*) cannot have any basis (*sedem*) if you withdraw the content (*rem*), and the content will remain in the dark if you remove the words" (*De Oratore* 3.19). The right harmony between words and things, Cicero goes on to suggest, flows from the nature of the intelligible universe, taken as an ordered whole (3.20-1) that "partakes of the nature of wisdom" (DiLorenzo 255, 258). This formulation implicitly acknowledges that a disproportionate relationship between words and things is possible and blameworthy, but one always has an instrument for judging the appropriate correspondence of words and things: the cosmos, "a unity. . . bound together by a single, natural force and harmony" (3.20).[271] In such a universe, words that describe things are allowed a certain degree of copiousness, as they fulfill the imperative that style capture and image the harmony of the spheres and the fecundity of the world. In this we see a nascent expression of Cicero's view of the unity of the five rhetorical canons (contra Ramus) and the inseparability of speech and thought ("*linguae atque cordis*" 3.61).[272] Cicero, while he acknowledges the virtues

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[270] See Logan, Adams, and Miller xxxiii-xli, esp. xxxvii, xl-xli and Hosington, "Language and Translation" on More's style.

[271] DiLorenzo remains key to my understanding of Cicero on these points. Also, while outside of the current scope of this section, it should be noted that Bacon's departure from this approach would have consequences if he wanted to ground ethics on a natural law.

[272] Bacon actually invokes this position of Cicero to his advantage in a different context (*Advancement* 205). Vickers relentlessly seeks to revise critics who have made Bacon into an 'anti-humanist' by comparative examination of Bacon's view of words and things with classical figures ("The myth" esp. 140, 146-50). I grant this to a degree, but believe that despite Bacon's use of humanist discourse conventions, there remains a fundamental

of style and discusses them in an artificial way as discrete from the concerns of invention and disposition, unites thoughts and words (*De Oratore* 3.24): "Discovering [*inveniri*] words for a distinguished style [*ornatum*] is impossible without having produced and shaped the thoughts, and. . . no thought can shine clearly without the enlightening [*luce*] power of words" (3.24). Cicero reuses the light and darkness metaphor to which he already had recourse when showing the harmony between words and things to join speech and thought.

Bacon rejects much of Cicero's vision. He places a greater distance between words and things, and insists that "the substance of matter is better than the beauty of words" (*Advancement* 140).[273] Disclaiming various vanities and distempers of learning, he puts forth his full view of the relationship between things/matter (*res*) and words (*verba*):

> Here therefore is the first distemper of learning, when men study words and not matter: whereof though I have represented an example of late times, yet it hath been and will be 'secundum majus et minus' in all time. And how is it possible but this should have an operation to discredit learning, even with vulgar capacities, when they see learned men's works like the first letter of a patent or limned book, which though it hath large flourishes, yet it is but a letter? It seems to me that Pygmalion's frenzy is a good emblem or portraiture of this vanity: for words are but the images of matter; and except they have life of reason and

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difference regarding the relationship of *res* and *verba* not only between Bacon's view and that of Ciceronianism, but between the view of Bacon's view and that of Cicero. Vickers aggressive provocations are based on excellent close analysis, but perhaps "so many otherwise learned and well-informed scholars feel confident about ascribing [anti-rhetorical, anti-humanist] opinions to Bacon" (154) when they synthesize many facets of Bacon's project and see a program that speaks a humanist language while working to undercut many essential aspects of Renaissance humanism. Furthermore, when Vickers, in defense of his Bacon-as-humanist thesis, quotes a line of Bacon and observes that it "might have come straight from the pages of Harvey's *Ciceronianus*" (148), then one sees that Vickers' conception of humanist includes Harvey and Ramus, who have a very different view of rhetoric than Cicero, not just Ciceronianism.

[273] cf. *New Atlantis* wherein the Father of Salomon's house places utility over and against beauty (482).

> invention, to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in love with a picture. (*Advancement* 139)

Bacon thinks that it is possible, as he previously stated in his critique of Ciceronianism, "to hunt more after words than matter" (139), to study words in excess or the expense of studying the matter.[274] We first should note how he translates *res*.[275] While "matter" is a perfectly good translation of *res* that, according to the *OED*, fits a common usage of "matter" for the time, the word also can refer to the strictly material stuffs which are the object of Baconian science.[276] The etymology of matter, coming from *materia* (wood), is not lost on the author of the *Sylva Sylvarum* when he translates *res* as "matter" rather than "things." Bacon chooses a less abstract word for *res* to emphasize further his view of the primacy of things and especially to reveal his more narrow view of what constitutes things.[277] Bacon, like Cicero, believes apt correspondence determines the right relationships of words to things. But, as gently hinted at in the choice of the word "matter," Bacon focuses on those *res* which are material, natural objects. He believes that "human understanding on account of its own nature readily supposes a greater order and uniformity in things [*in rebus*] than it finds" (*Novum Organum* 56 aphorism 45).[278] We can see that Bacon's restricted view of the cosmos is less grand than Cicero's and his approach to "things" (his view of or method for science) is more utilitarian. The famous adage attributed to

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[274] Uncharacteristic of the rest of Vickers fine essay, when he quotes this passage he offers no analysis of it, but assumes that it simply is clear to readers that the passage promotes the subordination of words to things without presenting any difficulties ("Bacon and Rhetoric" 223). However, his "The myth" article does look at the statement in more detail, but he does not see any of the problems with the illumination and Ovidian emblem that I will chart.

[275] While it is clear that he is referring to the traditional res-verba distinction in his writing, this is further confirmed by the Latin chosen in *De Augmentis Scientiarum* (451-2).

[276] The *OED* even uses part of the present quotation to illustrate definition 10a.

[277] Bacon is also drawing on Cicero, however, who uses the language of *sylva*. Bacon alludes to Cicero's use in *The Advancement* (173).

[278] For *Novum Organum* in Latin, see *Works* I; English references continue to come from Urbach and Gibson.

Bacon: "Knowledge is power" (cf. *Novum Organum* 43, aphorism 3) suggests that knowledge is valuable only because it is useful or empowering, and his approach to the less grand cosmos, absent wonder and imbued with curiosity, is to poke and prod the mechanized specimen for benefits that it can provide human beings (cf. *Instauratio Magna* 7, 16). Cicero and Bacon both judge words by their correspondence to reality, but they have very different understandings of reality.

This difference can be more fully understood, if one imagines how Cicero might question both the illumination analogy and Ovidian emblem that Bacon offers as examples of stylistic excess. According to the Ciceronian view, a robust collection of words, invented, organized, and stylized is rightfully like the beautiful versal that opens an illuminated manuscript. First of all, Cicero despite all of his concern for the *via activa*, would agree with Aristotle that some things are good for their own sake, that they need no justification beyond their participating (as Plato's Socrates might have it) in the good, true, or beautiful.[279] According to this view, the lovely versal remains potentially praiseworthy, even if "useless." Furthermore, on a more practical level, Cicero might suggest that an illumination stands as a worthy analogy of his view of words as the light of and yet as seated upon things: the embellished first *littera* of the literature could be considered "word" or artificial "thing," an image that stands as the threshold between words and things. The versal as *word* is quite simply a letter of the alphabet which is a necessary,

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[279] The versal that is merely beautiful has potential—according to the Ciceronian position—to be good in itself, liberal and in harmony with reality. For Cicero's position on the *artes liberales*, see *De Oratore* 3.58. He mentions devoting time to poets, mathematics, music, and the tasks of the dialecticians, saying that these "arts [*eis artibus*]. . . were devised to educate children's minds in humane culture and virtue [*ad humanitatem fingerentur atque virtutem*]." Also, see his *Pro Archia Poeta* for another defense of liberal education and "Dream of Scipio" in *De Republica* for a moment in which the concerns of the *via activa* are put into a larger perspective. Let us assume in the current moment that Plato is earnest, not ironic in his claims about the transcendentals.

constitutive part of the first word of the text.[280] The versal *as thing* enacts how words stand upon things, with the image appearing, especially if the letter is "diapered," as a foundation upon which to set a letter or as a threshold between the sphere of things and of words (admittedly with the words written on a material object). Additionally, as *thing*, the versal can either be beautifully useless (good in itself) or, in some cases, can shed light on the whole page (or whole text). It is the latter if it captures the whole in a visual representation of some episode or idea discussed in the text, and the former if it merely communicates that the text is important, worthy of the time, effort, and resources required to illuminate, to copy, or to read and understand it.[281] In accomplishing its purpose of capturing the whole or having no such task, the illuminated letter, as *word* and *thing*, can properly mirror the unity and splendor of the cosmos that Cicero believes can be at least partly re-presented in words.

