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Paris Peace
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1919

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THE COUNCIL OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS:
MINUTES OF MEETINGS AUGUST 29 TO
NOVEMBER 5, 1919

THE COUNCIL OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS: MINUTES OF
MEETINGS AUGUST 29 TO NOVEMBER 5, 1919

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/42

HD-42

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great
Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris,
on Friday, August 29, 1919, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Secretaries

Mr. H. Norman.
Sir George Clerk.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Saint-Quentin

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

Secretary

H. Paterno.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA . . . Mr. C. Russell.
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE M. de Percin.
ITALY Lt-Colonel Jones.

Interpreter—M. Meyer

The following also attended for the questions with which they were concerned :

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Professor Coolidge.
Professor Johnson.
Mr. Woolsey.
Mr. Scott.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.
Mr. H. Nicolson.
Captain C. T. M. Fuller, R. N.

FRANCE

M. Tardieu.
M. Loucheur.
M. Jules Cambon.
M. Seydoux.
M. Laroche.
General Le Rond.
M. Hermitte.
M. Massigli.
Commdt. Levavasseur.

ITALY

Count Vannutelli-Rey.
M. Brambilla.
M. di Palma.

1. M. TARDIEU said that on the previous day he had received from M. Tittoni a new proposal. There was no further question of a Plebiscite except in a small area near Radkersburg.

Plebiscite in the Marburg Area

M. CLEMENCEAU asked why M. Tittoni wished to hold a Plebiscite there.

M. TITTONI replied that his main object was to get an Austrian signature to the Treaty. What he proposed was a considerable reduction to the Austrian demands, but the area was entirely German, and though the district of Marburg would remain Jugo Slav, he thought it was desirable to give the Austrians satisfaction somewhere. One of the reasons for holding a plebiscite in this area was that the Chief of the Christian Social Party which supported the State had been returned for Radkersburg.

M. TARDIEU said that without expressing any opinion on the reason alleged by M. Tittoni, he thought the area of Radkersburg ought to be attached to Prekumarie. Should the Plebiscite go in favour of Austria, the resulting frontier would be a bad one.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked General Le Rond to state what, from a geographical point of view, would be the result.

GENERAL LE ROND said that it had been recognised long ago that the population in this area was mainly German, and in making a frontier, it was not possible to take any account of every little variation in the character of the population. This was all the less necessary as a considerable number of Slovene villages had been left within Austria. If the Plebiscite suggested by M. Tittoni turned out in favour of the Austrians, the frontier in this area would be geographically unsound, cutting valleys in a capricious manner and leaving Radkersburg almost on the boundary line. Should the vote be in favour of the Jugo Slavs, which was unlikely, the frontier would be the same as that proposed by the Commission. In the area in question, there were about 10,000 Austrians. The number of Slovenes left outside Jugo Slavia could be counted in hundreds of thousands. If the question of the Austrians in this area were raised, the question of the Slovenes left outside Jugo Slavia would also have to be raised.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the Austrians would still demand a Plebiscite in this region if a Plebiscite in the Slovene area left to them were required.

MR. POLK observed that the Slovenes left outside Jugo Slavia would remain in Hungary and not in Austria. Austria would therefore raise no objection.

M. TITTONI said that if the line of the Drave had been accepted, it would have yielded a more logical frontier than any other line. He pointed out further that the area in question was included in an

administrative boundary. The geographical objections therefore, did not appear strong, as the frontier adopted by the Commission was not itself a good geographical line.

GENERAL LE ROND said that the line proposed by the Commission followed the crest of the Hills.

M. TITTONI said that for so small a matter, he did not wish to risk a refusal of the Austrian signature.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought there was no great need to fear the refusal of signature.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that the River Mur be taken as the frontier line and that no Plebiscite should be held at all. Radkersburg would then remain Austrian.

“It was then decided that no Plebiscite should be held in Styria, and that the River Mur should be accepted as the frontier between Austria and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in this area.

“Radkersburg would be attributed to Austria, and Marburg to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.”

2. M. CAMBON said that the proposal referred to the Editing Committee by the Council on the previous day (H. D. 41, Paragraph 7, Appendix B)¹ had been examined. In the opinion of the Editing Committee, the Council had refused to recognise the principle involved, in the Treaty with Germany. The Committee therefore regarded it a mistake to record in the Treaty with Austria anything so diametrically different from the treatment accorded to Germany.

