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*The
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


The United States

1945

and **Germany**

1955



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Ten years ago World War II came to an end. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union set into operation the machinery for quadripartite military occupation and control of defeated Germany. The United States undertook to help create order out of chaos, looking forward to a world united in peace.

Now, in 1955, we in the United States are accustomed to adjusting our sights to the realities of a divided world and an atomic age. Our policy for Germany, a country tragically divided, as the world is tragically divided, has been profoundly influenced by that cleavage.

The entire decade has been marked by crisis and change. The hopes of the Western nations have risen, fallen, then risen again along the course toward unity and security. Events beyond our control have forced us to modify our course. But we have not compromised our policy objectives either for Germany or for Western Europe, of which Germany is an integral part.

The events of the past year more than any other have tested the validity of our policy. In spite of obstacles and reverses, our policy for Germany has achieved in a decade what we once believed would require a full generation. A new Germany, risen from the ruins of Nazi Germany, has reached the status of well-earned sovereignty and acceptance as an equal into the partnership of free nations. To be sure, not all Germany has enjoyed an equal rate of progress. To 18 million Germans living in what is known as the Soviet Zone, freedom and prosperity are still denied.

With respect to Germany no less than with respect to every other country, our foreign policy has one all-inclusive, unchanging purpose. "It is," to quote Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, "to enable you and me and our children to enjoy in peace the blessings of liberty."

The ways and means of achieving our purpose in regard to Germany have changed since 1945—but so have we changed, and

so has Germany, and so has the world. To appreciate the significance of both progress and change and to measure the success of U. S. policy in Germany, it is necessary to look back to the beginning of the postwar decade and note the factors that have influenced our course.

THE SHAPING OF THE POLICY

Long before the Nazi collapse the United States was developing its policy for a defeated Germany. Forged in the bitter war period and from the resolve that Germany must be prevented from again becoming an aggressor, the policy might well have been wholly punitive and negative in character. Instead, it was from the beginning a coin with two faces. A grim one dictated immediate punitive and preventive measures, such as prosecution of war criminals, disarmament, demilitarization, denazification, dismantling of heavy industry, and reparations. But a hopeful face looked to the future, contemplating ways and means of helping the German people to rebuild their society in a peaceful and democratic fashion.

In the fury of the Second World War, there were some who believed that the best way to prevent future German aggression was to strip Germany of all resources and industries upon which fighting power depends. They recommended forcing Germany to convert from an industrial to an agrarian economy. Others, notably Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, opposed this plan as impracticable.

Much of German history had been rooted in an authoritarian structure of society, and for the past 12 years the German people had been conditioned by a system of totalitarian control. Could there be a reorientation toward democratic thinking and practice? Moreover, could conqueror turn teacher? Might not the natural resentment of the conquered toward the conquerors breed resistance to any ideas the victors might advance? We could establish the machinery and procedures of democracy by military fiat,

but of what use would they be unless the spirit to animate them had a resting place in the German mind and heart?

Those who pondered the long-range objectives concluded that an authentic democratic way of life for Germany should grow from German roots. It must be indigenous. Germany most definitely had its democratic elements. It would be our job to discover living exponents of democratic thought in Germany and encourage them with practical aid and advice to lead their fellow countrymen along the democratic way. If we provided the people with a political climate favorable to democratic thinking and practice, then we might yet expect to witness the gradual growth and flowering of the democratic spirit. Such was the thinking behind the long-range policy for Germany, behind the hopeful face of the coin.¹

While war raged, minds at the international level were primarily concerned with the darker face. The problem of how to conquer the formidable German enemy appeared more pressing than that of what to do with him after the victory. Both problems required agreement among the Great Powers; that of a wartime strategy necessarily took precedence over that of a postwar policy for the defeated enemy—and was, relatively speaking, easier to achieve.

Despite the emphasis on conduct of the war, interallied discussions on postwar treatment of Germany were fairly frequent in Washington, in London, and in Moscow. Through his ambassadors and special emissaries, the President kept informed of the thinking of our Allies. During a brief visit to Washington in March 1943, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden confirmed certain reports that President Roosevelt had been receiving from his ambassadors. There was no question, Mr. Eden said, but that Stalin would insist that Germany be broken up into a number of states. Harry Hopkins, special assistant to the President, reported of a conversation with Eden:

“The President said he hoped we would not use the methods discussed at Versailles and also promoted by Clemenceau to arbitrarily divide Germany, but thought that we should encourage the differences and ambitions that will spring up within Germany for

¹ These principles were incorporated in the Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-education, issued June 5, 1946.

a Separatists Movement and, in effect, approve of a division which represents German public opinion.”

At Tehran, from November 28 to December 1, 1943, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Stalin planned the military operations that were to defeat Nazi Germany. However, they devoted part of their last meeting at Tehran to the issue of a proposed reorganization of Germany—frequently referred to as “dismemberment.”

President Roosevelt proposed the creation of five autonomous states: a reduced and isolated Prussia and four composed of two or more *Laender* or other political units each, with the Kiel Canal, the Ruhr, and the Saar to be placed under United Nations control. Churchill agreed that Prussia, long associated with the idea of German militarism, should be separated from the rest and suggested that the southern states should be detached to become part of a Danubian confederation.

At Tehran Stalin showed little enthusiasm for either proposal, saying that when *he* said dismemberment he meant dismemberment. He saw no difference between Germans of one part of the country and those of another, and he opposed putting any parts of Germany in a confederation, arguing that if Germans were in it they would soon dominate it. He warned that there would always be a strong urge on the part of the Germans to unite and declared the whole purpose of any international organization must be to neutralize this tendency by applying economic and other measures including, if necessary, force.

Their differences on the subject unresolved, the three powers referred the dismemberment issue to the European Advisory Commission in London for further consideration. That Commission, however, became absorbed in planning the occupation and control of Germany and never reached the point of discussing the dismemberment issue.

Meanwhile, proposals for the future reorganization and administration of Germany multiplied. At the second Quebec Conference both Roosevelt and Churchill approved the Morgenthau Plan for partitioning and “pastoralizing” Germany. But only a few weeks later President Roosevelt had reached the point where he doubted the wisdom of any specific planning for the treatment of a defeated Germany. On October 20, 1944, he wrote

in a memorandum to his Secretary of State: "I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy," pointing out that the details should be "dependent on what we and the Allies find when we get into Germany—and we are not there yet."

DECISIONS AT YALTA

The week of February 4-11, 1945, brought the three powers together again, at Yalta. The war with Germany was nearing its end, and some basic decisions on Allied policy for the defeated enemy were in order. Agreements were not easily reached. Some that were, were of a tentative nature.

The three powers agreed to amend article 12 of the Surrender Terms for Germany² to read:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarization and dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

However, they were actually no closer to accord on the nature and extent of "dismemberment" than they had been at Tehran. They referred study of "the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany" to a tripartite committee which was to meet at London—and which, incidentally, never reached any agreed conclusions.

The United States and Britain agreed to Stalin's demand to be given the part of Poland east of the Curzon Line and to compensate Poland by granting it the administration of "substantial accessions of territory" of adjacent Germany. The extent of the accessions should be determined in consultation with the forth-

² The Unconditional Surrender Instrument had been drafted prior to the Yalta Conference by the European Advisory Commission in London. Neither original nor revised version was actually used. SHAEF substituted a brief military instrument for signing on May 8, 1945. This *Act of Military Surrender* contained no reference to dismemberment. (For text, see 81st Congress, 1st sess., S. Doc. No. 123, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy*, p. 505.)

coming new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and "the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

Stalin consented to having France included in the occupation of Germany, the French Zone of occupation to be subtracted from the British and American Zones, with no whittling away of the Soviet Zone. With reluctance he agreed also to having France represented on the Allied Control Council for Germany.

The subject of reparations was under discussion throughout the Conference. Stalin called on his Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky to present the Soviet plan for reparations. This plan called for reparations in kind in two forms: removal at the end of the war of such German assets as factories, machinery, machine tools, rolling stock, and investments abroad; and yearly payments in kind for a period of 10 years. In addition, it proposed use of impressed German labor to repair damage wrought by the Nazi aggressors. "To restore Russian economy and for the security of Europe" the plan demanded confiscation of 80 percent of all Germany's heavy industry—meaning iron and steel, metalworking, engineering, chemicals, and electrical engineering—and 100 percent of the specialized industries of a military nature, such as aviation production and synthetic oil refineries. The remaining 20 percent of German heavy industry, the plan stated, would be enough for the real need of German economy. Russia would want "not less than \$10 billion."

While granting that the Soviet Union had suffered heavier losses than any other country in the war against Germany and was entitled to certain plants and materials from Germany, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill both argued against the amount of the Soviet demand. They cited the results of the Treaty of Versailles in warning against asking more than was feasible and explained that public opinion in their countries was strongly opposed to the concept of reparations, disclaiming any interest in Germany's movable assets—including its manpower. The President was stating the principle of United States policy for the defeated Germans when he said: "We want Germany to live, but not to have a higher standard of living than that of the U. S. S. R. I envision a Germany that is self-sustaining but not starving."