Bacon's seeming disdain for an ornamented letter that could be a word and/or a thing shows his utilitarian outlook; he dislikes both excessive words, but also "useless" things; his Father of Salomon's house insists that gardens respect conditions for growth over and against any beautiful arrangement (482). Bacon measures words not against *res* in the Thomistic, scholastic sense of all things (*omnes*), but against *res utilis* or *res materiae*. Furthermore, the illuminated texts to which Bacon refers can be of "patent." Cicero would certainly encourage the choice to ornament official civic or institutional documents. To do so would provide an apt sign to remind both the civil servant and the citizen who the paperwork concerns—even (or perhaps especially) one of "vulgar capacities"—of the rightful importance of civic institutions and the

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[280] Of course, the best texts may also be so well disposed that the first word is very deliberately chosen and can be all the more emphasized by the versal.

[281] Obviously, some illuminations are more closely linked to the content of a text than others.

duty of servant and served to support the commonweal or—in a bit of etymological irony—the ***res*** *publica*.

Bacon's Ovidian "emblem" reinforces his distance from Cicero and reveals tensions created by his rejection of that which is not strictly useful. An emblem is a picture and in many ways seems similar to a versal. By a utilitarian criterion, both are ornaments that are not strictly "necessary" to a text. Yet Bacon does not contradict himself in including both his analogy that opposes versals and his emblem-in-words retelling of Pygmalion's story as pieces of evidence. The latter, while ornamental, has greater potential to meet Bacon's utilitarian standard by accomplishing something that words alone cannot. Like the frontispiece of the *Instauratio Magna* that distills and successfully communicates Bacon's whole scientific program in a picture, this use of Ovid need not automatically be considered a contradiction, but a useful short-hand. Nevertheless, even if Bacon's employment of the emblem can be justified by his own criterion for word usage, it remains odd. Recalling his advice to Fulke Greville "to be ever a stranger to the [poets]" (105), his frequent recourse to bards in his texts is puzzling and seems to suggest a penchant for his own study of words that do not, by his definition, bear directly on matter but are—in the language of his emblem—only mere "pictures."[282] This is a difficulty that Bacon never fully addresses. For example, in the *Parasceve*, he insists that scientific observation (which he extends to include Natural philosophy/history) be "only a granary and store house of facts" unadorned, not giving pleasure (304, aphorism 3). However, to make his point, he has adorned his text with an agricultural metaphor and not a simple one, but a repetitive, pleonastic one.

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[282] Bacon's difficulty might be further exacerbated by invoking Sidney's view of a poem as "speaking picture" that can "teach and delight" (an idea that can be traced back to Horace) (66).

Furthermore, to return to the Ovidian emblem, Bacon's analogy does not pass scrutiny. He puts Pygmalion before readers to suggest that love of excessive words is like the frenzy of Pygmalion, like falling in love with a shadow rather than with reality. But Pygmalion problematizes rather than supports Bacon's view. Ovid's Pygmalion is described as losing his grip on reality as he desires his great work of artifice (10.273-92).[283] Yet the sculptor never is totally lost in madness; the reader sees him deliberate about how to ask Venus for a wife who will be like his statue, even while he desires the statue rather than a different wife (297-303), and the narrator gives the reader no reason to doubt Pygmalion's judgment that the goddess has, in fact, turned his statue into an actual human companion. Pygmalion might be unstable, but his over-abundant art and his prayers (a species of *verba*) bring about a new reality (*res*); As Bacon insists, the sculptor did fall in love with a picture and this is disturbing, but he marries one with "pulses beating" (316). Ovid is always eager to mock, but the episode also reveals Ovid's preoccupation with the relationship between art and nature, and with the effect of the former on the latter. The story is not against many words or bursting copia, but in fact suggests that these can effect something extraordinary in the realm of things.[284] Bacon's interpretation is something of a willful reading that does not acknowledge this aspect of the text.

Both Bacon's disdain for the versal illumination and peculiar Ovidian emblem serve to show just how drastically his vision departs from Cicero's view on the relationship between words and things. Nevertheless, he carefully positions his claims about the universe, against which the appropriate relationship between words and things would be measured by both Cicero

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283 My citations point to the book and line numbers given in a contemporary edition of Golding's sixteenth-century translation.

284 While considering more mundane works of artifice, Aristotle suggests that "generally art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly imitates her" (*Physics* 199a 16-17). See Crider's readings of revitalizing speech in *The Winter's Tale*; his "Through Nurture" takes this line of Aristotle as its starting point (17) and the expanded account in his *Persuasion* examines Shakespeare's use of Ovid's Pygmalion (162-9).

and himself, not as a circumscription of the Ciceronian cosmos, but as the golden mean. He veils his implied calculus of utility by drawing attention to his opponents. He insists that he provides the correct balance between words and things vis-à-vis the excess of the Ciceronianists and the deficiency of the Schoolmen. This "moderation" helps him persuade his audience to the reasonableness of his different approach to *res* and his contrary vision of the nature of things, even if it means severely pruning rhetoric and abridging style to place words in right relationship with reality (viewed differently) and to allow rhetoric and science to achieve utilitarian ends most easily. This is a clever way to reject substantively Cicero's view of rhetoric, to move beyond yet another long upheld authority, even while remaining quick to offer superficial, *ethos* reinforcing praise the Roman statesman.

New Atlantis: Quintilian's Old Rhetorical Ethic for a New Scientific Society

While Bacon consistently presents himself as an admirer of Cicero and as one grounded in and submissive to the Christian, Biblical tradition, we have seen that he in many ways tears down important aspects of Cicero and rejects the Biblical cosmology and the prohibition of curiosity as articulated by Augustine, among others. Anticipating Descartes, Bacon seems to be setting out to do something new while deliberately avoiding (or more properly, rejecting) that which has come before, even if—to build his ethos—he intentionally performs with recourse to Ciceronian humanist and Christian conventions. This rejection shapes the rhetorical ethics that Bacon dramatizes in his only fictive work, *New Atlantis*.[285]

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[285] Among the many general treatments of *New Atlantis*, the current study is in conversation with Box (125-64), Faulkner (229-58), Jalobeanu, Lampert (27-66), Price (ed., with particular attention to essays by Price, Colclough, and Hutton), Weinberger ("Science and Rule" and "Introduction"), and Zagorin (169-74).

I have already suggested that this work represents Bacon's scientific project in literary form; in the words of Bacon's secretary, W. Rawley, which introduce the first edition of *New Atlantis* (published after Bacon's death), Bacon thought that the work had a "near affinity" to "Natural History" (785).[286] As such, the whole utopian narrative is designed to persuade readers via story of the merits of Bacon's new science. Unlike More's *History*, in which the text as a whole subtly attempted to persuade readers to various opaque ends via a particular humanist pedagogy, the persuasive purpose of Bacon's work, as a whole, is transparent and rightly announced in this note to the reader from Rawley.[287] He reports that Bacon primarily sought to represent a "model" of a scientific college that can interpret nature "for the benefit of men" (785). Bacon, by this account, provides a prototype for the Royal Society in Salomon's House, justifying the institution, as one has come to expect from Bacon, on its usefulness. Rawley appears ready to concede the utopian quality of the "fable," advising that it is a "model. . . more vast and high than can possibly be imitated in all things" (785). Nevertheless, within the same sentence, he goes on to boldly proclaim that "most things therein are within men's power to effect" (785). The first part of the sentence becomes an exercise in false humility because, regarding the scientific aspects of the work, Rawley believes that men have the power to effect

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[286] The reference to this "To the Reader" leads to a footnote in the edition of *New Atlantis* included in Vickers' edition of *The Major Works*. Weinberger, in his edition, includes the note of Rawley before the text.

[287] This, of course, assumes that Rawley is correct; upon reflection, I believe that he is. In addition to More's *History*, *Utopia* is also of note. Bacon sets up a utopia that he thinks is a true, achievable ideal while More sets up a world filled with contradictions that many have read as not meant to be an earnest, one-to-one correspondence proposal for a commonwealth. Brann captures this succinctly in her contention that in modernity "[t]he utopian mode ceased to be *ironical* and become *oppositional*" (24-5 emphasis original). E. Simon, however, reads the utopian task of More and Bacon as similar (136-92) with both of them "less concerned with achieving his goals than experiencing the infinite process of visualizing possibilities" (192).

most everything that is suggested. History seems to have proven Rawley's claim (at least partly) right.[288]

To Bacon's primary rhetorical end of proposing a useful scientific college by means of "fable," Rawley adds another end sought by the same means; the text also puts forward the "best state," "mould of a commonwealth," and "a frame of laws" (785). In the way that Rawley orders his list of Bacon's ends and in the treatment of science and politics within the text, it seems that Bacon holds up the scientific project as the ultimate end with the ideal state as merely a proximate end to facilitate science. While it is worth noting both ends, it is the means that particularly attract our attention at present. Bacon uses literary means, presumably because he believes that they will be most potent in commenting on the design of the commonwealth and in proposing his new science. No doubt the success of the succinct frontispiece to the *Instauratio Magna* (1620) frontispiece revealed to Bacon how powerfully an image or a story could be both in capturing the argument he makes for his scientific project and in favorably stirring the passions of his audience.

