

Global Uniformities versus Local Complexities:  
A Comparative Ethnography of two Policing Programs  
in Rio de Janeiro and Recife, Brazil

by

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## ABSTRACT

The relationship between the police and the public is commonly seen as a major indicator for a healthy democracy. This dissertation examines the relationship of police officers with each other, underprivileged populations, and criminal groups in two of the most violent cities in the world, Rio de Janeiro and Recife, Brazil. Taking the cases of the *Police Pacification Unit* of Rio de Janeiro and the *Pact for Life* in Recife, I use the concept of “democratic policing” to discuss the implementation of westernized policing templates. My primary questions, then, are the following: What discourses and practices accompany Western ideas of democratic policing and human rights as they are implemented in other sites? How are models of policing interpreted on the ground, both by the police and by citizens?

Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted intermittently from 2009 to 2015, I argue that there is a disconnect between Western models of law enforcement and the contexts in which they are replicated in the Global South, leading to unintended transformations. Rio’s police deal with armed and highly organized drug traffickers, while police in Recife focus on homicidal violence that is largely out of the public eye. In addition, police officers in Rio are deadly enemies in favelas, while in Recife police are often residents of favelas. In both cities, segregation along class and race within the police institution leads to officers feeling disenfranchised and dissatisfied about state institutions and policies. This disconnect from state-imposed values and policies impacts day-to-day policing and promotes acts that are deemed illegal but not illegitimate. Favela residents, on the other hand, experienced “democratic policing” primarily as gentrification, especially in Rio.

Ultimately, this study shows that community policing efforts face unique difficulties in societies that are marked by extreme degrees of inequality, political corruption, and violence. Conceptions of “democratic policing” as conceived in the West do not translate neatly to the Brazilian context. People’s understandings of democracy, human rights, and legitimate policing vary substantially according to class, residence and specific cultural norms, even across one nation.

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
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# MAP OF BRAZIL



Source: [www.mapsland.com](http://www.mapsland.com)

## MAP OF RIO DE JANEIRO



Source: (Map of Rio de Janeiro Neighborhoods n.d.)

## MAP OF RECIFE



Source: [www.mapsofworld.com](http://www.mapsofworld.com)

## SELECT PORTUGUESE TERMS

<i>asfalto</i>	asphalt, meaning the formal city (because the streets are paved)
<i>bala perdida</i>	stray bullet
<i>bandido</i>	bandit, commonly meaning a drug trafficker
<i>battalion</i>	military police precinct
<i>carioca</i>	inhabitant of Rio de Janeiro
<i>caveirão</i>	big scull, meaning a tank-like police car used for operations in favelas
<i>cidadão do bem</i>	good citizen
<i>delegacia</i>	civil police precinct
<i>delegado</i>	civil police investigator/ detective
<i>dono do morro</i>	don of the hill
<i>favela</i>	shanty-town
<i>marginal</i>	marginal, meaning a criminal
<i>matuto</i>	hick
<i>morro</i>	hill, meaning favela
<i>nordestino</i>	inhabitant of the northeast
<i>pernambucano</i>	inhabitant of Pernambuco
<i>praça</i>	beat cop (militar police)
<i>proibidão</i>	music genre called “prohibited” because of association to gangs
<i>soldado</i>	soldier (military police beat cop)
<i>tirroteio</i>	shoot-out
<i>traficante</i>	drug trafficker

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

<i>ADA (Amigos dos Amigos)</i>	Friends of Friends (Drug faction)
<i>AMs (Associações de Moradores)</i>	Resident's Associations
<i>BOPE (Batalhão de operações especiais)</i>	Special Operations Battalions
<i>BPM (Batalhão de Polícia Militar)</i>	Military Police Battalion
<i>CEDAE (Companhia Estadual de Águas e Esgotos)</i>	Governmental water and sewage
<i>CIA</i>	Central Intelligence Agency
<i>CRISP (Centro de Estudos de Criminalidade e Segurança Pública)</i>	Center for Crime and Public Safety Studies
<i>CV (Comando Vermelho)</i>	Red Command (Drug faction)
<i>DHPP (Departamento de Homicídios e Proteção da Pessoa)</i>	Homicide precinct
<i>FT (Força Tarefa)</i>	Homicide Task Force
<i>GIS</i>	Geospatial Information System
<i>GPAA (Grupamento de policiamento em áreas especiais)</i>	Policing unit in special areas
<i>ICP (Instituto Central do Povo)</i>	Central Institute of the People
<i>ISP (Instituto de Segurança Pública)</i>	Institute for Public Security
<i>ONG (Organização não governamental)</i>	Non-governmental organization
<i>Pacto (Pacto pela Vida)</i>	Pact for Life
<i>PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital)</i>	First Command of the Capitol
<i>PC (Polícia Civil)</i>	Civil Police
<i>PM (Polícia Militar)</i>	Military Police
<i>PRONASCI (Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania)</i>	National program for public security and citizenship
<i>PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores)</i>	Worker's Party

<i>ROTA (1°BPChq Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar)</i>	Special police unit in São Paulo
<i>SDS (Secretaria Defesa Social)</i>	Secretary of Social Defense
<i>TC (Terceiro Comando)</i>	Third Command (Drug faction)
<i>UPP (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora)</i>	Pacifying Police Unit

## CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: THE PARADOX OF MILITARY HUMANITARIANISM AND  
“DEMOCRATIC” POLICING EFFORTS

*Part I Figure 1: Military police frisking favela residents. Photo by author*

"I found Diego there, covered in blood." Ivete motions to a corner of her small beauty parlor, a building she and her husband built themselves with bricks and wood, off the steep steps crawling up the *morro* hill. There was so much of it. I thought he had finally died. But it was just a through-and-through. I was quick to hose the blood off before the police came. I hid Diego on the roof, just in time before the police kicked the door in. My nephew is like a cat, has nine lives. He jumped off that roof and ran away!" He escaped and dodged their bullets. "Deus que protégé!" Ivete laughs and shakes her head in disbelief.

The police told her that her nephew, Diego, had shot at an officer and lost his gun in the chase, weapon that the local drug lord had borrowed him. Now Diego was in trouble with the gang for losing the gun and with the police for shooting at one of them despite a peace agreement between traffickers and local military police.

"One of the officers told me, if we don't make Diego leave Rio for good, he will have to kill him. And I understand, my nephew is a *bandido* after all, it's no secret. He's running with the traffickers since he was little."

Shortly after, Ivete packed Diego's stuff into a cooler and pretended to sell beer at a party downtown. She secretly got him a bus ticket to Ceará where Diego is staying now on a farm with her parents. Nothing out there but plantations. Nowhere to get into trouble. "He was crying and crying. Didn't want to leave his aunty. But he understood that staying in Rio would mean certain death, either by the police or his trafficker friends." Once Diego was gone, Ivete faced the drug lord, confessing that she helped Diego leave town. She was dreading punishment and that the debt of the gun would be burdened on her. The drug lord, however, "absolved" Ivete for doing what any aunt would have done but made sure to warn her that if Diego were to ever reappear, him and his whole family would suffer grave consequences.

Ivete, the woman telling this story, is one of tens of thousands of women living in Rio de Janeiro's favelas navigating the complex power dynamics imposed by state agents and criminal organizations. The logic of urban warfare in Rio can be simplified as follows: Political representatives, who should protect citizens are instead causing their suffering. People in poor communities are unable to defend themselves against armed police; thus, leaders of drug gangs take on the role of protecting. This protection enables the gang as the legitimate authority in the favela community, but it also is the reason for armed conflicts with police.

Drug trafficking and aggressive policing methods are claimed to be the biggest obstacle in lowering homicide and youth death rates in Latin America (Pereira 2000; Arias 2006; Waiselfisz 2016). Police violence, in particular, has also been declared an indicator for a weak or

failing democracy. In Rio de Janeiro, favelas have been controlled by armed drug traffickers who regularly engage in violent battles with the military police. These traffickers, like Diego, are overwhelmingly impoverished, poorly educated young men of color, representing the most discriminated and disempowered populations in Brazil. Nevertheless, this group has been able to establish "parallel" states with alternative forms of infrastructure, law, and economy in the midst of one of the most important cities in Latin America. They successfully fend off law enforcement, evade taxes and bills, and bring thieves and troublemakers to justice internally. The international media, film and gaming industry have focused on Rio's "state of exception" by reporting on dramatic shootouts, street blockades and paramilitary police storming favelas equipped with grenades and urban war tanks. In other metropolis of Brazil; however, violence levels are even higher but less spectacular and go mostly unnoticed by the international media. In the case of Recife, the capital of the Northeastern state Pernambuco, for example, murders are skyrocketing while sophisticated criminal organizations and pronounced police violence are largely absent.

Sitting at the edge of the Capibaribe River, running through one of the poorest slums in Recife, fisherwomen regularly encounter floating corpses of predominantly black men. Stabbed, shot, and beaten to death the bodies of poor citizens drift into the sea. They are killed in bar fights, out of revenge and over small debt related to crack cocaine. "They are *cachaçeiros* and *drogados*." - Drunks and drug addicts - fisher Dona Marina do Sururu would mumble at the *pobre coitado* - poor sucker - floating by. Murder in Recife is part of everyday life. It is primarily seen as personal, not military, and motivated by a culture of honor and revenge. That should not obscure the fact that poverty and severe social inequality is the primary driver for violence, but in the Northeast, it presents itself often as a question of honor between men.

While public security is a highly political topic in Brazil, in Recife, drug traffickers in favelas have little or no influence and power on the municipal level. They are regularly arrested and investigated by the police and rarely engage in armed confrontations with police officers. On the contrary, in Recife favelas are spaces regularly patrolled and even inhabited by police who usually enjoy a certain level of respect and authority in the community. In Rio, the borders of favelas are marked by weapons and police officers enter only armed to their teeth. Having personal relations with a police officer in Rio, is regarded as treason and often punished with death by drug traffickers.

This dissertation examines two public security programs, the Pacification Police Unit in Rio de Janeiro and the Pact for Life in Recife, that have been implemented in a global context of military humanitarianism – by which I mean a paradoxical phenomenon of increased police militarization, while also pushing police officers to be social agents guarding human rights and democratic principles. Both cities, Rio de Janeiro and Recife, were facing international and domestic pressure to make their cities safer and their police forces accountable for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games. While Brazilian politicians traditionally turned to crack-downs on crime via paramilitary measures, the two case studies presented here analyze an innovative turn to models of proximity and community policing, imported from the U.S., UK, and Japan among others.

Pacification in Rio is the conquest and saturation of favelas with military police, dispersal of drug traffickers, and community policing<sup>1</sup>. The Pact for Life in Recife specific goal was the reduction of homicides through a new form of management, accountability, infrastructure, crime

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<sup>1</sup> The word "pacification" in Brazil had its roots in the 16th and 17th century when it used to describe the extermination of hostile elements - indigenous tribes.

prevention and investigation measures resembling the COMPSTAT<sup>2</sup> system in New York City. Both programs resulted in a striking decrease in violent crime, hence allegedly a democratic push, but I argue that its success and productivity are treacherous. I argue that there is a disconnect between Western models of “democratic” law enforcement and the contexts in which they are replicated and transformed in the Global South. My primary questions, then, are the following: How are models of democratic policing constructed and understood on the ground, both by the police and by favela residents? What discourses and practices accompany Western ideas of democracy as they are "vernacularized" in other sites (Merry 2006)?

I find these questions fundamentally crucial for the consolidation and health of democracy in Latin America and abroad. Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) suggested that authoritarian practices persist in much of Latin America because state institutions have been unable to extend the rule of law to large segments of populations and have instead delegated authoritative power to private entities that are not accountable to democratic oversight. My research, however, uncovers how the extension of the rule of law and security into certain favelas, ultimately, debilitated the quality of life, freedom, and citizenship of the most vulnerable populations even more.

In Rio de Janeiro, the uneven extension of specific services and forms of accountability into favelas, such as law enforcement, formal addresses, bills, and documentation has resulted in real estate speculation, gentrification, and massive displacement of the most impoverished citizens. In Recife, the new public security policies adopted were never fully understood or

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<sup>2</sup> **COMPSTAT** (short for “Compare Statistics” which was the computer file name of the original program) is a combination of management, philosophy, and organizational management tools for police departments. It emphasizes information-sharing, accountability, and improving policing effectiveness. COMPSTAT has four main components: 1) Timely and accurate intelligence; 2) Rapid deployment of resources; 3) Effective tactics; and 4) Relentless follow-up.

supported by police officers, policy makers, nor residents. They saw their ability to navigate precariousness and structural inequality negatively impacted by what they identified as a foreign-led push for human rights set in a contradicting context of discrimination, social violence, and corruption.

Based on periodic ethnographic immersion from 2009 until 2015, with favela communities and police units, I explore the relationship between the police and the public in Rio de Janeiro and Recife to shed light on current policing dynamics globally. The idea of "democratic policing" is a central concept driving this study. While it has become the "white whale" of every police department, it is a highly slippery concept that lacks a concrete definition. As "first world" countries are attempting to restructure their police departments in accordance to human rights, accountability and transparency recent years have also shown a global push toward militarization of police forces. The clashes that this paradox produces become apparent in the public outcries of massive proportions in the U.S. about police violence such as in Ferguson 2014; the massacres committed by police in the Philippines; and the complex role of police in the European refugee crisis.

An anthropological lens allows us to critically interrogate the assumption that states classified as democratic share a "natural" likeness and affinity. Democracies cannot be compared as if they were equal units or represented the same values. Moreover, ethnographic research can uncover that to people on the ground, a democratic state and a totalitarian state might look alike at the level of everyday practices and bureaucracies. I show, for example, how some residents of urban shantytowns in Brazil appreciate elements of authoritarian policing, while members of newly reformed police forces understand the notion of "human rights" altogether differently from

Western normative ideals. I want to use such cases to re-visit and amplify theoretical frameworks addressing the intersection of security, globalization, democratic theory and human rights.

Rio de Janeiro was the focus of numerous scholars for its exceptionality and provides fantastic grounds for researching policing, criminal organizations, and development. Very few of these studies, however, have looked at these topics comparatively (i.e., variation within Rio de Janeiro or in other cities). As a result, these studies have presented many plausible but ungeneralizable and potentially incomplete explanations for why less violent relationships between citizens and the police should develop in some places and not in others. This study hopes to mitigate this methodological shortcoming by employing a comparative analysis of criminal violence, civil society, and state behavior in Rio de Janeiro and Recife.

The Rio-Recife comparison is also particularly useful because it enables us to also evaluate the role of the state in two critical ways: 1) How state behavior shapes criminal violence and vice versa, and; 2) How the state can adequately address problems of social violence, organized crime, and democratic failure where there are different logics driving criminal violence. Neither, however, can conceive of "democratic" policing as something of uniform applicability and as the following case studies will show, even similar approaches result in vastly different results depending on social context.

## CONTRIBUTIONS TO RESEARCH

This dissertation contributes to three bodies of scholarship: anthropology of democratic theory, security in particular policing, and globalization.

*Democratic Theory*

Teresa Caldeira and James Holston write: "At the end of the millennium, democracy has indisputably become a global value adopted by the most diverse societies." (Caldeira and Holston 1999). The third wave of democratization affected overwhelmingly non-Western countries, including Brazil; however, the political re-structuring, theories, goals, and means of evaluation applied are based on Western examples, values, and concepts. Free elections form the baseline for most political scientists' definitions of democracy. Almost all theories emphasize the even distribution of power between different actors in the system, dating back to at least Montesquieu (Montesquieu 1932). A "minimalist" definition of a democracy is focused on institutional arrangements that allow for competitive elections for a leader who will carry out the people's will (Schumpeter 2003). To prevent potential abuse that could arise from majority rule, democracy is also defined by equal suffrage for all adults, horizontal accountability amongst office holders, the rule of law based on human rights, political pluralism, and freedom of speech and press.

While some, like Schumpeter, see democracy as a political method, others argued that it is ultimately concerned with values (Pateman 1970). As such, it provides a set of criteria by which to judge a system. Pateman writes: "Rather than focus on describing particular institutions, a more helpful approach to examining the meaning of democracy is to analyze the range of values underpinning those institutions and processes" (Pateman 1970:6). Anthropology offers the ideal methodology to examine this range of values associated with "democracy," the way, in which they vary, and how they are vernacularized in different cultures.

Until recently, Anthropology has largely overlooked the topic of democracy, despite a rich tradition of research on politics, power, and authority in general. Several anthropologists have noted that there is no mention of democracy or elections in Vincent's (Vincent 1994) critical overview of political anthropology (Bowie 2008; Simon 2010; Spencer 2007). Katherine Bowie attributes the scarcity of research on democracy and electoral politics to the discipline's focus on stateless societies during its foundational period, as well as the prevalence of indirect colonial rule at that time. Spencer suggests that in later years, the prominence of resistance studies directed anthropologists' attention away from the realm of formal politics linked to the state. Recently, however, anthropologists have become increasingly interested in examining democratic processes and institutions.

Anthropology can bring to the fore the role of cultural difference in forming and informing states and the slippery concept of democracy. Although culture has not been wholly ignored in historical and comparative analyses of states, it also has not been given a central place in the process of state formation. Instead of seeing the state as creating culture, anthropology can see states and governance as products of culture. Cultural difference is an important variable that affects state formation, governance, and the conception of democratic and authoritarian practice. The classification of regimes into these two categories, not only pretend that terms like authoritarian and democratic are self-evident but is also premised on a set of core Western assumptions about the nature and function of the state.

Usually, comparative analysis of states and regions within countries assumes that the units compared are fundamentally similar. This dissertation contradicts this assumption by showing how two federal states that are institutionally similar can still be very different in the enactment of their policies. Anthropology's focus on particular branches and levels of the state

institutions, such as the police, enables a disaggregated view of the state that shows the "multilayered, pluri-centered, and fluid nature of this ensemble that congeals different contradictions" (Hall 1986). The case studies presented in this dissertation will show that the processes and outcomes of police performance vary by location within states and even inside cities. We also need to acknowledge that in the case of decentralized federal nation-states, such as Brazil or the US, individual states have high legislative autonomy, distinct governmental institutions, and are culturally diverse. Instead of analyzing Brazil (or any country for that matter) as a homogenously democratic unit of institutions, we need to carefully disaggregate it by its problems, people, and politics.

Ethnographic research further reveals the weaknesses of three popular assumptions about democratization. First, that people living in countries which were part of the "third wave" of democratization during the late 1980s and 1990s, such as Brazil, have not necessarily perceived the transition to formal electoral democracy as beneficial. West (2008) argues that in Mozambique, which first held multi-party elections in 1994, people feel that democracy has resulted in ongoing social conflict and has allowed politicians to enrich themselves and shirk their responsibilities to their constituents. In Malawi, which first held elections that same year, Kendall (2003) found that democracy is frequently associated with deteriorating economy and security. Homicide rates in Brazil skyrocketed after democratization in 1985, when criminal organizations solidified in public space. Such "uncivil democracies" escape the seemingly uniform notion of democracy as a good thing (Caldeira and Holston 1999). The ethnographic lens invites us to examine critically the assumption that nations classified as "democratic" share some natural similarity, or that "cultural difference is epiphenomenal to the functional and structural characteristics of states" (Sharma and Gupta 2009:10).

Scholarly literature tends to focus on police and working practices from the Global North in ways that separate these organizations from the social, cultural, and political context that structure policing. To understand the ambiguous social actors and false binary of the state versus citizen, my dissertation re-examines the social formation of policing practice, by examining the local historical and social context; the attitudes of favela residents toward the new policing methods; and how police view themselves embedded in the new policing program. Recent scholarly publications on public security imply that policing has globalized beyond the borders of nation-states, introducing a universal pattern for law enforcement. My findings contradict this position by differentiating the local causes of violence to understand better the context under which forms of security governance are implemented. I critically interrogate the notion of "democratic policing" and disaggregate its application in different regions of Brazil.

I argue that there is a disconnect between Western, supposedly universal models of "democratic policing" and the contexts in which they are implemented and transformed in the Global South, particularly in Brazil. Moreover, as Ilana Feldman points out in *Police Encounters* (Feldman 2015), prescriptive literature about democratic policing often suggests that there is a sharp line between democratic and totalitarian policing, and this categorization can thwart the comprehending of the effects of policing in practice. To people on the ground, however, the difference between totalitarian and democratic policing is as ambiguous as the concept of democracy itself. There are many forms of political interaction and strategies for leadership, and there are many ways in which such strategies can either succeed or be undermined. Democracies, like many forms of highly complex political organizations, are either resilient or fragile and go through phases.

### *Social Control*

It is hard to say with certainty when the modern police institution was born, but scholars conventionally point to the London Police of the 19th century (Garriott 2013), from where the model migrated to North America and other countries<sup>3</sup>. Much like today, its focus was on crime prevention and control: "they used preventive patrol as their key technique, and they employed a quasi-military organizational structure" (Walker 2012). Colonial efforts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were also crucial to the development of the U.S. police model. Alfred McCoy shows its impact in his book *Policing America's Empire* (2009), where he refers to the Philippines as a U.S. laboratory where experiments in policing and surveillance were carried out. Later, these results were incorporated into U.S. domestic police practice.

Herman Goldstein argues that the police institution is inherently anti-democratic: "The police, by the very nature of their function, are an anomaly in a free society (...) The particular form of their authority - to arrest, to search, to detain, and to use force - is awesome in the degree to which it can be disruptive of freedom, invasive of privacy, and sudden and direct in its impact upon the individual. And this awesome authority, of necessity, is delegated to individuals at the lowest level of bureaucracy, to be exercised, in most instances, without prior review and control" (Goldstein 1977:1).

In anthropology specifically, many theories depict the state as synonymous with coercive force, hence anti-democratic. But, as Pierre Bourdieu argues in *Rethinking the State: Genesis and*

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<sup>3</sup> Although one might argue that human societies of all kinds have always engaged in forms of leveling and creations of "equality", which tended to promote notions of egalitarianism and the prevention of what we might consider "free-riders" or those that would disrupt a more-or-less egalitarian ethos (such as those that might be labeled as criminals). I think, for example, about the ethnographic and ethnohistoric work of researchers like Polly Wiessner with the Enga in Papua New Guinea, where community members of non-state societies work very hard to develop ideologies and institutions aimed at minimizing the impact of so-called "aggrandizers". If we consider the enforcement of such cultural rules, behavioral norms, and notions of justice and equity as forms of "policing", we have always had "policing" within our societies.

*Structure of the Bureaucratic Field* (1977), there is an essential distinction between a state's need to protect its sovereignty externally through military power, and to provide law and order within its borders through policing. Historically, Brazil did not face serious external threats to its sovereignty, but the military police have repeatedly been employed to confront the masses of criminalized at the margins of society - *bandidos, traficantes, marginais*.

Ultimately, police need a threat to legitimize their existence. The role of the police in the state is a symbolic and threat-generating instrument. As a repressive apparatus, police help to conceal the state's illusory qualities and its performance of chaos to justify bringing order (Abrams 1988; Haanstad 2008; Robb Larkins 2015). I argue that this is especially true for Brazil, where the state historically represented by monarchies and oligarchic elites, seeks to justify and legitimize its corrupt methods by pointing to the "chaos," "delinquency," and "decaying moral" of the Brazilian poor (Denyer Willis 2015).

The literature provides essentially one way of looking at police abuse in Brazil: Brazilian police organizations actively resist democratizing pressures for greater accountability and transparency by continuing historical practices of extreme, and often extra-judicial repression, and corruption. The explanation seems simple: having never been held accountable during the dictatorship Brazil's police forces did not learn how to treat criminals, witnesses, and marginalized groups by human rights. However, I claim this explanation fails to examine one crucial variable, namely the lives and challenges of police officers on the ground and how they as well as marginalized groups understand human rights in the first place.

In her accounts of village scout initiation practices in Thailand, Katherine Bowie (1997) shows how initiates were stripped of their status and identity to become obedient to authority. Passivity and obedience were stressed as traits deemed necessary for a stable, secure nation. The

same applies to the military police in Rio, where police are employed on risky and brutal crackdowns for the sake of national security. Framed by the global "war on drugs," Rio's police embark "epic battles" with "evil" drug traffickers who are threatening civilization. In Recife, however, military police are less indoctrinated; although forbidden to unionize or protest, the military police in Pernambuco has impactful political representatives from their ranks and even stage strikes to underline their problems and demands.

Democratic policing seek to create a safe environment which best promotes democratic participation; gives priority to protecting the safety and rights of individuals and communities; obeys and protects human rights; provides society with professional and ethical services (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2007). Democratic police also identify as representative members of the community they serve while staying transparent in their activities. On the other end of this scale of "democratic" policing is, logically, the so-called "regime police" that protect the government rather than citizens and answer predominantly to the regime in power and not the people. Such police are associated with the control of populations and their sentiments against the government rather than protecting communities.

The Pacification Police Unit in Rio and the Pact for Life in Recife do not fit either extreme but are somewhere in the middle. Pacification was motivated by the interests of the elites and is not focused on reducing homicide rates but keeping drug traffickers quiet. In Recife, the Pact for Life emerged through pressure and activism of a few engaged citizens and politicians who cared about the high homicide rate.

### *Democratic criteria applied to Police*

One of the main premises of political democracy is that the rule of law is especially important to the democratic process (Dahl 1971). This assumption is based on the consensus that abusive police are the hallmark of a non-democratic regime. There appears to be general agreement about the desirability of "democratic policing," but equally disagreement about what exactly that would constitute. Hinton and Newburn write, for example: "Although democratic ideas and concepts have often been applied to discussions about policing, it is rare to find the principles underlying the meaning of democracy explicitly detailed and prioritized." (Hinton and Newburn 2009). Other scholars laid out specific conditions for "democratic policing" which can be followed to achieve a police force that acts by human rights and the constitution. Amir and Einstein (Amir and Einstein 2001), for example, spell out three fundamental conditions:

- 1) police are subject to the rule of law embodying values respectful of human dignity not to a party leader
- 2) police can intervene in the life of citizens only under limited and carefully controlled circumstances
- 3) police are publicly accountable

Community policing plays at this moment a unique role, as it appears to be the inherently most democratic policing method which is based and dependent on the participation of local actors. In some ways, the increasing popularity of community policing "represents a break with the professional-bureaucratic, technical, law enforcement model of policing which sought to keep police from the community in the presumed interest of neutrality and efficiency" (Marx 2001). Dahl states seven attributes essential to democratic states: 1) elected officials 2) fair and free elections 3) inclusive suffrage 4) right to run for office 5) freedom of expression 6) associational autonomy (see especially Dahl 1989:221).

The original police model focuses on arrest after a crime occurred. In contrast, community policing seeks to immerse police officers into a local community (e.g., by a walking patrol to a particular neighborhood or favela, rather than driving in a large area) as advocates and partners. Ideally, the rapport between residents and police will allow them to anticipate problems and prevent crime. For example, the police officer who is aware of unemployed youth should help them find jobs. Community policing is based on the assumption that policing will be more efficient with the input of societal knowledge. That requires, however, that the police accept their role involving social service and order maintenance, instead of seeing themselves as warriors. Of course, this can include complex issues as Gary Marx suggests (Marx 2001):

1. What constitutes a community? Is it based on geography or shared values and lifestyle? There is always the danger that dominant groups pursue their agenda while ignoring the real needs of minorities; also, a label of a community might promote a false idea of homogeneity and may re-apply stigma.
2. How to resolve tensions between professionalism/expertise and democratic participation, and the danger of police being captured by a given segment of a diverse community?
3. How is a police officer supposed to play so many different roles at one? Especially in the context of Brazil where violence, precariousness, inequality and poverty overlap, the police are charged with being a war machine and a counselor simultaneously.

In general, one can say that democratic societies strive for equal law enforcement where citizens are treated in similar ways, and police are trained to behave in a universalistic fashion. The personal attitudes of police should not affect their behavior as an officer of the law, and they should be neutral in enforcing rules. Such approach is supposed to eliminate the differentiated treatment of people regarding their race, age, or social status. So, states the United Nations International Police Task Force (1996): "the police force of a democracy is concerned strictly

with the preservation of safe communities and the application of criminal law equally to all people, without fear or favor."

### *The State and Militarization*

The 20th century saw a trend of predictions that globalization would bring about the end of the nation-state government as we know it. The neoliberal doctrine defines itself as a new liberal internationalism based on the vision of a global community united by a common code of conduct, namely deregulated markets, free trade, and shared legal norms among states that promote civil liberties, electoral processes, and representative institutions (Springer 2010). Its main principle, "one size fits all", is at the same time its main fault, assuming that "identical results will follow the imposition of market-oriented reforms, rather than recognizing the extraordinary variations that arise as neoliberal reform initiatives are imposed within contextually specific institutional landscapes and policy environments" (Brenner and Theodore 2002:353).

Saskia Sassen (1991) uses the term "unbundling of sovereignty" to describe the changing relationship between territory and sovereignty of a nation-state in a world where political power is being reorganized at a transnational level. Sovereignty, so Sassen says, can no longer be seen as the sole entity of the modern state but instead it is partially disentangled from the nation-state and mapped onto supranational and non-governmental organizations. Nevertheless, as Matthew Sparke points out passports, national borders, and armies show that nation-states still retain their role as the core building blocks of global governance (Sparke 2012). To quote Begona Aretxaga, "Globalization is not only compatible with statehood; it has actually fueled the desire for it," (Aretxaga 2003).

International efforts to democratize police forces in developing countries have become a major component of foreign policy and a substantially growing industry. With some notable exceptions, literature about "democratic policing" is prescriptive and produced by and about the Global North. This includes David Bayley's foundational book *Police for the Future* (1994), which envisions models of democratic policing based on case studies from "modern democratic societies" such as Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Japan, and the US. For instance, the UN has been active in advising and training local police in Haiti (1994), Kosovo (1999), and East Timor (2001). The US government has attempted to "reconstruct" police in Panama (1989), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Countless other governments are instituting their police reform programs, inspired by Western models. David Bayley estimated that in 2004 the US government has spent 635 million dollars on development and support of police agencies abroad (Hinton and Newburn 2009:2). But as Bayley himself points out, the attempt to "democratize" police outside these Western societies fails more often than it succeeds.

One particular body of literature on so-called global policing is growing (see for example (Nadelmann 1993; Held 1995; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Kuhns and Knutsson 2010; Bowling and Sheptycki 2012; Fassin 2015). In many ways, it is linked to the broader discourse on globalization and the relevance of the state. Trends in international policing are marked by significant increases in bilateral and unilateral agreements, extradition treaties, international police training programs, intelligence and surveillance networks that are primarily perpetuated by private firms. Andreas and Nadelmann note that "international policing is a case where globalization is expanding state power by providing support for enhanced police capacities" (Nadelmann 1993; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006). Police experts such as Bayley even published a manual for *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to do and how to do it* (Bayley 2001).

Paradoxically, while predominantly Western, democratic countries and organizations invest to democratize police in developing countries, the First World has experienced a continuous militarization of their law enforcement. In his book *Cities under Siege* (2011), Stephen Graham describes a new form of military urbanism "fueled by and perpetuating the extreme inequalities that have mushroomed as neoliberal globalization has extended across the world."

"[...] Israeli drones designed to target Palestinians are now routinely deployed by police forces in North America, Europe, and East Asia. Private operators of US 'supermax' prisons are heavily involved in running the global archipelago organizing incarceration and torture that has burgeoned since the start of the 'war on terror.' Private military corporations heavily colonize 'reconstruction' contracts in both Iraq and New Orleans. Israeli expertise in population control is regularly sought by those planning security operations for major summits and sporting events. Guided missiles and private armies work to securitize key events, from Olympics or World Cups to G20 summits and political summits. Even the 'shoot to kill' policies developed to confront risks of suicide bombing in Tel Aviv and Haifa have been adopted by police forces in Western cities" (Graham 2011: XVIII).

Aggressive and militarized policing against public demonstrations and social mobilizations in London, Paris, or Rio de Janeiro now utilize the same "non-lethal weapons" as Israel's army in Gaza or Jenin. Constructions of "security zones" and "fortified enclaves" are sold around the world as combat-proof security solutions. There is an emerging trend to deem cities to be intrinsically problematic spaces, as underlined by recent publications such as Didier Fassin's *Enforcing Order: An Ethnography of Urban Policing* (2013) in Paris, making seemingly generalizable statements about the situation of cities and police around the world. Cities became the main sites concentrating acts of subversion, resistance, mobilization, dissent, and protest challenging national security. In the meanwhile, in countries like Brazil, the real national security

issue takes place hidden in the jungles and at the borders where the army and drug cartels enter in conflict; and landowners massacre indigenous communities for real estate.

Kraska and Kappeler note a sharp rise in the normalization of paramilitary units onto mainstream police forces, parallel to a movement towards community policing and problem-oriented policing (Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Kappeler and Kraska 2013). They note a seeming paradox parallel development: "a well-publicized movement toward community accountability, responsiveness, and problem-solving, and another backstage development toward militarization" (Kraska and Kappeler 1997:12). To police officers in the US, this paradox trend of militarized community policing seemed legitimate and did not defy the notion of democratic (64% of respondents in the study agreed that paramilitary police units "play an important role in community policing"). This attitude is also observable with the military police in Rio de Janeiro and Recife. The Pacification Police Unit in Rio, whose name alone indicates militarized submission of inimical subjects, operates with paramilitary weaponry and tactics. In Recife, the Pact for Life does not put such an emphasis on weaponry (patrolling officers use Tasers and simple handguns). However, for the police officers on the ground, the lack of paramilitary equipment is perceived as a disadvantage. What might be perceived as mutually exclusive, is indeed historically embedded in police ideology and practice, so Kraska and Kappeler (*ibid.*). Scholars have argued that the international aid directed to democratize police abroad is a new form of colonialism. Brodgen calls such attempts "new missionaries" that disseminate "A uni-linear perception of police development [...] occurring largely independently of local police mandates, cultures and patterns of organization. What appeared to offer promise in small-town America, and in the prosperous white suburbs, is being exported by a new brand of academic and police salespeople to all and sundry." (Brodgen 1999:179). While such a critique is certainly

appropriate, as the data presented suggests there is a trend of enhancing even the most "democratic" police models in white American suburbia with weaponry and equipment from war situations. For example, at the annual police parade in Madison, Wisconsin the police department proudly presents a war tank at the city's capital which was donated to the department after the war in Iraq.

It becomes apparent that global trends impact the image of police as "peace officers" significantly. Anthropologist Elana Zilberg argues for globalization not only of security but also, of violence through the distribution of gangs and repressive policing methods (Zilberg 2011). What she calls "neoliberal security cape" is a transnational space at the nexus of youth, migration, and violence between different countries. Such a concept offers ways to examine spatial patterns of policing and how they are entangled in the local as well as global spheres. Anthropology can examine how police officers deal with this global space they are embedded in; if they associate with the "warrior" culture, or the "servant guardian" culture, or if those two are indeed connected as Kraska and Kappeler suggested. My dissertation is an attempt to disaggregate these global trends and show the local complexities on the ground.

The cases of Rio and Recife show the ambiguity of global trends, democracy, and policing and how citizens and police officers navigate these spheres of global and local expectations. This dissertation places the Brazilian police in a global perspective by examining its local actions in two very different cities because both programs were heavily influenced by "democratic" police examples from New York City, Boston, and Medellín. This dissertation contributes not only to the academic body of globalization and the state but also to the discourse on social control and state power in general. The ethnographic work enhances a greater understanding of the daily experiences of police actors as they navigate disparate social and

political environments. In many ways, the research also wants to highlight how the state, whether due to ignorance, inability, apathy, or unwillingness, can be largely absent for many communities, and how agents within these communities must find ways to live with their own improvised and oftentimes illegitimate forms of political and social infrastructures.

## RESEARCH METHODS

This dissertation is based on several field trips to Brazil spanning over six years. My latest research trip was of 13 months of fieldwork conducted between June 2014 and August 2015 in Rio de Janeiro and Recife. However, my relationship with Brazil dates back to 2002 when I spent one year studying in Marília, a small city in the state of São Paulo. I have returned to Brazil annually for work, study and travel. In 2009, I worked with a Brazilian non-governmental organization called Center for Digital Inclusion in Rio de Janeiro, when I made the first contact with police, favelas, and drug traffickers. In 2010, I returned to Rio to carry out a four-month-long study on the Pacification Police Unit for my MPhil degree at the University of Oxford. I lived at a favela I called *Saudade* and worked with pacification police officers, the secretary of public security, and social programs. I spent summer 2013 in Recife shadowing the Homicide Task Force and Pact for Life policymakers while living in a favela impacted by the program. I selected research participants from following groups for my project.

### *Policy Makers and Programmers*

During this segment of my research, I sought to understand the national and international strategies of urban violence management and policing methods. I used interviews, participant

observation and data analysis with public security policymakers and project management staff in Rio de Janeiro as well as Recife. At the municipal level in Rio de Janeiro, I worked with the Secretary of Public Security, and representatives of PRONASCI, the Military Police, CPP, UPP Social. In Recife, I worked with the Pact for Life committee, the Military Police, Civil Police, Secretary of Urban Security, Secretary of Public Defense and Citizenship, non-governmental organizations including ATITUDE. These interviews provided me with the context of previous and on-going public security efforts in Rio de Janeiro and Recife.

In order to better understand policing approaches and violence prevention attempts, I interviewed high ranking police officers, the secretary of public security José Mariano Beltrame in Rio, and then secretary of public security and social defense Alessandro Carvalho, secretaries of urban security Murilo Cavalcante and Eduardo Machado in Recife, the chiefs of military and civil police, as well as social scientists at research institutions working on public security, violence and policing. I also collected policy documents, project documents, and news articles that provided me with valuable information on ongoing interventions and policies on policing and urban violence in Rio and Recife.

In Recife, I participated in weekly meetings of the Pact for Life program, attended by police officers, policymakers, non-governmental organizations, and municipal politicians including the governor of the state. Primarily, I participated as an observer but also engaged in the analysis of violence and conversations about appropriate policing strategies applied to identified hot spots. Often, I raised questions for clarifications and sometimes I would interject with critique. I was also invited by the secretary of public security to give a presentation on crime scene regulation and child security, proposing stricter rules of crime scenes and the banning of children from violent crime scenes. In general, the committee was receptive to my

feedback, and this relationship provided me with an opportunity to reciprocate with a community that supported and authorized my research with the police. Methodologically, these meetings served as an important tool for understanding the context of the ongoing work of the Pact for Life as well as critical internal dynamics among staff members.

In Rio de Janeiro, I regularly participated in meetings, workshops, and training sessions for UPP officers at the military police headquarters or CPP. While these meetings were geared toward ranking UPP commanders, the meetings provided me with an essential overview of different leadership styles and attitudes toward the UPP. It also allowed me to understand better the training and protocols (or lack thereof) provided to the police officers.

Finally, knowing most UPP commanders personally and being known by them as an authorized, foreign researcher who was visibly supported by many in their midst also improved my safety, or at least it gave me the feeling that I had some official protection. There were several moments in which individual more hardline commanders would address my presence referring to me as a "spy for human rights" and verbalize animosity toward academics; other commanders usually stepped in taking my side and mitigating the intimidation attempts. These meetings were typically stressful and required a high level of patience and diplomacy on my side. Overall, I was under the impression that while there were some UPP commanders who were distrustful or opposed to my presence, the majority of commanders who got to know me over the years welcomed my presence.

*Favela Communities**Rio de Janeiro*

In Rio de Janeiro, I visited numerous pacified and not pacified favelas all over the city, but I focused on four communities in which I spent the most time: Morro da Saudade where I lived, Morro das Flores and Morro da Providência I shadowed the police, and Morro da Santa Marta where I conducted interviews with residents and police. The latter two favelas have distinct characteristics and were widely publicized; thus, I refer to them by their real name. Nevertheless, to protect research participants I purposefully scrambled some dates and events. Morro das Flores and Saudade are invented names.

In Rio, the favela I call Saudade was where I lived and conducted most of my participant observation as well as interviews. I selected Saudade because I've lived in that community periodically since 2009, that is over two years before the favela became officially pacified. This case study offers intimate insights into the dynamics of pacification as perceived by residents. During my dissertation fieldwork in 2014, I rented a room in my friend's Ivete's apartment, which I shared with her sister and 15-year old nephew. Ivete, who became an essential part of this manuscript, was the owner of a beauty salon in the favela. That beauty parlor was a favorite meeting spot for women in the community; here gossip was exchanged about cheating husbands and naughty kids, but also drug traffickers and police officers. The beauty parlor became my safe space where I could meet the women of the community inconspicuously and develop trusting relationships.

At Saudade, I offered free yoga classes in the community which quickly gained popularity. Three times a week, women, children and on occasion men would come and participate. The practice took place outdoors for everyone to see, including the drug traffickers

who would stand on surrounding rooftops and watch us in amusement. One day, three traffickers, all armed, came over and asked if they may participate; however, they refused to put down their guns so I couldn't allow them to join. The yoga classes became important hours of community building, communication, and friendship. It opened doors around the community and also increased my safety. For example, one day as I was returning home a shootout broke out. The favela is built like a maze; hence, sometimes it is impossible to tell where the shots are coming from. I cowered in a corner when a door swung open, and a woman shouted: "*Professora*, get in here!" - It was one of my yoga students offering shelter. The classes also improved my relations with the drug gang. Whenever we had to cancel a class due to conflict, a drug trafficker would come to my house and apologize for the inconvenience. They respected the time and effort given to their community members who could not afford joining a gym or prohibitively expensive yoga studios on the *asfalto*.

I had to reflect carefully on the safety risk this research project posed to research participants and myself. The two groups, drug traffickers, and police are antagonistic to the point that police officers are regularly shot at first sight. Drug traffickers are also rigorous in punishing community members who socialize or collaborate with the police. An *X9* - a snitch - will be met with a cruel execution. To protect myself and my friends, I avoided meeting, patrolling or any other interaction with the UPP officers at Saudade. Although I am a foreign researcher, which certainly gave me some extra safety, there have been enough cases of murdered journalists and human rights activists to take the risk seriously. I also avoided providing detailed information about my fieldwork to participants at Saudade; for instance, I would clarify that I am an anthropologist researching public security in Rio. However, I would not disclose that I interview and shadow police officers.

I also write about a favela that I call "Morro das Flores," where I have conducted most of the UPP patrols and shadowing. I had known organizations and residents in this favela since 2009 before it was pacified. All participants are de-characterized, and the experiences described could have happened in any of the primary case studies which I purposefully do not want to narrow down.

### *Recife*

I visited Recife for the first time in May 2013. I lived with a family at the favela do Bode, a community nestled between middle-upper class neighborhoods of Pina and Boa Viagem at the beach front, and poor communities built on stilts over the river Capibaribe. At Bode, police officers and criminals lived side by side. The community provided me with a diverse set of perspectives at the intersection of different social classes, the police, and the effects of the "modernization" and "democratization" of slums through urban reconstruction and security measures. From the time of my first stay at Bode in 2013 and when I left the field in August 2015, Bode was impacted by the new luxury Shopping Mall built right next to the slum as well as by increased police patrols in the community. I conducted 30 formal interviews with residents and dozens of informal interviews and participant observations.

At Bode, I lived first with a family, and later in an apartment, I rented from their cousin. I participated in the events of the local *Maracatu* group *Encanto do Pina*, a traditional Afro-Brazilian performance group lead by a woman named Joana D'Arc. Joana is historically the first and only female leader of a Maracatu group, whose leaders are appointed in a sacred game of *Búzios* played by Candomblé priests and decided by divine spirits. At Bode, the *Encanto do Pina* group were community leaders, social workers, and safe spaces, especially for women. That

group made sure that "nobody will touch you," as Mestra Joana told me, assuring me of safety even if I were out alone at night.

I also spent a lot of time with the local fisherwomen, who belong to the lowest income levels in the community. The women fish for Sururu a small black mussel, and crabs they catch in the mangroves of the polluted Capibaribe river. Their positions as female heads of households are an indication of the dynamics of violence and incarceration that removed men from families. Finally, I also focused on the several families of police officers who lived in the community, especially two of my neighbors. By living so close and due to the severe heat spending most time outside of our houses, it was possible to get an intimate picture of family life and the communities' ties to these officers.

### *The Police*

Beat cops in Rio de Janeiro are unwilling to give interviews. High-ranking officers were easier and safer to approach. I was more scared to work with beat cops because on patrols things can be chaotic and I could not trust any of these men to support my study. The fact that I was a foreign graduate student helped to improve these relations; sometimes cops felt flattered to be interviewed; they also showed less inhibition once they understood the study was academic and that I would leave the country afterward. I also built up critical relationships with social programs, the Secretary of Public Security, and the Military Police forces of Rio. For example, I had the opportunity to meet José Mariano Beltrame, the Secretary of Public Security of Rio de Janeiro and patron of the UPPs; Mário Sérgio de Brito Duarte the general chief of the Military Police in 2010; Colonel Robson Rodrigues da Silva the general commander of the UPP, and Ivan Blaz, then spokesman of the BOPE.

During my dissertation fieldwork in 2014, I accompanied the Homicide Taskforce from July - Sept 2014, and January - March 2015. In April 2015 I officially began shadowing the Military Police precinct in Recife; however, I have been accompanying different military police units on patrols, raids, meetings throughout the year, especially during the *Carnaval* festivities. On a weekly basis, I spent approximately 50 hours working with the police, mostly in 12-hour night shifts. In general, the police in Recife was much more open, if not enthused about my research project than in Rio. The men and women at the military precinct let me be part of their realities, hopes, wishes, and disappointments. In total, I conducted interviews with more than 100 police officers. I have also performed a comprehensive survey of 200 police officers at the military police precinct. I also worked closely with the creator of the Pact for Life, Luis Ratton, a professor at the Federal University of Pernambuco.

Analyzing one's positionality and identity in the field, writing about one's strategies, mistakes, failures, and successes are a terrifying and painfully tricky exercise. In this dissertation, I write about my own experiences working with police and favela residents in Brazil, but I cannot bring myself to write much about what happens outside of research. I played my "foreigner card" shamelessly to get access and authorization for this study. At the same time, as a young woman in an almost exclusively male environment, I was exposed disproportionately to insecurity. It would be selfish if I would not tell other female researchers who have the idea of studying the police (especially beat cops, especially in Brazil) that it cannot be done without difficulty. I was naïve to expect influential male figures to respect me, troubled by constant breaches of boundaries, and sexual harassment. I did not realize before how security can enforce insecurity; I faced a personal and challenging situation (not with a police officer!) in which I found myself unable to involve law enforcement - although there were officers I trusted - for

fearing possible consequences for my research and my well-being. As one confidant in the field said, rather brisk: you play with fire, you will get burned, especially as a woman.

## DESCRIPTION OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 2 describes the cultural, economic, and political conditions under which favelas in Brazil formed and became the epicenter of urban violence in Rio de Janeiro and Recife. First, I present the historical and geographical context of social violence, policing, and democracy in Latin America and Brazil. I focus on how the transition from the military regime to democracy in Brazil in 1985 affected three areas - income inequality, urban violence rates, and human rights. In the first section, I briefly describe the transition from the military regime to democracy in Brazil and how this shift affected urban populations and police institutions. In particular, I discuss how these changes shaped the contemporary class and race-based stereotypes toward favela populations as backward, violent, and uncivilized. In the second section, I explain the significance of the political shift in the presidential election of 2002 which put Ignacio Lula da Silva of the Worker's Party in the presidential seat and marked the beginning of “soft governance” measures. I illustrate the impact of the Worker's Party on national poverty and inequality levels, its impact through conditional cash transfers such as *Bolsa Familia*, and the emergence of Brazil as a global player on the international market.

The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part one is about the implementation of the Pacification Police Unit program in Rio de Janeiro and presents data collected periodically since summer 2009 until 2015. Part two examines the Pact for Life public security program in Recife, Pernambuco in the Northeast of Brazil. Part two is mostly based on periodic field research in Recife since 2013. Part one and two are broadly structured into three perspectives:

- 1) the unique context of each program
- 2) An analysis of strategies used to curb the violence
- 3) Ethnographic case studies

#### 4) Conclusion of the chapters

Part I Chapter 3, "Power Structures" explores the genesis of favelas and drug traffickers beginning with an examination of the manner in which the favela is conceptualized, governed, and policed in Rio. I argue that for upper classes, officials, and city planners the favela has always been a space of disorder existing beyond the "horizon" of formal society. I show how programmers, policy makers, and urban planners constructed harmful spaces by pushing the poor into mosquito infested hills or the deserted peripheries. I argue that these spatializing practices both reflect and reinforced pre-existing class-based hierarchies, placing blame for urban violence onto the most socially and spatially marginalized populations.

In Chapter 4, "STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL CONTROL," I explore the different strategies that have been employed in Rio de Janeiro to control the urban violence in the city. In particular, I discuss the traditionally repressive policing methods of the 1990s and a shift toward more progressive attempts of policing starting in the 2000s, beginning with the GEPAE project. I use the case study of Morro Santa Marta, a favela in the prestigious neighborhood Botafogo, which was subject to GEPAE and later became the first pacified favela in Rio de Janeiro. Through the views and experiences of police officers and residents, I trace the development and experiment of using alternative policing methods in Rio de Janeiro. Then I turn to the Pacification Police Program and its many variables that make up the UPP program. I analyze three variables that I identify as crucial to the success of every innovative policy: political backing, police commitment, and societal collaboration.

Chapter 5 presents the lives and work of favela residents and police officers in three case studies, Santa Marta, Providência and Saudade. The ethnographic data reveals changing attitudes

of residents toward the UPP, which are also reflected in a drastically changing environment and life quality. I trace the shifts and changes to the lives and work, the impact of international events such as World Cup and Olympic Games, and the effects of gentrification and dispossession that followed pacification. This chapter demonstrates that to the people on the ground, it becomes irrelevant if they are living in a democratic or totalitarian regime and that “human rights” and “democratic” policing, are regarded as foreign concepts pushed onto the poor. The process of making favelas “safe spaces” through police saturation and the alleged inclusion into “real” society raised living expenses and displaced thousands into the unsafe and remote peripheries. I argue, Pacification had the effect of creating insecurity through the provision of security to Rio's most underprivileged citizens.

Chapter 6 introduces the perceptions and experiences of UPP police officers in selected case studies. Anchoring my discussion in the figures of two UPP commanders, Pricilla and Achilles, I explore their transformation throughout the years on the force. The successes and challenges these officers faced are symbolic for complex dynamics of distrust, internal risks and the broad feeling of disenfranchisement that police feel toward their own institution and programs. It discusses the question of accountability and if police officers see themselves essentially representative of the state. I argue that police officers see the state as threatening as favelas residents and pursue their role as “warriors” against a corrupt system based on illicit but not illegitimate actions.

Part II, Chapter 7, provides ethnographic background that speaks to Recife's history and culture of policing and violence. I locate the Northeast as the socio-economic "other" in Brazil, imagined in many folkloric and derogatory ways as the "poor cousin" of the south, and as a region that experienced skyrocketing homicide rates in the past twenty years. The state of

Pernambuco is exemplary in the area regarding economic development and the recent reduction of homicides due to the Pact for Life. Nevertheless, I argue, violent death remains a somewhat casual and widely normalized occurrence among the poor in society.

In Chapter 8, I discuss the history and design of the Pact for Life and what kind of logics of violence the program is meant to ameliorate. In particular, I show the differences to Rio's booming cocaine market and Recife's rather small but impactful crack cocaine distribution.

Chapter 9 introduces the perspectives of favela residents in Recife anchoring my discussion in my case study, Bode. Although state forces were always present, and less violent than in Rio, favelas are rarely accessed by outsiders. Their inhabitants are conceptualized as a different species, "crab men," living in the mangroves. Their deaths are never deemed innocent or grievable. Different than in Rio; however, police officers are members of these spaces and respected neighbors. I want to underline that these spaces which are feared for their disorder and danger are also placed full of life, laughter, art, and solidarity.

Chapter 10 turns to the perspectives of police officers in Recife and their attitude toward the Pact for Life. First, I focus on the Homicide Task Force. This chapter sets out to show: who kills, who is getting killed, why, and how do police investigators see these cases. With less than ten percent of all murders ever being solved, and all victims deemed guilty a priori by the detectives, impunity is rife, and life of the "miserable" has little meaning.

In Chapter 11, I turn my attention to the military police. Just like in Rio, these officers are appointed to prevent violent crime in the streets. The selected case studies of patrols introduce their attitudes and interpretations of community policing, legitimacy, and the law in practice.

Finally, in Chapter 12 Conclusion, I draw on knowledge of the different structures of the two security programs - UPP and Pacto - and their police forces to make comments on their relative success and failures, and my sense of their immediate/long-term futures. I also discuss the broader implications of my research for anthropology, particularly for the study of violence and police, and for Brazilian studies more generally. I also offer some directions for further study and discuss significant changes in the security climate of Rio and Recife since my fieldwork.

## CHAPTER 2

### RACE RELATIONS, POLICE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN BRAZIL

The principal objective of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the government and racial politics of Brazil because they are essential to understanding security policy such as the policing programs discussed in this dissertation. I begin with a broad overview of Brazilian politics starting in the early 1960s to the present, examining the history of some key contemporary public policy issues and political parties. Specific objectives include understanding important features of Brazil's unusual political development, compared to the rest of Latin America, the United States, and Western Europe; underlining the outcomes of major political conflicts; examining the enduring socioeconomic and regional inequalities; and the ongoing struggle to democratize political decision making, policing, and social relations. Throughout the chapter the topics of social violence, race, policing, and human rights will reoccur. I address questions such as: are Brazil's race relations significantly different from those elsewhere? What are some of the barriers to greater racial equality in contemporary Brazil? What form of social violence and human rights are the police working with? How are human rights conceptualized in Brazilian society?

By the end of the chapter the reader will be well prepared to identify the parallel developments of innovative policing programs and the Worker's Party's rise and eventual demise, as well as the distinct regional characteristics. Latin America is a region known for rather unstable government, quick changes in regimes, and authoritarian, populist rulers. During the past two decades, however, democracy has been stable almost all over Latin America. This is despite the so called "second wave" of democracy in the 1940s-1950s being followed by a

demise of many civilian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s, most notably in Colombia. Much of the destabilization of democratically elected leaders in the region stemmed from the mingling of U.S. military, secret service and United Fruit Company, for example, in Guatemala (Springer 2010). The “third wave” of democratization beginning in the 1980s, spawned many reversals, especially outside the Andean region. Brazil is one case study that has been particularly successful in re-democratizing.

Brazil’s first “experiment in democracy” (Skidmore 2010) after 1946 was quickly disrupted by military rebellions and threatened by several crises thereafter. Finally, the military coup of 1964 derailed the democratically elected president Goulart and put the military in power for the following twenty years. The period of military rule from 1964-1985 in Brazil was one of systematic human rights abuses, such as disappearances and torture of political opponents. *Brasil: Nunca Mais* reported on the torture of 1,843 persons in the first thirteen years of the 21-year dictatorship<sup>4</sup>. In doing so, it stated that the source material necessarily excluded an “incalculable” number of other cases. Also, 356 cases of persons murdered and/or disappeared by the military were officially recognized by the Special Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances. At least 30,000 people were estimated to have been arbitrarily arrested or tortured during the dictatorship period according to two of the lead federal prosecutors in recent court challenges to impunity (Cavallaro and Delgado 2012).

It was during Brazil’s Military Dictatorship that the police were merged closely with the army, police units such as the *shock* were created to counterfeit so-called “terrorists,” defined as citizens who pronounced themselves against the dictatorship. During Brazil’s military dictatorship the Military Police (Portuguese: *polícia militar*, hence PM) were under the direct

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<sup>4</sup> See: *Brasil: Nunca Mais*, Projeto A, Tomo V, Volume I; Direito à Memória e à Verdade, Comissão Especial sobre Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos, Secretaria Especial dos Direitos Humanos da Presidência da República, 2007

control of the army. Specialized mobile shock units were established, such as the *Tobias de Aguiar Patrol Squad* called *ROTA* in São Paulo, to prevent “terrorism” and wage urban war against subversives. "These battalions remained in operation after politically motivated armed dissent was crushed, though control of the military police has, at least nominally, reverted to the democratically elected state government" (Cavallaro and Manuel 1997:21).

One dictatorship era measure worthy of note regarding police institutions in Brazil is the Decree-Law 1.001 of 1969, which expanded the jurisdiction of military courts to cover all offenses committed by military police (the vast majority of police on the streets). In 1996, Law 9.299 shifted jurisdiction over intentional homicides committed by military police back to ordinary courts. However, other kinds of violent incidents and crimes (for example resistance killings, physical abuse) continue to be prosecuted in the military courts.<sup>5</sup> In practice, this transfer of jurisdiction over cases of police abuse guaranteed impunity not only for crimes perpetrated during authoritarian rule but also for those committed after Brazil's transition to democracy.

In 1985, spurred by the *Diretas Já!* (direct elections now!) campaign<sup>6</sup>, the country returned to democratic elections. Following re-democratization, Brazil suffered from inflation rates upward of 2000 percent yearly, soaring poverty and violence levels, and the first popularly elected president, Fernando Collor, was impeached and removed from office on corruption charges. However, the “New Republic” has faced comparably fewer and less serious challenges and the

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<sup>5</sup> See, e.g. Final Justice: Police Death Squad Homicides of Adolescents in Brazil. Human Rights Watch/Americas, 1994: p. 41-47.

<sup>6</sup> In 1984, the *Diretas Já!* movement demanded democratic elections. It brought together diverse elements of Brazilian society and participants from a broad spectrum of political parties, trade unions, civil, student and journalistic leaderships.

crisis that did occur have been solved within democratic institutional frameworks. After 1994 when the *Plano Real* – a progressive economic stabilization plan – was installed, Brazil began to pursue widely praised advances of reformist social democracy. The government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) ended hyperinflation, improved government finances, renegotiated the federal pact, and implemented reforms that increased state capacity (Kingstone and Power 2017). In the historic elections of 2002, Luiz Ignácio “Lula” da Silva from the Worker’s Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, hence PT) defeated Cardoso despite the challenges of raising campaign funds<sup>7</sup>. Lula maintained Cardoso’s macroeconomic policies while dramatically expanding the social safety net and lifting millions of Brazilians out of extreme poverty.

Lula’s administration reduced the staggering income inequality to the lowest it has been in fifty years and implemented conditional cash transfer *Bolsa Familia*<sup>8</sup>, which became a widely praised template for Latin America’s approach to social policy. Brazil’s economy made important strides from 2002 to 2012. The Gini coefficient measuring income inequality improved from 0.60 to 0.53, which leaves Brazil still as one of the most unequal countries. Nevertheless, the situation for the poor improved dramatically, for instance, those living in extreme poverty (on less than \$1.25 per day) fell from 30 percent to 7 percent; unemployment fell from 12 percent to under 6 percent; real wages rose and transferred millions into a new middle class (Kingstone and Power 2017:15). Popular participation of civil society,

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<sup>7</sup> Political campaigns in Brazil are at least as expensive as in the U.S. While Cardoso had private investors, companies and the upper classes on his side as donors, unions and the poor were the majority of Lula’s supporters however, unions are prohibited from making campaign donations. To read more about how this dynamic reversed after 2002, see Goldfrank and Wampler *Good Government and Politics as Usual? The Schizophrenic Path of the Worker’s Party*, in Kingstone and Power *Democratic Brazil Divided*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017.

<sup>8</sup> See more about *Bolsa Familia* in: Hunter, Wendy and Natasha Borges Sugiyama (2013) *Assessing the Bolsa Familia: Successes, Shortcomings, and Unknowns*.

accountability of political leaders, and independence of civilian politics from military interference all showed the increased quality of this new version of democracy. Nevertheless, Brazil also experienced new challenges such as a rapid increase of violent crime, widespread impunity and corruption. In 2005 (just a year before the next presidential elections) the Lula government, which has been advocating against the “typical” politics of corruption, erupted in a huge scandal called *Mensalão* (translates into “Big Allowance”). The *Mensalão* scandal involved large scale payments to lawmakers for their support and led to calls for Lula’s impeachment. It forced the resignation of the presidential chief of staff and the president of the lower house of Congress and led to unprecedented convictions of dozens high ranking officials and their associates.

Lula’s appointed successor, Dilma Rousseff, who was elected in 2010, was the first woman in the seat of president in Brazil. She certainly owed her election to strong public approval of eight years of Lula’s government and pro-poor policies including the appraised *Bolsa Familia* program and strong increases in the real minimum wages. Voters in Brazil’s poorest regions – especially the Northeast – voted massively for presidential candidates from the Worker’s Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, hence PT) (Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008). The newly growing middle class had also strong reasons to support the Lula and Dilma governments. At the same time however, the more prosperous (and whiter) voters in the South and Southeast of the country where the “traditional” middle class was disproportionately concentrated, had good reasons to vote *against* the PT because their incomes grew at much slower rates than those of the poor during the Lula-Dilma years (Kingstone and Power 2017). Rousseff attempted to maintain Cardoso’s economic plans as well as Lula’s popular legacy of social inclusion, a challenging

juggling act in times of severe economic recession, approaching World Cup 2014, and Olympic Games 2016.

In her first two years in office Rousseff was a very popular president. Her second term, however, was controversially interrupted. About ten years after the *Mensalão* scandal that shook the PT to the core, approaching the 2014 electoral contest, prosecutors found evidence of corruption and money laundering at Petrobras, Brazil's most precious oil company. This was to become the biggest corruption scandal in history world-wide, called *Lava Jato* – Car wash. The investigation threw the Brazilian political system in turmoil, right at the time when the World Cup was taking place and preparation for the Olympic Games in 2016 were full blown. Matthew M. Taylor writes: “a variety of previously prison immune elites found themselves in jail: construction magnates, lawyers, Petrobras executives, bankers, and even a sitting senator were jailed.” (Taylor 2017:80). This is a radical change in Brazil's prosecution history, a sign of great improvements in accountability and no doubt represents a major advance for democracy. However, the arrests and persecution also destabilized the Brazilian democratic and liberal government and people's trust into the Worker's Party and liberal left overall, a weakness that radical right-wing representatives took full advantage of.

While Dilma herself was not found involved in any of the corruption schemes, she and the Worker's Party had lost all public confidence. Right wing politicians saw their chance and pushed for impeachment, which indeed resulted in Dilma's removal from office in 2015. Dilma's impeachment caused great divisions in the country, with her supporters calling the removal a coup d'état, while opposition saw justice served. These factors are significant obstacles to a stable democracy and affected policy making, public opinion and security on the ground significantly.

In times when top political leaders have been imprisoned on corruption charges, the president of the country Dilma Rousseff impeached, and the military has been given authority over public security in cities such as Rio de Janeiro, many pose the question if Brazil can still be regarded as a democracy. Nevertheless, Tim Power and Kingstone argue that “Brazil shows many qualities of a mature democracy, even as it confronts problems of corruption, protest, and economic backsliding” (Kingstone and Power 2017:9). While these events have not fully unfolded while I was in the field in 2014 and 2015, it sheds light on the dynamics regarding public trust toward the government. At least since the 2013 massive protests across the country, Brazil’s democracy was facing serious challenges on high and local levels which impacted public security agents and favela residents deeply.

## RACIAL INEQUALITY AND RACE RELATIONS

Michael Hanchard writes that Brazil is at the “intersection of race, citizenship and modernity in a society that in theory is committed to liberal-democratic principles, but in practice still struggles with the legacies of patron-clientelism, racial slavery and oppression” (Hanchard 1999:60). In everyday life this results in the denial of full citizenship to people of African descent, who are being granted contingent and partial citizenship only as a consequence of their own political struggles that have gone beyond boundaries of liberal discourse.

By the mid-sixteenth century the Portuguese were importing African slaves in substantial numbers to work in new, permanent sugar colonies in Brazil. Years before the North American slave trade got underway, more slaves had been brought to Brazil than would ever reach the United States. The Brazilian slave trade would continue for another nearly two hundred years, bringing almost ten million slaves to predominantly the Northeastern states of Brazil Bahia,

Pernambuco, and Alagoas. To this day, Brazil hosts the largest African Diaspora in the world. Brazil was the last country to abolish slavery in 1889; at the same time, by 1872 already 74% of all Afro-Brazilians were free compared to only 6% in the South of the U.S. at the eve of emancipation (Hanchard 1999). Moreover, the Constitution of 1824 defined Brazil as a constitutional monarchy and gave black freedmen the right to vote, but they could not be chosen as electors.

After slavery was officially abolished, racial exclusion and oppression took form most visibly in immigration laws, that prohibited immigration by any non-white people into Brazil. European immigrant laborers were preferred although Afro-Brazilians already had skills that these immigrants were just developing. It was during that time that the ideology of whitening became a concept that politicians began to push for under the cover of a Racial Democracy, in which cultural and genetic mixing was encouraged and painted as a unique and positive aspect of *brasilidade* [Brazilianness]. Ultimately, whitening asserted that miscegenation would eventually eliminate people of African descent; thus, re-marginalizing the shift from slave to wage labor.

The Brazilian elites justified the long delay of abolition on the grounds that Brazilian slavery was less harsh than the working conditions of peasants and wage laborers in Southern Europe. They claimed that slaves were actually spared the horrors of “savage” Africa by being transported to a more civilized and enlightened country full of opportunities. This justification, buttressed by purported cultural differences between Portuguese and other European civilizations underpinned the now well-known myth of racial democracy, an ideology advanced by Gilberto Freyre’s book *Casa Grande e Senzala* [Masters and Slaves] (Freyre 1933). Freyre represented the master and slave living in a symbiotic relationship that, because of the intermingling of races, produced a stronger Brazil. For much of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Brazil was seen as a post-racial, mixed

society and the *mulata/o* (mixed race individual) became the national ideal in terms of beauty and culture.

In Freyre argued that “miscegenation” and the mixing of cultures was Brazil’s unique feature and salvation. He described Brazil as a hybrid society of Africans, Indigenous peoples, and Europeans marked by its duality of “sadist and masochists”, the “learned and illiterate”. Historian Celia Azevedo has argued, that the relations between masters and slaves were more harmonious in Brazil than in the U.S. because “Brazil presented two fraternal parts whose distinct values and experiences had been long interacting in a mutually enriching process that required no sacrifice of one element to the other” (Azevedo 1995) . Abolitionists in both countries “constructed little by little the image of Brazil as a society immune to racial violence.”

Freyre claimed, that all Brazilians considered themselves culturally African, Amerindian, and European – something that in my experience and long years living in Brazil holds true. However, people use these affiliations strategically and those phenotypically white enjoy vast privileges and do not experience any type of insecurity when claiming their African roots, while those who are dark skinned are widely perceived as under classes. Different to the U.S., in the “absence of racial segregation, races were not so much sociological realities as somehow present in various degrees of cultural and biological combination in each *individual*, where they are fused” (Fry 2000:90). The idea of racial democracy was widely accepted in Brazil and abroad. U.S. black nationalist Henry McNeal Turner and journalist Cyril Biggs even advocated for emigration to Brazil as a refuge from oppression in the United States.

In reality, Afro-Brazilian were essentially conceptualized as the antithesis of modernity; however, this discourse was contrasted by the efforts of people such as Mario and Osvaldo de Andrade, anthropologist Gilberto Freyre and some politicians who argued African and

indigenous elements in their nation were uniquely Brazilian. For example, the 1940s saw a share increase of white membership in syncretistic Afro-Brazilian religions like Umbanda and Candomblé. In popular culture, Samba music was appropriated by the middle classes becoming emblematic for the Brazilian way of life; and African-derived corporal esthetics became a national standard of beauty. By the mid 1940s African elements were integrated in Brazilian culture and considered part of the cultural economy. Men and women embodied sensual desire and lascivious pleasure, whitening and racial democracy. While the government promotes blackness through Carnival, Samba, and soccer, it devaluates black lives through continuous subjugation to death (Alves Amparo 2018:145) inflicted by police and military. Afro-Brazilians were denied access to virtually all institutions of civil society that would have given them equal footing with the middle classes of modernizing Brazil. In the years following World War II, after the horrors of ethnic cleansing by the Nazis, UNESCO sponsored a pilot research program in Brazil to study “the problems of different racial and ethnic groups living in a common social environment”. The research showed severe racial discrimination and inequality in Brazil; nevertheless, it did not eliminate the idea of a functioning racial democracy in the nation. Some explained that the racial discrimination was a result of the legacy of slavery and a difficulty to adapt to capitalism, suggesting that it was just a matter of time when inequality and discrimination would fade. Moreover, some argued that discrimination was directed toward the poor, not people of color. Sociologist Carlos Hasenbalg was able to argue against that statement, pointing out that race was significantly related to poverty and that inequality could not be attributed to the legacy of slavery but rather to persistent prejudice and discrimination against people of color. Non-white people in Brazil fare significantly worse in terms of income, education, life expectancy, infant mortality and social mobility.