The final meeting at Yalta left differences on the amount of reparations unresolved, and the three heads of state agreed to refer the problem to an Interallied Reparations Commission in Moscow. Stalin had suggested that reparations should total \$20 billion and that the Soviet Union should receive half. Without accepting the figure, President Roosevelt agreed that the Reparations Commission might use it as a "basis for discussion." As noted in the protocol signed February 11, 1954,

"The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparations question by the Moscow Reparations Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned."

JCS 1067³

In April 1945, when German resistance was at the point of collapse, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive, JCS 1067, to General Eisenhower to serve as guidance in the military government of the American Zone of occupation in Germany. The directive informed him that he would serve as United States representative on the Control Council and be responsible for the administration of the military government of the American Zone. It instructed him to urge adoption by the other Control Council members of the principles and policies set forth in JCS 1067.

The introductory part of the directive states that the policies relate to the treatment of Germany "in the initial post-defeat period." The men who produced the directive recognized that it was subject to modification in the light of actual experience; they requested continuous surveys of "economic, industrial, financial, social and political conditions" with continuous reporting to serve as a basis for determining changes in the measures of control.


After the introductory matter the directive states the "Basic Objectives of Military Government in Germany" which reflect the temper of the period:

"The principal Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world. Essential steps

³This directive was revised July 11, 1947, to lay greater emphasis on the positive aspects of our policy. The revision, JCS 1779, incorporated the principles enunciated by Secretary Byrnes at Stuttgart in his speech of September 6, 1946 (see page 16).

GREATER BERLIN

Sectors of Occupation



in the accomplishment of this objective are the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their forms, the immediate apprehension of war criminals for punishment, the industrial disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, with continuing control over Germany's capacity to make war, and the preparation for an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis.

“Other Allied objectives are to enforce the program of reparations and restitution, to provide relief for the benefit of countries devastated by Nazi aggression, and to ensure that prisoners of war and displaced persons of the United Nations are cared for and repatriated.”

DECISIONS AT POTSDAM

The Potsdam Conference, held among the ruins of a defeated Germany from July 17 to August 2, 1945, was concerned with both short- and long-range programs for Germany. At that time the United States and Britain still assumed that the Soviet Union would remain a cooperative ally throughout the occupation. They assumed also that the Soviet Union, like themselves, intended large-scale demobilization. Upon these assumptions the agreements of the Potsdam Conference were concluded.

It was agreed that there should be uniformity in the treatment of people throughout Germany, and the following basic purposes of the occupation were declared:

(1) Complete disarmament and demilitarization and elimination or control of all industry that could be used for military production;

(2) To convince the German people that they had suffered total defeat and had only themselves to blame for their condition;

(3) Destruction of the National Socialist Party, dissolution of all Nazi institutions, and prevention of any Nazi or militarist activity or propaganda;

(4) Preparation for the “eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.”

In regard to administration, the three powers agreed that local self-government should be developed at once, on democratic principles and through elective councils. The occupation authorities were to encourage any democratic political party by granting it rights of assembly and public discussion. As soon as it became practicable, elective principles should be introduced into regional, provincial, and state (*Land*) administration.

For the time being no central German government was to be established, but for convenience "certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries," were to be established in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry to act under the supervision of the Allied Control Council, the quadripartite military governing body. Education was to be "so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas."

The economic principles laid down and subscribed to at Potsdam placed primary emphasis on the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit—an important point. Finally, it was agreed that payment of reparations "should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance" and to pay for essential imports. This clause in effect nullified the Yalta decision to take reparations out of current production. The idea of using impressed German labor as a form of reparations was not discussed.

It was agreed at Potsdam that permanent establishment of Germany's eastern frontier should await the peace settlement. However, "subject to expert examination of the actual frontier," the Conference agreed in principle to the Soviet proposal for the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Königsberg and its adjacent area. And, pending negotiation of a peace treaty, German territories lying east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers were to be administered by the Polish State.

While the Conference was in progress, masses of destitute German refugees were being ejected from "liberated" Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. They poured into Germany, adding to the general misery and confusion. Powerless to halt this traffic from the East, the Western delegations attempted to regulate it by



Childlife in Berlin, summer 1945.

including in the protocol a stipulation that Germans in the three countries should be transferred to Germany "in an orderly and humane manner."

Having reached agreement on these matters, the conferees adjourned, leaving the control of Germany to the Allied Control Council.

THE REALITIES OF QUADRIPARTITE ADMINISTRATION

In the summer of 1945 Germany's condition was desperate. Its central and state governments had disintegrated; county and city administrative offices had ceased to exist. There was no mail service. Transportation had broken down. Destroyed bridges had halted rail and highway transport. Normally navigable rivers were choked with sunken barges, ships, and wrecked bridges. In the bombed cities shelter was at a premium. Millions of people from Nazi-occupied countries, now freed from forced labor, needed to be returned to their own countries. German refugees from the East were streaming into Germany. Famine was close on the heels of the population. Destitution was the norm, and the occupation authorities were hard pressed to keep the German people from starving.

In the first months of military government war criminals had to be rounded up and interned; Nazi officials by the thousand had to be identified and tagged as ineligible for public office or anything but manual labor. Schools were closed while textbooks were being revised and teachers trained or retrained. Textbook revision bogged down because of the paper shortage, the shortage of American staff to supervise the work, and the difficulty of finding Germans qualified to do it. School buildings left standing served as temporary shelter for the homeless or as makeshift offices.

However, local and state administrative organizations developed early, at first on the basis of officials appointed by the military authorities, later by popular elections—at least in the Western Zones.

The Allied Control Council, faced with staggering problems and responsibilities, was hamstrung from the start. From the beginning the Soviets displayed general intransigence. For months the Americans continued to hope that by going halfway or even further they could persuade the Soviets to be reasonable and cooperative. The Soviets responded to such tactics by using the veto 69 times in the period of their stay on the Council. With the exception of a few decisions chiefly on formal educational matters, agreement in the Council was achieved only on negative or punitive measures.

Areas of disagreement were clearly defined. There was a long wrangle over the levels of industry to be permitted the Germans. The Soviets vetoed action to make an economic unit of Germany as a whole; without such action production was stultified, inflation developed, and a black market flourished. The Soviet authorities ignored the Potsdam decision on reparations and quoted the Yalta agreement to justify taking reparations out of current production. At the same time, they refused to give an accounting for what they had already taken. The amount was so great that the Germans were left incapable of paying for vital imports. This meant that the United States was providing those essentials, subsidizing the Germans so that they could pay reparations to the Soviet Union.

The Americans wanted the privilege of unrestricted entry by members of the occupation forces to one another's zones. The four zones had been created to simplify administration of the first phase of the surrender terms. But from the beginning the Soviets were determined to keep their foreign associates out of the Eastern Zone of Germany. Considering their intentions and practices, the Soviets had understandable reasons for barring the Western authorities from the area of Soviet control.

PROLOGUE TO DIVISION

From the moment of their entrance into Germany in the last months of the war, the Soviets had been working at cross purposes with their Western Allies. In the towns and cities along their ways of advance, American and British military officials had sought

out Germans known to have resisted nazism and had appointed them to administrative posts, pending elections. As soon as possible the Western Allies had held municipal elections that were free except for the banning of Nazi candidates. On the other hand, the Soviets, on their triumphal advance, had been accompanied by Moscow-trained German Communists whom they had appointed to key administrative posts. For other important official spots they had sought out stay-at-home German Communists who had weathered the war in the underground or in concentration camps. Except in the memorable citywide elections of October 20, 1946, in Berlin, no Germans under Soviet control have as yet experienced free elections.

On the economic front the Western Powers wanted a self-supporting Germany. The Soviets were bent on exploiting German industry, agriculture, and labor for the benefit of the U. S. S. R. and with intent to force all Germany within the Soviet orbit.

During the first year of Four Power occupation and control of Germany, the basic conflict between Western and Soviet philosophies and purposes became increasingly apparent and not just in regard to Germany. It was revealing itself in the other two countries under joint occupation, Austria and Korea.

At the same time, the Soviet Union was tightening its grip on Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. War-torn Greece was suffering from Communist-led insurrection, and Turkey was threatened with loss of territory to the Soviet Union. In Asia Soviet influence over the Chinese Communists was increasing.

The United States had good reason to believe that the Soviet Union had not renounced its dream of world communism when it dissolved the Comintern back in 1943. On February 28, 1946, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes warned that the United States would not "stand aloof if force or the threat of force is used contrary to the purposes and principles" of the United Nations Charter.

In the late spring and early summer of 1946, the subjects of disagreement within the Allied Control Council came under discussion at the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four occupation powers held at Paris.



The American delegation at the 1946 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris. Seated at table with Secretary of State James F. Byrnes (center) are former Senator Tom Connally (second from left) and the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (at far right).

Secretary Byrnes charged that, contrary to the Potsdam Agreement, Germany was being administered "in four closed compartments with the movements of people, trade, and ideas between the zones more narrowly restricted than between most independent countries." Consequently, he stated, none of the zones was self-supporting, and Germany was threatened with economic paralysis. He proposed prompt establishment of central administrative German agencies to govern the country as an economic unit and to arrange for free trade between zones and a balanced program of imports and exports. The British agreed at once. The French agreed on condition that the Saar be excluded from the jurisdiction of the proposed German agencies. The Soviets, using the French condition as a pretext, rejected the entire proposal.