It is because Bacon's pan-textual rhetorical purpose is so palpable, almost pedantic, within the text that I have foregrounded it before looking at the representation of acts of persuasion within the text. All these acts are distilled through the first person narrator, one of the European sailors who has stumbled upon Bensalem island. While he speaks with the benefit of hindsight, the narrator is not omniscient, so all of the moments of persuasion are situated in a way that departs from More's peculiar narrator in his *History*. One series of acts of persuasion

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[288] See Colclough for an account of the text which argues that Bacon intended to put forth a realizable scientific project. This fact can have a discomforting aspect when one considers some of the secret experiments that the members of Salomon's house undertake. See Farrington (*Philosopher of Industrial Science*) and A. Wallace for two accounts of what the latter's subtitle describes as the "early industrial revolution as foreseen in Bacon's *New Atlantis*." Much earlier John Evelyn argued that Salomon's House appeared "Romantic," but had "in it nothing. . . [i]mpossible to be effected" (Price 15).

that the sailor relates is a serially delivered discourse given by the Governor of the House of Strangers. On the surface, the Governor's speaking seems designed to offer welcome to the Europeans, but one will see that his ends are much more complicated.[289]

When he first appears to the sailors, they are in a very vulnerable situation, fearing that the Governor may give them a death sentence (462). One must imagine that it is with great relief to the sailors to learn that they will not be condemned to a swift death and that they may stay for at least six weeks and (upon petition) perhaps longer due to an ambiguity in Bensalem's laws. The Governor goes on to encourage them with news that the state will pay all their expenses and that they should not hide any requests because "ye shall find we will not make your countenance to fall by the answer ye shall receive" (462). However, he also insists that they must never go more than one and a half miles from the city walls without leave. The sailors receive all this news gladly. They have been moved from fear to rejoicing and are eager to agree to the Governor's invitation, even going so far as to compare their fate to receiving heavenly salvation,

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[289] For treatments of rhetoric in or the rhetoric of *New Atlantis*, see Faulkner, Hutton, and Weinberger ("Introduction"). Hutton's account is not particularly concerned with the ethical aspect of rhetoric in the text and examines only the text, taken as a whole, as an instrument of persuasion. Faulkner is attentive to Bacon's attempt to "conceal the repulsive features" of Bensalem through rhetoric, and he notes that this raises ethical questions, but again he is looking at the pan-rhetorical purpose of the whole, without concern for the practice of rhetoric or sophistry manifest in actual acts of persuasion. Only Weinberger, in a passing comment, picks up on the ethical-rhetorical issues at stake within the text, noting that "[t]he propagation of Bensalemite perfection is not immune to the possible problem of immoral means for moral ends" ("Introduction" xvi). (Weinberger's ethical concern with actions represented in the text extends well beyond speaking and is even clearer in his "Science and Rule" treatment of *New Atlantis*.)

As the current case develops, one will see that I believe not only is Bacon lacking immunity, but his acts of persuasion when read along with his "Of Simulation and Dissimulation" reveal Bacon intentionally asserting a very different rhetorical ethic than the realist ethic of Thomas More or Imogen. Colclough explicates Bacon's ethics by arguing that he "found a degree of incommensurability between ethical (specifically Christian) and civic values" (62). He cites the essay on "Simulation" as evidence of the claim and implements a method that looks at different texts of Bacon as "different and specific interventions into a particular debate" (63). To a degree, I think this is a fruitful method that can appreciate Bacon's various audiences and genres, along with development in his not perfectly consistent thought. Nevertheless, I will use "Simulation" as a lens by which to bring into focus the rhetorical ethics of *New Atlantis* not believing that I am "reading Bacon's wide ranging writings into an unhappily homogeneous unity" (Colclough 63), but rather insisting that the essay and fictive text shed light on one another and on their common author. The former makes the implicit and obscure of the latter happily explicit without enforcing a willful, unhappy sort of homogeneity.

having discovered a new "land of angels."[290] They refashion Yahweh's self revelation to Moses, calling the land of which they still do not know the name "holy ground" (463; cf. Ex 3:5), and they replace Jerusalem with the utopian isle as they echo the psalmist (cf. Ps. 137:6).

Having welcomed the sailors and gained their gratitude, the Governor retires until the next day. When he returns, he reveals the name of the island, Bensalem ("son of peace"). But then he subtly draws attention to the fact that Bensalem has intricate knowledge of the whole world despite the fact that his own land is not itself well-known. Therefore, he invites their questions to which the sailors reply with inquiries about how and by whom Bensalem was evangelized to the Christian faith. The Governor reports a special revelation not brought by an apostle or evangelist that occurred "[a]bout twenty years after the ascension of our Saviour" (464). The good news was heralded by a beam of light appearing on the sea. The Governor reports that it was "marvelous" and a source of "wonder." But this is not the wonder that shares something with holy fear because—unlike Moses on the aforementioned holy ground who was told to come not closer (cf. Ex 3:5)—the Bensalemites take to boats and sail toward the light. They are prevented from approaching too near to the light, but a single member of Salomon's house, "the very eye of this kingdom," is allowed passage forward at which point the apparition vanishes. Nevertheless, left behind are the Bible (including books not yet written) and extra-canonical documents including a letter from the apostle Bartholomew. In the retelling, the Governor is quick to point out that he knows which books comprise the scriptural canon of the sailors, at which point he is suddenly called away by a messenger.

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[290] In the latter name, Bacon may be drawing a parallel between Bensalem and England for whom he is proposing the Bensalem ideal. Gregory the Great, in Bede's report, upon seeing boys of Angles (i.e. of England) comments: "Well are they so called, for they have too an angel's face, and it is meet such men were inheritors with the angels in heaven" (2.1; Loeb ed. 200-1).

The next day, the Governor will resume his speech that is apparently intended for the rhetorical purpose of welcoming the sailors. But before recounting and analyzing that portion of the act of persuasion, let us pause upon what has been said so far. It seems that two irreconcilable readings are possible. On the one hand, it might be said that desperate sailors are treated with dignity and charity for which they express great thanks. Furthermore, this kind treatment goes so far as to answer the sailors' questions despite the fact that the Bensalemites apparently have nothing to learn from the Europeans that they do not already know. On the other hand, details in the text almost urge a reader to be more suspicious of the motives of the Bensalemites.[291] A reader has seen so many customs and laws carefully and precisely executed within the text that the Governor's claim that there is an ambiguity in the law that touches on treatment of strangers seems unlikely. Also, the Governor, as priest, has performed admirable ethical behavior, such as refusing payment for his services, while claiming his motivation for refusal is because he is a cleric. Nevertheless, this man of God does not object to or deflect the sailors almost idolatrous praises addressed to him and adapted from the Torah and Psalms. Furthermore, he moves the sailors from their initial vulnerability (physically sick and worried they may be executed) to an odd, new sort of vulnerability. He gestures toward matters of Bensalem about which he is forbidden to speak and puts strict boundaries upon where they can circulate while saying that he will favorably entertain any question or request. And he is always repeating that Bensalem knows everything of Europe, and the whole world, while remaining itself unknown. This must make the sailors—whose first experience of the island was "divers of the people, with bastons in their hands" (457)—feel like they are being closely watched in

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[291] Other have noted this potentially sinister element; for example, see Innes (10-4), Price (18-9), Weinberger ("Introduction" xv-xvi, xxviii and "On the miracles").

Bensalem, much like their societies have been susceptible to Bensalemite surveillance.[292] The offhanded reference to the House of Salomon as the "the very eye of this kingdom," even while it could primarily refer—as Vickers' glosses in *The Major Works*—to the 'intellectual center' and could highlight that sense (sight) which Plato claimed to be the highest, stands as another suggestive and eerie hint at the ubiquitous spying of the kingdom on other lands and, perhaps, of Salomon's house on its own guests or even on fellow Bensalemite citizens.[293] Also, the abrupt coming and going of the Governor could be interpreted as a technique of interrogation that keeps the sailors aware of their continuing helplessness. Even the account of the reception of Christianity on the island adds to the reader's, if not the sailors', feelings of unease. New Atlantis received the gospel in an unusual way and the Governor's retelling of it articulates a vision of religion that is gnostic. New Atlantis has books and doctrines only available to them (including the letter from Bartholomew [465], the natural history of Solomon [471], and—we will learn latter—a "secret cabala" of Moses that the Jews of Bensalem believe "ordained the laws" of the island [476]) that they have not sought to take to the ends of the earth (cf. Mt. 20:19), but which they keep as secret knowledge for their own benefit as enlightened ones.