For his part, he would suggest, should the Council adopt the proposal, that it be communicated to Austria in the form of a special additional document. The British Delegate on the Editing Committee regarded the question as one of general interest concerning all countries, including neutral countries. He thought, therefore, that it should be referred to the League of Nations.

M. TITTONI said that he favoured the suggestion made by M. Cambon that the agreement be made additional to the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer that nothing should be said in the Treaty.

MR. POLK suggested that the proposal be referred to the International Labour Congress² in Washington.

(It was then decided that no mention be made in the Treaty with Austria of the rights and privileges of Allied workpeople admitted to enemy territories and vice versa, but that the resolution passed by the Labour Committee on June 4th, 1919, (Appendix B to H. D. 41)

¹ Vol. VII, pp. 960, 963.

² Officially known as the International Labor Conference.

should be referred to the International Labour Congress in Washington.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had previously decided that German Labour Delegates should be admitted to the next meeting of the International Labour Congress,³ after that to be held in Washington. The same principle should presumably apply to the Austrians. The labour organisations in various Allied and Neutral countries, notably in France, were, however, asking that the German labour delegates be admitted at once. His proposal was that the question of their admission or non-admission be left to the discretion of the Congress itself.

Admission of
Austrian and
German Labour
Delegates to
International
Labour Congress in
Washington

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the proposal to be that the International Labour Congress should meet according to the constitution at present laid down for it, and that it should then decide whether or not German and Austrian delegates should be heard.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that was his intention.

M. TITTONI said that the Italian C. G. T.⁴ declared it would not send representatives to Washington and would not recognise the International Labour Congress or its decisions unless the German delegates were admitted. No International Labour legislation could be enforced in Italy against the will of Italian labour. He believed the same conditions existed in France.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not intimidated by threats. The French Labour Party had spoken to him very much in the same manner, but he thought his proposal was sufficient to meet the situation.

MR. BALFOUR said that M. Clemenceau's proposal appeared to him to be very reasonable, though it was a modification of a previous decision. As he had no expert on labour matters whom he could consult, he would like to postpone giving his assent until he had had time to obtain the views of the British Minister specially concerned with this subject. In referring the matter to him, he would express his personal agreement with M. Clemenceau's views.

MR. POLK said that he was in a similar situation to Mr. Balfour and would take up the matter with his Government.

M. TITTONI said that there was one practical difficulty in M. Clemenceau's scheme. Should the Congress decide to give a hearing to the Germans and Austrians, they would require a month to get to Washington.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had been assured that the Germans and Austrians would go to Washington in expectation of a favourable decision, should the Council adopt the proposal he had made.

³ CF-16, minute 4, vol. v, p. 681.

⁴ *Confédération générale du travail*.

(It was decided to postpone the decision on the question of the admission of German and Austrian Labour Delegates to the International Labour Congress at Washington, until Mr. Balfour and Mr. Polk had consulted their respective Governments.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a disquieting telegram from Colonel Haskell, the Allied High Commissioner in Armenia.

Situation in Armenia (The telegram contained in Appendix "A" was then read.) He added that he had ordered a note to be circulated to his colleagues to the effect that he was ready to send 12,000 men to Cilicia. This force would be able to occupy the points mentioned by Colonel Haskell. It would be necessary to utilise the Bagdad railway as a means of supplying this force. (The note contained in Appendix "B" was then read.)

MR. POLK asked whether the army referred to by Colonel Haskell was not one that was accessible from the Black Sea.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was also accessible from Cilicia, as the roads were good and suitable for motor lorries. It would be possible, he considered, to send supplies into Armenia from Mersina and Alexandretta. An agreement for the use of the railway would, however, be necessary.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether this had been studied by the French General Staff.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the note was a result of a study by the Staff.

(It was decided to postpone the consideration of the Note contained in Appendix "B" till the following day.)

5. (It was decided to postpone the consideration of the new English draft covering letter until the following day, and in connection with it, to discuss the question whether or not Austria was a New State.)

Covering Letter to Reply to Austrian Delegation

Article No. 61 of the New German Constitution. (Reference HD-41, Minute 3)⁵

6. M. BERTHELOT said that Article 61 of the new German Constitution was to the following effect:

"Each land has at least one vote in the Reichsrat. In the case of the greater lands, one vote is assigned to a million inhabitants. An excess which is at least equal to the population of the smallest land is reckoned as a complete million. No land can be represented by more than two-fifths of the total votes.