At that point Mr. Byrnes threw down the gauntlet. The United States, he said, was unwilling to share responsibility for the eco-

conomic paralysis and suffering that would result from continuing the current basis in Germany. The United States was prepared to administer its zone in conjunction with any one or more of the other zones as an economic unit. Whatever arrangements were made with one government would be open on equal terms to the governments of the other zones should they care to participate. The British at once agreed to merge the economy of their zone with that of the American Zone.

On September 6, 1946, Secretary Byrnes made a speech at Stuttgart that is reckoned an important turning point in the Allied administration of Germany. It was broadcast throughout Germany, bringing hope and new courage to the German people. He explained the zonal merger with the British, saying bluntly that, so far as many vital questions were concerned, the Allied Control Council was "neither governing Germany nor allowing Germany to govern itself." Then he laid down a positive, constructive, economic program for Germany.

Only a drastic fiscal reform program uniformly applied, said Mr. Byrnes, could prevent ruinous inflation. Transportation, communications, and postal services had to be organized throughout the country without regard to zonal barriers. A central administrative department for agriculture needed to be set up without further delay and allowed to operate in order to obtain the greatest possible production of food and the most effective distribution of it. Granted that Germany had to share coal and steel with its Western European neighbors, Germany had perforce to be allowed to use its skills and energies to increase its own industrial production and make the most effective use of raw materials.

Said Mr. Byrnes:

"Germany must be given a chance to export goods in order to import enough to make her economy self-sustaining. Germany is a part of Europe, and recovery in Europe, and particularly in the states adjoining Germany, will be slow indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron and coal is turned into a poor-house."

That fall the American and British Zones merged for economic purposes in an administrative entity known as Bizonia. France held back, hoping that differences with the Soviets could be re-

solved at the fourth conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers scheduled to take place in March 1947 in Moscow.

In Moscow the Council of Foreign Ministers came no closer to accord, though France moved closer to the United States and Britain and farther from the Soviet Union. The United States and Britain advocated a federal form of government for Germany; the Soviet Union demanded a strongly centralized state. The Soviets, while professing a desire for economic unity in Germany, again refused to make known what food supplies were on hand in their zone or what reparations they had taken out of it. Again they turned a deaf ear to the American argument that Soviet removal of factories and equipment from Germany should be modified to permit Germany to be self-sustaining. They insisted that agreement on the frontier between Germany and Poland had been *final*, not temporary. With the concurrence of France and Britain, the United States argued that perpetuation of the current temporary line between Germany and Poland would deprive Germany of land which had provided more than a fifth of the nation's prewar food supply.

On March 12, 1947, 2 days after the Moscow Conference had begun, the United States, aiming to curb Soviet imperialist expansion, pledged American economic and military resources to aid Greece and Turkey and to resist aggression, whether overt or covert, elsewhere in Europe. This course of action became known as the Truman Doctrine.

Between the Moscow Conference in March and the London Conference the following November and December, our relations with the Soviet Union became more strained. The Truman Doctrine—and, subsequently, the development of the Marshall plan to assist Europe toward economic recovery—produced concerted Soviet reactions.

On September 18, in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky charged the United States with being a nation of "warmongers." This attack was the preamble to the official announcement from Moscow on October 5 of the birth of the Cominform, successor to the Comintern, and of the Kremlin's intention of blocking the Marshall plan.

Nevertheless, the Western delegations went to London that November in hopes that the Conference might produce a few basic

decisions that would relieve the situation in Germany and advance the European recovery program. Their hopes were ill-founded. The Conference merely deepened the cleavage between Soviet and Western Powers.

Mr. Molotov rejected outright the Western proposals. These proposals were:

1. To establish a frontier commission to study any proposed changes from the prewar German frontiers as a preliminary to a peace treaty.

2. To delay establishment of a central government "until the division of Germany had been healed and conditions created for German political and economic unity."

3. The following prerequisites to German unity:

- a. Elimination of zonal barriers to permit free movement of people, ideas, and goods throughout Germany;

- b. Return of German properties seized by occupation powers as reparations without previous Four Power agreement;

- c. Currency reform with a new and sound currency for all Germany;

- d. A definite determination of the economic burdens Germany would have to bear in the future, that is, the costs of occupation, repayment of loans to occupying powers, and reparations;

- e. An overall export-import plan for Germany.

Soviet practices in the Soviet Zone—especially that of taking over virtually the entire agricultural yield—were responsible for American and British aid to Western Germany. However, the Soviet delegation charged that the real purpose of the aid was to make Western Germany "a strategic base against the democratic states of Europe" and to advance "expansionist aims."

The London Conference made it clear to the Western delegations that agreement with the Soviets could be reached "only under conditions which would not only enslave the German people but would seriously retard the recovery of all Europe." The Council of Foreign Ministers adjourned without setting a time or place for the next meeting.

After the collapse of the London Four Power Conference, the three Western Foreign Ministers invited the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg to meet with them in

London in February 1948 to discuss the German problem. On March 6 this group issued a communique that stated the necessity for their action. It read in part:

“The continuous failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers to reach quadripartite agreement has created a situation in Germany which, if permitted to continue, would have increasingly unfortunate consequences for Western Europe. It was therefore necessary that urgent political and economic problems arising out of this situation in Germany should be solved. The participating powers had in view the necessity of ensuring the economic reconstruction of Western Europe including Germany, and of establishing a basis for the participation of a democratic Germany in the community of free peoples. While delay in reaching these objectives can no longer be accepted, ultimate Four Power agreement is in no way precluded.”

The communique announced that France was about to merge the economic policies of its zone with those of the British and American Zones and that the Western Powers had agreed on a federal form of government for Germany.

To this announcement the Soviets responded on March 20 by walking out of the Allied Control Council and on March 30 by inaugurating systematic and serious interference with travel and freight transport between the Western Zones of Germany and Berlin.

In London the discussions continued, culminating in decisions that were of great importance to all Western Europe as well as to the German people. The agreements of June 1, 1948, provided for the economic and political fusion of the three Western Zones of Germany; the Occupation Statute, which, while reserving certain essential powers to the Allied authorities, would greatly increase the authority and prestige of the new German government; the establishment of the International Authority for the Ruhr, composed of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the three Benelux countries, and Germany; and participation of the new German government in the Organization for European Cooperation and in Marshall plan aid.

On June 18, 1948, the Western military governors announced the invalidation of the inflated reichsmark in their zones and intro-



U. S. Air Force transports of the famous Airlift lined up for assembly-line style unloading at Berlin's Tempelhof Airdrome, September 1948.

duced the deutschemark, or D-Mark, at a value of one-tenth of the R-Mark. This currency reform was basic to West Germany's subsequent spectacular economic recovery. The creation of a currency having real value allowed commodities to reappear in the stores, undermined the black market, and provided an incentive for work and saving, thus revitalizing the whole economy.

The Western authorities had been willing to retain the reichsmark in Berlin, since Berlin was isolated in the Soviet Zone, but only on condition that they share control over the issue of the reichsmark. When the Soviets refused to share this control, the Western Powers promptly announced the introduction of the new D-Mark in the Western Sectors of Berlin. This happened on June 23, 1948. The Soviets immediately shut off Berlin from all land and water communication with the Western Zones. What was to become the 11-month blockade was the major attempt of the Soviets to dislodge their wartime allies from Berlin and starve the Berliners into the Communist fold.

With the famous Airlift counteracting the Soviet blockade of Berlin and in the face of bitter verbal protests from the Soviets, the military governors of Western Germany went about their task of carrying out the terms of the London agreements. To indicate that the door remained open should the Soviets wish to join them, they invited the Soviet Military Governor to participate in arrangements for convening a German constituent assembly. The Soviet Military Governor ignored the invitation. On July 1, 1948, the three Western military governors authorized the minister presidents of the 11 *Laender* of Western Germany to convene a constituent assembly to draft a constitution.

On September 1 the West German Parliamentary Council convened in Bonn under the chairmanship of Dr. Konrad Adenauer to draft the document. By German decision the constitution (or Basic Law, as it is called), the resulting government, and its capital at Bonn are all provisional pending the reunification of Germany.

The Council completed its work in May 1949. On August 14 approximately 80 percent of the men and women of voting age went to the polls to cast their votes in the first free general election Germany had known since 1932. On September 21 the Federal

Republic of Germany came into being; the civilian administration of the Allied High Commission replaced the Allied Military Government for Western Germany; and the Occupation Statute, superseding all military government legislation and granting the new Federal Government a considerable degree of autonomy, was proclaimed by the Allied High Commission.

On October 7 the Soviet authorities set up by military fiat a puppet German government in the East Zone, declaring it to be the legitimate spokesman of the German people. The new Federal Government promptly declared the rival illegal. The Allied High Commission declared that the Soviet Zone's so-called "German Democratic Republic," which had been set up without benefit of elections, was not entitled to represent either East Germany or all Germany.