This suspicious reading of the governor's act of persuasion is strengthened when one considers the resumption of the act of persuasion on the following day. The Europeans rejoice, exclaiming that they "forget both dangers past and fears to come" when hearing the Governor

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[292] While not delivered with suspicion, the narrator sailor acknowledges in a speech meant to rouse his men to good manners that their hosts may have "an eye upon us" (461). Also, while the courtship customs of New Atlantis are praised by Joabin as "more civil" than those of More's *Utopia*, they ultimately amount to the state spying on its own citizens in addition to their surveillance abroad (478).

[293] See *Timaeus* (47a-c). This idea extended well into the Renaissance. Behunin argues that Jonson favorably reclaims it in his masques (48, 57). Also, see Astell (1-19); while her focus is slightly different, she touches upon how the sense of sight has been privileged by many medieval and more contemporary thinkers (1-19). On Renaissance afterlife of the *Timaeus* generally, see Allen, "Ficinian *Timaeus*"; for an account of the Renaissance reception of Plato, see Marback (46-102).

speak and that "an hour spent with him, was worth years of our former life" (465). In the trusting reading, these praises are merited, but the apprehensive reader may think that the Governor's tactics have already brainwashed his audience. The European narrator gives the reader no reason to think that these praises are insincere, yet they are in response only to an announcement of safety for the sailors and a testimony of the extraordinary fashion by which Bensalem was Christianized.[294] The Governor responds by again entertaining their questions, a subtle reminder that he already has an almost omniscient knowledge of the Europeans. One brave questioner addresses the looming, unspoken issue: how has the island attained such great knowledge of the known world while remaining itself unknown? The delivery of the question is highly deferential and the Governor wastes no time in insisting that such deference is due. He then darkly jokes that they must think Bensalem is a land of magicians who sent out spying spirits since they have such knowledge. The sailors banter back that indeed there is something supernatural at work but it is more "angelical than magical." Both sides acknowledge more openly the "touch in his former speech that [the island has] laws of secrecy toughing strangers," and the Governor insists again that what he says will be satisfying even if he must continue to keep secrets.

What follows is the lengthy historical account. The sailors learn that 3000 years ago Atlantis (America in his retelling), New Atlantis, and Europe all were very advanced in technology. However, the three fell into conflict. Atlantis ultimately was destroyed by a flood (about which the Governor displays detailed knowledge) that set Atlantis back in "letters, arts, and civility" (469); and "whether it were in respect of wars, or by a natural revolution of time,"

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[294] Such a fascination with this marvel, while understandable, does not seem "worth years of former life" to the European Christians when one considers the Pauline priority placed on faith, hope, and love over esoteric experience (cf. 1 Corinthians 13, 14).

European technology decayed. Only New Atlantis maintained their prowess, and about 1900 years ago, their great king—Solamona—founded a scientific college and made laws which inaugurated the current isolationist policy that admits no strangers, yet resolves to help the distressed (and makes provision if they want to remain forever on the island) and which sends fellows of the college out at regular intervals to gather intelligence of foreign cultures. He refuses to explain the details but notes that these convoys seek no "commodity of matter," but only "light" (472). This account leaves the men "astonished to hear so strange things so probably told," so the governor deigns to ask them questions about themselves (though he already knows it all) before exiting.

This concludes his long "welcoming" act. The content of the last day's address continues to offer mutually exclusive interpretive possibilities. It may be the case that the reader and the sailors are right to marvel at Bensalem's achievements and to rejoice at the refuge offered. Nevertheless, details of the story and its telling still present reasons to be apprehensive. The Governor's great knowledge of the "deluge" and "inundation" that brought an end to the old Atlantis has struck some as disconcerting, especially given the history of conflict between Old and New Atlantis that the Governor presents.[295] Similarly, something seems odd about the Governor's near omniscience and his intentional ambiguity (a dialysis of sorts) about whether war or time decayed European technology (469). Furthermore, the Governor never ceases to remind the Europeans that he has great, secret knowledge that he cannot share. (It seems a rather poor means to achieve his stated promise of reserving some things but satisfying all their questions.) While the trusting reading is quick to point out that all this acquisition is oriented to

[295] One such reader is Wegemer, "New Atlantis," who, furthermore, reads the Bensalemites as having replaced charity with courtesy.

"light," it seems to the more suspicious reader that all could be oriented to distorted or tyrannical power.

At this point, one should recall the larger purpose of the work that Bacon foresaw when conceiving of the whole as an act of persuasion. If the end of the whole is to promote the new science, an institution like the Royal Society, and Bacon's vision of the commonwealth, then is it possible that within the means of the fable he would create a highly suspect character who nevertheless belongs to his ideal society, promotes the equivalent of the Royal Society, and praises its advancement achieved in learning and *scientia* (knowledge)? I think not. If Bacon is to achieve his pan-rhetorical end, he must intend that the audience trust this Governor and respond to him as the European sailors do. The lingering unease of the suspicious, however, begins to reveal that Bacon has a very different view of rhetorical ethics, leading to a natural suspicion in some readers and critics.

Outside of the fiction, Bacon explicitly treats rhetorical ethics. In *The Advancement of Learning* just after his discussion of rhetoric's duty "to apply Reason to Imagination," he desires to touch on "abuses" of rhetoric as a caution (238). He proceeds to answer the historically frequent objections against rhetoric with the Aristotelian distinction between right use and abuse of words (239) and offers a degree of epistemological optimism that "speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good than in clouring that which is evil" (238).[296] Bacon goes on to develop his unique psychology and philosophical anthropology to justify the need of rhetoric and to explain the way in which persuasive words takes hold in an audience. As has been pointed out, while Bacon aligns himself with Aristotle, he actually often departs from the

[296] Vickers gives a lengthy analysis that draws from Bacon's whole canon to reveal how he "synthesized classical and postclassical doctrine" into his defense of rhetoric that asserts rhetoric to be ethical, while acknowledging that words may be misused ("Bacon and Rhetoric" 210-22, esp. 213 and 216).

peripatetic.[297] This is to be expected when one considers the consequences of Ramus's removal of *inventio* from the rhetorical canons. This removal is especially apparent in the above statement of Bacon's epistemological optimism which is actually a rather anemic expression of confidence compared to that offered by the other non-naive confident figures we have examined.[298] Nevertheless, it initially appears that Bacon—despite these differences and departures—has some form of realist rhetorical ethic, like that of More and Imogen, that distinguishes sophists from rhetoricians and upholds the need for licit means rather than justifying questionable means based on ends, circumstance or intention.[299]

However, Bacon's ethic becomes complicated precisely by the question of what constitutes licit means of persuasion. Cicero required—in an admittedly complicated way—the yoking of the useful (*utile*) and the good (*honestas*) in means. In the same tradition, Augustine goes on to disallow the use of any falsehood to achieve even a good end despite an orator's good intention and/or urgent circumstance. Bacon's essay "Of Simulation and Dissimulation" reveals the very different position of the Englishman. Perhaps in a rhetorical awareness of the Aristotelianism of his own day, the essay has moments in which the realist position, much like it

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297 In *The Major Works* (646) Vickers cites Wolff who has observed that Bacon's "distinction between logic and rhetoric is not Aristotle's."

298 Vickers quotes this line to show Bacon's Aristotelian rhetorical ethic and its distance from the naïve idealism of Quintilian and Wilson ("Bacon and Rhetoric" 217). I agree that Bacon avoids naïve idealism and proposes a form of tempered epistemological optimism, but I do not want to concede that Bacon is fully sharing Aristotle's view in the present case. Aristotle contend that "the true and just are by nature stronger than their opposites" and that it is the office of the rhetor to use rhetoric (ethically) on behalf the true and just (Rhetoric 1.1.12). Bacon only implies that the good is stronger than the evil when each is spoken of with equal skill, and he does so using language of "adorning" and "coloring" that revises the role of rhetoric as only trafficking in ornaments. This is potentially a much less robust confidence that reflects Bacon's persistent view that style and things can be severed. Vickers rejects Jardine's view that Bacon saw rhetoric as purely ornamental (Vickers, "Bacon and Rhetoric" 20-4, 221; Jardine 216) and underestimates moments in which Bacon articulates such a claim.