German Austria, after its junction with the German Reich, receives the right of participation in the Reichsrat with the number of votes corresponding to its population. Till then, the representatives of German Austria have a consultative voice.

⁵ Vol. VII, p. 957.

The number of votes is fixed anew by the Reichsrat after each general census."

Article 61 appeared to be out of harmony with Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace. The American Delegation, however, questioned whether Article 178 of the new German Constitution did not dispel the apparent contradiction. Article 178 was to the effect that no provision in the Constitution could be held to modify the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles. The question had been submitted to the legal advisers, who thought that Article 178 rendered Article 61, in so far as it conflicted with the stipulations of the Treaty, null and void. This appeared to furnish an additional reason for asking the German Government to cancel Article 61. The Council should therefore decide whether, and in what form, the protest should be made to the German Government. It should also decide whether M. Tardieu's proposal should be carried out, namely, to insert a counter-part of Article 80 in the Treaty with Austria.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the question raised by Article 61 of the new German Constitution had been referred to the Drafting Committee, and that agreement had not yet been reached within the Committee. He thought, therefore, that it would be better to await its recommendations. He thought that the first of the problems alluded to by M. Berthelot was the more important. He did not think it mattered much whether anything was inserted in the Treaty with Austria.

(It was decided to postpone the question raised by Article 61 of the new German Constitution to the following day, in order to obtain the views of the Drafting Committee.)

7. M. TITTONI said that he understood the Drafting Committee wanted confirmation of the decision taken by the Council on August 27th (H. D. 40, para. 3),⁶ regarding the plans for the Col de Reschen and Pas de Predil Railway.

Col de Reschen and
Pas de Predil
Railway

M. FROMAGEOT (who entered the room at this moment with the members of the Drafting Committee), said the only question in doubt was whether the draft contained in Appendix "B" to H. D. 40⁷ had been accepted by the Council.

(It was decided to accept the draft contained in Appendix "B" to H. D. 40.)

8. M. BERTHELOT explained that the people of Vorarlberg had expressed a desire to join the Swiss Federation. The Austrian Delegation, as might have been expected, had protested. The Swiss Federal Council, meanwhile, had not adopted

The Question of
Vorarlberg

⁶ Vol. VII, p. 945.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 951.

any resolution in favour of union with Vorarlberg. The Federal Council hesitated because the inclusion of this district would upset the present balance of power between the German and French cantons. The Conference, therefore, had before it only an appeal from the Vorarlberg. It could take no decision until it had before it a proposal from the Swiss Government.

MR. BALFOUR said he quite agreed that this was a matter that could not be settled without the Swiss. The only question left to the Council was to know whether the door should be left open for the Swiss to invite Vorarlberg to join them. He thought it might be better to leave the whole question alone.

M. BERTHELOT said that the following was the proposal of the Central Territorial Committee for insertion in the Treaty.

“23 aout, 1919.

En présence des manifestations des habitants du Vorarlberg en faveur d'un rattachement de leur territoire à la Suisse, la République d'Autriche, au cas où la Suisse elle-même, déclarerait formellement qu'elle accepte un tel rattachement, s'engage à reconnaître la décision du Conseil de la Société des Nations devant qui le cas devrait être porté.”^s

MR. BALFOUR asked whether the petition received from the Vorarlberg represented the majority of the population.

M. LAROCHE said that two unofficial plebiscites had been held, and they yielded the result of 4 to 1 in favour of union with Switzerland. The second had been even more decisive than the first.

M. TITTONI said that he would suggest reference to a regular plebiscite.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer to take no action. The matter had not been brought officially to the cognisance of the Conference. There was in Switzerland a balance of power between the German and French elements. The Swiss Government was satisfactory from an international point of view. It might cease to be so if its German population were increased.

M. LAROCHE observed that it was for this reason that the Committee recommended that a formal declaration by Switzerland should be obtained.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that so far Switzerland had asked for nothing.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was also in favour of not adding to the German majority in Switzerland.

^s “August 23, 1919. In view of the manifestations of the inhabitants of Vorarlberg in favor of the union of their territory to Switzerland, the Republic of Austria, in case Switzerland should formally declare that she accepts such a union, undertakes to recognize the decision of the Council of the League of Nations to which the case should be presented.” [Translation by the editors.]