Germany was indeed divided politically, economically, and physically, with 18 million of its people caught behind the Iron Curtain in the grip of a Soviet-dominated police state and about 50 million moving with their new representative government in ever-closer association with the free world.

GERMANY AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

Shortly after the *coup d'etat* of February 25, 1948, had placed Czechoslovakia under Communist rule, France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg concluded the Brussels Treaty, linking them in a 50-year defense alliance. In June of that year the United States Senate adopted a resolution, introduced by the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, supporting the principle of U. S. association with such regional collective security alliances as were sanctioned under the United Nations Charter.

The Vandenberg Resolution resulted in negotiations leading to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The signing of the treaty by the original 12 member nations took place in Washington on April 4, 1949, and the treaty became effective August 24, 1949, following ratification by all members. The major purpose of NATO is the preservation of peace through unity, strength, and preparedness. Under the treaty an armed attack against any one member country will be regarded as an attack against all, and all

members are pledged to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist attack" by self-help and mutual aid.

In the fall of 1949, while the division of Germany was being sharpened by unilateral Soviet measures and while Communist forces were in the final stages of their conquest of China, a committee of the NATO Council set to work on a defense plan for the North Atlantic Community.

The committee worked against a grim background of Communist gains in Asia and increasing Soviet pressures against Berlin and the young German Federal Republic.

Shortly after lifting the blockade of Berlin, the Soviet Union had entered Four Power agreements to insure free movements of persons and goods between Eastern and Western Zones of Germany and between Berlin and the Western Zones. But in January 1950 the Soviets instituted what became known as the "creeping blockade," aimed at wrecking the economy of West Berlin. Interference with transport and deliveries was chronic. At the same time, they launched a violent propaganda campaign meant to frighten the Berliners into submission.

Under the eyes of the residents of West Berlin, the Soviets began training East Germans in the paramilitary "Peoples' Police." "Alert Units" of battalion strength were stationed in the Berlin area and trained and armed with infantry weapons. While busily training and arming East Germans, the Soviets repeated endlessly the groundless charge that the United States was rearming West Germans.

Two days after the Communist invasion of South Korea, Soviet propaganda media were informing the German people that Korea was a test case for the planned American attack upon the "German Democratic Republic." Within a few days the Communist-controlled press and radio were reiterating the legend that the United States had planned a new world war and that American intervention in Korea was part of a design to establish a ring of military bases around Asia as a preliminary to aggression against Manchuria, China, and the U. S. S. R.

In August 1950 the Communist-dominated National Congress of the National Front held in East Berlin was hymning "national resistance" through the National Front in the fight for German unity, an all-German government, a peace treaty, and the with-

drawal of occupation troops. The National Front is a Communist-cover organization developed in the East Zone and designed to appeal to non-Communists on the basis of its nationalistic guise. Its objective is the reunification of Germany on Soviet terms.

The Congress approved a program for the October 15, 1950, East Zone elections—which many Germans regarded as an attempt to give legal status throughout Germany to the puppet government of the Soviet Zone. This program called for “peace, unity, a peace treaty, troop withdrawals, and a five-year plan.” By the mechanism of a new East German election law of August 10, 1950, the Communists had achieved the abolition of secrecy of the ballot. The law provided that the voter need not make any mark at all on his ballot.

In the course of this August convention, Moscow-trained Deputy Minister-President Walter Ulbricht of the “German Democratic Republic” outlined a plan for Communist action in West Germany against the occupation powers. In his speech Ulbricht exploited the initial reverses of United Nations forces in Korea as prophetic of what would happen to the Western Allies and their “puppets” in Western Germany in the near future. He told the people of West Germany what to do if they wanted to be safe: They should hinder militarization, boycott goods and food imported from the United States, defy all Bonn and Allied High Commission orders, foment strikes, fight attempts to create a West German army, oppose all steps favoring the Schuman plan, the Marshall plan, the Council of Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty; but they should support the East Zone “German Democratic Republic” and be ready to take up arms for the Soviet Union in the “fight for peace.”

Germans in the West were speculating on the chances that the puppet East German government, alleging it represented all Germany, would negotiate some sort of peace treaty with the Soviet Union after the publicized October elections and so place Germany in the satellite orbit. In that event, the people wondered, would not the Soviets withdraw most of their troops in a propaganda move to embarrass the Western Powers into removing theirs? The Germans recalled that the Soviets had followed a similar pattern in Korea prior to the withdrawal of American occupation troops from South Korea. The parallelism gave many West Ger-

mans a bad case of nerves, especially in the light of early United Nations reverses in Korea.

This situation of increasing East-West tensions was the background of the September 1950 meetings of the NATO Council in New York City. The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States alternated 3-power meetings on Germany with the 12-power meetings of the NATO Council. In both meetings the principal concern was with measures required to safeguard the security of the free world.

Earlier in the summer French Premier René Pleven had proposed the formation of a European army. The United States had accepted in the main the concept of a continental defense force. Accordingly, in September we proposed in the North Atlantic Council the prompt creation of a European defense force to be made up of contingents from each of the 12 member nations, to be under the overall command of one man, with a staff consisting of officers from the participating nations. The total strength of the combined force should be "equal to the task of keeping Europe free—of forcing any aggressor to ponder long and hard before starting out to conquer Europe."

The proposal was well received. The problem of achieving collective security for Western Europe, however, like that of achieving its economic recovery, involved Germany. Just as the planners for European economic recovery soon recognized the fact that German economic recovery was essential to all Europe, the planners for European defense now found the corollary to be true: Sound defense plans for Europe called for a German contribution.

Thinking among Western nations on the subject of Germany in relation to European defense had changed radically since the end of World War II. In the Brussels Pact of 1948 defense of Europe still meant chiefly defense against Germany. Thereafter, the Western nations began to realize that the immediate danger against which Europe needed to assemble defenses was not defeated and disarmed Germany but their powerful wartime ally the Soviet Union.

Our occupation policy with respect to demilitarization had eliminated Germany as an active opponent. At the same time, our policy with respect to German economic recovery had,



NORTH
SEA

COPENHAGEN

SWEDEN

D E N M A R K

Rostock

Hamburg

Bremerhaven

Bremen

BRITISH ZONE

Hannover

SOVIET

BERL

ZONE

FEDERAL

G E R M A N Y

REPUBLIC

Leipzig

Dres

OF

Frankfurt am Main

PRAG

C-Z

GERMANY

Nürnberg

AMERICAN

Stuttgart

ZONE

Danube

FRANCE

ZONE



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A U S T R I A



by means of our comprehensive aid program, restored Germany to an economic level that promised to surpass the prewar record. In the interests of the free world, it was imperative that Germany's power aggregate should be united with the forces of freedom and not be allowed to disappear behind the Iron Curtain in servitude to the forces of aggression. Defense of Germany was implicit in the defense of Western Europe, and realistic defense planning required a plan for German participation.

In his address of February 22, 1955, before the joint session of the North Dakota Legislature, Supreme Allied Commander for Europe Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther explained the importance of West Germany to the defense of Europe in these words:

"Because of the limited strength available to us without Western Germany, it is not possible to defend far enough to the east in Central Europe . . . We must have depth in our position in order to counter the striking power of mechanized armies and to fight off modern jet aircraft. We should, therefore, try to hold as far to the east as possible. Such a defense will be feasible when the German contribution becomes an effective one.

"The question is sometimes asked: 'What good are 12 German divisions in an atomic era?' The 12 German divisions, along with the German air and naval contribution, make the difference between a second choice strategy and a much more desirable forward strategy. This is true, not in spite of the atomic age, but because of it. We must have a sufficient shield of allied ground and air forces to prevent the enemy from advancing in widely dispersed formation. That shield must be strong enough to force an attacking enemy to concentrate in his effort to break through. Those concentrations would be extremely vulnerable to attacks by our new weapons."

In 1950 neither the United States nor any other Western power favored re-creation of a German national army. How to achieve German participation in the defense of Europe without revival of a national army was to be discussed for some time to come.

In three-power meetings that September the Foreign Ministers of France, Britain, and the United States agreed that the German Federal Republic should be permitted to establish federal police to safeguard its internal security. At the same time, they agreed

that the external security of the Federal Republic should be the responsibility of the occupation powers and announced on September 19, 1950, in their communique on Western Germany:

“The Allied Governments consider that their forces in Germany have in addition to their occupation duties also the important role of acting as security forces for the protection and defense of the free world, including the German Federal Republic and the Western sectors of Berlin. To make this protection more effective the Allied Governments will increase and reinforce their forces in Germany. They will treat any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves.”

This was the first instance of such a U. S. security guaranty to any European nation, and the guaranty itself marked the transition from occupation to defense mission on the part of all three powers.

The three Foreign Ministers had committed themselves earlier to a policy of concluding a peace treaty only with a unified Germany. That policy remains in effect today. But in September 1950, in recognition of the changed relationship of the powers with Germany, the Foreign Ministers pledged termination of the state of war as soon as their respective Governments could take the necessary legislative action.