299 This is the position of Vickers ("Bacon and Rhetoric") who notes that the discussion in *The Advancement* "is based on a realist acceptance of human nature" (218). Vickers is not talking about ethical realism, but about sensitivity to the fact that human beings often need more than logic to be persuaded. Nevertheless, Bacon—as he presents himself in *The Advancement*—does base his ethics on human nature and this is typical of a realist ethic.

is presented in *The Advancement*, is rehearsed.[300] However, the opening lines of "Of Simulation" reveal a more complicated position. He begins: "Dissimulation is but a faint kind of policy or wisdom; for it asketh a strong wit and a strong heart to know when to tell the truth, and to do it. Therefore it is the weaker sort of politiques that are the great dissemblers" (349). The first clause calls dissembling a puny policy or wisdom. While at first glance this seems like it could be taken to be a fairly traditional restatement of the realist position, it is actually quite vague. Because of the choice of the 'to be' verb, the predicate seems unnecessarily wordy and particularly unclear. An ethical judgment is avoided in favor of one of utility: Dissimulation is imprudent or unwise. The "or" conjunction linking "policy" and "wisdom" is equally disorienting. Are the two words synonyms or are they equivalent to something like Cicero's *utile* and *honestas*? The latter would edge toward a moral judgment while the former interpretation remains purely pragmatic.

The last sentence of this passage seems to confirm the utilitarian approach. Unlike Cicero's abstract argument that the useful is only apparently so unless morally good, Bacon seems to be using a Machiavellian criterion of utility above the good while drawing his ambiguous conclusion. He concludes that weak politicians are "great dissemblers." By consequence, one can conclude his belief that strong politicians are bad dissemblers. In this conclusion, either the emphasis is placed on strength with Bacon simply stating that a mighty tyrant need not pretend because he or she, being feared more than loved, can impose his or her will regardless of persuasion or the emphasis is placed on the badness of dissembling explaining

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300 On Aristotle in England in the period, again recall Schmitt (3-76) and MacIntyre, "John Case."

The essay "Of Cunning" provides another interesting case. Bacon is mostly against cunning, but in the middle of the essay does advise the use of some "point[s] of cunning." However, most of the "points" are not ones that include lying or that would be considered illicit for use according to a realist ethic. Still the permissiveness of cunning and the use of the language of 'cunning' rather than 'prudence' seems to foreshadow the anti-realist aspects of "Of Simulations."

that a politician who takes the high road (avoiding false appearances) respectably obtains a position of strength. The latter of these is more optimistic than Machiavelli and the former perhaps does not align fully with the Florentine's insistence that one appear good and learn how not to be so (*Prince* 15), but both possible interpretations of Bacon's conclusion share with Machiavelli the belief in the priority of the useful.[301]

While the last sentence helps point to the correct interpretation of the first clause, the second clause of the quotation, "for [dissimulation] asketh a strong wit and a strong heart to know when to tell the truth, and to do it," sheds further light on the ambiguity of the final sentence. In the midst of his caution against dissembling, Bacon offers a backhanded panegyric for the dissembler as one strong in heart and wit who knows when and how to speak the truth, and when and how to lie. This pushes readers to interpret the final sentence with the emphasis on power, not in the sense of cooperative leading but of magical force.

As the essay proceeds, it grows less vague. At one point Bacon relates that "the ablest men that ever were have had all an openness and frankness of dealing" (350). The suggestion seems to be that the best need not dissemble. But, in fact, Bacon proceeds to explain how these men won reputations that then allowed them to use dissimulation, as required, without tainting the "former opinion spread abroad of their good faith" (350). This is not the *bona fide* of Cicero or More, but of Machiavelli and More's Hastings character. In a similar passage, Bacon appears initially critical of "Simulation and false profession" as "more culpable, and less politic" to which he adds, "except it be in great and rare matters" (351). Also, he praises the proverb, "Tell

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[301] Minkov (266-7) and Faulkner (59-83) both point out how, in the *Essays*, Bacon takes up Machiavelli's starting points but, in Faulkner's words, attempts an improved edifice" (59). Also, see Paterson for an account of "the Machiavellian Character of Baconian Science" that is more specific to *New Atlantis* (439-41). Farrington, however, submits that Bacon familiarized himself with Machiavelli only to understand and defend against villainy (*Philosophy* 31).

a lie and find the truth" (351). Both these formulations allow for ends to justify means in a way objected to by the realists. The proverb is particularly notable because it introduces the language of lying. Some realists, as we have seen, allow some false assertions and significations that they believe to be not exceptions to a rule but as categorically distinct from lying. In his previous language of simulation and dissimulation, Bacon could have tried to articulate a similar view; his introduction of permitted lying eliminates such a possibility. Instead, in clear opposition to the realist position, Bacon reveals his advocacy for the primacy of intention and allowance of exceptions to the rule.[302] As he explicitly states in the essays final lines: the "best composition and temperature is to have . . . dissimulation in seasonable use; and a power to feign, if there be no remedy" (351).

In Bacon's ultimate formulation we see a return to the more Quintilianic, utilitarian view. This is surprising, considering the Aristotelian distinction between sophistry and rhetoric, and the epistemological optimism that Bacon put forth. As with Quintilian, there seems no way to reconcile fully this latter belief in the greater persuasiveness of the truth with a system that allows orators to lie for "great. . . matters" (351). Bacon situational ethic implicitly lays great emphasis on the speaker's good intention, contending—as Quintilian had—that instances of lying will be "rare" and that the orator can arbitrate when lies are and are not justified. Perhaps as the highly juridical character of Roman oratory may have influenced Quintilian's utilitarianism, so Bacon's legal training and practice, and life at court may have influenced his situational rhetorical ethic, as well as his conception of science as justified especially by its usefulness to human beings.

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[302] This is not to deny, as Briggs notes, that "Bacon couches ['Tell a lie and find a troth'] in a nest of qualifications," even as he asserts that such a lie is "heuristic" (*Rhetoric of Nature* 38).

One will recall that Quintilian's situation ethic especially lost credibility, even with those attracted to the utilitarian ethical system, when he advocated drowning the reason of a judge. It was suggested that while not a Callicles or Thrasymachus, Quintilian was truly a Gorgian sophist. This seems like an adequate title for Bacon too. He allows for the use of false means to persuade the audience (a transgression of the integrity of the internal end to realists) while providing no ethical checks on the external end. He celebrates those "ablest" who can keep appearance of good faith when a "case. . . require[s]" lies.[303] Unlike Quintilian who at least can claim that his situational arbiters are *viri boni*, Bacon presents merely talented, not morally good orators. Quintilian, when not teaching how to deluge a judge (6.2.6-7), wields sympathetic examples for his position such as lying to the sick child or the assassin (12.1.38-9); Bacon, however, is silent and gives the impression that those who are in the public life will inevitably encounter any number of unspecified ("rare" or "seasonal") occasions that justify lying.[304] Without examples for how to apply his utilitarian ethic and without even an insistence that the arbiters be of good character, Bacon looks the Gorgian sophist.

With the help of Bacon's essay, "Of Simulation and Dissimulation," and its explicit, if not totally consistent, advocacy of a utilitarian rhetorical ethic, the act of persuasion of the Governor, which is representative of many of the suasions in *New* Atlantis, gains clarity. The details that provoked a potentially suspicious reading (which seemed unlikely given Bacon's larger ends for the project) now make more sense. Bacon wants a fable that praises the new science and secures science's place in the ideal state. To this end, he permits the model citizens

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303 This insistence on the strength of will to see something through is picked up on by Lampert who argues that Bacon and Nietzsche "mutually illuminate one another" (2). Also on Nietzsche and Bacon, see Weinberger ("Science and Rule" 884-5).

304 In fairness, it should be added that Bacon's essay "Of Judicature" warns judges against such tactics of advocates and forbids advocates and counsels to take them up (447). However, one could also read the scandal that ended Bacon's public career as a confirmation of his belief that such behavior could be justified.

of the imagined state, such as the Governor, the persuasive means of misleading or lying to an audience (illicit for realists) so long as the means are used to serve, above all, science, but also the state that appropriately supports and privileges scientific inquiry. If this is the case, however, one needs to reconsider the topic, means, and ends of the act of persuasion between the audience of European sailors and orator Governor. The topic remains (as we were previously presuming) an account of the past and present of New Atlantis and an explanation of how the sailors will be treated, but the means are adjusted to include not only straightforward assertions, but lying, indirection, and intimidation because the end is not to offer welcome to the sailors (as previously posited), but to inspire awe and fear at the island's governance and scientific achievement.[305] This end could be labeled a means or proximate end of Bacon's pan-rhetorical purpose that his readers accept and support the new science and an institution such as the Royal Society.