### *Race and Policing*

The police institution plays a central role in the construction of race, slavery, and racial politics today. Before the Portuguese royal family relocated from Portugal to Brazil in 1808, Brazil did not have an institutionalized police force. In the 17th century, security and order were taken care of by so called *Capitães-do-Mato*, who were mainly concerned with hunting down escaped slaves. Those *capitanias* had established local units with law enforcement functions. Although some steps were taken to create a more formalized police force, such as the establishment of a Cavalry Regiment in Minas Gerais in 1775, colonial landowners held in their hands all executive, judiciary, and legislative power. After King João VI and his court moved to Rio de Janeiro in 1808, he reshaped the administrative structure of the colony. One of many reforms was the establishment of the *Intendência Geral de Polícia* (General Police Intendancy) which was in charge of crime investigation. Secondly, the King created a Military Guard with police functions on 13 May 1809, which is a direct predecessor of today's Military Police. After independence from Portugal in 1822, each province started organizing its local military police.

On 31 January 1842, Article 261 was enacted, reorganizing the investigative offices, the current "civil police." The first federal police force was created in 1852. Finally, in 1871, police and judicial functions were separated, creating the general bureaucratic structure and mechanisms still adopted nowadays by local police forces.

The current Federal Police was conceived on November 16, 1964, during the military regime but has experienced some major reforms since. Rio de Janeiro, up to the 1950s Brazil's capital city, has been the cradle of police as an institution. In the Northeast of Brazil, the development of a formal police body took longer. In the case of Pernambuco, according to

historian Carlos Bezerra Cavalcanti, the first attempt of a regulated police force was in 1817, which created the "*Capitania de Pernambuco*," made up of slave hunters devoted to the landlords. In 1841 the "*Chefatura de Policia*" was created and what was the predecessor of today's *delegacies* precinct.

It is important to note significant differences between police forces employed "at home" and their colonial counterparts - a distinction which might shed light on contemporary problems in Brazil. Colonial forces were more likely to be armed, and their relationship to the public was dramatically different. In Portugal, for example, the police emphasized the public as cooperators in a common project: keeping the streets "clean" from criminality. Moreover, the police relied to a great extent on public support to be legitimized. In the colonial context, however, the dynamic was one between ruler and subordinate; the police were a project of subjection directly allied to the king or prince. Legitimacy was achieved through the use of force against the "natives." We can see these structures and dynamics - a distinction between lawful and "savage" – reproduced in the post-colonial, democratic context of South Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia, where policing is inherently tied to subordination (McCoy 2009).

While in the U.S. race was until the civil rights movement of the 1960s, a legal construct that divided the population along "racial" lines in all spheres of social life<sup>9</sup>, in Brazil racial discrimination has been illegal since the inauguration of the republican regime in 1890. However, people of color are the most vulnerable population in the criminal justice system as becomes apparent in the sky rocketing numbers of black citizens killed by the police. In his book *The Anti-Black City* (2018) Jaime Amparo Alves reveals the violent and racist ideologies that

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<sup>9</sup> Thus, affirmative action was relatively easy to introduce in the US because it was built on the shared premises of "racial" difference. In Brazil, however, it is a far thornier issue since it runs counter to the notion of racial democracy.

underlie state fantasies of order and urban peace in modern Brazil. Alves illustrates how “governing through death” has become the dominant form of managing and controlling dark skinned and poor populations. Ultimately, these tactics only lead to more marginalization, criminality, and violence. Ultimately, Alves’s work points to a need for a new approach to an intractable problem: how to govern populations and territories historically seen as “ungovernable.” Alves argues that the Black subject experiences a double negation “neither human nor citizen”. This negation shows itself in the popular saying “*direitos humanos para quem é humano*” - human rights for those who are human (or *humane* depending on interpretation). Saidiya Hartman argued that blacks are seen as human only to the extent of their culpability and that the black body is in ontological opposition to the definition of humanity around which human rights, civil society, and the rule of law are defined (Hartman 1997). This results in a normalization of violence against those dark skinned and poor. Black vulnerability to homicide in Brazil is 135% higher than among whites, and black young men are by far the main victims of violent deaths (Waiselfisz 2012). The police play a substantial role in these numbers.

Between 1993 and 1996, 301 investigations of police killings were brought to the military justice system in Rio de Janeiro. "Of the 301 cases, 295 had been dismissed without any judicial proceedings; the remaining six were dismissed on motions by the prosecutors once the judicial process began" (Cavallaro and Manuel 1997). Not a single case led to any criminal sanction of the police officers involved in killings civilians. The most important measure adopted related to non-accountability was the Amnesty Law, approved in August 1979.<sup>6</sup> This law ensured immunity from prosecution for security forces and dissidents who had engaged in political

violence. The Amnesty Law, set in place by the military regime, was intended to shield state torturers and killers from prosecution.<sup>10</sup>

### *Race and Class Relations within the Police Institution*

In Brazil, the police are controlled by state governors, who until this day are mostly influenced by wealthy rural landowners who still have a disproportionate impact on urban politics. There are three types of police that are subordinated to a Public Security Secretary of the state. The Public Security Secretary supervises all state police activities of its state. It is subordinate to the National Council of Public Security (*Conselho Nacional de Segurança Pública*). According to the Constitution, the function of the Military Police "is to serve as a conspicuous police force and to preserve public order." The police are equipped with machine guns, grenades, night vision weaponry and armored cars, in addition to other items associated with warfare. Although training is weighted more heavily towards "police matters," depending on state and city police officers also receive counterinsurgency training.

The Military Police (*Polícia Militar*), commonly referred to as PM, is based on military principles of hierarchy, uniform, discipline, and ceremony. However, it is not a branch of the Brazilian Armed Forces (although many police officers certainly feel this way) and the two groups are regarded very differently by the public.<sup>11</sup> Men and women between 18 and 28 years old can apply to enter the Military Police by advancement and public entry exams. However, it is not a given that someone who starts at the bottom positions, *soldado*, will ever reach the next rank *cabo*, or even further the *sargento*. I have met *soldados* with dozens of unblemished years

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<sup>10</sup> Lei Nº 6.683, Aug. 28, 1979.

<sup>11</sup> Polls have shown that despite widespread distaste for the memory of the dictatorship (1964-85), Brazilians trust the military more than the police (Cunha et al. 2013).

on the force or who were promoted to the next rank after 25 years. Those who had the privilege of a college education can take a public exam for lateral entry as a lieutenant. Thus, it is not uncommon to see police officers in their mid-twenties commanding far more experienced and older police officers simply because they have a university degree and money to pass the officer-level entry exam. Instead of working their way up and earn a rank through merit, officers can literary buy their entry.

The Civil Police (*Polícia Civil* hence PC) has the function of investigating crimes that in most part was brought to them by the Military Police or by residents who filed a police report in person. The Civil Police does not patrol or engage in preventive or community policing and does not use uniforms. The central figure of the civil police is the *delegado*, a police chief who holds a law degree and must have law practicing experience of at least three years. He or she presides over a team of detectives for an investigation and makes the final decisions over a case. In Brazil, *delegacias* are central structural units for policing and investigation. *Delegacia* is probably best translated into the precinct, are fixed police units attending the public. It is the base and administration for police operations, criminal investigations and temporary arrests (holding cells) of "in flagrante" delicts.

Military Police	Civil Police
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Patrol and arrest</li> <li>• Community police</li> <li>• Operates on military code</li> <li>• Headquartered in Battalion</li> <li>• Wear uniforms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investigate crime; occasionally participate in raids</li> <li>• Operates based on civil law</li> <li>• Headquarters in precincts (<i>delegacia</i>)</li> <li>• No uniforms</li> </ul>

Part I Figure 2

Except *delegados* (detectives) and high-ranking Military Police officers, the vast majority of police officers in Brazil earn a modest salary, have a low education, and come from poor communities. A large number of officers have relatives, often fathers, who were police officers, and they struggled to prepare and pass the public entry exam. They are swayed by the promise of a modest but steady salary, a pension, and some health insurance. As a government employer, it is also difficult to get fired, so many see their employment with the police as a sort of lifelong tenure. They are part of an expendable and cheap labor force, paradoxically charged with providing security and order amongst their precariousness.

In some cities, the modest salaries do barely allow the officers to keep their families safe. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, police officers have to keep their job secret as they are regular targets of attacks by gangs. I have known a police officer who would drive almost two hours to deliver his laundry (PM uniforms) to a person he trusted with cleaning it. He was a single man who did not have the money for a washing machine, no time to do the laundry himself, and going to a laundromat in his neighborhood could have revealed his employment and put him at risk of getting killed by a hateful criminal. The insecurity that comes along with working as a police officer, particularly in cities that are regulated by organized crime such as Rio, has led many to move out of affordable favelas into the expensive formal space – something they cannot afford on their meager salary. Thus, the question is not why police officers are corrupt, but how is it even possible to be a beat cop and survive without giving in to corruption?

I argue that the military police in Brazil is a mirror image of the segregated society they are serving. The disproportionately dark-skinned beat cops live primarily in favelas or poor neighborhoods, while the majority of their high-ranking superiors are light-skinned and middle class. Also, a significant number of lieutenants, captains, and majors are stepping into their

father's footsteps. Thus, they already have a "name" and can take advantage of a significant social capital to further their career. This produces a structure marked by inexperienced but privileged commanders and distrustful and even hateful subordinates. Not surprisingly, this segregation causes a resentful dynamic between beat cops and officers which comes to light in their daily interactions. Because most officers have a college degree, they are also seen as intellectuals, while beat cops are stereotyped as uneducated, disregarding the fact that many are attending college.

It is important to remember that refusing a direct order by a superior officer, is a crime according to military code. Theoretically, a police officer is allowed to and should refuse orders to commit illegal acts; however, there are no mechanisms in place that would protect the *praça* from the consequences of a refusal. Any complaints they would submit would go to a higher ranking officer. Since the upper ranks are a tightly woven group of men and women whose relationships are defined by class, race, family relations and political alliances, it is nearly impossible to file complaints against superiors.

There has been attempts in recent years to reform the PM into a "full cycle" system. Reaction to this proposition was heated and dispersed. Beat cops were excited about the possibility of upward mobility inside the institution, not only because of a monetary incentive but mainly because "we know how things are on the ground and keep people safe" (author interview with a *praça*, 2010). The reactions of officers had a taste of panic. One Major told me that the biggest error would be to leave the PM in the hands of "*favelados*", meaning his subordinates. Another officer referred to his cops as "*meninos e meninas*" (boys and girls) who needed guidance and limits. "I feel like I have two hundred children," the commander of the battalion I accompanied in Recife would say. He was a highly decorated colonel, who genuinely

cared about his troops but was completely oblivious that his statement was degrading the police officers to children.

This division between beat cop and officer is a direct parallel to the discrepancy between people of the hill and people on the asphalt. Beat cops, just like *favelados* are regarded as suitable for following orders and providing certain services, not engaging in shaping strategy or politics that directly affect them. Similarly, *favelados* are widely regarded as in need of rescue from drug traffickers, moral guidance, and inclusion into “civilization”. These ideas of humanitarianism are drawn upon clear racial lines, implemented top down on both groups. At the same time, those who are deemed black, poor, and un-civilized are also given the paradoxical task to control *favelados*.

### *Social Violence and Human Rights*



Part I Figure 3: "Understanding human rights. Got it? Those who spare the wolf, sacrifice the lamb!!!!" Source: Military police Facebook group

As Brazil approaches 30 years as a democracy, the police seem no less violent than in times of the military regime. Although police violence was apparent before, it became a major public issue after a series of brutal massacres that have occurred in the 1990s. In 1992, 111 prisoners were killed in the infamous São Paulo prison *Carandiru*. In 1993 seven street children were killed by police in front of the *Candelária* Cathedral in Rio de Janeiro and in the same year over twenty residents of the favela *Vigário Geral* were shot by the military police as retaliation for a previous dispute with drug traffickers. Those are just a few of the most shocking examples.

During one of the many police operations seeking to arrest or eliminate so called *bandidos* – commonly black men – it is not unusual to notice a group of people voicing their defense of said criminals from police brutality. These groups are commonly known as the Commission for Human Rights (CHR) and have been appearing increasingly at crime scenes and police pursuits in cosmopolitan cities such as Rio or São Paulo. CHR are fighting for the rights of suspects to a lawful investigation, arrest, and trial but in Brazil they are often perceived as enemies of justice and the *trabalhador* or *cidadão do bem* – the “good” working people. The CHR encounters opposition especially by police unions and associations such as *Association of wives, relatives, and friends of police and fire fighters*. This is in public imagination often described as an epic battle between “heroes” and “marginals” – Human Rights being strongly associated with the protection of criminals. There has been a lot written about this distinction between the bandit, who inhabits the *mundo do crime* sphere (world of crime) and the worker in Brazil<sup>12</sup>. Alves writes:

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<sup>12</sup> For reference works discussing this dichotomy in ethnographic perspective, see Alba Zaluar, *A Máquina de Revolta: as Organizações Populares e o Significado da Pobreza*, 2002; Desmond Arias, *Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro. Trafficking, Social Networks, and Public Security*, 2006; Michel Misse, *Sujeito, Crime e Sujeição Criminal*, 2009; Gabriel de Santis Feltran, *Fronteiras de Tensão: Política e Violência nas Periferias de São Paulo*,

“The favelados evoke their belonging to the world of work as an attempt to distance themselves from the world of crime when the police invade the favela. Moreover, it gives the police a moral guide to their work. After all, if one is not a worker, one is a bandit and thus deserves to be mistreated and even killed. Finally, it also guides the “criminals” in situating themselves in relation to the police [...] The real criminal is one who respects the rules of crime: he or she does not rob workers and only robs the playboys – those who have real money” (Alves Amparo 2018:15).

The division between worker and bandit made irrelevant the generalization of human rights. This has particularly been apparent during prison rebellions in the recent years. Prisons in Brazil, especially in Pernambuco, are some of the most overcrowded in the world. Conditions are despicable as I can assure you from the times I have accompanied the delivery of prisoners and my visits to urban as well as rural male state prison complexes. Sewage, clean water, space, and food are luxuries for those residing. Rats, cockroaches and mosquito infestations are constant and pose a serious health risk. Visitations are allowed but often abused. Many wives, daughters or other female relatives pay guards or gang members with sexual favors for the safety of their loved ones, or they are forced to do so.

Within the context of mass incarceration of young black men, criminal structures transfer into the prison system. In recent years, these power dynamics resulted in violent gang wars that broke out and hundreds of prisoners belonging to opposing groups massacred each other. The police were hesitant to investigate these outbreaks of violence and the state government responded to the public outcry by offering the families of killed prisoners a financial compensation. But when the relatives of convicted criminals, many on violence charges, were

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2011; Graham Denyer Willis, *The Killing Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and the Regulation of Life and Death in urban Brazil*, 2015.

given stipends for the death in government custody, it caused protests. People were upset that “human rights” reward relatives of violent criminals, while their predominantly poor victims continued penniless.

In Brazil, the relatively recent interest and public mobilization for human rights is in today’s social conscience often misunderstood as the defense of criminals. It reduces the fundamental right to dignity for all members of society, to the protection of certain criminal individuals. Without human rights there is no exercise of citizenship. Who does not have citizenship is automatically marginalized or excluded from social life and political decisions. Many reduce the intentions of human rights merely to the defense of delinquents. It is forgotten that these rights apply to everyone and are made to protect the community in its entirety. Hence, while human rights operate especially where they are abused, thus, with the most vulnerable members of society, they are not exclusively for these people. In Brazil, however, the activism of human rights defenders is only seen publicly or displayed by the media when it comes to protecting the rights of those who are arrested, in prison, abused by the police as a part of punishment for a crime, defending women in the most vulnerable spaces such as prostitution, defending those who are deemed an abomination by the catholic church and other Christian institution.

### *Police killings*

Human Rights Watch claimed that in the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro alone police killed more than 11,000 people since 2003 (Human Rights Watch 2009). Furthermore, almost all of these killings the officers involved have reported the shootings as legitimate resistance killings, claiming they shot only in response to gunfire from criminal suspects.

Furthermore, Human Rights Watch argues that over the past five years there were more police resistance killings in São Paulo state (2,176) than police killings of suspects in all of South Africa (1,623), a country with a higher homicide rate than the city of São Paulo. Consequently, one must assume that many of those resistance killings are indeed abuse of police force.

Death at the hands of a police officer, commonly labeled *resistência* – resisting arrest – continues to be a rather mundane occurrence although there are several attempts to change this status quo (Denyer Willis 2014). Most victims die in a cop car on the way to the hospital, being “rescued” by police officers. This procedure is common for “casualties” and involves the eradication of physical evidence by removing the body from the crime scene, in an alleged attempt to rescue the victim by bringing him or her to the emergency room, where the victim often is denied urgent care (see Human Rights Watch Report 2009). As Alves points out, the scope of the complicity between police and medical staff is unknown, but “the expanse between the street, the police car, and the hospital constitutes the theater in which other state interventions energize police assassinations”(Alves Amparo 2018:147). This procedure has become a predictable modus operandi of the military police in Brazil, in five acts: resisted arrest, seriously injured fighting police, taken to hospital where victim succumbed injuries and is declared dead.

Underlying is that in most states police killings of civilians are not recorded by police organizations as a "homicide." In fact, it is based on the *a priori* assumption that they are not homicides but rather, the use of "legitimate force" against a criminal's threatening actions. Instead of assuming the victim's innocence, this system automatically assumes his or her guilt. The national system both limits the powers and leaves lots of discretion of locally-controlled and easily influenced judicial system where it does have powers. The public court system cannot try cases against military police officers. However, in 1996, a federal law was passed to make an

exception in the event of murders committed by police officers. Further, torture was finally defined as a crime only in 1997.

Impunity persists in part because the two police forces tend not to characterize the crimes of torture or homicide as such and these practices against criminals receive public support. In Brazil, human rights are often perceived as the enemy of the “good” working people, especially by members of public security institutions. In the eyes of those who want criminals convicted and trialed, it is democracy and more specifically human rights that award the *bandido* democratic rights and the victim obligations. A common saying in Brazil is: “*Bandido bom é bandido morto*” – a good criminal is a dead criminal and it encompasses the general attitude of law enforcement toward criminals of the lower classes. Human rights groups are accused of privileging the rights of criminals over the rights of their victims and to misrepresent police officers in their line of duty. In Brazil, shoot-to-kill policies and death squad activities can be directly linked to a lack of political will and implicit public support of such practices because they imagine themselves living in a “state of exception” (Agamben 2005) where no normal rules can apply. As a result, human rights and public security have developed into seemingly conflicting priorities. From this perspective, Brazilian police forces seem to struggle with, if not resist, democratic change. How can it be, that police transformation has been so halting in a country over 30 years removed from its transition to democracy?

The literature provides essentially one way of looking at the gruesome police massacres and violent outbursts in Brazil: Brazilian police organizations actively resist democratizing pressures for greater accountability and transparency by continuing historical practices of extreme, and often extra-judicial repression, and corruption (Denyer Willis 2014). The explanation seems simple: having never been held accountable during the dictatorship Brazil’s

police forces did not learn how to treat criminals, witnesses, and marginalized groups by human rights. However, I claim this explanation fails to exam one crucial variable, namely the actual lives and challenges of police officers on the ground in post-1985 Brazil. The logics of crime and violence, as well as police responses, vary dramatically by region, from paramilitary war machines in Rio, to repressive but less lethal cops in Recife.

The second body of knowledge consists of research that examines police organizations from a top-down, structuralism perspective. Here police organizations are conceptualized as “political appendages defined by pervasive and endemic institutional norms that promote corruption and an indiscrete use of violence” (Denyer Willis 2015). This body of knowledge relies extensively on quantitative analysis and interviews with primarily “accessible” police officers, in most cases press officers. What becomes apparent is that neither body of knowledge pays attention to what I think most matters when it comes to violence: the people and their daily experiences on the ground. There is clearly an area in the literature that has been yet underdeveloped, with important exceptions as mentioned before. The next chapters of this dissertation will emphasize the lived experience of police officer’s themselves. The practices, incentives, and constraints of police officers need to be examined in their local context. Disaggregating policing on a national (even regional), economic, social, and political level this dissertation will improve our understanding of their role in the construction of the (un)rule of law, marginality, their normative outlooks and sub-cultures and their structures of accountability.

#### *The turn toward “soft” governance*

After re-democratization in 1985, violent crime in Brazil rose significantly. Brazil’s sharing the border with the three major producers of cocaine – Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela –

positioned the country in the optimal spot for drug operations. The trafficking of marijuana and cocaine spurred the development of various mafia like structures and gangs. The violence that erupted in Brazil's urban centers made the issue of public security the center piece on the socio-political agenda for the decades to come. The repressive policing approaches of the 1990s and early 2000s showed the failures of traditional policies – generally militarized and reactive - to control crime and violence. Many shortcomings were identified in the traditional, repressive models, for example, a lack of planning and of investment, flawed training, an authoritarian legacy, human rights abuses, and institutional corruption (Cano 2008; Cano 2012). Despite the obvious failures, supporters of more traditional policing methods are plentiful and continue to advocate for no mercy toward criminals. Nevertheless, in the past decade several innovative policing initiatives have arisen in Brazil, a trend that is strongly correlated with the continuous administration and progressive social policies put forward by the Worker's Party.

Over the past years scholars have offered analysis on what they identify as a shift from “tough” to “soft” neoliberal urban governance, with the police at the center of the security state. However, under the neoliberal urbanism, as Alves argues, the practices of the police have been increasingly framed by cultural and human rights discourses as well as urban development. Importantly, the global economy shifted in a way that made so called “third world” metropolis such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Cape Town, and Mexico City into competitors for foreign investments. Making these cities “safe” has become a matter of urban development and crucial to qualify for investments. Under such discourse of development, Tony Samara observed (Samara 2010), the urban poor become a threat of underdevelopment and the police and criminal justice system are deployed not only to contain crime but also to enforce development.

Since the mid 2000s, Brazil as a whole and its metropolis in particular, have experienced transformations aiming to reduce violence rates. To reduce crime and especially violence, the state has targeted mainly favelas with a set of “progressive” strategies derived from Western models of human rights training for police officers, encouraging citizens to step in to neighborhood security councils, and implementing community police. Especially after the election of Lula in 2002 and his push for social programs, new images began to show in the media: police officers playing soccer with favela kids, military police big bands teaching how to play instruments to youth in the peripheries and military police planting trees in favelas, that were supposed to show the “human face” of the state, selling “soft” governance to enhance these underdeveloped, criminalized areas. In *The Security Archipelago*, Paul Amar (2013) argues that this new emergence of a human-security-based regime underlines the replacement of traditional discourse of a repressive state with moral politics. It brings to the fore a troubling discourse of “military humanitarianism” (Savell 2016), that allegedly rescues the bodies and souls of delinquents and liberates favela dwellers from vicious drug traffickers. The two programs discussed in this dissertation - Rio de Janeiro’s pacification of favelas and Recife’s Pact for Life - both fall under this “human-sensitive” approach to security. The concept of “soft” urban governance is a paradox that exists side by side with what Mbembé calls a “necropolitical state”<sup>13</sup> (Mbembé and Meintjes 2003) in a context of mass incarceration and astonishing numbers of killings of black youth..

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<sup>13</sup> Mbembe is concerned with the politics of death. To Mbembe “Necropolitics” has two main aspects: it is the power and capacity to dictate who may live and who may die - the ultimate expression of sovereignty; and Biopower, which is a domain of life over which power has taken control. Mbembe draws on Foucault’s concept of biopower and explores its relation to sovereignty and Agamben’s state of exception. Mbembe’s notion of sovereignty centers on “the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations” (Mbembe 2003:14)


*Two Unique “Soft” Security Measures in Brazil*

Over the past years scholars have offered analysis on what they identify as a shift from “tough” to “soft” neoliberal urban governance, with the police at the center of the security state (Arias 2004; Wacquant 2008; Denyer Willis 2012; Amar 2013; Alves Amparo 2018). However, under the neoliberal urbanism, as Alves argues, the practices of the police have been increasingly framed by cultural and human rights discourses as well as urban development. Importantly, the global economy shifted in a way that made so called “third world” metropolis such as São Paulo, Rio, Cape Town, and Mexico City into competitors for foreign investments. Making these cities “safe” has become a matter of urban development and qualification for investments. In the case of Brazil, the applications to host the Football World Cup 2014 and Olympic Games 2016 were driving revisions to the traditionally repressive public security measures in several cities, especially Rio de Janeiro. Under such discourse of development, Tony Samara observed, the urban poor become a threat of underdevelopment and the police and criminal justice system are deployed not only to contain crime but also to enforce development (Samara 2011:32). The Pacification Police Units in Rio de Janeiro and the Pact for Life in Recife are two such examples of public security developed under vastly different conditions and advertised internationally as a success story. Both cities launched public security programs modelled after templates in the U.S., Colombia and Japan, amongst others, employing approaches such as “community policing”, “proximity police”, and top-notch surveillance technology to deal with the staggering violence rates.

### *The Pacification Police Units*

In Rio de Janeiro, the government was attuned to the critique of international scholars and policy makers who continuously pointed out the separation of *favelas* and the rest of the city, describing favelas often as “parallel governments” and “city within a city”, which implied the lack of power and authority of the state in those areas. The Pacification Police Unit (Portuguese: *Unidade Policia Pacificadora*, hence UPP) is an innovative policing program aiming to dampen the regular shootouts in favelas and reintegrate them into the city. The program has been characterized by then governor Sergio Cabral as the “re-conquest” of territories formerly ruled by drug gangs, through the saturation with military police that are supposedly trained as community police officers.

Pacification involves, first, the invasion and occupation of a favela by a high number of police; second, the dislocation or arrest of known drug traffickers, and finally the installation of a permanent UPP station whose police officers are trained in human rights. Eventually, the new, safe environment is supposed to come into line with the legalization of commerce, urbanization (such as construction of hospitals, schools, playgrounds) and social outreach to include these areas into the formal city. The UPP program drew its inspiration from different security models, for example the *Plano Cuadrantes* in civil-war stricken Colombia and the Japanese community police model *Koban*, as well as several U.S. inspired community police models.



Part I Figure 4: Homicide Rate and Pacification. Source: ISP Rio de Janeiro 2013


The primary goal of pacification is the elimination of armed conflict in the favela that affected not only its residents, who are predominantly poor and dark-skinned, but often the more affluent neighbors. Since pacification shootouts and homicide rates throughout pacified favelas decreased rapidly and the UPP gained broad public support and were hailed as a democratic turn for the historically violent Military Police. The number of killings involving police have also dropped continuously; between 2003 and 2015 “auto-resistance-deaths” have declined by 46% across the state of Rio de Janeiro and by 62% in the capital city (Muggah et al. 2016). In the pacified favelas, killings by the police have dropped by 85%. In five years of experimentation since 2009, the UPP was credited with reductions of more than 65% in homicidal violence since its inception in 2009. The United Nations Global Report on Homicide noted the UPP program as a significant improvement in violence and homicide prevention.

### *The Pact for Life*

The ambitious multi-institutional public security reform called *Pacto pela Vida* (Pact for Life) has the explicit objective to decrease homicides in the state (not only the capital city) by 12 percent per year. The *Pacto*, as the program is referred to, also attempts to reform and manage interactions between all of the major state agencies associated with the justice system, as well as institutionalized the participation of civil society representatives (Wolff 2015; Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014). Following international, “democratic” examples of law enforcement, most of all New York’s COMPSTAT, the Pact for Life proposed a new form of management, accountability, infrastructure, and crime prevention measures explicitly targeting places, people and times where criminal activity recurs.

The Pacto also reconfigured the notion of policing substantially. The method of police work itself shifted in two important ways. First, the organization and management of both civil and military police were given a specific structure and set of performance guidelines. Patrols, performed by the Military Police, are being coordinated with local communities; data is collected using a geospatial information system (GIS) to map homicides including location, time, victim’s details and state of investigation.

Overall, the Pacto showed immediate results with a 26.26 percent reduction in homicide rates between 2007-2011. An average of 5.25 percent decrease per year was recorded (INFOPOL 2014). According to the Pernambuco Secretariat for Social Defense the reduction in homicide rates reached 39 percent in the period between 2006 - 2013, with a remarkable 60 percent decrease in violent crime in Recife.



Part I Figure 5: Violence Rates Pernambuco. Source: SDS Pernambuco 2015

On their state goals, both initiatives, the UPP and Pacto have been profoundly successful, at least on the surface, and have been touted by their proponents as exportable models of public security (Macedo 2012; Magaloni, Franco, and Melo 2015). Both respond to each local's particular logic of violence. In Rio de Janeiro, violence has long been dictated by a logic of territorial control and political as well as economic influence. After decades of brutal crack downs, the police could not count on the collaboration of local populations in exiling drug traffickers. The UPPs were to solve this problem by sheer police saturation, which makes credible the state's threat of repression and guarantee of protection, and therefore produces the ground conditions for civilian loyalty to the state (rather than to drug gangs) to develop. One problem with this approach, however, is the cost of maintaining and expanding such an intensive police presence (Wolff 2015). To illustrate, six years into the Governor Cabral's initiative, police recruitment has increased by some 30 percent, yet UPPs still directly affect only 7 percent of

Rio's favela population (Zaluar and Barcellos 2013). Another, and in my opinion more pressing problem is the lack of criminal investigation. In Brazil, the military police are charged with maintaining order, while civil police are responsible for investigations. In the case of UPP the civil police have no specific place or function in the program, rather is the pacified favela exclusively managed by military police.

The Pacto pela Vida, for its part, responds to an epidemiological pattern of violence, which is driven less by imperatives of territorial control, and instead as Michael Wolff argues, the spreading of an infectious disease (Wolff 2015). The Pacto, much like the UPP, seeks to identify hotspots – areas where outbreaks of violence are commonly originating- and directly address it before it spreads elsewhere (Sherman 1995). However, the Pacto involved various governmental and civilian institutions and put emphasis on both, guided performance in maintaining order in the streets (mainly through stop and frisk by military police) and investigation (especially a homicide task force by the civil police). Also, the Pacto collects geographic, demographic and criminal data meticulously and shares this information with the entire program.

Since roughly 2013, Brazil is facing a socio-economic crisis that influences public security in the form of widespread protests, severe funding cuts (Rio is essentially bankrupt as of this moment), and the rise of a right-wing movement advocating for militarization of the police. Both program experienced serious drawbacks as a result. Nevertheless, both represent a significant shift in policy orientation concerning violent crime. The UPPs and the Pacto are far more ambitious and more deeply institutionalized than any of their predecessor policies. They represent a fundamentally different philosophical view of the state's role in fighting crime than earlier policies and practices.

However, as this dissertation will show, there are serious intended and unintended consequences of both programs that impact the poor and black populations disproportionately. The UPP lack a holistic approach that involves crime investigation, a protocol and training of its officers. The approach of pacification, which in essence is the saturation of an area with a large number of police officers is long term prohibitively expensive. More importantly, while the UPP achieved its goal to make prime areas in the city safer, it also opened those regions up for real estate speculation that resulted in the displacement of its poor and black residents. Thus, as the late Marielle Franco has argued, the pacification police has become a “gentrification police” serving powerful elites and foreign investors (Franco 2014). The Pact for Life, despite its current deep crisis if not demise, exhibits more potential to achieve a longevity and permanent change in the region. Unfortunately, neither program achieved to change the fundamental experience of *favelados* of the state as a “necropolitical machine” (Mbembe 2003), as something that cannot foster life, but only produces black death. Similar to the rise and demise of the Worker’s Party, reaching its crescendo with the recent imprisonment of former president Lula, these innovative approaches to “soft” governance also found their end after the Olympic Games 2016.

## PART I

## THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PACIFICATION POLICE UNIT



Part I Figure 6: Graffiti in Santa Teresa, RJ. Photo by author

Since the 1980s, heavily armed drug traffickers ruled regions inside Rio de Janeiro as the monarchs of the hills. The police, on the other hand, entered these communities showing no

mercy, often using the so-called *caveirão* (an armored urban tank), helicopters, and military weaponry. A resident in Katia Lund's documentary *News from a Private War* pointed out: "Sometimes they [the police] don't come up to arrest, but they come up the hill to kill" (Lund and Moreira Salles 1999). Homicide rates in certain regions of Rio de Janeiro resembled numbers from a civil war, and the chronically repressive police only exacerbated the problem. In a city that has approximately seven hundred favelas, (in)security became a daily and always tragic issue.

In March 2011, President Barack Obama and his family visited the infamous City of God, a favela in Rio de Janeiro known for its notoriously violent drug gangs and dramatic conflicts with the police. City of God became a symbol for Rio's bloody wars between drug traffickers and the police through the same named film by Fernando Mereilles (Mereilles 2002). Obama, accompanied by his wife and children, was not wearing a bulletproof vest, nor seemed the Secret Service particularly worried about the President's safety. The first family walked through the favela, talked to residents, visited various projects and attended Capoeira, Samba, and Funk performances. Only one year earlier, homicide rates at City of God, which is home to more than 10,000 people, were alarming and the region was dominated entirely by armed drug traffickers. What has changed?

This part of the dissertation will introduce and examine one of the most discussed public security programs in Latin America, the Pacification Police Unit. Starting in 2009, the UPP program has changed the lives of cariocas living in or nearby favelas by saturating these communities with hundreds of military police officers. The UPP practically eliminated shootouts, making it safe enough for the President of the United States to walk through. The program has been widely hailed as an exportable public security model, although the Rio de

Janeiro has unique conditions regarding community and policing. The World Bank has found that the “Police Pacification Units are tackling security and social issues at the same time” and that the “successful experiences in Rio and the Southeast set an example for other Brazilian regions” (World Bank 2013). The UPP’s “goal is to disarm territories secured by fire weapons. I don’t know if this reality exists in another place in Brazil” Secretary of public security, Beltrame, stated in 2010 (author interview 2010).

Structured chronologically, starting in 2009, the following chapters of Part I analyze the UPP program on three levels: first, the unique historical and socio-political context of Rio de Janeiro; second, the attitudes and experiences of favela residents toward their UPP police; and finally, the attitudes of police officers toward the UPP program.

## CHAPTER 3

### POWER STRUCTURES: POLICE AND TRAFFICKERS IN SYMBIOSIS

This chapter introduces the particular dynamics and history of favelas and the police in Rio de Janeiro. I explore the genesis of the favela and drug traffickers beginning with an examination of the manner in which the favela is conceptualized, policed, and governed. First, I introduce the violent routine in Rio's favelas. I show that for the upper classes, officials, and city planners favela has always been a space of disorder and imminent danger. Then I present the history and structure of dominant drug factions that control entire territories and analyze the response on public security level. Finally, I argue that the conflict between drug traffickers and the police generated a collaboration and mutual enforcement, rather than a "parallel state". This underlying symbiosis, which in many ways is beneficial to traffickers and the police, but also residents and bureaucrats, is an important factor which makes public security and especially policing practice in Rio de Janeiro resistant to change.

*Field notes, 19 August 2009, Morro da Saudade, Rio de Janeiro (pre-pacification)*

One Wednesday morning, just after seven o'clock, the loud beat of the Baile Funk had just faded, a strange clapping-noise filled the air. Preparing breakfast, I asked Wagner what this noise could be. "The traffickers are probably just testing new guns" was his response. We heard more of these shots when suddenly a different sort of weapon could be heard, a dark growling sound. This dark, threatening sound was unmistakably the BOPE – an elite military police squad - making its way up the hill. Only minutes later a helicopter began to circle above the favela and the shooting and shouting increased; one could hear people running through the alleys and over the rooftops.

"The pigs choose to storm when children are leaving for school," said Wagner angrily meaning the police. The now massive shoot-out made leaving the house impossible, and all we could do was to lie on the floor to decrease the risk of being shot – although there were no windows I have seen bullets go through brick walls. Suddenly, something dropped on our roof and rolled sideward where it fell and finally exploded in the lot next to our house. The walls were shaking but did not collapse. Thankfully the family next door left their house months ago. To calm me down, Wagner explained that this was only a "small" *bomba caseira*, a home-made grenade that apparently missed its destination. It was not very calming. Since I had never experienced such a war-like situation before, I put all my faith in my friend, Wagner, who after fourteen years living here certainly knew how dangerous the situation was. I asked him if he was afraid. For a moment he seemed unsure of what to say, as if weighing what effect his answer would have on me. Eventually, he admitted to being concerned. Seeing my horror, he added quickly that his house is small and in the midst of others, shielded from stray bullets. The shooting, helicopter chattering, and yelling lasted for almost two, seemingly endless hours. When the helicopter left, and the shooting decreased, Wagner got up.

"Time to go to work," after all a *tiroteio* (shooting) is not a sufficient excuse to miss work in Rio. Even though, leaving the house appeared crazy to me I could not bear the thought of staying here alone or risk being discovered by the BOPE. I stepped outside instructed not to look left nor right but to follow Wagner straight to the exit. We passed people running with children in their school uniform to hide in their homes. At the first corner, my eyes moved to the right. I found myself facing a black rifle barrel attached to a uniformed BOPE officer crouched in the dirt, his eyes fixed on me. A black mask was covering most of his face. He was so close, I could count the sweat drops on his forehead. I froze, hoping he was trained and willing to distinguish me from the "bad guys." Carefully, Wagner took my hand and pulled me away.



*Part I Figure 7: BOPE Symbol. Source: BOPE website*

This police operation in 2009 was a joined effort by the Military Police, Civil Police, and the BOPE that was a revenge act for an *arrastão* mass robbery that had taken place just two days ago. In the tunnel, just below Saudade, criminals robbed four white upper-class citizens sitting in their cars at gun point. The criminals have caused such terror that nine cars were left abandoned in the middle of the tunnel. Two days later, the police stormed Saudade and its neighbor favela equipped with two helicopters, one urban tank, and 100 police officers to find the suspects and to show that their actions have consequences. They found Israeli machine guns, a precision rifle, and two 9mm pistols. In a house, which they entered without warrant or consent, the police found the stolen jewelry. They also arrested four men, one of which was the number two in the hierarchy of the drug faction at Saudade. An accomplished drug dealer, he was very unlikely to have been involved in the robbery. Residents told me that at least one man had been killed, but nothing about that showed in the news. The robbery of affluent citizens became a legitimate reason to wage a “war on drugs”; in reality it was a carefully placed reminder of what happens if the drug traffickers do not have their people “under control”. Robbing inside and in proximity of

your favela is widely prohibited by the drug lords, precisely because it attracts police. In smaller cases, such as stealing from a local grocery store, the drug traffickers will punish the culprit themselves. However, when the “first class” citizens or tourists get involved all hell breaks loose.

On the news, I learned that a group of drug traffickers hid inside classrooms at the public school next to the favela, effectively holding dozens of children as their human shields. Reportedly, other 1,300 children were not able to attend classes that day. Neither the police nor the traffickers showed any measures to minimize the danger for civilians in their dispute. The anecdote above demonstrates the routine that residents of many favelas in Rio go through. At Morro da Saudade, shoot-outs happened on a weekly basis. The drug gang that was ruling Saudade was regularly attacked by rival gangs from neighboring hills. Police operations of such scale were less common, usually police officers were paid to not mingle in the favela business, which they gladly accepted to keep shooting at a minimum. However, every couple of months or so, police would raid the community either because a bribe failed, a crime affected “first class citizens”, or to show “productivity” to their superiors and the media.

Historically the drug factions of Rio de Janeiro emerged during the military regime in the 1970s when political prisoners were imprisoned together with "ordinary" criminals. The state's expectation was that the political prisoners would be subordinated or eliminated by their prison mates. However, the political prisoners managed to not only survive but also recruit other prisoners in their critique of social inequality and against state repression. That way an organized faction with an own ideology developed that called itself *Comando Vermelho* (The Red Command), who claimed to represent the excluded and marginalized and promised to protect the people against an oppressive state. From the 1980s on criminal organizations that resided in favelas and claimed to protect the residents from the state.

After democratization, Brazil quickly emerged as the world's second largest cocaine consumer in the world, after the US. The demand for this expensive drug, coming almost exclusively from the upper and middle classes in cosmopolitan cities such as Rio and São Paulo, offered a unique business opportunity for the poorest members of society. Groups such as the CV financed themselves increasingly through drug trafficking; they provided jobs in form of packaging centers in favelas where men and women would weigh and package cocaine and marijuana into small portions. The CV established zones of its rule in the favelas of Rio, where most state institution had no access to and guarded it with increasingly militarized weaponry. In those zones, the residents did not pay electricity or water, but also had no garbage collection, no adequate infrastructure, furthermore, the separation from the formal city, became physically marked by firearms (Perlman 2010; Wacquant 2008).



*Part I Figure 8: "Gato" - deriving electricity illegally for residents at Morro da Saudade. Photo by author.*

## FAVELAS, DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND THE POLICE IN RIO

Favela cannot be fully understood without discussing social inequality in Brazil. Brazilian philosopher Marilena Chauí wrote that Brazil's is a "verticalised and hierarchised" society "in which social relations are always realized either in the form of complicity (when the social subject recognizes each other as equals) or in the form of orders and obedience between a superior and an inferior." Thus, the idea of 'equality of rights and the juridical equality of citizens' does not exist (in Kingstone and Power 2000:221). Anthropologist Roberto da Matta reaches a similar conclusion; he argues that the cordiality and conviviality that often impress tourists also produce personal exceptions to every rule, the so-called *jeitinho* (Da Matta 1997). Different rules are expected for different layers of society and laws are not enforced universally, but internally, among peers. Rio de Janeiro has a lucrative illegal drug market, mainly cocaine; a host of geographic barriers in its many mountainside favelas many of which are located in wealthy neighborhoods, and a policing strategy that for the last three decades has consisted of extremely violent but periodic and unpredictable police assaults in favelas.

Adventurous youth from wealthy neighborhoods regularly hike the *morro* (hill) - as favelas in Rio are referred to - to attend the (in)famous *Baile Funk*, a particular music and party scene. In recent years, favela tourism has also become a popular business. The public perception of favelas is distorted by the imagery offered by the arts and media, who paint a homogenous picture of favelas and obscure the realities of the life within. Favelas can be found in the center and peripheries, on hills and flatlands. Some slums are fairly recent, others, like the Morro da Providência, are over a hundred years old. Favelas vary widely in size, population, political structure, and layout. The largest favela with approximately 200,000 inhabitants (governmental and NGO data varies significantly) is arguably Roçinha in Rio. Over decades of improvisation,

many favelas developed into self-sufficient economies – with their supermarkets, bars, beauty salons, and drug packaging districts. Because there was no formal government presence, the residents developed their own justice system, infrastructure, water, and electricity supply. Roçinha and many other favelas became "cities within the city".

In her book, *Favela*, Janice Perlman describes a “sphere of fear” that came to life due to the increasing violence in Rio, mainly referring to the unpredictability of stray bullets. The public’s heightened fear caused a profound urban segregation, described by Teresa Caldeira as "fortified enclaves". Those citizens who could afford it retreated from public space into enclaves with private security system and bulletproof windows; the working class and poor residents' only option for security, however, was to turn to drug traffickers who secured their territories against the police and rival gangs with military weapons. The population's feeling of insecurity increasingly shaped a more repressive public policy and officials who searched for policies to calm a fearful public. According to Hagopian “what is critical is that citizens perceive the government as responsive, accountable, and relatively free of corruption, whether or not the actual results meet expectations” (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005:321) – none of which applies to Brazil. It would be tough to find any Brazilian who does not openly admit and complain about the government’s corruption and ineffectiveness.

### Who commits more acts of violence in the favela?

<i>In Percent</i>	
Police	22
Traffickers	11
Both	48
None	12
Don't know	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Part I Figure 9: Random sample. Source: Janice Perlman 2010

The locally founded chapters of a drug gang, be it CV, ADA or TC, attracted immediately youth from the communities by offering money, firearms and status (Jetersonke, Muggah, and Rodgers 2009). Although local chapters are explicitly affiliated with one of the three factions, and occasionally they might join powers to fight a rival faction or the police, the CV, ADA, and TC do not answer to a single chain of command. The *dono do morro* – local drug lord - controls one particular favela and may collaborate with other gangs of the same affiliation. But the umbrella nature of the CV, ADA, or TC is more symbolic than demonstrative of any real unity. Despite the often-dramatic media accounts linking those factions to kidnapping and even internationally organized crime, all three factions are principally involved in localized crime, and violence is mostly limited to their territory<sup>14</sup>. In broad view, drug gangs in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro have become powerful political entities that maintain territorial control and exercise elaborate authority functions. Drug traffickers represent law and order in favelas through what

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<sup>14</sup> In recent years a worrisome trend shows their spread into Northeastern states. Jailed CV bosses have often been transferred to prisons in the Northeast to weaken their local leadership out of prison; however, this strategy backfired as they managed to organize within the prisons and establish their business in the new location. One of the results of these power struggles are brutal gang wars between CV and *Família do Norte* (a gang originating in the North of the Amazon) within prisons that have recently been covered by the international media.

they call *Lei do Trafico* (law of the traffickers) or *Lei do Silêncio* (law of silence). They hold trials for accused community or gang members, punish any crime such as stealing or fights with brutality, kill traitors or police informants, mediate domestic issues, and provide charity to the community. Due to their network in the community (most grew up in the favela where they deal), they are able to gather intel about any and every incident in the favela and perform “justice” quickly and efficiently.



*Part I Figure 10: Drug traffickers in a favela. Photo credit: Felipe Dana*

Despite the high price of cocaine, drug dealers in the favelas are not to be imagined as influential millionaires like Pablo Escobar. The majority of the income generated by the drug trade does not stay in the favela. While the *dono* might be living more luxurious according to local standards, their income does not come near to those residing in the Zona Sul south zone of

Rio, or the silent investors in the drug trade. They earn sufficiently to throw exuberant parties, buy flat screen TVs, and send their children to college but they are not able to leave the favela for the police will find them. The draconian state violence attempting to kill off drug traffickers has failed to bring order and peace to Rio's favelas and has had the reverse effect of reinforcing criminal legitimacy, as residents suffer police abuse and lose faith in the state. Desmond Arias indicates that high levels of violence can be destabilizing to democratic governments, for example in the cases of Peru and Colombia. He poses the underlying question: "how can democratic order, which is necessary to guarantee civil and human rights, can be extended to Rio's favelas?" (Arias 2004:2).

Traffickers in Rio are overwhelmingly poorly educated, black, adolescent men. Consequently, Arias asks how such a group can pose a serious threat to the city and hold such substantial power that they can establish "parallel states" in the midst of the city (Arias and Ungar 2009). While there is little doubt that drug gangs in Rio are responsible for significant levels of armed violence and homicides, they are the direct result of governmental abandonment and social exclusion, rather than a recent occurrence established by drug traffickers (Goldstein 2003; Zaluar 2004; Misse 2011). Drug traffickers indeed constitute a real risk to society and democratic order, but not more than the abusive law enforcement. Different to the state, drug factions are often also a source of welfare and participatory governance. In 2003 the *Comando Vermelho* issued a statement:

"it is no longer possible to put up with these politicians and their oppressive and cowardly policies which are creating terror in poor communities, ordering their inferior worms, the police, to invade favelas and create terror, causing the deaths of many innocents, including old ladies, children, and adolescents ... someone has to put an end to this violence, and that someone will have to be us, because the people aren't able to fight for their rights, but they are aware of who is robbing and killing them (Folha de São Paulo, 24 February 2003).

In the statement above, sent to the government, the CV "uses the language of the patriarch, the territory's owner, and the residents' master, to attempt to legitimate its authority" (Penglase 2010:324). The police and the traffickers are competing over power, which as many police officers I have interviewed indicated was "stolen" by the traffickers. Many drug traffickers and police officers grew up in the same favela playing football; but ultimately, they found themselves pulling the trigger at the opposing ends of a conflict. The vast inequality and unemployment, pervasive consumerism, and corruption of political institutions gave rise to a new generation of "bandits". Young men from impoverished families are ready to use violence to access goods and the respect they were denied by the market economy and society. Essentially these men believe they have two choices: the *caminho do bem* - righteous path - or disconnect themselves from an oppressing state in joining the seemingly all-powerful drug faction.

If joining the police force, these young men must leave the favela or keep their job secret as they would certainly be killed by drug traffickers. Both describe their decision as a vocation to be a hero fighting for freedom. Police officers and drug traffickers (until recently almost exclusively male) use a gendered ideology of masculine authority to structure their relationship with each other and the residents of the city's favelas. Gendered notions of respect and heroism, often derived from Christian context, provide police with a way to legitimate their influence, naturalizing inequality and silencing contestation. In the center of masculinity in Brazil stands the ability to be violent. Brazilian anthropologist Roberto da Matta (1997) pointed out the close links between masculinity and violence by noting the ubiquity of slang terms that equate the capacity to be violent with virility. Parker argues that such symbolic structure "links notions of virility and potency to notions of force, power, and violence" (Parker 1991:38). The following

two examples, lyrics from a Military Police hymn and a funk music dedicated to the CV gang, demonstrate the parallels and differences between the police and drug traffickers.

### **Hymn of the Military Police Rio de Janeiro**

Em cada momento vivido  
uma verdade vamos encontrar  
Em cada fato esquecido  
uma certeza nos fará lembrar

I every lived moment  
a truth we will find  
In every forgotten fact  
One certainty will remind us

Em cada minuto passado  
mais um caminho que se descobriu  
Em cada soldado tombado  
Mais um sol que nasce no céu do Brasil  
Aqui nós todos aprendemos a viver  
demonstrando valor, pois o nosso ideal  
é algo que nem todos podem entender  
na luta contra o mal!

In every minute that passes  
One more path we will discover  
Every fallen soldier  
Is one more star that is born on Brazil's sky  
Here we all learn how to live  
Showing value, because this is our ideal  
It's something not everyone can understand  
In our fight against evil!

Ser Policial  
é, sobretudo, uma razão de ser  
É, enfrentar a morte,  
mostrar-se um forte  
no que acontecer

To be police  
Is above all, a reason to be  
It means to face death  
To show strength  
No matter what happens

Em cada pessoa encontrada  
mais um amigo para defender  
Em cada ação realizada  
um coração pronto a agradecer  
Em cada ideal alcançado  
uma esperança para outras missões  
Em cada exemplo deixado  
mais um gesto inscrito em nossas tradições  
Em cada instante da vida  
nossa Polícia Militar  
será sempre enaltecida  
em sua glória secular!

In each person we recover  
One more friend we gain to defend  
In each successful mission  
A thankful heart  
In every achieved ideal  
Hope for the next mission  
In every example we gave  
Another part inscribed in our tradition  
In every moment of life  
Our Military Police  
Will always be lauded  
In its secular glory!

Em cada recanto do Estado  
deste amado Rio de Janeiro,  
faremos ouvir nosso brado,  
o grito eterno de um bravo guerreiro!

In every corner of the state  
The beloved Rio de Janeiro  
We will make heard our growl  
the eternal scream of a brave warrior!

Ser Policial  
 é, sobretudo, uma razão de ser  
 É, enfrentar a morte,  
 mostrar-se um forte  
 no que acontecer

To be police  
 Is above all, a reason to be  
 It means to face death  
 To show strength  
 No matter what happens

*Part I Figure 11: Source: Military Police of Rio de Janeiro*

There are hundreds, if not thousands of songs by and about drug factions in Rio. The style, funk *proibidão* (forbidden funk) glorifies the gang but also announces big bosses, changes, new rules, planned invasions, threats, and recent losses or wins. Each and every favela has their own funk. The music is under surveillance by the secretary of public security. The following sample, dedicated to the Comando Vermelho faction, demonstrates a similar vigor as in the hymn of the military police. It is clearly less patriotic than the police song, focusing on one favela which amounts to their cosmos, while the police hymn located the police as Brazil's protectors. Nevertheless, this excerpt demonstrates the general attitude of drug traffickers who perceive themselves as fulfilling their destiny, indulging in the luxuries their "work" gives them, and embracing the danger and risk as part of their vocation.

### **MC Orelha; Vermelhão tipo faixa de Gaza (Red like the Gaza Stripe)**

Na faixa de gaza, só homem bomba,  
 Na guerra é tudo ou nada,  
 Várias titânio no pente,  
 Colete a prova de bala,  
 Nós desce pra pista pra fazer o assalto,  
 [...]  
 Perfume importado pistola no Couto,  
 Mulher ouro e poder,  
 Lutando que se conquista,  
 Nós não precisa de credito,  
 Nós paga tudo a vista,  
 É ECKO, LACOSTE, é peça da OAKLEY,  
 Várias camisas de time,

In the Gaza stripe, only suicide bombers  
 In war it's all or nothing  
 Multiple titanium in the comb [head],  
 Bulletproof vest,  
 We descend to the streets to assault,  
 [...]  
 Imported perfume and pistol on the hip  
 Women, gold and power,  
 Fighting is how to conquest,  
 We do not need credit [cards],  
 We pay all cash,  
 It's ECKO, Lacoste, and Oakley,  
 Various [soccer] team shirts,

Quem ta de fora até pensa que é mole  
Viver do crime,

Nós planta HUMILDADE, pra colher poder,  
A recompensa vem logo após,  
Não somos fora da lei,  
Porque a lei quem faz é nós,

Nós é o CERTO pelo CERTO,  
Não aceita covardia,  
Não é qualquer um que chega  
e ganha moral de cria,

Consideração se tem,  
Pra quem age na pureza,  
Pra quem ta amando o papo é reto  
Bota as peça na mesa,

Quantos amigos eu vi,  
Ir morar com Deus no céu?  
Sem tempo de se despedir,  
Mais fazendo o seu papel,

Por isso eu vô manda,  
Por isso eu vô manda assim,  
Comando vermelho até o fim,  
É vermelhão desde pequenininho,  
[...]

Outsiders might even think it's easy  
to live from crime,

We plant HUMILITY, to harvest power,  
The rewards come soon after,  
We are not outside the law,  
Because we make the law,

We answer RIGHT with RIGHT,  
We don't accept cowardice  
It's not just anyone who can come and earn  
support since childhood,

We have consideration,  
For those who act in purity,  
For those who love straight talk  
Who put the piece on the table,

How many friends I've seen,  
Who went to live with God in heaven?  
No time to say goodbye,  
but doing their part,

Thus, I proclaim,  
I tell you  
It's the Red Command till the end,  
It's red since little  
[...]

*Part I Figure 12: Source: MC Orelha, , <https://www.ouvirmusica.com.br/mc-orelha/1538377>*

## SAINTS, DRAGONS, AND MASCULINITIES



Part I Figure 13: Saint George, patron of police and traffickers

Ben Penglase observes that “heteronormative ideologies of gender and sexuality necessarily stratify the allocation of legal rights and social privileges” (Penglase 2010). Drug lords describe themselves as *dono do morro* the owners of the hill, making the community his family whom he will protect in exchange for submission and respect. Both, police and drug traffickers enforce their masculinity and power through religious mythology, in particular the figure of Saint George<sup>15</sup>, the dragon slayer, who is the patron of warriors. King David is another biblical figure that both groups identify with and pray to. The following psalm would frequently be displayed in police squad rooms as well as graphitized by traffickers on walls in favelas:

<sup>15</sup> Saint George plays also an important role for Afro-Brazilian religions such as Umbanda and Candomblé in which he is referred to as the African *orixá* Ogum.

“Blessed be the Lord, my rock, who trains my hands for war, and my fingers for battle” (Psalm 144:1).

The proximity of criminal organizations and the state is observable in everyday practices. Many bureaucrats, police, and politicians work with dealers to accomplish personal objectives. These actions strengthen drug factions, which, as a result, operate with relative freedom inside favelas. Enrique Desmond Arias, in particular, has shown how the networks of traffickers, politicians, police, and civic leaders allow favelas controlled by a drug gang to be included in Rio de Janeiro’s broader political and social system. While undermining legitimate democratic aspirations, these networks produce "uncivil movements" as Leigh Payne calls it. Uncivil Movements are expressions of violent, exclusionary social mobilizations that eventually strengthen pro-authoritarian politicians (Payne 2000). More importantly, for my work at least, is the direct relationship between the two "war machines," the traffickers and the police. Ben Penglase, for example, observed how by accusing each other of being the source of arbitrary violence, the state and traffickers depend on each other to justify and to produce their strategy for "order" and "security" (Penglase:2009). Since state services broadly do not exist in these areas populated by the poorest citizens, favela residents showed extraordinary abilities in constructing their infrastructure such as sewage systems, electricity, transportation, law enforcement and legal representation through resident's associations (*Associação de Moradores*, hence AM). Local leadership plays a major role in favelas' internal governance.

Desmond Arias writes: “In the 20 years of authoritarian rule that began in 1964, AMs worked to protect favelas from removal and provided government services in large areas of the city. With the return of democracy in the 1980s, clientelist politicians again used contacts with AMs to gain access to votes. These efforts resulted in improved urban services in favelas but

weakened the AMs and their state-wide interest group as the government met many favelas' most pressing infrastructural needs" (Arias 2004:2).

Today, different organizations enforce order over various aspects of life in Rio's favelas. Arias summarizes the distribution of power as follows: "No longer are AMs the primary leaders of communities. Rather, drug traffickers, AMs, religious groups, and NGOs all participate in the management of favelas. (...) In this context, traffickers have the upper hand, but since they ultimately depend on the tolerance of favela residents themselves for protection against police and outside traffickers, drug dealers must often work peacefully with other favela leaders to resolve differences" (Arias 2006). The power of traffickers is not increased by the absence of the state; on the contrary, corrupt police, disinterested bureaucrats, and personalistic politicians all empower these criminals and lubricate bureaucratic channels through illicit but widely accepted exchanges. The drug traffickers at Saudade, for example, assist needy residents with money for medicine, food, housing and mediators (albeit violent ones) in domestic conflicts. Both, traffickers and the police are essential brokers that mediate between the underprivileged and the state, as the following anecdote shows.

*Fieldnotes, Rio de Janeiro, Morro da Saudade, 14 October 2014*

I found Luiza sitting on a concrete bench in the little square at the entrance of the favela. It was a beautiful evening, and the sun was just disappearing behind the green mountains allowing to cool off a little. Surrounded by rubbish and cockroaches, she was drinking beer and asked me to join her. Luiza was in a gloomy mood. Today she remembers her son, who was shot dead by the police some years ago. Her son, Jefferson, was her only child and as a single mother, she worked hard to afford a good school and healthcare.

They shared a tiny room, her, sleeping in a little bed and him on the dirt floor. "I told him, he has a good life. We were simple, but we had each other", Luiza remembers. Aged twelve, Jefferson joined the drug traffickers under the charismatic dono at the time. In just a few years he climbed the ranks to "salesman," earned money, status and a girlfriend. Soon enough his girlfriend got pregnant.

Luiza thought the prospect of a child would make Jefferson leave the gang; "If you continue like this, you will never see your daughter turn fifteen, I would tell him. He would get a little mad at me but then he would stroke my cheek and say 'don't be silly mother'". When Jefferson was almost shot in a police chase, Luiza tried to get him out of the favela. She sent him to live with an aunt, but he came back "like a dog." She cried, pleaded with him, offered money, beat him as hard as she could. At one point she even hoped he would get shot, incapacitated in some way so that he wouldn't be able to stay in the gang. She knew that otherwise Jefferson would not live much longer.

One day, a group of police officers appeared at Jefferson's shack, who was sleeping. They shot him right through the bricks and disappeared the body. She saw the blood when she got home from work. A group of drug traffickers had already arrived to help with the clean-up, but she screamed and threw things at them. "I hate the traficantes. But I hate the police more" Luiza said. I offered to accompany her to the cemetery to visit Jefferson's grave. But Luiza didn't want to, "he left me behind. This was his fault; he knew what would happen. He knew, and he left me alone."

After Jefferson's murder, the drug traffickers negotiated with the police and recovered his body to give him a proper funeral. Shortly after, Luiza was awarded a house by the governmental project Cimento Social. They built her a neat little one-

bedroom home, with tile floors, a bathroom, a kitchen, and a roof terrace. They even painted it her favorite color: purple. The resident association of the favela – effectively a legal representative of the local drug gang to operate in the formal world – was involved in Cimento Social “randomly choosing” Luiza. She doesn’t like to talk about the fact, that the house was a compensation for her dead son.

As Luiza’s story above demonstrates, brokers – in her case mainly drug traffickers and the resident’s association - impact state-citizen relations and decision-making processes regarding the allocation of resources such as housing, infrastructure, security, social care, and healthcare. It is possible that the drug traffickers felt compelled to "care" for Luiza simply out of compassion; indeed, the drug lord at the time was known as a helpful man. But how did a group of police officers pass unhindered through the favela, find Luiza's home and why was Jefferson never warned?

It was highly unusual for a group of police officers to enter the favela without being confronted by dozens of men armed to their teeth. It is much more likely that Jefferson was a sacrifice to appease the police who’s superiors were pressuring them to show results of their "war on drugs." To avoid a full-blown warfare, which would leave many victims on both sides, Jefferson became a disposable piece in this "peace" negotiation. It is not certain why he was chosen, but probably he was causing some trouble within the organization. Maybe he sniffed some of the cocaine he was supposed to sell; maybe he kept some of the revenues for himself. The fact is that we all knew that Jefferson’s death was not accidental but based upon agreement.

The police got to show their "productivity" of eliminating dangerous traffickers, the favela was spared a bloody confrontation, and Luiza earned a proper house.

Such actions contradict actively the myth that favelas are "parallel" to the state, as many scholars still depict it (see for example Leeds 1996; Arias 2006; Penglase 2009; Amar 2013; Wheeler 2014). On the contrary, favelas under the regime of drug traffickers exist in their form despite the state. While "the state" is creating the image of being in an epic battle against murderous dragons, its "police forces are indeed both, dragon and dragon slayer" (Bittner 1970). In this example the AM reached out to a governmental program, drug traffickers negotiated with the police and bribed government employees to choose Luiza as a house recipient. These intertwined formal and informal actions and transactions show that there is nothing parallel to this relationship between criminal organization and the state. They function in a routinized and structured symbiosis.

For most of the last thirty years, public security policy in Rio de Janeiro has been characterized by poorly institutionalized initiatives in reaction to particular and acute political crises (Cano 2008). In other words, there was little policy per se, other than that of "muddling through, and decisions were often based on heated media scandals following dramatic news of violent crime, and consequently, they lacked any long-term rationale for reducing crime" (Wolff 2015). That said, there has been a general trend to increase police firepower and discretionary violence in both cities, as public opinion tended to lean that way (Caldeira and Holston 1999). In Rio, this trend led to a dramatic increase in police killings that earned the police the notoriety of being the world's most violent (Human Rights Watch 2016). Such high levels of violence can be destabilizing to democratic governments, as the examples of Colombia and Peru show (see for example (Koonings and Kruijt 2013; Taylor 2009).

The repressive approach of most governments in the region seems to have even exacerbated the conflict: the heavy-fisted attempts to arrest or kill drug traffickers has resulted in

younger, more radicalized and reckless gang members as well as police officers. Both sides developed radical concepts of their enemies, reducing civilians - like residents of favelas - to either criminal or worker, allowing "collateral damage" more openly. Revenge actions on the side of the police show that no differentiation is made between actual offenders and residents or children; they seemingly merged into a homogenous group labeled "enemy," that has to be eliminated at any cost (Magaloni, Franco, and Melo 2015).

The upper classes, city planners, and politicians widely regard favelas as disorganized agglomerations that is painful to see, a nuisance to hear, and dangerous to cross. However, in reality life in Rio's favelas has many implied rules and is carefully structured. Drug traffickers established a rigid form of law and order that they apply indiscriminately. While the police routinely performs violent raids in favelas, these two antagonistic groups are more similar than one would assume. In fact, residents in Janice Perlman's survey are not sure who of the two is more violent. Labeled eternal enemies, police and traffickers actually established a well-oiled collaboration over the years in which both sides profit; both use armed conflict to appease superiors or to get rid of bothersome members (as Luiza's story suggests); both can blame escalating violence on the other party, hence, legitimizing their existence. Finally, both are essentially the product of the elites' habits and demands for cocaine which is inherently the baseline for the development of these criminal organizations and some increasingly violent police.

## CHAPTER 4

### STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL CONTROL: EXPERIMENTING WITH DEMOCRACY?

This chapter is to provide a detailed history of important predecessors of the UPP project and analyze the particular motivation and design of the program. I argue that in Rio de Janeiro it was primarily the elites who pushed for a change of public policy that resulted in the Pacification Police Unit. However, the motivation were not so much the thousands of poor youth killed in urban conflict, but rather to develop a more “civilized” manner of unarmed drug trafficking without having to legalize drugs altogether.

I will first situate the UPP in the context of previous public security measures. Then I trace the conception, organization, and implementation of the UPP program in particular favelas in Rio de Janeiro. Finally, I discuss the notion of pacification as a form of military humanitarianism.

Public policy in Rio has focused on the surface of the problem of violence by trying to remove the undesirable populations from the view of the upper classes. In the 1960s and 1970s, over 100,000 residents were forcibly moved and placed in public housing projects in the peripheries. *Cidade de Deus* (City of God), for instance, was planned and created by the state government of Guanabara in 1960 as part of a policy to systematically move favelas from the city center of Rio, and to resettle the inhabitants far out in the suburbs.

Not surprisingly, many of the proposed solutions to the violent conflicts in Rio centered on policing practice. Like most Latin American police forces, Brazil’s military and civil police

are notorious for poor training, violence, corruption, and inefficiency. Brazilians have keenly looked up north to the United States for ideas of public security. For example, Rio de Janeiro has employed New York's "zero tolerance" and "stop and frisk" measures, which impose "automatic punishment for infractions of a stated rule, with the intention of eliminating undesirable conduct". At the other extreme, some community policing strategies were experimented with; for example, in São Paulo, however, without sustainable success.

In 2000, a man called Garotinho saw the chance to go from radio broadcaster to secretary of public security of Rio de Janeiro, by playing on people's fear of the ongoing violence in the city. After decades of fighting violence with violence, Garotinho put together a group of social researchers who eventually ghost-wrote his electoral public security program based on community police approaches. His promises elected Garotinho to Secretary of Public Security and finally, governor of Rio de Janeiro. The head of the research team, Brazilian anthropologist Luis Eduardo Soares was made the assistant secretary of public security, in Brazil a very high ranking political position. However, Garotinho dismissed Soares already in March 2000, which was quickly labeled as illegitimate and a serious setback for human rights. The circumstances suggested that Soares was removed due to pressure from the Rio Civil Police Chief Alvaro Lins, an infamously corrupt and violent figure amongst police officers. After receiving death threats, Soares went abroad for a time, becoming what has been dubbed a "neoexile."

Despite the overtly corrupt nature of Garotinho's administration, it also marked a change in Rio's public security approach by launching a community policing project called the *Grupamento de policiamento em areas especiais* (GPAE) was initiated in 2002. Even though the program initially seemed very promising; it was abandoned only a few years later. The short

lived GEPAE experiment significantly tainted the way “community policing” is conceptualized by favela residents in Rio de Janeiro.