The new phase in relations between the Western Allies and the Federal Republic was marked by an important declaration—which was to amend the Occupation Statute so as to extend the authority of the German Federal Republic. This amendment empowered the German Government to conduct its own foreign relations; lifted existing restrictions on size, speed, and number of German ships constructed for export; and, to “facilitate the defense effort of the West,” removed many of the existing limitations on German steel production. The Allies agreed to make other “far-reaching reductions” in existing economic controls and to limit the exercise of their power to review Germany’s domestic legislation.

The German response to the Foreign Ministers’ communique of September 19, 1950, was varied. In general, the German free press hailed the document as “a milestone on Germany’s road back into the community of Western nations,” and announced the security guaranty in banner headlines. A small group of people



Coal from the Ruhr, an important element in Germany's economic recovery.

thought that a federal police force smacked of the police state. Some thought the authorization a sensible precaution against the occasional forays of East Zone rioters into the Federal Republic. Still others feared that formation of federal border police units would provoke attack from the East.

Talk of rearmament and participation in a West European army increased nervousness. The German "man-in-the-street" appeared to have become quite as peaceful as we had hoped, and the thought of taking up arms again for any purpose seemed to appall him. The Soviet-controlled press and radio assured him that if he aided the Western "warmongers" his country would again be a battleground.

Although the September landings at Inchon and the turning of the tide in the Korean war raised German confidence in United Nations power and American ability to win in the long run, most Germans were loath to risk having their recently devastated country overrun again. Western guaranties of defense in the event of attack from the East left many Germans uneasy. The Soviet Union was reported to have 175 divisions in readiness behind the Iron Curtain, whereas a scant half-dozen divisions were immediately available to the Western nations should the Soviets suddenly move into the German Federal Republic.

At this stage in developments Chancellor Adenauer and his supporters, as well as the opposition in the Bundestag, agreed that German participation in the defense of Europe had to be on a basis of equality and that the Occupation Statute should be terminated.

The planning for the defense of Europe was advanced considerably at the December 1950 meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels. The members reached agreement on the structure of the unified army, and they requested and obtained the designation of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Commander.

The Ministers then took up the matter of Germany's part in the defense of Western Europe. On this phase of the meeting Secretary of State Dean Acheson reported:

". . . We cleared away the obstacles which had been in front of German participation. We made it perfectly clear to the Germans that their participation is a matter to be discussed with

them. Their will and their enthusiastic cooperation is an essential part of anything which is to be done. We made it clear that, if they take part in this effort, then clearly their relations with the nations of Western Europe and with us in the United States will be and can be on a different basis from what they are now."

From this Brussels meeting also came the authority to negotiate a contractual relationship with Germany to replace the Occupation Statute. At the same time, conversations began in Bonn to determine what should be Germany's contribution to the proposed defense army, and in Paris further meetings took place to settle on the organization of the European Defense Force.

The purpose of the contractual agreements was to restore sovereignty to Germany except in certain areas where her special situation made the retention of Allied rights necessary. Only a Germany free to make its own decisions would be in a position to complete its integration with the free nations and to make its integration genuine. The division of Germany necessitated retention by the occupation authorities of supreme authority in regard to four major fields: stationing of armed forces in Germany, unification, Berlin, and the negotiation of a final peace settlement including determination of German boundaries.

While these agreements were being worked out, negotiations were going forward on a treaty embodying the principle of a European army that would include German troops. At France's initiative, Italy, the Benelux countries, and the German Federal Republic joined in negotiations for a six-nation treaty. These were the same six nations that formed the European Coal and Steel Community under the Schuman plan.

The treaty they developed in 1951-52 provided that all defense forces of the member nations—barring those required in overseas possessions and for coast guard duties—should be gathered into a European Defense Force under supranational authority. National groupings should extend through the *groupement* or divisional level, with the corps combining *groupements* of different nationalities under a combined staff.

This European Defense Force was to be under the control of a European Defense Community and would operate on a common budget.

The virtue of the plan lay in the fact that it allowed Germany to contribute to the common defense of Europe without revival of a German national army and general staff.

The treaty was signed in Paris on May 27, 1952, a day after the contractual agreements were signed in Bonn. The EDC Treaty was to go into effect as soon as ratified by the six member governments; the contractual agreements were to become effective with the ratification of the EDC Treaty.

The German Parliament was first to approve the EDC Treaty. The lower houses of the Netherlands and Belgium followed suit. Luxembourg and Italy appeared to be waiting for France to take action—but at the end of 1953 this action had not been taken.

1954—A YEAR OF DECISIONS

BERLIN—JANUARY 25—FEBRUARY 18

In January 1954, for the first time in 5 years, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France met with the Soviet Foreign Minister to discuss the future of Germany and Austria. The three Western Powers had proposed the meeting in July of 1953, and many notes were exchanged before the Conference opened in Berlin on January 25. Much had happened in the 5-year period between four-power conferences. Mr. Dulles summed up the developments:

“A war had started and been stopped in Korea.

“A war had reached ominous proportions in Indochina.

“Stalin had died and his successors talked more softly.

“Six nations of Europe had created their Coal and Steel Community and planned to move on to a European Defense Community.

“Communist China had emerged as an aggressive military organization, allying its vast manpower with that of the Soviet Union.

“In the Soviet Union itself, industrial and agricultural strains were developing.

“In East Germany, the spontaneous outbreak of June 17, 1953, revealed, in one enlightening flash, how much the captives crave freedom.⁴

“What did all of this add up to in terms of world politics? Many speculated and no one knew. The uncertainty was leading to hesitation, wishful thinking, and some paralysis of action.

“There was only one way to find out—that was to meet with the Russians and deal with them in terms of some practical tests.

“We went to Berlin in the hope that Soviet policies would now permit the unification of Germany in freedom or at least the liberation of Austria. Those two matters would, in relation to Europe, test the Soviet temper. We hoped to achieve those two results, and we were determined to let no minor obstacles deter us.

The obstacles we incurred were, however, not minor but fundamental.”

What the Berlin Conference revealed to all the world was that the Soviet position admitted of no real negotiation.

“This division of Germany cannot be perpetuated without grave risks,” Mr. Dulles had stated in his opening speech. “For no great people will calmly accept mutilation. The partition of Germany creates a basic source of instability. I am firmly convinced that a free and united Germany is essential to stable peace in Europe and that it is in the interest of all four Occupying Powers.”

Great Britain then proposed a simple and direct method of achieving the unification and freedom of Germany on the basis of free elections. Under this plan the German people, their freedom of choice safeguarded by international supervisory machinery, would elect their representatives to draft an all-German constitu-

⁴Ruthless, systematic exploitation by the police state which had been foisted upon East Germany by the Soviet Union resulted in the uprisings of June 17, 1953. The immediate occasion was another increase in work norms designed to force more production from the worker without increasing his earnings. On June 17 spontaneous uprisings of workers in East Berlin and throughout the Soviet Zone showed the world what German workers think of the so-called Worker's Paradise of communism. By tens of thousands in smaller industrial areas, by hundreds of thousands in larger ones, construction workers, miners, skilled and unskilled industrial workers defied the Communist police state. They were subdued in due time by brute force, but first they stood, armed only with sticks and stones, against the machineguns and armored tanks of the Soviet Army.

For a fuller account of the June 1953 uprisings, see “Soviet Germany: The Unruly Satellite,” by Geoffrey W. Lewis, in the Department of State *Bulletin* of Dec. 28, 1953.



East Berlin, June 17, 1953. The spontaneous uprising of German workers throughout East Germany "revealed, in one enlightening flash, how much the captives crave freedom."

tion and establish the kind of government they wanted. Once the free elections had been held and the government had assumed control, the supervisory machinery would be withdrawn and the German Government would be on its own to make such commitments as it saw fit, to make such alliances as it wished—or to refrain from making commitments and alliances at will. The whole plan expressed confidence in the German people's right and ability to conduct their own affairs.

Mr. Molotov rejected this proposal for genuinely free elections (for he required elections that assured a Communist victory). "In the name of peace," Mr. Dulles commented, "he proposes a method of extending the solid Soviet bloc to the Rhine. In the name of what he calls democracy, he has set forth the classic Communist pattern for extinguishing democracy as that word has been understood for 2,000 years."

Before the Conference ended the Soviet Foreign Minister presented a text of a proposed all-European treaty on collective security. It called for abandonment of the European Defense Community, dissolution of NATO, and the exclusion of the United States from Europe—except in the role of observer. As Mr. Dulles put it, "It offered Western Europe, as the price of Soviet 'good will,' a Soviet-controlled Europe; it offered Germany unification at the price of total sovietization."

WASHINGTON—JULY 1954

More than 2 years had passed since the Contractual Agreements and the EDC Treaty had been signed. The French Government had ratified neither. The Italian Government had not ratified the EDC Treaty. Restoration of German sovereignty, of course, was contingent upon full ratification of the EDC Treaty.

The United States had given full support to the plan for the European Defense Community. It seemed the solution to European unity. Our policy in regard to this unity was written into law in the ECA Act of 1949, which states: "It is further declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to encourage the unification of Europe."