M. PICHON observed that the problem was complicated by a financial question. Switzerland would only accept Vorarlberg if the area were relieved of its share of the Austrian debt. The hope of escape from this burden was one of the determining motives in the result of the plebiscites.

M. TARDIEU said that there was also a political reason against inserting anything in the Treaty regarding Vorarlberg. The Conference was attempting to meet the Austrians as far as possible. The Austrian Delegation would be greatly offended at any Article tending to deprive it of Vorarlberg. The Conference had received expressions of opinion from Dutch Limburg in favour of union with Belgium. No notice had been taken. He thought the question should be left for the League of Nations to consider at a later date.

(It was decided that no action need be taken on the subject of the union of Vorarlberg with Switzerland.)

9. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the conclusions of the report had been accepted by the Council (H. D. 39, Para. 2).⁹ He observed that he had taken action and fulfilled his part of the undertaking. He had given orders that the French troops in Fiume should be replaced by others. As to the suppression of the French base, this could not be undertaken immediately, as the base must be maintained while there were French troops. In the meantime, however, there had been a recrudescence of unpleasant incidents. He thought it was necessary that General Grazioli should be recalled forthwith, and that Italy should take as prompt action as he had taken himself, otherwise further bloodshed would occur, as threatening posters were appearing in Fiume, directed against both the French and the British.

M. TITTONI undertook to act and to fulfil all the undertakings of the Italian Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he took note of this declaration.

10. M. SEYDOUX explained that the Note¹⁰ prepared by the Eastern Blockade Committee for the Council, and considered by the latter on the 23rd August (H. D. 37. Minute 6)¹¹ had been reconsidered in order to meet the views of the American Delegation. Certain modifications had been made, but the Blockade Committee thought it absolutely necessary to maintain a sentence to the effect that any action taken by a warship of an Allied or Associated Power should be understood to be taken in the name of all the Allied and Associated Powers. Without such a stipulation, it would be impossible for the ships in the Baltic to take any action at all.

Report of Inter-
Allied Commission
on the Incidents
at Fiume

Blockade of
Soviet Russia

⁹ Vol. VII, p. 929.

¹⁰ Appendix D to HD-37, *ibid.*, p. 823.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 817.

MR. POLK observed that there appeared to be no amendment in that case of the previous provisional decision. What was proposed was equivalent to a blockade.

M. SEYDOUX said that it was not blockade, because merchant shipping could not be captured, but could only be turned back.

MR. POLK said he regretted that he could not agree. The phrase M. Seydoux attached such importance to represented a blockade. The American Government had always held very strong views on this subject. He thought, however, that some compromise might be possible. According to M. Seydoux, a neutral ship, attempting to trade with Bolshevik Russia, could not be captured, but could be turned back. Should the neutral ship refuse to turn back and should its papers be in order, Allied ships would not be entitled to take any action at all. What he suggested was,

“that vessels of the Allied and Associated Powers should, in the name of those Powers as a whole, be authorised to prevent any vessel not provided with legal clearance for a Bolshevik Russian port, or any vessels whose papers are falsified, from proceeding to a Bolshevik destination.”

MR. BALFOUR asked what the United States Government would do if an American trader asked for clearance papers for a cargo to Petrograd.

MR. POLK said that the United States Government would refuse clearance.

MR. BALFOUR said the British Government would do the same.

MR. POLK pointed out that stopping a neutral ship at sea if it carried regular papers, was nothing less than blockade.

MR. BALFOUR said that the United States Government made a distinction between fighting Russia and being at war with Russia.

MR. POLK observed that the British Government made the same distinction.

MR. BALFOUR said that according to International lawyers, it was impossible to be at war with any Government unless that Government were recognised. He did not, himself, attach much value to the opinion of international lawyers.

M. SEYDOUX said that it was known that several Swedish ships were ready to sail with cargoes for Petrograd. If the American proposal were adopted, the Allied Navies would not be able to intercept them.

MR. POLK asked how the Navies could stop them at present.

M. SEYDOUX said that hitherto no such shipments had gone to Petrograd. He suggested that the British Admiralty Notice No. 1298 of the 18th July, warning shipping against entering the zone in which

operations were taking place, should be re-affirmed in the "Journal Officiel" of the various Allied Governments.