Things went back to "normal" when in June 2007 troops from the Civil and Military Police invaded the conglomeration of dozens of favelas known as Complexo do Alemão to demonstrate a firm position against the drug trade. The favela-conglomeration - also known as the "Gaza Strip" - was the headquarters of the Comando Vermelho (CV), inhabited by approximately 200,000 people. By the end of the operation, at least nineteen civilians were killed, who the state claimed they were members of the CV. This invasion was the start of a two month- long (but unsuccessful) campaign to shut down the drug trade of the CV. In the end, the operation cost at least 25 lives, all of whom were claimed to be dangerous drug traffickers. At the time, the newly elected governor of Rio, Sérgio Cabral, responded to the outcry of international and local human rights groups that it was time to take back the city and that the state was at war with criminal elements, "a war that cannot be won without bloodshed". Surprisingly, given the aggressive police operations at the beginning of Cabral's mandate, the same governor has ultimately been responsible for the implementation of a Pacification Police Unit (UPP), a militarized community policing program.

#### THE DESIGN OF THE PACIFICATION POLICE UNIT

The political timing of the UPP was not favorable because the failure of the GPAE still lingered in the city. Beltrame's aim to "pacify" notoriously violent favelas with the help of the, also notoriously violent military police, was pushed by middle and upper classes. Their complaints about the constant shoot outs in the favelas bordering their neighborhoods have become louder. Rio de Janeiro's geography has a lot to do with the motivation to design the UPP

program to eliminated such “loud” confrontation. They “marvelous” city, as Rio is called, is characterized by mountains throughout the city, beaches, and Atlantic rain forest. Different to many other setting, in Rio favelas throne above the poshest neighborhoods, which are located near the beach.

Rich and poor live next to each other in this “segregated city” (Leite 2000). For example, the neighborhood Gávea in the southern zone of the city, has the state’s highest Human Development Index (HDI) (and one of the highest in the country), but is located adjacent to Roçinha, Brazil’s largest favela, which has one of the lowest HDI.

Armed conflicts at Roçinha are visible and audible; at night one can see bullets flying and hear grenades explode. Stray bullets pose a serious risk, potentially traveling from the mountain (Roçinha) into one of the high rises (same situation applies to most other upper-class neighborhoods in the city center). Thus, it is not surprising that the first years of pacification affected almost exclusively favelas in proximity of the south zone, touristic centers, and that were featured in internationally acclaimed movies like *City of God*. The success of a pacified favela is officially evaluated not only by declining homicide rates, but primarily by the number of shootouts recorded.

The general command of the UPPs was given to Colonel Robson Rodrigues da Silva, the head of the department for coordination of pacification police (CPP). Robson was a police officer in his mid-forties with a degree in anthropology and a strong proponent of “proximity policing”. Robson’s design of the UPP was inspired by foreign examples, especially the transformation of Medellín in Colombia, where he sent many of UPP commanders for an educational visit. The city was once home to the world's most notorious and violent drug cartel, headed by Pablo Escobar. In 1991, Medellín had a murder rate of 380 per 100,000 inhabitants.

The rate decreased thanks to innovative mayors who laid out plans to integrate the poorest and most violent hillside favelas into the city. Medellín's officials consulted Western crime specialists and implemented high-technology, hot spot policing, and "Broken Window" theory and proximity policing. The murder rate has since fallen more than 80 percent (Cavalcanti 2013; Brodzinsky 2014). Critics, however, explain the decrease by pointing out that Pablo Escobar died and was never replaced by an equivalent leader. Skeptics also wonder if the "Medellín miracle" is more about show than substance.

Robson was responsible for the management and evaluation of all UPPs, its officers, and provides feedback to UPP commanders. A central piece of information as well as critique of the UPP program is the fact that it is NOT an institutionalized reform of public security apparatus as a whole, nor of the military police in particular. The pacification police are more of a special unit, an experiment, that affects a minority of military police who are allocated in a small percentage of the city. While these UPP officers are trained and expected to perform "proximity" policing, the rest of the military police remains in the status quo of historically repressive and unaccountable policing practice.

Pacification is commonly referred to as a "re-conquest" of territories ruled by drug gangs. First, the governor announces the favela, date, and time of pacification on public television and radio. He then cautions drug traffickers that there is no sense in resisting the large numbers (sometimes into the thousands) of heavily armed police officers and sometimes even army soldiers who take over the area. Outmanned, drug traffickers flee and find refuge in an allied, not pacified favela elsewhere. The UPP program relies on hot-spot policing, a preventative measure that analyses where and when most crime happens and subsequently saturates that area with police officers. A much higher number of military police officers is placed per inhabitant

(compared to other regions in the city). Over 9,000 new UPP officers were deployed between 2009 and 2015 in areas amounting to about 500,000 residents (author interview with Robson Rodriguez, UPP, 2015). The main goal of the UPP program is not to end drug trafficking or to reduce homicide rates per se, but to establish a non-armed, non-confrontational way drugs are being sold<sup>16</sup>.

One difference of the UPP to previous approaches was the choice of police officers and a better salary. Designed as a “proximity police”, the personnel were selected with focus on young police officers who are given classes in human rights. These officers usually had no combat experience in favelas and were less likely to bear strong feelings or prejudice towards the residents, than their more experienced, often traumatized colleagues. Nevertheless, each UPP station was also equipped with experienced officers who were responsible for the training and supervision of the young officers. The commander of each UPP station plays an important role; these figures were hand selected officers you were young, charismatic, and if possible female.

In 2008, few weeks after the devastating operation at *Complexo do Alemão*, the federal government unveiled plans for a National Program of Public Security and Citizenship (PRONASCI), which would spend 6.7 billion Brazilian Reais over the next five years on 650,000 individual grants, each between 100 and 300 Brazilian Reais. According to the Ministry of Justice, these grants would be distributed to at-risk youth, low-paid police officers, correctional officers, as well as women in positions of leadership in areas of high conflict. The program was an attempt to extend the reach of the state and to compete with organized crime, which had been the largest employer of underprivileged children and adolescents (Gay 2009). With the launch of the UPP the government of Rio de Janeiro saw its opportunity to use

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<sup>16</sup> After the United States, Brazil is the world’s second leader in the consumption of cocaine, bought and consumed primarily by the upper social classes.

PRONASCI to pay UPP officers a better salary to discourage bribes. UPP officers earn approximately R\$1.400 (ca. 890 US Dollar) compared to R\$900 (580 US Dollars) for “normal” military police. Additionally, each UPP officer receives R\$400 monthly grant from a state fund (Instituto de Segurança Pública 2015). Such increase in salary was intended to demotivate police officers from making lucrative deals with criminals.

The UPP program focusses almost exclusively on the presence and actions of the military police, who are charged with “prevention of crime” through patrols, searches, and establishing rapport with residents. The civil police, in Brazil solely responsible for investigation, are rarely present or involved in favela matters. Their precincts are always outside favelas and citizens are expected to report crimes to the civil police in person. The military police are also supposed to deliver any suspects arrested to the appropriate precinct (e.g. a thief to the precinct that deals with stolen goods and robbery, if homicide to precinct that deals with violent crime etc.). In pacified favelas, crime prevention (specifically the prevention of armed conflict) is the principal goal; however, those who commit crimes are rarely pursued or prosecuted.

Finally, the UPP program was and still is “under construction”. Its inception was little planned, its guidelines and goals were formalized only four years after the inauguration of the first UPP; and new ideas and inspiration are found over the years. For example, in 2011 the UPP program sent UPP commanders and officials to Japan to visit their community police project “Koban”. Japan's national police inspector, Koichi Marauyama, explained to the Brazilian how the 140-year-old model has managed to reduce homicides to only 20 cases per year in Kyoto province. In the Koban system, the main activity is police officers visiting people's homes to gather information. This makes it possible to collect crucial information about the neighborhood which helps to prevent and solve crime, explained the inspector. Another feature of the Japanese

system is the participation of community volunteers who assist in the work of the police. I remember vividly some young UPP commanders returning with enthusiasm about the Koban system and looking forward to implementing the strategy in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Very quickly, though, they realized how far removed from the local reality such system is. The historical animosity and hate aside, sharing information with the police is punished by death by drug traffickers and militia alike. It would take decades of arduous trust-building for a favela resident to invite a military police officer into their home.

### *Political Backing*

Innovative policies like the UPP move forward only when executives provide resources and incentives for other agencies to co-operate and co-ordinate with the police. Limited resources, institutional tensions, and political rivalries, however, can make implementation an uphill struggle, particularly when some officials advocate different methods and philosophies. A new government may dismantle a reform if associated with a particular executive, a concern many civilians, especially favela residents in Rio share.

Over the decades all governors, mayors, and secretaries of public security of Rio de Janeiro were met with similar demands: to bring the violence in the city under control. The difficulty of this task makes itself notable by the fact that most secretaries of public security did not stay over a few hundred days in office and were from different political affiliations. Starting in 2010, for the first time in Rio de Janeiro's history, an alignment of the governor, mayor, and secretary of public security could be observed.

Eduardo Paes, during his time in Congress at Brasília, became well known for his harsh critique of President Lula in the Mensalão corruption scandal in 2005. In the 2006 gubernatorial

elections in Rio state, however, Paes supported the PMDB candidate Sérgio Cabral, who backed Lula for re-election that year<sup>17</sup>. This step turned out quite successful for Paes as he was promoted to state secretary for sports and tourism. In 2008 he was elected mayor of Rio de Janeiro. The UPP was quickly supported by Paes and Cabral once the first pacified favela, Santa Marta, turned into a strong example of Rio's new security policy and a possible answer to the safety risks at the 2016 Olympic Games.

José Mariano Beltrame was elected state Secretary of Public Security in 2007 after he had worked as the chief of Interpol in Brazil. Beltrame insists that he is not a politician, and indeed his previous career in intelligence and policing does not illustrate any political ambition. Beltrame did what everybody in Rio de Janeiro thought impossible; he pacified two of the city's most drug-infested, crime-ridden favelas Complexo do Alemão and Rocinha. Several drug bosses of three competing drug factions were imprisoned. Moreover, the consistency of the office as Secretary of Public Security is unique: since assuming his position in 2007, Beltrame completed nine years and ten months in this post. Figure 14 shows that this is a record time compared to all his predecessors since the transition to democracy. Never before could the governor of Rio de Janeiro complete his mandate with the same secretary appointed at his side.

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<sup>17</sup> All three, Lula, Cabral and Paes were later persecuted in 2015 for major corruption involving the Olympic Games 2016

### Time in Office, Secretaries of Public Security, Rio de Janeiro since 1975

Governor of RJ	Secretary of Public Security	Period	Days in office
Faria Lima	Oswaldo Ignácio Domingues	15/03/1975 – 10/03/1977	726 days
Faria Lima	Rubens Mário Brum Negreiros	10/03/1977 – 06/03/1979	726 days
Chagas Freitas	Edmundo Adolpho Murgel	15/03/1979 – 10/02/1981	695
Chagas Freitas	Waldyr Alves Costa Muniz	10/02/1981 – 28/02/1983	748
Brizola, Moreira, Brizola e Nilo	No secretary	28/2/1983 - 1/1/1995	-
Marcello Alencar	Euclimar Lima da Silva	01/01/1995 – 18/05/1995	137
Marcello Alencar	Nilton de Albuquerque Cerqueira	18/05/1995 – 03/04/1998	1050
Marcello Alencar	Noaldo Alves Silva	03/04/1998 – 31/12/1998	272
Anthony Garotinho	José Siqueira Silva	01/01/1999 – 07/04/1999	95
Anthony Garotinho	Josias Quintal de Oliveira	07/04/1999 – 06/04/2002	1095
Benedita da Silva	Roberto Armando Ramos de Aguiar	06/04/2002 – 01/01/2003	270
Rosa Garotinho	Josias Quintal de Oliveira	01/01/2003 – 28/04/2003	116
Rosa Garotinho	Anthony Garotinho	28/04/2003 – 27/09/2004	517
Rosa Garotinho	Marcelo Zaturansky Nogueira Itagiba	03/12/2004 – 30/03/2006	482
Rosa Garotinho	Roberto Precioso Júnior	31/03/2006 – 02/01/2007	276
Sérgio Cabral	José Mariano Beltrame	01/01/2007 - 16/11/2016	1214

Source: “Estado do Rio de Janeiro e Política de Segurança Pública: dados e resultados recentes”, <http://blogdasegurancapublica.wordpress.com>

Part I Figure 14: Time in Office. Source: Instituto de Segurança Pública

After the UPP was publicly backed by Paes and Cabral and actively reported in the media, the program gathered interest on the federal level. Suddenly, a policing project represented in only one Brazilian state, and as Beltrame underlined, responding to truly unique conditions, was considered as a federal security template. Principal presidential candidate Dilma

Rousseff showed strong support and affiliation with the program emphasizing her co-operation with Rio's governor Cabral, Paes, and Beltrame.

In 2010, I experienced the visit of at the time President Lula to the pacified favela Santa Marta. Promoting Dilma Rousseff, Lula launched the *Rio Top Tour Santa Marta*, an initiative offering free training as tourist guides to residents. Lula's speech to the residents of Santa Marta praised the UPP project as "revolutionary" not only for the people of Rio de Janeiro but also Brazil and even the world. Accordingly, during presidential elections, Dilma Rousseff put the UPP as one of her major propositions and priorities for public security in other cities. Investors from Brazil and the rest of the world also became interested in the new preventive policy. In 2010 substantial investments from Brazilian businesses were allocated by the government of Rio to the UPP program. One of Rio's biggest newspapers, *O Dia*, reported in August 2010 the investment of 23.3 million Brazilian Reais per year from the private sector to a fund specially created for the UPP. The money was supposed to be paid yearly until 2014 when the Football World Cup would take place. According to Beltrame, the money would be invested in constructions and reforms of new UPP quarters (as many newly installed UPPs are initially allocated in containers). The primary sponsor, Brazilian billionaire Eike Batista, donated 20 million Brazilian Reais per year until 2014.

These substantial investments from the private sector have less to do with altruism, than with the unique possibility to invest in new markets and potential real estate. Real estate value in pacified favelas, many located in some of the most desirable areas of the city, skyrocketed; also, the legalization of commerce eliminated many local businesses who were not able to afford a license or rent, and opened space to "formal" commerce like supermarkets, restaurants but also hotels and shopping malls.

## UPP -SOCIAL: THE SECOND PHASE OF PACIFICATION

To facilitate access to inside knowledge and needs of favela residents the secretary for social aid and human rights, Ricardo Henrique, complemented the UPP program with a department called the UPP-Social, a sub-division of the Secretary of Public Security. The program, initially led by social scientist Silvia Ramos, was supposed to coordinate social and urban projects in pacified favelas, selected according to the individual needs of each community. Primarily, it functioned as a buffer between the police and favela residents, supplying both with opportunities. One of the first key assignments of the UPP-Social was to conduct extensive research on the different communities and their residents.

Back in 2010-12, that was a plan that was possible to conduct as there were only about a dozen of UPPs, all in rather small and central favelas. The researchers, mostly local social science graduate students, were assigned one community where they spend two months with the residents, conducting interviews and observing their daily life. Eventually, a social map of each district was created based on the data found by the researchers. This map included social hot spots, places of social or historical importance, a list of leading figures, favorite activities, socioeconomic allocation as well as most common problems and needs according to residents. After analyzing the data, the UPP-Social appointed a permanent representative, in essence, a social worker, who was responsible for the management and co-ordination of projects and meetings in the community. Most importantly, this included the guidance of the residents through new arrangements such as bills for water and electricity and the licensing of commerce. Since before pacification favela residents were not formally registered and did not pay for any services, these changes were particularly unsettling to the community.

The UPP-Social representative organized meetings and workshops to introduce the companies that provide electricity, water, and cable at an adjusted price for these underprivileged communities. Rio's primary electricity provider, Light, provided pacified communities with free energy-saving fridges and light bulbs; it also charged electricity at a minimum price. UPP-Social also negotiated with CEDAE, the water provider in Rio, and agreed to an exclusive offer for pacified communities. Particular attention was given to the issue of legalization of commerce, a topic that affected many residents who ran small businesses including bars, moto-taxis, shops, and beauty parlors.

The UPP-Social was of particular interest to private businesses which were keen on entering the newly accessible markets. Most pacified favelas in the affluent South Zone are on hilltops featuring a stunning view of the beaches – ideal locations posh hotels, bars, and restaurants. With time, it became apparent that the data UPP Social gathered benefitted more private investors than the community members or police officers. Over the years, the presence and activity of the UPP-Social deteriorated and finally nullified.

### *Pacification and the Myth of Racial Democracy*

Pacification was depicted in the Brazilian media as a process of acculturation between Rio's elite and the urban poor. End of 2011 Rio de Janeiro released an annual new year's video on the country's dominant television channel *O Globo*. The video featured dark-skinned youth from different pacified favelas, first playing typical and improvised samba instruments, then playing cellos, flutes, and violins. Finally, the sound merges with the voice of a young woman singing: "The sun can rise once again ... The evil will be burned at its roots and love will be eternal once again. Merry Christmas and a new year of peace".

The video implies that pacification offered black favela residents the chance to develop from Afro-Brazilian samba instruments to classic violins, flutes, and cellos; from darkness and "barbaric" violence to civilized activities. It also seems to imply, that favela residents are in need to be "saved" by the government from the drug traffickers – who are often their family, friends, and neighbors. What stands out, is also the fact that although the clip clearly has pacification as a topic, it fails to show but one police officer or government representative, thus completely ignoring the government's rhetoric of "invasion" and "occupation" of favelas by the police. It implies a non-violence and peaceful approach, granted once those who are labeled *bandido* seemingly just disappeared.

In reality, however, the pacification program aims to replace drug trafficking organizations' control over favelas with UPPs and occasionally even the military, as happened at the favelas Maré and Alemão. The image of the UPPs is transformed into what Stephanie Savell calls "humanitarian militarism," a concept she defines as a form of public security performed to "display both state force and, alternately, state solidarity, with favela residents construed as in need of physical rescue from traffickers" (Savell 2016). This image of heroic territorial control as a favor to favela residents insinuates a justification for repressive police actions. Moreover, as Savell argues, the "visible spectacle of humanitarian militarism effaces abuses and makes light of the everyday fears and insecurities suffered by the urban poor" (Ibid.).

In direct response to international and internal pressure, Rio de Janeiro's Public Security distanced itself seemingly from policing as force and tried to create the "Western" image of democratic "state care." By pairing militarism with humanitarianism "which logics are not opposed but in practice deeply aligned" (Savell 2016), both, state force and state caregiving are performances to justify military action to the international community, Rio's upper classes, and

(to a lesser extent) audiences in the favelas.

### Homicides and deaths during police interventions 2005-12

Age	Victim No.	Percentage
0 – 10	81	1%
11 – 15	200	2%
16 – 20	2,218	17%
21 – 30	5,122	39%
31 – 40	2,821	21%
41 – 50	1,467	11%
Over 50	1,242	9%

Between 2002 and 2013 the majority of victims were male (93%).

*Part I Figure 15: Deaths during Police Interventions. Source: Stanford CDDRL 2015*

The conditions in Rio de Janeiro are unique in terms of chronic armed conflict, a particularly challenging geographic setting, and deep social inequality. As a response to this specific form of violence, the UPP program was created in dialogue with Western crime prevention methods, in particular hot spot policing. Modern criminology suggests that crime is concentrated in small numbers of streets, squares and even within neighborhoods with high criminal incidents. The understanding of the dynamics that make certain streets, corners, bars, or in this case favelas more susceptible to crime became essential for the planning and strategy of policing in areas with high crime rates in the United States and the UK. Evidence from the US shows that directing police resources towards these hotspots, in particular, can help to prevent criminal activity (Weisburd et al. 2003; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Durlauf and Nagin 2011). The

UPP is broadly modeled after this template and has achieved remarkable success with this approach, reducing homicide rates significantly.

However, as critics point out, hotspots are highly mobile and policing these small areas often simply makes crime migrate as has happened in Rio de Janeiro with drug gangs being pushed out by the UPPs and migrating to larger favelas such as Maré or Alemão. Papachristos, Huerau, and Braga (Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau 2014) argue that hot spots policing cause only moderate gains in long-lasting crime control to neighborhoods near policed high-activity areas. They identified problem-oriented policing (POP) as a preferable and more sustainable strategy for reducing crime.

Compared to simply increasing the visibility of police or the number of arrests, POP relies heavily on societal collaboration and intel to prevent criminals from developing in the first place; for example, by identifying at-risk youth and offering alternatives through jobs and activities. Moreover, the lack of investigation in form of a present and active civil police undermines the mission of bringing peace to Rio's underprivileged communities. Without a structured, organized and reliable police investigation into violent and non-violent crime, the sustainability of the UPP program is in jeopardy. The UPP program situated only one part of policing in Rio's favelas; the historically repressive, violent, and military police with no investigative functions. There is no emphasis on the collaboration between the military and civil police, government, municipality, and judiciary to prevent and combat crime. As Martin Luther King Jr. said poignantly: "True peace is not merely the absence of tension: it is the presence of justice."

In the next section I will elaborate on the mechanisms that the UPP used to earn resident's rapport and the problems that arose with the one-sidedness of the military police

function. By examining resident's attitudes and responses to UPP attempt at "proximity" policing, the presented case studies will demonstrate the inherent benefits but also pitfalls of the UPP program on the ground. The case studies will also show that the mere increase in police presence may not always result in positive perceptions by the community, as it enhances the tension between the police and community members.

## CHAPTER 5

## LIFE LIKE IN “REAL” SOCIETY. THREE CASE STUDIES OF PACIFIED FAVELAS

*“Eu só quero ser feliz, andar tranquilamente na favela onde eu nasci; e poder me orgulhar e ter a consciência que o pobre tem o seu lugar”*  
– Cidinho & oca, Rap da Felicidade

(I just want to be happy, walk undisturbed in the favela where I was born, able to be proud and know that the poor have their place)<sup>18</sup>

Sharing of information, between community and police, is an underlying condition to crime prevention; but in Rio de Janeiro, as in the rest of Latin America, profound distrust commonly characterizes the relationship between citizens and state institutions. Reforms take place in a social and political environment marked by a lack of trust in public institutions and the police in particular (Uildriks 2009). As a consequence of decades living life amid a "civil war" (Perlman 2010) the co-operation between Rio's favela residents and the police leads to suspicion and conflict. In the following, I will draw on three case studies of pacified favelas to show how the UPP program was implemented and experienced by residents on the ground.

My findings indicate, at least three ways of successfully triggering trust and co-operation that were employed by UPP officers. First, the implementation of a typical police, such as women or young, well-educated policemen with no combat experience. A-typical officers showed a positive impact on cultivating trust and co-operation with residents. Second, co-work between UPP officers and already established local organizations such as churches, NGOs, or resident associations aided in gaining support. Third, UPP officer's outreach through sports

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<sup>18</sup> My translation

classes and other activities. Targeting the weakest and most endangered members of a favela, namely women and children motivated societal incorporation and centralized the moral power of community members. In the following, I will elaborate on how these approaches played out in practice.

The three case studies - Santa Marta, Providência, and Saudade - are similar in location, population, and geographic setup. They are located on mountain tops near the city center and have between 3,000 and 4,000 inhabitants. However, they are very different in their internal structure and response to pacification. Although ruled by a powerful gang (CV) Santa Marta has a history of being relatively open access to tourists, international artists, and upper classes. It has many community leaders, NGOs, and projects. Providência (also ruled by CV) is the oldest favela in Rio and has been in the center of attention due to its history, location (port area), and civil activism. Saudade, on the other hand, was ruled by TC but was a strategically important territory to all drug factions due to its particular location. At Saudade there were few organizations or institutions, almost no influx from outside populations or institutions. The following chapters will show the individual paths of pacification in each case study and the unique conditions that shaped very different outcomes of the pacification police on the ground.

## MORRO DA SANTA MARTA: THE FIRST UPP



*Part I Figure 16: Santa Marta overlooking Botafogo. Photo credit: Caio Mauricio Vitch*

Nestled on a steep hill in between the Atlantic forest, Santa Marta is a favela with a population of over 10,000, located in the prestigious upper-middle class neighborhood Botafogo. For the longest time, the only way to access Santa Marta was on foot; for those living in the upper half it meant serious exercise in the heat. Elderly, sick, or injured individuals were essentially unable to move and relied on the help of friends and relatives (or drug traffickers) who would provide them with groceries. With pacification, the city built a funicular that now transports residents and tourists to the top of the hill for free. Once you made it to the top,

following labyrinth-like alleys and climbing hundreds of irregular stairs, you were compensated by a spectacular view of the iconic Sugar Loaf to your left and Copacabana and Ipanema beaches to your right. The houses at the bottom were relatively spacious and plastered, while the housing at the top used to be simple shacks made out of uncovered bricks or wood, some without running water or electricity.

Santa Marta, or Dona Marta as some call it, is around 80 years old and was controlled for decades by the powerful drug faction CV. The official numbers of traffickers are difficult to estimate; however, the police estimated that only between 50 and 100 residents were actively involved in the drug trafficking operation in the community, a small but influential fraction of the population. Santa Marta became internationally known through visitors such as Michael Jackson, who recorded the music video clip to "They don't care about us" with permission of the drug lord. The singers Madonna and Alicia Keys also filmed their music videos in the favela and even Pope John Paul II visited. Moreover, Santa Marta was stage for an in-depth documentary by Katia Lund, who conducted her research in the 1990s with the permission and even appearance of the local drug lord. In the documentary, the masked drug dealers elaborate on their philosophy and solidarity with their community. They defined themselves as protectors from a corrupt state and entrepreneurs taking a readily available business opportunity. However, they also expressed that they wanted a different future for their children, who they sent to college.

Due to its privileged location and difficult access, the drug faction at Santa Marta flourished as did regular *Baile Funk* parties that attracted many clients. Hundreds of young men and women from the city used to come up the Morro to the infamous Baile Funk, a dance party that rose in the favelas and became a polemic issue in the debate on security<sup>19</sup>. Baile Funk with

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<sup>19</sup> To read more about Baile Funk and security see Paul Sneed, *Favela Utopias: The Bailes Funk in Rio's Crisis of Social Exclusion and Violence*, Latin American Research Review Vol. 43, No. 2, 2008; Gregory Scruggs and

their “often intensely violent and aggressively sexualized nature, are fundamental expressions of the culture of the city's favelas, or squatter towns, with tremendous significance for enormous crowds of poor, young people who attend them. [...] Like some other cultural expressions of African diaspora communities, these bailes conjure up and sustain a morally and politically charged musical space that joins the young people together, emotionally elevating them above the harsh conditions of their lives into a spiritual state that makes available to them the feeling of living in a better world.” (Sneed 2008).

The funk is a sort of rap music typical in Rio de Janeiro and highly disputed because of the vulgar and violent lyrics. The funk was socially immediately associated with favela, or more specifically with drug trafficking, although it is slowly becoming more "mainstream," most UPP commanders still prohibit Baile Funk parties and even private listening to funk. Baile Funks are big open-air parties and were typically organized by a drug faction who hires a DJ (who usually plays mainly songs praising the faction and its members), bribe the police and turn up the music, sometimes for several days. The primary goal of these events is drug sales as well as arms trafficking *en masse*, mainly for the visitors from the *asfalto*. Shootouts at Bailes Funks are standard, so that funk music is administered by the Secretary of Public Security instead of the Secretary of Culture and lyrics are monitored by the Brazilian Federal Police.

In December 2008, Santa Marta became Rio's first pacified favela and was often presented as a role model of the UPP program. It is the place where the idea of a pacifying community police consolidated. In 2008 and before, the favela was subject to several police operations, during which the traffickers usually hid in the nearby forest, waited for the police to

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Alexandra Lippmann, *From Funkification to Pacification*, Norient.com, 2012; and Ellen Sluis, *De-Funkification? The Fight for the Right of the Funkeiro*, 2011

confiscate what they had left for them (to avoid further raids), and then return to the favela. But in December 2008, instead of disappearing immediately after confiscating drugs and weapons, the police stayed in large numbers. The traffickers were startled but unable to face the sheer number of police they migrated and sought refuge in other favelas.

Couple years after pacification, Santa Marta had transformed drastically. There was no more the underlying feeling of danger, no heavily armed look-outs and drug traffickers at the entry and corners. Shoot-outs that used to flame up the sky in Botafogo stopped entirely. Now Sta. Marta was filled with foreign tourists – something unthinkable before. People were working on constructions and improvements of the streets and acclaimed artists came to paint houses. A cost-free funicular was installed to transport people comfortably to the top of the community, where a bronze statue of Michael Jackson had been put. A viewing platform overlooking the spectacular beaches and mountains attracted people from all over the world. Residents wearing colorful uniforms offered informative tours of the favela at the entrance. This new job opportunity, as tourist guides, was supported through Rio Top Tour, a pilot project which was launched by President Lula in August 2010. All in all, the pacification of Santa Marta surpassed all expectations and seemed to be a turning point for a long history of violence and police brutality.

### *Life Like in “Real” Society*

The first reaction to the police presence at Santa Marta (as in any other favela) was to ignore them. One central rule of the drug factions is that all and any interaction with the police is considered treason, punishable by death. Not knowing what the absence of the drug lord and saturation by police meant and how long it was going to last, residents opted to lay low. The

police approached the favela with similar distrust. In my conversations with residents, it became apparent that the change from a trafficker led regime to “democracy” was tough to conceptualize.

Rules that used to be essential to survive, did seemingly no longer apply. Before pacification one would think “300,000 times before starting an argument with a neighbor” as one resident said, for fear of the harsh punishment by the traffickers. Without the drug traffickers as mediators, friction discharged openly. Even though homicide and shootings practically vanished, residents complained about an increase of domestic violence, fights between neighbors, and theft. These things would rarely happen before pacification because the traffickers had enough intel to identify delinquents quickly and punish them. Consulting the military police, however, was fruitless, as they had no knowledge nor investigative function.

At Santa Marta, a group of young residents organized a community radio which debated daily difficulties, local news and introduces new arrangements and laws after the pacification. The radio became a channel for the community to deal with the impact of recent changes and also to hold the police accountable. The creators of the radio, who I met, saw their project as an attempt to represent the favela in the *asfalto* and keep things transparent. Avid critics of the military police, they discussed attitudes and experiences with individual officers, the commander’s actions, and the frisking of residents. However, the principal goal of the radio was to represent the favela to the rest of society, beyond the common image as a dangerous, illicit place that required militarized occupation by the police.

“The people should know that we are not criminals but hard-working people. We have culture, we can organize a radio station or print a magazine, just like them” said DJ Squid and Naldo of Radio Santa Marta, when I interviewed them in 2010.

To the DJs and most of their guests, pacification was much more than the feared military occupation. It boiled down to crucial changes in habits, rules, and organization that presented an opportunity to be included into larger society, not as the despised “other” but as equal citizens.

*“Regras que tinha antes não tem, é como na sociedade mesmo, se tem horário e tal, você não pode tá com som ligado as onze horas da noite; tem que pagar água e luz, como se fosse na sociedade” –*

- "Rules you had before are not valid anymore, it is now like in society, you have certain times and so, you cannot have loud music at 11 pm. You have to pay for water and light, as if you were in real society. Never before I received mail at my house; we all had to pick it up at the resident’s association." DJ Squid remembers.

DJ Squid’s distinction between the favela and “real society” is a profound observation of a historical, social divide and a specific discrimination of residency in Rio de Janeiro. The high rates of violence have weakened the bridge between favela residents and other people living in the city. This erosion has grave consequences for the poor; for instance, even smaller chances on the job market, access to education and knowledge about citizenship rights, but most importantly *favelados* are widely depicted as criminals who one should not trust. According to Janice Perlman (2010), discrimination in Rio de Janeiro does not begin with skin color or gender; she found that living in a favela was the biggest issue.

Referring to this, the UPP program was seemingly a remedy to structural inequality by giving favela residents an official address and a *comprovante de residência* (residency certificate) acknowledging them as citizen. Instead of the so called *becos*, proper street names and numbers were established, literary paving the way to a “formal life”. On the other hand, one

could argue that now discrimination is based not solely on favela versus *asfalto* dichotomy, but also not pacified versus pacified favela.

### Discrimination in Rio de Janeiro

Reason for discrimination	
Residing in favela	84%
Skin color	80%
Appearance	74%
Birthplace outside of Rio	60%
Residence in Baixada Fluminense (periphery)	56%
Gender	53%
Living in North Zone	52%
Living in public housing	45%

Part I Figure 17: Source: Janice Perlman, 2010

Opinions on the UPP and the saturation of the favela with military police officers varied widely among Santa Marta's population. Overall, I was under the impression that the majority of residents were excited. For example, Senhora Claudete and her son who ran a small restaurant at the foot of the hill, were impressed by their interactions with UPP officers. They recently started to receive police officers for lunch. As I discovered, the UPP commander gave orders to eat lunch at local restaurants (instead of buying in the *asfalto*) to encourage interactions with residents. Claudete told me that she was surprised the first time she saw the young officers standing in her restaurant, looking rather helpless. "They didn't look malicious", she noted in surprise. After some time, Claudete's restaurant became a favorite spot where police and

residents could meet inconspicuously. Some evenings, I even discovered some officers after duty watching football together with residents.

Not everyone had such an optimistic view of the pacification. After living their whole lives in “informality”, many were resistant to legalization and formalization of their habits. Particularly, the issue of leisure in the form of funk parties, which were prohibited under the pacification police, was a sensitive subject to the younger generation in the community who felt deprived of the only amusement they had access to. At the top of Santa Marta, I met a group of young mothers playing with their babies outside their shacks. Even though they were members of the same community, these women lived under vastly different conditions than their neighbors below. They were unemployed, semiliterate, and their houses were tiny rooms with no running water. Many have been in a relationship with drug traffickers, hence lost their babies’ fathers during pacification, either through arrest or because they had to flee the community. To these women the dreaded police did not mean improvement; instead, the new regime represented a take-over by an inimical party.

Often the police would know that these women were related or intimate with wanted drug traffickers, thus they were under surveillance. Moreover, the UPP officers took away what was a significant expression of their alliance to their drug faction, but also a means of leisure and fun by prohibiting funk music even in private settings.

"They are sticking their noses in everything," one young mom complained meaning the police. Instead of frisking her, they should repair the lights and fix the water problems in her house, another added. When I asked what had changed since the pacification, they responded angrily: "Nothing changed. Everything only got worse!" meaning the increase in theft inside the community, the permanent police presence, and new rules on noise limitation. "When we put on

some music or have a little dance with friends they come and demand us to turn it off." The women admitted that the shootings had stopped; however, they declared that the conflicts were "not a problem. We grew up with it and so would have our children". While certain segments of favela populations - in most cases those who had relatives, lovers, or friends involved in the drug faction – were vehemently opposed to the military police presence in their community, most residents were preoccupied with the sustainability of the project. Especially after the most recent policing attempt, the GPAE, was abandoned after a few years, residents were reluctant to trust the new project. After all, an alignment with the police could mean exile from the community or worse if the drug traffickers were to return.

As I experienced, drug traffickers or their relatives who lived incognito in pacified communities often threatened residents who co-operated with the police. At the inauguration of an UPP at a different favela, for instance, I asked a group of women with their grandchildren and a couple of youngsters, what they thought about pacification of their community. The response was an angry outcry against policing and that everything should have stayed the way it used to be. A few minutes later, however, they approached me again and pulled me aside. They explained in a low voice that they could not talk freely before because of "certain people" listening but that they were hopeful about the installation of the UPP, "thank God the violence stopped now" (author interview 10 July 2010).

#### *A-typical leaders: Women in the Field*

Another major contributing factor why pacification was largely embraced by Santa Marta, was the UPPs commanding officer Pricilla Azevedo. In Brazil, female police officers in the field are still very rare and even more so in higher ranking positions. In Rio, female officers

were typically not employed in operations in favelas, thus residents had likely never seen a woman in uniform, much less commanding subordinates.

Pricilla became a source of pride and a symbol for change. She took her daily walks through the community carrying only a small handgun to signal that there was no danger, nor her being dangerous. Children and adults greeted her enthusiastically. Several residents explained that a female officer is associated with a respected "mother-figure" rather than an authoritarian repressor and represented a change in police behavior. Residents of Santa Marta believed that the effectiveness and quality of "their" UPP depended to a high extent on Pricilla and that it made "their" UPP unique and worth participating.

Major Pricilla played her motherly part well, by initiating Judo classes for children of Santa Marta, taught by one of her officers. She also collaborated with the UPP-Social in organizing social, educational, and environmental events with particular focus on the youngest community members. She was always accessible to the residents and often I would see children enter the UPP headquarters to visit Pricilla. The positive impression she made on the youngest at Santa Marta rubbed off on their relatives and enabled ways to consolidate peaceful interactions between residents and a "social" police.

Pricilla was chosen deliberately to command the very first UPP. To send a clear message of change, she was appointed to the favela by Colonel Robson, the coordinator of the UPP program. The implementation of female UPP commanders became a tactic to win the trust of favela residents and lower resistance to the police in general. Pricilla was developed into an elaborate figure of a leader, employing many stereotypes associated with womanhood such as non-violence, dialogue, and sensitivity. Other female police officers were recruited and appointed to command other favelas in the years to come, but being the first, Pricilla earned a

special place. Years later, when scandals of police abuse were shaking the credibility of the UPP program, she was implemented in problematic pacified favelas to re-construct trust and legitimacy of the program.

The people of Santa Marta have been experiencing a new type of policing for almost ten years now. Many remain wary, but the peace has been kept in the favela, infrastructure has been improved (most notably the funicular) and social services have been implemented. Millions of Brazilian Reais have been spent on improvements in the favela and attracted international tourists who spend good money on legal goods such as food, local tourist guides, and festivities. The success of the UPP brought Brazil's President at the time, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, twice to Santa Marta to recognize the importance of the UPP program. Lula stated that now the state can make up for the time that it has abandoned its poor citizens. His words meant a lot to the residents of Santa Marta; Lula's official approval of the UPP program and appeal for cooperation certainly had an impact on the relationship between residents and the police. While Santa Marta remains to this day the shining example of UPP program, it also shows the impact of opening the favela to the rest of society and economy.

Since pacification, real estate value in Santa Marta and surrounding rose significantly. Many home owners in the favela began to rent their houses at higher prices which resulted in numerous residents moving into the cheaper peripheries far away from their jobs. The popularity of Santa Marta dislocated poor residents and instead hosted increasingly international tourists eager to experience a "hip" and "authentic" favela. Similar trends impacted the middle-class in proximity of Santa Marta, where the already high rent doubled or even tripled after shoot-outs were eliminated. One could argue that the successful pacification of Santa Marta is based on the elimination of favela per se and replacing it with middle-class population. To many cariocas, me

included, Santa Marta is not even longer considered a favela. Its desirable location allowed for gentrification which was accompanied by “peace”; however, in reality the problem has merely been dislocated into the increasingly violent peripheries.

### MORRO DA PROVIDÊNCIA- THE OLDEST FAVELA IN RIO



*Part I Figure 18: Newly inaugurated UPP Providência, 2010*

The Morro da Providência is the oldest favela of Rio de Janeiro established in the late 1800 and is for many a symbol of the weak government presence. Its first residents were ex-combatants in the Canudos War who settled there around 1897. Some 10,000 soldiers came to Rio after the government promised them they would receive land in the then federal capital for their services in the war, but as, so often, the politicians broke their promise. Homeless, the ex-

combatants began to occupy the hillside temporarily to demonstrate their protest and ended up staying there. After decades of being ruled by the drug gang Comando Vermelho, Providência was pacified in March 2010.

Providência is situated on a steep hill in the very center of the city, only a few meters away from the Secretary of Public Security, the central train station of Rio de Janeiro, and the port. Today, around 5,000 people live in the favela (although the entire Morro da Providência – including the "formal area" holds about 13,000 people in total) additionally ca. 6,000 people pass through the area daily. The neighborhood is mostly low and lower-middle class; the area is characterized by illegal commerce, prostitution, drug dealers and addicts, and homelessness. From its beginning, Morro da Providência had a very direct relationship with the port area, where most of its residents worked and continue to do so. This link found its tragic destiny in the 1980s with the beginning of cocaine and weapon trafficking.

To understand the current problems and the range of success of the UPP in Providência one must take the history of the community and its social structures into account. To this day, the only side of the state the residents of Providência saw, was the police or the military, either shooting during an operation or came to collect bribes and sell weapons to the traffickers. In 2007 Senator Marcelo Crivella, a member of the polemic Igreja Universal Church, proposed a project called Cimento Social to restore housing and infrastructure inside Providência. Even though the workers employed for the project were residents of the same community, Crivella requested the presence of army soldiers for the time of restoration. During that time, three youth from the community who were allegedly disrespectful to the soldiers, were kidnapped by them. The soldiers wrote "CV" in bold red letters on the teenager's foreheads and drove them into a nearby favela ruled by an inimical drug faction. Left there, the three teenagers were tortured and

ultimately executed by the local drug traffickers<sup>20</sup>. The atrocity shook Providência's community members who organized in large protests in the city center, demanding justice for the boys. Indeed, the soldiers were trialed, however, the attitude of Providência towards the state in any form was damaged, possibly beyond recovery.

This and many other cruel incidents shaped the relationship between favela residents and the state. At Providência I could not find a single person who had not lost a relative or friend in the war between state and traffickers. For instance, André, a priest and long-term employee at a local charity remembers a terrible massacre which happened few decades ago, when police officers threw grenades into the charity's kindergarten, killing sixteen children. I met mothers who told me how they used to run out in the middle of a shootout, not minding the danger of stray bullets, to find their sons or at least to recover their bodies before those were disappeared by the police. I listened to Gabi tell me how her husband got shot in the back by the police, on his way home from work. Angelo, a successful young law student, whose brother joining the gang and was killed during pacification. I met Monique, who not only raised her own seven children, but also her five-year-old grand-daughter who is a daily reminder of her dead son, shot aged seventeen. Monique also fostered her neighbor's little son, whose mother was exiled from the community by the gang and had to leave with nothing but her clothes.

Those and endless other life stories made me understand how many layers of collective trauma these communities navigate. The victims pile left and right due to police as well as gang abuses. To many, the UPP program is nothing more than a temporary change of command to which the best response is silence and obedience. Others embrace the UPP as a possibility of

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<sup>20</sup> Even after death, the three boys could not be buried at the cemetery near Providência because the cemetery belongs traditionally to the ADA drug faction. The bodies had to be transported to the South Zone, where they joined countless other victims from communities belonging to the CV drug faction.

freeing themselves from either form of oppression. Forms of establishing rapport between police and residents Given the exceptionally brutal history with state representatives and a correspondingly potent affiliation with their drug faction (CV) at Providência, the fronts between residents and UPP officers were particularly antagonistic. Moreover, relatives and friends of drug traffickers prevented residents, sometimes physically, from participation in meetings with the new UPP leaders.

The local UPP commander, a young *capitão* called Achilles<sup>21</sup>, was perceived positively by community members; nevertheless, Achilles was a man and had been previously employed in the field with a well-known special task force. To ease the approach for residents, Achilles decided to collaborate with the oldest and most efficient social service in the community; the *Instituto Central do Povo* (ICP), a charity initiated by the Methodist Church. The ICP has been active Providência for over 100 years and provided the residents with a kindergarten, basic medical care, a church, food for the poorest, and free IT and English classes. Throughout the decades, the Institute had built strong community ties and is until this day a well-respected institution. The ICP agreed to host the opening meeting of the UPP on their premises, in which Achilles would be introducing his goals in the community. The stage of the ICP allowed residents to attend the meeting without being judged or directly associated with the police. On the other hand, the cooperation with the ICP gave the UPP certain legitimacy and the opportunity to learn from the institute's experience. In a favela like Providência, which showed special resistance to the implementation of the UPP, the co-operation with a trusted local organization was a precondition to initiate progress.

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<sup>21</sup> Name has been changed to protect the identity of the officer.

*Targeting the youngest*

The new and young UPP officers were often keen on developing rapport with favela residents. However, the relationship was often marked by mistrust and even hate especially in the beginning. Like at Santa Marta, the local UPP commander decided to target the younger generation, rather than adults, through free karate classes. In the first months, the classes were empty. However, upon my return in June 2010, there were 155 students training Judo with police officers and 68 on the waiting list. Many of the kids had to convince their parents to let them go to the classes taught inside the UPP headquarters. With time, more parents sent their children – some of them children of drug traffickers.

The judo training even allowed some students to travel to national competitions and earn medals. Their success was noticed by Secretary of Public Security, José Mariano Beltrame, who congratulated them personally in a special ceremony. He also encouraged similar courses to be developed across UPPs in Rio, although there was never a protocol or official guideline established. Ultimately, the cooperation between favela and police resulted in Brazil's success at the 2016 Olympics: Judoka Rafaela Silva, from the UPP City of God, delivered the first gold medal for the host country when she won the women's 57kg. Unfortunately, Rafaela's victory and celebration with friends and family in the favela were overshadowed by a shoot-out when drug traffickers attacked the local UPP headquarters in an attempt to re-conquest their territory (O DIA - Rio 2016).

In the time I have spent with the children and their parents, I was surprised to discover that for many the role model had shifted from drug trafficker to police officer. One day, Duda a nine-year-old girl and her little friends took me to the shack of an elder lady to buy food. The kids began to tell me about themselves. Some of their fathers and brothers were drug traffickers,

who were either killed or in prison. It was fascinating how calm and reasonable these young children explained to me the advantages between being a bandit or a police officer. The clean, nice uniforms of the police as well as their good behavior during the Judo training made the police more appealing than the drug traffickers, who were "smoking, drinking, and not wearing shirts". Furthermore, the guns the police carried while patrolling the favela did not seem to worry the kids, on the contrary, they underlined their competency. Even relatives who were serving a prison sentence, such as Duda's older brother, encouraged her to continue with the classes.

At UPP Providência, the effects of Judo classes were even reflected in the children's school performance. According to the director of the local elementary school, children who participated in the karate class achieved better marks and showed different ambitions:

"One thing that always shocked me was the admiration (of the children) towards the bandidos. Kids would tell me, 'Aunty, I want to become a *bandit!*' It made me cry. The situation now makes different paths possible" (author interview 2010).

The positive experience and success of their children made parents more receptive to the idea that the UPP might be something worthwhile. While parents of new students initially waited for their children on the street outside the UPP headquarters. After one month, I discovered several of them inside the classroom, some even chatting with police officers. The youngest generation of Providência and Sta Marta turned out to be the mediators between police and residents, the only ones who were innocent enough to trust men in uniforms.

Monique developed a friendly relationship with Achilles, the commanding officer at UPP Providência, whose support and engagement convinced Monique of his good intentions.

Moreover, she was compelled by the officer's "good looks" and "green eyes"<sup>22</sup>. One day, while

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<sup>22</sup> Achilles' race and phenotype signal higher class and opportunities that many wanted to take advantage of. Monique would talk often about her daughters, some of which were of marrying age, hoping that Achilles would

Monique and I were drinking coffee, she giggled how "good and handsome" Achilles was. Surprised about her own words she added "My God, Martinha, I could get killed for saying these things". Her opinions about beat cops – largely lower class and dark skinned - patrolling the favela were different though. She did not trust these young officers who had "fear in their eyes" as she said, and frisked residents. She would tell her daughters to stay away from beat cops, but she encouraged them to visit the UPP quarters and talk to the officers, especially Achilles.

The legacy of the CV gang at Providência was strong and UPP officers were not convinced that drug traffickers had indeed left the favela. Different than at Santa Marta, they expected an ambush at every corner. The inherent distrust played out in complicated ways especially when it came to crime prevention and prosecution.

Four months after pacification a case of child abuse shocked the residents of Providência. An eleven-year-old girl had been sexually abused by three men in the community and although video evidence of the crime existed it never reached the police. The topic was discussed at the resident's association and inside homes and was finally reported to the imprisoned drug lord of Providência. He sent orders to "solve the problem immediately". The three accused men were beaten close to death and exiled from the community.

Gabi, a resident who worked at the ICP institute and was running for political office, did not understand my discomfort with the incident. She was taking courses in law school but seemed satisfied with the way the problem was handled. To her, the crime was not a police matter. Gabi explained: "the police do not do anything for us, they only know how to hit and abuse us". Then she burst out: "They come in shooting randomly, killing innocent people. When

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bond with one of them. This wish to connect her daughters with a more powerful man is not unusual, as Achilles at the time had become the new "dono" in the eyes of the community. His race, however, also signaled an opportunity to whiten future generations, hence, given them more opportunities in this highly racialized class system.

I was a girl, police dropped grenades into the ICP kindergarten. They killed 16 children! Years later, my husband was coming home from work when he was shot in the back by them" (author interview, 2010).

The personal trauma almost each of Providência's residents went through marks their relationship with the military police. Moreover, the inherent lack of civil police presence, hence lack of investigation, in the UPP program contributed to a distorted view on police and their mission. Pacification relies exclusively on the military police presence which is historically and by its official function reduced to physical force such as patrols, stop and frisk, shooting, searching, and arrests are the actions of the military police. The civil police, who investigate crimes and bring criminals to justice, have been excluded from the pacification design, which shows a significant flaw in its conception. Citizens are generally expected to either report crimes in person, by filing a report at a *delegacia* (precinct) or involve a military police officer who (if willing) will file a report, arrest the suspect or assist the citizen. In reality, this poses a big challenge, especially to favela residents who historically were never allowed or able to call the police. They relied fully on internal structures of the drug gang to solve or prevent crimes. In addition, the UPP program became dependent on the centralized figure of a commanding officer, often charismatic leaders who effectively replaced the previous drug lord. While some residents, like Monique, developed a bond to the commanding officer Achilles, most other residents interact mostly with patrolling beat cops and rely on "traditional" ways of making justice, be it through community vigilantism or extra-legal police action. Thus, the democratic approach of the UPP program affects in fact only a small stratum of residents who are directly interacting with certain police officers and have a good experience. For those beyond that realm – who do

not attend meetings, classes etc. (few citizens in society do) – the relationship with the police has not changed significantly.

Angelo, for example, refused to participate in any project offered by the UPP, although he admitted that the police were trying to bring real projects in. Instead of the police, he would like to see more educational and job opportunities. Angelo noted that the new police officers were “different”, “more likable”, but to him that was irrelevant.

*“I do not need to make friends. I just want the favela at peace and a job”* he said. “We want to be part of the *asfalto*; we just don’t want the police” (author interview 2011). To Angelo and many others, it was clear that without the presence of the military police the drug gang would return, and conflict would reignite. However, he was uncomfortable with the idea that in order to be safe he would have to bond with police officers. They should just do their jobs in protecting all citizens equally, friendly or not.

Angelo’s remarks point to a fine line between establishing trust and clientelism. A “democratic police” should serve and protect based on their mission, not personal relationships. The fact that Monique was closer to Achilles because of her work at the Resident’s Association gave her certain benefits. For instance, Monique’s son, who was a crack addict would be spared by the police but other residents with drugs on them would be frisked and arrested. When Monique’s oldest daughter became involved in drug sales (unarmed), Achilles approached the young woman trying to persuade her of a different career path, instead of categorizing her as a bandit who had lost her right to live.

This brings up important questions about the notion and expectations toward police effectiveness. How much does the perception of the mission of policing matter (whether for control, crime prevention, or as a public service to their local community members)? More to the

point, how important is to whom police are ultimately accountable to – whether to government officials/politicians or to the communities themselves? The UPP, as a decentralized program without an overarching protocol, intelligence system, or crime investigation took an awkward position in the lives of the communities it occupied. While the UPP commanders saw themselves in service to the community members, they were equipped with tools limited to armed presence and occasional “fun” events, rather than sustainable law enforcement that involves gathering of information, investigation and prevention. Ultimately, the UPP were employed to get rid of armed drug traffickers who occupied precious land, establish open access to the favelas to the government and private investors who quickly realized the opportunity to displace its populations and buy prime property under market value.

The case of Providência clearly shows more underlying problems and difficulties than Santa Marta anchored in its specific circumstances. First of all, its geographic location in the port area and city center does not make Providência “pretty” or desirable location for tourism, thus it was not flooded with international attention. The area is, however, prime real estate for import-export, transportation, and international trade via ships and trains (there is a large train station). The most lucrative good in Rio de Janeiro is to this day cocaine; which makes the combat of drug trafficking in Providência a fruitless task.

Providência’s historical context makes it also more resistant to state intervention. Its entire founding history is based on the betrayal by the state. With chronic abuses, massacres, and raids over the decades, Providência’s inhabitants grew up with a generational trauma of state violence. As a result, the idea of a permanent police presence in the favela was particularly difficult for most residents.

Thanks to a devoted UPP commander, local institutions, and attentive UPP-Social, the approximation between residents and police flourished despite all odds. The collaboration with long trusted local organizations such as the ICP and the resident's association allowed for communication between police and residents. The initiation of UPP Judo classes for children approached at-risk youth with alternatives and created a bond with the families. The mere absence of armed conflict allowed for more consistent education in public schools, paving a way to improved chances on the job market.

Nevertheless, few years after the command of this UPP was replaced with several inconsistent leaders, the arrival of World Cup in 2014 and Olympics 2016, Providência experienced a boom in drug influx. In 2014, tons of cocaine and marijuana were entering Rio; several tons were confiscated during BOPE operations. The drugs make their way through the city center, with Providência as one of the major points of re-packaging in the city. With so much goods coming in, drug trafficking at Providência experienced a re-vival; residents complained about pistols, machine guns, and grenades being back in the favela. The years of collaboration between police and residents paid out in form of anonymous tips to the UPP; however, facing a lack of funding the number of police officers reduced and the station did not have sufficient resources to attend to all of resident's tips. The lack of an active investigation by the civil police made matters worse. According to the CPP, in 2014 the number of armed conflict between police and drug traffickers rose again from zero to 58 reported incidents of police fired weapon.

## MORRO DA SAUDADE



*Part I Figure 19: Photo by author, 2010*

*—Living in a favela is an art. Nobody robs, nobody hears, nothing is lost. Those who are wise obey those who give orders.*  
Jorge Selaron

Anchored in the previous discussion of relatively successful cases of UPP at Santa Marta and Providência, I will discuss the effects in a small favela like Saudade. I trace the genesis of the UPP Saudade since before pacification in February 2011; because of Rio's unique geography and conditions, changes on neighboring hills in the city center are readily observable and audible. I argue that it is this diffusion of innovation that ultimately influenced residents of

Saudade to conceptualized pacification as something positive. Saudade is located on a hill opposite to Morro da Providência, the case study I wrote about in a previous chapter. The drug factions of both favelas are deadly enemies. The short distance of approximately two kilometers, allowed residents to see and hear shots and explosions in the other community. Even though it would be impossible to visit the other favela because of the gang rivalry, residents knew when changes were happening.

Providência was pacified in March 2010 and residents at Saudade immediately noticed the visual and aural change in the other community. While Saudade and surrounding favelas were still experiencing regular shoot-outs, things were quiet at Providência. A large sign saying “UPP” in blue letters was put up facing Saudade. One could observe constructions of houses, streets, and even a funicular to transport the residents to the top of the hill.

Moreover, national and international television and newspapers reported continuously about the achievements and success of pacified favelas. Images were showing the arrival of social services such as garbage collection, restoration of buildings and streets, construction of health units. Cameras zoomed in on residents crying in happiness because they finally received an official address, necessary for instance to apply for the Bolsa Familia social welfare program.

It is easy to accidentally stumble upon the entrance of Morro da Saudade on a walk through the neighborhood Santa Teresa, as it happened to me one day in 2009. The cobblestone alley took a turn and suddenly I was standing in front of shirtless young men wearing golden necklaces and holding guns in their hands. The surrounding walls and houses were riddled with bullets, the ground was covered in rubbish and some of the men sat at plastic tables covered with supermarket plastic bags. Those bags contained loose Reais bills, neatly packaged cocaine, and

marijuana. Next to it a modern laptop (every sale was carefully registered), more guns and radios. Finding myself in this situation for the first time, I quickly explained that I took the wrong turn; the guys, apparently amused wished me a nice day and let me go.

Couple weeks later I met Wagner, a resident from Saudade, at capoeira training. Wagner was one of sixteen siblings from a tiny fisher's village in Bahia. At the age of sixteen, he migrated to Rio de Janeiro where he found work fixing boats at the yacht club<sup>23</sup>. Over the years, he bought an affordable little house at Saudade but kept dreaming of living in the *asfalto*.

Wagner hated the traffickers but always remained polite and was well liked in the community. In Wagner's opinion, the traffickers were the reason for all trouble in the community, for instance, the regular shootouts, the occasional abuse of residents, and loud parties that kept people up all night. Nevertheless, he trusted them more than the police. In his life he had experienced the police as abusive and corrupt. He went to several funerals of friend's who were killed in the crossfire, that were often financially supported by the gang. Before pacification, any community events such as barbecues, parties, children's football or carnivals were paid by the traffickers. When I asked him about the contributions the traffickers made towards the community he laughed, "if you mean free sweets, drinks, and parties. That's something you can lure children with. What does the *trabalhador* (worker) get from it?" (author interview 2010).

One evening Wagner took me up Saudade for a drink. We passed the traffickers at the *boca* (drug vending point) and took the countless steep stairs up the hill, walking through narrow dark alleys where barely two people had space side by side, squeezed between small houses, little shops, and bars. Children and dogs were outside, loud music was playing, and tired parents

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<sup>23</sup> When we met in 2009 Wagner was 35 years old.

were returning from work. We arrived at a small open bar where the telenovela was running, and a smiling toothless man named Beto welcomed us with cold beer. Later that night, when Wagner escorted me out I peeked into the houses, where people were still chatting and children with sleepy eyes staring at the TV. A little girl laid sleeping on top of a box television like a cat. At the exit, the number of traffickers had increased. They were drinking and playing cards; their machine guns hung loosely on their backs and attractive young women surrounded them. If not for the weapons, life at Saudade would have seemed poor but happy and peaceful. The people were welcoming and joyful, children running freely, playing in the dirty alleys. I decided to move in with Wagner at Saudade. Over the next years, I would get to see Saudade with different eyes.

I lived at Saudade periodically since 2009, spending approximately four to six months a year in Rio. Until 2014, I would stay at Wagner's house. In 2014, I moved in my friend Ivete's sister's house. The traffickers got used to me returning yearly to Saudade. Like any community, Saudade was spatially stratified, that means different social groups lived in different areas. For example, the top of the hill was thought of as the central drug gang area, since the house of the drug lord was located there. Its residents were largely his relatives and sympathizers. Further down the hill, towards the city center was an accumulation of *nordestinos*, residents who had migrated to Rio from Northeastern Brazil. On another side lived a largely Afro-Brazilian population.

Martha Huggins and Marie-Louise Glebbeek wrote: "before a researcher crafts a safe research space, she has to know its kinds and types of dangers" (Huggins and Glebbeek 209:14). In order to negotiate the risks and dangers associated with specific areas of the community, I relied heavily on information Wagner shared with me. However, the way in which danger is

perceived changes from person to person and, as I would like to emphasize, is seen differently by men or women. Only the women in the community were acutely aware of areas in which sexual harassment would be more common. The choice of with whom you associated yourself was very important for safety. Families who had sons in the drug gang were more vulnerable during police raids or attacks by rival gangs, thus their friends would be at risk by association. Men were generally more social than women, who were either working or taking care of children; however, as a young woman I could get a bad reputation spending time with men without Wagner present.

After months of loneliness, I decided to take action and chose a safe space which I could enter without upsetting gender roles: a small beauty parlor just a few steps down from my house. The owner was a woman in her mid-thirties who I will call Ivete. She was a *nordestina*, known to be a pious evangelic active in the local church. Ivete had a large family – 13 siblings, two sons and countless nieces and nephews. Majority of the family lived at Saudade for several decades. When I entered the salon for the first time, seven women of all ages and races were sitting in the small bright orange room<sup>24</sup> and a Christian television show was running in the background. All conversation died immediately. I greeted them with a big smile and identified myself as the woman who lives up the stairs with Wagner from Bahia.

“Ah, *o baiano*. That grumpy man!” Ivete said<sup>25</sup>, “Yes indeed, he is quite grumpy”, I replied, and the atmosphere became friendlier. They asked where I was from, when I moved here and wanted to see pictures of my family. I asked Ivete if she could do my nails - a procedure which usually takes an hour or so in which I was hoping to make conversation. In the next weeks

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<sup>24</sup> The color of a house alone can often tell the ethnicity or region the person comes from; in the Northeast of Brazil it is a tradition to have the houses and rooms painted in bright colors.

<sup>25</sup> There is a long cultural dispute/rivalry between the Northeastern states and Bahia who discriminate against each other.

I would visit Ivete's salon regularly, to do my nails but mostly to just sit in this safe space and listen to the gossip. The beauty parlor became the main channel for information about current community problems. It was an exclusively female space which men would not dare to enter (any son, husband, father and even drug traffickers would wait in front of the door but not enter unless invited). The women who would frequent the salon were of all ages, religions, and ethnic backgrounds, from teenagers with their babies, to 90-year old grandmothers. Ivete became passionate for my research project and would invite trustworthy friends who wanted to share their experiences with the police or drug traffickers, so I could interview them. Ivete would vouch for me. That way I conducted many of my interviews with informants who were already verified as reliable sources and who would not endanger us by "telling on me" to the drug traffickers. Despite being *evangelica*, Ivete had an open mind, in particular when it came to her clients. She did not care for their race, religion or sexual orientation and was generally well liked and respected in the community.

Over the next months and years, Ivete and I became close friends. I saw her sons grow into young, hard working men, two of her nephews into drug traffickers. Together, we hid in the bathroom through the worst shootings (ceramic is supposed to hold machine gun bullets), talked a lot about the police, spent Christmas and Easter together as a family.

Contrary to the romantic view of favela as a cozy community, living at Saudade meant getting used to being surrounded by people you cannot trust. The smallest critique of the traffickers, mention of a rival gang, police or person in disgrace could get you in trouble with the gang. It also meant no garbage disposal, the regular sound of gunshots, drugs, and a faulty sewage system. Housing in Saudade varied from brick houses to wooden shacks. However,

neither of them was considered safe, especially during heavy rain falls in the summers when many houses were simply swept away.

Road access was limited, so all groceries had to be carried up hundreds of stairs passing heavily armed men. Some stairs were built precariously next to steep slopes. On these passages my heart would race in fear that a shooting might break out and I would fall into the dark slope. In my case, it also meant living in a tiny house without windows (actually a positive aspect because it decreased the risk of stray bullets) and enduring nights of deafening Baile Funk next door. Saudade is on one of many proximate hills that face each other and are ruled by rivaling gangs. This rivalry between the Terceiro Comando, the gang that ruled Saudade (until early 2017), and the Comando Vermelho, who ruled the nearby hill was particularly vicious. CV had tried to invade and conquer Saudade for years and had succeeded temporarily in the past. The police were benefitting from the rivalry selling weapons, information, and specific police raids once for one, another time for the other side. The territory was a particularly valued one because of the location of Saudade, right above the tunnel Sta. Barbara which is a quick connection into the wealthy South Zone where most of the cocaine was sold to. The difficult geography and location made Saudade a small but powerful base for the Terceiro Comando and the neighborhood is to this day one of the more violent ones in Rio.

Violence is not distributed evenly in the neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro, but because of the city's unique geography (mountainous terrain), violence and police killings are not exclusive to the peripheries. Catumbi, the small neighborhood where Saudade is located has an estimated homicide rate of 1,019 and stunning 207 per 100,000 deaths occurring during police interventions.

### Neighborhoods in Rio with highest violence rates

Neighborhood	Violent deaths p/ 100,000 inhabitants	Homicides p/ 100,000 inhabitants	Deaths during police intervention p/ 100,000 inhabitants
Grumari	11,976	10,180	1,796
Barros Filho	1,708	1,310	399
Cidade Universitária	1,671	1,478	193
Cidade Nova	1,427	1,354	73
Engenheiro Leal	1,227	1,080	147
Costa Barros	1,023	643	380
<b>Catumbi</b>	<b>1,019</b>	<b>812</b>	<b>207</b>
Vicente de Carvalho	901	633	268
Jacaré	862	647	216
Vaz Lobo	824	752	73

Part I Figure 20: Source: Magaloni et al. 2015

The dono do morro, grew up in Saudade and was well respected. His nickname was Carneiro (sheep) because as a kid he was selling meat in the community. Carrying a large bucket on his head, the little future drug lord would scream “*Carneiro!*” to let people know when he was coming through with mutton meat; the community called him by this name ever since. There were many legends about Carneiro. One of the most amusing ones was about a white, enormous goat that was his pet. The goat had a long beard and would drink, sniff cocaine, and smoke weed; it would also bump misbehaved clients or residents with its long horns. Some residents swore that the goat was real and that it was eventually killed by a rival drug gang to take Carneiro’s

power. While the goat might be dead, Carneiro had another gem, that is irrefutably true: a golden and functional AK 47. He would display it proudly at *pagode* parties in the community.

In 2010, I noticed a considerable increase in tension and excitement among residents and traffickers at Saudade. The trafficker's nervousness about losing their territory (and source of income) materialized in angry graffiti saying "*UPP é o caralho*" (UPP is shit) or "*Um verdadeiro rei nunca perde a Coroa*" (a real king never loses the crown), as well as newly created funk lyrics which expressed threats against anyone involved in the UPPs. Moreover, the numbers of traffickers at the entrance and viewpoints of the favela doubled, as if they would be able to fight hundreds of police officers. The residents, on the other hand, were secretly excited about the possibility of having their "own" UPP, like the other communities where the voices of "freed" residents seemed to grow louder by the day. Furthermore, as state and presidential elections were approaching, the political campaign focused almost exclusively on the UPP program, supported most notably by Brazil's "national hero" President Lula and his chosen presidential candidate Dilma Rousseff, also from the then very popular Worker's Party.

During the political campaign for state governor in Rio de Janeiro, Sérgio Cabral (also PT) released a fifteen-minute video about the UPP Providência which was regularly shown on television. In the video, children and adults were interviewed and the UPP commander Achilles was introduced – a good looking, young man with white skin and green eyes all signaling status and success, not like the predominantly dark skinned and uneducated beat cops residents were accustomed to. At Saudade this political campaign video attracted attention; residents sat in bars and homes discussing the pros and cons of the UPP and although the clip was clearly political propaganda it seemed convincingly hopeful. While Providência served as a visual and aural example of a better future, the UPP Santa Marta represented the ultimate success, especially after

the visit of President Lula in the favela. At Ivete's beauty salon, women discussed plans to get certified as tourist guides, like the ones in Sta Marta, once Saudade would be pacified and where they would take *gringos* on a favela tour. There were speculations if Saudade would get a good-looking captain like Achilles, or maybe a woman officer like Pricilla. The women were undecided which one they preferred but many expressed the wish to have a woman lead the *morro* for once.

Finally, the day came and Saudade was pacified February 6th, 2011. The drug gang did not offer any resistance. At the time, most drug traffickers had already left the favela, including the *dono* who left behind his family. Residents received the police and media calmly. Eventually, the *dono* was arrested hiding in a different favela, and his golden AK 47 was mounted on a police "altar" together with bags of cocaine, ammunition, and burner phones. Proudly the police took their pictures next to the trophy. After so many years, the golden machine gun had become legendary and its apprehension became a symbolized the change in regime. Most drug traffickers were either arrested or fled Saudade seeking refuge with "brothers" of the same faction in other favelas.

Anxiously the residents were awaiting the changes in the favela. Who would be the commander? How would the new police officers be and behave? But contrary to Sta Marta or Providência, at Saudade, one would rarely see UPP patrolling inside the favela. It took me a while to even figure out where the local UPP station was, as it was installed outside the community. In the first year of pacification, there were officially 193 officers assigned to the three pacified communities including Saudade. The officers worked 12-hour shifts followed by a mandatory 24-hours break. That means that there are maximum 64 officers available for each (12 hour) shift, assuming nobody is sick or on leave. However, this number includes the commander,

several administrators and guards who stay permanently at the UPP station. To be generous, it would allow for 10 patrol groups of five cops each and divided more or less equally into the three communities, that would result in about 16 officers per community. With roughly 3,000 residents per community, one police officer attended approximately 187 citizens, scattered on challenging terrain. By the time a patrol would hike up and down the mountains, the whole day would go by.

As the same UPP was attending three different communities, ruled by rival gangs, residents were afraid that the UPP officers might sell information from one gang to another. Residents avoided any contact or conversation with the police. It is probably self-explanatory that the relationship between the residents of Saudade and UPP officers never had a chance to develop.