At the conclusion of their July 1953 Conference the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had stated jointly:

“Such a Community, peaceful by its very nature, is not directed against anyone. The interests and security of all countries cannot be better safeguarded than by the removal of causes of conflict in Europe. Indeed, the provisions laid down in the European Defense Community Treaty are a guarantee that its forces would never be used in the service of aggression.”

Still, in July 1954 France had not ratified the treaty. Mr. Dulles hoped earnestly that the French National Assembly would do so before adjourning in August, but he faced the fact that it might not. On July 12 he wrote identical letters to Senator Alexander Wiley, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and to Representative Robert B. Chiperfield, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In these letters he cautioned:

“. . . we must be prepared for the situation that would arise if the French Assembly should reject the Treaty or adjourn without having voted on it. I know you fully appreciate what serious consequences any further delay in the application of these agreements might have. A continued denial of sovereignty for the Federal Republic would bring a risk of political developments within that country which could cause apprehension to other nations as well, while a continued failure to include the Federal Republic in the common defense arrangements would prolong the danger to Germany and to the free world as a whole.”

He outlined a plan, developed during discussions with Prime Minister Churchill in Washington and with the British Foreign Office in London, to bring the Bonn Conventions into force in the absence of the EDC Treaty—should the French Assembly reject the treaty.

As a result of the letter from Mr. Dulles, Senator Wiley introduced in the Senate a resolution favoring restoration of sovereignty to the German Federal Republic and empowering the President to take such action in the matter as he might deem suitable. On July 19 the Senate unanimously approved the resolution.

BRUSSELS—AUGUST 19–22

In Brussels on August 19 the six signatory governments of the EDC Treaty met to consider French Premier Pierre Mendès-France's proposals for amending the treaty. By this time all but Italy and France had ratified the treaty, and Italy was on the verge of doing so. The countries that had ratified were reluctant to have changes made that would require a new ratification by their Parliaments. France, who had first put forward the idea of the defense community under supranational authority, had become increasingly wary of the supranational control. Protests, particularly from French circles of the extreme right and the extreme left, were violent. Many of the French were genuinely fearful of drawing as close to a rearmed Germany as the terms of the EDC Treaty demanded—especially without Britain in the organization to balance the growing strength of Germany.

At Brussels Premier Mendès-France, just over 2 months in office, presented proposals which impressed the other signatories as an attempt to destroy the supranational powers of EDC and transform it into something quite different. Mendès-France was convinced that without such alterations as he proposed the treaty would not pass the National Assembly. The five other signatories were not disposed to see EDC change in fundamental character and purpose. Agreement was impossible at Brussels, but the five who had held together and the remaining members of the North Atlantic Community clung to the hope that France would accept the original treaty.

PARIS—AUGUST 30, 1954

On August 30, by a vote of 319 to 269, the French National Assembly cut off debate on EDC. Hope of achieving European unity seemed dead. The following day John Foster Dulles issued a statement in which he referred to the rejection by France of its own proposal as a "saddening event." And he pointed out:

"The French action does not change certain basic and stubborn facts:

"(a) The effective defense of continental Europe calls for a substantial military contribution from the Germans; yet all, in-

cluding the Germans themselves, would avoid national rearmament in a form which could be misused by resurgent militarism.

“(b) Germany cannot be subjected indefinitely to neutrality or otherwise be discriminated against in terms of her sovereignty, including the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. Limitations on German sovereignty, to be permanently acceptable, must be shared by others as part of a collective international order.

“(c) The prevention of war between neighboring nations which have a long record of fighting cannot be dependably achieved merely by national promises or threats, but only by merging certain functions of their government into supranational institutions.

“To deal with these facts was the lofty purpose of EDC. . . .

“The U. S. postwar policies beginning in 1946 were framed on the assumption that Western Europe would at long last develop a unity which would make it immune from war as between its members and defensible against aggression from without. . . .

“The French negative action, without the provision of any alternative, obviously imposes on the United States the obligation to reappraise its foreign policies, particularly those in relation to Europe. The need for such a review can scarcely be questioned since the North Atlantic Council of Ministers has itself twice declared with unanimity that the EDC was of paramount importance to the European defense it planned. Furthermore, such review is required by conditions which the Congress attached this year and last year to authorizations and appropriations for military contributions to Europe.”

LONDON—SEPTEMBER 28—OCTOBER 3

The general gloom had not lifted very far when Mr. Dulles left Washington on September 25 to attend the Nine Power Conference in London. It was called to explore new approaches to the problems created by the failure of EDC. Mr. Dulles' parting words were:

“We are encouraged by the initiative taken by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France in developing new proposals. The United States believes that the primary responsibility for new

proposals rests with the European states. Therefore, we take with us no specific proposals of our own. But we do go, to be helpful if we can.”

Returning to this country 9 days later, Mr. Dulles reported:

“The London Conference produced solid results. It worked out a system, in place of the European Defense Community, which can preserve and strengthen the Atlantic Community by giving it a hard core of European unity. Thus, it salvages many of the values of the EDC plan and will give opportunity for the other values to be achieved by further effort. The fact that all of this was done, and done within 33 days of the rejection of EDC, shows the vitality of the Atlantic Community.”

Hopes were high again. The London meetings had produced more than anyone had dared believe possible. Here is what our High Commissioner for Germany, Dr. Conant, had to say of them:

“Those of us who participated in the sessions were well aware that the fate of the free world hung in the balance. The United States was determined that the German Federal Republic must have its sovereignty whether or not the London Conference produced a plan that our Government could support. All the conferees were in agreement that Germany was indispensable to any European defense alliance. The knotty problem was how to go about rearming Germany in a manner that would be acceptable to France and to Germany itself. Chancellor Adenauer had laid down one major condition, which was that there could be no discrimination against his country in any scheme of rearmament.

“I can say to you as an eye witness that those meetings . . . were no less than inspiring. I was deeply impressed by the foresight of the European statesmen, by their sense of proportion and their fundamental will to resolve their differences for the common good. When each man in a group is willing to go half way to meet the rest, the group is bound to get together. That is what happened.”

Decisions and agreements came clearly and firmly at London.

First: The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States declared that their policy is to end the occupa-

tion regime in the German Federal Republic. Pending completion of formal arrangements, the three Governments instructed their High Commissioners to forego the exercise of most of their occupation rights, beginning October 4. The Declaration of Intent issued by the three Occupation Powers pays eloquent tribute to the New Germany and the thoroughness with which it has dedicated the great energy and talents of its people to keeping world peace and serving the welfare of all Europe:

“Recognizing that a great country can no longer be deprived of the rights properly belonging to a free and democratic people; and

“Desiring to associate the Federal Republic of Germany on a footing of equality with their efforts for peace and security.

“The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America desire to end the Occupation. . . .”

Second: The British came forward with the idea of resurrecting and strengthening the dormant Brussels Treaty to accommodate the Western European Union, successor to EDC. Agreement was reached on specific modifications in the treaty's structure to take in Germany and Italy, to convert the former Consultative Council to a Council with powers of decision, and to extend the authority of the Brussels Treaty Organization in reference to determining size of contributions and control of production of weapons and armaments.

In one of the most dramatic moments of the Conference, Britain's Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden announced the decision of his Government to enter the Union of the continental countries. For the first time in history Britain made permanent military commitments on the European Continent.

Third: The French met the German condition of no discrimination by going beyond the inclusion of Germany in the Western European Union and by agreeing to German membership in NATO as well. Germany voluntarily assumed two specific limitations. Chancellor Adenauer reaffirmed an earlier public announcement that Germany would of its own volition forego the right to manufacture certain types of weapons. He also committed his country to retaining the limitations on armament laid down in the EDC Treaty—12 divisions and about a thousand aircraft.

The German Federal Government agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the U. N. Charter and never to resort to force to achieve either the reunification of Germany or the modification of its present boundaries. On their part the three Occupation Powers reaffirmed their intent to work for a peace settlement for a united Germany and to safeguard the security and welfare of Berlin.

Not only the accomplishment but the entire spirit of the Conference at London was heartening.

Then the conferees adjourned for 2 weeks to give their experts and advisers opportunity to draft the many documents required to bear out the agreements.

PARIS—OCTOBER 20-23

On October 20 the delegates met again in Paris to tackle the massive collection of documents which their experts and technicians had drafted and on which they had achieved agreement of the many countries involved.

This is the way Secretary of State John Foster Dulles described to President Eisenhower and the Cabinet what had happened at Paris:

“. . . we had first a meeting of the Four Powers—the powers that were directly concerned with the question of German sovereignty; that is, the three occupying powers, Britain, France, and the United States, plus the Federal Republic of Germany itself. And there we approved the various agreements and documents which had to deal with this subject of restoring German sovereignty. Rather complicated because of the great many things that have been going on during this past 10-year period which have got to be wound up in an orderly way.

“And we decided—which was a fresh decision, really—to make a new convention to deal with the stationing of forces in Germany. . . . And that convention will mean that the forces stationed there in Germany, instead of being there just as a result of reserved powers which we got under the Potsdam agreements, and the surrender terms, will be there as a result of a fresh agreement, made by Germany voluntarily, and to be approved by the

responsible German parliamentary bodies. So Germany, in that respect, will be just like the other allied countries.