On its face, the Governor's new end of inspiring awe and fear in the sailors sounds oddly as if it is trying to provoke wonder. We have seen, however, that Bacon has worked to diminish wonder in his attempts to lift the prohibition against curiosity.[306] Elsewhere in *New Atlantis*, Bacon inserts a clever equivocation in his use of wonder. The Bensalemites that approach the miraculous pillar of light supposedly gather "to wonder" (464). But for them wonder is assertive actions, depicted in a praiseworthy fashion, that seek to overtake and possess and understand every aspect of the ineffable divine light. Wonder is stipulatively reworked to mean not wonder,

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[305] Perhaps these situational ethics means (lying, indirection, intimidation) are alluded to when the Governor jokes that the sailors must think the island is one inhabited by magicians and they retort rather that Bensalemites must be angels. Angelos, in the biblical tradition, are (trustworthy) messengers while sophists are traditionally linked to magicians that charm and dupe.

[306] My previous treatment of Bacon's view of wonder examined his rehabilitation of curiosity and his brief comments on wonder in *The Advancement*. However, as I will demonstrate, Bacon's view of wonder is at play in *New Atlantis* as well. See Achinstein, Cowan, Funari (22-37), Jalobeanu, Price (9-14, esp. 13), Quinn (*Iris Exiled* 196-7), Serjeantson, and Weinberger ("On the miracles") for diverse analyses of knowledge acquisition and/or wonder in *New Atlantis*.

but curiosity. Yet the Europeans, in the current episode, react with more traditional wonder. They are "all astonished to hear so strange things so probably told. And [the Governor], perceiving that we were willing to say somewhat but had it not ready, in great courtesy took us off" (471). In this case, which uses the Aristotelian vocabulary of wonder incited by improbability, More, Shakespeare, and Aristotle would argue that wonder is already disclosing without the wondering agent immediately attacking the object that provoked the passion. An intuitive but rational movement toward new knowledge takes place without the exercise of curiosity.[307] This type of wonder is different in kind from the Baconian redefinition (manifest in his non-literary works and in his stipulative reworking of "wonder" into curiosity in *New Atlantis*) that implicitly suggests that wonder is not rational and, therefore, is both an impediment and a waste in the quest to advance knowledge.

Since the Governor, and by extension Bacon, extols curiosity and calls it wonder, this moment of the more traditional wonder of the sailors does not show Bacon embracing a claim that the sailor's awe and fear are semi-cognitive or rational emotions. Instead, if traditional wonder for Bacon equals "broken knowledge," then the Governor's act of persuasion—in its end of fear and awe—seeks shackles that restrict the audience and that forcibly persuade without cooperation.[308] The act of persuasion seeks to confine and cloud. Our earlier suspicions have been confirmed and now it is left to understand whether the persuasion is, at best, benevolently

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[307] Harp elucidates this view when he argues that wonder, for many thinkers, is a "rational movement of the mind toward fresh knowledge" (295).

[308] Briggs also sees that Bacon envisions a program in which "the mass of men" will only know of "the new sciences' power to amaze, please, and comfort" (*Rhetoric of Nature* 41). Price makes the complementary point that the narrator's very limited acquisition of knowledge "runs counter to the empirical, experimental, inductive approach Bacon promotes" (13).

elitist or, at worst, sinister.[309] The Aristotelian, Morean, and Shakespearean view of wonder and epistemology maintained a democratic element. Bacon has narrowed reason so much that only a few can attain fresh knowledge and only by hard work and by commitment to a method, never by intuition.[310] *New Atlantis*, as it dramatizes Bacon's view, does not inspire the epistemological question that the texts of More and Shakespeare arouse: can, and if so, how can one see through false appearances? Instead of concerning himself with the positive problem of if and how a natural but limited intuitive sight can be honed to see more sharply, Bacon's approach assumes the existence of many who will ever be ignorant, who "easily err" (*New Atlantis* 487), and proposes a program of science, statecraft, and religion in which the few use their sight powerfully. Bacon is concerned that a few people create and manipulate appearances not that many grow to improve their natural ability to penetrate beneath false appearances.[311]

To understand more fully the Governor's exercise of power that seeks via an act of persuasion to ensnare the sailors in awe and fear, let us turn to the text's treatment of the last of

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309 See note 291 for treatments of *New Atlantis* that find a sinister aspect. However, other critics have submitted that Bacon is simply elitist. Price synthesizes the elitist reading well (7-9); also, see Wortham and Zagorin (174). See Achinstein for a related account of Bacon's willingness to conceal and potentially misdirect in *New Atlantis*. Briggs addresses Bacon's view of the morality of secrecy (*Rhetoric of Nature* 243-8) and thinks that *New Atlantis* provides a code that can be deciphered only by those who allow the text to initiate them; this secrecy is not "to hide their achievements from envy or theft, but to protect their piety from their own unreliable dispositions" (*Rhetoric of Nature* 174). The question of the use of power in *New Atlantis* is examined directly by Box (147-64), Lampert (27-66), and Weinberger ("Science and Rule," esp. 882-5).

310 To be fair, Bacon sees a different sort of democratization present. Even if few can reason well, these few can discover a method that allows—in a phrase commonly attributed to Bacon—"men of no genius" to pursue scientific studies.

311 Of course, Bacon's Idol of the Marketplace (cf. *Novum Organum* 55, aphorism 43) is, according to *The Advancement*, "the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort: and although we think we govern our words and prescribe it well, 'Loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes', yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. . ." (228). Bacon's elites are to avoid such false appearances, but not necessarily in all acts of speaking, rather in their knowledge acquisition and discourse with other such elites. The advice is good in as much as he goes on to calls for clearly defining terms, but such distinguishing was not new and was particularly practiced by the scholastics that precede Bacon and for whom he shows great disdain. However, Bacon also enacts an epistemological distinction between the vulgar know-nothings and elite knowers rather than providing the Aristotelian view of degrees of knowledge, even as he quotes and "prescribe[s]," but ultimately undercuts a dictum from Aristotle's *Topics*.

the three spheres of life mentioned above: religion.[312] This aspect of life on New Atlantis will bring into focus two mutually exclusive possibilities; the power possessed by the rare, sharp sighted, best citizens of Bensalem keeps strangers and lesser citizens in ignorance either to best serve the good of all (benevolent elitist possibility) or to serve well the self-interest of the sharp sighted at the expense of everyone else (sinister elitist possibility). In matters of religion, I have already labeled Bensalem's unorthodox form of Christianity as something gnostic, reflecting on the way extra-canonical scriptures, secrecy, and a lack of evangelical zeal or eschatological focus reveal Bensalemite Christianity to be organized around a cult of secret knowledge. Nevertheless, the strangers observe a society that has many Judeo-Christian trappings: Bensalem has biblical symbols on document seals (458); the first question the sailors are asked is if they are Christians (459); figures from the island casually allude to biblical figures and episodes such as creation (471, 472), Noah (469), Lot (477), Solomon (469, 471), Elijah (478), and Paul (477); figures who claim to be clergy are often seen; divine services are attended; prayers, said; Trinitarian blessings, given (473, 475).

These markers of religious citizens or of a religious society, however, continue to be complicated by other facts. Bacon transfers much of the traditional ecclesial trappings and office to the secular Father's of Salomon's house. Figures that appear to be bishops, who in liturgical processions of Bacon's England had a privileged position, are merely part of the retinue of the Father of Salomon's house in the festive procession by which he enters the city (479); the Father offers his tippet to be kissed, much like a bishop's ring (480).[313] The language of "Father"

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312 The role of religion in *New Atlantis* has an extensive critical history. Innes, Lampert (27-66), and Paterson give accounts complementary to mine that Bacon can be disingenuous or can manipulate Christianity to serve his own ends. See McKnight (1-44) and Briggs ("Bacon's science" 192-7) for a different view. The state of the question is well summarized by McKnight (1-13, esp. 10-3).

313 For an example of the place of clergy, and by extension bishops, in processions, see the *Injunctions* of 1559: "[P]erambulations of the circuits of parishes" are to be retained and the "curate in their said common

sounds priestly and the man of science raises his hand, "as blessing the people" (479, 480). These prelates of science build high towers to collect meteorological data that reach much higher than Babel with an intention that seems to be not just knowledge acquisition, but such acquisition for the sake of power for self-aggrandizement.[314] It appears that the Fathers of Salomon's House either set up science as pseudo-religion or as a preferable alternative to faith. The pageantry and trappings of the Christian religion lose their original content and are manipulated in a fashion to persuade the Europeans and/or the average citizens of Bensalem of the compatibility between the island's scientific project and the Christian faith.