Also different to Santa Marta or Providência, there was no charismatic “savior” figure, like Pricilla or Achilles, who would connect with the community. In fact, nobody even knew the name of the UPP commander. Police officers who were patrolling the alleys were young and inexperienced. The UPP-Social or their researchers did never appear, hence, no classes, courses or other activities were offered to the residents (that we knew about).

Soon after pacification, construction workers began to remove strategic buildings that had been used by the drug faction as storage. The popular *Bar do Gordo* – where many parties happened – was closed temporarily. Precariously hanging houses were restored and residents were particularly thrilled about the two large open terraces and playgrounds that were built. Importantly, a family health clinic and a daycare center were built just at the foot of the hill, where a soccer field used to be – another symbolic space that was used by the drug faction for their business. These symbolic and pragmatic changes were welcomed by Saudade’s population.

The construction workers brought business to local restaurants and the prospect of having medical help and much needed child daycare delighted parents.

Another problem that appeared after pacification was petty crime, especially the sudden rise of theft in the communities. Before pacification, residents could leave their doors unlocked and fights between neighbors or spouses were seldom. Under the rule of the drug traffickers, theft was unheard of because a thief would be identified quickly and punished harshly by the traffickers. I will never forget the terrible day that the traffickers entered my neighbor's house and beat their son for hours, in front of the parents, as punishment for stealing from a local bar. After pacification, residents expected the UPP officers to fill that function but were quickly frustrated when their attempts to identify and punish petty criminals were in vain. Some residents would report minor wrongdoings to the UPP but never felt they were equipped to find and punish the suspect. Petty criminals, on the other hand, were aware that the new police officers did not have enough intel or geographic knowledge to find them. The police had no inside knowledge in the community and the young officers were regarded as weak because “human rights” prevented them from punishing criminals accordingly and keeping resident’s property safe. After all, the success of a UPP was measured by homicide rates and number of shoot-outs, not the safety of property. Moreover, as I mentioned before, investigation of crime (by the civil police) are not part of UPP’s design.

Once, Ivete, her sister Inalva, and I walked to the civil police precinct in Santa Teresa to try and report a break-in into Ivete’s parlor. The thieves had stolen hair dryers, curlers and other expensive electronics. After waiting for over an hour in the empty precinct a delegado attended us finally. Ivete made her report but the delegado did not seem to listen. Instead he was eying Inalva and finally said: “Aren’t you the mother of that little shit, Diego, who they call *Fogete*?”.

Inalva's son was a drug trafficker who had several run-ins with the law in the past and had an outstanding arrest. The delegado refused to attend Ivete's report and even stated that now that they have the UPP, the military police should take care of such "social issues".

Unfortunately, Saudade is one of the favelas that were never as "successful" as some UPP cases described above, not even in the early years of pacification. Corruption and police brutality are deeply embedded in Rio's history, and Catumbi – the neighborhood where Saudade is located – was one of the ten most violent areas in the city. Different than Sta Marta, Saudade never received any celebrities or upper-class residents for the Baile Funk; it also lacked community leaders such as the Sta Marta radio station of DJ Squid and Naldo, or Monique and the ICP institute at Providência. Saudade had very few, rudimentary local organizations (for example, a single woman trying to establish urban vegetable gardens). The UPP commander did never make an appearance and the UPP-Social was unheard of, thus there were no community meetings, workshops, or classes. It became apparent that there was a strong bias towards more "popular" favelas in the city center, near beaches, or upper-class neighborhoods, where most social projects and the UPP Social would be present.

Saudade's residents were initially excited about receiving an official address and certificate of residency. Most did not realize, though, that with the formalization of their address and services, they would have to pay for electricity, water, and property tax. The first month that the bills reached resident's doors the whole community seemed to gasp for air. Nobody had thought to turn off the air conditioning, lights, or the TV when not at home. People would still shower three or more times daily (climbing all those stairs drenches in sweat). The bills were a shocking experience and solidified the already rising disappointment with pacification that they had imagined very differently.

At Saudade the absence of inclusionary projects, invisibility of atypical police leaders, and lack of local institutions to collaborate with resulted in fear and frustration. Not even the *gringos* people had hoped for did make an appearance. Its inaccessibility and frankly ugliness made Saudade stay out of sight in the news, different to more “pop” favelas such as Sta. Marta in the touristic South Zone.

Saudade hasn't, however, gone unnoticed to organizations such as Human Rights Watch who in a recent report (2016) made mention of the small community as one of the biggest failures of the Pacification Police program in the city center.

#### *Changes in criminal structure*

In June 2011 an UPP officer on patrol was ambushed with a hand grenade and lost his leg. Officially, the attack was reported as initiated by drug traffickers, but everyone at Saudade knew that there were no more such weapons on the hill. Residents said that the injured police officer was "one of the good ones" who was set up by his own colleagues to prevent him from testifying in a case of police corruption. Indeed, few months later a large number of UPP officers from Saudade, including the commander, were arrested as large quantities of money and drugs were found in UPP police cars. It was obvious that large quantities of drugs still had to be transported through the Santa Barbara tunnel into the South Zone (the other option would have been more uncomfortable through the Atlantic forest). The access to the tunnel had been for decades one of the most prestigious resources for the area and police officers were paid tens of thousands of Reais to either transport drugs in police cars, or to let drug traffickers pass through. Pacification has eliminated the weapons of the traffickers, but it has not changed the general business dynamic.

Upon my return to Saudade in 2012 I felt a unique sense of insecurity. Drug trafficking changed only visually in that traffickers were no longer armed occupying the entrances of the favela, nor were they longer able to protect the residents from thieves; but they were still active. Since the dono and his chief men were arrested, his wife had taken over control of the operation. She employed much younger boys who were under the radar of the police. From what I know, they had only a few guns at their disposal which they were allowed to access only with special permission. The new dona also changed another important variable in allowing the sale of crack cocaine inside the favela, something that is frowned upon by the "traditional" drug factions. Life at Saudade had become very volatile as these young kids (some as young as eight years old) were very different than their previous, older versions. The kids were disrespectful to residents, would stash their drugs onto people's roofs (which could mean arrest of the homeowner if the police found them), created crack addicts in the community, and had a low threshold for anger. Many familiar faces of boys who used to play with Nilson and Nelson (Ivete's sons) had become smoking and stern looking dealers who were paying off UPP officers in broad daylight.

One of them, a particularly scrummy boy named Danilo, had lost his parents couple years ago and was "adopted" into the gang. Eight years old, he would purposefully sit at the entrance of my house, blowing smoke into my window, stuffing little pieces of rubbish through the opening. I told him to stop doing this and added that smoking will kill him. A few minutes later, there was a knock at the door. An older trafficker, who looked like a piglet with acne was standing in the door, a gun at his belt. "What did you say to him? He can smoke wherever he wants. Nobody here is a child!". My heart dropped as I was sure I would either get a beating or shaven (head shaving is a common form of punishment for women). My neighbor who observed the situation rescued me by telling the teenager that I was Americana and the US military would

come if he did something to me (a common myth). After he had reminded me that he is to be addressed with *senhor* (Pigboy wasn't older than 15 at the time), he left with Danilo. In 2014, the number of police officers at UPP Saudade seemed to have reduced even more.

*Field notes, one afternoon at Saudade, December 2012*

"These nice UPP officers do not belong here. They do not understand how things work in the favela and that their rules don't apply. In here they are nobody" said Ivete. Her and I were sitting at the window observing a group of visibly scared UPP officers making their way through the labyrinth of alleys and stairs.

Suddenly, loud popping sounds filled the air. I jumped, as did the police officers on the stairs underneath. Ivete started laughing hysterically. Only then I spotted a group of small children giggling and hiding on a roof, throwing firecrackers at the startled police.

"Just look at their scared faces when they pass through the alley. They are just boys. There is nothing they can do right in here, so they do everything wrong", Ivete commented about the officers. Once, Ivete saw a female officer, and she screamed at the top of her lungs for me to come and see. The poor policewoman was shaking. It became the laughing matter for many days to come.

Drug traffickers were back, armed, and busy. The free yoga class I was offering three times a week for women at Saudade would now be framed by machine guns held by young men staring at us. But these youngsters were not a problem, yet. Another worrisome change had happened in the power structures of Saudade that residents perceived as more threatening than armed traffickers.

Ivete and I noticed how the prices for drinking water and cooking gas doubled, then tripled in the favela. Each favela has their own provider who delivers these essentials to the residents. The resident's association negotiated a fair price on these goods. The gas and water

suppliers were located at the entry of the favela and had replaced the boca with a busy handling, transporting, and exchanging of barrels and jars. The chatty woman who was in charge of the accounting for many years suddenly fell silent. When the prices finally quintupled, some residents decided to seek out a neighboring provider. Upon their return, they were beaten bloody by "big men dressed in black nobody had seen before" and advised to stick to their local seller. To Ivete it was evident; there was a militia in the making.

The UPP has been lauded for reclaiming "lawless" areas from dangerous outlaw drug traffickers in many favelas. But the image of a democratizing Rio has been undermined by the actions of its own security forces. Particularly concerning is the growing activity of militias in recent years, composed largely of active-duty and retired police officers, firefighters, correctional officers, and even soldiers. These groups function similar to drug traffickers regarding "lawlessness", however they differ significantly in their attitude and brutality towards community members. Drug gangs were commonly organic members of a particular favela, and while their rule indeed involved violence and punishments, they did have an active charitable connection and solidarity with their community.

Militias, on the other hand, extorted protection money from residents, operated unlicensed public transportation, charged commissions on real estate deals, punished those who cross them and, most alarmingly, carried out extrajudicial killings. Alba Zaluar, an anthropologist who studies public security at the State University of Rio de Janeiro, sees the militias occupying a paramilitary role that lawful, "democratic" policing cannot fulfill. With the years of pacification, the power of militias is expanding; according to Zaluar, 45 percent of Rio's favelas are under the control of militias in 2010, up from only 12 percent in 2005<sup>26</sup>. "They're

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<sup>26</sup> While militias have expanded with vigor since pacification, their presence in regions of Rio, especially in the west of the city, is not new. Originally called "*polícia mineira*," referring to aggressive policing tactics in neighboring

invading, watching over, buying favelas from traffickers,” Zaluar said (Goldstein 1977; Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler 2003; Ungar 2011). The fact that after pacification favelas are up for sale to criminal organizations that are not organic members of the community and whose primary interest is running it like a business, is an indication of how dangerous and precarious the downside of pacification for favela residents is.

In the meanwhile, the *dona* of Saudade was re-structuring the drug gang. With the Football World Cup happening and the Olympics coming up in 2016, Rio was flooded with rich tourists and cocaine sales were at a high. Some factions even manufactured cocaine baggies with the Olympics logo. Since the number of UPP officers had declined into an insignificance, weapons reappeared. Ivete’s young nephew, Kaká who was living with me, was recruited by the gang like his brother before him.

Ivete also convinced Danilo – the little boy smoking into my window – to leave the gang and go live with her priest and his wife. Unfortunately, Danilo returned to Saudade only a few months later, in January 2015, following a call for "all warriors of the TC". The *dona* succeeded in banishing the militias, but Saudade was facing attacks by the rival CV gang from a neighboring hill. At the time, I was already living in Recife, but Ivete would send me audio and video messages daily. The situation seemed frightening. The shootings would last for entire days, with residents locked in their houses. TC and CV entered a full-blown war over the territory. Residents faced a nightmare; those who left their homes temporarily to stay with relatives until the worst had passed, returned to their homes taken by family members of CV.

Ivete, who had just recently finished building her new home, was too afraid to leave. She sent Nelson and Nilson away but remained in her home in hopes to keep it. Several times, she

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Minas Gerais state, militias have operated in Rio for about thirty years.

said, small groups of UPP officers were hiding on her roof and trying desperately to kick in the door to her home to hide. The UPP officers, hopelessly understaffed did not show their face unless it was in sporadic and anxious run-through in which they would shoot wildly at anyone and everything.

Rumor was that the UPPs had allied with the stronger CV gang and helped them to take over Saudade. Finally, the Military Police, headed by BOPE, stormed Saudade in a big invasion in February 2015. Ivete sent me a picture of seven dead bodies lying spread out on the terrace where a year ago we would practice yoga. Danilo and "Pigboy" were both dead. Some residents managed to drag bodies into their houses. Others were undressed by the police and transported to the hospital, in an attempt to appear concerned and impede later forensic investigations such as testing the bodies for gunshot residue.

Months later, I sent Ivete's the news that this shootout at Saudade had made it into the Human Rights Watch Report; she responded: "Wow! We are famous in America!". Notice that the report speaks of only three men shot, not seven. I suspect that the resting four bodies were either recovered by residents (for burial), or that the police disappeared the corpses. Days later, civil police investigators arrived at Saudade starting a fruitless investigation of the shooting.

Excerpt from the Human Rights Watch Report (2016):

"Morro da Saudade favela, members of BOPE shot three men who they said had shot at them. The officers told civil police investigators that they took the three men to a hospital after a BOPE paramedic said they were still alive. One survived. In a statement made to civil police officers investigating the case, a witness said she saw one of the victims, "Antônio," 28, alive, lying on the ground. She did not notice any injuries, but he told her he had a head injury; he explained to her that he had told the police he was merely a resident of the favela, but they had still shot at him. The police dispersed the neighbors who had congregated around Antônio. As

the witness was leaving the area, she heard many shots; she believes this was the police killing Antônio. More than three hours later, she saw the police put the bodies of Antônio and another man in the trunk of a truck and throw the surviving man on top of them. The registry from the hospital records Antônio as dead on arrival. A medical report included in the case file shows at least one of his wounds had an abrasion ring, indicating pointblank range. The forensic report said Antônio was shot seven times. The witness told civil police investigators that police officers threatened that “they would come back to do the same” to any resident who testified against them.”

While the implementation of UPPs in certain favelas decreased the number of officially recorded killings after a peak of more than 1,300 in 2007 to around 400 in 2013, the number has risen since then. In 2015 alone, police killed at least 645 people. In Rio de Janeiro that year, police committed one in five of all homicides. The military police of Rio de Janeiro, a 48,000 men strong force that is doing "preventative work," are responsible for the vast majority of the killings. The civil police, a 9,000-strong force that investigates crimes, carried out the rest, according to official data obtained by Human Rights Watch.

Life at Saudade had changed but not in a democratic turn. Policing was not an essential part to this change of criminal structures. The case study of Saudade goes to show that in the unique conditions of conflict in Rio de Janeiro, the UPP program relies predominantly on number of police officers and not their particular training, behavior or attitude. If the number of police officers is not sufficient enough to be even visible to community members, patrols do not have any effect and police officers are quickly faced with illicit propositions.

## ENTERING THE FORMAL ECONOMY: NAVIGATING OPPORTUNITIES AND DESPAIR

“The favela needs to wake up!” said Monique to me one day at Providência. We were sitting in Achilles’ office at UPP Providência, discussing steps to formalize commerce in the community. Monique, was the vice-president of the Resident’s Association and saw pacification as an economic opportunity for the residents, different to many community members who saw the formalization as a threat. Formalizing one’s business required certificates, paper work, taxes and fees. Enterprises, such as *mototaxi* – a vivid taxi service provided on motorcycles able to drive up the narrowest *becos* of the favelas – were particularly annoyed by the new regulations.<sup>27</sup>

“We don’t have a bakery or a grocery store. All you can get at bars are things like oil, soda, and coffee but at high prices because it costs to haul it all up the mountain. If we are not careful, outsiders will profit instead of the residents!” Monique explained, fearing that private businesses will enter the favela and take their opportunities.

“Carlinhos is the only one so far who is awake”, she continued. “He opened his bar and named it something English, *Welcome*, for the gringos, you know? Can you believe how many gringos are coming up the hill now? Since it’s pacified they are no longer afraid”.

According to Monique, pacification opened new possibilities, but the community was still in shock after the change of regime and slow in realizing its new liberties. Licensing has been made easy thanks to Achilles’ efforts to pressure UPP Social representatives to organize workshops on how to finance business ideas. They were scarcely visited.

“People are still afraid”, Monique explained, meaning that going to the workshops could be regarded as collaborating or supporting the police. In the past you could not make a move

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<sup>27</sup> Mototaxi is a criminalized enterprise in Rio de Janeiro as the drivers are often making drug and money deliveries for the gangs and are thought to be involved in crime.

without the approval of the drug lord – who guarantees safety now? Another issue was to acquire funding to launch an own business. “It is easier to get documents, now that our addresses are formally registered, but we need more incentives from the government. For example, we have many cooks but without conditions to buy their own kitchen appliances, many hair dressers who cannot afford chairs or products”, explained Monique.

With all eyes on Brazil and its plans to host the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics, the government was paving the way for a new economy. The Rio Times reported that “the informal market in Brazil was worth R\$826 billion in 2014, equivalent to 16.1 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP)”<sup>28</sup> (Rio Times 2015). Informal economy in Rio is booming with family owned pop-up bars and restaurants in their garages, street vendors selling beer and snacks, vendors walking up and down major beaches selling coconuts, drinks, ice cream and even frying fish or shrimp right next to your chair.

Favelas that are located near the city center and popular tourist spots developed a structured form of informality to manage their entrepreneurs. There are the more formal simple bars at the street level, which often double as *discotecas* or dance clubs on the weekend. There are many homes that open their garages to sell drinks and food, and often charge for the use of their bathrooms. Dozens of residents descended the hill to set up *barracas* or tents on the street level, selling mostly alcohol as street vendors called *camêlos*. To operate a *barraca* one must live in the community and obey an informal licensing system in which one pays a fee to a man who stores the tents (carrying them up and down the steep hill is very cumbersome) and provides

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<sup>28</sup> The informal economy was measured in the Shadow Economy Index (HEI) by the Brazilian Institute for Ethical Competition (ETCO) and the Brazilian Institute of Economics of the Fundação Getulio Vargas (IBRE-FGV).

basic security services. Vendors from outside the community who try to set up a *barraca* would be kicked out quickly and their only option is to remain mobile on bicycles or push carts.

To many, pacification was symbolizing the end of such informal economy and an opportunity for new investments in the favelas. Previously inaccessible (and undesirable) markets and properties up in the mosquito infested hills suddenly became penetrable spaces for neoliberal capitalist speculations. *Camêlos* are the most visible players in the informal economy, hence, they were central targets of the city's sweeping efforts to formalize and "clean up" its image in preparation for the World Cup and Olympic Games. Mayor Eduardo Paes made this a priority from early on in his tenure, enacting a variety of legislative decrees to regulate street trade and register street vendors. At the same time, the federal government established the Micro-empendedor Individual (MEI) licensing program, "which attempts to encourage informal workers to formalize in a tax-exempt manner and begin receiving government benefits for a monthly fee. Universally praised for its simple and non-bureaucratic online registration process, the license also offers access to the financial system through the ability to create a bank account, fee-exempt online business creation, and subsidized credit card point-of-sale machines for street vendors" (RioOnWatch n.d.). The MEI had a rather low response rate in part due to a lack of awareness about the benefits of the program. Social scientist Adalberto Cardoso also suggests that for people whose entire sociability was formed in the realm of informality –housing, access to electricity, relationship with the police – becoming formalized means being visible to an untrustworthy and threatening government (Cardoso and Cardoso 2016).

The government and elites were not the only ones seeing pacification as a moment to change its economies. SEBRAE, a nonprofit organization that aims to promote the competitiveness and sustainable development of small businesses, shares this view. According to

SEBRAE's José Luiz de Souza Lima, "the pacification of *favelas* opens the possibility of constructing an atmosphere of peace and developing productive activities, attracting public and private investment." (in Canavaggio et al. 2012). SEBRAE created a division for the *Development of Entrepreneurship in Pacified Communities*, working with the government, financial institutions, local entrepreneurs, local organizations, research institutions and companies to promote entrepreneurship and to improve the local business environment (Canavaggio et al. 2012). In reality, big businesses and banks, such as *Caixa, Santander*, supermarket conglomerates began to enter the biggest favelas such as Complexo and Roçinha, effectively undermining local grocery and money lending systems.

At Providência, a *Teleferico* was being installed, a viewing platform for tourists at the top of the hill, just next to the charming white chapel. Its construction was a social maze of threats, corruption and political interference in the favela, as it required dozens of homes to be removed, a long argument with the local ICP on which property the Teleferico would run through and paying off local officials.

Real estate was being bought left and right, primarily from residents who suffered from unemployment, poverty, drug addiction, and disabilities. Residents told me about men in suits carrying suit cases filled with cash, paying up to 50,000 Reais for a three-bedroom shack. To impoverished residents who don't make such an amount in a whole year, the offer seemed irresistible. Soon, however, they had to realize that life on the *asfalto* is unattainable in a city with one of the highest cost of living in the world. Those who already owned properties, evicted tenants and advertised the spaces to foreigners via Airbnb or word of mouth. This turned quickly into full-fledged hostels that advertised their rather meager accommodations as "authentic" favela to tourists.

Pacification also changed the local economy through the criminalization of public gatherings and the popular *Baile Funk*. With the arrival of UPP, the *Baile Funk* dance parties had been prohibited. It was a common step that UPP commanders took in almost all favelas to show the beginning of a new regime. Instead, many UPPs started offering music lessons for children with their military police bands, which consist of mostly brass instruments. The police gave several reasons for the criminalization of Funk,<sup>29</sup> especially the so called *proibidão* (prohibited) with explicit lyrics praising drug gangs and justifying crime of gang leaders (*apologia ao crime*). Funk musicians were one of the first to articulate and disseminate warning and critique of the UPP program. They reinforced the dichotomy between favela and *asfalto*, underlined the independence of the community from the state and articulated a deeply rooted and legitimate distrust in the government as the lyrics underneath show. For despite a new law established that funk should be treated the same way as samba, “the word pacification, with its denotation of quelling or quieting, has finally put bailes in several high-profile favelas on lock down. It is a concern that funkeiros have not taken lightly” (Scruggs and Lippmann 2012).

**UPP filho da puta**

Não Entra Aqui UPP  
 Todas as favelas  
 Sempre tivemos lazer  
 Quem mora aqui sabe  
 Entende o que eu vou dizer  
 Tudo dando certo  
 Mais eu tô esperto  
 Não quero essa coisa de UPP  
 Dentro das favelas  
 Morador vive legal  
 Com muita humildade  
 Mas temos potencial

**UPP sons of bitches**

Don't Enter Here UPP  
 All the favelas  
 Always had plenty of fun  
 Whoever lives here knows  
 Understands what I am gonna say  
 Everything was working out  
 I'm smart about it  
 I don't want this UPP thing  
 Inside the favelas  
 The residents were cool  
 Very humble  
 But full of potential

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<sup>29</sup> Funk has been criminalized before, as the music was always administered by the security council in Rio, not the culture and art division.

Estamos unidos	We're united
Canta aí comigo	Sing with me now
O baile tá cheio e tá legal	The baile is packed and it's hot
Eu tô revoltado com Sérgio Cabral	I'm disgusted with Sergio Cabral
Sem o baile aqui não vai ficar legal	Without the baile, it won't be cool
Mas pra aqui ficar tranquilo	But around here it's chill
Eu já sei o que eu vou fazer	I already know what I'm going to do
O jeito é não entrar aqui a UPP	The way to go is no UPP enters here
O jeito é não entrar aqui a UPP	The way to go is no UPP enters here
Se você quer saber o que vai acontecer	If you want to know what's going to happen
Primeiro vocês entram depois vou te dizer	First come in then I'll tell you what's up
Eu disse ÔÔÔÔ acabo o K.Ô	I said oh oh oh oh it's over KO

*Part I Figure 21: Source:MC Tovi*

At the Baile, which is often organized by the traffickers, are typically drugs and weapons present. The lyrics are also about women and mostly very degrading and sexist in a subgenre called *putaria*; hence, funk is closely seen to criminality and obscenity. Besides that, there is a strong devaluation of funk by the older generations in the middle and upper classes that do not accept funk as a cultural or artistic expression nor movement<sup>30</sup>.

While I was grateful for nights of sleep without the bass of funk shaking my windows and gun chatter, the local economy of Saudade and other favelas started to deteriorate. The weekly *Baile Funk* had attracted hundreds of residents for whom the party was one of the few leisure activities. The party also was a reason for residents from neighboring favelas to come in and mingle. They would spend money on beer, marijuana, cocaine, get the "munchies" and buy snacks from local commerce. Residents like Ivete, who had her own beauty salon, would have

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<sup>30</sup> However, as Scruggs and Lippmann write (2012), since its inception, funk has undergone several cycles of national popularity, and middle- and upper-class youth (not just favela youth) are listening to funk (Yúdice 2003:129; Herschmann 2005:114). Lippmann reports that funk DJ Marlboro played at a birthday party for the son of Rio's governor in 2008, and later that year Luiz Inácio da Silva posed for a photo with the popular all-female funk ensemble *Gaiola das Popozudas*.

her hands full with clients every Friday; painting nails and straightening young women's hair for the Baile. After pacification, Ivete was sitting most days in her empty salon watching television. She also lost many older clients, who worked in the local gastronomy and could no longer afford Ivete's services.

On a sunny, hot day at Saudade, men and women wearing reflective jackets climbed up the cumbersome stairs with notepads in their hands. Going from door to door, they made notes and took pictures of people's houses. They also visited dona Leila's kitchen, operating out of a shack that is was also used as a community center, Baile Funk space, and Resident's Association. Leila's kitchen was one of the few thriving after pacification as she was making *quentinhas* to all the construction workers in the favela. Inspecting Leila's appliances, such as the improvised grill made out of a recycled washing machine grid, the reflective jackets shook their heads and wrote something in their pads.

Soon after, the community learned that these people were building coders sent to evaluate houses and recommend the removal of homes in "risky" categories, such as built in areas of environmental protection, those whose residents receive social rent and who have been rehoused, and homes in areas where rains can trigger landslides. The coders also inspected homes for health and safety violations, which were abundant given the informal, patch-work construction of homes. They visited family homes and inspected the general state of the homes, prescribed necessary changes and fined those who didn't obey. Ivete was furious about the hefty fine she received for "irregularities" in her home. They were also a major force in pushing favela residents to sell their home and land to large corporations who were trying to take over these prime properties with a unique view over the city.

As James Holston argued in *Insurgent Citizenship* (Holston 2009), the freedom to build, add to and shape your own home at your will is a very powerful expression of rights in Brazil. Over decades, the poor have formulated a new form of citizenship not primarily through struggles of labor but through those of illicit residence, house building, and land conflict.

For example, my home at Saudade featured some of the most creative ways residents navigate the tight spaces available, by being innovating, negotiating with their neighbors and expressing their needs and identity. My home started out as a single room, then a bathroom was added, then steep, irregular stairs in patch work manner. It certainly was not developed by engineers and did not comply with health and safety regulations.



*Part I Figure 22: a patch-work home of several apartments.  
Photo by author 2014*

Favela residents didn't distinguish between the UPP and the coders because to them, both represented the state. So, when there were issues regarding a building, electricity, or bills residents would approach the police officers at the UPP station. When building coders would prohibit construction or fine families, some residents walked into the local UPP headquarters accusing the officers of human rights abuse.

To many residents, this was the moment when distrust in the UPP grew. Although the UPP at Saudade had been involved in corruption and violence, that never shocked residents nor did they find it particularly disturbing. However, after being fined and having to pay exuberant electricity bills, residents feared for their future. Some had no doubt that the ultimate goal of pacification was gentrification – giving their land and homes to strangers. The (relative) safety in the favela brought quickly property speculation. Men in suits would come up the hill of Saudade with their cases full of cash, targeting those who were fined for building code violations that they could not pay. They persuaded even more reluctant residents, that pacification had brought them a chance to make money and transition into “real” society.

Since pacification, the price of buying or renting property in the favela has at least doubled, pushing out poor tenants and preventing settlement by migrants from poorer areas of the country. Even foreigners began moving in to pacified favelas (not Saudade, but “fancy” ones like Santa Marta or favelas above the Copacabana and Leme beaches) and inversely pushing previous residents to the edges of the city. Ivete, whose large family owned many patch-work properties at Saudade also rose the rents and evicted a couple of tenants to replace them with wealthier ones. Saudade did not see an influx of foreigners like other favelas, but at its foothill a new hostel opened, and residents would go and try talking tourists into visiting the favela and rent their homes.

As a result of rising costs, thousands of residents were forced to migrate into non-pacified favelas outside of the city center. They lost their houses and their jobs due to the long commutes, and hundreds ended up living in deplorable conditions. Suddenly, the shootouts and violence of the past didn't seem to be the prime concern of residents in pacified favelas. Many expressed that they knew how to deal with the violence, which parts of the favela to avoid, in which room not to sleep due to stray bullets.

Precisely as Rio de Janeiro attempted to include its favelas into society through pacification, violence and poverty migrated, and injustice and petty crime in the favela increased. Policing and formalizing the favela had the effect that people's decision making, one of the few freedoms the urban poor had, were now scrutinized and taxed by the state. Many favela residents felt that the integration of their community into formal society actually debilitated their rights and freedom as citizens.

## CONCLUSION

The Pacification Police Unit is an attempt to develop a democratic police force that would be trained in and obey to human rights. But as the case of Saudade showed, the UPP program has indeed created insecurity through the promotion of security (Robb Larkins 2015). It promoted the military police to see themselves as "military humanitarians" who physically had to rescue favela residents from an enemy constructing favelas as territories that had to be re-conquered and secured. The rhetoric of war remained dominant throughout the pacification process. While urban infrastructure in all three case studies improved and some central UPPs, especially Santa Marta, became representative of a colorful and "authentic" favela experience for

tourists, these communities also experienced an increase in living costs, real estate prices through the roof and crack down on the local, informal economy such as restaurants, bars, and salons.

The Baile Funk, that in many favelas such as Saudade, was one of the main economic opportunities – residents would spend money on beer, food, groomed themselves in the beauty salons – was practically eradicated. The legalization of commerce, registration of addresses implanted a capitalist economic system that disadvantaged local enterprises and opened the gates for corporate companies. As Monique at Providência feared, soon private investors bought residents out of their houses. Even international celebrities, such as American “artist” Kanye West, participated in the gentrification of pacified favelas through buying land.

After being absent from these communities and letting rapport develop between residents and traffickers, the state could not count on the collaboration of local populations in repressing crime. The UPPs were to solve this problem by sheer police saturation and “enthusiastic”, young police commanders like Achilles and Pricilla, who makes credible the state’s threat of repression and guarantee of protection, and therefore produces the ground conditions for civilian loyalty to the state (rather than to drug gangs) to develop. Perhaps the biggest potential problem with this approach, however, is the cost of maintaining and expanding such an intensive police presence which goes hand in hand with decreasing police commitment to the program. To illustrate, six years into the Governor Cabral’s initiative, police recruitment has increased by some 30 percent, yet UPPs still directly affected only seven percent of Rio’s favela population (Zaluar and Barcellos 2013), most of it in the rich and touristic city center and beaches in the South Zone.

As I have shown, the participation of citizens in policing efforts can have significant effects on the social inclusion of favelas into the formal city. Initiatives such as the use of atypical actors and targeting the weakest and most vulnerable groups through sports improve

channels of participation and knowledge production. At Santa Marta, the presence of a female commanding officer calmed the population and assured a different, improved police practice because she was not associated with aggressive masculine force. The children who trained Judo with police officers at Providência, symbolized a new generation that has the chance to establish a new relationship with the police and the state government. Especially the female residents, who for decades saw their sons, brothers and husbands being killed, sensed a chance to offer security and opportunities to the future generations. This not only motivated societal incorporation but also centralized the moral power of community members.

The vast majority of favelas currently controlled by criminal groups will likely never see a UPP installed at all. In this sense, the UPP program has simply created a new kind of social division in the city by displacing gangs but never addressing the underlying structures. Whereas before existed a stark contrast between favela and asfalto (favela and formal neighborhood), today people make the difference between UPP and favela. Despite the potential drawbacks and long term unintended consequences the UPP represents a significant shift in policy orientation with respect to violent crime. This is not only because the UPPs are far more ambitious and more deeply institutionalized than any of their predecessor policies, but also because they represent a fundamentally different philosophical view of the state's role in fighting crime than earlier policies and practices.

## CHAPTER 6

### HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE *RIGHT* HUMANS

This chapter is dedicated to the experiences and attitudes of UPP officers since the inception of the pacification project until its official staggering in late 2014. I draw on ethnographic data gathered through interviews and shadowing of individual UPPs. I also refer to internal Rio de Janeiro Military Police reports that were provided to me at random by supportive police officers, as well as a survey conducted with 2,000 UPP officers by a research center in Rio.

Two of the previous three case studies, Santa Marta and Providência, re-appear in this section from the perspective of police officers. The case study Saudade could not be included in such a perspective due to substantial danger in interacting with police officers who worked in the favela where I lived. I could not risk my or my informant's safety, thus, I had as little contact to Saudade's UPP as possible.

The third case study in this section is called Morro das Flores and is an UPP that I de-characterized in terms of name, location, dates, and description. Shadowing the police on patrols is an extremely risky activity and I carefully chose a community that would fit the demography of the other case studies, but enough removed to not identify me. In addition, I often used a ski-mask on patrols.

This chapter will first present the perspectives of police officers at Santa Marta and how they conceptualized the UPP program. Then I turn to the figure of UPP commander Achilles, whose life and work in many ways represents the rise and fall of the pacification police unit program. His personal experiences underline strategic and organizational pitfalls of the UPP

program and demonstrate an incompetence of Rio's government to fully subscribe to the idea of a democratic police force. I introduce the case study of Morro das Flores and the daily struggles of UPP police officers facing an increase in armed conflict. The section discusses officer's approach to the concepts of democracy, human rights, and policing practice under the specific conditions of their location. Finally, I present data on the overall attitudes and expectations of UPP police officers that reflects the experiences of police officers described in the case studies.

## POLICING ON THE GROUND

### MAJOR PRICILLA OF SANTA MARTA

In 2010 there were only three female commanding officers in different UPPs all over Rio de Janeiro. One of them was Major Pricilla de Oliveira Azevedo, in charge of the very first favela to be pacified at the end of 2008, the Morro da Santa Marta. From 2009 to 2011 Major Pricilla, an energetic woman in her early thirties was the commanding officer at Sta. Marta, responsible for 200 policemen serving under her and a community of approximately 4000 inhabitants. Pricilla is one of the very few female exemplars in the Military Police in a high rank; she was the authority in Santa Marta. Her relationship with the residents was kind but firm, as it was with the 200 officers under her command. For example, her officers received the formal order to eat in local establishments to interact with residents. Initially, the police, as well as residents, were outraged, but with time one would see police next to residents drinking a beer after duty.



*Part I Figure 23: Pricilla Oliveira de Azevedo with Michele Obama and Hillary Clinton, 2012 Photo by United States State Department*

Seeing Pricilla's strong will to establish trustful and social relationships between the police and residents of Santa Marta, I was surprised to hear that only couple years earlier, Pricilla was car-jacked and when the criminals realized that she was a police officer, they brought her to their drug lord. She was tortured and held captive for two days. Pricilla tried to escape, but according to her story she was caught and beaten by residents who brought her back to the drug traffickers. Finally, she was set free thanks to the pressure of her armed colleagues who negotiated her release. After this traumatic incident, Pricilla admits that she was not inclined to command a Pacification Police Unit which has the goal to form friendly relationships with favela residents, who in her mind were violent criminals. Very soon, however, "my thinking changed with the experience of good residents," she affirms.

Pricilla became somewhat UPP program's poster child and symbol of change in the police force. In 2009 Brazilian *Veja* Magazine named her "Defender of the City" as part of the

Rio de Janeiro Personality of the Year Awards. In 2012 she was awarded by Michele Obama, for her “outstanding leadership and courage” by the U.S. State Department during a ceremony on International Women’s Day.

Not everybody was satisfied with having a woman in a commanding position. Police officers at meetings from different UPPs often complained about having to work for women superiors who they claimed were less experienced and more volatile. They brought up sexist arguments such as that women are more prone to mood swings due to menstruation and that women are not "tough" enough to deal with favela residents, who they regarded as inherently deviant. Most of all, many *praça* complained that they did not sign up for this kind of "social work" but were meant to be warriors and heroes. They remained wary and resentful towards the new, non-aggressive approach towards favelas. While these officers do not represent the majority of UPP officer's attitudes toward the program, they are critical voices representing especially those who did not join the UPP but remained working "real police work" at the battalions.

The police officers patrolling Santa Marta also regularly expressed their satisfaction and surprise about the success of the project. Most of the officers were ordered to an UPP directly after police academy. Hence, their first experiences as police officers were completely different than what they expected. Instead of having brief and violent interactions with favela residents during raids, these officers had to communicate and prove themselves to the inhabitants. To many, this was not police work but "women's work," as some officers mentioned. In the first months, as the Sergeants Bento and Scarpa said, no one would dare talk or even look at them in the favela. Bento had already served 24 years in the PM and was ordered as an experienced officer to guide the young police. He worked his whole life in favelas and was part of the previous policing program GPAE.

As I explained before, GPAE was launched in 2000 by a centre-left coalition led by Governor Anthony Garotinho. The concept was similar to UPP; establish a twenty-four-hour occupation to prevent homicides and adapt a non-violent approach to the residents. The state coupled this project with efforts to provide opportunities to at-risk teens and worked closely with Rio's biggest NGO Viva Rio to build a collective capacity to work with and hold police accountable. Even though GPAE was successful in the first year (homicide rates dropped to zero in the target communities), it ended in 2003 when a hardline commander of the PM took over the leading position and cut communication with community leaders and the NGO. As a result, police violence against the community increased.

Bento claims that his department was understaffed, lacking arms, logistics, and accommodation while facing powerful and heavily armed drug dealers. "First, we had 70 men inside the Complexo Alemão, at the Vila Cruzeiro<sup>31</sup>. I saw many of my colleagues die there; many police lost their lives due to GPAE". Arias' study on GPAE corroborates Bento's statement; one officer he interviewed said: "GPAE is more combat; we have more gun fights in Vila Cruzeiro. We have to exchange fire and try to get along with the community, but they can't even get close to the police because the traffickers will kill them" (Arias and Ungar 2009). Bento cannot remember one conversation happening between residents and police officers.

The failure of GPAE is an example of the government's attempt to make cosmetic changes. The experience of GPAE had visible effects on police and favela residents at the start of UPP. Bento and Scarpa, for example, explained that they and many of their colleagues had a very negative image of the UPP: "It was mandatory for me to work in Santa Marta and the

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<sup>31</sup> Vila Cruzeiro is one favela in the Complexo Alemão, a complex of several communities with a population of approximately 200,000 inhabitants.

beginning, I was very upset. Not only would I be responsible for inexperienced police officers and I was afraid of possible accidents, but also, I thought it would be the same as the GPAE. But when I arrived I realized that it was different, that it has what it takes to change things".

Nevertheless, Bento and Scarpa assured me that only putting policemen on the morro will never be a solution; the UPP is working because it opened channels to help residents, for instance by establishing health centers. The state is finally investing in its citizens, and the residents can see that the police have come with orders to help, not to kill. However, what the GPAE experience also shows is that leadership, and political support is crucial for police commitment. Without supervision and accountability violence can be a quick solution for police officers, moreover if the circumstances are frustrating. In 2010, residents approached the officers to ask for assistance with a broken light, problems with their neighbor and even medical emergencies. "This never happened in Cruzeiro (under GPAE)," Bento assures me, "never before had I this kind of contact with favela residents."

A consistent leadership, the commitment and motivation of the people working in the field is crucial to the success of a policy (Schafer 2010). Many scholars such as Herman Goldstein, Taylor, Mark Ungar and Desmond Arias highlight how the support of law enforcement officers is essential to any reform (Goldstein 1977; Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler 2003; Ungar 2011). Especially since the resistance to change can interfere with the implementation and development of a program. Arias and Ungar warn that "when law enforcement officers perceive disregard for their professional training and resent the usurpation of authority, they will tend to resist" (Arias and Ungar 2009). While this risk can be minimized by cultivating police allies or by decentralizing, long-term success depends on institutional support in the form of training and resources which can be tough amid authoritarian and

clientelistic legacies. After approximately three years of internationally hailed success and a halt to urban battles between drug traffickers and police, the UPP experienced a significant stagnation. In 2014 I encountered increasing frustration on both sides, the residents who were overwhelmed with the burden of sudden electricity and water bills, taxes, etc. and police officers who were understaffed, working in dangerous conditions. Armed attacks on UPP headquarters increased, especially before and during presidential elections 2014. The economic and political crisis in Brazil was accompanied by a strengthening of drug trafficking gangs, in part because people were fleeing unemployment into gangs, in part because certain political actors profit from urban unrest and deterioration of policies. Influential drug traffickers who were on the run, returned armed to their favelas, and police commitment and trust did deteriorate.

While in 2010 I met UPP commanders walking confidently and unarmed through the favela, greeting and even being greeted by residents, in 2014 I found the UPP commanders in shambles and the same commanders depressed, often battling severe physical or mental diseases. One of these UPP commanders is Achilles, who became my research participant in 2010. The following section uses Achilles' experience as a vignette for the rise and fall of the Pacification Police Unit.

#### ACHILLES: COMMANDING UPP PROVIDÊNCIA

I met Achilles during my research in 2010 at the favela Providência, in Rio's city center. Achilles had just turned 35. He was a white man with thick black hair and piercing green eyes - his most cherished feature. He had nine years of experience working in the Military Police and was just promoted to the rank of Captain. In many ways, Achilles is a stereotypical example of a high-ranking officer: his family has a military background; his grandfather was a pilot at the

Brazilian Air Force, his father served the Marines, and his younger brother is also a police officer in the PM.

Achilles grew up in the lower middle class, but with enough privilege to make it through university. Before joining the military police, Achilles got a degree in Economics and worked in a bank; however, he always wished to apply to the military police. Aged 26, he entered the military police in the rank of lieutenant thanks to the lateral entry system. Achilles was quickly promoted and different to most officers he insisted on leading operations in favelas. He joined a special task force in the Niteroi district that was feared but respected. "People feared us, but we were different. We treated criminals hard but fair. Criminals knew that if they drop their arms, our team will not kill them. We got to be known as cracking down on crime but incorruptible. Back then I thought I was doing police work" (Achilles, author interview, 9 Dec 2014).

In 2009, Achilles was approached by the UPP general commander Robson Rodrigues, who nominated him to be the commander of a new UPP. Not knowing what was expecting him, Achilles arrived at the Morro da Providência, Rio's oldest favela located in the very city center. When I met him in 2010, Achilles commanded 250 officers at Providência and showed significant effort to connect with the community on a formal and informal basis. He not only patrolled the community on foot - usual for a commander - but also organized parties and meetings for the residents, coordinated projects with local NGOs and government agencies. Moreover, Achilles personally funded the education of a young girl in a wheelchair and was available 24/7 for the residents of Providência. Nevertheless, the community was not as easily persuaded by his good will, and the only reason Achilles had to believe that the relationship will ever grow were examples of other UPPs, such as Santa Marta, and his experience with the

children of Providência. The UPP offered a Judo class taught by a police officer, who had been training incognito even before pacification.

Achilles also paid special attention to one family in Providência; a single mother and her five daughters who were knowingly involved in the new, unarmed drug trafficking in the favela. The family was bitterly poor, and the teenage girls were relatives of drug traffickers who were arrested during pacification. They have established themselves as the new traffickers, dealing



*Part I Figure 24: Police officer giving martial art class at Providência. Photo by author 2010*

small amounts of marijuana and crack cocaine. Instead of arresting the girls, Achilles made it a habit to encourage them to attend free courses, lend money for them to start a little business and made sure the youngest would participate in UPP courses.

To many, Achilles became a shining example of a young and "unspoiled" generation of police officers who were then handpicked for the UPPs. He was motivated and dedicated to

community members even if he knew that they were involved in petty criminal activities. He actually enjoyed being part of a different kind of police and proud to not wear a ceramic bullet proof vest nor a machine gun in his daily strolls through the community. However, his dedication was met with the state's unfulfilled promises to bring social projects, improve infrastructure or invest in the education of the community members. With time, residents became impatient as they never saw real welfare benefits to pacification. Achilles had no idea that soon this illusion of peace would pass and that he would be left broken.

As rosy as this particular UPP may seem, the internal dynamics were much more involved. Commanding 250 men and women, most of them beat cops that entered the military police expecting to work at a battalion, was not an easy task. In his first year in command, Achilles arrested several of his own troop for misconduct, abusing residents, and taking bribes<sup>32</sup>. This earned his trust in the community, who saw that their complaints were being heard, but it made Achilles enemies among his own ranks. Talking to Achilles's troop, it became quickly apparent that the commander was everything else but well liked. Except for his right-hand man, Falco, and his office assistant, Paula, Achilles was on thin ice with his troops. Many openly admitted that this kind of leadership "giving criminals a second chance but punishing his own men for minor illicit activities" would not go over well. They demonstrated extreme anger about the numerous arrests of their fellow officers and the "vigilance of human rights" that took over their work. In their opinion, human rights are protecting criminals and blaming police officers for any force.

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<sup>32</sup> As is standard in the militar police, these arrests do not mean investigation or prosecution. They are militar arrests performed at the discretion of the superior officer. Arrest in this case can mean: house arrest in the battalion/UPP station; desk duty; and in more severe cases suspension without pay.

One day in 2011, I opened the newspaper and saw Achilles's picture on the front page with a title that slandered him as corrupt. He was immediately dismissed from the PM - something that historically almost never happens, especially not to higher ranking officers. In most cases, police officers are not even dishonorably dismissed even when facing murder charges. It was abundantly clear that Achilles's policing strategy and the arrest of police officers who were involved in the *Jogo do Bicho* - an illegal gaming activity that in Rio developed into an elaborate mafia and reaches the highest levels of power - interfered with underlying illegal business in this central region of Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, Providência is located in an area crucial for new investments and urban construction for the World Cup and Olympic Games, the money for which had largely disappeared. Eventually, all charges against Achilles were dropped, and he was reinstated. It took the involvement of Secretary of Public Security, Beltrame, who personally ordered for Achilles to be restored. But the damage was done; not only did Achilles's father suffer a heart attack when his son was arrested, but Achilles also fell into deep depression and a disillusion with a system that he never was able to overcome. From now on, he had to play by the rules. He was directly ordered to ignore corruption and certain activities at his UPP which at this time became a major construction site for bogus investments.

I saw Achilles again in 2014. At the time he was no longer an UPP commander, and I went to see him at his office in the PM Headquarters in Rio's city center. I found that the inspired and honest young UPP commander had mutated into a profoundly depressed Major (a promotion that was given to appease Achilles for leaving the UPP program) on desk duty. Nevertheless, Achilles began to work on a body camera project he envisioned for police officers, with Stanford researcher, Beatrice Magaloni. According to him, cameras would take pressure off police officers as well as the public. Equipped with a camera, police would run much less risk to

be in situations where they could be coerced to commit illegal acts. Once the project took off and received significant attention by national and international media, Achilles received a notice that his superior had suggested him to head armed operations at the Complexo do Alemão, a large favela in the periphery also called "the Gaza Strip." I remember distinctly his despair upon opening the letter with his name on the assignment. Among police officers, the Complexo do Alemão is a well-known killing ground for cops, an extremely dangerous environment riddled with armed drug traffickers and two-faced police. It is unheard of to assign a forty-year-old, high ranking officer with combat injuries into the field. To Achilles, this was as if someone put him onto the frontline of a battle without a weapon.

A few weeks later, while I was at a conference on Jamaica, I received several disturbing WhatsApp messages from Achilles. He was clearly in a phase of great depression which was worsened by the "stab in the back" by his superior as well as recent attacks on different UPPs, commanded by his friends. The messages expressed violent and suicidal thoughts. It was not clear to me if he meant his own life or that of others, but it was apparent that he was in a state of great despair and a danger to himself as well as others. It made me concerned enough to call his brother, asking him to apprehend Achilles and most of all, to take away his weapon. His brother found Achilles in tears in his apartment holding the gun. Meanwhile, he was still on duty and supposed to police in Complexo do Alemão. A man who has not taken his anti-depressants in weeks, who suffered from PTSD, and had violent thoughts towards himself and others. The military police were not (officially) aware of his mental health issues because Achilles paid for a private doctor, but the point is, that nobody ever examined him or his fellow police officers.

A Human Rights Watch Report asserts this by saying "multiple studies have found that Rio's military police officers suffer from very high levels of psychological stress. And yet, in

Rio de Janeiro, mental health care for military police officers is very limited. Some 70 psychologists provide counseling to the 48,000-member military police - a ratio of 1 for every 686 officers - and there are no psychiatrists. Very few officers see a psychologist after participating in a violent encounter” (Human Rights Watch 2016).

Seeing what Achilles went through, a privileged high-ranking officer, it is not difficult to estimate the difficulties street cops have to face. If officer’s mental health deteriorates, and they are facing dangers from rank and file within, the street cops have even less of a security net to fall back on. Their mental health is secondary. Over the years, Achilles mutated from a liberal police officer who was dedicated to promoting change, who voted the Worker’s Party, who supported the families of drug traffickers, into a bitter man disillusioned with democracy. He is convinced that the only way to reach any improvement in this world is by using force, killing all "enemies" if that is what it takes. Today, he supports radical right-wing politicians like Bolsonaro who glorify the military dictatorship and see human rights as a barrier to law and order on the streets.

In September 2015, Brazil watched a video broadcasted on the news, of military police officers killing Eduardo Felipe Santos Victor, aged 17, at the Morro da Providência. The police said Eduardo died in a shootout and had a radio transmitter, munition, and a gun - identifying him as a drug trafficker. However, the video shot secretly by a neighbor, showed the young man bleeding heavily on the ground, while a police officer shoots in the air with his gun. Another officer put a different gun into Eduardo's hand and fired it twice to make it seem like he was wounded in a shootout.

I immediately called Achilles; he had genuinely cared for Providência and especially its children. His response was tearful but heartless:

"In this inhumane world, you have to be inhumane to succeed. I am done with understanding. People here don't want change; they don't want the common good, just individual rights, and profit. If that is what democracy and human rights are about, I say fuck it. Under the slogan of human rights and democracy, I and many others went to war in Complexo Alemão. Under the banner of peace, many of us died and were sacrificed by our own people. Now I see reality, so I will vote the reality. Fuck the Brazilian people; they don't deserve any better" (Achilles, author interview Sept 2015).

#### CHANGES AND MORE IMPORTATIONS FROM THE WEST

The Psychology Section of the UPP headquarter, *Coordenadoria de Polícia Pacificadora* (CPP), began its activities in 2012 and has attended approximately 1,800 military police officers as of 2014. Currently, it serves UPP officers who spontaneously seek counseling, police officers sent by their UPP commanders, relatives of deceased police officers, wounded policemen and police officers who fired a firearm.

The specific assistance to police officers who fired a firearm began in April 2012, by determination of the CPP General Coordinator Colonel Robson Rodrigues. This new approach to firing a weapon was based on models in the US and according to the CPP had the purpose of providing a space to listen to police officers involved. To the UPP officers, Achilles included, this new measure was an abomination. To these policemen the "listening" was nothing more than an interrogation initiated by imported notions of human rights that were and attempt to "fake the idea that Brazil is a democracy" (author interview with Achilles, 2014). To many, the measure demonstrated an active distrust in the abilities of the troop.

In May 2013, the Psychology Section of the CPP carried out research on the interactions between pacification police and the community where they operate. The objective of the study

was to analyze behaviors and attitudes of the UPP police to identify affective variables or underlying factors that could potentiate situations of conflict between police and residents. The partial results obtained were presented to the CPP Command in July 2013, and authorization for the research was continued. In the second phase, the Psychology Section carried out “sensitization and orientation” of the current commanding UPP officers. The objective was to turn them into “motivators” and “mentors” for their troop. The main findings of the study were overlapping with my experience in the field. UPP officers at large, felt little recognized and dissatisfied with their role in pacification. An official brief of the Rio de Janeiro Military Police bulletin said:

*“Entendemos que contribui para isso a falta de compreensão, por parte do policial, da importância das tarefas por ele executadas dentro de um planejamento maior da política de segurança pública.”*

“We understand that this [dissatisfaction] is based on a lack of understanding on the part of the police officer, of the importance of the tasks performed by him within the larger plan of the public security policy”.

Such wording underlines my argument that beat cops are being treated purely as subordinates without capacity for critical thinking. It is interesting that a Military Police psychologist comes to this result, alleging that he or she has a better grasp of police work than the police officer himself. The study identified few reports of motivational actions performed within UPPs; police commitment being an essential factor for a change in the attitude of police officers. The report continued: “It presents the challenge for these commanders and supervisors to broaden and intensify in their practice skills and competencies for managing people. The command must be concerned with the improvement of policing technique, but also with the

development of attitudinal (social and relational) competencies of its troops, aligning its actions with the proposal of proximity policing”.

To commanders like Achilles and Pricilla the above statement was nothing but gibberish. In all these years, UPP commanders were never presented with coherent guidelines or protocols on policing practice or clear goals for their communities. I have attended the mandatory classes for UPP commanders on ethics, human rights, and proximity policing at the CPP. I did not encounter one satisfying definition of “community or proximity policing. Moreover, any attempt to discuss the actual problems that the police officers were facing in pacified favelas, such as armed attacks which increased in frequency in 2013, were suffocated by the lecturers. After mandatory classes on human rights for UPP commanders, the CPP asked more proactivity from the commanders in form of three main approaches:

- 1) Performance recognition: offer positive feedback to subordinates, with the aim of rescuing and reinforcing the legitimacy and recognition of the police officer in their work of proximity policing, facilitating the construction of this identity. Promote praise and awards of police actions that are aligned with the goal of proximity policing, in addition to the care of facilities and equipment.
- 2) Participation: the supervisor may create, during instructions or completion of services, spaces for dialogue with the troop. In addition to receiving instruction, the police officer can give an opinion on the planning and possible resolution of problems. Encourage the officers to identify and communicate with local leaders, seeking their participation in crime prevention. Sensitize the troop to possibilities for partnership and positive interactions with the community, “which in traditional policing practice is recognized only by the aspects of poverty, disability, marginality, and crime”.
- 3) Security: Improve internal communication processes, with clarity and transparency of the goals and procedures to be carried out. In the routine of proximity policing, the policeman might eventually neglect to use a bulletproof vest during the patrols. It is pertinent that the officer be constantly in contact with supervisors and pays attention to any different impressions of the territory, behavior and emotional state of residents during patrol. that the police officer had on the police officer.
- 4) Knowledge of the results: Establish a systemic view of the work process, facilitating the flow of information between the command and the troop. Provide data so that the officer is aware of

the results of his or her work. Create opportunities to listen to the problems that police officers experience in their daily lives and in times of great tensions.

First, the wording “rescuing and reinforcing legitimacy” of police officers in the field, under performance recognition, is an open admittance that there is essentially no police legitimacy in the favelas. However, the CPP does not present any solutions to the problem on how to define legitimacy or to rescue it. Based on the history and culture of the Rio military police, many officers see police legitimacy as a form of respect or fear, rather than in terms of legality. Thus, this sort of rhetoric (derived directly from Western police mission statements) might be interpreted in a very anti-democratic form by police officers on the ground.

The second approach, participation, is based on the anecdotal experiences of pacified favelas such as Providência, where the collaboration between police and local institutions showed results (this approach was implemented after I submitted my MPhil thesis in 2011 to the CPP, in which I identified such measures as effective). However, the idea of a subordinate military police officer to “give an opinion on the planning and possible resolution of problems” is directly in contradiction of the training at the police academy where the military code prohibits any form of contestation of superior officers. This includes any form of questioning, doubting, or discussion of the superior’s orders. It goes essentially against the nature of the military police to have participative subordinate officers. Since the UPP program involves only a small part of the military police and is not a reform of the police institution, the police officers graduating from police academy are not prepared for this form of “free thinking” or “proximity policing” that the UPP asks for.

The third category, security, points to another problem. It implies that the goals and procedures of “proximity policing” are clearly defined. Then it talks about common protocol

such as bulletproof vests and appropriate handling of equipment. In the same paragraph speaking of “proximity” policing the authors indicate highly militarized conceptions of territory and observance of subtle indicators of conflict. The idea of proximity policing is once again not defined.

Finally, the issue of “flow of information” is exceptionally amusing. Military police officers often refuse to use radios because their signal is often accessed by drug traffickers. Instead, almost all communication between troop and commander happens via private and cost-free provider WhatsApp. The same application is used by drug traffickers. It is not a secure, official server and prone to hacking. However, the CPP did not offer viable alternatives or suggestions on how to set up communication lines. Feedback is generally also sent via WhatsApp and rarely makes it into the (faulty or non-existent) computer data base.

## MORRO DAS FLORES: PROXIMITY POLICING AMIDST AN URBAN WAR



*Part I Figure 25: Foot patrol at Morro das Flores. Photo by author, 2014*

*Extract from field notes, at a “pacified” favela in Rio de Janeiro, 9 Oct 2014, 12 PM*

The patrol, the police commander said, would start by vehicle and continue on foot. In the car I was jammed in between two heavily armed men, squeezed into a seven-pound heavy ceramic bulletproof vest, wearing ridiculously red sneakers and carrying a camera.

"If we get shot at in the car just duck," says João, commander of this military police squad, pointing at the bullet hole in the windshield. When we reach the top of the hill, another six men meet us, one of them, Gil, in a ski mask. All of them heavily armed. These are my companions for the day, men I wouldn't usually dare to trouble even for directions. But today I need them to survive. The heavy vest makes me stumble as we scramble through bushes, up the hill, across mountains of smoking rubbish.

"There is someone on that rooftop," says João, looking through his binoculars as we throw ourselves on the ground. Gil, wearing the thick ski-mask in 100-degree heat, is

laying by my side and focuses the machine gun at a person on that rooftop. False alarm, so we continue.

The sun seems to burn a hole in my head. There is no time for fear, just adrenaline pumping through my veins. Each rooftop, balcony, or tree is a potential death trap where the drug gang positions their snipers. Each narrow “beco” alley is a revelation. I have been in shootings before but wearing a police vest feels like having a target pinned to my chest. And I know that even if it stops a bullet, the impact could still crush my organs.

Under this kind of pressure, knowing that the “enemy” has such weapons and uses them, there is no time for politeness. Stop and frisking random passers-by from the favela is brute and quick. I feel impatient and even annoyed with suspects who are slow or resistant. Time is of essence. Their arguing raises risk. After seemingly endless two hours of skimming through the favela, squeezing through holes and stomping through open sewage, we arrive back at the base, drenched in sweat.

They smile at me and shake my hand. “Voce é macho!” - you are a real guy, Gils says as he sends a quick prayer skyward.

I have known Morro das Flores, as I will call the favela described above, since 2009. Back then I was conducting an impact measurement project in different favelas for an NGO that provided its residents with informatics training. When I entered Morro das Flores for the first time, in 2009, my heart dropped as I was stopped by a young man with an AK47 over his shoulder asking me what the heck I wanted here. The NGO I worked for was well regarded, so he let me in.

At the school, the students, mostly youngsters, pointed all out a common worry: the violence in the community that claimed many lives. One day, as I was interviewing them, a shoot-out between drug traffickers and the police broke out and father, on his way to pick up his child from school, was shot dead in front of the school doors. A year later, in another of such

shootouts, a police helicopter was shot from the sky and crushed into the community. Morro das Flores was pacified in 2010. I attended the pacification ceremony and was surprised to see residents out on the streets applauding the Military Police that was marching in and driving the infamous BOPE *Caveirão* (literary means big skull), a small armored tank showing a skull with a knife in it. Residents, especially women shared their hope with me that maybe now their community could be at peace. They wished that their children will be able to play outside without gunfire; that drug traffickers will stop corrupting their sons; that they will become part of the *asfalto* (the formal city) and earn access to its infrastructure and opportunities. Most of all, people were expecting a stop to the drug-fueled violence that terrorized their community for decades. As if to encourage their hopes and dreams, in March 2011 President Barack Obama visited the then recently pacified Cidade de Deus (City of God) seemingly affirming a new, peaceful future.



Part I Figure 26: Barack Obama walking through Cidade de Deus, 2010. Source: New York Times

For a few years that peace became reality. While nothing was perfect, Morro das Flores and many other pacified favelas experienced a unique episode of non-violence, improved infrastructure, and positive attention from the media. The main drug bosses either fled, were arrested or killed; their families remained in the favela but became rather powerless. The armed young men disappeared from the streets and I could enter and exit as I pleased. The local UPP station commander, a man in his late twenties was excited and honored by the opportunity to lead this experiment. Sometimes, the police support of the community showed itself in more bizarre forms. For example, a community wedding was performed by the BOPE priest – who "Bible in one hand, *caveira* (skull) in the other," as a resident described it, married dozens of couples who could otherwise not afford it.

#### *The Roçinha Effect: Return of Violence*

In July 2013, Amarildo de Souza, a bricklayer from the enormous favela Roçinha in Rio de Janeiro was kidnapped, tortured, and disappeared by pacification police officers. The police falsely claimed he had ties to gangs. His body has never been found. "Pushback against the program began in 2013 and reached a crescendo with the killing of Amarildo," said Robert Muggah, research director at the Rio-based Igarape Institute, a security and development think tank. The highly publicized case triggered what some call the "Roçinha effect," similar to the so-called Ferguson effect in the US. What is meant is the viral videos captures on cellphones that distribute these images to the public at incredible speed and cause massive outcry.


An often-overlooked factor of the Roçinha incident is; however, that there was an immediate federal police investigation that resulted with twelve UPP officers found guilty of torture followed by death, disappearance of a corpse, and obstruction of justice. The former

commander of Rocinha's UPP was sentenced in February 2016 to over 13 years in prison. Such efficient investigation and trial of military police officers of murder without the victim's body present is unheard of and impressive even by Western standards. It sent the message that impunity for police officers is a thing of the past.

Unfortunately, since the killing of Amarildo, there have been many more incidents of police violence in Rio that circulated social media and damaged the image of the pacification police as a "democratic" version of the military police. As a result, UPP officers were confronted with a wave of distrust and even attacks by favela residents. A study with 2,000 UPP officers in 2014 resulted in the general perception, by the officers, that the majority of community members have a negative attitude toward police (61.5%), compared to only 28.5% in the beginning of the UPP program in 2010.

As a result of the distrust and animosity, pacification police became less proactive in those highrisk areas. Residents, on the other hand, became less inclined to report crimes or to ask police officers for help. The Roçinha effect is certainly a key factor that marked a crisis among UPPs in Rio de Janeiro and damaged police-resident relationships. Due to the prolonged economic and political crisis starting at the end of 2013, as well as the bankruptcy of billionaire Eike Batista (UPPs major donor) the UPP program lost 30 percent of its funding. Combined with the decreasing public support, return of drug gangs, and emergence of militias the UPP program came to a staggering halt. With 40 UPPs established, in a city with over 700 favelas, the last UPP station was inaugurated in May 2014.

**What sentiment does the majority of the community demonstrate toward police, according to UPP officers?**



Part I Figure 27: Source: Silvia Ramos, ISP Rio de Janeiro 2013

Like in many other UPPs, at Morro das Flores the relationship between police and residents soured in early 2014. The weakened drug factions quickly saw their opportunity to regain people's support and their territory. As the UPPs were sliding into a crisis of values and funding was cut left and right, drug traffickers re-entered these communities incognito and recruited support. Suddenly, the *lei do silencio* was re-established, and residents began to experience threats if they collaborated with police. One day, the local bakery that was frequented by the UPP officers was burned down by drug traffickers. The baker was burned with it. The faction had sent their message loud and clear: we are back!

The UPP squad at Morro das Flores added me to a WhatsApp group of the UPPs. Suddenly, my phone would ring hourly with news about police officers shot, about officers attacked and attacks planned by drug traffickers. One weekend, four officers were murdered in

their homes. Another, 23-year-old PM from the UPP Vila Kennedy was tortured and killed by drug traffickers. Another pair of PMs were attacked in their squad car. Within two weeks the cases were so often and so brutal that some people spoke of a possible order from Bangú (a prison and headquarter of the CV) to hunt down police officers to provoke a war. A war would certainly undermine the UPP, as police officers have no hesitation in killing whomever they regard as an enemy. At the same time, violence and extrajudicial killings on the part of the police increased by the day.

The PMs I was working with were visibly stressed. The fear made them bond even closer, made them feel like brothers who were on a heroic mission risking their lives and misunderstood by the world. In particular by the despised human rights activists. To make things even worse, a new study by Human Rights Watch had just declared that Rio's PM kill more civilians than the US or any other in the world.

"How can they compare our reality to theirs? This is not America; this is not England. This is Brazil! We are at war here," the soldados would exclaim angrily, shouting at the television. Another soldado, who grew up in a favela, said: "You want my opinion? They don't want it different." (Meaning favela residents) "They are not ready for change. Look at the streets filled with filth. Look at these kids using drugs and getting pregnant. Favelado is always going to be favelado! They lack discipline. Is it possible to get out? Yes. It is hard work, but I did it. So why can't they?"

After patrols, we often sat in the small UPP container watching television. In 2014, the events in Ferguson and the Black Lives Matter Movement were discussed on the news in Brazil and the small UPP container flamed up in debates about the cases of police brutality. One day, we watched footage of two US cops shooting twelve-year-old Tamir Rice who was playing with

a toy gun in a park. The news reported that upon the cop's arrival, Tamir reached towards the toy gun in his waistband – a claim that was confirmed with enhanced video evidence. Tamir Rice was shot immediately, without warning or "drop the gun," and died the following day.

The UPP container in Rio de Janeiro was watching the footage in anxious silence. In April 2012, the UPP program implemented measures (based on examples from the US) in which officers who fired a gun are investigated and psychologically evaluated, something largely unheard of before.

"God forbid that I would ever be in this situation, a situation where I have only milliseconds to decide if I shoot or not; if I choose his life or mine. God forbid, after all, it's a toy pistol!" one policeman exclaimed, visibly upset. "Every day, I am afraid of being judged for it, by people who know me, by people like you," he pointed his finger accusingly at me. The rest of the team nodded. "Imagine what would happen here. The residents would lynch us".

Then he pointed at the walls of the container which were riddled by bullets and the remaining dried blood spatter still showing on the floor from an attack they suffered last week. A female officer, an administrator, was shot in the leg and bled out. There were so much bitterness and disappointment in his statement. Police officers stationed at UPPs, in predominantly black communities with predominantly dark-skinned drug traffickers, have difficulty grasping the notion of racial profiling. Different to cops in US cities, they are not patrolling vast areas choosing suspects, they are inside a favela and often threatened by traffickers. Many of these police officers also work additional hours stationed in white neighborhoods where they are (made) incapable of pursuing charges against privileged members of society for drug possession, use, and distribution.

There is an inherent bipolarity of being a black military officer from a poor community, confronting dangerous armed criminals of your own profile. As one officer admits, "No human mind can stand this paradox, you cannot be a healthy and humane social agent. You will begin seeing parts of society as not prepared for change, not conscientious of what the world is like, and another part as evil and dangerous" (author interview 2015). Moreover, UPP officers at Morro das Flores complained about not being paid on time; that they were equipped with faulty rifles; and being too low in number to secure the UPP station. As drug traffickers and heavy weaponry reappeared, many officers saw no other choice but to find an agreement with the gang.



*Part I Figure 28: Cocaine packaged with Olympic Logo and "use away from children" warning, 2016*

In 2014, Rio experienced a steep increase in confrontation with firearms fired and incidences of wounded policemen. The 2014 World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio had significant impact on this situation. Drug traffickers found themselves with an extraordinary economic possibility with millions of tourists entering the country, the demand for cocaine increased enormously. The gangs even produced cocaine baggies with the Olympic Logo on it. Thus, traffickers re-entered pacified favelas located at prime spots in the city. In

2014, drug dealers put their plastic tables with drugs, guns, and radios in the middle of the main street at Morro das Flores. UPP officers were often standing only dozens of feet away. The UPP patrols reduced to the outskirts of the community,



*Part I Figure 29: Drug trafficker's sale table. Photo credit: Felipe Dana*


leaving the center to the traffickers<sup>33</sup>. Any arrest or even frisking of community members was immediately avenged by attacking the UPP station, who often outmanned, called the local battalion for help. The help never arrived; it turned out that the battalion had found a lucrative agreement with the drug traffickers and would not intervene in their actions. The UPP became an insignificant, under-staffed, and beaten little container filled with scared and frustrated officers.