"Then after the four had met, then we went on to a meeting of the Nine Powers, the same nine that had had this meeting in London. . . . There we reached final agreement upon all the documents that would be required to amend the Brussels Treaty, to establish the Council for Western European Union; to set up the agency for the control of the armed forces, and the munitions and equipment, and the like—and to define the powers of the Council, which, in a considerable respect, is supranational, in the sense that they act by majority vote, or less than unanimous vote, with respect to many important matters.

"Then after that came the meeting of the 14 members of the North Atlantic Treaty, acting through the Council of Ministers. There we unanimously approved of the form of protocol which would invite Germany in as a full and equal member of the North Atlantic Treaty and make Germany a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Council."

The last and knottiest problem to be solved at the Paris meetings was that of the Saar, the small but valuable industrial area in a basin of the Saar River southeast of Luxembourg. It contains slightly less than a thousand square miles and a population short of a million. Its rich coal deposits near the iron mines have given it a steel industry of major importance. Currently the Saar produces about 15 million tons of coal and 3 million tons of steel annually.

For the better part of a century the rich Saar basin has been a source of friction between France and Germany. Predominantly German in culture and antecedents, the Saar has been a pawn in the several wars that have disrupted Europe. After the First World War it was separated from Germany, then reunited with Germany by a plebiscite in 1935. In 1945 the Saar went under French occupation, and its economy was integrated with the French economy. Its political life has been rather forcefully oriented toward France, and the effect of its current constitution is to prohibit parties advocating reunion with Germany.

A plan to "Europeanize" the Saar, pending the negotiation of a peace treaty with a united Germany and final delineation of

German boundaries, was being developed in conjunction with the establishment of EDC and a European Political Community. This plan bogged down when EDC was defeated in August 1954.

Although it was, strictly speaking, a French-German problem, the French took the position at the Paris meetings that they would not sign the other agreements unless the Saar problem was solved. Mr. Dulles said of the final tense hours in Paris:

“. . . We got within about 24 hours of the date when all these things were supposed to be signed up and there wasn't any agreement.

“Then on Friday night Chancellor Adenauer and Mr. Mendès-France went into a session, and they started at 10 o'clock Friday evening and they sat together until 3 o'clock in the morning. . . . They took a few hours of repose, and they went back again into session first thing Saturday morning. . . .

“The agreement was reached, through this intensive effort by these two leaders. And it is another example of how they showed their statesmanship, to put first things first, and to do away with this age-old problem. . . .”

By the terms of the agreement, pending a peace treaty, the Saar remains within the French economic sphere but becomes accessible to Germany. Politically the territory will be administered by a commission responsible to the Western European Union.

With the agreements signed, there remained ratification by the appropriate parliaments. The spokesmen of the various governments promised early action, some before Christmas, the others early in the New Year of 1955.

SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE AGREEMENTS

In his report of October 25 to the President and the Cabinet, Mr. Dulles said: “I would say that I feel pretty confident that the Soviet Union doesn't like what is going on.” He added: “Perhaps that is the understatement of the day.” It was.

Just as our goal has been a united Europe, the Soviet Union's goal has been a weak and divided Europe. Crying “Peace and Friendship,” the Soviet Union has fought every inch of the way against the progress that Europe has made toward the unity that

spells peace and cooperation. The Kremlin knows well that overt Communist aggression becomes impracticable when it cannot turn itself on one nation without facing the united strength of a dozen or more.

Therefore, extraordinary effort and staggering sums of money have gone into Soviet attempts to sow distrust among the nations that have drawn together for their mutual security. Soviet propaganda has sought desperately to discredit the United States with other non-Communist nations and to revive and enlarge old hostilities and fear among the nations of Western Europe. Especially has it sought to prevent any rapprochement between France and Germany.

Marshall plan aid, which helped war-disrupted Europe back to economic health, was another challenge to Soviet aims. No one knows better than the men in the Kremlin that the Communist stock promise of pie in the sky is powerless to impress people who have pie on their tables. Covert Communist aggression has little chance against an economically healthy people.

Still another setback to Soviet propaganda was the Schuman plan, under which economic cooperation worked to the advantage of all members. The increasing economic health of Western Germany and its progressive integration with Western Europe were hard facts for the Kremlin to face.

The failure of EDC in August 1954 was accounted a triumph for Communist propaganda. The agreements of London and Paris constituted a defeat. Although Mr. Dulles pointed out that the program worked out in London and Paris would protect Soviet Russia as much as it would protect anybody else against the possible resurgence of German militarism, the Soviet Union was not mollified. It answered with barrages of propaganda intended to prevent European union and German rearmament.

France, with its strong Communist Party, and the German Federal Republic, with its hope of reunification with East Germany, were the principal Moscow targets, and Britain was a lesser one. The Kremlin threatened Germany with permanent division if it joined forces with Western Europe. It fed French fears of a unified Germany towering menacingly over France; it created fear that it would deal directly with a sovereign Bonn on unification unless another four-power meeting were held prior to ratifica-

tion of the Paris treaties. It threatened both France and Britain with abrogation of earlier Soviet treaties with them.

Despite these Soviet efforts to prevent ratification of the treaties, the British House of Commons, the German Bundestag, and the Italian Chamber of Deputies took favorable action on them before Christmas. And 12 days before the end of the year, Premier Mendès-France presented them to the French National Assembly.

YEAR'S END

On December 24 the French National Assembly rejected German rearmament within the Western European Union by a vote of 280–259. Anxiety over this new crisis darkened the Christmas weekend in the capitals of the free world. Premier Mendès-France announced that he would fight for a reversal of the Assembly vote.

On December 27 when the Assembly reconvened, the Premier presented all agreements signed at Paris in a package. Rejection of one meant rejection of all, and he staked his Government on acceptance. In his speech of presentation the Premier stressed the consequences to French prestige of continued failure of France to face its responsibilities. He pointed out that failure to approve the treaties would exhaust France's credit with its Western allies and give it a low rating even with the Soviet Union.

A tense world awaited the results of M. Mendès-France's efforts. On December 30 this final crisis of the year was resolved in the French National Assembly. The six interlocking treaties were approved. In two instances the majority was slight, but the new plan for Western European Union was saved and, as Mr. Dulles stated, "in the face of unparalleled pressure from the Soviet Communist bloc."

In the words of President Eisenhower: "A special tribute is due to those in France who saw that patriotism required the burying of age-old hostilities. That this could happen is a good augury of the years ahead."

And in Bonn Chancellor Adenauer, who had worked tirelessly and long to achieve this aim, expressed his Government's satisfaction with the decision of the French National Assembly, stating that the French debate had "shown the extraordinary psychologi-

cal and political difficulties which lie ahead on the way to a cohesive and unified Europe." He added that "many of these difficulties can be explained by the tragic past which we hope will be finally eliminated by the realization of the Paris treaties."

AS FOR THE RESULTS—

With Germany about to assume control of its destiny again, many Americans have been asking: "Have the German people really had a change of heart?" and "Can we trust them when they are on their own again?"

High Commissioner Dr. Conant, to whom those questions are put repeatedly, answers them by drawing comparisons between the Germany he knew in the 1920's and the one he discovered on his return as High Commissioner in the 1950's.

"In 1925 I had found Germany suffering mass unemployment and the aftermath of its fabulous postwar currency inflation. Political assassinations, local uprisings, and street fights were becoming commonplace.

"A considerable proportion of those people with whom I talked were either indifferent or hostile to the principles on which the Weimar Republic was founded . . . It seemed to me . . . that the new governmental structure of Germany had not won the loyal support of many influential sections of the German people. This was in part because of the failure of the Western democracies to give encouragement and support to those elements in Germany which were trying to build a democratic government. These democratic elements were opposed by German conservative and reactionary forces who had never accepted the military defeat of World War I as final and who therefore refused to break with the imperialistic past. Practically from the beginning of the Weimar Republic, the official German government found itself competing for popular support with an oppositionist shadow system consisting of anti-democratic elements whose purpose was to achieve a nationalistic restoration and which was unscrupulous in the choice of their means. Those who had created the new constitution were rarely in full political control of the Weimar Republic."

Dr. Conant left Germany at the end of 1925 with "the feeling that the Weimar Republic, lacking popular support, was based on shifting sands." When he returned to Germany 28 years later and 7 years after the Nazi collapse, he found the German Federal Republic, then in its 4th year of existence and preparing for an election, a far cry from the Weimar Republic of the twenties:

"This was a brisk and prosperous Germany. People on the streets were healthy-looking, alert, and well dressed. Vast reconstruction projects were rapidly effacing the ruins of the war-blasted cities. The recovery from economic chaos seemed incredible. In 1953 the industrial index reached 158 percent of the 1936 index, 1936 being generally accepted as the last normal prewar year. Exports were increasing steadily. Banks were sound and currency was stable. . . . Since the surrender, West Germany has had no uprisings, no organized revolts, no political assassinations. The temper of the people is utterly different from what it was in the twenties. They freely admit German responsibility for World War II. There is no hedging on that point. At the same time they reject the past. They face the future."