MR. POLK said that he would try and find some formula to which the American Government could consent.

(The question was then adjourned.)

11. MR. POLK asked whether Treaties with the new States were to be between the New State on the one hand, and all the Allied and Associated Powers on the other, or between the New State on the one hand, and the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other.

(It was decided that the Treaties with the New States should be between the New State on the one hand, and the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 29 August, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-42

[*Telegram From the Allied High Commissioner to Armenia (Haskell) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

I have personally investigated conditions in Armenia and find the horrible situation beyond description. Relief can and will reach the destitute in time to prevent starvation providing you support me with troops. Cavalry most suitable if available. The equivalent of an American reinforced infantry brigade will save situation in Russian Armenia. Tartars attacking on east and south with Tartar uprisings increasing daily throughout interior. Arrival of even one regiment might decide fate of our Armenian allies who may be exterminated at any time unless troops are rushed. British now leaving Caucasus and have already refused even temporarily to use any of their troops in Armenia stating that orders from above forbid their stationing of any British troops in Armenian territory. If British policy forbids protection of Armenians indicated by above conditions, this must be changed or other troops must be found and their arrival expedited. British troops now here are principally Indian. Please acknowledge receipt this telegram.

W. M. N. HASKELL, Col., G. S., U.S.A.
Allied High Commissioner to Armenia.

Appendix B to HD-42

[Translation ¹²]

FRENCH DELEGATION

PARIS, August —, 1919.

Protection of the Armenians

In pursuance of the decision of the Conference of August 25,¹³ the possibility of sending a small expeditionary contingent for the protection of the Armenians has been examined by the French Government, and the following conclusions have been reached:

(1) The French Government recognizes the possibility of constituting an expeditionary force of some 12,000 men of all arms, to be taken for the most part from the army of General Franchet d'Esperey, upon completion of the reconstitution of that army, that is, after September 10.

The operation would be carried out by taking as point of debarkation the ports of Cilicia, where two French bases would be created (at Mersina and Alexandretta).

In order to gain time, however, it would be necessary to reserve the maritime route for the transport of troops; material and horses would be transported by rail through Haidar-Pasha, Konia, Adana; an understanding to that effect would be concluded with the railway company for control of the transportation.

(2) The occupying force would ensure its own food supply first by the railways from Mersina and Alexandretta, and beyond these by means of motor trucks for which the good state of the roads in Armenia permit a wide use.

The supply of the bases could be assured out of our own resources as for the French troops in the Levant, provided the English continue to assure us a supply of refrigerated meat.

(3) To recapitulate, the operation contemplated is possible after September 10 without serious difficulties, on condition that an understanding be reached regarding transport and supply.

¹² Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹³ HD-38, minute 5, vol. VII, p. 839.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, August 30, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Secretaries

Mr. H. Norman.

Sir George Clerk.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta.

M. Berthelot.

M. de Saint-Quentin.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

Secretary

M. Paterno.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Capt. Chapin.
 BRITISH EMPIRE Lt-Commander Bell.
 FRANCE M. de Percin.
 ITALY Lt-Colonel Jones.

Interpreter—M. Meyer

The following also attended for the items with which they were concerned.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dr. James Brown Scott.

Mr. Woolsey.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.

Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.

Major-General Sir C. J. Sackville-West.

Mr. H. Nicolson.

Mr. A. Leeper.

FRANCE

M. Tardieu.

M. Cambon.

M. Laroche.

M. Fromageot.

M. Hermitte.

M. Massigli.

M. Kammerer.

ITALY

Count Vannutelli-Rey.

M. Galli.

M. Castoldi.

M. Ricci-Busatti.

1. M. CAMBON read aloud the French text of the draft covering letter, in reply to the Austrian counter-proposals, prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr. On concluding, he remarked that the letter now before the Council was longer than the former communication drafted by the Editing Committee. He further remarked, that, in Mr. Philip Kerr's draft covering letter, no mention was made of the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to call the new Austrian State the Austrian Republic, and to avoid all mention of the expression "German Austria".

The Covering Letter in Reply to the Austrian Counter-proposals. (See Appendix A)

M. TITTONI said that it had been decided that the expression "Republic of Austria" should be employed in all official communications addressed to that Country. He did not think that it was within the power of the Council to do more. (See H. D. 29, Minute 4.)¹

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with M. Tittoni.