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<sup>33</sup> At this time, it had become too dangerous to join police officers in patrols and I acquired the information through interviews and participant observation.

Police, on the other hand, were under great political pressure to clean up the favelas by whatever means necessary, and this pressure led them to conclude that reverting to extra-judicial abductions and killings was the most expedient way to achieve that objective. As the country geared up to host the Olympic Games, killings by on- or off-duty police officers were now in second place of violent death in Brazil.

As the country geared up to host the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016, the Brazilian forum of public security reported that the number of violent deaths was up nearly 5% in 2014, from 2013 (when Brazil had a then high of 55,000 such deaths). The report takes into account homicides, manslaughter, killings by police and robberies that end in deaths. "While murder remains the top cause of violent death in Brazil, killings by on- or off-duty police officers now are in second place", the statement said (Reuters 2015).



Part I Figure 30: Police violence in Rio de Janeiro. Source: Human Rights Watch, 2015

Beat cops often felt like their lives, rights, and services do not matter to anyone; that the population takes it for granted that they are confronting armed criminals while being expected to attend to children and elderly the next moment. An hour ago, we were sweating fear up in the hills and alleys; the other, residents stop by to complain about bills they now have to pay because of pacification. To many officers, the idea to approach populations they regard as resistant to democracy, with democratic policing measures is paradoxical. To these officers, democracy is solely based on the formalization and inclusion in the economic system, such as address registration, bills, “fulfilling your duty to society”.

The already precarious setting was framed by general corruption in the higher echelons. In 2018, the governor Sérgio Cabral was sentenced to 72 years in prison for embezzlement and participation in criminal organizations – the same groups that his project the UPP were supposed to encounter. But we all knew about these connections a long time before a judge put Cabral away. Sergio Cabral is one in an unbroken line of political leaders who are either imprisoned or accused of corruption and racketeering. Every governor in Rio de Janeiro since 1998 is now behind bars. A survey from a few years back suggests that over 80% of all elected officials in Rio - both state and municipal - are facing ongoing criminal investigations ranging from homicide to money laundering. Cops were acutely aware of the network that their superiors and politicians mingled in. They feared the people who give them orders, assigned cops duty and signed their pay checks. They were ordered to perform “democratic policing” for the cameras and pretend that pacification effectively got rid of armed drug traffickers in the favelas.

### Use of firearms by police in UPPs, first semester 2014

	Jan	Fev	Mar	Abr	Mai	Jun	TOTAL 1º SEMESTRE
2ª UPP/16º BPM Nova Brasília	0	5	41	47	41	52	186
3ª UPP/16º BPM Alemão	0	13	2	23	6	29	73
2ª UPP/4º BPM São Carlos	0	0	2	16	11	21	50
1ª UPP/18º BPM Cidade de Deus	0	0	0	11	15	26	52
2ª UPP/23º BPM Rocinha	9	2	3	3	10	22	49
2ª UPP/14º BPM Vila Kennedy	0	0	0	0	0	26	26
1ª UPP/3º BPM São João	2	1	0	8	4	5	20
6ª UPP/16º BPM Parque Proletário	3	3	0	5	3	2	16
2ª UPP/19º BPM Pavão Pavãozinho	8	0	1	1	4	0	14
1ª UPP/23º BPM Vidigal	0	0	0	6	0	8	14
4ª UPP/3º BPM Camarista Méier	2	0	0	4	5	2	13
1ª UPP/5º BPM Providência	0	0	0	2	1	9	12
5ª UPP/6º BPM Macaco	1	0	0	2	7	2	12
2ª UPP/5º BPM Fallet	5	0	0	0	1	6	12
3ª UPP/3º BPM Lins	0	0	0	0	7	3	10
2ª UPP/22º BPM Manguinhos	0	0	2	3	0	4	9
7ª UPP/16º BPM Vila Cruzeiro	0	0	1	2	0	4	7
4ª UPP/4º BPM Caju	0	0	2	0	0	4	6
1ª UPP/16º BPM Fazendinha	0	0	0	1	3	2	6
3ª UPP/4º BPM Mangueira	3	0	0	0	1	1	5
3ª UPP/22º BPM Arará Mandela	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
1ª UPP/15º BPM Mangueirinha	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
1ª UPP/6º BPM Borel	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
2ª UPP/3º BPM Jacarezinho	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
1ª UPP/4º BPM Turano	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
1ª UPP/22º BPM Adeus-Baiana	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
1ª UPP/19º BPM Babilônia-Chapéu	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
3ª UPP/6º BPM Andaraí	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
5ª UPP/4º BPM Barreira do Vasco-Tuiuti	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<b>TOTAL MÊS</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>608</b>

Part I Figure 31: Source: Psychological Center CPP, Rio de Janeiro 2014

### Use of firearms by UPP officers, second semester 2014

	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	TOTAL 2º SEMESTER
3ª UPP/16º BPM Alemão	30	32	7	22	15	18	124

2ª UPP/16ª BPM Nova Brasília	11	15	28	17	40	6	117
2ª UPP/23ª BPM Rocinha	19	22	11	14	34	6	106
1ª UPP/18ª BPM Cidade de Deus	4	15	17	26	20	14	96
1ª UPP/16ª BPM Fazendinha	0	12	14	11	24	18	79
3ª UPP/3ª BPM Lins	5	10	14	18	18	7	72
1ª UPP/3ª BPM São João	8	5	12	10	22	13	70
4ª UPP/3ª BPM Camarista Meier	4	13	14	21	0	5	57
7ª UPP/16ª BPM Vila Cruzeiro	9	18	14	4	8	2	55
2ª UPP/14ª BPM Vila Kennedy	4	3	15	12	9	3	46
1ª UPP/5ª BPM Providência	11	12	0	5	16	2	46
6ª UPP/16ª BPM Parque Proletário	0	12	18	3	8	0	41
5ª UPP/6ª BPM Macaco	2	10	7	18	0	0	37
3ª UPP/4ª BPM Mangueira	0	2	8	13	5	7	35
2ª UPP/4ª BPM São Carlos	0	6	12	1	5	8	32
2ª UPP/5ª BPM Fallet/Coroa/Fogueteiro	13	9	2	0	0	4	28
3ª UPP/6ª BPM Andaraí	0	3	0	3	5	14	25
1ª UPP/4ª BPM Turano	0	0	1	20	0	2	23
3ª UPP/22ª BPM Arará Mandela	9	0	0	0	1	2	12
1ª UPP/23ª BPM Vidigal	1	5	0	0	2	1	9
1ª UPP/15ª BPM Mangueirinha	2	0	1	0	4	0	7
2ª UPP/3ª BPM Jacarezinho	1	1	0	3	2	0	7
1ª UPP/22ª BPM Adeus-Baiana	6	0	0	0	1	0	7
4ª UPP/4ª BPM Caju	0	1	0	4	0	0	5
2ª UPP/19ª BPM Pavão Pavãozinho	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
1ª UPP/6ª BPM Borel	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
2ª UPP/22ª BPM Manguinhos	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
1ª UPP/19ª BPM Babilônia-Chapéu	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
5ª UPP/4ª BPM Barreira do Vasco-Tuiuti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL per MONTH</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>206</b>	<b>195</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>1142</b>

Part I Figure 32: Second semester..Source: Psychological Center CPP, Military Police Rio de Janeiro 2014

Every shootout that resulted in injury had grave consequences on beat cops who were “scarified” to human rights activists Why do you, human rights activists only care about the bandits?”, they would ask me, blaming the foreign push for human rights for their insecurity. Police officers don’t see themselves as “the state”, they see themselves as vulnerable citizens – *cidadão do bem*. When I asked what they think human rights are, one beat cop replied: “Direitos humanos, para humanos *direitos*” – Human rights for the right or, law abiding humans. In this

context, police see human rights as something that has to be earned and they refuse to obey human rights applied to everyone. Human rights and security had developed into seemingly conflicting priorities. The effects of this structural contradiction between the state's deployment of police to eradicate armed criminals when key state actors like the governor and mayor are at the center of corruption and ultimately protect the same criminals the police are supposed to attack – is a central contradiction that deserves some prominence in the framing of Rio's police.

In accordance with my experience with UPP officers in the field, a study with military policemen who work in UPPs, indicates that most of these agents present a great dissatisfaction with their work (Musumeci et al. 2013). In dismembering this dissatisfaction, the authors of the research found the main reasons to be:

- 1) bad working conditions
- 2) did not like/ did not want UPP
- 3) UPP is not/or is less police
- 4) not feeling respected/valued
- 5) bad relationship with the community
- 6) disruptive institution/hierarchy/command
- 7) no apparent results from UPP; UPP is a political project.

Working conditions appear as the main factor for dissatisfaction for police officers working in UPPs. According to my informants this includes irregular working hours due to being short staffed, but also the infrastructure of UPP stations that are often not more than simple containers. Like at Morro das Flores, most UPP stations are small and vulnerable. Bullets pierce

through the thin walls, police officers have limited equipment and often not even toilets to use. Although UPP officers earn a better salary than before, due to gentrification and their jobs most cannot live in the city. Thus, most move into the peripheries where they rent. The majority drive several hours to work. Even Achilles, who was a ranking officer, could not afford the rent in Rio and lived in a nearby municipality two hours away, as did Pricilla.


For many UPP officers their work quickly became conceptualized as an insult in which they felt required to make good face in a bad situation for the media. Being charged with “proximity” policing, UPP police were supposed to approach the community in a friendly manner. In the beginning, the new and “fresh” officers working at colorful and cosmopolitan favelas such as Santa Marta had the motivation to do so. Santa Marta had a proper building used at the UPP station, was equipped with computers and functioning toilets. The residents were used to “outsiders” and the favela became quickly an attraction to foreigners which made commerce, not drug trafficking, a lucrative and safe business.

However, once the “real” favelas were pacified, and the government needed thousands of police officers to saturate those dangerous regions, the program became less selective. Even the most reluctant police officers were ordered from military police battalions into UPPs. I noted that numerous police officers wished to leave the UPP to work in a battalion. Their desire for change was closely related to the police officer's dissatisfaction with their working conditions and their own performance at the UPP. They believed that the battalion they would be more respected (or feared) by citizens in their work as “real” police officers.

Another important point is that UPP officers see proximity policing as a high-risk performance which serves the government in the attempt to seem “democratic”, but in reality endangers the lives of police officers. The feeling of vulnerability and fear is inherent in the UPP

containers, at patrols, and police officer's homes as I have witnessed. Many police officers who work in UPPs that are facing frequent attacks, like Morro das Flores, consider that the purpose of their service is merely to stay alive.

### How do UPP officers feel?



*Part I Figure 33: Survey with 2000 UPP officers. Source: Centro de Segurança e Cidadania, 2015*

The peculiarity of the police officer's role in UPP is anchored in the long history of “traditional” or more to the point, repressive policing performed in favelas. As I have demonstrated in previous chapters and the case study Saudade, in many pacified favelas the conditions did change only on the surface. Criminal structures have adapted; drug traffickers re-emerged, militias developed, and both turned to confront a police force that was ordered to approach them in a “democratic” manner, thus without the use of force.

The level of stress in this line of work, trying to consolidate democratic ideas of proximity policing in a reality where bullets fly, and residents are burned to death for collaborating with the police, is unimaginable. As the figure of Achilles shows, even those with

good intentions and a set of privileges (high ranking, white, wealthy, educated) reach a threshold of no return in a system marked by corruption, clientelism, and overt hostility. Minayo, Souza and Constantino (2008) carried out an extensive study with military police officers in Rio de Janeiro where they sought to understand the conditions of life, work, and health of these cops. One of the notes of the study addresses the stress and mental suffering in the routine of police officers and the consequences of this for their lives. The study showed that military police officers are in a constant state of alert. Alertness refers to the first phase of stress and represents the body's response to danger also called “fight or flight” reaction. At this time, the individual feels an increase in vigor, strength, motivation, and creativity, thus, has increased productivity. However, this state can be harmful if maintained over time.

In the case of the work carried out in the UPPs, this reality adds to the sense of vulnerability experienced by the police, generated by the high frequency of armed confrontations and attacks by criminals and, sometimes, members of the community they serve. UPP police complain that work in UPPs is more tiresome and stressful than the previous rapid “in and out” police raids. While these operations were very risky, violent, and stressful they were also short-lived periods of few hours. Working in the UPP, however, police officers feel a constant imminence of potential conflict, requiring that they remain in a state of alert throughout their whole shift.

While the hand-picked commanders were almost without exception high rank and well educated, their troops originated for the most part from favelas ruled by drug traffickers. They grew up despising the violence and criminality surrounding them and aspired the “righteous” life of a police officer. Once they entered this path, they had to leave the favela for safety reasons and would re-enter only blazing guns during a raid.

In general, the military police I met shared a feeling of being misunderstood. They distrust and resent favela residents because they accuse them to not take the “right path” as they did. Police officers often make a meager salary but pride themselves of being dedicated to eliminating “evil” which has no price. Their attitude towards favela residents was tainted by their experience of being hated by them (because they kill them...). Often the path into the police force is paved by strong religious beliefs of righteousness, the notion of masculinity and justice in form of punishment.

The Pacification Police Unit was in first place a system that pacified the police officer, before proceeding to pacify the favela. Guided by Western templates of hot spots and proximity policing, selected officers were lectured in human rights and conflict resolution, based on experiences in the West. To UPP officers this approach boiled down to feeling disrespected and not valued, as the primary goal was to hold police accountable, while minor illicit actions by residents were largely tolerated in times of transition.

For example, Achilles would hold his police to high standards and punish even minor infringements; however, he would approach the families of drug traffickers with tolerance trying to offer alternatives on the job market rather than arrest them. This attitude (in accordance with principles of problem-oriented policing) was intolerable to his troop who felt betrayed. While literature on democracy often focus on state-citizen binaries, incorporating perspectives of police officers, like Achilles, really challenges this, and shows what happens when we analyze police as both, people and a state force.

Police voices tend to be excluded from these conversations and viewed only as powerful oppressors. This is complicated by my research and while it may be an unpopular view in the particular political climate, it is an important perspective to include, precisely because the police

on the ground are supposed to do the work of the state. They are intermediaries between citizens and the state, but many also suffer from PTSD, mental illness, and economic hardship. Police killings do not happen because all these officers are “evil”; just like young men do not enter drug gangs because they are “evil”. As popular culture shows, the image of the police and favelas is incredibly spectacular and is commodified, but behind these portrayals there is a reality that is human and very disturbing. Police officers in the UPP program are not given the tools to manage, understand, and adapt to new templates of “proximity policing”. The Military Police are without a doubt brutal oppressor; but many officers also suffer from mental and physical health issues, an abandonment by the state in terms of healthcare, proper pay, as well as safety on the job and beyond.

## CONCLUSION

International headlines frequently tell us that Rio’s police are losing control, but when we look closely at the lived experiences of police and favela residents, we learn that the situation is more complex. Through a long-term ethnographic immersion in the everyday lives of these communities, my work demonstrates that favela residents have alternative ways of constructing human rights – primarily focusing on their freedom and quality of life.

Although the UPPs did not dismantle the gangs and drug trafficking, at first violence fell, and trust slowly developed with these atypical, young officers. Over almost ten years of existence, pacification has brought homicide rates and armed conflict down in Rio de Janeiro, but it went off the rails in mid-2013. At that time, massive street demonstrations turned perilous, tarnishing an image that police had only recently begun to democratize. In July 2013, the torture and killing of Rocinha resident Amarildo resulted in the “Rocinha effect” that was followed by

an increasing number of shooting incidents resulting in police deaths. Armed violence between drug traffickers and the police began to spike in UPPs all over Rio. Hand-picked UPP commanders were challenged to identify problems that plague specific communities and craft and implement responses that are uniquely suited to each. Police, like Achilles, were supposed to become problem solvers and expand their repertoire beyond reactive policing.

The second phase of the program —investment in urbanization, health and social projects — was, however, a failure. Those plans fell short amid pervasive corruption, and Brazil entered a long recession that left the state of Rio de Janeiro bankrupt. Formerly free services secured by armed gang members, such as electricity and water, became costly expenditures after pacification. The legalization of commerce, registration of addresses for bill payments implanted a capitalist economic system that disadvantaged local enterprises and opened the gates for corporate companies.

Many residents had to move into the peripheries into non-pacified favelas where they could afford to live. In such conditions, democratic policing, which was expected to pave the way for accountability and access to human rights, simply didn't seem affordable. The idea of human rights, as stated by the UN, puts physical integrity at the center. But my work in Rio's favelas shows that safety from violence is only one of many variables to how people understand human rights. While infrastructure in some UPPs was indeed improved and some central UPPs, especially Santa Marta, became colorful and "authentic" favela experience for tourists, these communities also experienced an increase in living costs. The prohibition of Baile Funk parties, legalization of commerce, registration of addresses for bill payments implanted a capitalist economic system that disadvantaged local enterprises and opened the gates for corporate

companies. To many residents, economic opportunity, property, and freedom are more important than having less shootouts.

To cops, the idea of human rights is associated with a foreign model of showing respect and courtesy even to criminal suspects. But that is perceived as an insult. Overall, the understanding of human rights in a setting marked by corruption and fragility is summarized poignantly by one beat cop who said “*Direitos humanos para os humanos direitos*” - human rights for the *right* humans.

As I have shown, the participation of citizens in policing efforts can have significant effects on the social inclusion of favelas into the formal city. Initiatives such as the use of atypical actors and targeting the weakest and most vulnerable groups through sports improve channels of participation and knowledge production. At Santa Marta, the presence of a female commanding officer calmed the population and assured a different, improved police practice because she was not associated with aggressive masculine force. The children who trained Judo with police officers at Providência symbolized a new generation that has the chance to establish a new relationship with the police and the state government. Especially the female residents, who for decades saw their sons, brothers, and husbands being killed, sensed a chance to offer security and opportunities to the future generations. This not only motivated societal incorporation but also centralized the moral power of community members.

I found that the UPP officers -fresh out of police academy – were largely excited to join a “different” police force that worked with favelas. But with the social unrest rising in context of two international events, the World Cup 2014 and Olympics 2016, officers began to resent the program despite the decrease in crime because they perceived the methods as more dangerous to their safety. In addition, the internal discrimination left UPP officers frustrated. This form of

“proximity” policing was developed and applied only to a few dozens of favelas in the city, while the rest of the military police continued with their status quo. As a result, a divide emerged between young and inexperienced UPP and old-school military police battalions. Pacification an attempt to develop an accountable police force that would be trained in and obey to human rights, has indeed created insecurity through the promotion of security (Robb Larkins 2015).

Finally, there is an underlying structural contradiction between the state’s deployment of police to eradicate criminals when state representatives are at the center of corruption. When the leaders of program such as Pacification are at the apex of criminal networks and ultimately protect the same criminal enterprises, the police are supposed to eradicate, it creates an environment in which nobody can trust no one.

As the case of Achilles shows, this is unbearable even for the privileged high-ranking officers, who often start out with good intentions. To police on the ground, the notion of human rights and democracy became foreign-pushed, empty concepts that cause more harm than good.

One of the central problems of the Pacification Police Unit, that has been surprisingly little addressed by scholars, is the almost complete lack of an investigative arm in this policing project. Civil police, responsible for investigation of crimes in Brazil, are excluded from the design and organization of UPP policies. While civil police precincts are officially attending favelas (if approached with a report), it is only the military police that is present and active inside favelas. Their actions are by institutional nature limited to patrols, arrests, frisking, and repression.

Despite the potential drawbacks and long term unintended consequences, the UPP represents a significant shift in policy orientation in Rio de Janeiro. This is not only because the UPPs are far more ambitious and more deeply institutionalized than any of their predecessor

policies, but also because they represent a fundamentally different philosophical view of the state's role in fighting crime than earlier policies and practices. However, without the inclusion of an investigatory arm, prosecution and trial not only of police officers but civilian criminals, the UPP will not achieve sustainability. Furthermore, if the project is not embraced and regulated by government and civil society including different branches of the judiciary, NGOs, police institutions, and municipalities the UPP program will remain a fragile and explosive experiment. The next part of the dissertation will introduce a public security program that is also based on the idea of proximity policing. Nevertheless, due to its particular organization and local conditions, the Pact for Life in Recife plays out inherently different on the ground. While UPPs emphasis was on the reduction of armed conflict that mainly bothered the upper classes, and the logics of violence were based on a centralized system of drug factions; in Recife violence is decentralized and including the figure of the police. Most importantly, we will see that in the case of Recife, the emphasis on the civil police, thus investigation of crime underlines a very different design of a "democratic" police force. The Pact for Life differs significantly in its motivation, design, and implementation on the ground.

## PART II

### THE PACT FOR LIFE IN RECIFE, PERNAMBUCO

This part of the dissertation will introduce and examine the Pact for Life public security program in Recife, Pernambuco. As will become apparent, Recife and Rio are host to inherently different socio-economic and political conditions that shape the logics of violence locally. Both security programs employ similar Western templates of crime prevention and policing practice in an attempt to democratize their public security institutions; however, the organization, design, and implementation on the ground are strikingly different. While the UPP in Rio employs hot spot policing and focusses on the military police employing a strategy similar to the Japanese Koban proximity policing, in Recife the Pact for Life restructured the whole judicial system. The specific goal of the Pacto was to reduce homicide rates in the state by 12% per year. Different than the UPP program in Rio, Pacto's design puts emphasis on civil police, hence criminal investigation. It has achieved a decrease in violent crime by 60 percent in Recife. This section of the dissertation is structured like Part I in three main themes: first, the unique context and design of the Pact for Life in Recife; second, I analyze the attitudes of residents in a particular favela, Bode, toward the Pact for Life and how it changed over time.

Finally, I examine the attitudes and experiences of police officers toward the Pact for Life. The chapters are based on ethnographic work in the favela Bode, the homicide task force, a military police battalion, as well as a survey conducted with 200 military police officers. Furthermore, I attended weekly Pact for Life meetings. The three levels of analysis – context, citizens, police - provide analogous points of comparison to my research in Rio de Janeiro.

## CHAPTER 7

## O NORDESTE



Part II Figure 1: Source: <https://www.infoescola.com/geografia/regiao-nordeste/>

Josué de Castro famously described the Brazilian Northeast as “600,000 square miles of suffering” (Castro 1966). De Castro was referring to the horrible droughts, oligarchic landowners, and devastating poverty throughout the “land of sugar and sweetness but also of leather and darkness”. Northeast of Brazil is, as Roger Bastide noted, “*a terra de contrastes*” a land of contrasts (Bastide 1980). Cloying sugarcane fields spread out amid hunger and disease; periodic droughts and deadly floods that kill livestock and people; authoritarian landowners and

primitive rebels; Catholicism co-existing with Afro-Brazilian Candomblé (Cabral de Melo Neto 2010). The region is made up of nine states (Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte, and Sergipe) that are drastically different regarding the economy, history, demography and culture from the developed and largely white Southeast, where Rio is located. The relationship between northern states and the Southeast of Brazil is especially strained. The vast inequality between the country's north and south has caused painful national divisions on the political and cultural level. Similar to the US South, "the Northeast of Brazil is depicted as a problematic "other" against which Brazilians measure their progress or lack thereof, relative to the First World" (Enriquez 2014; Scheper-Hughes 1993; Skidmore 2010). The Northeast, as depicted in hundreds of songs and movies, is often placed as the nostalgic cultural center of Brazil.<sup>34</sup>

Many civil groups and politicians are advocating to make the Northeast a sovereign nation, to get rid of the economic ballast that it poses; others would like to see an autonomous Southeastern region, which is the most economically developed. Of all the separation movements in Brazil, the group "*O Sul é meu país*" (The South is my country), is the most developed one. Its members see themselves as part of a plebiscitary awareness movement. They claim that as much as 75% of the population of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná is for a separation. Nordestinos themselves also have many advocates for an independence of the Northeast, or at least of particular states<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>34</sup> Luiz Gonzaga, for instance, is one of Brazil's artistic treasures and the first musician from the Northeast to make a skyrocketing career beyond the region. Born and raised in the Sertão of Pernambuco, a mystical area marked by poverty, plantations, slavery and drought, Gonzaga became famous playing the accordion – an instrument that became a symbol for the Northeast. His songs are beloved by *nordestinos* and tell stories of love and suffering in the northeast.

<sup>35</sup> In Pernambuco, for example, a research group at the Federal University of Pernambuco – Recife, Grupo de Estudos Sobre um Nordeste Independente (Study group for the independence of the Northeast) founded by Jacques Ribemboim, is arguing that independence from the rest of Brazil would benefit the region economically. The

Numerous *nordestinos* also confided that they feel like foreigners visiting other states and are often discriminated because of their origin and dialect. Immigrants from the Northeast are widely regarded as cheap and uneducated labor that "flood" the job market, allegedly taking away jobs from locals (O'Dougherty 2002). *Cariocas* from Rio and *Paulistas* from São Paulo, in the wealthier and more cosmopolitan regions of the south, commonly see *nordestinos* similar to folkloric figures. It almost seems like *nordestinos* are not "real" but anachronistic reminders of a past embellished with the esthetics of wretch, religion, courage, and folklore. In popular culture, poetry, and songs men and women alike are described as short and stocky (due to malnutrition but also indigenous heritage), strong (from hard labor on plantations and again indigenous heritage), and fearless (in attribution to their suffering).

Born in Pernambuco, João Cabral de Melo Neto is one of the most influential Brazilian poets of the twentieth century. In the poem *Morte e Vida Severina*, (Cabral de Melo Neto 2010)1967, Cabral describes the long journey of a man from the interior, migrating to the coastal area of Pernambuco in search of a better future. Severino, the poem says, lives a life indistinguishable from many others:

#### Vida e Morte Severina

Somos muitos Severinos  
iguais em tudo na vida:  
na mesma cabeça grande  
que a custo que se equilibra,  
no mesmo ventre crescido  
sobre as mesmas pernas finas,  
e iguais também porque o sangue

#### Life and Death of Severino

We are many Severinos,  
we are exactly alike:  
The same big head  
that's hard to balance correctly,  
the same swollen belly  
on the same skinny legs,  
alike because our blood

---

academics see the area as historically exploited by other states, in particular by the Southeast, to which most raw materials are exported to below the international market value. However, when importing products from Southern manufacturers, Northeastern states buy at protected prices which are in fact higher than international market value, claims Ribemboim, who is Professor of Economics at UFPE, which results in an internal neo-colonial structure.

que usamos tem pouca tinta.  
 E se somos Severinos  
 iguais em tudo na vida,  
 morremos de morte igual,  
 mesma morte severina:  
 que a morte de que se morre  
 de velhice antes dos trinta,  
 de emboscada antes dos vinte,  
 de fome um pouco por dia (...)

has little color.  
 And all of us Severinos  
 with the same lives  
 will die of the same  
 severe Severino death:  
 the death died  
 of old age before thirty  
 of an ambush before twenty,  
 of hunger day by day (...)

*Part II Figure 2: João Cabral de Melo, 1967*

The poem describes the hardships and challenges faced by people living in the poorest regions of the Brazilian Northeast. A “severe Severino life” was indeed the fate of most people in Pernambuco - historically, one of the poorest states of Brazil. Governments in the state have tried to overcome the development gaps by establishing policies that increase the coverage of services and create better opportunities in rural areas.

The state of Pernambuco, one of Brazil’s 27 federative states and the second most populous in the Brazilian Northeast, has undergone a substantial transformation over the last fifteen years. In part, this is related to the more stable economic environment in Brazil as a whole and the improvement of inequality. During the so-called "Lula era" - named after Worker’s Party elected President Lula da Silva - millions of people were helped out of absolute poverty through conditional cash transfer program Bolsa Família. In Pernambuco specifically, the expansion of the SUAPE port, the introduction of incentives for private investors, and extensive investments in social services were crucial. Another factor contributing to improving social indicators is the Pernambuco's *interiorização* strategy; a policy developed to increase the coverage of public services in underserved areas, with a focus on the interior of the state (World Bank Report 2014). The World Bank reports: "The decline in poverty rates displays a trajectory towards convergence

with Brazil and recently, a faster than national decline of the Gini Index [...] has brought Pernambuco's income inequality below the national and Northeast level" (Lopez-Calva, Rodella, and Sharman 2014). With second-term governor Eduardo Campos<sup>36</sup> at the helm, a member of the center-left Brazilian Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Brasileiro*, hence PSB), the state has become more active in the globalized economy<sup>37</sup>

Despite all the critical socio-economic improvements described above, the "Severe Severino Life" is still a phenomenon that I find descriptive of the lives and deaths of Pernambucans well into the 2000s. Since 1967, infant mortality decreased significantly, and the symptoms of hunger and drought have been ameliorated (Lopez-Calva, Rodella, and Sharman 2014). Nevertheless, very few people originally in poverty were able to join the middle class, and virtually no one in extreme poverty had escaped poverty in the end.

These findings have important implications in analyzing the realities of Recife's large favela population. Premature death is still an ever-present threat affecting *Pernambucanos*, but since democratization in 1985, those deaths have increasingly become of the violent kind. Daily, men and women in Pernambuco's most precarious areas "will die of the same severe Severino death, the death died of old age before thirty of an ambush before twenty and of hunger day by day" (de Melo Neto 1967) – shot, stabbed, beaten to death. In the following chapters, I trace their lives and death as well as police work under the Pact for Life to examine the local complexities that entangle global uniformities of "good" or "democratic" policing models. I show that

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<sup>36</sup> During my second field visit in 2014, Pernambuco's governor was Paulo Câmara who is also a member of the PSB.

<sup>37</sup> Recife was one of the cities hosting games for the World Cup 2014, but even before that, Recife was already experiencing an influx of foreign capital. For example, in 2000, Recife's historic district became the site of the public/private funded Porto Digital, (multi)national software development consortium. Also, multinational corporations, such as Fiat and Kraft Foods began building factories near the city (Enriquez 2014).

although the police in Recife are less militarized and less violent than in Rio, and progressive accountability structures have been successfully implemented, the police officers themselves strive to images of “warriorship” as seen in Rio de Janeiro and also the U.S. The notions of justice and rights is closely connected to ideas on masculinity, honor and fear/ respect which often contradict human rights in practice. Favela residents are also heavily influenced by global trend of militarization of security services and law enforcement, seeing a legitimate police officer as someone who is equipped with weaponry, gear and the state given use of force, secondary to be a human rights advocate.

## CHAPTER 8

## OF “CRAB MEN” AND MANGROVES: FAVELAS AND SECURITY IN RECIFE

This chapter will disaggregate the specific circumstances and logics of violence and policing in Recife. First, I examine the nature of favelas in Recife through the metaphor of mangroves, a space that officials and elites regard as mystical, dangerous, and home to its species of “crab men.” While in Rio de Janeiro the hillsides are depicted as dangerous, armed spaces participating in a war-like conflict, in Recife the segregation of the flat city is into the solid and the amphibious. To the elites, mangroves represent a space inhabited by a different species, so called crab-people, who are the most vulnerable parts of population. However, their daily struggles and the violence that destroys their communities is little discussed by outsiders.

Second, I introduce the specific forms of violence in Recife. Different than the situation in Rio, violence in Recife takes a more interpersonal form expressed in “revenge” and “crimes of passion”, but also fueled by crack-cocaine. While drug trafficking is a dominant aspect of violent crime in Recife, there are no organized and well-armed dealers who contest the police.

Finally, the chapter examines the motivation and design of the Pact for Life, based largely on Western policing templates such as COMPSTAT and Boston Ceasefire project. I examine its differences to the UPP program in Rio de Janeiro.

*Favelas in Recife*

Recent figures confirm that 60 percent of Recife’s population of 1.5 million, live in squatter settlements, typically located on hills or close to water, swamps, and mangroves (IBGE 2011) occupying just 14 percent of the city’s total area. While in Rio upper-class youth visit

favelas for the Baile Funk and some, like Santa Marta, have become tourist attractions, in Recife outsiders rarely enter favelas. The inhabitants are seen as "other," almost like a different species. Josué de Castro, who himself was born and raised in Recife, created the metaphor 'crab man' to designate the kind of men that lived in Recife's favelas in the mangroves.

The *Mangue* (mangroves) is an essential esthetic to understand Recife. Mangroves in Recife are mystical spaces, but they have lost the pristine nature of their cousins still growing free outside the city. The thick growing plants stick out of the sandy ground as if the leafs were balancing on stilts. Between its exposed roots, visible to everyone, a new world exists, populated by fascinating half salt, half sweet water creatures. Snails, fish, frogs, clams, turtles, rats, birds, and most of all crabs, all inhabit these spaces. According to the *mães de santo* priestess of Candomblé, African deities and their companions are also home in the mangroves. The wealthy and nobles Portuguese from Olinda would pass through Recife "*pisando em ponta de pé, receando os alagados e os mangues*" - "On tip toes, fearing floodwaters and the mangroves" (Melo Filho 2003:35); fearing the unknown, imagining dangers lurking in the damp darkness, contempt for this amphibious landscape. These negative sentiments towards the mangroves, cultivated by the colonizers, are until this day present in the social imagination of the *Recifense* who imagine its inhabitants as "amphibious" "crab-men" uniquely adapted to their natural habitat and raised on "mud milk," a porridge made with crab broth.

"The impression I had was that the mangrove dwellers - men and crabs born at the edge of the river - were merging more and more in the mud as they grew. It seemed that the dense vegetation of the mangroves, with their twisted trunks, the tangles of their rough branches and the dense web of their piercing roots, had finally grabbed them like an octopus, sticking invisible tentacles through their flesh, through all the holes of their skin: by the eyes, by the mouth, by the ears. And so they all remained, drowned in the mangrove, seized by the suckers with which the insatiable swamps sucked all the juice of their flesh and their souls as slaves. With a strange

force, the swamps were thus seizing the lives of all those people, in a slow, tenacious, definitive possession. These strange plants that in past geological ages had taken possession of this whole area of land - this swampy pit where the city of Recife now rests - now extended its possession also to its inhabitants. And everything in this region belonged to the conquering and dominating *mangue*: both the earth and the man.” (de Castro, 1967, pp. 13-14)

Today the Mangroves are synonymous with prostitution, crack-cocaine, pollution and urban rubbish – human and other. These zones, which are of great importance to the ecosystem, also have major potential in real estate speculations. The mangroves in Recife remain shelters for those socially excluded. They have harbored a population of those expelled by the latifundias and droughts in the Sertão, the interior of the state. These refugees “vegetate” in the mangroves living in *palafitas* – a characteristic shack construction on stilts above the water. Depending on one’s viewpoint, these settlements are “problems” or “solutions” (Perlman 1980:7). For the poor, the shacks are a solution to housing, but living in slums close to a river is also problematic. Mangroves became home for those who emigrated from the sugar plantations, those who fled the droughts of the interior, those in search of the urban dream of independence and modernity. But the mangroves are not only conquered by migrants seeking refuge; as Josué de Castro elaborates, the mangue became itself a conquistador that held men and women hostage and apart of the city. The harbor that offered protection and a home soon became an eternal habitat; its residents have little chance of ever escaping it, not only due to a lack of education and other public services but also because the mangue becomes part of them.

The dampness enters every hut and drenches every inch of clothing. Passing by open doors, one is met by the distinct scent of black mold that lingers in the walls, clothes, hair, and lungs. The scent of decay reveals who is "crab-men". The sweet-sickening scent of the Mangue permeates clothes, hair, and skin. The mold gives people distinct coughs, the rising sewage after

heavy rainfalls gives them parasites. Then there are the mosquitoes. Being the tiniest of intruders, they are also among the most dangerous. Until 2014, all people had to worry about was Dengue fever - having had Dengue twice I can tell it is a very uncomfortable experience. But after the World Cup, the mosquitoes brought a more devastating disease: Zika. Although it feels not much more than a bad cold, Zika changed a whole generation of Brazilians who were born with microcephaly into the poorest areas of the city. Having lived next to a family with a mentally challenged 18-year old son, the thought of such children surviving the realities of the favela makes me shiver. There is no therapy, no attention, no money.

### *Two types of citizenship*

The modernist aesthetics of straight lines, open spaces, and visible order informs the architecture of cosmopolitan cities. The design of houses and public space comes with a requirement to use it according to the standards of “modern civilization.” Favelas do not fit this view. I showed how in Rio, pacification resulted in gentrification and a re-shaping, coding, and removal of these patch-work spaces. In Recife, the security measures of Pact for Life also had impact on these irregular spaces, but removals and reconstructions were initiated several times in the past decades in the name of “law and order”. Such a regime of spatial ordering clashes with the livelihoods of the urban poor, whose quality of life might even deteriorate as a result (Garmany 2009), as we have seen in the cases of Morro da Saudade in Rio de Janeiro.

In 2003, the municipal project ‘Recife without palafitas’ was intended to guarantee that future postcard views depict a modern city of high-rises and highways without these symbols of poverty. Palafita stilt homes built at river banks are cast as an image of poverty, and a shameful embarrassment for the middle-class population of Recife, but its residents have a particular pride

of their stilted, traditional homes that survived the state's attempts to be destroyed. A final determining dimension of slum upgrading projects in Recife is the influence of "high modernism," the aspiration to improve the human condition through "a sweeping, rational engineering of all aspects of social life" (Scott 1998:88). As Scott argues, it is typically progressives, who have come to power with a comprehensive critique of existing society. They engage in big modernist projects to transform people's habits, work, living patterns and moral conduct to create the "*cidadão do bem*," the "good citizen." The new, identical houses, the paved streets, and the canalized waterways convey a promise of order and progress in contrast to the colorful and improvised shacks that stand for a racialized concept of backwardness and decay.

Many favela residents were attracted by the idea of living in the formal city and becoming part of modernity as a full citizen in "real" society. Yet, the kind of "civilized" behavior expected in this new setting impinged on everyday living. For instance, in many favelas the collection and separation of rubbish were a central means of income; however, as Garmany writes this was disallowed in the new housing projects (Garmany 2009). Also, in many communities it was common to keep livestock such as chickens, pigs, and goats. The new housing projects did not have yards, however. As a result, there was a significant discrepancy between the cultural way of life and work of favela residents and the kind of space these new governmental housing projects provided. This explains why some of the resettled population never moved into their new houses but left to occupy land or the riverbed in other locations in the city (Garmany 2009). Many accepted the free housing provided by the government, but rented it out or sold it, a practice which is prohibited.

"In Brazil, we have two types of citizens. Citizens of the 'first class' and the 'second class,'" explained Eduardo Machado, crime journalist and since 2013 assistant secretary of urban

security in Recife (author interview 2015). According to Machado, Brazilians have a "natural" capacity to distinguish first and second-class citizens. "We Brazilians have a trained eye to spot who belongs to which class and what kind of behavior and dress is appropriate," he assured me.


This classification happens by appearance, physical composure, dress code, skin color, manner of speaking and also smell. To give a quotidian example, the conversation with Machado took place in his office in the Recife town hall, where I had trouble being let in. I was wearing shorts, cheap rubber sandals, and a supermarket plastic bag instead of a purse to keep "low profile" on the public bus. The trained eye of the guard at the door immediately classified me as "second class" and inappropriate to enter the city hall; being himself "second class" the guard knows the distinction only too well. Machado had to come downstairs and persuade the guard to let me in, who was convinced only when it was explained that I was a foreigner.

Class boundaries are not only kept in place by the "first class"; on the contrary, the poor regulate themselves in the matters of appropriateness. This "slave mentality," as Gilberto Freyre would call it, enables an inherent submission and accommodation that form the roots of Brazil's democratic inexperience. It is a legacy of a predatory colonialization that Brazil suffered and continued suffering to some extent: slavery, brutal utilization of power on the part of land owners, engendered the "muteness" of the Brazilian people and their seeming incapacity to speak for themselves.

"Submission was part and parcel of this exacerbated sense of power. From this submission was born a consequent adjustment; accommodation rather than integration. Accommodation requires a minimal dose of critique. Integration, on the contrary, demands a maximum of reason and consciousness" (Freire 1967:69). Therefore, "the democratic inexperience rooted in truly cultural complexes" (Freire 1976a:60). "Slave labor from which

arose a series of obstacles and, simultaneously, the impossibility of forming a democratic mentality, a permeable consciousness, experiences of participation and self-governance" (Freire 1967:69). In my opinion, based on over fourteen years living in different parts of Brazil, Freire's assertion is still true, especially in the Northeast of the country.

*Logics of Violence in Recife*



*Part II Figure 3: Executed. Photo by author, 2015*

Recife, the capital of Pernambuco, features magnificent colonial architecture and is known as the "Venice" of Brazil because of the many bridges built over the Capibaribe River that flows into the blue sea. Its white, sandy beaches are framed by palm trees, dozens of beach vendors provide delicious *caldinho* (soup served in tiny cups), and the blue waters invite for a swim. Whoever is staying at one of the luxurious hotels and makes a trip to neighboring Olinda,

Brazil's oldest city, and UNESCO heritage site, or the town of Porto de Galinhas (Harbor of hens), the region will seem like a long-lost paradise with friendly people, great food, and fantastic art. The antique city center of Recife takes people's breath away with its stunning architecture and performances of Frevo – Pernambuco's colorful jumping dance using little umbrellas. Pernambuco, often referred to as Brazil's cradle for arts and folklore has been developed into a romantic composition of essentialist tropes that reinforce the Northeast as the colorful "other".

At a closer look, however, a contrasting side appears. The blue waves reveal dangerous sharks that prey on people; sewage is flowing from the luxurious skyscrapers directly into the sea; beautiful Olinda is stage to most vicious kills on a daily basis; the "hens" are code for slaves in the formerly biggest slavery port in Latin America that is now a resort; and finally, the little Frevo umbrellas used to be spiked with sharp knives to kill competitors during carnival. Once it rains, the poor parts of the city transform into stinking swamps. The rubbish thrown onto the streets clogs the drainage system, the polluted rivers overflow and impede cars to cross the water masses in the streets.

Like other Northeastern states, Pernambuco experienced a sharp rise in violent crime in the past twenty years, accompanied by economic development. Recife became the most violent capital city in Brazil, leading with 223.6 murders for each 100,000 inhabitants (Waiselfisz 2016) which earned it the nickname "Hellcife" (Popular with Tourists in Brazil, Recife Is Deadly for Residents - LA Times 2008) To put this number into perspective, Chicago, a city with a similar population to Recife and infamous for its gang violence, had its highest homicide rate recorded at 22.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2003 (Brazil 2016 Crime & Safety Report: Recife 2016). In Recife, approximately 5,000 corpses of predominantly black, young men from the slums

accumulated within one year. Daily, dozens of the poorest residents got killed behind the posh hotels and skyscrapers, most of them by firearms. While Rio's armed conflicts are visible and audible to all social classes who live nearby the mountains, in Recife violence is less apparent. Murders happen in homes, streets, and mangroves of slums that are built on mostly flat terrain. While guns are the primary weapon used to kill, they are much more rudimentary than the war equipment in Rio de Janeiro. Most importantly, there are no shoot outs and explosions. As a result, violence is largely invisible to Recife's upper classes, who live in luxurious high rises and do not frequent favelas.

For decades politicians and the media met these massacres with indifference. With an emergence of a crack epidemic in Pernambuco, a considerable portion of murder victims were also drug users, killed by dealers to whom they owed money. Research found that crack users in Recife are largely poor (84%), black or mixed-race (78.5%) and male (80%), with a little education. They are often homeless, and nearly always unemployed (90%) (West and Escobar 2017).

Before 2007, robberies, extermination groups were a main feature of the killings. These self-proclaimed *justiceiros* (vigilante justice teams) were "cleaning" the slums off petty criminals. *Justiceiros* were often police officers who were fatigued by the continuous crime and lack of prosecution in their community and assumed the role of providing justice. However, they did not centralize power in the slums in any way like the highly organized drug factions in Rio de Janeiro. There were multiple *justiceiros* acting in different favelas without any ideological or economic affiliation to each other or developing governance structures. *Justiceiros* were also not regarded as sole community leaders; while residents would approach them for specific services, *justiceiros* commonly did not make larger decisions affecting the favela; nor did they have the

power to protect the community from the police. For example, a grocery store owner terrorized by regular robberies, could hire a justiça to punish or kill the thieves for a small amount of money. Community members regarded justiça widely as a necessary service that the state failed to provide.

The largely inactive and understaffed police openly approved the work of extermination groups framing it under the common expression: “a good criminal is a dead criminal”. Overwhelmed with the sheer amount of homicides, and inherently disorganized, the medical examiner took days to arrive at crime scenes and remove corpses. Bodies were regularly dumped into the river and ended up floating into the sea.

The key, said Eduardo Machado, is not to combat violence itself but the miserable living conditions at its root. The historical separation and submission of the lower classes in a region where the slave trade was most present, resulted in unequal access to education, opportunity, and security. Violence affected "first class" citizens only minimally because social services work for them; they are employed, live in comfortable and safe high rises, have rubbish collection, a functioning sewage system, clean water, and health care.

At its worst episode of homicides, in 2005, not even the local media paid attention. Machado remembers the bloodiest weekend in Pernambuco's history, when 56 people were murdered from Friday night until Sunday in Recife's metropolitan area; but the Monday head news story read: "Bloody weekend in Gaza. 34 killed in combat". In the meanwhile, 56 people were murdered in Recife – a city at peace – and nobody paid attention.

The violence became so dramatic, and the indifference of the elites so painful, that in 2007 Machado and a group of friends initiated a Body Count Clock inspired by a project in Iraq to tally the numbers of murders over twelve months. The giant clock was established in the

middle of Recife's biggest Avenue to catch the eyes of people driving to work, counting daily murders "to make them uncomfortable and raise awareness. What's going on here is effectively social cleansing. The vast majority of victims share the same profile: poor, black men between 15 and 30 living in the outskirts and killed by a .38 revolver," explains Machado (author interview 2015). The group also started working with a website that uses Google Map technology to mark the location of each murder with a little red flag – the beginnings of crime mapping in Recife was made.

Machado and other journalists, academics, and policy makers in Pernambuco belonged to a small group that had genuine interest in reducing the violence rates in their home state. In 2005, Luiz Ratton, Sociologist at the Federal University of Pernambuco-Recife, drafted a proposition of reconstructing the way that public security functioned in Pernambuco. The Pacto, as the program is called by Pernambucans, has been developed in response to staggering homicide rates. Before the inauguration of the Pacto in 2007, Recife had a homicide rate of over 200 per 100,000 which is three times as high as Rio de Janeiro at the time. This number is even more devastating when taking into account that Recife has only 1.5 million inhabitants (Rio has 6 mio) and in Recife violence was not fueled by sophisticated criminal organizations but by interpersonal violence and extermination groups.

The election of Governor Eduardo Campos in 2007, who hired Ratton as a consultant, was followed by a significant policy change. Just five months after taking office, Campos launched the highly ambitious multi-institutional public security reform *Pacto pela Vida* (Pact for Life) with the explicit objective to decrease homicides in the state by 12 percent per year. In contrast to the Pacification Police Unit in Rio, which focused exclusively on the military police, the Pact for Life reformed and managed interactions between all of the major state agencies

associated with the justice system. It also included the formal participation of civil society representatives (Wolff 2015; Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014).

The central values guiding the *Pacto* are as follows:

- coordination between public security and human rights
- making qualified repression compatible with specific crime and violence prevention
- cross-cutting full public security actions
- incorporation of management, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms
- social control and participation from the drafting of strategies to policy delivery
- priority to combat intentional lethal violent crimes (ILVC)<sup>38</sup>
- goal to reduce the rate of ILVC by 12% a year in Pernambuco

The ILVC includes murder, robbery following death, and manslaughter. Pernambuco distinguished itself from other Brazilian states in that the *Pacto* also includes police killings as ILVC, the so called *resistencias*; as well as police officers killed on duty. The monitoring procedures of the *Pacto* are under the coordination of the State Planning and Management Secretariat (SEPLAG), not the Secretariat of security; it underlines the notion that violence prevention is not only a police matter but of all government branches and society as a whole. Under the leadership of the state governor Eduardo Campos, the committee, including the mayor's office, social welfare, and police executives, met on a weekly basis to discuss hotspots, particularly problematic criminal cases, strategy, successes, and setbacks.

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<sup>38</sup> \**Latrocinio* translated from Portuguese means “larceny”; however, in Brazil *latrocinio* armed robbery after victim has been injured or killed.

Starting in 2007, the Pact for Life program has categorically changed the organization and management of the public security apparatus by replicating the US COMPSTAT (short for computer statistics). COMPSTAT works on two levels: collect, analyze, and map crime data with help of technologies such as geospatial information system and surveillance; measure police performance regularly based on the data and hold police superiors accountable. It transforms police in leadership positions into managers who are evaluated weekly on the results in their area. Beat cops on the ground receive specific guidelines and patrols are allocated according to calculated hot spots.

The Pact for Life also incorporated elements of Boston's successful "Operation Ceasefire", a problem-oriented policing initiative expressly focused on apprehending firearms. Boston Ceasefire combined aggressive law enforcement (stop and frisk to apprehend guns) and prosecution (Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project's Operation Ceasefire. 2001). It operates on "deterrence theory", the assumption that crimes can be prevented when the cost of committing a crime outweigh the benefits of committing a crime. The prevention strategy involved meetings with both community groups and gang members which the community was informed that gang violence will provoke a zero-tolerance approach. When violence did occur, Ceasefire agencies would increase patrols, frisk, disrupt street drug activity, serve outstanding warrants, or request longer bail terms. At the same time, the policing project offered gang members help through service providers, probation and parole officers, and church and other community groups. The deterrence message was not a deal with gang members to stop violence. Operation Ceasefire functions well in the context of more organized gang activity, such as in Rio, where gang members want to avoid police attention to increase their profit. In Recife, where gangs are not consolidated and do not control territory this approach applies only partly.

Pernambuco's Pact for Life focused primarily on the apprehension of firearms by military police using stop and frisk tactic.

In Recife, the majority of violent crimes were committed using a firearm, mostly 0.38 caliber revolvers. The program revolutionized Pernambuco's policing through the introduction accountability tools such as GPS tracking of squad cars, specific policing protocols, installation of hundreds of surveillance cameras, and the establishment of an Internal Review Board for both military and civil police.

Like the UPP in Rio, Pacto also reformed its approach to military police practice by allocating regular patrols to specific hot spots explicitly targeting places, people, and times where criminal activity recur. However, one significant difference is that the reform changed the approach of the military police for the whole city, not just some areas like in Rio. Another important difference is that the state rhetoric was not one of "reconquest" of favelas but rather of improved public security services to the entire state of Pernambuco. The program revolutionized Pernambuco's policing through the introduction accountability tools such as GPS tracking of squad cars, specific policing protocols, installation of hundreds of surveillance cameras, and the establishment of an Internal Review Board for both military and civil police.

The plan divided the state into 21 integrated public security areas, in order to facilitate the monitoring of actions and results. Each area has a set monthly goal of crime reduction called *meta*. Metas are calculated using data from previous months estimating an average number of violent crime per month; then a plan is formulated how to tackle the most problematic areas; finally, a realistically possible reduction is estimated. Metas are evaluated in three colors, green for reduction, yellow for steady, and red for increase in violent crime. If an area reduced violent crime in one month, the next month will have a lowered meta. It is impressive to see high

ranking military police officers (who never were held accountable before) explaining themselves to the committee and their performance being evaluated.

The Pacto reconfigured policing substantially through the emphasis on investigation and prosecution of crime, for instance, through the creation of specialized police stations (*delegacias*) for the resolution of homicides. The method of police work itself shifted in two important ways. First, the organization and management of both civil and military police were given a concrete structure and set of performance guidelines. Areas received steady police units of officers who would patrol the area continuously and develop rapport with residents. The patrols were coordinated in dialogue with local communities as well as guided by geospatial information system mapping of violent crime to identify hot spots and times. The Pact for Life “also led to the first institutional reforms in the police forces such as changing promotion related criteria, which allowed for increasing and renewing actors in commanding positions in the forces” (Ratton, Galvão, and Fernandez 2014). However, promotion within the military police was still slow and hindered by the lateral entry formation for ranking officers.

Furthermore, material incentives have also been built into the reform in form of bonus. For example, homicide task detectives (civil police) received bonuses for increasing their rates of completed case submission to the Court of Justice; this, however, did not necessarily improve the quality of the investigation. Military police officers also received bonuses at near-market value for illegal arms apprehensions, which discouraged corruption and the re-circulation of weapons into the black market.

Overall, the Pacto showed immediate results with a 26.26 percent reduction in homicide rates between 2007-2011. An average of 5.25 percent decrease per year was recorded (INFOPOL 2014). According to the Pernambuco Secretariat for Social Defense the reduction in homicide

rates reached 39 percent in the period between 2006 - 2013, with a remarkable 60 percent overall decrease in violent crime in Recife.



*Part II Figure 4: Crack cocaine is the drug of choice in Recife. Photo by author 2015*

In the first part of this dissertation I showed that in Rio de Janeiro cocaine is the driving force behind the urban war between drug traffickers and the police. Upper and middle classes are the largest consumers of the drug, fueling a lucrative business. In the less affluent Pernambuco, however, the expensive cocaine never reached much popularity and drug traffickers did not organize. However, crack-cocaine made its entry in the 2000s.

The cheap drug found popularity mostly among the poor. In 2014 alone, approximately 61,000 grams of crack-cocaine were seized throughout the metropolitan region of Recife, and 246,882 grams were seized throughout the state of Pernambuco (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco - Agência de Notícias - Clipping 2014). Crack users were blamed for staggering

violence rates, although data shows that users are not more violent (see for example (Reiman and Levine 1989; Bourgois 1995; Hart, Csete, and Habibi 2014; Rui 2015). However, addicts stemming from poor backgrounds soon could not pay their drug debt and got killed by their drug dealer (who were often addicted themselves) in revenge. At the same time, extermination groups would hunt down and kill crack dealers in favelas.

In an attempt to focus forces on underlying conditions and not criminalizing users, Pernambuco passed a bill that de-criminalized the possession of drugs for personal use. This bill had substantial impact on policing practice as it did no longer reward police officers for raiding and frisk citizens for insignificant amounts of narcotics not related to drug trafficking. It cut down on arrest rate, thus, created time to investigate more pertinent crimes.

One of the central social projects in the Pacto that addresses the crack epidemic is the ATITUDE Program (Integral Attention to Drug Users and their Families). ATITUDE is a program initiated by Government of Pernambuco in 2011 and is coordinated by the Secretariat of Social Development and Human Rights through the General Management of Policy on Drugs. ATITUDE provides social care to drug users with particular focus on crack-cocaine. It is also directed to the family of the user, offering hygienic care, food, rest, and psychological care in connection with public healthcare systems SUS and SUAS. Its approach to crack users is humane and forgiving; ATITUDE does not require to stop using crack. Nevertheless, a majority of beneficiaries claim that they smoke less or even quit crack because they feel healthier and safer. Without the daily stress, fear, and fight for survival crack becomes less necessary. ATITUDE underlines an approach that is not based on repression but care and recovery for drug users. Rafael West is the head of the ATITUDE program in Recife and a researcher for the Fiocruz institute in Pernambuco. In an interview with Rafael in 2014, he underlined the

importance of ATITUDE, “there is scientific evidence that show that drug policy based on help and care for users are much more effective than policing,” said West. “Crack users are not criminals. We need to see them as humans who need care. Many times, if you look beyond the crack you will see a history full of inequality, poverty, and negligence.” (author interview 2014). In 2017 the Atitude program was recognized by the Open Society Foundations as one of three most impactful drug policy experiences in Brazil addressing the issue of crack abuse. Atitude is also essential to the prevention of violence. A study by led by sociologist Luiz Ratton recently found that beyond the health harms posed by homelessness and drug use, crack users are also more exposed to violence. Around 96% of Atitude beneficiaries have suffered some kind of violence and 65% had their lives threatened in last six months (West and Escobar 2017). Women were five times more likely to have been abused emotionally or physically. In 2014, the time of my field study, crack-cocaine has been federally recognized as a pandemic affecting the Northeast in particular. The Ministry of Justice launched a federal program called “It’s Possible to Beat Crack”, which provided funds to individual states. For example, in 2014, Recife received three video monitoring bases in the neighborhoods of Santo Amaro, Coque/Coelhos, and Iburá. The favelas were chosen because they had higher levels of social vulnerability and crime. Each neighborhood received two touring vehicles, two motorcycles, and a mobile base in form of a bus equipped with surveillance technology that was supposed to help the police. Each base acted as a small monitoring and control center; police monitored the images captured by video cameras installed in hot spots for crack use and sale.

The project was supposed to help in the fight against drug trafficking but also offer recovery to crack users. However, the surveillance has never been complemented with social action. The police officers, unable to arrest anyone with small portions of crack, had no idea

what to do with the citizens caught on camera using crack. The base was not linked with ATITUDE nor equipped with a social worker, only military police. Some officers would initially try and convince addicts of “a better path” or scare them into abstinence. Without support in form of counseling or a crack addiction rehabilitation center, the police were equipped with technology worth millions of Reais but ultimately useless. They resorted to watching movies in the bus.

### *The Social Component*

Innovations in law enforcement and social prevention are critical to preventing murder. Various policing methods, including proximity policing, community policing, and problem-oriented policing, have helped to reduce murder rates in Latin American cities such as Medellín, Rio, and Recife. However, infrastructure and policing philosophy will remain secondary if underlying social conditions are not being addressed. Not surprisingly, the social environment plays a significant role in determining where crime occurs.

In weak communities like Recife’s favelas, affected by unemployment, social inequality, and crack-cocaine is more likely to take place. Hot spot policing combined with socio-economic welfare programs have great impact on the decline of homicides (Muggah and Garzón 2017; Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau 2014). In Rio de Janeiro, the UPP-Social was initiated to promote social inclusion through legalization of commerce, projects, courses, and evaluations. In Recife, the government approached social investment from a different angle. Instead of focusing on formalization of bureaucratic procedures, such as licenses to sell food or billing, the Pact for Life identified the most challenging social issues in society and developed strategies.

In 2013 Recife established a secretary of urban security and elected Murilo Cavalcante into office. Murilo had a personal stake in reducing violence in Recife since his sister was robbed and shot years ago. The bullet left her paraplegic and Murilo turned from a successful event manager into a politician. He and journalist Eduardo Machado as assistant secretary, both focused primarily on improving social conditions that lead to crime and violence, not policing. Inspired by the case of Medellín in Colombia, which has made a transformation from “Murder Capital to Model city”(Brodzinsky 2014), one of the most stunning transformations of a violent city into Murilo conceptualized the COMPAZ – a community center for peace. COMPAZ is a social project which brings social services, education, and leisure to underprivileged communities. The prevention of violence is extended through COMPAZ which are being constructed in precarious neighborhoods. They offer space for judicial assistance, meetings with conflict resolution experts, child care, counsel families in need and professional development classes. Moreover, most will be equipped with a theatre, computer rooms, a library, and art classes. Murilo even published a book about Medellín’s successful crime reduction. “Medellín changes everything. They cut their murder rate in half! The city was voted a role model in the world. I went and couldn't believe it – clean, orderly, even the favelas were nice." Murilo was enthused by Medellín, where he had visited seventeen times accompanied by policymakers, journalists, and even Colombian politicians.

The key, to Murilo, is the involvement on municipal level, and investment in infrastructure. Following the "Broken Window Theory," Murilo wants to create a comfortable, safe and accessible city (Kelling and Wilson 1982; Kelling and Coles 1998; Sampson 2004). "Recife will have the same success," was his prognosis. The secretariat also initiated actions such as “vaccine against violence” at public schools in favelas to teach helpfulness and solidarity

stimulating good behavior through, for example, video games that encourage citizenship and a culture of peace. In the end, the children receive a symbolic vaccine against violence. "Research from across Latin America convincingly shows that age and educational attainment are key factors shaping violent crime exposure and that targeted support for permanent income can play an important deterrent role in criminal involvement. Interventions that focus on supporting positive early childhood development, parenting skills, youth employment (including high-risk adolescents and young offenders), mentorship and life-skills training, and engagement in social programs (particularly for adolescents) are cost-effective and have multiple positive impacts" (Muggah et al. 2016).

#### HIGH TECH SURVEILLANCE AND LIVES MADE OF CARDBOARD



*Part II Figure 5: Favela do Papelão. Photo by author*

*Excerpt from field notes: Favela do Papelão, Recife, February 2015*

I take my bullet proof vest off and leave it in the squad car. "Please wait for me here," I ask the colonel who reluctantly agrees to stay in the car. It's not easy for him to take orders from some foreign woman. I begin to walk through the favela, named Papelão – cardboard - because most of its residents live by collecting cardboard and selling it to recycling factories. Indeed, the alleys are framed by enormous stacks of cardboard, carefully bound together and put onto pallets, so they won't get wet in the rain and sewage. Colorful clothes are drying on the fences, stray dogs, rats, and children are running cross and queer.

The kids are amused to see me; they laugh and ask to have their picture taken. Somebody gathered wooden pallets to cover the mud and connected a hose to a water source. A group of kids, between one and twelve years old, are playing under the splashing water stream. The water stinks, it must be from the river, but the kids couldn't care less. It is carnival, the heat is unbearable, and they jump and run through the cool stream. A couple meager looking horses, their manes colored pink, and chickens have joined them. Behind the children, a group of skinny, tattooed men in their twenties is smoking and drinking. They give me a toothless smile and hold up their thumbs. The tiny shacks are destitute and consist of one small room that houses whole families.

I remember reading that children at Papelão regularly suffer from diseases transmitted by rats and stray dogs. The standing water and proximity to the river banks make also an ideal breeding ground for mosquitoes. In February 2015 we did not know yet that Recife was about to enter emergency status because of an outbreak of Zika, a virus that would deform thousands of babies, predominantly born in poor communities such as Papelão.

Apparently, my police colleagues became worried about me. I see the police car parting a sea of people, looking for me. "Come, I want to show you something," the colonel says. We drive only a few feet outside of Papelão and enter a modern building. The icy air conditioning hits my hot face; only now I realize how sweaty I am. My sneakers are soiled with mud and what seems to be blood stains from a crime scene I

have been to earlier, my shirt is drenched in sweat, my jeans feel sticky - I am sure I stink. I have been 20 hours on shift: first 12 hours with the homicide task force, then with the Military Police at the Carnaval patrols. The clean, white rooms make me feel embarrassed, and I notice the judging look on the receptionist's face. Without the colonel at my side, they would not have let me in.

The aluminum elevator takes us upstairs, a door opens, and I cannot believe my eyes: dozens, if not hundreds, of screens in a dark room showing different areas of the city. I identify celebrations downtown, people at the beach, shopping centers, even some corners in favelas, bridges, markets – all under surveillance. The images are pooled into this center and continuously analyzed.

“There, you see that commotion on the upper right screen?” it looks like a fight, maybe a robbery happening in the middle of a big crowd. “We can give our men the coordinates to get quickly to these people. But we can do even better” the colonel explains. I observe how the blurry faces of the suspects are being framed, zoomed into, then ran through a data system to determine their identity. Very impressive, just like in the movies.

Just minutes ago, I was walking through misery, where children die because of preventable diseases. Now, I am standing in front of cutting edge imported surveillance equipment that can zoom in on everyday life, then rewind and fast-forward to solve crimes. Two seemingly incompatible realities.

Currently, there are 985 video surveillance cameras installed in the state of Pernambuco, 535 of which in the Recife metropolitan area. These surveillance systems are monitored by the Secretariat of Social Defense (Secretaria de Defesa Social, hence SDS), which responds by dispatching military police. In wealthy neighborhoods such as Boa Viagem, there are static guards posted to monitor for crime in residential areas. The apparent benefit is that the system allows for rapid event management, and definition of scenarios based on intelligence which makes it proactive and even preventative, not merely an after the fact forensic tool. Intel is

something the police inherently lacks, as they are by nature first respondents and only rarely crime preventers.

The SDS is claiming that the cameras have contributed significantly to the vast decrease in homicides between 2007 and 2013, thus they are a major factor in the Pact for Life program. It is the major – if not only – tool of intelligence gathering in the state. However, almost all cameras were installed in the city center, which historically was a stage of petty crime and robberies of tourists, but not murder. Homicides happen mostly inside favelas or in the outskirts of the city. What the cameras have achieved, is that the surveillance system has been of value to the city in areas such as tourist trade and event management; especially during Carnival fights, and robberies can be diminished with the help of the cameras. In addition to the already installed cameras, the SDS decided to use the luxury high-rises (many built illegally on public land), as a sort of Panopticon. Over 100 cameras were installed on top of different skyscrapers, home to many public personalities accused of corruption and racketeering, gazing upon the "suspicious" poor beneath them, an ironic reminder of Brazil's social disparities.

What nobody accounted for, however, is a new trend in which violent perpetrators film themselves committing crimes and post them on social media. With disturbing regularity, cases of torture, public shaming, and even murders are being filmed with readily available mobile phones and published via WhatsApp or Facebook Live. Most recently, the disturbing images of a group of young men at the favela Santo Amaro beating, torturing, and humiliating a teenage girl were posted online. What this distasteful trend shows, is a rampant impunity that keeps even the most violent assailants out of prison. Brazil's and especially Northeastern prisons are chronically overpopulated and most of the cases that the civil police investigates never go to trial, which contributes to impunity. One result is affecting the value of life, which becomes minimal as there

is little consequence for violence. The security, technology, surveillance systems do not correspond with the realities of these victims and perpetrators living in the poorest areas, nor with the capability of the police investigating and trying to prevent such cases.

After the implementation of the Pacto, homicide numbers dropped progressively in Pernambuco from 2007 until 2013. The following year, however, they increased again. Governor Campos left the government in 2014 to run for presidency but ended up dying in a plane crash in the middle of the campaign. Still under the impact of the commotion, Paulo Câmara, Campos' political godson, had no difficulty in winning the state dispute, thus, keeping political backing for the Pacto project in line. However, Câmara failed to institutionalize the program which leaves the Pacto nothing more than an experiment that may or may not survive the next state election. The presence and allocation of military police in the streets increased, as did the civil police's capacity for investigation. This resulted in above national average solved crimes (almost 10% compared to national 5%), thus more people in prison. However, the prison system – one of the most overcrowded in the world – was not reformed or modernized. The Funase, a department concerned with education for juvenile delinquents, was not expanded. Violence prevention programs such as courses on conflict resolution, social assistance to poor families, and general improvement of living conditions have been sporadic and dependent on each municipalities dedication.

Overall, the Pact for Life started out as an integration of preventative and punitive measures, but it mainly focused on the latter by investing heavily in policing. It is important that police numbers in the streets went up, that guidelines and practice protocols were established, and better equipment was provided to precincts; however, not even these changes were

institutionalized, thus remained vulnerable to political will power. In the almost ten years of Pact for Life no bill was approved that would maintain these advances and improvement to its police institutions (both civil and military). Furthermore, the Public Prosecutor's Office was not efficiently incorporated, hence, there was no mechanism for external accountability and control of police activity.

## CONCLUSION

In summary, the Pact for Life is an innovative public security program that is based on cutting-edge research and technology from Western countries like the USA. Similar to the Pacification Police Unit in Rio de Janeiro, the Pact for Life takes advantage of the fact that violence is concentrated in time, place, and social class and targets these "hotspots" specifically. As the next chapter will show; however, the application and results on the ground differ vastly from the UPPs in Rio de Janeiro. Under the Pact for Life, cases and investigation are closely monitored, commanding police officers are being held accountable. GPS is used to track police cars, and to record coordinates of crime scenes; geospatial information (GSI) programs enable a detailed analysis of hotspots, identifying hours and kinds of violence. Recife has been dotted with hundreds of surveillance cameras with cutting-edge facial recognition software, the same that is being used in New York and Los Angeles. All in all, the Pact for Life sounds like a "first World" model of public security, equipped with modern technology, subscribing to international human rights and standards of investigation. On the ground, however, the discrepancy between these policies and reality could not be crasser.