Nevertheless, Joabin tells the Europeans a tale of the religious freedom on Bensalem that sounds almost to foreshadow free societies that come after Bacon which will allow free exercise of religion. Yet, upon close examination, there are many disturbing aspects in the narrator's description of Joabin. Not only is there palpable anti-Semitism in the account, but almost all of the praise of Joabin is based on his love of Bensalem or respect for Christ. The case of Joabin is yet another example that could be interpreted generously or suspiciously. In the latter interpretation, one suspects that the state requires Joabin to place its concerns or at least the concerns of science before personal concern for the exhortation of the Shema and the first commandment.

This suspicious reading is reinforced in the resonances of biblical language in *New Atlantis*. We have already seen that the Governor allowed a reorientation of biblical images in praise not of the biblical God, but instead of the holy ground of Bensalem (Ex 3:5, Ps 137:6). In

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perambulations. . . at certain convenient places shall admonish the people to give thanks to God, in the beholding of God's benefits, for the increase and abundance of His fruits upon the face of the earth. . . ." (Gee 426). Of course, one can look to non-liturgical processions, like Elizabeth's progresses, for an alternative model.

[314] Quinn uses the language of "self aggrandizement" that I have employed more than once (*Iris Exiled* 134); Bacon's description of such a tower stands in notable contrast to Augustine, who in one of his instances of condemning curiosity invokes the folly of pagan astronomers (*Confessiones* 5.1-7, esp. 3).

the account of the Feast of the Family and the encounter with the Father of Salomon's House there seem to be similar biblical revisions that reorient the biblical word. The herald's proclamation, "Happy are the people of Bensalem" (474), and Joabin's observation about the coming of the Father of Salomon's House, "Ye are happy men" (479), rewrites the first line of the Psalter (*beatus* [*est*] *vir*) and exploits the formula of the Beatitudes.[315] It seems that the sailors and Joabin are assured happiness only if they put their trust in princes (or—more properly—in the metaphorical princes of science), rather than in the Lord (cf. Ps. 146:3).

Collectively, this account of the role of religion in Bensalem uncovers a hierarchy—in Bacon's thought—in which religion is subordinated to the state and in which the state is the servant of science. The scientific authorities and, by extension, the regime of Bensalem do not seem neutral to religion but want to appropriate its trappings to secure the preeminence of science in its society. Even within *New Atlantis*, Bacon is ever offering his defense that he has a biblical mandate to be a new Solomon, but his vision is one in which faith and reason are not in rapprochement, but in which faith must be subjectivized and cut down, another potential idol unless it is appropriately subordinated.[316] Every aspect of religion in New Atlantis, it turns out, serves science.[317] The leaders of science create a limited space for religion and have extended many of the benefits of their discoveries to their fellow citizens and to the sailors. In this respect, there is an appearance of an elitist, but benevolent dictatorship of science; the customs and

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[315] The "happy" or, as the 1611 King James Bible puts it, "blessed is the man" language is not limited to Psalm 1, but pervades the Psalter. For example, see Psalms 32 and 41.

[316] cf. note 262 on Bacon and fideism. The language of rapprochement between faith and reason draws upon the well known account of *Fides et Ratio*.

[317] The political sphere, which is not presently treated at the same length as religion, is also subordinate. While Bacon notably does not address many matters of the island's regime, the Laws of Bensalem may come from secret Cabala (481), rather than being grounded in an Aristotelian rule of law that flows from an understanding of natural justice. Rules and customs ensure secrecy that the Fathers of Salomon's house believe essential for the exercise of their scientific task.

trappings of religion and the political sphere appeases the masses and gives space to the few to work on the supposedly most important task.

However, this elitism, while certainly making use of an unegalitarian epistemology, is only benevolent to the degree to which one is willing to accept the elevation of science to scientism, either as the fundamental value shared by members of Bensalemite society or as the greatest good sought by the commonwealth. If science should not be architectonic, if it lowers ultimate horizons, then perhaps one can accuse Bacon and the Fathers of Salomon's House, whom he deeply reveres, as more sinister. This more ominous possibility is reinforced by the long list of deceits that the House of Salomon can fashion that might be misused to veil reality in false appearances. One such deceit, relevant to our discussion of the Governor's attempt to entrap the sailors in wonder, is "artificial rain-bows" (485); these traditional objects of wonder (thought to unfurl in the wake of Iris, daughter of the god of wonder and sign of the covenant that the Lord made with Noah) can now be feigned by scientists. Also, as reinforced by the listing of "Deception of the senses" on the appended list of *Magnalia Naturae* (489), there is a whole house dedicated to "deceit of the senses" (486) within Salomon's House. This college is given the ultimate position by the Father in his long list of the houses and instruments of Salomon's House. The Father by his disposition of proofs suggests that the house of deceit is the preeminent example of how powerful Bensalem's science is. In his description, he boasts: "surely you will easily believe that we that have so many things truly natural which induce admiration, could in a world of particulars deceive the senses, if we would disguise those things and labour to make them seem more miraculous" (486). This is complementary to the view of entrapping wonder that we have already examined. In the present case, the language insists that

wonder is a tool of power to ensnare, and such an entanglement can be achieved by either natural or deceitful science.[318]

As with our earlier difficulty with whether or not to interpret certain data with suspicion or with trust, it seems that the benevolent-elite-versus-sinister difficulty is also not totally resolvable within the text. Nevertheless, we must note that this is not More's *History* or *Utopia*. The mutually exclusive possibilities are not part of a pedagogy, not an invitation for the reader to sharpen his or her own sight. Rather, in the end, Bacon wants to preserve the elitist view over and against the sinister. Therefore, he has the Father acknowledge how the ability to manufacture deceits for any occasion might cause concern about a potentially sinister rather than benevolent elitist program. He assures any suspicious auditor: "we do hate all impostures and lies: insomuch as we have severely forbidden it to all our fellows, under pain of ignominy and fines" (486). Within this defense are an implicit anthropological claim and a rhetorical-ethical claim. As regards the former, the Father acknowledges the potential of corruption in persons and offers a remedy. While Augustine would scoff at the naïveté of such toothless negative consequences in the face of such potentially powerful deceits and of what he saw as human beings' weakened will, darkened intellect, and disordered passions, Bacon, with his trust in science and willingness to use it for good, questionable, and neutral ends, assumes an ontological and a *nearly unqualified* moral goodness only for his Fathers/scientists, preserving their elite benevolence. This is a development from the ethic of "Of Simulation" where we noted that Bacon did not even require the moral goodness of his orators vis-à-vis Quintilian's *viri boni*. In *New Atlantis*, Bacon, if his philosophical anthropology is more persuasive than Augustine's view that posited ontological goodness and *highly-qualified* moral goodness for all, successfully

[318] The language of "induce" and "admiration" is notable since what is described sounds more like sophistic seduction rather than cooperative conducting or educating in wonder.

preserves his elitist program; it is spared from falling into something more sinister because those not in the class of the paternal scientists are like Hobbesian animals (morally and ontologically bad) that need to be constrained by the wisdom of the ontologically and morally good Fathers.

This is a rather adept move by Bacon as it places any Augustinian objector in the position of being one who is not elite and is thereby proud when he or she should be humble; he or she is a Hobbesian plebs who remains incapable of the wisdom required to understand. The quote that has this implicit philosophical anthropology, however, suggests a very concrete ethical principle that presumably the Father (and Bacon) would think comprehensible to the European sailors and other non-elites. The Father claims hatred for all lies. Bacon's Father sounds like an ethical realist, offering a universal claim by which every lie is always judged illicit. Again, Bacon seems to insist that his view may be elite, but—as revealed in such a universal norm—it is not sinister. Nevertheless, the tension between an elite and sinister view is never fully resolved. The Father walks back his assertion and quickly adjusts to articulate the more utilitarian, sophistic rhetorical ethic in his next words. Having finished account of all the houses, he turns to the "Merchants of Light" who "for our own we conceal" (486). The Father believes these lies to be justified, over and against any previously implicit universal formulation. There are no qualms about keeping others in the dark when trying to extend the enlightenment of Bensalem's own scientific project. Apparently, lies are necessary and justifiable on these reconnaissance missions because they are means to gather knowledge and advance science.[319] An unqualified universal principle would have strengthened a claim to non-sinister elitism, but the utilitarian reworking

[319] In fact, the language of espionage is insufficient because spying adds ethical complexity absent from the current deceits done "for our own."

leaves the elite-or-sinister problem unresolved when the text breaks off, even while it is clear that Bacon is advocating for the reader to believe that he promotes a benevolent elitist view.[320]

Conclusion

The revered Father of Salomon's house has confirmed my reading of Bacon's abstract account of rhetoric as utilitarian (and perhaps sophistic), and the sinister possibility reinforces my mistrusting analysis of the Governor's act of persuasion that could be read in two mutually exclusive ways. *New Atlantis* ultimately promotes a utilitarian rhetorical ethic, a narrowed rationalist/empiricist epistemology in which there are only a few specialists who may both construct and see through false appearances, and the new science as the greatest personal, cultural, and civic good. In this program, Bacon rejects Cicero and Augustine in favor of Quintilian and the Gorgian sophists. While More and Shakespeare (or at least Imogen) found ways to synthesize aspects of Roman rhetoric and Christianity in their rhetorical ethics, Bacon discards the approach and certain fundamental aspects of both (though he does, as we have seen, at times allude to each as expedient means by which to increase his *ethos*).