M. CAMBON read the passage in the original covering letter drafted by the Editing Committee, dealing explicitly with the point in question (see H. D. 38, Appendix "F").²

MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to make a general comparison between the former document, prepared by the Editing Committee, and the one now before the Council. He accepted M. Cambon's statement that the new draft covering letter was longer than the former. He also agreed with him that the new letter omitted certain points which had been dealt with by the Editing Committee. With regard to the manner in which the Austrian Government should henceforth be addressed, the Council had always referred to the "Austrian Republic" in all official documents, and it was not possible to do more than this. Neither the Council nor the League of Nations could prevent any Country from conferring upon itself any title that it might desire to be known by. The original document drawn up by the Editing Committee was an extremely able one and a proof of this statement consisted in the fact that the new draft before the Council was based entirely upon the old covering letter, to which it owed everything. None the less, he preferred the new version to the old. What was desired was a document drafted in such a form, that it should be read widely in Allied, and in enemy, countries. This document should, moreover, express in the clearest and most forcible terms, the main contention of the Allied and Associated Governments, which was that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had largely caused the war and that the Austrian Republic was the direct successor of the old Kingdom. He thought that this main argument was expressed with greater force in the new document. If, however,

¹ Vol. VII, p. 672.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 859, 860.

the Council desired to adhere to the former draft covering letter drawn up by the Editing Committee, he would point out that it had not been the work of a single mind; that, in consequence, it contained a certain number of repetitions; and that it insisted on details, which, though important to the Allied Governments, and possibly to Austria, would not excite the interest of the ordinary public.

He thought that in the new document, Italy's case had been better stated. Attention was drawn to the selfish and unscrupulous manner in which the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had always tried to arrange her frontiers with Italy in such a way that she would have that country at her mercy. He did not think that too much emphasis could be given to this. In favouring the acceptance of the new document before the Council, he based his preference on the conviction that it would be more accessible to the mind of the ordinary public throughout the world.

MR. POLK said that there was no great choice between either draft. On the whole, however, he was ready to agree with Mr. Balfour to accept the one prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr, but drew attention to the fact that a few changes would be necessary in it.

M. TITTONI said that the new document before the Council had been very well drawn up, and that it possessed the qualities ascribed to it by Mr. Balfour. He therefore accepted it.

M. MATSUI said that he accepted the English draft.

M. CAMBON drew attention to the fact that in the old draft letter drawn up by the Editing Committee, the question of a possible union between Germany and Austria was dealt with. It was not mentioned in the new document.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question of the future relations between Germany and Austria would be discussed.

M. CAMBON drew attention to the American proposal contained in Appendix F of H. D. 38.³ This proposal pointed out that the original covering letter was not in agreement with the preamble of the Peace Treaty on the subject of the present status of Austria.

MR. POLK, in further explanation, stated that in the preamble of the Peace Treaty the words "Austria is recognised as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria" appeared. In the original covering letter, Austria had been treated as the successor of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He suggested that the matter could be settled by deleting from the preamble of the Treaty the phrase above quoted. In addition to this, the word "Austria" on page 8 of the preamble, should be replaced by the expression "Republic of Austria".

³ Vol. VII, pp. 859, 912.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that the words "Austria is recognised as a new and independent State" had been inserted by President Wilson, who would not, he thought, raise any objection to their suppression.

MR. POLK said that the manner in which Austria was referred to in the preamble had an important bearing upon the future obligations of the new Republic. The phrase in question affected the Peace Treaty; the covering letter was not concerned with it.

M. TITTONI remarked that in the new document before the Council, the "tyranny" of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was emphasised in one place and the "centralization" of that Government in another. He thought that the last expression weakened the first.

MR. BALFOUR said that the centralization of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been drawn attention to, in order to show the Austrian people how much the dominant position of Vienna, in former days, stood to their prejudice at present.

MR. POLK said that on page 7 of the English Draft, the words "Committees who reported on the question" should be replaced by the word "Conference". He also said that the resolution passed on the previous day, with regard to Radkersburg, made it necessary to amend the statement on the subject of the Austro-Hungarian frontiers.

M. TARDIEU said that a small sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission had been of the opinion that a special clause (see Appendix "B") should be inserted in the draft letter.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought such a clause ought to be put in a separate document.