Pacto's policy makers, especially the secretary of urban security, are encouraged and inspired by strong cases of crime reduction such as in New York or Medellín, Colombia.

Although Recife and Medellín experienced similarly high violence rates, the type and logics of violence are completely different, especially considering that Colombia had until recently a declared civil war. Therefore, the implementation of the same crime prevention mechanisms cannot be expected to show the same impact and results.



*Part II Figure 6: Homicide and Larceny in Pernambuco. Source: Pact for Life 2015*

The Pacto acknowledges that the underlying social conditions are what triggers most violent crime and attempts to address the problem through the inclusion of social programs instead of only policing. The COMPAZ community centers, which are modeled after a project in Medellín, is one example. While community centers are a good step, since 2007 there has been only two COMPAZ centers finalized in 2016 which attend to merely a handful of underprivileged communities. Moreover, without the institutionalization of the Pacto, there is little hope for sustainable and consistent governance in the future. As recent years have shown, the Pacto has continuously lost its impact: since the past three years' violence levels are on the

rise again.

## CHAPTER 9

### FAVELA DO BODE: A COMMUNITY AND THE PACT FOR LIFE



*Part II Figure 7: Palafitas at Bode. Photo credit: Michael Jerome Wolff*

This chapter introduces Bode, a favela where I lived in 2013 and 2015. Bode is a case study which represents the attitudes and interactions of favela residents with police officers. Through interviews and participant observation I trace their opinions of the Pact for Life. While Bode cannot be representative of all favelas in Recife, it does present some of the most common

underlying infrastructural and demographic conditions that are common in Recife's central favelas. In the following I describe the basic social structure from which violence sprouts and the diverse manners it is met by police officers.

Second, I introduce the protagonists of this story, the victims, assailants, and the police, whose lives overlap. Every person at Bode is at risk and suspect. It is almost up to chance who will kill, die, or live under these social conditions. Finally, I will look at the dual status of members of the police at Bode, as inherently distrusted but also wanted by the residents. I argue that the police also are "suspect" as their profile does not differ from the rest of the community: poor, black, and from favelas. The fact that these men and women are so intimately interwoven with those who they suspect, frisk, and arrest complicates the imagined binary between state and citizens. It also addresses the different notions of order, morality, and representation. Police officers operate under two kinds of rules: the one of the government, shaped by global pressures; and those of the people, shaped by local conceptions of citizenship, governance, and honor.

In 2013, during my preliminary four-month field work, I joined a capoeira group in the neighborhood Pina. The group offered free classes to youth from favelas nearby, and the *contramestre* was himself born and raised at a small favela right behind the gym, called Bode. We were training daily, and I quickly made many friends; as a result, I started to spend a lot of time at Bode getting to know people. It was also at Capoeira that I met Dandara, a woman my age. Dandara introduced me to the Candomblé temple, which holds a lot of power in Bode. Her grandmother is a powerful priestess, and Dandara is herself very active in the temple and Maracatu<sup>39</sup>. Located in the urban mangroves, a mystical and dangerous space, Bode is the

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<sup>39</sup> Maracatu Nação (also known as Maracatu de baque virado: "maracatu of the turned-around beat"), the most well-known of the maracatu genres, is an Afro-Brazilian performance practiced in the state of Pernambuco, mainly in the cities of Recife and Olinda.

opposite of the clean, air-conditioned and economic Pact for Life meetings. It is the clashing, chaotic reality that Pacto so desperately wants to quantify and order through policing and gentrification. Before she moved to Rio in 2015, Dandara lived with her mother, Ninho, and her two older brothers, Sergio and Anderson, in a small house at the banks of the river Capibaribe. They also took in two little children who were given up by their mother. The house was simple but made of brick and had ceramic floors which made it more luxurious than most. However, after decades of flooding and a salty sea breeze, the house was in bad shape, and parts of the roof were falling through. Dandara invited me to live with them.

Thrilled about the invitation, I packed my suitcases. I had been staying with a friend, Leo, in Olinda. My friend, a son of a Rio de Janeiro millionaire, drove me in his snazzy white Land Rover into Bode – a favela well known for its high incidences of violence. We made it through the narrow streets riddled with holes and open sewage, deeper and deeper into Bode.

Almost at the river bank, we arrived at the colorful gate of Ninho's house. The sound of Brega music filled the air, and a group of men was sitting on the ground with cachaça in one hand, crack pipe in the other. As the gate opened, Leo stared silently at the decaying concrete columns that used to hold a roof and green ranks that started to devour a little orange house. The yard had partial walls and a cement floor, which was cracked up by roots squeezing through. The walls were colorfully painted with scenes from Capoeira and Candomblé, drums and *berimbau* instruments laid scattered on the floor. The odor of herbs, *pimenta*, fermented niño fruits and the ever-present sewage filled the hot, moist air. Dogs and chickens were running through, followed by two tiny, naked, black children with absurdly white hair. Back in the left corner stood a big open tank filled with greenish rain water. Empty booze bottles dispersed on the floor.

Next to a big table with a sewing machine and dozens of colorful fabrics and costumes, stood Ninho - picture a female version of Danny De Vito - barefoot in the mud. She was wearing only a long old shirt that barely covered her buttocks. Her eyes were red and small from the cachaça. One hand on her hip, she watched us in amusement, chugging her "third teeth" in her mouth. Dandara and her girlfriend Monique, came out to greet me, wearing traditional white Candomblé dresses and headwear. As a turtle crawled over Leo's foot, he seemed to wake up from his freeze. "Well, you like favela," he said and pushed the turtle away with apparent disgust. Without the traditional *beijinho*, he left hastily, and we didn't see each other ever again. In my experience, wealthy Brazilians have a hard time confronting these harsh and so different realities.

Bode is a community of maybe 2,000 people, near downtown Recife in the neighborhood called Pina. The community was completely abandoned by the state and had no basic infrastructure until well into the 1970s. Only then community leaders organized successfully to have basic services such as sanitation, rubbish collection, running water and electricity. Until this day, social investment in the form of projects, construction and education come and go with election campaigns. The periodic investments in the community made it look like a more regular neighborhood with wide, paved streets, numbered houses and little parks for leisure. But the appearance of inclusion was disturbed by a new wave of rural migrants flooding in in the late 1980s, unemployment rates rising and an economic crisis that ravaged Brazil.

With the despair and confusion of families pouring in, the traditional family structure of the *sertanejo* families began to fall apart. The unemployed fathers, heads of family, started to drink themselves into oblivion with the state-subsidized cheap cachaça. Their children learned this new way of being a man, and took it a step further, consuming hard drugs – especially crack

cocaine – in their hopeless leisure. In Pernambuco, the crack is made directly from coca paste and began to pour into Recife's poor areas beginning in the mid-1990s. The unemployment, crime, and drug consumption affect men disproportionately, who then disappear in prisons, succumb to addiction, and get killed. The systematic violence had a social shift as a consequence, in which women emerged as the principal leaders and heads of households. It could be argued that the demise of the traditional head of the family has empowered women and opened new channels to hear women's voices. However, it is imperative to acknowledge that women continue to suffer from violence in their homes. Without a man at their side, they are often left more vulnerable than before. In addition to being mothers and leaders these women now must take on the role as breadwinner on top of it all.

Bode and the area surrounding it is one of the most dynamic real estate speculations and investments in recent years in Pernambuco, located next to a luxurious shopping center and a newly built avenue through the mangroves, the Via Mangue. According to Recife city hall, 97 percent of Bode's inhabitants live in conditions below the poverty line; many people at Bode live in palafitas in the mangroves without running water or sewage. They are the subjects of de Castro's "crab men," not as a derogatory but as a source of pride, survival, and creativity. Yes, Bode is marked by violence, drugs, and poverty, but it is also a place full of life, laughter, art, and an important hub for the LGBT and Afro-Brazilian communities.

The tight quarters are laid out at the banks of the Capibaribe River and borders with some of Recife's wealthiest neighborhoods such as Boa Viagem, where white, clean condos and restaurants overlook kilometers of white sandy beach. Bode, however, is a maze of muddy alleys and planks put over the open drainage canals. To my great relief, there was no more mountain climbing, like in Rio at Saudade; Bode is built on flat land. The sewage system in all of Recife is

extremely precarious and overflows every rain season. The drainage goes directly into the sea but regularly overflows due to heavy rain and rubbish that is constantly thrown onto the streets and ends up clogging it. Smell aside; the sewage is a serious health risk for those who cannot escape into the high rises. Houses get regularly flooded, and residents have to wade or bike through the brown waters to work.

Bode, was at the center of a controversial upgrading when I arrived for the first time in 2013. An ambitious project, the Via Mangue – an avenue going through the mangroves and connecting South Recife with the North Zone - was about to be finished. In the construction process parts of the mangroves and swamps were drained. Residents at Bode and other communities in proximity pointed out that the Via Mangue only aggravated real estate speculation in the area, putting pressure on the poor to leave their palafitas and the mangroves. Communities such as Bode give Recife the title of fifth Brazilian city in number of invasions and favelas, according to IBGE. Bode is the reflection of social inequality, displaying great social, economic, and environmental problems.

In addition, an enormous and hyper-modern Shopping Mall, the Riomar Shopping Center, had been constructed by millionaire and businessman João Carlos Paes Mendonça (JCPM group) right next to the community. In the process, the swamps and with it the mangroves had been drained. The project “Recife without palafitas” was removing the stilt houses and resettling people into newly built governmental housing. The new, modern buildings pleased the elites and many tourists who enjoy watching sunsets from the shopping’s rooftop. For some residents of Bode and surrounding, the JCPM group and shopping center provided new opportunities, such as free courses, training, and employment. JCPM also collaborates with the Military Police in providing free instruments and music practice for children with the Military Police’s band. A



*Part II Figure: 1Raw Sewage and Luxury Constructions on the other side of Bode. Photo by author 2013*

majority of the residents, however, were frightened by the changes affecting their community, by real estate agents trying to buy people out, and by the government demolishing their traditional palafitas. Especially the numerous Candomblé priestesses in the community – elderly Afro-Brazilian women – who lived their whole lives in palafitas, united to protest what they perceived as a governmental invasion and forcible change of their traditions. To many, the government and private enterprises were destroying and changing not only homes and fishing grounds but also the sacred mangue and a historical legacy.

The wealthier residents at Bode lived in brick houses further away from the polluted river and closer to the city. They had access to basic sewage, electricity, and water. They also tend to be *pardo*, lighter skinned Afro-Brazilians, Christians (particularly evangelic) who work in the

service industry as waiters, maids, teachers, nurses, bus drivers, and police officers. Towards the interior of the favela and the river banks, lived the predominantly Afro-Brazilian population in simple shacks or palafitas often without a functioning sewage system or water supply. These residents made their living mainly through fishing, selling fruit and vegetables on the streets, and hemming clothes. A majority also frequents Candomblé Temples, an African-Brazilian religion. Everybody knows each other, but these two groups would not interact much.

### *Living at Bode*

I lived with Ninho for four months during my pre-dissertation field work in 2013. When I returned in 2014, I lived with Ninho for approximately five months but then decided to rent a small apartment in the wealthier area of Bode. Unfortunately, I simply could not keep my clothes and books from molding or myself healthy. Nevertheless, I still visited frequently.

Ninho's home at Bode had rudimental electricity and (sometimes) running water. There was a loo, but the bathroom was not quite finished. Most days we would use cups to wash ourselves with the greenish rain water collected in a large tub in the yard. I was worried about parasites and Dengue fever; the water tub was an excellent home for mosquito larvae. But when I offered Ninho to pay a plumber to fix the bathroom she responded: "*Pobre tem que ter verme!*" - the poor must have worms.

And so, we did. Biel, the little foster boy, was diagnosed with Amoeba<sup>40</sup> in his eye, his sister Dadá and I lost weight due to internal parasites, and we all got Dengue fever and Zika. Ninho, Dandara, and her brothers, however, were as healthy as ever. It was interesting to see that

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<sup>40</sup> From Wikipedia: "Acanthamoeba is naturally occurring amoeba (tiny, one-celled animals) commonly found in water sources, such as tap water, well water, hot tubs, and soil and sewage systems. If these tiny parasites infect the eye, Acanthamoeba keratitis results."

in this environment my thirty-year-old white body was as susceptible to illness like that of a four-year-old child.

I was offered Dandara's little room, which was an addition to the main house made of some mud-concrete mix. Dandara decorated it lovingly with mosaics and small pieces of mirrors; several old photo-cameras were hanging around. It had a little bed and a desk; the only window were small slots in the wall that opened towards an alley. Dadá and Biel (and the turtle, dogs, and chickens) would sometimes come into my little room and sleep with me in my bed. I learned quickly to put a plastic sheet under because Dadá had regular nightmares and wet the bed. Dadá and Biel were surrendered by their mother couple years ago at Ninho's door.

Before the mother gave both children to Ninho<sup>41</sup> she would take the babies with her to work, at a bar frequented by fishermen, prostitutes, and drug dealers. Stuck under a table, the children witnessed fights, assaults, and even murder. Dadá's nightmares were a constant reminder of the precarious conditions and trauma that children in Recife experience on a daily basis that contribute to a stunning banalization and indifference to violence.

On rainy days I would wake up in a pool of water that had filtered through the mud walls, as the room was sort of caved into the ground. It was rain season, and the moisture began to eat away our clothes. As everything turned into mold I resorted to hang my clothes in a tree to save them from the stench and destruction. I would make it to the weekly Pact for Life meetings with help of a neighbor's boy who transported me on his bicycle through yet another flood of brown water – I was wearing a fancy dress and holding my high heeled shoes. Nevertheless, at the meeting with well-groomed politicians and policy makers, I would notice some of these

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<sup>41</sup> In Brazil, it is rather common to give children to be raised by neighbors, relatives or friends, if the family cannot afford the time or money to take care of them.

perfumed officials "sniff" me in surprise. Everyone knows how citizens of the "second class" smell like.

### *Community leaders*

Bode had exceptional community leaders and activists who would negotiate with police, business men and represent the community in public hearings at City Hall. Different than in Rio, where all favela matters were handled exclusively by the Resident's Association via the local drug lord, at Bode and other favelas in Recife power was decentralized. Drug dealers were plenty, but they did not hold particular power or respect of the residents. If nobody mingled in their business, they did not bother residents. Moreover, at Bode as in most favelas in Recife, women were at the front of community leadership. This has to do on the one hand with the type of employment; most men in coastal favelas were fisher. On the other, this has to do with the Pacto investigating crime more diligently, thus many men were in prison, leaving their homes in the capable hands of their wives.

One example of community leadership at Bode, was Joana D'Arc, who is the first and only female head of a Maracatú group in Brazil (an Afro-Brazilian musical performance anchored in Candomblé). She cares for dozens of youth from the favela teaching them the ancient performance that requires discipline and dedication. The active Candomblé presence in Pernambuco makes these temples also a hub for LGBT community and activists; homosexual men and women as well as *travesti* (transgendered) are common and unusually well received at Bode, despite the fact that Brazil's Northeast has some of the highest rates of hate crimes in the world. While homophobia is a problem across Brazil, in more cosmopolitan Rio the LGBTQ community has established itself firmly, participates actively in yearly parades, protests, and

political action. In Recife, the city council has started only recently to pay attention to the lynching of travesti, in particular.

Another community member, a young man called Kaká, initiated a library project at Bode. First located in a palafita, the library expanded and is today in a colorful brick house equipped with air conditioning, public to everyone. Its wall is graphitized with a fitting quote from Oscar Wilde: “We are all laying in the gutter, but some of us are looking at the stars.” Kaká was hired by Eduardo Machado at the Secretary for Urban Security to help other communities to develop projects toward education and social inclusion, in an attempt to pave better futures. Fishing in the sea or river is one of the most popular jobs at Bode. While women are not allowed on the boats and ships that head out to the deep sea, they are dominating the polluted river banks where they fish for different clams in the mangroves, especially *Sururu* – tiny black mussels – and crabs. At Bode, these fisher women were headed (and protected) by the honorable Dona Marina do Sururu, a woman who was respected for her age, her many children, grandchildren, and great-grand-children, most of which survived into their teens and further. Although Marina is only in her fifties, her mouth shows only one good tooth and she has the status of an elder.

I loved to spend early mornings with Dona Marina, helping to clean *Sururu* and prepare it for sale; she enjoyed talking to me and my dog Cachaça. Dona Marina lived in the probably most dangerous part of Bode; there a majority of the male population were ex-convicts involved in crack, murder, and robberies. They would get into fights with each other and extermination groups and the police would raid these areas on occasion. Dona Marina made sure that word got out to leave the “gringa” (me) pass unharmed; often I would be greeted by rough looking strangers who would escort me to Dona Marina’s door step for security. Like in most favelas, at Bode women were the real, reliable and continuous leaders and guardians of the community. The

fisher men, on the other hand, operated under very different circumstances and I had little opportunity or desire to access this group. While at sea, for weeks or months at a time, fishermen manage to stay mostly sober, but once they set foot on soil most return to their addiction and spend all their earned money on drugs and alcohol. Most of these men never return home to their families, either because their wives (like in the case of Dona Marina) did not allow it, or because they fear revenge from someone in the area. Political Scientist Michael Jerome Wolff has accompanied deep sea fishers from the area. Here an excerpt of his accounts: "If the drug is there, they will drink it, snort it, or smoke it non-stop until it is gone. No matter what. And when it is gone, well, they manage. They don't even seem to suffer, which leads one to think that they might not be so addicted after all. And yet they will always go back to it as soon as it is available, and the binge begins again. That is why, were it not for their profession, which keeps them out at sea twenty-five days out of each month, they would probably have succumbed to complete destitution, prison, or death long ago. There are no drug dealers, liquor stores, or money to purchase anything with, way out there in the high seas. And that is where they are happiest and most productive.

Onshore they are outcasts, hoodlums, wastes of human capacity, persecuted by the police and laughed at by society. Out at sea they are well-tuned machines working day in and day out like clockwork, casting out cages and reeling them in, cooking, cleaning, eating heartily and sleeping like logs. Out at sea, they are proud men. On shore, they don't even eat. They live off of cachaça and hard drugs, and they spend what little money they make in a matter of days." (Wolff 2014).

Many of the fishers, recently returned from sea, have not been back to their homes on land for several months and left it in the hands of their wives. Consequently, the majority of

households in coastal favelas like Bode are headed by women. Often the men cannot return because one of the local drug dealers put out a hit on them for not paying a debt. They would spend their time on land in bars and streets, smoking crack and drinking until it was time to get out to sea again. Monica, a large black woman who people call "little Monquinha," got married to a fisherman when she was fourteen and pregnant. "Every day he would hit me. When one side healed, the other one swelled," she tells me showing the scars on her face. She described herself as "*sou uma nega feia mas eu estou aqui comendo, bebendo, fudendo e ele está comendo areia*" – "I am an ugly negress, but I am here eating, drinking, fucking, and he is there, eating sand."

After her husband was killed in a fight, Monquinha started working with Marina and the other women cleaning *Sururu*, mussels, crabs that they fish out of the urban Mangroves and polluted Capibaribe River. Her fingers show healed scars from the many infections she had; the sharp *Sururu* occasionally cut into the fingers. However, in the group of fisher women Monquinha feels safer. Most women in the group became more empowered and able to get rid of abusive husbands; they live with help of each other, their sons and also police officers who under the Pacto pay more attention to domestic violence.

### *Violence at Bode*

Monquinha invited me to her home on a Sunday, traditionally the most festive and drunk day of the week, before *mata-mata* (kill day) on Monday<sup>42</sup>. I bought meat as a gift for Monquinha. I hopped over my neighbor, as usual bound with rope and left on the street to sleep off the *cachaça* (he is a kind man when sober, but a destructive drunk). Making my way through

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<sup>42</sup> *Mata-mata* is a reference to actual killings, not notions of back-to-work Monday. In Recife, debt is settled in the beginning of the week. If debt is not paid on Monday, the debtor gets killed. Mondays and Tuesdays routinely show highest numbers of murders or discovery of a body.

the vivid streets framed by smoke from many barbeques, numerous little markets, women with tocas on her head sweeping, men playing domino in the sun. The moment I enter into the narrow mud path leading into the Mangue the scenery as well as the smell change - mud and fish.

The stench of the mold is pouring out each door. Immediately lost, I asked a man sitting and eating crabs where Monquinha's house was. He took me few steps further and points at a small, contorted shack overgrown with green algae. "This is her palace," he smiled. In front of the "palace" was a little boy, maybe two years old, taking a bath with a bucket in a hole in the ground. His slender legs were covered with scars from scabies.

Monquinha's house was, as I expected, filled with half-broken stuff. The obese woman lived in the small space with her 5-year old daughter and an adult daughter who was not there at the time. I sat down on the little sofa and noticed how the toilet bowl is touching the edge of the couch, separated by a rag hanging from the ceiling. The kitchen is chaotic, but there is a large flat screen LG television. Next, hangs a big laminated poster featuring a young black man with bleached hair, wearing black sunglasses and a smug smile. These posters are bad news. "It's my nephew. They killed him last year," Monica says as if to confirm my inner thoughts. I cannot tell who she means by "they" – the *justiçeiros*, drug dealers, police? I do not detect any emotion in her voice.

She explained that her nephew was selling crack and when the crack dealers from "São Luis" (behind the Banhista, a bar next to where I live with Ninho) went to "war" with the group from "Bode", he got killed at the tender age of seventeen. At Bode every corner seems to have its owner, a crack dealer who is killed and replaced on a regular basis. I would visit Monquinha about once a week, bring her some meat or Danone yogurt for the little daughter. Usually, I would find Monquinha sitting outside with some fisher men drinking cachaça and eating crabs.

They always were thrilled about my showing – it doesn't often happen that a stranger finds its way to this place. One particularly nice and dry Sunday, a big group received me – fisher men and women, some I identified as local crack dealers, others introduced themselves as police officers living at Bode. The men got me a chair and introduced each other politely, wanted me to take pictures and to teach them Polish and German. Suddenly, I spotted Gustavo, Ninho's first foster child she took in over a decade ago. Gustavo had only recently been released from prison, where he spent three years for murder. He smiles at me and trots over to give me a hug. The police officers sitting with us watch him cautiously. Gustavo put his hand around my shoulder and addressed the group: "This is *gente boa*. She's family, *viu*." People nod silently, and I feel deeply uncomfortable about the underlying threat. Then, Gustavo disappeared into the mangue.

A young man carried over a bunch of live crabs, freshly caught; we quickly rinse them but are too hungry to shave their little hairy legs and throw them right into the big pot of boiling water. I am terrible at eating crabs... Monika shows me how to crack the scissors with your teeth and suck out the meat, but I always smash the crab meat inside of it. My mouth is full of crab meat, shell, and the hair. Cachaça, my dog, is trying to lick it off and then I cut my finger bloody with one of the scissors. My clumsiness causes a good laugh. An old woman, shaken by laughter shouts to a boy: "Menino, give me your shirt for the moça!" and starts cleaning my face with his shirt. I feel like an idiot; it's not even my first time eating crab! "You need many years of experience to eat like us in the Mangue," Monica consoles me and spits little crab legs on the floor. "*Quer caninha?*", I sip more of the warm canned rum and watch a group of military police in uniform march through the alley, their guns drawn. They see the two police sitting with us and give them a friendly nod. I cannot tell if they are from "my" precinct, the cachaça clouds my view. Couple hours later, I will find out that they were searching for Gustavo. He had just killed

a fifteen-year-old girl at her birthday party.

*Field notes, Bode, Recife 2015*

It was in March 2015 when Helena finally turned 15 years old – an important age in Brazil. She straightened her curly black hair, put on pink lipstick, and squeezed herself into a pair of tight shorts. Her party took place in an open garage in Bode, where she and her family lived. Balloons, booze, and beats penetrated the humid heat with festive humor. But before she could blow out a candle, Helena was shot four times by a young man from her community. Her lifeless body was surrounded by a crowd of men, women, and children, gazing rather casually onto the bloody corpse.

Gustavo, who was 23 years old, did not run and hide. The police found him sitting at the nearby beach watching the sunset shortly after the murder. He did not deny the crime. At Bode, Ninho and friends watched Gustavo's arrest live on their television. Once I heard of the killing, I ran home to Ninho. Gustavo was one of Ninho's kids; she took him in when he was only one-year-old.

On the television screen, the cameras zoomed onto Gustavo's peach fuzz mustache and emaciated body. He was handcuffed and put in the trunk of the police car (as is customary). "Why did you do it?" a reporter asked him, seemingly expecting some exciting story. "It was either her or me, *doutor*," Gustavo answered politely.

During questioning at the Homicide Task Force precinct, Gustavo explained, that a few months ago Helena led an armed attack on him that left a bullet in his shoulder. After Gustavo was arrested three years ago, Helena (then 12 years old) took over his spot as a crack dealer.

Upon Gustavo's release from prison and return to Bode, Helena feared he would want his corner back; so she had him shot. Once Gustavo recovered from his wounds, he borrowed a revolver and executed Helena in front of witnesses. The reporter turned to Helena's family, wearing their best clothes for the cameras. They answered the reporter's questions politely; Helena's cousin waving at the camera. Ninho, watching the scene at home, just shook her head saying, "nobody can help".

Like so many others, Gustavo and Helena grew up in poverty and inequality in a favela in Recife. When Gustavo was approximately one-year old, his crack-addicted mother gave him to Ninho. By then, he had already seen and experienced a lot of violence, witnessed corpses in the streets, drugs, and domestic abuse. Ninho told me that as a child he suffered from nightmares and had trouble concentrating. Gustavo never learned to read or write, to use a computer, or open a bank account. Eventually, he started dealing crack to earn money, some of which he would use to buy food for Ninho. One day, a friend stole Gustavo's baseball cap, that was a gift from Ninho. Gustavo killed him. He was arrested and spent three years in an overcrowded prison.

Ninho loves Gustavo but does not believe that Gustavo is violent because of social conditions. *"Bandido nasci bandido, não é criado. Já vi bandido em famílias excelentes. Ninguém foge do seu destino. Eu tento dar oportunidades, mas vai acontecer o que tem que acontecer."*

"A bandit is born a bandit; he is not raised. I have seen bandits even in excellent families. Nobody can escape its destiny. I try to offer opportunities, but it will happen, as it is meant to happen. - He was always curious. He had a thirst for blood since he was little" –

she explained. Whenever there was a murder in the community, and there were many, Gustavo always wanted to be first to see. He had a fascination for blood. According to Ninho, Gustavo was already born a sinner.

Once released, he returned to the favela and moved in with a girlfriend, picking up odd jobs and trying to stay on the “right path.” I would see him around here and there at Ninho’s house or in the streets; he would always come over, give me a shy hug, and tell people not to mess with me. Only a month after his release, Gustavo was shot, allegedly by Helena. Ninho visited him in the hospital where he recovered slowly under the precarious conditions of the Brazilian public health system. Helena and Gustavo have a lot in common: they are both victims of underlying unequal social conditions, trauma. They are also both quick to use violence as a solution to conflict. It is a full cycle between victim and victimizer.

"I live in the mud," said Tadinho, another young crack dealer at Bode, pointing at the open sewage surrounding us. "But at least the prettiest girls want to go out with me, and I can buy nice clothes. When you are a matador (killer) people respect you”.

Especially youth are prone to take the only way out of poverty and social marginalization by entering the illegal economy. "In search of respect," they often find short-term legal jobs, mostly the least desirable in society only to be fired or succumb to exhaustion after a couple of months. Then "they treat their return to the world of street dealing as a triumph of free will and resistance on their part" (Bourgois 1995:115), the only act of so-called “free will” they will ever have agency over.

However, as much as young men and women tried to persuade me of their status and freedom as drug dealers, many also expressed the frustration of not having options and

opportunities on the job market like "*gente*" – “real” people - but always being offered the worst working conditions and lowest pay. Their activities as dealers and criminals protected these youths to a certain extent from admitting that they are victims of a brutal social system. The little authority and respect they gain in the favela, shielded them from facing the fact that they are socially, economically, and physically disposable to mainstream society

### *Relationship with the Police*

When I shared with my friends at Bode that I am conducting research on the police, they immediately brain stormed several police officers that lived at Bode and put me in touch. I was stunned how different the favela structure was compared to Rio. At Bode was no centralized power structure in form of a drug lord. The police were regularly and calmly patrolling the favela. Residents didn't show them fear, nor particular kindness.

One day I saw a woman leaning casually on a marked police car. I stopped and took a picture - in Rio police perceive such behavior as disrespectful and punish it with at least a warning, or even arrest or beating. At Bode, the woman and the police officer probably knew each other or were neighbors. Apparently, in Recife, the rhetoric of warfare hasn't taken over (yet?) and the relationship between police and favela residents seemed healthier. In Recife there was no BOPE task force that would employ war like weaponry, tanks, and explosives; the military police rarely used machine guns and were not afraid of coming home wearing their uniforms. Everybody has an opinion about police, but at Bode the attitude was overall neutral. Police officers were neighbors who are sometimes good, sometimes bad. Many police officers at Bode had two or three jobs. My neighbor, for example, a *cabô* at a military police battalion in the

city center, would cook up burgers after work in his *lanchonete* (small restaurant). Often, he did not even bother to take off his uniform, unthinkable in Rio de Janeiro.

Bode is a place where you could spend the whole week drinking warm cachaça from cans, cracking crabs, go fishing with the women, and clean Sururu with Dona Marina as if life was that simple. Once in a while, police would pass through, which makes small drug traffickers hide in their mother's houses but they come out quickly after. Sometimes a GATI team<sup>43</sup>, dressed in black on their motorcycles, would drive through the streets, putting fear in the men and delight in the women. The team would quickly be surrounded by young women who bring them *caldinho* and *macaxeira* dishes.

Nevertheless, the police have a long, complicated history at Bode engaging in extralegal punishments and killings. As it was expected, the civil police was better regarded than the military police. Military police are more interactive with the population; they patrol, intervene, raid, and arrest, thus there is more opportunity for friction. They also have a history of repression. The civil police, on the other hand, come to solve crimes and generally have minimal interaction with citizens.

Betinha cousin, for example, was a commissary at the civil police and worked many years in the Pina neighborhood. Betinha is in her early fifties, although she cannot be sure, because her birth certificate is forged<sup>44</sup>.

“Just around the corner, by the theater Barreto Julio, that's where the delegacia was,” remembers Betinha. “It was a fine precinct, so the guys would think twice, three times before

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<sup>43</sup> GATI is a special task force used for high risk situations, armed conflict and kidnapping.

<sup>44</sup> Betinha's mother "got belly" when she was a young teenager and was expelled from her parent's home. She found refuge and work in a brothel in Pina. When the baby, Betinha, was born, the mother put her in a shoe box and left it on a woman's doorstep, who she knew wished for children but was barren. Back then, so Betinha, a single mother was not able to register her bastard child, so leaving the baby with a married woman was a good solution for all. The couple registered Betinha as their daughter and raised her at Bode.

they would dare to rob someone. Also, here in Pina, we had a law: you steal where you live, you will be killed or tortured.” Bode at the time was infamous for its extermination groups. Kelly, Betinha's nineteen-year-old girlfriend who practices capoeira with me, added: "It were the people of the community, but mostly our police men who would punish criminals," she got interrupted by Betinha who, with pride, exclaimed: “We always had our justiçaes, an extermination group<sup>45</sup> here. Particularly at the time when the precinct was there. But that precinct closed about forty years ago now. The guys [in the precinct] were good, active. They made everyone think twice before messing around because they would hang them upside down and spank their testicles with leather straps. They would make them return the stolen goods. Back then we would sleep with open doors, with open windows,” Betinha pointed accusingly at the iron bars in my windows.

“Nobody would steal. Everybody knew they would get pau de arara or lose a finger or two at the delegacia if they did. And it was not the military police, you know? It was the civil police.”. Before the Pact for Life, the civil police had little resources or incentives for criminal investigations. Medical examiners were under staffed and had no equipment; civil police investigators often had no functioning cars, no chain of custody for evidence collection, no computers. Nevertheless, they saw themselves as responsible to identify and prosecute criminals. Equipped with a law degree, as all delegados in the civil police, these officers were met with respect and their decisions equivalent with the law. Their actions were widely regarded as “illegal but not illegitimate”(Civico 2012). I have heard many stories about the almost mystical

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<sup>45</sup> Extermination groups are traditionally made up of police officers and fire fighters who operate on small scale as individuals or small groups. They can be hired for specific kills. For example, an owner of a grocery shop who had been robbed could contract a death squad who would track down and kill the thief (who is almost always poor, black and young).

justiceiros who lived and worked at Bode, kept the community safe and gave criminals “what they deserved.” One of the most famous and feared characters in Recife was a military police officer called Jorge Grampão. His name would come up in casual conversations at Bode, but also when I worked with the civil police at the homicide task force, who often used Grampão as an example of everything that is wrong with the military police.

Born and raised at Bode, Grampão was indeed a real human, even though the stories about his size, age, and immortality would suggest differently. Jorge Grampão was feared for his persecution of petty criminals, his brutality and lack of mercy with those who broke the law inside the community. He disappeared about ten years ago and is thought to be dead, although that is still disputed. Grampão was Betinha’s third-degree cousin.

“He used to dress up as a *gari* (rubbish collector) and enter people’s houses, pull the guys out from underneath their beds and kill them. They would shit their pants,” Betinha remembers. Apparently, Jorge Grampão had also a sophisticated criminal network of thieves and “exterminators” who were mostly police officers. They would rob banks, were killers for hire and kept law and order at Bode. Other police officers would fear them; including a homicide detective, Eliane who I met. She remembered vividly the atrocities committed by Grampão's extermination group and the fear of investigating this man.

With the initiation of the Pacto, when policing was re-organized, equipped and the state cracked down on extermination groups, Jorge Grampão and his men disappeared. But their ghosts still seem to haunt the people and you hear parents warn their children to stay on the right path, if not Jorge Grampão might get them.

Myths and figures like the one of Jorge Grampão stand in crass contrast to the history and view of the police in Rio de Janeiro. Even though, in Recife the police are immediately

associated as violent, they are not conceptualized as enemies. Rather, the character of Grampão resembles Rio's drug traffickers who took protection, law and order into their own hand in the favelas. However, the scenario in Recife it is not a dichotomy of state versus poor citizen.

Different than in the more cosmopolitan and politically active Rio, the state has never played a dominant role in people's lives in the Northeast. While in the former national capital Rio, the police developed from the military protecting the crown, in Pernambuco the history of the police is much more recent, only 180 years. During the military dictatorship political activists organized and protested in Rio, were imprisoned by the police, tortured and finally developed into drug gangs like the *Comando Vermelho*. In Pernambuco, however, the plantation owners and former slave masters remained the most powerful entities, the state was secondary.

Until this day, social segregation, rooted in the history of slavery and plantations is vivid in the Northeast and keeps the "first" and "second" class citizens apart and in their place. Instead of state versus rebellious drug traffickers, in Recife it is an endless cycle of poor killers and poor victims, like Gustavo and Helena, that is perpetuated by a chronic inequality, abandonment, and exclusion. Police officers in the interior of the state, the Sertão are until this day deeply respected (and feared). "In the Sertão, the police are father, doctor, and church," said a military police commander in a little village few hours from Recife to me (author interview June 2015). This view and expectation migrated to the city with those who escaped the droughts; there it transformed but traces of this deep respect for authority can still be found.

Moreover, as I indicated, police officers are members of the communities which they police, something unthinkable in Rio. They are held to similar standards as everybody else, to keep peace and order in the community. If there is trouble, a neighbor might even ask a police

friend or relative for assistance. Usually a “friendly” conversation with a gun at the belt solves the problem at Bode to this day.

Residents at Bode were wary about the effectiveness of the Pact for Life. While the official homicide rates in the area decreased significantly, residents explained that for the most part *matadores* (killers) just have gotten smarter. “They continue to kill, but now they take the bodies and dump them in a different area,” explained a woman to me. Conflicts between drug dealers are regular but much less spectacular than in Rio de Janeiro. The weapons used are old fashioned pistols and revolvers, no machine guns or hand grenades like in Rio. The territory they fight over are street corners, specific houses or bars, never the entire community.

Joana, the head of Maracatú at Bode, did never like the police. She described them as lazy, especially when it comes to her complaints about racial insults coming from a neighboring Evangelical church. However, she confirmed that police are rather harmless and useless than dangerous.

“They drive by in their nice cars, so the *bandido* runs inside for a moment. But then he comes out again. How does that help?” Joana said (author interview 2014). Joana’s Maracatú is a space where children and youth can seek refuge; there are many members who are involved in crime, even murder. “*Ninguém aqui é bomzinho*” – nobody here is a “goody goody”, Joana explained; but she believed that Maracatú had a better chance at restoring these young people than arrest. Most police officers in the area agreed and would leave Maracatú members alone (unless they had an outstanding warrant). In that sense, Joana and the local police officers did establish a sort of rapport and certain expectations of each other.

Betinha and Kelly agreed that “today, the police here are of little use. They smack mothers for protecting their sons; they plant crack on those who didn't come up with enough to

get arrested. Most of the police are bastards.” They admitted that justiceiros have been largely eliminated and that the police are less violent than ever. However, this also meant that criminals had an “easier time robbing” in their opinion. “Today, they [the police] cannot do anything. Today there is no justice,” Betinha said with a certain nostalgia.

There are exceptions, however. Kelly witnessed couple weeks ago a young woman getting robbed, just outside of Bode. A group of armed young men she knew held a gun to the woman’s head and took her purse. Kelly biked after the group into Bode. She told her cousin - who is involved in shady business - that the boys had robbed her school teacher. Furious, the cousin retrieved the woman's ID and credit cards. A few days later, I heard gunshots. In the alley in front of me laid a young black man, bleeding on the street, a bullet in his back. Another was trying to run with his arm shattered. A man on a motorcycle calmly guarded his gun and took off. “It is funny,” said Kelly, “you reap what you sow. Both these guys were part of the group that robbed that woman. They tried to steal that man's motorcycle too, but he was a police officer. He shot them. One of them is paraplegic now; the other just broke his arm. No one arrested. That's how it is. It's either kill or die.”

The thieves and criminals at Bode do not assault indiscriminately. They never touched me, for example, although I’m white and foreign because they knew me from Ninho’s house, the Candomblé temple, and capoeira. But with the Pacto and the disappearance of the extermination groups, assaults and robberies became more common within and around Bode. Similar to the case of Rio de Janeiro, more “democratic” policing meant more freedom for criminals. The increased accountability and vigilance of policing practice did reduce serious crimes such as homicides. However, petty criminals benefitted from a system that would be unlikely to put

emphasis on investigating stolen goods. Police officers had now too much to lose to physically punish.

Some residents, thus, saw proximity policing as a farce and ineffective in protecting their property. Many, just like Betinha and Kelly did appreciate the work of the *justiçeiros* in the area because their violence never affected them personally, as long as they didn't commit a crime within the community.


The increasing and indiscriminate use of crack-cocaine inside the favela also contributed to a general feeling of insecurity and unpredictability. While the number of homicides decreased with the initiation of the Pacto and the area was saturated with military police, the local bandits knew that police now had too much to lose to get involved in extra-legal killings. Bode's inhabitants have divided attitudes about the Pacto; nevertheless, they agree that more police officers make them feel safer. In Rio, the responses to police saturation at favelas was more ambivalent; in favelas such as Santa Marta where the police established good relations they were eventually welcomed, but at favelas such as Saudade where drug gangs remained strong, police officers caused more tension than good.

A survey conducted in 2008 by Luiz Ratton and the Federal University of Pernambuco-Recife, one year after the Pact for Life was launched, showed that 62 percent of residents at Bode saw violence levels in their community as "very violent" (Ratton and Torres 2010). When given the opportunity to grade the police on a scale from one to ten (10 being the best) most chose five. Roughly the half of interviewees said they trust the military police "*mais ou menos*" (more or less); and 36 percent declared they do not trust the military police at all. Distrust in the police is a leitmotif in Brazil, if not the whole world.

However, 20 percent stated that they do trust the military police which is a strong statement in a community that has a long history of violence. Trust levels decreased with age, hence, most young people between 16 and 30 years and those who were better educated were less trustful of the police - which correlates with the age of most victims and assailants. Importantly, only one year after the initiation of the Pacto, the majority of interviewees stated that the increased presence and patrols of military police had reduced violence in the favela. 40 percent believed that the police have no influence whatsoever on violence. Finally, stunning 89 percent of the interviewees have responded that policing at Bode should be increased (Ratton and Torres 2010). In summary, despite being one of the poorest, most violent slums in Recife, Bode approved of the high number of police officers patrolling the community. They were impressed by the new cars and motorcycles of the police and generally approached the officers without fear. Different than in Rio, where a charismatic and atypical commander had to be established to win the trust of residents, in Recife favela residents were already more than used to police in their midst. They were just not acquainted with police that is professional, well equipped, and organized according to democratic principles.

### Do you trust the police?

- A - residents see violence levels in their community as “very violent”
- B - do trust military police “mais ou menos” (more or less)
- C - do not trust the military police at all
- D - do trust the military police
- E - the increased presence of military police has reduced violence
- F - military police have no influence whatsoever on violence
- G - think policing at Bode should be increased



Part II Figure 8: Do residents trust the police? Source: Ratton and Torres 2010

### POLICE VIOLENCE AND NOTIONS OF JUSTICE

Carnaval 2009 was wild and beautiful. People from all over the world united in Recife and Olinda to dance Frevo, Maracatu and participate in folkloric processions. Youngsters paint their hair and hit the city. According to the police, even *matadors* (killers) take a break from killing and go to have fun; debts are going to be settled afterward. Nevertheless, the police had their hands full as so called *arrastão* were terrorizing tourists and local commerce. In an *arrastão* a large group of people, typically teenagers, run looting and robbing through the crowds, destroying vendor’s stands and stealing en masse. That night during carnaval, 11 teenagers were arrested by the military police for allegedly having participated in such a *arrastão*. The patrol cars

brought them to the 16th Battalion of the Military Police and presented to their commanding officer. All these low ranking soldados were rookies who usually do desk duties but were pulled into the streets due to high demand. The Pact for Life was just initiated couple years ago, and the officers were probably excited about a possible bonus awaiting them for this “prevention of violence”.

The superior officer that night, Lieutenant Felix, a man with a proud mustache, directed his police officers to bring the boys to the civil police station to formally file a report as is protocol. But in the middle of the way, Felix suddenly ordered a detour. He guided the police cars into an abandoned neighborhood and stopped underneath a bridge at the Capibarive river, next to the courthouse. Lieutenant Felix decided to proceed “old-school” and teach the boys a “lesson”. He made the 11-handcuffed youth to lay down in the mud and spread their legs. Then he ordered his officers to beat them; one refused although he was threatened to be fired he returned to the car and waited.

Afterward, the handcuffs were taken off and one by one, the youth were forced to enter the river. Two of the young men drowned after they had told the police that they could not swim. The rest floated down the river and returned home. Four police officers participated, one – the driver of the Lieutenant - insisted on staying inside the car.

Six years after this terrifying event, I was sitting in a full courtroom, located in a building right across from the previously mentioned bridge. The four police officers who participated in the beating and subsequent death of the youth, were on trial for torture and murder of the two young men. The survivors, all young men from a particularly poor favela in Recife, gave powerful testimony. The low-ranking police officers, most of which were *soldados* and one *cabo*, were suspended without pay immediately after the incident in 2009. The officers testified

that they followed the direct orders of their commanding officer, Lieutenant Felix, thus acted by the military code. Also, the police officer who stayed in the car and refused to participate in the torture testified that Lieutenant Felix had threatened them with imprisonment and physical punishment if they did not obey.

Lieutenant Felix sat a few rows behind me, his arm around his young wife and casually chewing a toothpick. At this time, he was still on active, paid duty at a different battalion. At the end of the day, the court condemned the police officers to each 96 years in prison, an unusually harsh sentence (Jornal do Commercio 2015). Lieutenant Felix, went home that afternoon; later he was sentenced to 150 years and six months in prison. However, he remained free while his lawyer and the court entered a long round of appeals. Despite the bias toward higher ranking officers, the Pact for Life program sent a strong message against impunity. The trial was discussed vividly in favelas and police precincts as a symbol of change.

Nevertheless, public opinion was divided about its implications. To many, it boiled down to one question: are the teenagers indeed criminals? Hence, did they “have it coming” or were they innocent?

The night after the court’s decision which was publicized in every newspaper and on television, I was patrolling with two military police officers in the city center. Around midnight we made a stop at a street vendor to drink a coconut. A group of senior men, all street vendors, were united, playing domino. The owner of the coconut shack approached Paulo, the older of the cops, with a complaint about teenagers practicing *arrastão* in the area and that they have damaged his commerce.

“You need to do something. If you are scared of the Pacto and treat them softly, they will not respect you. You need to crack down on them!” the vendor told Paulo, then he added “but

today's police are useless, because of all them human rights," earning cheering from his peers. Paulo nodded silently with a grim face. He explained that his hands were tied by new, stricter regulations and pointed out the court case that had just happened – "They [the victims] are the criminals, but we get punished for being too harsh," he complained. It is worth saying that to most, including the police officers on trial, the death of two of the youth was not intended; however, certainly possible to foresee.

The public's wish for more repressive police is not uncommon, even if stemming from poor members of society, who are statistically more often targeted by law enforcement. Facing a lack of capital and power, violence is and has been for a long time the only way to "properly" educate your children, to assert authority, and appropriately revenge honor. You may be poor and dark skinned but want to be respectable; violence equals authority.

A central reason why people cooperate with and approve of the police is that they view them as legitimate legal authorities but the degree to which police are able to generate trust are not always through legal actions (Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler 2003; Tyler 2004; Tyler and Fagan 2008). The police need public support and voluntary cooperation to be effective in their order maintenance role. Such voluntary support and collaboration is linked to judgments about the legitimacy of the police, not necessarily the legality of their actions.

Under the extermination group's leadership at Bode, the rules were clearly laid out and the "good worker" felt protected, safe and could "sleep with open doors and windows", as Betinha said. The change of the police in the direction of better monitoring, accountability, and human rights decreased violence rates generally; but it raised the number of petty criminals. For some individuals the decrease of homicides was not as acute as for others; those who feel that those who get killed deserved in a way because they were following the "wrong path", also think

that they deserve more safety because they are not involved in “wrong” things. These residents had protection and “justice” available through *justiçeiros* and some more repressive police.

However, in Recife police killings never came close to the amounts in Rio de Janeiro.

As a bottom line, it seems to many it is irrelevant if the police officer is likeable, trustworthy and legal; what matters is if they can identify themselves with views and values of the residents. In Recife, where most police officers grew up and live in favelas this is often a given. Residents want to see a cop who will punish the “evil” (e.g. thieves) and spare the “innocent” (e.g. mothers). Police officers or *justiçeiros* were expected to keep the majority of the community safe, even if at cost of delinquent lives or well-being.

At the same time, police officers who are aggressive and brutal against those who are deemed “innocent” such as mothers, are dismissed as “bad cops” and met with dis-respect. A key antecedent of public judgments about police legitimacy involves the manner in which the police exercise their authority - that is how they treat suspects. Such evaluations of police behavior are central to public perception of the police and separate from assessments of police effectiveness in fighting crime. In Recife, police violence is much lower than in Rio especially when considering lethality. Citizens are more likely to cooperate with police that arrest your child, but not kill it.

## CHAPTER 10

LIFE AND DEATH AT THE MARGINS: SHADOWING THE HOMICIDE TASK  
FORCE

*Part II Figure 9: Homicide scene investigators. Photo by author*

This chapter sets out to show the routine of violence work in Recife: who kills? Who is getting killed? Why? How do police investigators see these cases? I first accompanied the homicide task force in Recife from May to September 2013, and then over the course of nine months from 2014 to 2015. In total, I have spent about 36 to 40 hours per week with the homicide task force at crime scenes, hospitals, and prisons. Accompanying the Homicide Task Force in Recife, allowed me to better grasp the social conditions under which lethal violence occurs and the position that police officers are in. What became apparent, was a never-ending

cycle of victim turned victimizer, and the routinized response of civil police investigators to whom no victim was innocent.

It is important to examine how and if the work of the civil police in Recife plays a role in how the police are perceived by the public. Civil police and medical examiners became a common sight at homicide scenes after the Pacto was implemented and their work was closely followed by a local group of crime reporters who sometimes aid in investigations. The following case studies present the most common kinds of murders in Recife: debt, drug trafficking, revenge, crimes of passion, and finally the completely ignored but common category “hate crime” (in particular violence against LGBTQ community). I present the routine of homicide to demonstrate the intricate dynamics and power structures between police, citizens, and the media. The case studies are meant to introduce some of the victims, perpetrators, and detectives I have worked with and show how little their routine and experience has to do with the clean and innovative image of the Pact for Life. Attending sometimes dozens of homicides in a single weekend, with less than 10 percent of all murders ever being solved, sheds light on the conditions and the motivation (or rather lack thereof) of police officers that try to make ends meet.

I chose these examples also to demonstrate how quickly individual cases start to merge and lose their “shock-factor”. The routine and normalization of violence is an inherent part of this type of police work, but also represent the banalization of violence in society at large. Exposure to such scenes on a daily basis has the inevitable consequence, that these murders lose their significance, especially because victims and perpetrators seem to overlap; predominantly black, young, poor from favelas. The following anecdotes will demonstrate how diverse the motive “drug trafficking” plays out on the ground and how it is manipulated by the civil police

investigators. The stories shed light on routinized dynamics at crime scenes, the notion of “ungrievable” lives, the lack of child protection, masculinity, and the role of the media. These dynamics shape police officer’s perception and attitude toward “democratic” policing methods which they largely do not see applicable to the particular social conditions.

### *The Homicide Task Force in Recife*

In Recife, every murder case falls under the jurisdiction of a local delegacia. However, because of the high number of homicides and the relatively small number of delegacias (especially those specialized in homicide) it used to take days for police to appear at crime scenes. By then, evidence was mostly destroyed and witnesses near to impossible to find. The Pact for Life improved upon a 24/7 task force, the Civil Police’s homicide department, which in Portuguese is written *Departamento de Homicídios e Proteção a Pessoa*, hence DHPP, and the *Força Tarefa de Homicídios* – a special task force implemented by the Pacto to attend to homicide crime scenes quickly. The Força Tarefa collect evidence, question witnesses, and deliver a detailed report to an investigating delegado. That way the Força Tarefa alleviate the burden put on the few civil police precincts that attend to large areas.

Three teams on call collect evidence, question witnesses, perform an initial medical examination and arrange for the transport of the body to the legal medical institute. Then the collected information is turned over to the investigating detective in the area. This way the Força Tarefa assures a more reliable evidence collection and witness questioning. A team is made up of a detective, a note taker (*escrivão*), and one agent (a lower ranking civil police officer who usually is the driver). All are volunteers who hope to make extra money - 50 US Dollars for a 24-hour shift for a detective, less for the others. All the detectives (who graduated from law school)

work the homicide task force in addition to their regular job at a particular delegacia. While the task force certainly improved the accuracy of evidence collection and tracking of violent crimes throughout the metropolitan region, it did not manage to increase the number of homicides being solved<sup>46</sup>.

The emphasis on investigation is what most distinguishes the Pact for Life from the Pacification program. In Rio, pacified favelas are left entirely in the hands of military police officers who have no investigative power nor interest. In Recife, however, military police regularly patrol hot spots but the civil police is also on retainer to attend to crime scenes in a timely manner. Throughout the years living in Rio's favelas, I have never seen a civil police officer or medical examiner enter the favela to collect evidence or dead bodies. Neither had my friend Ivete who lived at Saudade for decades. We heard of civil police officers questioning witnesses, days after deadly shootouts.


Consequently, as of 2011, Rio de Janeiro's public defenders' department said the state had more than 60,000 unsolved murders in the last 10 years. The department investigated the matter for the federal Ministry of Justice as part of a national plan to improve public safety. Approximately 24,000 of the victims have not been identified. This is in part, because in contrast to the Pacto, military and civil police in Rio work in separate systems and the names, descriptions or other details about victims simply get lost if they are ever noted down. In Recife, the Pacto prides itself to have every single name of a murder victim recorded in a governmental data collection system.

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<sup>46</sup> In Brazil only 5% of murders are being solved; comparatively 85% of homicides in the UK are solved, and 65% in the USA.

In 2011, the city Rio de Janeiro created a special homicide division that was to resemble the Força Tarefa approach in Recife; however, it lacked the general structure and technology. Solution rate for homicides increased from 11 percent to 14 percent. Across Brazil, civil police solve about 8 percent of all murders. Recife's homicide solving rate is around 10 percent, but it is important to keep in mind that the number of murders are higher than in Rio.

## Motives



*Part II Figure 10: Most common motives for murder. Source: DHPP 2008*

In 2008, the DHPP started to track and categorize violent deaths by location, time, and motive. It was also in 2008 that Brazil finally acknowledged its rampant violence against homosexual and transsexual individuals and began to track these deaths nationwide. Unfortunately, however, the category "hate crime" does not make part of the DHPP's six prime motives for murder: drug trafficking, revenge, interpersonal, crimes of passion, fight, and

extermination. It should be obvious to anyone with human interaction, that categorizing killings according to these six motives is more than ambiguous.

Another complication is, of course, the distinction between Fights, Interpersonal, and Revenge. The first is commonly understood as bar fights and altercations at football games between opposing fans. The second means, in essence, crimes of proximity in which the assailant and victim knew each other. "Revenge" is determined when honor is involved, for example, a murder over an insult or to avenge a family member. The three overlap significantly depending on the depth of investigation and there can be a fight between two people who know each other and are avenging a wrongdoing.

Revenge is the most cyclical of all; estimated as the cause of 30% of all murders, it tells a lot about the local culture in which (male) honor is the most valuable resource. An insult or assault has to be avenged with blood (Santos 2012); and, of course, the first revenge killing is then avenged with more killings. This cycle of violence is near to impossible to interrupt. However, when a victim was killed over a debt, like the case in the anecdote above, investigators often choose "drug trafficking" instead of "revenge" because they assume the victim was owing drug traffickers.

Crimes of passion usually refer to someone who killed his or her intimate partner. Since President Dilma Rousseff declared "Femicide" a new category, to draw attention to the high numbers of women killed in Brazil (especially in the Northeast), the motive "crimes of passion" became a bit more confusing. Femicide is treated by the police as a form of hate crime as opposed to a symptom of gender inequality.

Extermination groups are a small but important percentage in this scenario. These groups were widespread before 2007 (as the previous chapter on Bode demonstrated), and therefore

most murders in Pernambuco were attributed to them. After the Pact for Life was initiated, a significant effort was put into disarticulating these groups and jailing its members. As a result, coming across a murder with characteristics of an extermination group is unsettling to the Pacto officials because their actions were supposed to put such killings into the past. In contrast to cities such as Rio de Janeiro, these groups were very dominant in Recife but never developed significant territorial control or political ties. Killing is only one of their activities as they are usually also involved in extortion, kidnapping, theft, robbery, and drug trafficking. It is important to keep in mind, that the Pact for Life has increased the investigation of crimes dramatically and raised its solving rate above national average to almost 10 percent 30. However, over 90 percent of all murders in the state are unsolved.

Given the widespread use of crack-cocaine, as well as the ambiguous definition of the motive "drug trafficking," "drug trafficking" is the motivational basis for the highest percentage of homicides, according to DHPP. This includes territorial conflicts (e.g. fights over street corners) as well as a range of "control killings" necessary for the un-institutionalized illicit market to run a profitable and respected business. For example, you are able to rent a gun from your local drug dealer to commit robberies, etc.; but if you lose the gun in a police chase, the drug trafficker will kill you. This prevents the individuals borrowing the guns from possibly lying if the gun is lost.

#### REASONS FOR MURDER: DEBT

*Field notes, Recife, 12 June 2013 – My first homicide scene.*

It is my first official night shift at the Homicide Task Force in Recife, and I am nervously awaiting the unavoidable call to a crime scene. I will accompany detective Filipe, a fat, friendly white man in his fifties. He is very talkative; in fact, he doesn't seem to take a breath between sentences and soon the prospect to spend twelve hours at his side becomes more grueling than dead bodies. Around midnight, our first call comes in – “*Presunto na Areinha!*” – “Ham at Areinha,” is the crude announcement of a brutal slaying. Detective Felipe, the driver, and Rosa, the *escrivão* (note taker), get into the car and to my surprise, ten minutes later we are driving right into Bode – the favela I just have moved to. The names of the communities were confused by the police call center. Panic spread in my stomach.

I am still used to the conditions in Rio, where identifying or collaborating with the police is a death sentence in the favelas. Of course, I was wearing the obligatory bulletproof vest with “Policia” written on it. I interrupted Filipe's accounts: “I can't go, I need to get out!” The car went silent for a moment; then the driver started laughing, “well, that was quick. I told you the girl doesn't have it in her. You wanted to see all these corpses, huh? Post them on Instagram, and now you got scared?” He looked at me in surprise when I told him that I lived at Bode and was afraid of being ostracized from the community for showing up with the police. He and Rosa assured me, however, that I had nothing to worry. “This is not Rio. Where do you think most of us live? Especially us, the *polícia civil*, are well received. We come to solve the crime, to get justice for the victim. We don't abuse like the Military Police,” they explained.

We come to a halt in front of a crowd standing around the bloody corpse of a young man lying in the middle of the street. He is wearing white underwear; someone covered his face with a T-shirt, but I can see a little cross hanging around his neck. He is lying in a pool of blood that merged with the rain and sewage. It is a hot and wet night. “Wanna see the corpse up close? Comon'!” an agent pushes me toward the body. Annoyed I shake his hand off. Suddenly, I realize that we are standing right in front of my favorite little restaurant, where I have soup almost every day. Sonya, the owner of the restaurant, looks at me in surprise. After that night, she went from calling me “*menina*” (girl) to “*doutora*” (doctor), a respectful term, but also one that conveys authority and is rooted in the plantation mentality where the white master would be called “doutor”.

The medical examiners have already arrived and made their way into the small, moldy kitchenettes where the attack started. Following the blood spatters, we enter through the gate into a narrow, light blue corridor. The stench of black mold is suffocating. A small dog in the neighbor's apartment barks frantically. The cold blue walls are interrupted by blood spatter.

It is so crowded. Military Police officers are stomping carelessly through the blood, forensics taking pictures, and Felipe and I are trying to reach the victim's room. "Careful not to touch the blood! We don't want you to get AIDS,"<sup>47</sup> Felipe warns me laughing.

Inside the little room are two single beds, a desk and a shower area behind. It stinks – a unique mixture of sewage, mold, heat and blood; but also, the very peculiar odor of fear, which is a mix of sweat and piss and something no words can describe. It seems the attackers (witnesses have described two men) have entered the victim's room and stabbed him with a knife, not minding the roommate in one of the beds. As we enter, the roommate is handcuffed. His hair is wet, and his clothes clean despite the horrendous blood spatter all over the small room. His eyes tell me that he is in shock. He admitted to taking a shower to clean himself of the blood, which made him the prime suspect. "You can let him go. It's two guys, not him", Felipe tells his colleagues. Word on the street is that two men entered the building, and a short time after the half-naked victim stumbled out bleeding; the two men following him holding a *peixeira* – a thin, extremely sharp knife used by fishermen. The victim collapsed in the street, and the men took off running. Nobody wants to give any details as to the identity of the killers, who are certainly from the area.

The victim, an eighteen-year-old from Ceará, is the perfect victim. According to his roommate, he migrated to Recife for work, so he has no family in Recife, nobody to avenge his death. According to his roommate, he was sending most of his earnings home to his parents, but when his boss failed to pay him, he borrowed money. Still not

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<sup>47</sup> Recife has the highest number of AIDS and HIV infections of all Northeastern cities in Brazil. However, Felipe's comments, as a white man with a law degree and clearly belonging to the upper middle-class also points to a pattern of connecting poverty to disease/ affliction. See for example: Veena Das, *Affliction: Health, Disease, Poverty*, Fordham University Press (Das 2015); Paul Farmer, *Infections and Inequalities*, University of California Press, 2001.

receiving his salary the next month, he failed to pay back his debt – 80 Reais, about 30 US Dollars. "Did he need the money for drugs?" Felipe asks the roommate who insists that the victim was a clean and hard-working Christian. However, there are not many people that are willing or able to lend money to a stranger; commonly drug traffickers are the ones who have enough to lend money.

The medical examiners and forensics are ready. The corpse is removed, and we drive back to the precinct, bringing the roommate with us to take an official statement. Felipe, in a good mood, shows me pictures of his young wife – wearing a bikini and hat – “very sexy,” he says. Behind me, the roommate is sitting in the trunk – as is customary with suspects – sobbing. Around 3 o’clock in the morning the report is finished, and the roommate is released. "Where am I supposed to go?" he asks the police officer. He fears the men will come back and kill him, too. Not to mention that his room has become inhospitable after the blood bath. The police officer shrugs his shoulders and gives the man couple Reais for the bus. He goes off into the night.

The next morning, back at Bode, I have difficulties passing by the place of the murder without feeling a bit sick. The blood in the street was washed away, and everyone is back to the usual quotidian routine; women are washing laundry, senhor Zé pushes his cart with fish and macaxeira for sale, Sonya is already preparing lunch. I am told that the roommate returned to pick up the rest of his stuff and then left for home in the state Ceará. I decide to go to the little church of Pina and write a note with the name of the victim for the pastor. He will read it in his daily obituary and send a prayer.

In Recife, every day about half dozen young men like the one described above is brought into the morgue, filled with 0.38 caliber lead or stabbed by knives and machetes. All of them are from favelas very much like Bode. Each homicide is categorized based on the initial investigator’s assessment of the crime. In the anecdote above, Felipe classified the murder as "drug trafficking" although no drugs were present at the scene and no witness confirmed the

suspicion that the killers were drug traffickers. Even if they were, it would be safe to say that that identity does not transcend into every aspect of their acts and lives. Debt is the motive that I found being predominant.

The violence can be viewed as a struggle over access to resources in a highly conflicting and competitive milieu, particularly due to the precarious conditions in overcrowded slums. Those resources may include money but also livestock, women, and children. Problems in the urban space are being solved according to the laws of the strongest. In Recife, debt is unacceptable to the poor, simply because people need money. The idea of revenge has become a trope by which people try to rationalize and understand when the debtor fails to pay; it is regarded as a lack of respect and an example for other's that deals do not have to be uphold. Debt is avenged with death even if that means that the money will never be paid. Debt and drugs are interrelated in Recife, as most debtors are drug buyers struggling to pay their bills. As a result, drug trafficking is the number one motive for homicide identified by the civil police, although it is clearly also interwoven with revenge.

## DRUG TRAFFICKING

While drug gangs in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro have become powerful political entities that maintain territorial control and exercise elaborate authority functions, in Recife they have remained small, disorganized, and unable to control territory; they are much less developed authoritative structures. This difference correlates with the local economies: Rio de Janeiro has a much more lucrative illegal drug market, fueled by the large demand for cocaine by its upper class and millions of tourists. The geographic barriers in its many mountainside favelas in the city center actually work as fortifications that make favelas difficult to access by car, thus limit

police patrols. A policing strategy that for the last three decades has consisted of extremely violent but periodic and unpredictable assaults in favelas has ultimately strengthened and solidified drug gangs which developed into highly armed entities controlling and securing territory. Finally, in Rio de Janeiro crack has only recently become an epidemic; in the past, drug traffickers categorically prohibited the sale of crack-cocaine in their territories. Crack is less lucrative but also destructive to business because it is highly addictive and results in unreliable clients as well as dealers.

In Recife, by contrast, the middle class and widespread drug consumption have never paralleled that of Rio de Janeiro. Cocaine use, in particular, has historically been minimal, although spreading in recent years as economic development in the Brazilian Northeast nurtures a growing middle class (Wolff, 2015). The drug market is less lucrative and less stable, most favelas are smaller, flatter and were historically accessed by the police on patrols. Police officers also commonly live in favelas. The state has also been far more benign in its application of lethal violence in Recife than in Rio. Most importantly, drug dealers sell almost exclusively crack-cocaine which is consumed by largely poor, uneducated and unemployed men; thus, debt is accumulated quickly and ultimately avenged with death. In Pernambuco 66 percent of all homicide cases are attributed to the motive category “drug trafficking” (SDS Recife, 2012). For example, at a different crime scene, a whole family had been killed over debt for crack. The father, mother, and fourteen-year-old son were all crack users; unable to settle their debt with drug dealers they were executed in their wooden shack. Even the dog was killed. The only survivor was the seven-year-old daughter, a malnourished child that was already born with alcohol and crack addiction. The detectives learned that the little girl was sent out to earn money prostituting herself to pay the bills.

In the car on the way back to the DHPP, a discussion about sterilization arose. “They invented Bolsa Familia, but why not a Bolsa Sterilização?<sup>48</sup>” the driver asked. “How is an addict living in this slum supposed to raise children? How are these kids supposed to become good citizens? They are already born into addiction and crime”.

This anecdote underlines the social conditions of the poorest in Recife which are the root of the cyclical violence that consumes them. Born into addiction, the little girl in the scene above had little choice or opportunity. While the Pact for Life has involved one crack rehabilitation program called Atitude, Pact for Life officials have little knowledge about the challenges and realities of crack users.

In Recife, however, anecdote speaks to the othering of poor favela inhabitants and especially crack users as diseased and undesirable (Farmer 2001). The police officers suggest government sponsored sterilization as a solution to the spread of violence in the city, instead of psychological help or similar. Driven by preconceived and maybe desperate notions of social control, these police officers speak out what many of Recife’s elites and politicians solved for themselves through segregation, marking the progeny of "crab men and women" as inassimilable.

### *The Normalization of Violence*

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<sup>48</sup> Bolsa Familia is a conditional cash transfer that provides financial aid to low-income families. Parents must ensure that their children attend school and are vaccinated. The program attempts to both reduce short-term poverty by direct cash transfers and fight long-term poverty by increasing human capital among the poor. It also works to give free education to children who cannot afford to go school to show the importance of education. Brazil has been driven by eugenic movements in the past, by declaring Racial Democracy and encouraging the "whitening" of its population. To this day, many view sterilizations as a necessary public health and security intervention to protect "good" citizens from populations deemed dangerous. It also is argued to be a way to protect the most vulnerable populations from the social and economic costs of managing their offspring. The individuals deemed inferior or dangerous are the poor, the disabled, the mentally ill, and criminals - who are also largely dark skinned.

It is very awkward, to say the least, to wait for a murder that is statistically bound to happen on a Friday night in Recife. When I arrive at six PM, the teams were already busy with four homicides and one attempted. A suspect is being interrogated for killing a fellow fisher in a bar. They got into a fight, and one smashed the other's head with a one-liter beer bottle. The man is clearly drunk but polite and calm to the detective. Underneath his chair, I spot a concrete pipe wrapped in a supermarket plastic bag. It is covered in blood - a murder weapon from another case that didn't make it into the lab yet. Nobody seems to be worried about contamination.



*Part II Figure 11: Crowd watches as police investigate the shooting of an alleged crack dealer. Photo by author*

Soon, we get a call – a man, 32 years old, shot dead in Chão de Estrelas (Floor of Stars), an ugly favela with a beautiful name. When we arrive, there is a big street party happening with live bands and hundreds of people. The Military Police, always first at crime scenes, have trouble keeping the large crowd away from the body. The body lies in the middle of a dirt crossroad. He

is still on his motorcycle, which fell over his leg when his head was shattered by several bullets. Hands up over his head he looks like he is just giving up. His naked feet lay almost gracefully over the hot motorcycle engine. At a closer look, I see the dozens of crack cocaine stones wrapped in plastic sprinkled around him.

We are told that the victim was a known drug trafficker at Estrela. Detective Eliane walks around trying to figure out what the timing could have been. The undercover investigators mix themselves into the crowd trying to get information from the people watching the scene. The crowd grows quickly. People are walking over from the party, beers in their hands; children arrive on their bikes; a pregnant girl with her boyfriend sit down at the edge of the crime scene and he begins to massage her feet. A woman with a toddler in her arms leaves her house and joins. I spot a boy, maybe three years old, sitting alone with a pacifier in his mouth staring at the dead body.