Having formulated his utilitarian rhetorical ethics against the Christian and Roman traditions, Bacon would address the titular question—"Is the *Ars Rhetorica* for the Good?"—very differently than More and Shakespeare. No doubt if Bacon was pressed, the answer offered would be in the affirmative, but Bacon's utilitarian ethics entail very different uses of the terms

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320 Many critics note the absence of the promised frame of laws within the text and argue from this absence that the work is truly unfinished. While there may be no way to settle the question definitively, I am of the opinion that the text is actually complete. The disposition of the episodes in *New Atlantis* suggests a thoughtful unity in which Bacon deliberately wanted to conclude with an account of Salomon's House and its many impressive functions. The breaking off also fits with the continued way in which the Bensalemites and, in this case, the European sailor who now appears to be their neophyte undertake a program of confusion and disorientation. See Spitz and Faulkner (233-6) for arguments that the work is complete or intentionally unfinished. Also, Price gives a helpful account of both sides of the issue (1-3, 24).

"Ars," "Rhetorica," and "Good" than the meanings assumed by More and Shakespeare, and put forward in chapter one. The *Ars Rhetorica* is a very different sort of *techne* for Bacon. It is now just a craft of style that need not concern itself with logical, albeit enthymematic, invention. And rhetoric, while it remains a dynamic power in Bacon's view, is—despite his very invocation of the Aristotelian defense of rhetoric (*Advancement* 238-9)—no longer the use of the apt and ethical available means of persuasion, according to the traditional frame of Western, realist (Augustinian, Ciceronian, Aristo-Thomistic, Morean, Imogenian) ethics. His good does not blend the individual and civic good as Aristotle and Cicero attempted to do, nor is it particularly informed by a Christian metaphysic or Christian philosophical anthropology.[321] In his best commonwealth we have seen that the achievement of scientific knowledge is the highest good that orders all other aspects of the personal and common weal.

As Ramus disfigured the canons, so the example of Bacon has disfigured our question. Where, then, does Bacon's very different sort of affirmation in reply to the titular question place him on the spectrum between the available naïve idealized and anxious cynical extremes? Surely he is on the suspicious side of the confident-suspicious divide because his answer to the question, as it has stood since the beginning of this dissertation, would actually be that the *Ars Rhetorica* is not for the Good in the original sense. However, his suspicion differs from the person so fearful of a Machiavel that he or she assumes that beautiful speech must be concealing evil ends or illicit means. In a strange similarity to More, Bacon's very treatment of rhetoric as not the highest or most important art/discipline (also seen in his taxonomy of knowledge in *The Advancement*)

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[321] One could object that Aristotle's justification of slavery actually makes him into a Baconian elitist rather than an egalitarian. Nevertheless, I would want to emphasize that Aristotle's epistemology and the Christian, Augustinian philosophical anthropology still stand in marked contrast with Bacon.

leads him to a less anxious suspicion.[322] Furthermore, his situational ethics open up to him Machiavellian means. If these are licit tactics for him, then he is again not anxious while suspicious, but instead he seeks to ensure that his words are the most potent, so that in a milieu that might be filled with Machiavels he can win any wars of words by sophistical rhetorical force.

In some ways, Bacon's answer is less surprising than Quintilian's. The latter gave a robust account of epistemological optimism while the former offers a tepid one when addressing rhetoric directly and is only confidently assertive when maintaining materialist, scientific epistemological optimism. However, Bacon's eerie account of Bensalem and of the Fathers of Salomon's self-justified concealment, while sharing Quintilian's move to subjectivize the norms by which to judge an act of persuasion, is even less grounded in the good. Quintilian's *vir bonus dicendi peritus* (with the exception of the account of drowning the judge's reason) maintained a hope that moral norms would rarely be broken and would always be in service of the greater good, understood as the *communis utilitas*. Bacon's utopian "best state" seems constructed upon an even more utilitarian view, upholding the greatest good for the elite, perhaps at the expense of or only superficially mollifying the least. Bacon hopes the good of the few will benefit the rest who are intentionally kept in ignorance, but as expressed in the fiction, he does not seem to have concern if some lesser citizens are destroyed in the quest to advance science.

It is difficult to remain focused purely on matters of rhetorical ethics and the epistemology that undergirds them because Bacon primarily wants to cultivate a class of *viri*

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[322] See my chapter on More, as well as Wegemer ("Civic Humanism"), on More's ranking of rhetoric among the arts; also, see Vickers' treatment of Bacon's ultimate judgment of rhetoric's importance ("Bacon and Rhetoric" 225-7).

boni natura aut scientia periti, skilled, above all, in natural philosophy, not speaking.[323] This leads him to his adjustment of ethics that allows these men, whom he presumes astute and trustworthy, to do as they please. They, not the ideal orator, have the power to order society; they may dissemble, and therefore, they are less concerned with seeing through false appearances than with potentially constructing them. Bacon comes by his rhetorical ethics tangentially, almost by accident; it is not his primary interest or concern, but it reveals a serious shift in understanding of rhetorical ethics characteristic of the end of the Renaissance and beginning of Modernity.[324]

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In situating Thomas More, William Shakespeare, and Francis Bacon on a continuum of available opinions, the dissertation has achieved an enriched understanding of the English Renaissance debate about rhetorical ethics. The opinions of all three poet-thinkers improve our understanding of the influence of both the classical Roman and Christian rhetorical traditions in the period, and the three authors' literary modes and collective avoidance of the extremes of naïveté and cynicism help to reveal an element of subtlety in the period's debate about the nature and ethics of rhetoric that has not yet been fully appreciated in secondary literature.

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323 I use these Latin words thinking of Bacon's own phrases: "*Magnalia Naturae*" (*New Atlantis* 488) and *De Augmentis Scientiarum.*

324 It is, of course, debated when the Renaissance ended. However, Bacon is often a touchstone in the discussion about the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of modernity. See, for example, Blumenberg. In the present analysis, Bacon's text clearly has more modern qualities than the other early modern works that have been examined in this project. Furthermore, Schall's observation about modernity seems particularly apt to Bensalem: "The completion of the modern project is proposed as an inner-worldly "city" in which everyone has everything he can want as if his purpose is an on-going existence in the world." (The quote comes from Wood's review of Schall's *Modern Age* [par. 8].)

Furthermore, reading the three figures chronologically provides a helpful narrative that illustrates the development of very different humanisms, from More's pre-Reformation return to Christian and Classical sources as a means to renew the commonwealth to Bacon's pre-Cartesian turn towards science and utility that anticipates and helps initiate Modernity.

The dissertation, in addition to discovering More's, Shakespeare's, and Bacon's different opinions on rhetoric and ethics has also shown the close relationship of epistemology and philosophical anthropology to early modern understandings of the art of persuasion. The roles of these branches of thought in Renaissance literature stand in need of further study. Especially if the project is correct in its suggestion that More and Shakespeare look to a (neo)Aristotelian rather than Modern conceptions of knowing, then there are many unexplored and potentially fruitful questions to ask.

Last of all, the study began by suggesting that at the heart of the present inquiry one finds fundamental issues about the ethics of speaking that extend back, at least, to Gorgias. Perhaps in the reading of these pages, the reader has felt that these enduring questions are still relevant. I believe that they remain with us. For example, politicians routinely accuse their opponents of unethical or dissembling speech, and the tactics of exposé reporting have been questioned recently precisely because a journalist made use of false assertions.[325] If these examples seem rather tame, one need reach back only a little further into the past to see the full significance of rhetorical-ethical questions. In the wake of Nazi atrocities, a question that arose and that has become a common case study in moral casuistry is: How is one able to speak with integrity to a Nazi-like interrogator when hiding a person who is wanted (unjustly) by the state? The need for answers to such rhetorical-ethical questions remains urgent. While this dissertation has taken

[325] See J. Smith, who makes reference to the episode, as well as Reno, and Tollefsen and Pruss who respond to Smith.

care to view More, Shakespeare, and Bacon in their historical context, perhaps they have something to teach the twenty-first century as well, as we continue to ask: “Is the *Ars Rhetorica* for the Good?”

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