(After some discussion, it was agreed the proposed special clause should be added to the covering letter, in some way, possibly, as a footnote.)

It was decided:—

(1) That the covering letter prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr, and submitted to the Council, should be accepted as a whole, but that the following modifications⁴ should be introduced:—⁵

(a) Page 7 (English Text) Paragraph 4, Lines 8 & 9, the words "Committees who reported on the question", should be replaced by the word "Conference".

(b) That the statements in Paragraph 4, Page 7 (English Text) on the subject of the Austrian frontiers, should be amended in

⁴ Modification (a) has already been made in the copy of the draft letter which accompanies the minutes as appendix A.

⁵ In *Resolutions Adopted by the Supreme Council*, August 30, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 180.03502/43), this paragraph reads as follows:

"It was agreed that the covering letter prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr and submitted to the Council should be accepted as a whole, but that the following modifications should be introduced therein by Mr. Philip Kerr, who should transmit his text to the Editing Committee:"

conformity with the resolution taken on the previous day with regard to Radkersburg and Marburg (See H. D. 42, Minute 1.)⁶

(c) That the draft resolution passed by the Sub-Committee of the Reparation Commission (See Appendix "B") should be added to the covering letter in the form of a foot-note, or in some other suitable manner.

(2) It was also decided that the following changes should be made in the preamble of the Peace Treaty with Austria:—

(a) On Page 8, Line 11 from the bottom, the word "Austria" should be replaced by the words "Republic of Austria".

(b) On Page 8, Lines 5 & 6 from the bottom the words "Austria is recognised as a new and independent State under the name of the Republic of Austria", should be deleted.)

2. The Council took note of the reply of the Drafting Committee to the question put before it by the Council on the 27th [28th] August. (See H. D. 39, Minute 4,⁷ and See Appendix "C".)

Article in the German Constitution Violating the Stipulations of the Peace Treaty With Germany. (Reference HD-42, Minute 6)⁸

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not agree with the reply of the Drafting Committee. In his opinion, Article 61 of the new German Constitution not only violated the Treaty of Versailles, but called for the collaboration of the Austrian Republic in that very violation. The situation caused was a serious one, and must be faced. In his opinion, the attention of the German Government should be called to this act of violation and should be forced to give a reply. He thought that the Drafting Committee's argument was an extremely clever one, but the assent of the German Government to that argument must be obtained. International lawyers were notorious for their differences of opinion. One lawyer would assert that an object was red, another that it was blue, whilst a third would be equally certain that it had no color at all. These differences of opinion, though entertaining, were not a suitable basis for measures affecting the peace of Europe.

MR. BALFOUR said that there were two questions before the Council. Firstly, the insertion of a clause in the Peace Treaty with Austria, with a view to counteracting the provisions of Article 61 of the new German Constitution; and, secondly, the action which should be taken with regard to Germany in view of her violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. He would like to know the opinion of the lawyers of the Drafting Committee upon the legal side of the question.

DR. SCOTT said that, in his opinion, the insertion of Article 61 in the German Constitution showed that the German Government had wilfully, deliberately, and without cause, broken the pact into which she had entered at Versailles.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 2.

⁷ Vol. VII, p. 937.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 5.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it might be sufficient to make the Austrian Government undertake not to be a party to the German Government's manoeuvre.

(It was agreed that a special clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Austria.)

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau, but that he would like to hear a concise statement of the problem in international law raised by Article 61. He believed that the Drafting Committee had not been unanimous in its opinion on the subject.

M. FROMAGEOT said that he thought that the new German Constitution violated the Peace Treaty, and added, that the advice to the Council, in the form submitted, had been unanimously accepted by the Drafting Committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had news, in the form of a letter, which he had not yet circulated to the Council, that the attitude of the German Government was quite unsatisfactory. They were opposing Allied action in Silesia and his latest information was to the effect, that one army corps would now be necessary for that country. All this only constituted an extra proof of the bad faith of the German people, and its Government.

MR. HURST said that there had been a difference of opinion in the Drafting Committee as to the extent to which the Peace Treaty of Versailles had been violated, although all were agreed that it had been violated in a certain degree. The point at issue was as follows. Article 80 of the Peace Treaty with Germany contained two references to the independence of Austria. In the first, Germany was called upon "to respect strictly the independence of Austria." In the second, she agreed that "this independence shall be inalienable." Undoubtedly Article 61 of the German Constitution violated the letter of the Peace of Versailles, but it was in the form of an invitation to Austria to join Germany. A country's independence was recognised by abstaining from all acts of coercion against it; and an invitation, which was the very reverse of a coercive measure, could hardly be said to threaten the independence of a sovereign State.