In the meantime, a young, thin woman is angry at the military police because she is not allowed to retrieve her sandal from underneath the victim. Relatives of the victim arrive, and begin to fight over the motorcycle – who should get to take it home? There is no time or interest in finding out; Eliane just wants the evidence and body bagged, and the crime scene logged into the Pacto GPS tracker. She leaves the Military Police behind to argue about the motorcycle situation with the relatives.

Children in Recife's favelas witness homicide, rape, and domestic violence on a daily basis. Arriving with the homicide task force at multiple crime scenes, there were always dozens of children gazing onto corpses, most accompanied by their parents. On the arms of their mothers, toddlers watch the medical examiners toss and turn bloody bodies. At a different crime scene, where a whole family had been killed over debt, only a small girl survived. Instead of

placing the child with social services, she was left behind with a neighbor. No regulations exist about minors at crimes scenes. Those kids may not suffer physically, but emotionally thousands are dealing with PTSD, nightmares, and trauma which often evolve into depression, drug abuse, and may eventually culminate in violent behavior.

The situation is similar in Rio de Janeiro where children suffer from the stress of regular shoot outs and witness bodies in the alleys of favelas. As I have described in Part I of the dissertation, children also suffer in terms of health and education. After pacification children achieved better grades in school. However, violence is framed differently in Rio by a rhetoric of war between distinguished groups, either drug traffickers and the police or rival drug gangs. In Recife, violence is less centralized; while it is true that “drug trafficking” is a consistent variable to death, Recife also shows substantial amounts of interpersonal violence that can affect anyone. It is important to remember, that while the favelas are marked by violence, ordinary life persists much of the time, albeit “overshadowed by the constant possibility of violence” (Hecht 1998). Studies illustrate that children who are abused or witnesses to violence are much more likely to become abusers themselves as juveniles and adults (Smith 2005). Rather than to target results through policing, namely arrest young adults who continue to perpetuate the problem, preventive programs such as psychological counseling, education and witness protection for children are much needed. In the meanwhile, children like the ones in the anecdote above grow up learning that violence is an overly common reaction to injustice, threat, and conflict in general. The victims become victimizers and this cycle is perpetuated by a widespread banality of violence.

Child services do exist in Recife, but they are overwhelmed, understaffed, and therefore little used<sup>49</sup>. I believe this lack of child protection has certainly to do with funding, but also with

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<sup>49</sup> See Tobias Hecht, *At Home in the Street*, Cambridge University Press 1998 for a historically embedded account on juvenile services and conditions for children in Recife.

the complete lack of awareness in the Pact for Life program about the realities and high numbers of victimized children. In April 2015 I gave a presentation at the Pact for Life meeting about the conditions and regulations at crime scenes. While the police officers in the room were well acquainted with the image of toddlers next to a murdered person, the Pacto officials and policy makers seemed shocked. The pictures I used (which I chose carefully not to be gruesome) made a big impression. Most of these officials were never at a crime scene, never accompanied the police or took a moment to imagine this line of work. Violence against the poorest population had only with the Pacto become an issue worth caring about. It became apparent that without sensitizing younger generations to conflict resolution instead of violence, murder will remain a standardized manner to solve problems. As a result of the presentation the Pact for Life issued new regulations on crime scene regulation. Military police officers are supposed to approach parents with children or minors and explain that they are not allowed to be present. Although the military police generally agreed with the idea, in practice most refused to “parent” the parents.

## EXTERMINATION GROUPS

*“ninguém morre de graça”* – nobody dies for free

Tonight, I am accompanying detective Josineide and her team to a crime scene in Olinda, at the so-called *Ladeira da morte* – slope of death. On a dirt path framed by palm trees and wild jungle, the body of yet another young, black man lies on his stomach. He is barefoot, and his

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hands are tied with plastic on his back. His hands sparkle in the night, I notice that he has carefully manicured and painted fingernails – to distinguish himself from the farmers. His brain has been blown out of his well-shaved head. He was found around nine in the evening, early for a weekday. He is a large man. Four shots.

“This is the third execution here this week,” detective Josineide says. “All with their hands bound behind their backs.” Because of that, the murder is preliminarily categorized as an extermination and the GATI team with machine guns are accompanying us at the scene for security. When we get closer to the body I notice the stench; he soiled himself.

Although the slope is seemingly in the middle of nowhere, a group of people has arrived, together with reporters. A young woman, in her teens, is standing at the crime scene tape, her arms crossed, and her eyes are sparkling with fascination. She observes the scene with a smile on her face. “They will turn him over!” she tells her friends excitedly when the medical examiner arrives. I cannot take my eyes off her. “*Ahhhh olha o presunto!*”- Look at that ham – the kids exclaim when the faceless corpse is turned. With the little blue band around his ankle, the body is ready to be transported, a complete rite of passage. The ME in their white boots and face masks lift the body, “*ai, heavy! Already stiff,*” they complain. A ten Reais bill falls out of the victim’s pockets; the girl laughs “he still has money.”

Josineide is on the fence about categorizing the murder as “extermination” or “drug trafficking.” In the meanwhile, the chubby reporter has no issue in declaring to his viewers on television that *justiçeiros* have gotten rid of yet another vain drug trafficker who was “terrorizing” local communities. Josineide’s face shows annoyance; “drug trafficking” goes down as the official motive for the crime. At home in Bode, I meet Ninho’s son, Anderson,

sitting as usual in front of the television. “Martinha! We saw you on television. What a nasty drug trafficker. He got what he deserved!” he exclaimed.

Extermination groups or so-called "justice teams" are essentially killers for hire and were the main reason for high homicide rates in Pernambuco before the Pacto. With the Pact for Life arresting a large number of members of these groups the government wanted to signal a new era. Every case which resembles the profile of extermination groups left detectives in great discomfort – in this case, the location, the bound hands, and the execution-style shots to the head all suggested a planned and organized crime. In Rio de Janeiro, on the other hand, where power is more centralized, calculated killings are almost always “approved” by either a drug lord, a police commander, or militia leader of a specific area. Of course, “crimes of passion” between lovers and family members happen. However, killing someone in a favela is more controlled and supervised than in Recife<sup>50</sup>.

Detectives in Recife knew that a high number of "extermination" motives, would mean more vigilance by superiors and bureaucrats of the Pact for Life. If no suspect could be found and the group dissembled, investigators faced consequences, such as detectives being transferred to less desired delegacias far out in the peripheries, missing out on a promotion, bonus, or being assigned to more cases than usual. This pressure contributed to detectives identifying more cases as "drug trafficking" because this motive can be blamed on several dynamics out of the control of the Pernambuco police. Such manipulation of the “motives” played in favor of individual

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<sup>50</sup> To read more about the effects of criminal organizations in reducing homicide rates and controlling violence in Latin American cities, see Benjamin Lessing’s book *Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin America*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Series, (Lessing 2017) and Graham Denyer-Willis, *The Killing Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and the Regulation of Life and Death in Urban Brazil*, University of California Press, 2015.

detectives are common and affect governmental statistics on the reasons for murder.

### *Masculinity and the Media*

Tonight, I am accompanying detective Umberto – a short man with skin like a “gringo” - and his team to a scene far out in the green bushes of Lourenço da Mata. Listening to “Dança Kodura” blasting from the car radio, we speed out into the night, the agent next to me dancing, Umberto, singing along – *cintura solta*. Just as we drive into São Lourenço, we get a call from DHPP – they gave us the wrong place; the homicide is in Aldeia. Nobody knows how to get there, and Google maps is of no use. Finally, we find a military police officer snoozing in his car at the side of the road. He points us into the right direction. Still, we drive for another hour through the forests and cannot find the scene.

I receive a message from Edson, a reporter for TV Record’s live crime show, who I routinely meet at crime scenes. “Are you working tonight? Do you know where the crime scene is?” he asks me, apparently as lost as we are. Of all the reporters I’ve met, Edson is the only one with some dignity and respect.

Eventually, three hours later, we arrive in a small, simple village framed by banana trees. Edson and his team are already there, and I am thankful for the strong camera light as we struggle down a steep, muddy hill to the scene. The body of a young, dark-skinned man is laying belly up on the red clay earth. His trousers are open, and a cell phone lies next to his hand. I notice his manicured hands, the expensive phone, a golden necklace, and his bleached hair; this and the fact that his face was shot to pieces are indicators of someone involved in drug trafficking.

The family of the victim blocks the reporters and does not want them near their son, who, without a doubt, would make yet another “dead trafficker” portrayal to be judged on public television. Despite the protest of the parents, the medical examiner waves the cameraman to come closer to shine a light on the body while other investigators are searching the ground for bullets. Detective Umberto puts in the coordinates of the scene on a GPS device, a practice ordered by the state governor to track murder sites.

“*Aqui ninguem morre de graça*” – here nobody dies for free – I hear someone say, a common phrase that insinuates the victims were involved in something big enough to pay a *matador* to get rid of them. The girlfriend of the victim is crying in the background. She was with him when they were surprised by gunfire. The medical examiner counts eight bullets, most in the face, as well as stab wounds indicating that there were multiple attackers. I look around and spot a surreal image of a young boy, maybe seven years old, with bright blonde hair sitting high in a palm tree observing the scene with curiosity. He looks like an angel. The medical examiner continues to place little, pink stripes next to each bullet hole in the man’s body; there are now fourteen already.

In the meantime, Detective Umberto is joking and flirting with the young women in the crowd. He shines his light into the girls’ eyes and jokes he will arrest them; they chuckle. The whole team – all men – is very loud, inappropriate, and show no empathy towards the crying family. After Umberto makes a self-serving statement to Edson on camera, we leave without having taken notes of witness accounts, without even the girlfriend’s statement about what happened. “It is clear what happened, but nobody will tell you who the killers are so why waste my time? We have the GPS. The body will be removed. My job is done,” said Umberto. “If I find out who the murderer is, I will let the police know,” Edson assures me. In Recife, journalists

are the real investigators. They have leverage; they offer two minutes of fame for those who come forward with information.

The anecdote above operates on several levels; one, it addresses the issue of gender and masculinity in the police institution. Second, it once again underlines the notion of “ungrievable” lives. Third, the anecdote shows the close relationship between media and police. During my time at the DHPP I accompanied predominantly female detectives; however, it is a largely male environment. Detectives, such as Umberto and his team, are the most common faces at crime scenes, where they quickly attract the attention of local young women who are impressed by the law degree, social status, and (gun)power<sup>51</sup>. The investigation of the murdered man became immediately secondary if it was not already irrelevant, to begin with. It seemed almost like Umberto was competing with the dead alleged drug trafficker, who was a desirable partner based on his well-groomed looks (manicure, hair) and his earthly possessions (phone, golden necklace). The women were now paying attention to Umberto, who first of all is alive, has a gun, a degree (which is common knowledge) and is interviewed in front of cameras.

The second aspect to this anecdote, is the expression "*ninguém morre de graça*" “nobody dies for nothing.” This sentence was like a mantra of the homicide detectives. The belief that the victim brought his/her murder upon him/herself is the a priori assumption on which every theory, evidence, and explanation will be based on. This is also the case in Rio de Janeiro, with exception to the many victims killed by stray bullets, something that does practically not exist in Recife. However, the previous story of the goat breeder, killed out of revenger, showed there are

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<sup>51</sup> Male officers were more likely to behave inappropriately. Also, most were married, and some wives felt threatened by a foreign, young researcher spending nightshifts with their husbands. Umberto, on the other hand, did everything it seems to ignore the dead man who would be otherwise (and should be?) the center of attention. I cannot speak of Umberto, but I have witnessed several romantic connections made at the scenes of murder, between a male detective or agent and female spectators or witnesses.

different degrees to blaming the victim. If motivation was revenge and is based on protecting one's property, family, or honor (not drugs) the victim and perpetrator in this cycle are "absolved".

Assumption of guilt, it is also the prime de-motivator for investigations; if the victim was to blame, it seems wrong to spend the time and effort trying to find a suspect who had "good reason" to kill. Particularly in cases of drug trafficking, where the victim is either blamed with distribution or consumption he or she is labeled as deplorable and ungrievable. The status of a drug trafficker as being ungrievable applies largely to both, Rio and Recife. However, in Rio where drug traffickers have established themselves as contributors to the community (building infrastructure, providing free water and electricity, parties) they experience more solidarity and their death is at times mourned in large processions.

The third level to this anecdote is the role of the media in Recife, which is incredibly powerful. The local media plays a significant role in the construction of public opinion about the effectiveness of the rule of law. In Rio de Janeiro it creates an image of "epic battles" between the good and the evil through dramatic images of armed conflicts shot from helicopters (Robb Larkins 2015:15). Programs like "Cidade Alerta" (Alert City) and "Brasil Urgente" (Urgent Brazil) recount and analyze criminality in addition to the real violence happening. Those crimes are almost exclusively dealing with delinquencies committed by lower-class, black perpetrators, who are supposed to represent the concerning moral state of Brazil's society (Garmany 2009). Context of the crime, such as the issue of poverty and inequality, is widely replaced by a rhetoric of evil and sinful behavior. In Rio de police are depicted as armed heroes but also dangerous and unpredictable; drug traffickers are always "evil" and deserve the full extent of the law, which usually means bullets.

In Recife reporting on violence is tragic but less divided. Police officers are widely depicted as allies of citizens who investigate (not kill) those “lost” in addiction and misery. The state is largely portrayed as an ineffective or dormant entity, the police; however, are depicted as detached from it and driven by altruism to bring order into chaos. The by standers at crime scenes treated the crime scene not different than watching at home, accompanied by snacks and drinks. Violent death in Recife became a constant presence, penetrating every day with the possibility of being next. Exposure to this reality maybe is even therapeutic in some way because it causes a certain numbness and indifference that protects sanity.

As previous chapters about Eduardo Machado have shown, journalists are also important on the public security level, where they influence policies and public perception of social problems. Moreover, journalists and police officers have long worked in symbiosis; especially civil police detectives have benefitted from positive portrayals on the news. “In the past, you made your career if you appeared regularly on TV. Today the Pacto measures more how much you have solved, but TV appearance still does help,” one civil police officer explained to me. Recife’s judicial system is slow and overwhelmed with the increased number of suspects being prosecuted. The prison system is massively overpopulated; thus, impunity is widespread. The work of journalists brings the “truth” to the surface faster and once the name of a suspect is made public (which happens often), his or her photo and location released, vigilante justice takes over. So, for example, videos of child abuse, torture, and killing of homosexuals and women which are publicized by television networks and ignite groups of vigilantes to procure the suspects. In addition, victims, witnesses, and relatives get their moment of fame in front of cameras. In Rio these forms of vigilante justice in favelas certainly exist but are not as much incentivized by the media, who do not have free access to these communities controlled by drug lords. In the favelas

in Rio, the drug gang knows already every single step of its residents or they get informed by community members, they do not need the media.

### REVENGE: A "LEGIT" REASON TO KILL

It is yet another Friday. Eliane and I are sitting in the reception area watching something on TV, when Adilson, an agent, comes in and reads calls from a piece of paper. "tentative in Paulista for team I. Vic is at the Miguel Arraes Hospital. *Homicidio consumado*, shot in the head in Ibura, for team II". Eliane grabs my hand and smiles. "Go with Ricardo! *Homicidio consumado*. Much more interesting!" She means a murder that has been "completed," in contrast to attempted murder. I gladly take the offer to accompany Ricardo with team II; attempted murders are usually quite boring and uncomfortable; you have to spend time in the terrible orange sector at the public hospital and see not only the victim's but also all the other miserable, poor people who are coughing, leaking, and dying in the crowded space.

Ricardo is happy to let me come with them; we know each other from the Pact for Life meetings. He is the head of the Homicide Task Force. Nevertheless, he also needs the 50 extra bucks he can make in a nightshift. Ricardo, the driver, an *escrivão*, and I enter the pick-up truck with the colorful letters "DHPP" written on the sides as if it's a party bus. I put on my vest, in part for safety but mostly to blend in, and we speed through the warm night.

We arrive at the scene before the IML, and I skim the ground for a body. Behind a parked car, a *senhor* in his sixties is sitting on a chair in the driveway, his head resting on the wall, arms fallen at his sides. The white wife-beater reveals his big arms and shoulders, a round belly. He looks asleep until I realize the blood dripping from his arm into the gutter. The entry wound is so

small I did not even notice it. It's hard to access the body as a car is parked right in front of him; it seems like an unlikely spot for the old man to be street-watching on a hot evening. Ricardo approaches the Military Police officer who is responsible for taping off the crime scene and who has visibly trouble to keep the nosy neighbors, crying relatives, stray dogs and children from trampling over the scene. He admits that he ordered the car to be parked in front of the body, to shield it from the crowd – "Idiot!" Ricardo yells at him, "you just destroyed all tire tracks! How are we going to know which tracks belong to whom? How are we going to find bullets and blood?" Ricardo turns to me, still in earshot to the soldado, "you see what we have to deal with? They are incompetent, morons!" meaning the Military Police.

The victim was from the Sertão where he bred goats. He was accused of murdering a boy who allegedly stole one of his goats. The family, at a neighboring farm, promised retaliation, which explains what the man and his wife came five months ago to Recife, staying with his relatives in hiding. The wife assures us her husband was a good man, "He doesn't drink, not even smoke. Every night he likes to sit there and watch the street. He didn't owe money. He just sat there, was not even nervous." She says in a sober voice. "Someone emptied a whole revolver at his head. Six bullets. He must have upset someone," says Ricardo.

"Ah, let's get something to drink," Ricardo says to me, and we walk over to one of the many street vendors that now frame the scene. He gets us two cokes. "Are you familiar with Lombardi's theory of body and crime?" Ricardo asks me while sipping nonchalantly on a coca cola. Morbidly, our red cans match the victim's head in the background. "This guy is massive. The wife didn't seem sorrowful about his passing. I thought she seemed relieved, no? His arms, those hands... These are hands of someone who uses them on others. Look at him; this is a

*cabra-macho* who does not let anyone owe him”. A woman, maybe 45, arrives crying and screaming, the sister of the victim as we find out. Those are the awkward moments.

While military police search the street for security cameras, Ricardo and I go into the victim’s house accompanied by the wife, brother, and sister- in law. The room is small but clean and carefully decorated. The dining room features a large poster showing the "last supper," a plastic flower bouquet is on the table. The family from Ceará, a neighboring state, are reluctant to speak ill of the dead, but there is something they are holding back; probably the fact that Don Francisco, the victim, killed a boy back in Ceará. Finally, they admit in a quiet voice, that relatives of the killed boy also live in this street. Families in the Northeast are large, and blood must be avenged in blood. The "mystery" is solved; now we just have to find the relatives and identify the two men who did the lethal drive by.

There is an old assumption about the northeastern region of Brazil, which states that it is inhabited by “rural hotheads,” “sertanejos,” essentially, “choleric cowboys.” The region is historically marked by a reputation of an unchanging culture of honor and a natural impulse toward violence displayed by “male backlanders” (Santos 2012). Sertanejos, the inhabitants of the merciless interior of the state, are largely depicted as obsessed with their honor. Male reputation and respect are often the only important and available resources many poor men in those areas, characterized by powerful land owners, have. To protect their honor, men will “avenge in blood” (Santos 2012); a concept that is specific to the Northeastern context. In 2015, revenge remained the second most common motive for murder in Pernambuco, accounting for roughly 30 percent of all murders. Marta Santos writes:

“Outsiders traveling to the Sertão, provincial authorities, and other observers also ascribed to poor sertanejos an almost obsessive preoccupation with establishing male reputation

and respect. According to these commentators, *sertanejos* were “revengeful” and more than ready to settle a variety of offenses to their honor through the use of violence” (Santos 2012:85).

These descriptions ignore that aggressive acts perpetrated in defense of honor and other forms of interpersonal masculine violence do not take place in a vacuum, and “instead emerge out of contextual, contingent conflicts and power relations that need to be understood historically.” (Santos 2012:187). The phenomenon of violence is variable, the views and feelings about physical violence differ with changing cultural context. The meanings that participants in violence give their actions and experiences can be crucial for deciding what is and what is not considered violence. The law, however, leaves no space for such philosophical elaborations. While the legal system requires narrow and precise definitions of punishable acts, reality is much more complex.

Favelas in Recife are mainly inhabited by families that have migrated from rural areas recently or a generation ago. Many still live to large extent from subsistence economy such as fishing or work on sugar cane plantations. Some found work as street vendors, cooks, and bar owners in the informal economy. Others have become police officers - in fact, most police officers live in favelas. It is a cultural environment that values rural concepts of masculinity, traditional gender roles, and honor. Historian Steve Stern observes in his work on gender and honor in late-colonial Mexico, that men from subordinated groups forged their manhood and ratified the connection between masculinity, honor, and power within public spheres of plebeian male sociability through force and violence: “In this horizontal arena, men created cultural space to affirm their valor and competence, their honor and importance as men” (Stern 1995:171).

Conventional interpretations explained these behaviors by asserting that, by constantly emphasizing masculine reputation and respect, *sertanejos* were enacting a culture that placed

excessive importance on personal, male honor. Moreover, in Pernambuco, the police are a very recent institution of barely 180 years, and the judicial system had long encouraged the idea of honor as a valid reason for violence. A look at court cases in the Northeast in the past 200 years will show that many violent attacks and even murders were deemed justified because the victim had insulted the other man's honor so deeply that his reaction was not only unavoidable but also legitimate (Santos 2012:197). Santos argues, however, that it was the need to access the core necessities of community and family life - such as access to water, land, and animals (in a drought-prone region) – that gave the code of honor and preoccupation with male status a particular meaning and purpose.

While the victim-blaming still applies to revenge victims, they are not categorized as “sinners” or lost. Their motivation to commit violence is regarded as rational and honorable. There is a general comprehension towards the need to defend one's property and honor. In the case of the goat breeder, Ricardo had no doubt that he had the capacity to kill anyone who intrudes or steals his goats; however, Ricardo also had no judgment.

### CRIMES OF PASSION

The hospital is an enormous complex of asbestos, mold, and yellow. I already know the way to the orange unit by heart, much to the surprise of detective Gaspar. The nurse rolls the vic out on his bed; he seems in a good mood regarding the circumstances. The man, I call him Naldo, is in his late 30s and has the look of a hard-working, low-class black man. Short, thin and strong with plenty callous on his hands and black curly hair. His teeth tell that he enjoys the crack pipe here and there, his yellowish eyes, that Cachaça is always close by. "It's nothing,

*doutor*, a scratch really!" Naldo assures detective Gaspar waving his hand; "she was angry, jealous – you know how women are!"

It is Sunday, and Naldo went to the beach in Pina without telling his wife. Everybody knows that Pina on a Sunday is "wild"; there is samba, cachaça, and women in bikinis. When he came home, the smell of alcohol, crabs, and a distinct tan immediately shattered his lies of having been at his mother's house. Overcome with anger, Naldo's wife wielded a knife and stabbed Naldo in his stomach. Then, she ran. Detective Gaspar looks amused, "And you let her do this?!" he asked Naldo, shaking his head in disbelief. "Doctor, were the injuries life threatening?" Gaspar asks the young physician, who explains the wound is serious but the victim got lucky as the knife did not hit any organs.

"So... Not life threatening," Gaspar concludes with a smile. "I don't want to come between a man and a woman. We will not search for her; this is clearly not an attempted homicide. Not our jurisdiction. Call her and tell her to come home. You really can't let her treat you like that." Naldo looks relieved. When he begins to thank Gaspar and explain his wife is a very "passionate" woman, Gaspar just rolls his eyes and turns to the exit. Gaspar is just glad that he can avoid more paperwork over "something that ridiculous," as he put it.

Another evening, at the precinct a tall black woman stumbled in. She was in tears, her face showing swelling and bruising, her nose and forehead were bleeding. She left bloody prints on the door handle and was very upset. The way she was crying and screaming it was hard to understand her. The receptionist (male police agent) initially tried to calm her down, but she was too distressed. I resolved that it would be best just to observe the situation and took out my notebook.

The receptionist, visibly annoyed, finally figured out that the woman lived in the governmental housing projects across the street and that her boyfriend had beat her. In the meanwhile, the woman's young daughter, of maybe 14 years and old mother arrived at the precinct. The injured woman couldn't calm down, pacing up and down, screaming "he is going to kill me!"

After beating her, the boyfriend left announcing that he is getting a gun. The receptionist, at this point, lost his patience. "If you don't calm down I cannot do anything for you," he repeated over and over in a monotone voice. Marcelo came into the room, an agent I made the acquaintance with earlier who made a very aggressive impression on me. Marcelo had been working in the Military Police until recently and very vocal about human rights destroying communities by protecting bandits, but not the good people.

Different to the other police officers, who walked by ignoring the scene, Marcelo seemed to thrive in this situation. "What the fuck is going on here? You want to make a scene?!" he shouted at the woman. Neither of the men made any actual attempt to calm the woman down to get useful information.

A female agent came in and ignored the whole situation head outside. I followed her in the hope to get a bit more clarification on the procedure. She didn't give me much information except that if the victim identifies her boyfriend, they will have to call another unit – if they are willing and available – to go and search for him. But as for the safety of that woman, not much would be done.

Back in the room, Marcelo was now heating up, screaming insults at the woman who was still sobbing uncontrollably. "You will respect me!" I heard him yell. When Marcelo approached the woman, still shouting aggressively, and poked with his finger into her chest, the young

daughter intervened by tapping him gently on the shoulder. Marcelo spun around, and forcefully pushed the girl away. "Did you just touch me? Did you just assault me?" he yelled. To my surprise, the girl (probably used to such reactions) stayed very calm; she sweet talked Marcelo, asking him for protection despite his continuous outburst. It did not help. In the end, Marcelo grabbed all three women – the bloody woman, the elderly mother, and teenage daughter – and kicked them out of the precinct.

Shocked, I finally dared to speak: "Was that really necessary? Why did you push her?" I asked Marcelo. I could have equally poked a hornet's nest. I suspect that only my status as a foreign researcher saved me from Marcelo's outburst about questioning his authority. It was the only time that I feared for my safety while shadowing the Task Force. Marcelo did not leave this incident alone. As a consequence of my "intervention," I got called in by his superior, a young detective. He told me in a grave voice that he had received a complaint about me from a "very reliable agent" who claimed that I have disturbed an investigation and disrespected him in front of suspects and his colleagues. The claims were outrageous, (also, notice how the battered woman suddenly became a "suspect"). Calmly, I explained that I did no such thing; that it was my impression that to push, yell, and kick out a woman who received a death threat clearly goes against policy (I purposefully did not want to use the term abuse of power). "Marcelo and the receptionist say that the girl attacked him," the detective told me, looking me firmly in the eye.

"No Sir, I was sitting right there and taking notes. The girl gently tapped him on the shoulder," I could see he was getting impatient with me not accepting his version of the story, so I caved in; "I did not understand the procedure that's why I asked if such strict measure were necessary. I apologize if I have offended anyone due to my lack of experience." I added in the hope that being submissive might save the situation. Bottom line, Marcelo wanted me banned

from the Task Force. Under different circumstances, he would have quickly succeeded. Luckily, he was a low-ranking agent, and I had several detectives including Eliane and Ricardo, the director of the Task Force, stand up for me.

In my experience, police officers in Recife are reluctant to attend to crimes of passion or domestic violence. When the victim is a man who was attacked by a woman, the situation becomes awkward. To most men, it is embarrassing and emasculating to get injured by a woman who is conceptualized as physically weak and essentially a man's property. In the story above, both, the victim Naldo and the detective are rather uncomfortable with the circumstances. Neither conceived of the knife attack as a real crime but blames it on female sensitivity, and the victim's lack of control over her. The Detective offers the victim a solution that would allow him to keep face and the Detective to save time. "*Paixão*" – passion – is a double-edged sword," detective Gaspar told me. Men and women can't do without it; power is derived from it, but it quickly turns into violence. According to most police officers, I worked with crimes of passion are private matters the police should rarely involve themselves in. Unless it gets "ugly," like the woman, we found stuffed in a bucket at the favela do Coque; or the other woman, chopped up by her husband who buried her under their marital bed. After things escalated.

With a rate of 4.8 murder per 100,000 women, Brazil is one of the highest-ranking countries in terms of violence against women: it is ranked fifth behind countries like Russia and El Salvador. Since Brazil launched a federal law Maria da Penha that addresses domestic violence in 2006, police in every state have an obligation to report and investigate every incident of domestic violence, even if the woman does not want to press charges. The law also increases the punishment for men attacking women. It is named after Maria da Penha Maia, a woman whose ex-husband attempted to murder her twice; the injuries left Maria paraplegic. The law has

been received very differently across Brazil; while it has been celebrated by human rights groups many men were less impressed.

Especially in the Northeast, where women get married at a younger age and are more economically dependent on their husbands, the law has caused some resistance. Pernambuco is ranked the 10th state with a femicide rate of 5.4 per 100,000 per year. In the capital Recife things are even worse, being ranked sixth in the state with a femicide rate of 7.7 per 100,000 women per year. Rio de Janeiro is third lowest on the list of Brazilian states with an average of 3.2 per 100,000 women.

Many male favela residents would complain that the law invades the privacy and intimacy between couples; some would even claim that it attempts to subject them to a foreign culture and that marriage looked different in the Northeast because of a masculine culture of honor. This has to do with the wide spread assumption that a woman is property of a man. Many police officers, including women, were also skeptical. Paula, a female Military Police officer, working with the Maria da Penha task force, told me that "these women don't want to be rescued. I come and see them all bloody and bruised, but they will kick and scream when I arrest their husbands. One even spit at me when I cuffed her husband; he still had blood on his hands. It seems they want this life because without him they are even worse off" (author interview, Recife June 2015).

Paula was referring to the fact that even a violent husband has the benefit to bring money home and can protect the family from outsiders. She gave me another example: "even if he rapes his wife, it is better than being raped by a stranger. He will still provide for her children." In the context of poverty and economically underdeveloped Northeast, the "democratic" human rights approach towards women was perceived by many victims as well as perpetrators as causing more

economic precariousness than protection. The concept of human rights, in this case, the protection of women's bodies and lives, cannot be appropriately implemented if the context does not support independence and safety. To many police officers, human rights become an obstacle, not a solution.

There are exceptions, however. As I showed in the chapter on Bode, with the Pact for Life more men were arrested and imprisoned leaving their wives as heads of households. Women like Dona Marina do Sururu quickly adapted to the new circumstances and united to protect each other. While this is not to say that these women do not suffer from aggression, Dona Marina do Sururu and her fisher women learned to live more independently and free without their men present. However, without more employment opportunities, social projects and psychological support for battered women, there is little advancement that keeps women safe.

### *The Forgotten: Hate Crimes*



*Part II Figure 12: Victim of a hate crime. Photo by author*

Finding the crime scene turns out to be a challenge tonight. Iraq – a sarcastic name given to a slum in Recife's peripheries - does not have developed streets, rarely electricity and this one are built on a hill. The dirt roads are riddled with big holes and some too narrow to pass by car; others are dead ends. The DHPP pickup truck is driving back and forth through the favela. We regularly ask passer byes "hey, where is the homicide?". It is a small place, everybody knows. We come across the car of the reporters; these guys are usually better informed, so we follow their vehicle, and indeed we find the crime scene within minutes.

It is very dark, so once again the reporters are helpful in illuminating the area with their bright lamps. In exchange, the detective lets them film indiscriminately. We are told the body is in the small mud hut up the hill. The door is a dirty rag. As we enter, a disturbing scenery awaits us. The little hut has a dirt floor and the typical open space of a village house, with the kitchen being outside. The room looks rampaged. There is a rugged couch, a random baby shoe with a bullet casing next to it. Pots and pans were thrown around.

Rice and beans are scattered over the floor. Several porn DVDs are laying in a corner. The victim lays in the middle of the room. It is a travesti, a young transgendered woman. Her black hair is messy, her eyes open under the heavy makeup, she has a belly piercing and wears a pink bracelet. Her short skirt exposes his genitals; the underwear is torn down at the ankles. His naked feet are contorted in pink rubber sandals, and there is already that blue tag the medical examiner slapped on. Now it's official; you are in the system. Killed. The mouth was cut with a sharp object. Neighbors heard six shots. But the medical examiner also counts several knife wounds amidst the thousands of ants crawling over the body.

I notice two short, stocky women, standing barefoot in the room. The mother and sister of the victim, seemingly unaware or indifferent to the blood on the floor. They are observing with curiosity as the medical examiner turns the body on the dirt floor. While the police officers work the room and bag shell casings, the reporters are shining their light and filming the bizarre scene, broadcasting the murdered *travesti* to the world. I can imagine Anderson and the kids at Bode, sitting at home watching the “live crime” report. *What else to expect from such a lifestyle?* would Anderson comment, well aware that his sister is gay and their Candomblé temple a haven for transgendered people.

“He was known to do tricks and rob clients,” the victim’s sister tells the detective. Then she smiles when she notices the camera is pointed at her. “He was a viado – a faggot,” she says the microphone. I remember the group of travestis a few weeks ago, who we interviewed in the hospital after they have been attacked by a man, a former customer. The travesti who was severely beaten and stabbed said that the man has been attacking them repeatedly. “We need protection. We exist because we have some purpose in society!” she told the detective. The DHPP never identified the attacker. I don’t even know if there was an investigation.

Detective Jaqueline takes the mother and sister outside where she meets the rest of the family sitting barefoot in the dust holding cans of cachaça. One man catches the detectives eye, a brother-in-law of the victim, the only one with tears in his eyes. Jacqueline takes the man to the side, “where is your wife, sir?” – She left me Senhora, we are separated – “so, did you live with the victim? You don’t need to be ashamed... I know how things are, I don’t judge”. The man looks uncomfortable, fumbling his shirt, then he admits that the victim "seduced him to the devil’s path" and that he was living in the house since his wife found out about the affair. Jacqueline lets him go, "I don’t think he did this. He is not angry enough.

"He was always trouble," the mother of the victim tells us. "He got arrested when he was 18, for stealing. He left the house and prostituted himself when he was twelve; I could not stop him. Most days he would be out at the Avenue with other viados, especially with Didi, the matador (killer)". Jaqueline notes down the name. When asked how many children she has, the woman tries to count her fingers. "I think sixteen, but six are still alive. The rest died young, some I did abort at five or six months pregnant, do you count these? Ten died...", Jaqueline interrupts her softly asking, what do you live from, senhora? The woman shows a toothless smile and points at her husband, a small man baked by the sun with bloodshed cachaça eyes. "It's my husband and me. We work sugar. All died, teeny tiny..." she responds quietly. Jacqueline turns to me: do you see the conditions here?

It takes hours to bag the body because the coroner's car got stuck in the mud. The whole community is pushing and pulling. Someone brought a meager horse to pull it out, but that emaciated animal has no chance. People laugh, take pictures, drink. It would be an amusing scene if it weren't for that poor, murdered transgendered woman in the mud hut.

Hate crimes, defined as a crime motivated by racial, sexual, religious or other prejudice, typically one involving violence, is an understudied and under-acknowledged issue in Brazil. It largely does not penetrate the public's conscious as a particular category of crime. In a country where a large number still deny the existence of racism and discrimination based on the assumption of an alleged "Racial Democracy" (as was introduced by President Getúlio Vargas and the Estado Novo), hate crimes are often seen as "normal crime."

While in Rio de Janeiro travesti certainly experience discrimination and violence, they are more organized and, in a way, more empowered. For example, in Rio's city center is a popular travesti prostitution spot that has been administered by the "Queen of Lapa" for decades.

In Rio prostitution is legal, however, any form of sexual exploitation - say, pimping - is prohibited. Of course, street-level prostitution rarely works anywhere without some form of coercive hierarchy. To many it is a mafia, to others it is a labor union. The queen, a travesti in her early sixties, is a Madam; however, she also is a feared leader who protects her employees from violent customers and legal charges. She also is a large contributor to the yearly Copacabana Gay Pride Parade. No such thing in Recife, where most travestis work under dangerous and abusive conditions, where they get killed eventually.

The detective in the case above demonstrates that most such cases are dealt with as issues related to "drug trafficking," a robbery gone wrong, or even crimes of passion. The only way that the murdered travesti above could become a "hate crime case", would be if the media would portray it as one; a recent video of a travesti being tortured and murdered in Northeast Brazil that went viral shows that with enough publicity those crimes will and can be prosecuted.

Experts and NGOs argue that Brazilians have been confronting an epidemic of anti-gay violence. The activists at Grupo Gay de Bahia, for instance, tracked violent deaths of in the LGBT community through new articles and found that nearly 1,600 people were killed in hate motivated attacks in the past four and half years. By its tally, a gay or transgender person is killed almost every day in Brazil. Such numbers, as the New York Times proclaimed, "earned Brazil the ignominious ranking of the world's deadliest place for lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender people." Brazil began tracking violence against transgendered people (in Brazil called *travesti*), in 2008. Since then, the TMM recorded 868 murders of transgender people occurred in Brazil. An unprecedented high of 144 transgender people were killed in 2016. These numbers do not do justice to the vile, and cruel ways that travesti experience violence every day. Human rights organizations have been pushing for a national anti-homophobia law, but they

haven't been successful yet. In fact, there is no law that specifically punishes homophobic crimes. In Brazil, homophobia has not quite become "inappropriate"; on the contrary for many – especially men – homosexuality feels like a threat to their manhood and honor. Brazil, and I argue particularly the Northeast, has a machismo culture, and homophobia is frequently accepted as an expression of proper male heterosexuality. Of course, these men who use homophobia as a source of jokes and insults, are often involved with other men or travestis, just like the brother in-law in the story above.

### **Trans Murder Monitoring Pernambuco. Absolute Numbers**

TMM absolute numbers 2008-2014	868
TMM 2016	144
TMM 2015	113
TMM 2014	132
TMM 2013	104
TMM 2012	126
TMM 2011	103
TMM 2010	99
TMM 2009	68
TMM 2008	0

*Part II Figure 13: Source: Trans Murder Monitoring project, accessed 11 March 2017*

The "seduction" that they claim is a dangerous identity crisis that is more often than not resolved in violence. I do not know if Detective Jaqueline believes that the brother-in-law was not a good suspect, or if she took pity on a man who "went down the wrong path" getting involved with a transgendered woman. The fact is that this angle of the crime was never investigated and contributed to yet another unsolved and underreported hate crime in Brazil.

### *Conclusion*

Most stories of the modern detective novel or television crime show start with a mind-boggling crime, a more or less charismatic detective or brilliant amateur investigator (think of shows such as *The Mentalist*, *Monk*, *Dexter*, *Bones*, etc.). The beat cops in these shows are usually exchangeable and depicted as non-intellectual agents. Eric Haanstad points out that the popular structure of such stories is mainly based on Poe's short story "The Murders in the Rue Morgue". In it, Poe introduces the melancholic Parisian M. Dupin, an amateur having a particular reputation for clear and precise thinking, who finds himself called to solve the case of a particularly gruesome double murder. The Prefect of Police himself is confounded by the circumstances: two bodies have been found in a locked room leaving no possible means of regress for the perpetrator. How has the killer escaped? It takes the genius Dupin to show that the crime is not the result of intelligence at all - it is the deed of an escaped orangutan from a traveling circus.

The esthetics of a crime scene are one of the most important parts in such detective stories. In popular TV shows such as *Law & Order*, *CSI*, and *Cold Case*, the scenes may be bloody and chaotic, but at the moment that the detectives appear, order and logic seem immediately established. Closure can begin. Uniforms, tapes, gloves, scientists testing the scene, taking measures, interviewing witnesses. The destroyed bodies become part of a carefully choreographed attempt to rationalize violent death through uniform procedures and protocol of investigation.

This is just about the opposite of how I have experienced the almost hundred homicide scenes I visited in Recife. In Recife, the arrival of the police is an intrusion in a context of precarious intimacy. Especially at murder scenes, where the arrival of the police is often

accompanied by TV reporters pointing heavy cameras like weapons. Medical examiners poke dead bodies with sticks and pens; black boots stomp through blood; the bright lights of camera teams penetrate bodies, houses, and teary eyes. Witnesses do not cooperate. The uniforms pose a stark contrast to the ripped clothes of the victims. Dogs wag through the crime scene attracted by the scent of flesh. The odor of sweat, fear, blood, mud, gasoline, freshly pressed clothes and mold makes everything even more dis-elegant and confusing. There is no diabolical genius. There is no "compelling" crime with ties to unlikely family tragedies, or spectacular discoveries. There is just "José" who killed "João" one fine evening with his cheap revolver. Or "Severino", who stabbed "Maria" with his fisher knife because he suspected her of having an affair. And "Marco" who ordered "Luis" dead, because he was screwing up his business dealing crack in his bar.

Shot, stabbed, beaten to death. In Recife, gruesome scenes have become daily spectacles in poor communities where mothers carry their children to view the dead bodies of those who "didn't make it." This form of voyeurism is, on the one hand, is not unusual, but in Recife, it is also a reflection of deeply entrenched distrust of police officers who are as suspect as oneself. Bystanders often argue they invade crime scenes because they want to make sure the police do not steal or tamper with evidence – everybody knows police are poor and could use some extra money. In the process, many crime scenes get trampled by dozens of people trying to catch a glimpse, dogs running through, items being removed. Children in Recife's favelas witness homicide, rape, domestic violence on a daily basis. Arriving with the homicide task force at multiple crime scenes, there were always dozens of children gazing onto corpses. On the arms of their mothers, toddlers watch the medical examiners toss and turn bloody bodies. No regulations exist about minors at crimes scenes. Those kids may not suffer physically, but

emotionally thousands are dealing with PTSD and nightmares which evolve into depression, drug abuse and may eventually culminate in violent behavior.

Studies and statistics illustrate that children who are abused or witnesses to violence are much more likely to become abusers themselves as juveniles and adults (Smith 2005). Rather than only target results through policing, namely young adults who continue to perpetuate the problem, preventive programs such as psychological counseling, education and witness protection for children are much needed. Children grow up learning that violence is an overly familiar reaction to injustice, threat, insult and conflict in general. The victims become victimizers, and this cycle is perpetuated by a widespread banality of violence, leaving the city scattered with the bodies of (almost exclusively) black, young, poor youth.

Police assume that those who have met a violent death are either involved in crime or a dispute over honor. Male, black victims are either expected to be *bandidos* or to have provoked their murder through insults or disrespect towards another male. Female, homosexual or transgender victims are suspected of "deviant" behavior. In Rio, however, violent death is more calculated and put on the spectrum of "worker" or "trafficker" – outside of these categories, murder is unlikely to take place because of the rules enforced by drug traffickers.

Indifference to violence perpetrated against victims already deemed "guilty," is understood as the rejection of common humanity, a "denial of identity, of selfhood," as Herzfeld defined it (Herzfeld 1992). I extend Herzfeld's concept of indifference to describe whose life is accepted to be mourned publicly, and whose life is not "grievable" (Butler 2010). Martha Huggins suggested three factors which contribute to the social production of indifference to violence in Brazil: extreme societal inequality that encourages and excuses it; pervasive societal violence that justifies and hides it; and organizational institutionalization that enables and

legitimizes it (Huggins, Hariots-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002). Although a wholesome analysis of each variable would go beyond the scope of this dissertation, the cases presented above provide a baseline broad enough to comprehend the structures of everyday life, or rather survival, in Recife's favelas.

The media plays a significant role in the construction of social indifference to certain violent deaths by creating an image of those who lost their "path." In her book *Precarious Life* (Butler 2004). Judith Butler suggests that particular lives cannot be apprehended as living, and if certain lives do not qualify as lives or are, from the start, not conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, then these lives are never lived nor lost in the social sense. Extending the argument, in *Frames of War* (2010) Butler argues that "the process of differential grieving is enacted through media forms that have become part of the very waging of war."

In Brazil, reporters like Edson present dozens of violent crimes daily in extremely popular local television programs like "Cidade Alerta" (Alert City) and "Brasil Urgente" (Urgent Brazil). Those crimes are almost exclusively committed by lower-class, black perpetrators, who are supposed to represent the concerning moral state of Brazil's society (Garmany 2009). The crimes and suspects are depicted with a rhetoric of evil and sinful behavior, suspects who do not deserve to be called human but rather "trash," "animals," "monsters." Ironically, these shows are watched predominantly by people like Ninho who live in already very violent environments.

In my comparatively short time at Bode, I attended to two homicides with the DHPP. In addition, there were many more I witnessed "privately". At Bode, violence is a common occurrence, but it is less predictable than in Rio where residents often can estimate when raids or shoot-outs are going to happen. At favelas like Bode in Recife, where everyone is vulnerable and suspect at the same time, violent death is a constant threat. The great popularity of the crime

shows may have to do with a need to normalize this steady feeling of precariousness and attribute it with specific structures. For instance, what type of involvement or behaviors are legitimate reasons to die. On the level of the elites, this situation has contributed to the destruction and abandonment of populations who do not conform to the prevailing norm of the "human."

Statistically, most victims and perpetrators are young, dark-skinned men from favelas engaged in the illegal economy. Butler writes that "such "ungrievable" populations are framed as never having been "lives" at all, and so already lost from the living from the start" (Ibid.). Cast as threats to human life as we imagine it, rather than as living populations, these "amphibious" members of society become targets for destruction. This disparity, Butler argues, has profound implications for why and when we feel horror, outrage, guilt, loss and righteous indifference, both in the context of war and, increasingly, in everyday life.

Based on the presented cases, I argue that aggression is often the only act of free will and agency that will be available to the most marginalized populations and ultimately an expression of lacking resources in the favelas of Recife. Glauber Rocha's famous film manifesto *Aesthetics of Hunger* (Rocha 1965) argued that the aesthetics of violence found in the Northeast

"are revolutionary rather than primitive. The moment of violence is the time when the coloniser becomes aware of the existence of the colonised. Only when he is confronted with violence can the colonizer understand, through horror, the strength of the culture he exploits. As long as he does not take up arms, the colonised man remains a slave".

Unfortunately, in Pernambuco as in most states in the Northeast the elites (largely plantation owners) are so separate of the poor that they do not even notice (or care) for the massacres happening in their proximity. The violence remains internal to favelas and does not

affect the rich. Residing in this kind of perceived, televised, and re-imagined "Gomorra" contributes to an inherently catholic perception of the sinful soul a priori, a view that is more prevalent in the Northeast than in Rio. Not different to Ninho's assertion that a "criminal is born, not made," society and police operate on the concept of either a well-natured subject or an inherently sinful one without redemption. Nancy Scheper Hughes delivered an important argument in *Death without Weeping* (1993), about the lives and deaths of sickly babies born in shanty towns of Pernambuco. These babies were not yet of this world; God would still make the decision if they would continue on earth amongst sinners and suffering or make the metamorphosis into little "angels" and leave toward heaven. The mothers lack resources to ameliorate causes of death, thus, they favor stronger babies, while ignoring the weaker ones, who are "encouraged" to leave this earth (Ibid.). Mothers, fathers, and children become accustomed to the idea of early death. Scheper-Hughes presents in her analysis the mother's apparent indifference to the death of their babies not as a suppression of grief, but a strategy of survival and mental health.

Pernambuco has improved vastly regarding decreasing infant death, and socio-economic development; nevertheless, death remains omnipresent and has not yet become "uncommon" and "uncomfortable" enough to be perceived as a real problem. In the chapter above, a mother who was wailing for her murdered son at a crime scene, was called "hysterical"; the murder of the travesti was neither surprising nor particularly tragic to the family who seemed to have expected this to happen at some point; the eyes of a young teenage girl watching a man who was brutally executed were filled with curiosity rather than tears. This world is very clear, very structured. We were all born in sin and what follows is God's will, which is in most cases brutal.

## CHAPTER 11

PATROLLING THE STREETS: MILITARY POLICE NAVIGATING POLICIES  
AND PRECARITY

*Part II Figure 14: Military police, Recife. Photo by author*

This chapter will introduce the work of military police officers at a particular battalion in Recife under the Pact for Life. I will first explain my positionality and the conditions of my ethnographic work with this battalion; second, introduce the specific expectations and demands of the Pact for Life regarding policing and interaction with citizens. Third, I introduce the area and demographics that the battalion attended to; and finally, I present selected case studies of patrols I have accompanied. This chapter also presents data derived from a survey that I conducted with 200 men and women beat police, most of which I worked with directly. The study gives access to information on the socio-economic background of the police force, their

views of the Pacto, human rights, and violence in society. It also establishes a baseline for age, gender, and education of the police officers of this particular battalion. While beat cops in Recife and Rio are both dark-skinned and lower class, they show striking differences in daily stress levels, expectations of citizens, and use of force. Recife's cops look up to Rio's militarized units and wish they had the same power; however, their context has vastly different requirements. Similar to Rio's UPP, cops in Recife see human rights as a risk to their safety and express thoughts and attitudes that mix notions of humanitarianism and militarization as a form of "tough love" to their "subordinates". At the same time, cops in Recife are members of these "subordinate" classes who live in the favelas.

First, I discuss the military police in Recife and the expectations of the Pacto towards battalions. Then I introduce the particular battalion that I shadowed during my fieldwork, its area and demography. Then the chapter turns to the experiences of beat cops who patrol communities and how it compares to Rio de Janeiro. Based on ethnographic data and survey results, I discuss beat cop's attitudes toward the Pact for Life and police accountability in particular. Finally, I pay attention to the more militarized context of special task force GATI, which show how police officers conceptualize police work and human rights differently. Finally, the chapter turns to the issue of police unions and debates on valorization of the police forces, in which ideas of human rights for state agents are discussed as the only viable use of "human rights" according to police in a violent urban context. I argue that influenced by a regional push for integration and development, policy makers on government levels and police departments in Recife are divided in their goals and definitions of "democratic" policing. While police departments strive to achieve the most "spectacular" paramilitary policing as seen in Rio de Janeiro and the U.S., which is seen as "democratic" only because those regions are economically more advanced,

government officials are pushing for “soft governance” tactics to improve the security system overall. Soft governance, however, is more invisible in its effects and does not address local complexities of crime, violence, and law enforcement in detail.

### **Hymn of the Military Police in Pernambuco**

Do sertão, do agreste e da mata	From the sertão, the countryside and forest
Das campinas ridentes em flor	From the blossoming meadows
Esta força de filhos se integra	This force of sons is dedicated
Que a servem com fé e amor	To serve with faith and love
Polícia Militar de Pernambuco!	The Military Police of Pernambuco!
Bravura e lealdade varonil	Bravery and manly loyalty
Jamais deixaram de cingir-te a fronte,	They never ceased to gird your brow,
Na guarda e na defesa do Brasil	In the protection and defense of Brazil.
Pernambuco altaneiro contempla	Towering, Pernambuco contemplates
Do Brasil, a grandeza e a glória,	From Brazil, greatness and glory,
E o valor do seu povo aguerrido	And the value of its brave people
Que reluz com fulgor na história	Who sparkle with glow in history
Lá de cima dos montes sagrados,	From above the sacred mountains,
Guararapes, com sangue e com vida,	Guararapes, with blood and life,
Camarão e avós indomáveis	Unbreakable shrimp and grandparents
Nos legaram esta Pátria querida.	They have bequeathed us this beloved homeland.

*Part II Figure 15: Source: military police informant.*

The military police in Recife is inherently different than its companions in Rio de Janeiro. As previous chapters showed, they are members of favela communities and often respected neighbors to the poor, that they police. They also have a very recent history of only about 190 years. The Military Police of Pernambuco emerged through the Imperial Decree, dated

June 11, 1825, signed by the Emperor D. Pedro I, who created a police corps to attend mainly to the city of Recife. This Police Corps was composed of an initial force of 320 men and constituted a cavalry and two infantries. The military police also did not play a major role during the military dictatorship which, as some argue, played out less repressive in the Northeast, than in the capital city Rio de Janeiro, although that is certainly debatable and hard to measure. Overall, police and policing practice in Pernambuco are anchored in the values of the sertão; as the hymn shows, manliness, bravery, and honor in a setting of the countryside are the primary pillars, while Rio's hymn used a modern war rhetoric. This aligns itself neatly with the fact that police in Pernambuco are far less lethal than in Rio, although they certainly have a history of violence.

Military police functions according to the Pact for Life were drawn largely from the US model Boston Ceasefire which addressed the high number of homicides committed with firearms. The strategy applied by the Pact for Life was to apprehend and prosecute offenders who carry firearms to send the message that the cost of committing a crime was bigger than its benefit. This was done through hot spot policing in form of patrols in vehicles and on foot employing stop and frisk tactics. For every firearm apprehended, police officers received a governmental bonus comparable to the black-market value of the weapon. This is a crucial aspect of the Pacto and an incentive to keep weapons from re-entering the illegal trade. In Rio de Janeiro at the time, no such bonuses were employed, and it was common knowledge that drug traffickers bought their weaponry from military police officers.

The police should not only respond to but also know how to foresee and anticipate difficulties; that is, to be preventative. This prevention was to be accomplished through improved familiarity with the area and residents, developing partnerships with local organizations and community leaders. The term "community policing" is, however, as Manning said a "semantic

sponge” (Manning 1997) loaded with different ideologies, political and cultural meanings. “One can do almost anything and call it community policing” (Cordner 2014:148), this vagueness is a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it created a broad enough definition for supporters of different political and socio-economic backgrounds; on the other, it made it a challenge to establish protocols according to which implement and to evaluate its effectiveness. This results in uneven, inconsistent, and simply half-hearted implementations by different battalions. The same problem in the Pacification Police Unit, where police officers were asked to establish rapport with residents but not given consistent guidelines, examples or initiatives how to enact “proximity policing” on the ground.

The area of the battalion I worked at received each month a specific meta, a number of how many violent crimes were acceptable for the Pact for Life. Metas were the center piece of the battalion’s concern and driving beat cops mad. All metas were calculated with the end goal of reducing violent crime rates in the whole state of Pernambuco by 12 percent per year. Based on the number of violent crime in the previous month, the meta for next month was calculated.

A “green” month meant a monetary bonus; “red” meant that the battalion would be scrutinized at the Pacto. A battalion unable to meet the meta several times in a row would often lose its commanding officer, who would be replaced by someone chosen by the Chief of the Police. For beat cops to lose their commanding officer is a difficult adjustment and usually the new colonel would be stricter in order to get the district “green”.

The Military Police in Recife patrols hot spots in their assigned judicial area of the city. If an arrest or apprehension of stolen goods occurs, PM must deliver the prisoner or the goods to the according to delegacia. For instance, if one captures someone stealing, that person must be

delivered to the delegacia for robberies. If someone is suspected of a violent crime, to the delegacia de CVLI; but if the victim is elderly to the delegacia of "third age." If the suspect is minor of age, he or she must be delivered to the delegacia for minors. However, any and all suspects that have been arrested "in flagrante", that is caught in the act, are brought to one delegacia no matter what kind of offense (running a traffic light, murder, robbery, sexual delict, domestic abuse, property, etc...). Consequently, this delegacia is constantly overrun.

Dozens of delegacias are sprinkled all over Recife and are mainly responsible for their particular area. It can take up to two hours' drive to reach your specific delegacia to file a report and deliver the suspect. The civil police officers at the delegacia collect all the necessary forms to decide if they will start a formal investigation. Without the civil police filing a formal report, there is no prosecution of crimes.

### *Conditions and Positionality*

To me, it was a surprise that most police officers in Recife were enthused by the idea of having me shadow them in their daily duty. In December 2014, I presented my intent to shadow his Military Police Battalion in Recife, the chief commanding officer of the battalion, Colonel Cruz was thrilled. Immediately, he assured me his full support and cooperation, introduced me to his ranking officers and beat cops. It was evident to me that Cruz, who knew that I was weekly at the Pacto and in good contact with local politicians, was keen on me telling "their side of the story" to the Pacto. However, once the word got out to Cruz's superiors that I wanted to shadow the precinct and be on patrols, I was shut down by the General Chief Commander of the Military Police himself.

"It is too dangerous," he claimed as did his boss, the Secretary of Social Defense, Alessandro Carvalho. Shadowing the Homicide Task Force may have been traumatic, but it was less risky; the military police dealt with violence and crime more directly, interacting with citizens in a more unpredictable manner. Most of all, the police were simply afraid that I might expose illicit behavior. It took me months of nagging and negotiating until I was allowed limited access to the precinct under the supervision of ranking officers.

The Pacto officials were very preoccupied to show me a "democratic police force" similar to what they were expecting I am used to in the US or my home country Germany. Officially, I received a signed blank authorization by the General Chief Commander and Alessandro, the Secretary of Social Defense end of May 2015, motivated by the governor Paulo Câmara himself who I had met at a Charity event. Over several Whisky, I persuaded him to recommend a *carta branca* – a blank authorization that would allow me to come and go as I pleased, to accompany whoever I wanted without the supervision or seeking permission from the ranking officers. While I did indeed receive such authorization a few days later, I had made an enemy in Alessandro, who felt I went behind his back. By then I had already been on many patrols and daily at the precinct for over two months.

While the higher-ranking officers were more worried about me witnessing illicit actions and how it would contribute to the image of the Military Police, most beat cops were thrilled to have me join them. On the one hand, this has certainly to do with the fact that I am a young woman. But there was more to it. They were genuinely keen to show me their reality, "we are interested in people who want to get to know us and our challenges," a soldado told me whom I met at the battalion. They felt valorized and flattered that an international scholar would take an interest in their ordinary lives and work (although I did my best to explain that I am by no means

as powerful as they perceived me). Some were so excited, that they grabbed an extra vest and picked me up "incognito" at some corner in the city before I had the official authorization by their superiors.

Unlike their superiors, the beat cops were not worried that I be witness to illicit actions. Of course, they would not be stupid enough to let me see any abuses; but as the next pages will show they also did not seem to put much effort into hiding things. They wanted to share their experiences: of rain dripping through the precinct roof, the lack of handcuffs and vests, the lack of training, their resentment of their superiors and the Pacto, and the many hours of overtime that would never be compensated. Some also shared more private issues, such as alcoholism and addiction to crack. Most assume (correctly) that I will try to understand once I have experienced their reality. I made it also very clear that it was not my place to judge but to observe and collect data; that I would keep our conversations and interactions confidential.

For four months I worked with 200 men and women. Very rarely, I would be confronted with an individual who did not want to share their story, or who would not want me to accompany them on patrol. This general attitude of openness was remarkable, despite the fact that illicit actions did happen on my watch; but because I was part of their lives and duty, because I experienced the stress, the boredom, the repetitive banality of violence, most of my police colleagues assumed that I would understand and accept that certain illicit actions are unavoidable if not necessary in this line of work.

There were two additional variables that influenced my rapport with the beat cops. First, the fact that I was living at Bode and they respected me for it. Many of my police colleagues had friends and family there. Suddenly, I would run into people at Bode who complimented me on

my work with their cousin, or who offered assistance if I ever needed anything. Secondly, I had achieved a “*carta branca*” a blank authorization with the bosses who made me appear powerful. Nevertheless, I would still always ask the actual unit if they were comfortable with me in the car.

This signaled to the troops that while I went “over the heads” of the ranking officers – whom they resented – I made sure to get their permission and respect. “I would love to treat the officers like you do!” several of them would mention at occasions when I dismissed ranking officers from following or questioning me.

The “*carta branca*” did not earn me any favor with the officers; but since they were predominantly in administrative positions and almost never out on the streets, it was not very relevant. Most of all, I needed the rapport and protection of the beat cops that I was accompanying every day. Being a foreign researcher with direct authorization by the governor of the state, the secretariat of security, and the chief police commanders allowed for leeway with superior officers. But rapport with the beat cops relied solely on our interactions.

## LIFE AND WORK AT A MILITARY POLICE BATTALION


Based on my survey, conducted with 200 police officers at the battalion (see Appendix 1), the vast majority of the troop at the battalion precinct were young men between 25 and 35 years old (65%). Only 30% of the 200 active street cops were older than 35, and most are relatively new in the police force as almost 40% of the respondents entered less than five years ago. 34% of the interviewees worked no more than ten years in the military police force overall. Further, most of my respondents have been stationed at only one battalion (46%), while about 24% have experienced two battalions.

A majority of the officers (nearly 50%) indicated that they earn "three to five minimum wage salaries" per month; just over 40% are making less, between one and three, and a small fraction of 7% earn over five minimum wage salaries, which are with certainty ranking officers. One minimum wage in 2015 was 880 Reais, hence, a soldado earned on average 2,600 Brazilian Reais (just over 800 US Dollar) per month. This salary makes it near impossible to rent or own outside of slums, especially considering that the majority of beat cops were married with on average two children.

Almost all of the police officers at the precinct were born, raised and living in a favela with a strong presence of criminality – in my survey only 3.53% of the 200 respondents disagreed with this statement. Judging from the time spent working with those men and women, most seem to be living in favelas while some others either migrated from the Sertão or still live in the periphery of Recife.


Because this police force was a predominantly male, militaristic environment, I had little opportunity to do patrols with female police officers, who are more likely to get assigned to one of the police booths or bike patrol in touristic areas. As to the educational background of the street cops, only 34.32% of 169 respondents said to have completed high school. Nevertheless, roughly 40% of officers claimed they were currently enrolled in undergraduate classes. A high school diploma is required to enter the police academy; however, particularly older police officers often do not have such degree. Almost 60% of the respondents were currently enrolled in classes (high school and university level).

### Gender at the 16th Battalion, Recife 2015



Part II Figure 16: Gender distribution. Source: survey by author 2015

### Education levels



Part II Figure 17: Education levels. Source: survey by author 2015

### *The Area and People: Santo Amaro*

The 16th Battallion of the Military Police in Recife, whose police officers I shadowed daily from April until August 2015, is located in the city center next to the Mercado São José. It

is only a couple miles from Bode, but the community does no longer make part of the battalion's territory. The Battalion covers a diverse region: the historic city center with many touristic bars, concerts, museums, markets and performances; two of the largest favelas in the city, Santo Amaro and Coque, Ilha do Leite and governmental buildings, and several major train and bus stations that are especially important during football games. During my time shadowing the patrols, I have been particularly interested in the community of Santo Amaro which is one of the more violent and gang organized favelas in Recife.

Santo Amaro is one of the areas that was prioritized by the Pact for Life program and saturated with police patrols, social projects, and problem-oriented policing, based on data that indicated it was a hotspot for violent crime. Major Ferreira, the responsible commander for the area serving at the 16th Battalion, is a bright, ranking officer who was exceptionally well-liked among the troops. Ferreira and I met before at Santo Amaro and during carnaval when I was accompanying a military police unit in their patrols of the city center and rural areas. He had a Master's degree in Sociology with a focus on criminology from the Federal University of Pernambuco-Recife and studied under Luiz Ratton (the creator of the Pacto). Santo Amaro has 28,000 inhabitants and is one of the oldest and biggest favelas near Recife's downtown area. It also has the fame to be the "most violent favela," according to the police officers with whom I worked. There are just over 8000 houses at Santo Amaro, most of which are home to three to four people on average. The majority of households are headed by women (Santo Amaro | Prefeitura Do Recife n.d.). The community arouses as a conglomerate of unregulated shanties surrounding new factories that were erected during the regime of President Getúlio Vargas and his "Estado Novo" project, some seventy years ago. At the time, the area was mostly *mangue* – swampland overgrown with mangroves. Little by little, the area was filled with dirt and debris by

the families who were immigrating from the sun-scorched Sertão. They worked in the factories, mixing soft drinks at bus stations, working at nearby plantations, fishing, and hemming clothes. These families transformed Santo Amaro from a muddy, mosquito infested shantytown into a village like community with broad streets, sewage system, and electricity.

Santo Amaro stands out in Recife due to its criminal structure; there are three gangs in the favela that control four territorial sections. They are relatively organized, in comparison to the usually loose ties and small territories (e.g. a street corner) that drug dealers at smaller favelas have. Each gang name corresponds with the name of the area in the favela: Joao de Barros; Campo do Onze, "D," and Salgado. At the time of my study, Junior Box the *cachorro louco* (mad dog), was the dono (owner) of Campo do Onze and "D," although he controlled his business from prison via cell phone and family members. Most of the other donos were also in prison, according to the police. The older gang bosses (between 25-35 years old) use teenagers and children for drug sale and security functions predominantly because they are smaller, quicker but also don't face prison time. Most of the low case drug dealers are also drug addicts. For a while, Salgado was run exclusively by teenagers, and although they were less organized they were more audacious it gained them a fame of exceptional brutality.

Families are crucial to the gang structure who function through alliance and implicit community support. Mothers routinely hide their sons who are "involved," their weapons used in a murder, or even dead bodies. The option to work for the gang is an obvious one for uneducated poor men, especially when they have a criminal record that limits their chances in the formal job market.

While gangs in Rio are highly organized and operate based on what is best for their business (such as conquest new territories, defend a territory, eliminate competition, etc.), the

gang confrontations at Santo Amaro are mostly *rinchas*, that is revenge attacks in response to a previous insult or aggression. It is once again the manifestation of the male honor culture which is expressed through violence. This corresponds with the DHPP's category of "revenge motive," to which more than 30% of Recife's murders are attributed to.

#### ROUTINES: COPS OUT IN THE STREETS

The following ethnographic anecdotes describe the routine of military police officers in Recife who spend their shifts patrolling one specific area. Shadowing these cops shed a light on their interpretations of the Pact for Life, human rights, and the idea of "democratic" policing applied to their context. I also draw a distinction between beat cops, ranking officers, and special task forces; for each different concepts of policing practice apply that are often discrepant. The anecdotes are divided broadly in themes. First, I present ethnographic data to introduce the routine of military police patrols in Recife, which are drastically more calm and ordinary than in Rio. As a consequence, police work is also not characterized by fear and stress like it was the case in Rio. Second, I address the issue of special task force units, which are more repressive but also stand in contrast with task forces such as the BOPE in Rio. This section also includes a discussion of human rights and attitudes of police officers. Third, I go to present a particular discrepancy between the Pact for Life bonus system and police commitment to the program. While the bonus for productive police officers has been hailed as a great motivator, my study suggests that police officers do not see it that way. Fourth, I present the work of police activists and representatives who are fighting for human rights for public security agents, and how that stands in conflict with the Pacto program.

The first time I went on "patrol" a lieutenant dressed me into a white bulletproof vest, which made me look like I escaped from a mental health institute, called three cop cars and initiated an "operation" in the middle of the day at a public park. For clarification, vests are always black, patrols are done in one or maximum two cars, and there is no way any police officers go frisking in a public park during the day.

As in probably any city in the world, we encountered people sitting and sleeping on benches. Many probably were homeless, others street vendors taking a nap next to their cart. The police officers approached the men and asked in an extremely polite tone: "excuse me, senhor, would you have the kindness to stand up and empty your pockets?" – It was the most absurd stop and frisk I have ever seen. Proudly the lieutenant turned to me explaining how his officers are trained to be kind and polite and how the people being searched know they are doing their duty to society. He also assumed that in the United States we probably don't have any homeless and apologized for the bad shape of his country. In the meantime, his police officers' eyes were sparkling with anger and humiliation as the "suspects" they were frisking were visibly amused by the treatment they received. I took the "suspects" to the side and asked why they were laughing, "I have never been frisked so nicely before. Only when you reporters are there" (he assumed I was a journalist) "I wanna see them do it this way without you here," a young man told me.

Before the lieutenant could get me back into the car to take me to an "authentic" cop place for lunch (where they would even have "salad" that "thin" women like me like to eat), I managed to slip my contact card to the praça. He hissed in my ear: "This is not us!" Later that day, I received a text message from that police officer and his partner "do you want to go on a real patrol?"; I swung myself on my bike and met them at a corner. "We will show you the real

thing now. Not some bullshit little park stunt.” The police officers, Waldemar and Luis, were very upset that the lieutenant called them off from their usual work to perform a show for a "human rights activist." They felt it made them look like children, with no authority or respect and having those "no-goods" in the park laugh at them.