Persuasive evidence that the Germans of today are different in mind and aspirations from those of a generation ago is provided by the elections of 1953. By their vote the German people demonstrated their support of a federalized republican form of government based on democratic principles and their rejection of extremist doctrines whether of right or left. Neither Communists nor extreme rightists were able to win a single seat in the Bundestag in the 1953 elections. But Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, with his platform of European integration and German participation in European defense, won an absolute majority for his own Christian Democratic Party and a two-thirds majority for his coalition. As Dr. Conant has pointed out:

"Adenauer has done what no chancellor of the earlier Weimar Republic was able to do. He has managed to draw all parties into the new state, disbarring only the totalitarian elements of left and right. Conservative and liberal elements have jointly created a democratic political system."

There is political opposition, but, with the exception of the right- and left-wing splinter parties, this opposition is not hostile to the



Essen, largest city of the Ruhr, is typical of the new Germany that has risen from the ruins of Nazi Germany.

state; above all, it is not antidemocratic. One may differ with the Social Democratic Party on economic principles and in matters of political strategy; but anyone who knows the tradition and the record of this party cannot doubt for one moment the sincerity and consistency of its devotion to democratic processes, to the protection of civil rights, to international cooperation and peace.

Today Western Germany has effective political leadership in its Federal, State, and local governments, and at all levels it has elected representatives who are loyally devoted to the principles of democratic government. This leadership is friendly to the West and profoundly opposed to both political and military aggression. The late Ernst Reuter, Berlin's greatly loved "fighting Lord Mayor," offered such leadership. He continues to be missed as well as mourned, but he had around him men and women who shared his beliefs and who have proved capable of providing isolated and valiant Berlin with sound leadership. Chancellor Adenauer and President Heuss, staunch champions of democratic principles and European unity, have around them able men devoted to the same principles and dedicated to pursuing the same objectives. Statements by leading politicians reflect the increasing interest of the German people in the creation of a European Community in which Germany would be an equal partner. The delay and final collapse of EDC has slowed the movement but has not halted it.

In 1949 the honorary President of the opening session of the first Bundestag, Paul Loebe, a member of the oppositionist Social Democratic Party, said:

"Germany wants to become a sincere peace-loving member of the United States of Europe, with the same rights and obligations as every other member. In our basic law we renounced in advance some national sovereign rights in order to make possible this greater governmental structure which is a demand of history, and we shall not be frightened away from our goal by any initial difficulties."

In late 1954 the newly elected President of the Bundestag, Eugen Gerstenmaier, a member of the Chancellor's own party, in accepting his office, quoted Paul Loebe's words. They continue to express a profound German sentiment.



◀ *Theodor Heuss, President of the German Federal Republic.*

Some of the Germans of vision and democratic principles who survived the Nazi regime to assume leadership of the new Germany.

Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the German Federal Republic. ▶



◀ *The late Ernst Reuter, Berlin's "Fighting Mayor."*

Our long-range policy for Germany, the hopeful face on the coin, has paid us dividends of friendship and trust. The belief of the many American men and women who helped to construct that policy was justified. We found steadfast Germans of vision who had survived the Nazi regime—some in concentration camps, some in forced labor battalions, some in hiding. We found them and gave them the support that they needed, the kind of support that we failed to give the democratic elements in the Germany of the twenties.

Our help has been of many kinds and it has been substantial. Economic assistance since 1945 amounts to \$3.5 billion. But without the will and ability of the Germans to help themselves, no amount of assistance could have brought about what is so often called the “miracle” of German recovery. However, the Germans themselves tend to stress American aid as the dominant factor in their recovery. As one high Federal Republic official said:

“Yes, we Germans work hard, but that isn’t the most important factor. First, there was the currency reform of 1948. It stopped inflation. We owe it to the occupation that we have a stable currency. Then there was American aid from the beginning and the Marshall plan that allowed industry to revive and our cities to be rebuilt. Never before in history have complete conquerors turned around so quickly and done so much for the conquered people who had started war.”

In the relatively few years of the German Federal Republic, Germany and its people have developed an increasingly rich and varied network of friendly and mutually satisfying relationships with the democratic nations of the West. The official governmental and diplomatic relations are cordial, and that is important. But even more important are the contacts between the individual citizens of Germany and those of other free nations. There has been valuable give-and-take across borders, across the ocean, in the fields of politics, commerce, science, and the arts.

Under the State Department’s Educational Exchange Program, more than 10,000 Germans have had the opportunity to live and learn for varying periods of time in the United States. Women leaders, teachers, university students, doctors, legislators, youth leaders, welfare workers, city planners, journalists, and even high

school age boys and girls have had the experience of knowing Americans at home and at work in their native country, of sharing as well as observing our way of life. The exchange program has proved an effective means of increasing understanding between the countries, and the Germans are reaching out to other peoples both intellectually and humanly.

During Chancellor Adenauer's first visit to the United States in the spring of 1953, he and Secretary Dulles exchanged notes that constitute a cultural agreement, pledging the two Governments to continued support and promotion of cultural exchange between their peoples.

Then there is the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, signed by Secretary Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer in Washington on October 29, 1954. On that occasion Chancellor Adenauer made the statement:

"What gives this event deeper significance is the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany concluded its first Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the great American Nation.

"In the last few years and months we have rightly recalled to ourselves again and again the importance for us and for the other freedom-loving countries of the protection that our mighty American friend is offering us against the threat to which we are continuously exposed. But we do not want to forget that the worth of that protection is not higher than the values it protects.

"A rich and prosperous life shall be possible within this protected area; free countries shall peacefully compete in a free exchange of their gifts and the products of their industry to promote the welfare of their citizens and to further their civilization.

"These convictions form the basis of the impressive development of the United States and are the same ideals which form the foundations of our own political and economic life.

"This common character of the ethical foundations is the basis of the friendship that unites our nations. This friendship is therefore much more than a mere community of interests which owes its existence to a present, and we hope passing, external threat.

"That is why this friendship constitutes a lasting element in the life of our nations. To bear witness to this is the main object of the treaty we have just concluded."



Chancellor Adenauer conferring with President Eisenhower at the White House in October 1954. Standing (left to right) are U. S. Ambassador to Germany Dr. James B. Conant, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and German Ambassador to the United States Dr. Heinz L. Kreßler.

Finally, Germans of the Federal Republic and of isolated Berlin have shown consistently the ability to resist and withstand Soviet pressures—pressures to draw them under Communist control and to alienate them from the West. They have been impervious, on the whole, to both threats and blandishments from the East. The Berliners proved their mettle during the blockade. The East Germans demonstrated the strength of their resentment and resistance against Communist domination in their uprising of June 17, 1953. And the West Germans gave proof of their sentiments in their repudiation of communism at the polls on September 5, 1953.

Yet the fact remains that the most serious hazard to the course of German sovereignty and European unity is the Soviet-engineered, Soviet-maintained division of Germany.

THE PROBLEM OF REUNIFICATION

Ever since Germany was divided, with 18 million of its people caught behind the Iron Curtain, it has been a definite policy of the United States to help restore unity to Germany by peaceful means. Britain and France have joined our Government in repeated requests to Moscow to permit reunification of Germany on the basis of free, democratic elections. The Soviet Union, while striving to appear as the champion of reunification, has consistently refused to allow reunification on a basis acceptable to the free nations and to divided Germany itself.

As Cecil B. Lyon, Director of the State Department's Office of German Affairs, explained recently:

“To most Germans the problem of unity is not even strictly speaking a political question. With the Iron Curtain cutting thousands of family ties, it becomes a deeply human, highly personal problem. But if the solution is too long delayed, the matter might develop into a very formidable political issue.”

The Soviet Union has sought to make reunification a bargaining point and a political bomb. It has directed flamboyant appeals to German nationalism and made threats to alarm the neutralists. It has outdone itself to prevent the German Federal Republic from ratifying the Paris treaties, threatening it with permanent loss of the Soviet Zone should it cast its lot with Western Europe and the free world. And it offered unity in captivity disguised as a bargain if the Federal Republic would reject the treaties and abjure alliance with the Western nations. But the Soviet Union was unable to create sufficient disunity within the Federal Republic to defeat the treaties in the Bundestag. They were approved in the first week of March 1955.

It attests to the high spirit and political maturity of the German people that they have been stalwart against Soviet threats and scornful of Soviet promises. They have shown no disposition to purchase unity at the cost of freedom. The fact remains that their desire for reunification is deep and urgent—as our own would be if we were a people divided by the Mississippi River, with those east of it enduring captivity.

We believe, and so does the German Federal Government, that Germany's best hope of reunification resides in the creation of a new set of facts, which the Soviet Union will be compelled to recognize. Of these facts the most important is the ratification of the Paris agreements. Once these treaties are consummated, we shall have proved beyond the shadow of a doubt, as Mr. Lyon has stated,

“the fallacy and the futility of Soviet policy, which aims at conquest through division and corruption and which tries to perpetuate the unnatural and uncalled-for state of weakness by keeping free nations disunited in open disregard of their true interests. Once this Soviet objective has been frustrated . . . a vital part of Soviet strategy will have been foiled. And once Western European Union has become an accomplished fact, the way will be open for us to negotiate from strength.”

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