We drove into several favelas where they assured me that they are facing daily dangers and prevent horrific crimes from happening. While the lieutenant was preoccupied to demonstrate to me "*polícia estrangeira*," foreign police, that deal with nothing more dangerous than homeless in a park, Waldemar and Luis felt insulted in their honor by the performance. "Real" police work doesn't look like that in Recife. You have too many executions, wife killers, and drug dealers; "you cannot always afford to be nice," said the soldados. They drove me to a shabby little military police station where we met the rest of their unit. When we entered, Waldemar shouted at the grumpy looking men: "She's alright!" He turned to me with a grin, "Sorry, I was cursing you before... We thought you were one of those bitches from the human rights which always want to crush us." The rest of the unit immediately began to speak: "People here don't want a police like in Switzerland or wherever you are from. This is Brazil. Everyone thinks they have special rights and no obligations", they assured me, adding that the whole Pact for Life program was a scam trying to convince the outside world that Pernambuco was a democracy.

Luis said:

"The media is important because it shaped people's views and expectations. They show policing in the USA and Switzerland and put these ideas in people's heads. But this kind of policing is impossible here! Just look at our streets, full of rubbish, addicts, prostitutes. Tell me, do you see people living next to open sewage in Switzerland? Do you see such murders, so many sick people in England? Such poverty in the USA? They want us to prevent crime, but they don't train us, we have no equipment, little money, and corrupt

politicians. Then you put me on the street with thugs, murderers and child abusers who all get human rights for being inhumane. Rights that I as a police officer am not awarded. The police are depicted as criminals, as incompetent, not as the heroes that we are”.

The police officers standing around us nodded in agreement – *é isso ai!*

### *Mata-Mata and Stop & Frisk*

I meet Major Ferreira and Cabo Jorge at the battalion. Ferreira and I know each other from a couple of years ago when I met him and other police officers patrolling at Sto. Amaro. Since Ferreira and my friend Patricia knew each other from a sociology class (Ferreira holds a Master in Sociology), we were introduced. Cabo Jorge is a lanky black officer in his mid-forties. Colonel Cruz, the chief commander of the battalion, who sees me checking out a bullet proof vest, makes a worried face.

“I am worried about you. Today is *mata-mata*”; Cruz said. He refers to it being Monday, the day when people (mostly drug traffickers) settle their debts; in other words, kill debtors who failed to pay promptly. Every week, homicide rates shoot up on Monday and Tuesday in Pernambuco. Thus, more patrols are out on these days. There is no such system in Rio de Janeiro. Drug traffickers might lend money to residents but as an act of charity; they would not kill community members who they regard as needy and dependent on them, although they might use them for tricky favors (such as hiding in their houses during police raids) instead.

Colonel Cruz knows that the chief commander of the Military Police still did not authorize me to ride along with the patrols without the company of a high-ranking officer – a measure that prevents me from talking to beat cops, as they won't say a word in the presence of a superior officer. Luckily Cruz is keen to support my work. He is hoping that I can say things he can't, that I can tell the bureaucrats at the Pact for Life how things "really" are for the police and

the people they tend to. Therefore, he doesn't intervene when Major Ferreira tells him that two of his men will take me to interview cops at Sto. Amaro. It is evident that visiting the vast favela at night, wearing a bullet proof vest, and riding with two beat cops goes beyond a simple interview.

Once Colonel Cruz checked my vest for the third time and finally left to go home, Ferreira also bids his goodbyes reminding me that he "knows of nothing." Jorge and two of his men will take me for a ride along at Santo Amaro. We ride through Sto. Amaro that suddenly looks very different from the cop car perspective.

After all the talk, I am nervous that someone might shoot at us and I begin to see something suspicious at every corner. Isn't that man walking slightly too fast? Isn't there something bulging in this guy's shirt, maybe a gun? I realize I must get the images of the homicide scenes out of my head. My police companions are not much different, though. Any "suspicious" behavior such as moving too quickly, riding on a *cinquentinha*, or even a particular haircut becomes a reason for stop and frisk. I feel uncomfortable seeing the police grabbing men in the genital area to check for drugs, shining flashlights into their mouths. We drive into the mangroves, a place known as "*chupa-chupa*" (suck-suck) which is a self-explanatory name for the prostitution area. They stop at a young, black, emaciated woman wearing very little clothing; apparently a crack addict prostituting herself – which not a crime in Brazil.

They ask her to squat and cough. She obeys silently. I sit in the car, quite shocked. Jorge explains that he regularly catches women who sell drugs which they store in their vagina. "Hell, I even found a weapon in there once!" he tells me. I wonder what this is supposed to achieve. A couple crack stones? This woman is clearly not a dangerous drug trafficker; she is not "important" in the fight against drugs and violence.

Although the Pact for Life legalized small amounts of drugs for personal use, that law did not (yet) transform the frisking techniques of military police. Frisking in Recife is employed to apprehend firearms, but cops are still frisking for drugs. Some cops explained this has to do with habit, but it is also a strategy. Citizens are often not aware of the decriminalization of drugs for personal use and the police can use this lack of knowledge as leverage in some cases. For example, to threaten someone with arrest if he or she does not share information on a crime.

Working with the Homicide Task Force meant to go from one tragedy to another. Under such circumstances it is easy to forget that this is not all that entail police work. Patrolling with police officers at the battalion showed a different side to policing in Recife. While the city is one of the most violent in Brazil, individual patrols are overwhelmingly uneventful, even boring. The coming anecdote, based on field notes, depicts such an ordinary, non-dramatic patrol that is the routine for police officers at the battalion. It goes to how “community policing” looks like on the ground.

Patrolling in Recife stands in harsh contrast to the always adrenaline pumped patrols in the favelas in Rio de Janeiro, where an “enemy” is expected at every corner, ready to attack. Drug traffickers armed with high-tech weaponry, positioned strategically on rooftops and hillsides are a real danger in Rio that transforms policing practice, even in pacified favelas, into a “video game” of shoot or get killed. In Recife, on the other hand, where the number of murders is much higher, the quotidian police work in even the most violent favelas is rather mundane: helping the elderly, attending to drunk and drug users, stop and frisk suspect citizens for merely a couple crack stones. Moreover, police officers are sometimes indistinguishable from such “suspects”, succumbing to alcoholism and drug addiction.

At six PM on a Friday, I am waiting for Cabo Jorge at the battalion to start patrol. The rest of the patrols are already in rank and file (as customary) saluting their superior officer. Then they go to their cars and drive out into the evening. It is already 18.30 and still no sign of Cabo Jorge. Military Police officers can get arrested for being late to their shifts, a rule that is strictly enforced in Rio, but here nobody seems to give it much thought. I hang out in the reception area with the stray dogs that come in for a belly rub by soldado Beto, a talkative older man who spends most of his shift talking to the dogs and watching television. The battalion is very relaxed, especially to the rigid routines in Rio.

Elias, a young, chubby sergeant enters the precinct and comes over to me. I ask him if Cabo Jorge is well - "he's alright, just drunk," explains Elias who will take the shift over for Jorge. While we wait for his colleague (in Recife you can patrol only with at least two police in the car), Elias tells me that yesterday a "bandido" carrying two pistols trying to rob people on a bus, was shot and killed by a police officer - "one less on this earth, thank God." Gilberto, our second policeman, finally arrives and we get in the squad car. Moments after we leave the battalion a man in shorts and a hairy naked belly waves us over. Pointing to the window in a shabby apartment, he tells us that his roommate has taken an overdose of antidepressant with alcohol. Loud English music is playing in the street.

"You see how everything becomes the problem of the police?" Elias exclaims annoyed. He tells the man to call an ambulance and we drive off to dinner. The restaurant below the hospital had a discount for cops. The plastic tables are always packed with uniforms of various colors representing the different specialty units of the Military and Civil Police. The men wearing black are with special task forces, for example, GATI, a force created to combat a surge in car-jacking in the mid-1990s. CIOE was formed to rescue kidnap victims. CIPC, the canine

unit, still sniffs for anything smelling of weed or explosives, and CORE guards hospitalized prisoners while waiting for something more exciting to happen. Then there are the khaki beat cops, military police doing the usual patrols.

We eat *macaxeira* (mandioc) with rice and beans, and Elias and Gilberto explain how, in their opinion, the police in Recife is in its “embryonal” stage. “The Pacto people want us to be like the police in Europe. But look at this mess!” Elias points at the street. “Filthy. People are corrupt, irresponsible, only think about their rights, never their obligations”. Gilberto adds: “People believe that we are from Mars. We are supposed to be better, smarter, than everyone else. But the police are just as good as its society”.

According to modern criminology, motorized patrols are, wherever possible, the preferred form of patrolling as was applied in Recife. Whether on motorcycles or in cars, large regions can be covered in short time, police presence is demonstrated through marked identifiers such as sirens, bright colors, and lights in the hope to scare criminals away. However, motorized vehicles, especially cars, also serve cops like Elias and Gilberto as a comfortable and more secure means of transportation<sup>52</sup>. Hidden behind tinted windows it is “story time”.

There are several problems with the motorized patrols as they are implemented by the Pacto. David Bayley claims that “The number of patrols in an area may have doubled, halved, or even removed altogether without changing crime levels” (Bayley 1994). Saturating a hotspot with police (as done few times a week in different hotspots in Recife) does have an effect on crime, but it is too expensive to be more than a short-term expedient. The Pacification Police in

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<sup>52</sup> Often, the vehicles are also a catalyst for performing masculinity, and I have not seen any female police officer driving. Ever. Many cops I have worked with cannot afford a car, thus, driving one at work compensates for the lack of independence and manhood that they might feel.

Rio was a good example that saturation can help to lower crime rates significantly but is prohibitively expensive to keep up (Wolff 2015).

Generally, police work has actually little to do with crime, even in a violent city like Recife. Most of the incidents are social matters, such as fights, drunks, and escorts. The general conclusion is that "some motorized patrolling is probably better than none, but more is not better than some" (Bayley 1994). Patrolling on foot, as practiced in UPPs, is more efficient because it makes the public (initially at least) feel safer, although it does not affect crime rates significantly (Cordner 2010). It increases the satisfaction with police service because rapport between the police and residents can be established. The same inefficiency goes for responses to emergency calls. The cases above illustrated how helpless police are when called to a crime that is taking place. First, police rarely arrive on time, and after only a few minutes the criminal is very unlikely to be caught. We would drive like maniacs and chase thieves within two minutes of a report but lose them every single time. Criminals, no matter where always have a big head start.

What does work in policing practice is when the public is ready to provide information to the police to help identify hotspots, times, and "hot people." Such a rapport is based on trust that the police officer will use the information cautiously; that he will protect the identity and confidentiality of the informant, that he will not hurt or kill the indicated suspect. In that sense the police in Recife has better preconditions to earn people's collaboration because they have been historically less lethal than in Rio.

### *What is "real" Police Work?*

Tonight, I work with Lieutenant André in Recife Antigo until midnight and then patrol the Cais de Santa Rita. Most PM who work in this area are "borrowed" from other battalions.

Recife Antigo, a beautiful area, reserved for tourists and college students, is usually pretty boring but at least I get to listen to the live bands playing and can observe the young crowds in the bars. I am sitting in the PM container at the Rua da Moeda, the probably busiest street filled with restaurants, music, and young people. Marta, Tais, and Kleber just had dinner and are now preparing a little café and cake for us. It has gotten much more peaceful here in comparison to earlier years where there were many fights, stabbings, and robberies. "We always hope that nothing will happen," says Marta. Taisa puts it plainly: "you need a certain profile to be able to handle 12 hours of boredom inside a tiny container". I look at the team, all slightly overweight, eating cake and sipping sweet coffee content to watch the telenovela.

The streets are getting fuller, people are getting drunker, and the smell of marijuana is overpowering. A group of white men, probably college students, stand behind a taxi across the police container smoking weed. Fabio, a young soldado is furious, he feels disrespected and wants to walk over to the students. But Lieutenant André stops him immediately. "This is not favela, Fabio," he tells him. It is evident to all of us that here, in the space of the white, wealthy and well-educated people, not the same laws and rules apply. Fabio and André are no exception; both are dark-skinned and were born and raised in favelas where no police officer would ever show such tolerance towards smoking weed in their faces. We talk a little about legalization, and the officers are very interested in the topic. "But it is already as good as legal," they say pointing at the group, "well. For some at least".

Lieutenant André decides we should move on to patrol the Cais. On one of our rounds, I spot two young women standing on the bridge waving us over. One is a travesti, the other pregnant. They have many bags. They are asking the police for help as they do not know where to sleep tonight. I notice how hard the Lieutenant tries to be polite and seem interested; I do not

believe for a second that he would have stopped if I was not in the car. The travesti explains that they were threatened at the shelter and are afraid of getting killed. Now they do not know where to go. The pregnant girl is 18, the travesti 27 years old, so both are too old to call Child Services - not that anyone believes they would be of any help. Both are addicted to crack. I try and call ATTITUDE, a project within the Pacto that provides care for crack users, but they tell me they do not accept anyone this late at night.

Although both women claimed to have received death threats, Lieutenant André insists that this is not police work. I counter that prevention of homicide is exactly what the Pact for Life is about. After all, with the murder at Coelhos earlier tonight, those two could potentially ruin the meta of the month in one night. The lieutenant, clearly overwhelmed, sends out for another patrol car to pick the women up and bring them to the police container. "They can sleep next to it. They will be safe there," he assures me.

Fabio is amused. Later, when the unnerved Lieutenant André had left, he turned around and said "Marta, Marta... Do you realize that this would have never happened without you in the car? I wish I could treat them like you do. Officers behave differently, we [soldados] have to think twice before we speak or do anything. I do not like to work with them; they feel too quickly offended".

The anecdote above speaks to three levels of evaluating police officer's attitudes toward police work. First, it addresses the discrepancy between what the Pacto defines as appropriate police work, and how military police see it. Second, it allures to the deeply entrenched relationship between the troop and their superiors. Related to this dichotomy, it suggests that the fear and distrust that beat cop feel toward their superior officers inhibits them from doing the "right" thing and it shows class and race divides between officials and other citizens.

Even though the Pacto pushed through a decriminalization of small amounts of drugs from personal use, the consumption of those in public is prohibited. Public display of drug consumption is also perceived as a great insult and provocation to law enforcement; something I am sure the young people in the story above are aware of. If it were not for a crowded and touristic place, I am convinced that Fabio would have forced the youth to put out their joints and possibly arrested them (only as punishment, not in hopes of conviction). However, the race, location, and social status of the youth clearly put them outside of what is conceptualized as “hot people”, “hot spot”, and “hot time”. Thus, Lieutenant André does not consider educating these citizens, who are probably more affluent than himself, as appropriate police work.

The vulnerable women we meet later in the evening are clearly stressed enough to call over a police car (travesti do generally not have a healthy relationship with police). They have received death threats, which makes them prime prevention subjects, in terms of the Pacto. Protecting these women would mean potentially preventing two homicides; killings that would deeply affect the monthly “violent crime” quota of the battalion. Nevertheless, Lieutenant André is annoyed and underprepared in having to assist the women. In part, I believe this has to do with their gender and situation. In the logic of Recife’s social dynamics, the pregnant woman out at night without a husband and even worse in the company of a travesti; both crack users; hence, both “ungrievable” casualties of their own “wrongdoing”. Lieutenant André does simply not see how this could possibly be police work; or more precisely he does not see social work and policing as interrelated. Neither do most of his (ranking)colleagues.

Fabio, however, when no ranking officer was around, I witnessed giving rides to people in need, sometimes even transporting people injured in fights without reporting it. Once, we got into trouble with a superior officer because the car got blood stains from a young man we found

beaten and whom Fabio transported to the hospital. All these actions are technically illicit; transportation in the squad car is prohibited unless the victim has been shot with a gun, so that the police cannot be accused of wrongdoing in case the victim died. The police are obliged to guard the victim at the scene and wait for the ambulance, which in Recife is painfully slow<sup>53</sup>. However, with the ranking officer, Lieutenant André present, Fabio is mute. His place in this hierarchy is very clear, obedient, and silent. Not once have I heard a beat cop express an opinion in front of a superior officer. There is an underlying fear of ranking officers, whose power over beat cops was historically absolute. While the military code allows for a soldier to refuse an order that is illegal, it almost never happens; the likelihood to prove in military court (to other high-ranking officers) that such order was in fact illegal is near impossible. As a result, there is no communication between ranking officers and beat cops and their relationship is characterized by inequality and distrust. Consequently, both groups have inherently different expectations, experiences, and attitudes toward policing practice.

My survey confirms that ranking officers and praça do not trust each other, as 74% of the respondents stated. Furthermore, 53% said that they do not feel supported by their superiors. When asked if, in their opinion, the *formação única* (a one entry career system that would allow all police officers entering police academy gradually and climb the rank up to ranking officer) would bring officers and praça closer and improve the quality of policing, over 70% of the praça respondents agreed.

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<sup>53</sup> On one occasion, when a young student was run over by a bus whose driver then proceeded to flee the scene, the ranking officer present refused to transport the victim. The ambulance took over one hour to arrive, although the hospital was only five minutes away. The young man died at the scene.

## POLICE COMMITMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

I have argued that police commitment to innovative policing programs is crucial to the success of such experiments. Without a dedicated and involved police, there cannot be a consistent application on the ground. In Rio de Janeiro, many police officers felt insulted and even threatened by the pacification police program and its idea of accountability and proximity policing. In Recife, the Pact for Life was similarly rejected by the military police. The Pact for Life attempted to address police commitment through a bonus system that awards “productive” officers a money price. Officers who apprehended a firearm are paid its value in order to prevent the cops to re-sell the gun on the black market. As the following anecdote will show; however, even for underpaid cops these bonuses do not motivate.

The monthly general meeting of the battalion takes place at an auditorium at the *Banco do Brasil* at 8 AM. Attendance is mandatory, whether it is your day off or not. Kleber, a soldier, working with the GATI task force is pissed off. He and his team just returned from a 12-hour night shift that was supposed to end at 6 am, but they had to process an arrest, so it took longer. Now, instead of going home to sleep, Kleber will have to attend the hour-long meeting. The overtime will not be paid.

Cornel Cruz is aware of the headaches his meeting is causing his troops who don't like “the talk” of the officers, but he insists that he needs to touch base with his men (and women). He wants to know them, them to like him. Most of all, he is trying to motivate them to be productive and by the book so that the battalion, which in the past months has not been able to meet its meta, doesn't fall out of favor with the Chief Commander. This month the battalion is facing a meta of only three. That means by the end of the month the police are expected to prevent all but three violent crimes in their territory which covers two major favelas, the Market

of São José, hundreds of bars, brothels, football stadium, and a large touristic center. "How are we supposed to do that?" Kleber whispers.

"Nothing is impossible for God. Nothing will be impossible for this troop of warriors!" Cruz begins his speech. Next, to me a soldier hisses "then take the PM and put him into church!". To everyone, it is clear that this meta is only dependent on luck. For PMs, there are two categories of homicide; one that is in public space such as fights, robbery, and assault. Those can be prevented by patrolling hot spots and frisking suspects, collecting guns and machetes. The second, however, are "private," crimes of passion, crimes fueled by honor or revenge. To motivate police to do their job rather than taking a nap in the squad car, the Pacto installed monetary bonuses awarded to exceptionally efficient precincts and police officers. A precinct that reached its monthly goal (meta) was supposed to receive a money prize to every police officer working the streets that month. However, this depended on one important variable: the whole state with all its areas must have achieved the proposed 12% reduction in homicides this year. A goal which is almost out of reach, as it would mean that all areas scored green or under this year. Effectively, that means that nobody got a bonus<sup>54</sup>.

I feel almost sorry for Cruz who is trying desperately to make jokes, connect to his troop, show that he is one of them. "I grew up just around the corner from here, at Brasília Teimosa," a favela opposite of Bode, said Cruz alluring to his simple background. Cruz continues his speech by referring to the current political and economic difficulties the country was facing in 2015.

"We live in challenging circumstances. Companies and industries are closing down, and unemployment is rising fast. People are getting fired from their jobs. Remember who used to

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<sup>54</sup> This bonus system has been revised since. Now police officers receive a bonus if they keep metas for three consecutive months in a row, regardless if the whole state can decrease CVLI by 12% per year.

earn well? Do you remember? The brick layers!" He talks about his former jobs, allegedly as brick layer, a popular employment for many cops before they entered the force. There is nothing that Cruz can say to make the disparity between high ranking colonel and soldier disappear.

Cruz, like all the other officers, entered through the *concurso* without any prior experience in the streets. He earns at least five times as much as his troop. And he responds directly to the Pacto policy makers and politicians, which makes the troop distrustful if Cruz would stand up for them if they were to be investigated.

The PIP (an Institutional Productivity Price) is a new tool that the Pacto team came up with to motivate police to do their jobs. It awards the most productive police units in the

battalion with a small monetary bonus of approximately 200 Reais. Productivity here is understood as the number of arrests firearms apprehended. The cops are skeptical. "The PIP is not to marginalize you. I know there are many of you who cannot produce because they are on leave, vacation, or medical issues keep them from working. I am taking this into consideration," Cruz tries to assure his troop. This month, the PIP goes to Cabo Moura and Fabio, two street cops who have apprehended an impressive number of machetes, guns, and drugs frisking the streets.

"Am I or am I not doing justice to these two citizens?!" Cruz yells enthusiastically. Fabio and Moura are asked to stand up and collect their medals up front. A picture of both is projected onto the large screen, the real Fabio and Moura look small and miserable underneath with their medals hanging around their necks. "Congratulations Moura! A PM who after 20 years is already Cabo!" their commanding officer, Captain Pereira, standing next to Cruz says proudly. This causes a bit of an outcry amongst the troops – twenty long years to earn this miserable promotion.

Later I talked to Fabio and Moura who revealed that they prefer not to receive any bonuses for their productivity, although money is short. Now that they have been established as role models, their colleagues will be pushed harder to achieve similar results. That makes the other cops resent them.

“So, why do you work so hard?” I ask them; “well, it’s not like we try. We are just a good team, have been on the streets for a long while and after so much time you develop an eye for something suspicious,” Moura responds. They are also the kind of cops who want the night to go by fast, so they make their rounds while many others choose to park the squad car in a silent corner and sleep.

Fabio explains to me that he and Moura are getting a lot of shit from the others at the precinct for having won a “medal” for productiveness. The other soldados accuse them of working for their commanding officer, Pereira, so that he can get promoted. If Fabio and Moura perform well under the command of Captain Pereira, Pereira will ultimately be promoted – not Moura, nor Fabio, who will go home with just another medal.

Police commitment is a crucial variable for the success of innovative public security programs. Without the police understanding and feeling in accord with the project, their motivation to perform at their best will remain low. To my surprise, while overall the troop seemed demotivated, against the Pacto, and critical of their superiors, over 50 percent responded that they want to give their best at work. 26.19 percent disagreed, and 23.21 percent remained neutral.

Although 83 percent of the respondents replied that they had received a bonus for meeting the monthly quota of the Pacto, almost 60 percent responded that they do not feel inspired to meet the monthly meta. How to explain such discrepancies? My survey with the

battalion in Recife showed that the cop's opinions and satisfaction with training and work conditions were rather alarming. The overwhelming majority of respondents - almost 80% - said that the Military Police has NOT prepared them adequately for their work as a police officer under the Pacto. They narrowed down that mostly they lack in practice and experience in the field (52%); knowing the reality (43%); legal training (37%); self-defense (36%); and the handling of weapons/ shooting training (30%) were the most cited problems (134 out of 170 respondents total).

After hearing overall positive opinions about the Pact for Life from the greater population, praising of the program for decreasing homicides by the media but also from the civil police investigators, I wanted to know the military police officer's attitude towards the program that they have been working with for over seven years. A large number of the police officers at my precinct worked there long before the Pacto was launched, when Recife was experiencing extremely high violence levels. Nevertheless, a majority of 105 respondents indicated that they had a negative opinion about the Pacto. For example, some felt that "Pacto is working against police officers"; that "Pacto has made police work harder than before and punishes police officers for minor offenses."


In an interview with a military police colonel, he said: "*Precisa de policial com feeling, não ROTA de São Paulo. Precisa de policial que trata bem, não quer matar*"— we need police officers with 'feeling', not the ROTA from São Paulo. We need police that treats well, that doesn't want to kill", referring to the terror of extermination groups in the past. "The Pact for Life made the police accountable. Policing is a form of interaction, not some statistic. The Pacto communicates with society. We are creating a new generation of police officers with a new

vision, fresh minds, entering where nobody entered before,” (my emphasis) he continues<sup>55</sup>.

Colonel Cabral continued to praise the Pacto; “I have commanded and grown with the Pacto. It has revolutionized our police with new cars, equipment, laboratories, and better salaries. Also, now we punish the bad police officers – the flagrante for police officers doubled in sentence!”

Indeed, police officers who were charged with corruption or abuse of power were more rigorously prosecuted under the Pacto than ever before; even military police officers, who are usually trialed within the military police court, faced harsher punishments for misconduct.

### Number of Military Police Officers Punished before and after Pacto



*Part II Figure 18: Police Accountability. Source: Secretary of Social Defense, Recife 2008*

<sup>55</sup> Immediately I recognize this rhetoric from the Pacification Police Unit program. It is striking that Cabral would refer to the UPPs in Rio de Janeiro – a program celebrated as Brazil’s most innovative and fruitful - despite the fact that the police in Recife has always entered favelas routinely and moreover, the majority of cops live in favelas. Furthermore, the expression “new, fresh officers”, one of the central principles of the UPPs, was not adopted by the Pacto, which continued to work with the troops they already had.

Cabral and others attribute the concept of “merit” to be the most important change that changed and motivated police officers under the Pacto. “Mérito – this is new with the Pacto! Before, you were not rewarded for good behavior, so what difference does it make to arrest or to kill somebody? An arrest means a lot of work. More often than not, police officers watch the suspect go free after dozens of hours at the delegacia, then they arrest him for the next crime. Those are unpaid over-hours. So, in the past, they would punish them so the bandidos wouldn’t lose respect. Now we have the metas de homicidio, clear expectations of how many homicides are ok for which area,” said Cabral (author interview 2014).

What Cabral was talking about was a major change – probably the most significant change in Brazil. The Pact for Life included people shot or killed by the police in violent crime rates. To foreigners this may seem obvious that police shootings and killings would undergo an investigation and be included in homicide rates; however, in Brazil, the police operate under the underlying assumption that anyone who resists the police, can be legitimately shot dead. The victims of so-called *auto de resistencias*<sup>56</sup> are assumed guilty a priori, and their deaths are not recorded as homicides, but rather as suspects shot by the police in self-defense against a criminal’s threat. Pernambuco is the first state in Brazil to subject police killings to investigation and record lethal interaction between a police officer and a civilian as a violent crime. As such, it is part of the violent crimes counted monthly in each district. As a result, a police officer injuring or killing a suspect will automatically raise the meta and put the entire squad under investigation.

While Cabral, a high-ranking officer who never sets foot in the streets, is positive about the changes beat cops on the ground feel criminalized by their own institution. Many also felt that the Pacto did not change anything in the streets; when I asked how they explain that

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<sup>56</sup> Resistencia has its roots in the military dictatorship where the term was used widely when opposition members were killed by the police.

homicide rates seem to have gone down by 60% since the Pacto was implemented, one cop exclaimed: "It's all rigged! It is not true. I see the same amount of murders and violence as I did before", while a group of his colleagues nodded in agreement. Such conspiracy theories were very popular and seemed impossible to debunk. I would present data from different sources, government, and NGOs, which came up with same numbers of homicides; I would tell them about my work with the DHPP where civil police officers swear that before the Pacto murders would happen by the hour. Nothing convinced these military police officers that the Pacto had at least some positive effect, or at least that homicide rates in Recife decreased for whatever other reason.

Overall, for almost all of police officers working on the streets the shift goes by quickly (97 percent). They also feel that they can count on their colleagues and those police officers help and support each other (70 percent). It is an interesting discrepancy between motivation to give your best at work and not wanting to meet the targeted number of crimes. It seems evident that police officers did not incorporate the crime quota as related to "good" police work. Their definition of what proper policing consists of was not overlapping with the values of the Pacto.

My ethnographic work with those cops suggests that this discrepancy is based on a general resentment toward the Pacto, which to the cops represented an "intrusion" into the police's daily work. The accountability and surveillance that the Pacto introduced, through regular meetings, metas, and also GPS tracking of police cars resulted in a much higher numbers of suspended police officers.

Another aspect pertaining to satisfaction was the perception that the Pact for Life has decreased the respect for police officers. This feeling overlaps with the attitudes of pacification police officers in Rio, who also declared that "democratic" policing practices have weakened

their authority and respect for police. The underlying idea is that less repressive police tactics and more accountability of police officers automatically mean that criminals fear the police less. In both cases, Rio and Recife, military police officers who were part of a new program that put emphasis on accountability and proximity to citizens, conceptualized it as negative for their status and safety.

### *Special Task Forces and Human Rights*

While the Pact for Life operates on a less militarized basis than pacification in Rio, the military police do employ special task forces. These special task forces are generally more aggressive, equipped with more sophisticated weaponry, such as machine guns, these units are more feared by residents. One such task force is GATI, (which stands for *Grupo de Apoio tatico Itinerante*) in a police unit that was initially established to counter car-jackings. Special task forces do not necessarily use “special” police officers; in the case of GATI the beat cops get an invitation by a ranking officer, a few extra training hours, black uniforms and machine guns which completes their transition into fear and admired “warriors.” The famous and admired BOPE special task force in Rio de Janeiro is the best-known unit and while other states do not employ such radical task forces, they all aspire to earn this kind of respect and fear from the public.

### *Ride-along with GATI special task force*

I am sitting in between Barbosa, a dark-skinned giant who is always smiling, and Aristoteles, a hopelessly dumb muscular man. Aristoteles is not used to having a woman in the squad car; he tries to impress me with the story when electrocuted himself with his Taser gun

and did not lose consciousness. The team's commander, Tubarão, sits in the front next to our driver, Claudio, who is wearing a black ski mask to protect his identity; he doesn't want to take the chance of retaliation. GATI are different from regular beat cops in that they have more discretion to use force, better weaponry, and the attitude of "warriors". GATI teams generally aspire to the standards of infamous BOPE task force in Rio de Janeiro, although the conditions in Recife are entirely different. Residents respect GATI officers but they are also met with fear because they punish every wrong doing.

Aristoteles, 32, is a veteran from the army and loves his job because he thinks he is arresting the "bad guys." He cannot imagine such fulfillment in any other job. Claudio is with 39 years the oldest but has been working as a cop for only four years. Before that, he was a private security guard. Tubarão, 37, is sixteen years on the force. His whole family is in the military police, but his father didn't want him to enter; he wanted him to be someone important, like a physician. Tubarão has a reputation for being short-fused in the battalion.

While we drive slowly through Santo Amaro, we talk a little about human rights and violence. All of them agree on one thing, "*o seu direito acaba onde começa o dos outros*" – "your rights end where the rights of others begin. People still need to learn that here." "Everybody is throwing stones at us, but when they are in need, they call us," Aristoteles says. I ask if they would prefer to act like the police officers in Rio. "The situation is different here," they replied "we don't have sophisticated gangs or a clear enemy like them. Hell, sometimes I think it would be much better if we did! Here everyone is suspicious; everybody is capable of violence. In Rio you know it is the CV, the TC, the ADA. In São Paulo nothing happens until the PCC gang tells them to. It seems the fronts are much clearer, while here we arrest men, women,

children, our neighbors" - "*todo mundo é safado!*" – Everybody is rotten”, ponders Barbosa. Everyone assumes the worst of everyone else.

Immediately they start stopping and frisking people. The reason could be as simple as that they looked at them, that somebody clutched a bag, that someone was walking fast, or because of some other "hunch." If you run, you have something to hide. The first is a young black taxi driver who was sitting in his car counting money. GATI speed up, doors fly open and six armed men surround the taxi. The driver gets out of the car with his hands above his head. Aristoteles squeezes the taxi driver between the legs, doesn't find anything and lets him go. A couple comes by, both on a bike, she is sitting very pregnant on the bar. Claudio points his gun at them, and they immediately raise their hands, let the bike fall to the ground. Back in the car we get a message that a young man is wanted, suspicion of having two revolvers to commit an attack. Description: *Moreno* (brown), wearing shorts, and orthodontic braces<sup>57</sup> - essentially the suspect looks like everybody. Suddenly, I am thrown against the ceiling of the car, as we go full speed after a suspicious car, sirens ringing. In the middle of a busy alley, a man sees us and starts running. Three of the officers immediately exit the still moving car and take pursuit on foot while we drive after him. Finally, they catch him. A quick frisk shows no gun, no drugs, no stolen goods.

"What's your name?" Tubarão asks, "your apelido!" (nickname) – "Machete" the man responds. Tubarão looks his colleagues in the eyes, nods and the man is cuffed then put into the other squad car. I see the panic in his eyes. It all goes very quick. The patrol car disappears with screeching tires. There are no Miranda rights in Brazil, at least no police officer ever heard of

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<sup>57</sup> Braces are a fashion and status statement in many communities and do not actually work, or rarely even put in by a professional. Many simply glue the braces onto their teeth to signal that they are wealthy.

them. "They all know how this goes. They don't need this. Once they arrive at the delegacia, the PC tells them their rights, and they can call a lawyer."

The man known as Machete has a long record of eight (convicted) murders. Nevertheless, he is out and about and cannot be older than 25 years old. Tubarão explains that he received information from an informant, that the Machete was on his way to his mother's house to pick up a gun for a kill. This case is important as the precinct is only one violent crime away from hitting this month's meta, but there are still two long weeks to go. Every effort counts to keep that from happening.

We drive to Machete's mother's house to search for the alleged revolvers. I am asked to stay outside with Tubarão securing the area, while two GATI enter the house. A woman with a broom in her hand smiles at us, "look how fancy; today I have my personal security", she jokes and continues sweeping. The search comes up empty. "She must have tossed it. Word travels fast," Tubarão grumbles. I am now anxious about that suspect. Where did they take him? "To the delegacia," Tubarão says shortly. I find that hard to believe. The civil police have been on strike for months; operation tortoise has stopped all investigations. Different than the military police, the civil police are just like "normal" citizens allowed to protest; they have been actively doing in to receive better salaries. The military police, on the other hand, are prohibited by the military code to protest. As a result, military police resent the civil police for that freedom but also because it makes their work very difficult. Delegacias are understaffed, overcrowded, and most cases are not even accepted by investigators.

No police officer in his right mind would take it upon himself to spend hours in a crowded delegacia just to get the case dismissed right off the bat. A couple of weeks ago, I accompanied military police who waited 17 hours to hand over a suspect they arrested with a

bloody knife on him. I keep insisting on the disappeared suspect's whereabouts, his human rights and that I don't believe that they took him to the delegacia. Tubarão is getting annoyed. Or worried. Maybe now he realizes that having a foreign researcher in the car makes things difficult for them. Finally, after Tubarão sent out a few WhatsApp messages, we meet the rest of the team. They are at the hospital; allegedly, the suspect had an epileptic attack. He is in the orange unit, intensive care.

"What happened?" I ask Barbosa. "What do you mean?" he responds innocently, "We just needed to talk to him. He is a dangerous man you know" - "He is the one in the hospital," I replied. "We just talked. Psychological pressure you know, diplomacy... That's why we are so well liked," Barbosa says with a sheepish grin. When he realizes that I am not amused he adds, "Look, he gave us some information because he is afraid. He does not know that we cannot do anything to him anymore. He thinks we could kill him, right now; he doesn't know that with the Pacto resistências now count as homicides. Many also don't know that small quantities of drugs are no longer a crime. We just lied to him. He suddenly fell and had foam in his mouth". I am allowed to see him and talk to the doctor. I cannot identify any bruises, and the doctor says it is possible that this was indeed an epileptic attack, but he cannot tell for sure.

Claudio tells the doctor that Machete killed eight people. The doctor's face goes grim, and he suggests the suspect could have faked the attack to be brought to the hospital. It happens all the time. Machete does not want to talk to me; he simply falls asleep cuffed to his bed. The notion of the militarization of the police is understood by critical scholars as police which is given means (weapons, tactics, strategies) to repress marginalized populations (Wacquant 2008; Stephen 1999; Davis 1992). In Brazil, there is a dominant right-wing group that advocates for an increase in militarization of the police and orients itself by examples like the BOPE special task

force, which is unique to Rio de Janeiro. This "elite" task force operates with exceptional brutality and weaponry. Their pride to belong to a group of police that drive armored vehicles and subscribe to a symbol of a skull with a knife is routinely expressed in interviews and social media. It is this kind of "spectacular" state violence that is successful not only in the cinema but also among tourists looking for the ultimate Brazilian adventure, as Erika Robb Larkins shows in her book about drug violence in Rio de Janeiro (Robb Larkins 2015). BOPE's training is vastly different than any police unit in Recife, including GATI. However, military police officers are keen on joining task forces which are more militarized and more "manly".

However, police representative Joel da Harpa said: "BOPE cannot represent the police as a whole. They are an anomaly. Police must be prepared and trained as social agents. I will tell you something, I do not know how long this partnership between militarism and humanitarianism is going to work. The police officers in Recife do much more social work than "war." They come to domestic disputes, noise complaints, split up fights between drunks, visit single mothers and their starving children, talk to prostitutes..."

Military police in Recife understand human rights similar to police officers in Rio, as a threat to the *cidadão do bem* - the good citizen - and a protection of criminals. When asked if the use of force is necessary to obtain the population's respect, 55% of 170 police at the battalion in Recife responded "yes"; additional 35% "agreed strongly" with the statement. They also said that the "surveillance employed by the human rights limits the liberty to act as a police officer," to which 37% strongly agreed, and another 28% agreed. Only 16% disagreed with the statement.

While police officers in Rio might have responded in the same way, the ideas of appropriate use of force differ between the two cities. As already mentioned, Rio's military police are the most lethal in the world. In Recife, police officers certainly are repressive and

brutal at times, but they rarely employ premeditated lethal violence. The conditions in urban space do forge such extreme violence as military police in Recife generally do not face armed and organized criminals who want to kill police. As I have shown, the average patrol of a police officer, even in Recife's allegedly most violent favela, is ordinary and rather boring.

Furthermore, the majority of military police officers at the battalion in Recife (55%) still believed that police have a positive impact on the lives of favela communities, while UPP officers in Rio were very pessimistic. Nevertheless, an overwhelming number (64%) of beat cops in Recife, stated that most favela residents show a negative sentiment towards police officers. Cops explained this paradox with an argument about "inverted values." In their opinion, most favela residents are not able to appreciate police work and the improvements police bring to the communities because many residents are involved in crime; thus, these people will not see police in a positive light. However, for the "good citizen," so the police, they have a positive impact in keeping people safe. An older military police officer explained to me:

"The notion of the appropriate use of force has changed a lot in the military police [with the Pacto]. If a dealer dies in a shoot-out with the police, we get investigated. The problem is a lack of justice; we arrest, they get out. Arrest a murderer, next day he's back on the street. This is how bad police officers are created. But it is also a government which has its values the wrong way around. Human rights should be for the right humans!"

The Pact for Life in Recife has put human rights in the center of its program. Its central goal is the protection of human life, that has been too long treated with indifference by authorities when violence affected the "second class" of citizens. The police who interact most with this class are crucial to achieving a change in perspective. But it is the police unions that predominantly battle with the conceptions and misconceptions of human rights and how they are

applied and understood in society. In Recife, the deputy Joel da Harpa is one of the main players who "fights" for public security agents including civil police, military police, and prison guards. I met Joel da Harpa at a rally of police officers mourning and protesting the violent death of a prison guard called Silveira in 2014. Dramatically, Harpa was introduced at the meeting by the Military Police priest right in addition to the prayer to Saint George, the saint of police and soldiers, protector of all warriors and heroes.

"That policemen are not allowed to fight for their rights will change in Pernambuco!" shouts Da Harpa, earning storming applause. The convention center is packed and loaded with emotions; people are holding posters and demanding justice for Silveira, a corrections officer who was recently chopped into pieces at a prison rebellion. The speakers scream their speeches at the top of their lungs until their voices break. They are preaching and sweat profusely.

"We must radicalize! How do you think the major conquests in Europe were made? Radicalization! Revolution!", Harpa continues, referring to the French revolution. He is touching upon the sensitive topic of protest and freedom of speech in the Military Police institution. The military code forbids military police officers to strike, protest, or even complain about their employer or working conditions. Coming late to a shift can be punished with prison; a ranking officer can arrest you for having the wrong haircut, painted nails, wearing make-up (women) or a not ironed shirt. The civil police, on the other hand, operates under civil laws. Thus, the agents have the right to unionize, strike and protest.

*"Eu vim da base, como soldado da PM,"* Joel begins our interview by positioning himself socially, as a "second class" citizen and praça who grew up in a highly violent and impoverished favela, as most police officers do. The favela he grew up in, Cavaleira, is a known name to my ears; it is a community that was well known for its merciless extermination groups that worked

all over Recife killing those that made "too much trouble" in the name of other criminals. A kill was not expensive, about 5,000 Reais tells me Joel; "there were even payment plans." Joel entered the Military Police in 1998 because he wanted to address the terrible violence that had been terrorizing his community his whole life. "Every weekend there would be at least two or three homicides. People would be walking by the bodies to go to the bakery or market. Someone would put a bed sheet over them, and then it was like there was nothing. "*Banalização total da vida*" – a total banalization of life, Joel remembers.

Once a police officer, Joel began to notice the inequalities and injustice about the Military Police institution and perpetuated by his superiors. "It is the indifference that the media, human rights, the proper executive power show about the disqualification of the professional." According to Joel, and his followers, the media, human rights as well as the judicial system are chronically meeting police matters with indifference, lack of empathy and a lack of attention.

"The police officer is a citizen before he is a policeman. He is a human being. His service is already punishing in itself. The state should recognize him more and realize the difficulty in the overlap of a police officer's life and duty. Police officers and their families struggle to eat, to live decently, and to enjoy any recreation."

At the time of my interview with Joel, in March 2015, the monthly salary of a Military Police soldier was about 2,300 Brazilian Reais, about 740 US Dollars. On average police officers have two to three children, they cannot afford their home, so they rent which on this salary is only possible to afford if inside a favela. Police officers in Recife go to work in favelas and return to reality in which they become exposed to danger, revenge, and precarity as a resident. As a police officer, they combat issues arising from such circumstances, almost exclusively in favelas. They are intrinsic members of those who suffer from poverty, inequality, and

discrimination. They are also intimately acquainted with the dynamics at play, the exposure to violence and the "banalization of life," as Joel put it, where one life is rarely more worth than 5,000 Reais, or three years in prison.

While police officers are government representatives that are especially under scrutiny because they are equipped with a unique license to use force, it is also tough to overlook their role as citizens, especially because they are part of a group that is disproportionately targeted by a lack of a political voice, inequality, and state violence. In essence, favela residents are policing themselves in the name of a state that has historically treated this part of the population with indifference. Joel's proposition as a politician who is primarily interested in the rights and quality of life and duty for the Military Police are propositions made for "workers," not government employees.

Above all, Joel wanted "*valorização das forças de segurança*" – the valorization of the security forces, predominantly through human rights. In 2010, he helped to establish a national group for the promotion and defense of human rights for public security professionals. Ironically, the group received support by radical right politician and human rights critic, Jair Bolsonaro (who is also politically affiliated with Joel and currently a presidential candidate for Brazil). Amongst the many points, the following constitutional rights that are demanded stick out:

- 1) to secure the exercise of the right to free speech and opinion of the public security professionals, in particular on the Internet, blogs, websites and online discussion forums
- 2) to guarantee work schedules that keep in line with the right to vote for all public security professionals.
- 3) proportionate distribution of equipment for individual and collective protection for public safety professionals, in adequate quantity, quality, assuring its permanent allocation, considering its usage and validity

- 4) training and instruction for all public safety professionals
- 5) orientation and concrete actions to identify, prevent, and confront racism in the institution<sup>58</sup>
- 6) guarantee integral respect to the constitutional rights to female security agents, considering the specifics related to pregnancy and breastfeeding, as well as the permanent demands of caretaking of children and teenagers.
- 7) to fortify and disseminate in the public security institution the culture of non-discrimination and respect for the freedom of sexual orientation of security agents with emphasis on combatting homophobia<sup>59</sup>.

For Joel and his peers, militarization means mainly the military code of conduct that impedes the police to be valorized. Joel is advocating for a loosening if not abandonment of the military system which he describes as antiquated, stemming from times of the Military Dictatorship. "A police officer who comes late skips a shift, or doesn't have polished shoes may face imprisonment for 21 days. Nobody asks for a reason," says Joel. The military code prescribes that "arrest" of officers may be executed at the will of their commanders and the officer is usually put under "house arrest" at the precinct. This means, however, that over the course of 21 days he will not be able to attend courses at a college or the like, nor work an extra job (illicit under military code but for most necessary to earn a living for their families). The imprisonment over things like coming late is enacted surprisingly often, compared to charges of much more severe crimes such as abuse of a suspect (Huggins 2010). Thus, Joel argues correctly, that the Military Police send a message that prioritizes the appearance of the force but encourage behavior that is military and violent in nature against suspects. Joel requires worker's rights for

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<sup>58</sup> This point about racism, addresses mainly the hierarchy between superior officers and beat cops, latter being predominantly dark-skinned and former predominantly white.

<sup>59</sup> This one is surprising given the radically homophobic exclamations of Bolsonaro and his followers

police officers not to abandon militarism all together, but to secure fundamental rights such as paid over time, being able to be affiliated with a political party (prohibited under military code), and expression of opinions, which includes the right to protest.

In Pernambuco, the civil police regularly take advantage of those rights – as previous chapter shows, in 2014-15 they were almost constantly on strike, during the operation “Polícia Cidadão”, which advocated to see police officers as regular citizens and raise their value in society; and Operação Tartaruga (Operation Tortoise), aiming at slowing down their services even more to demonstrate the value of its agents. Since arrests became even more nonsensical than usual, the military police felt that their only option to “keep the peace” in the city was to employ more repressive tactics.

The military police in Recife is, however, not entirely subordinated to the military code. In 2013, beat cops in Recife went on strike. Protesting is prohibited for military police members and rare to happen throughout one institution. In Rio de Janeiro any attempt on strike in the military police are met with harsh and unforgiving punishments; such large strike has never happened. In Recife in 2013, thousands of military police officers stayed at home, while the population of Recife slowly realized the vacuum. The result were city-wide looting, killings, and chaos. While the effects of the strike cost many lives, the military police were satisfied with the outcomes as they felt that, finally, the population and politicians had understood their value and necessity in society. They achieved a slight raise in salary. Without police, so many of my police colleagues, society would drip back into the dark ages.

## CONCLUSION

It is only in the last few years that a transformation of drug policy across countries began to appear as a credible scenario. The global debate on the failure of the "war on drugs" gave way to shift from criminal punishment toward legalization and public health approaches.

Nevertheless, for undefined future ahead, the police will remain the first state respondent to drug-fueled violence in the streets. These local experiences and encounters will interconnect and propel the circulation of political ideas, policy knowledge, and new imaginaries related to the management of "the drug problem" in society. Clashes between police and citizens will mark – for both sides – how the state, criminality, and citizenship are imagined and experienced.

The Pact for Life in Recife introduced an important change by decriminalizing drugs for personal use. The program, thus, reduced police incentive to search and arrest addicts; instead, it provided care through the program ATITUDE which focusses mainly on crack users. As a result the daily interactions between patrolling military police officers and underprivileged drug users took a less repressive shape. On the other hand, elements adopted from Boston's Project Ceasefire put emphasis on firearm apprehension through intensive stop and frisk activities, that alienated many in the communities. Furthermore, violence related to the few gangs in the area, such as turf war over a street corner, would be met with "Operation Saturation", in which a high number of police officers would enter the area and frisk every person in sight, stop street level trafficking, arrest petty criminals for minor incidents, and employ the more repressive special task force GATI.

What I have experienced in the military police battalion was an utter dissatisfaction and resentment towards the Military Police institution and local government. That is not to say that the cops did not respect their work and mission – most would state that they felt a "vocation" to

enter the police force and remain fond of its ideals. However, the street cops experienced what they identified as a profound disconnect between their realities on the streets and the expectations at administrative levels. The Pacto provoked a resentment for scrutinizing and punishing the police in its attempt to make police more accountable. Many officers felt also divided about their tasks to be enforcers of the law and their role as social workers in mainly non-criminal cases. To me, it was not entirely understandable how the Pacto could be so badly regarded by the troops. While conditions were not elegant, the Pacto did decrease violence and provided police with better salaries, and equipment than before.

The fundamental problem of policing is, that police are not effective at preventing crime. There is no evidence for a connection between a number of police officers and crime rates. Studies in the US showed that police numbers rise parallel to rising crime rates. There is also no significant difference in crime when police numbers suddenly dropped. However, there are critical thresholds beyond which changing the number of police would affect crime (Marvell and Moody 1996; Sherman and Eck 2002; Kovandzic and Sloan 2002; McCrary 2002; Lin 2009) One such threshold was achieved when the military police in Recife went on strike in 2013. David Bayley writes in *Police for the Future* (1994) “It is unlikely that crime will be reduced if we try to spend our way to safety by adding police officers. Changes in the number of police within any practicable range will have no effect on crime.” While this may be true, a radical reduction of police will provoke an outcry by citizens and the police themselves. On the other hand, police officers in Recife perceived themselves as completely powerless against crime rates. They are acutely aware that they appear only after a crime was committed and only rarely are in the position to prevent a crime from happening. In conclusion, it becomes apparent that the primary strategies of modern police, namely patrol, emergency response, have little to no effect

on crime. Studies show that unless the public can specifically identify suspects to the police, the chances that a crime will be solved fall to about 10% (Greenwood, Petersilia, and Chaiken 1977; Eck 1983). On their own, police are of little use in crime prevention, regardless of the technology and bonuses they receive.

Police usually argue that it is not their fault that clearance and prevention rates are low. They point out the corrupted and inefficient criminal justice system in Brazil, especially courts and judges, who fail to follow through by convicting and punishing suspects. They also point to the hopelessly overcrowded and underdeveloped prisons in Pernambuco, one of the worst in the world, that has been neglected by the Pact for Life. While more suspects were arrested due to improved policing, the prison system was never updated.

As violence rates began to rise again at the end of 2013, police officers complained repeatedly that they “arrest and the next day he is out on the streets again.” Military police blamed it on suspects being found innocent, evidence being thrown out because of technicalities, plea bargains that reduced serious charges into minor offenses, and, most of all, lazy civil police investigators who are reluctant to take on cases. There were several times when the whole arresting team would have to wait up to 17 hours at the delegacia for a suspect to be processed because of the civil police strike at the time.

Military police are right in arguing that their preventive efforts depend in large part on actions by the prosecutor, judges, parole officer, and corrections officers. The Ceasefire project, based on deterrent (fear producing) and firearm apprehension showed itself effective in decreasing gang related violence in Boston. However, the U.S. has also the highest crime rates in developed, democratic countries also has the highest proportion of its population in prisons, while Canada, UK, and Australia had lower crime rates and much lower incarceration rates (U.S.

Department of Justice 2014). Nevertheless, the U.S. cop and criminal justice system are often cited as the optimal model to achieve in Brazil. This is in part, as more conservative police and citizens explained to me, because of the death penalty in some states which they believe cautions criminals; as well as the liberal gun laws, which supposedly scare criminals from committing a robbery. The fact is, that although the U.S. has the harshest penalties among democratic countries, its crime rates also are the highest and there are no signs of them dropping.

"That the police are not able to prevent crime should not come as a surprise. It is understood that social conditions outside of the control of the police, as well as outside the supervision of the criminal justice system as a whole, determine crime levels in communities. Police know this, and they often complain that they are expected to protect communities from the consequences of their neglect [...] They see themselves as a "band-aid on cancer" (Bayley 1994:10).

It is widely accepted, that the best predictors of crime are factors such as employment, income, education, gender, age, ethnicity, and family composition. In Recife, for example, most victims and perpetrators are black, young men from favelas. To my surprise, police officers repeatedly stated that they wished Recife would have more organized crime structures as in Rio, a city that became infamous for its battles between armed drug gangs and police. Their hypothesis was that then, the "enemy" would be easier to identify, and the more *laissez-faire* laws of war would allow more ways to combat criminals. Recife's seemingly random violence, which spreads throughout the region like a virus, affects disproportionately the people in poor neighborhoods and makes police work seem senseless to many officers. They guard the feeling of being ultimately useless, invisible, and inactive - which they counter pose to the spectacular militaristic violence of Rio de Janeiro. In Recife, police work entails predominantly dealing with

social problems, not crime. I would argue that not all people in the streets of Recife see the police as social workers; however, as shown in these chapters, routine patrols focus predominantly on issues not related to crime but daily insecurities, struggles, and inconveniences. For example, Dona Maria at Santo Amaro, who would call our vehicle to resolve arguments with her neighbor; paramedics who request an escort; quarrels between husband and wife; drunk and disorderly. Colleagues received calls from an Evangelical Church to report "black magic" in the Candomblé Temple next door; finally, at Bode residents regularly called patrol to control a destructive drunk man. These services of more social nature lubricated the relationships between police and residents and enabled cooperation and intelligence in these particular communities.

## CHAPTER 12

### CONCLUSION: ENTERING THE ERA OF MILITARY DEMOCRACIES?

The recent impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff once again steered the attention of the international community towards Brazil. The political, social, and economic instability that spread through Brazil in recent years are accompanied by underlying questions of security and if Brazil indeed can and should be categorized as a democracy. In the past fourteen years the country was under the leadership of the Worker's Party and has accomplished some astounding improvements with pulling millions out of poverty, expanding economically, and even tackling its dramatic violence rates. Nevertheless, until this day there is no federal agreement or proposal of reforms that would transform the chronically corrupt police forces. The recent political and economic crisis in Brazil has also undermined the legitimacy of already weak institutions.

Brazil's government recently reported that the cumulative cost of crime and violence amounted to more than 4.3 percent of the country's gross domestic product in 2015 (Londoño and Moriconi 2018). Between 1997 and 2015, the cost of violence in Brazil rose to over \$138 billion per year, at a time when Brazil is facing an existential economic crisis with several states being bankrupt. In part, the release of such concerning results has to do with the upcoming presidential elections, in which the historically most unpopular democratic administration is trying to project a sense of urgency about crime prevention strategies. President Michel Temer's recent actions regarding public security were to put the military overseeing security operations in Rio de Janeiro, while extending "democratic" policing models like the community police in primarily wealthy neighborhoods.

With over 62,000 deaths in 2016, Brazil certainly reached one of the highest homicide rates in the world, with more than 30 per 100,000 residents. As a comparison, in the U.S. the homicide rate for the same time was at 5 per 100,000 although the country has twice as many inhabitants as Brazil (World Bank Data 2015). The violence is clearly marked by race, as black or mixed-race Brazilians account for the majority of homicide victims and almost all police killings. Despite the concerning results, violence rates in metropolises such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo have decreased significantly over the past decade, while *mata-mata* Mondays became routine and the primary cause of death for young men in the Northeast of the country.

As I outline in Chapter 2 and 4, Brazilian policing tactics have evolved since democratization in 1980s, and with places like Rio we can see the uses of militarized equipment and approaches when dealing with heavily armed drug trafficking organizations. We can see large investments from the private sector (e.g. real estate interests), coinciding to some extent with early perceptions of success for preventive policing programs. The picture I offer is one in which the First World is currently experiencing a militarization of law enforcement styles (as reflected in weaponry, equipment, training, and acceptable uses of force), while simultaneously we see Western, democratic countries investing to democratize policing efforts in developing countries (e.g. Haiti, Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq).

The case studies presented in Chapter 5, discuss local complexities brought upon the most vulnerable residents in Brazil, who experience “democratic” policing and human rights primarily through gentrification and real estate speculation. This leads to the question how much of the democratizing effort globally is happening due to market opportunities and financial gain? In other words, do various parties within the Western, democratic countries stand to benefit financially from a market dealing in security services, consulting, and sales of arms and military

technologies? My answer to this question is yes. Even if the Pacification Police Unit were not invented with the primary goal to exploit new economies (favelas that lost the protection of drug gangs), the formalization of commerce, opening to a formal economy, and building coding all had the effect of displacement and damaging foreign investment in Rio's favelas, and to a lesser extent in Recife's favelas like Bode.

I have shown, that on their state goals, both initiatives, the UPP and Pacto have been profoundly successful, at least on the surface, and have been touted by their proponents as exportable models of public security (Magaloni, Franco, and Melo 2015; Macedo 2012). What is most interesting about this study, however, is that the UPPs and the PPV respond to two very different logics of violence, with rather similar approaches "approved" by Western examples. Hot spots, stop and frisk, proximity policing; ideas from Japan, Colombia, New York City and Boston coupled with high technology - a concoction that was readily labeled as "democratic policing" by Pacification as well as Pacto officials. To the police officers on the ground, however, these approaches might as well have been "from Mars," as one officer put it.

In thinking about what accounts for the vastly different approaches to criminal violence (since 1980s) used by the state and/or localized policing institutions in Rio (Pacification Police) versus Recife (Pact for Life) some might point out that there is a greater mandate for control and crime prevention (and perceptions of order) in Rio, especially given the higher domestic and international visibility of crime in parts of Rio as compared to Recife. Some might also argue that there was more funding available in Rio policing, which may in turn lead to more experimentation with or applications of paramilitary tactics or "democratic" policing.

I also suggest another important variable, what I call the logics of crime and violence, and how such local constraints and challenges might shape everyday decisions made by policing

agents on the ground – thus leading to variability by region. As my study has shown, violent crime in Recife is different from Rio. Chapter 11, in particular, discusses the lack of well-armed and highly organized drug traffickers (which police argue require a paramilitary response) in Recife. Chapter 12 discusses the logics of homicidal violence in Recife, which is largely out of the public eye (domestically and internationally, which motivated a high-profile response with rapid results). This context contributed to its policing approaches being less paramilitary and based on systematic intel collection and crime investigation – both aspects are lacking in the Pacification Police Unit in Rio de Janeiro.

Notions of accountability and (self) perceptions are situated in between the worlds of the state, the traffickers, and the residents meant to be protected. I make the case that police need to be perceived as “publicly accountable”. I also point out the ways in which formal and informal actions are intertwined, how criminal organizations and the state are in a structured symbiosis (Chapter 3). Also evident is how pacification led to both relocation and de-arming of traffickers, but not an elimination of their markets and to opportunities for police to still participate in the illegal economy through bribes, transport, and safe passage. The positionality of Rio’s and Recife’s police officers as essentially linked to the state, however, is not clear cut. As survey work with the UPP as well as Pact for Life police officers shows, both expressed deep disconnect and dissatisfaction not only with the programs but the government overall.

Chapter 6, shows through the figure of UPP commander Achilles and his transformation, the treacherous relationships, race and class divisions within the police institution that threaten its members and make “good cops afraid”. Police in Recife share these feelings of disenfranchisement and dissatisfaction about state institutions and policies. This disconnect from state-imposed values and policies enhances the hyperbolic notion of a “warrior” or Saint fighting

alone against a beast and impacts day-to-day policing duties on the ground by promoting acts that are deemed illegal but not illegitimate.

As Achilles and Pricilla both demonstrated, they did not see themselves serving the state, but the communities and even attempted to protect residents from neoliberal policies implemented by state and non-state agents (much like drug traffickers before them). Chapter 13 offered insight on the daily patrolling and interactions between citizens and police officers in Recife, versus their interactions with state policy makers. It shows the importance of whom police feel they are ultimately accountable to – whether to government officials/politicians or to the communities themselves, even though these sometimes require illicit repressive actions, as in the case of the *arrastão*. Same question could be asked about elected officials in democracies – whether seen as self-serving or public-serving.

I argue that the relationship between the police and the public is at the heart of the dissertation, and thus convey the notion that local community attitudes and trust concerning the police are significant factors for both the perceived successes of policing as well as feelings of justice and security experienced by local communities. Attitudes about the efficacy, ineffectiveness, apathy, or corruption of the state influence attitudes about the legitimacy of localized policing programs and attitudes about the “trustworthiness” of police officers.

Broadly speaking, these micro case studies in Rio and Recife shed light on the dynamics of policing effectiveness and how it is greatly influenced by how policing institutions are perceived by themselves and those that they are serving. The issues of trust and legitimacy are hereby crucial factors. As encapsulated by Wagner’s views, in Chapter 5, about how he hated the drug traffickers at Saudade but still trusted them more than the police, we can see a significant

challenge that police officers face. Indeed, officers I interviewed talked about the theft of power by criminal traffickers from police officers.

The cases of commanders Achilles and Pricilla show that some police officers on the ground saw hope in building trust. Policing agents negotiated this conundrum to foster forms of trust with favela residents by primarily approaching those they deemed “innocent”, namely children, women, and local churches. However, the hope and work for trust was only possible in a safe and stable environment; once the World Cup and Olympic Games were under way, drug gangs started reclaiming their territories, politicians engaged in corruption on deep levels and UPP officers were left understaffed in precarity.

After my return from the field in 2015, the Military Police administrators in Rio de Janeiro declared that proximity policing will become policy not only in favelas but as a general policing model for the whole city and even the entire state by 2018. To this effect, the state government is to publish new decrees, one establishing a hands-on public safety council; and one setting out police goals and monitoring mechanisms which were largely copied from the Pact for Life program in Recife. The first "Batalhão Legal" (meaning “friendly battalion” but also an ironic play with the word “legal”) was set up in the North Zone in March 2015. It has received the nickname “UPP do asfalto”, a pacification police unit on the asphalt, or formal part of the city. While such attempts are overall admirable, they come without credible content. The issue of police training and military code were not reformed and greater emphasis on criminal investigation is still lacking. At a minimum, the UPP program needs a clearer doctrine (there is no protocol for how precisely to police favelas), improved metrics (no surveillance system is in place), and a more systematized means of collecting data as well as sharing this data.

The Pacto pela Vida, for its part, responds to an “epidemiological pattern of Violence”, which is driven less by imperatives of territorial control, and instead resembles the spreading of infectious diseases (Wolff 2015). Its approach seeks to identify hotspots – areas where outbreaks of violence are commonly originating. Using stop and frisk methods to apprehend firearms and concrete monthly goals, as well as an emphasis on investigation the Pacto succeeded in increasing crime solving and reducing homicide rates. Nevertheless, after ten years of constantly lowering murder rates, Pernambuco has returned to the staggering violence that ravaged its poor before the Pact for Life was initiated in 2007.

Supposedly, there will be a 290 million Reais investment in the Pacto over the next two years. This funding is focused almost exclusively on police officers, cars, and military weaponry, not in preventative measures or social investment. Different to previous years of the Pacto, civil society has not been consulted in the planning and strategy of preventative measures that would integrate coercive and preventative approaches. No projects addressing violence prevention and focus on vulnerable populations were announced. Most disturbingly, there has been a push to create a Pernambucan BOPE squad, based on Rio de Janeiro’s notoriously brutal special task force. Importantly, the government of Pernambuco has not mentioned any necessary transformation of the prison system to adequately deal with higher conviction rates. Furthermore, the Attitude Program, a project that aims to protect crack users against violence and provides rehabilitation, is being threatened by conservative groups who insist on gratifying the police for even minimal drug seizures. The criminalization of drugs for personal use would only increase violence in local drug markets and favor police raids and corruption. The most telling feedback of these retrograding measures are violence rates. The first three months of 2017, totaled almost

1,500 homicides in the state of Pernambuco. At this pace, there will be more than 5,000 homicides in Pernambuco in 2017; which would be almost 1% of all murders on the planet.

My research makes contributions to anthropological thought along the dimensions of social control, study of violence and grief, militarization and the state as well as to other domains of research in Latin American Studies and Criminology. The ethnographic work enhances a greater understanding of the daily experiences of police actors as well as favela residents as they navigate disparate social and political environments. In many ways, the research also highlights how the state, whether due to ignorance, inability, apathy, or unwillingness, can be largely absent for many communities, and how agents within these communities must find ways to live with their own improvised and oftentimes illicit forms of political and social infrastructures.

Ultimately, this study shows that community policing efforts face unique difficulties in societies that are marked by extreme degrees of inequality, political corruption, and violence. Police officers themselves feel that there is an inherent paradox in what they are charged to do and what they can actually accomplish, and many point regularly to the “first world” policing methods they are asked to perform in a “third world” context. Conceptions of 'democratic policing' as defined and developed in the West, do not translate neatly to the Brazilian context. As my ethnographic examples showed, people's understanding of democracy, human rights, and legitimate policing vary substantially. These notions are guided by class, residence, and specific cultural norms of each region and community. The relationship between citizens and police is one extreme context through which understandings of democracy are magnified. It naturally raises questions about democracy in the West, too.

Politically, the post pacification era in Rio de Janeiro as well as Pact for Life in Pernambuco, beg the question how much political parties such as PT (Worker's Party) that

promoted these programs, benefit through the promotion of ideologies premised on protection against terror, fear, and disorder. Favela residents as well as police officers were left to navigate the changing waters of public security in both cities, both vulnerable to decisions made in the higher echelons. Favela residents experienced safer communities, but suffered from real estate speculations, displacement, and gentrification.

While international media reports tend to depict favela residents purely as victims of situations that are out of their control, this ethnographic account aspires to be different. Although violence had become a part of everyday life, my study shows that residents sought ways to make sense of violence, new regimes and policing models in their community and to mitigate the effects of change. To people on the ground, the difference between paramilitary and “democratic” policing was a matter of adapting to a new set of restrictions and a new “regime”. For those living in midst of the most violent areas, uncertainty was double edged - it caused despair but also made space for maneuver and improvisation.

## APPENDIX 1

In July 2015, I surveyed 200 military police officers in Recife, using the following questionnaire. The survey results are provisional and offer a glimpse into how police officers understood violence patterns, their mission, and the Pact for Life program, as well as who is responsible for mitigating crime. Language: The survey was drafted and presented in Brazilian Portuguese, the only language common to myself and the research participants. I was responsible for the final draft and the dissemination of surveys.

Analysis: I conducted survey analysis using Survey Monkey.

**Vista de Policiais****Perfil Policial**

## 1. Gênero

- Feminino  
 Masculino

## 2. Você é oficial ou praça?

- Praça  
 Oficial

## 3. Eu fui criado/ moro em comunidade de baixa renda com forte presença de criminalidade

- Discordo fortemente  
 Discordo  
 Neutro  
 Concordo  
 Concordo fortemente

## 4. Para chegar no BPM eu uso

- carro  
 transporte público

## 5. Idade

- 18-24  
 25-35  
 Mais que 35

## 6. Escolaridade

- Pós-graduação  
 Curso superior completo  
 Curso superior incompleto  
 Ensino médio completo

7. Está estudando atualmente?

- sim
- não

8. Tempo na PM

- menos que 5 anos
- mais que 5 anos
- mais que 10 anos
- mais que 15 anos

9. Em quantos BPMs, ao todo, o (a) senhor(a) já foi lotado(a)?

- Um
- Dois
- Três
- Quatro
- Cinco ou mais

10. Quanto tempo, em média, o (a) senhor(a) leva diariamente para chegar da sua casa até o BPM?

- Menos que 30 min.
- 30 min a menos de uma hora
- Uma a menos de duas horas
- Duas a menos de quatro horas
- Quatro a menos de seis horas



## Vista de Policiais

### Formação

11. De modo geral, você acha que a formação na PM preparou você adequadamente para o serviço de polícia?

- Sim
- Não

12. Para quem respondeu NÃO na pergunta 8: Na sua opinião o que faltou na formação?

- Prática/ experiência na rua
- Formação em direito
- Formação direcionada a policiamento de proximidade
- Trabalho na favela
- Conhecimento da realidade
- Manuseio de armamento/ treino de tiro
- Técnicas de abordagem
- Formação mais longa
- Técnicas de patrulhamento
- Professores/instrutores melhores
- Policiamento comunitário
- Defesa pessoal
- Uso progressivo da força
- Tudo/quase tudo
- Outros

13. Formação única de policiais iria melhorar a qualidade de policiamento (formação para todos PM entrando começaria como soldado subindo até oficial)

- Discordo fortemente
- Discordo
- Neutro
- Concordo
- Concordo fortemente

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