M. TARDIEU said that Mr. Hurst's argument was to the effect that Article 61 of the German Constitution exerted no pressure against Austria. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, however, stipulated that nothing should be done to interfere with Austrian independence. As an act prejudicial to that independence had been taken, the question of whether there had, or had not, been direct pressure, could be laid to one side.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought a letter should be sent on the subject to the German Government, which should be called upon to reply.

M. TARDIEU said that the action of the German Government had been taken by the Legislative Authorities. In previous cases (Slesvig, etc.) the Executive Authorities had been concerned. In either case, the Council could act.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council was called upon to take a political and not a legal decision; and suggested that Mr. Balfour, who was a moderate man, should draft the communication to be sent to the German Government.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not think that moderation was the exact quality required, and he thought that M. Berthelot, who was not a moderate man, ought to draft the letter.

M. TITTONI remarked that the cases of Austria and of Germany was not quite analogous. Germany must be called upon to perform her Treaty engagements. He did not know whether Austria could be called upon to settle, finally, her future condition, at the dictation of the Council.

M. PICHON said that in the draft Article for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Austria (See Appendix "C"), the manner in which the future independence of Austria was to be assured by the League of Nations was clearly provided for.

(It was agreed :—

(1) that the draft Article regarding the independence of Austria (See Appendix "C") should be accepted and inserted in the Austrian Peace Treaty;

(2) that M. Berthelot should draft a letter for transmission to the German Government on the subject of Article 61 of the new German Constitution and should submit his draft to the Council at its next meeting.)

3. The Council took note of the Drafting Committee's report on the draft articles to be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Austria, for

Draft Articles for
the Treaty With
Austria for the
Settlement of
Differences Between
States Called
Upon by the Treaty
To Conclude Special
Conventions

the settlement of differences between States called upon by that Treaty to conclude special Conventions.

(See Annex "D".)

(After some discussion, it was decided that the draft articles for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Austria—See Annex "D"—should be accepted.)

4. The Council took note of a document drawing attention to the divergences between the French and English texts of the Covenant of the League of Nations. (See Annex "E".)

Languages of the
Peace Treaty

MR. BALFOUR proposed the following draft resolution :—

"The present Treaty in French, in English and in Italian shall be ratified. In case of divergence, the French text shall prevail, except in Parts I and XIII, where the French and English texts shall be of equal force."

He said that in bringing forward this resolution, he desired to make it quite clear, that he did not wish it to be thought, that he was provoking a competition for priority between the French and English languages:

(After some discussion, it was agreed:—

1. That in the case of divergence between the French, English and Italian texts of the Peace Treaty with Austria, the French text should prevail, except in parts I and XIII, where the French and English texts should be of equal force.

2. That the Drafting Committee should insert an Article in the Peace Treaty with Austria in conformity with the aforesaid resolution.)

5. The Council took note of a communication from M. Pachitch, on behalf of the Yugo-Slav State, to the effect that the Yugo-Slav Government could not undertake to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, until the special Treaty between themselves and the Allied & Associated Govts., provided for in Article 59 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, had been communicated to them.

Proposed Treaty
Between the
Principal Allied
and Associated
Powers and the
Yugo-Slav State

(It was agreed that the consideration of this question should be adjourned to the Meeting of the Council on Monday, September 1st, 1919.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL ASTORIA, PARIS, August 30, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-43

Draft Covering Letter

1. The Allied and Associated Powers have given most careful consideration to the observations of the Austrian Delegation on the draft Treaty of Peace. The reply of the Austrian Delegation objects to the draft Treaty on the ground that, in view of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Austria ought not to be treated as an enemy state at all, and that in consequence she ought not to be made in any special way the inheritor of the responsibilities in regard to reparation to which the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would undoubtedly be liable, did it still exist. As these observations point to a fundamental misconception of the responsibilities of the people of Austria, the Allied and Associated Powers feel it necessary to state, as briefly as may be, the principles which they consider must be applied to the settlement of the late war, so far as Austria is concerned.

The people of Austria, together with their neighbours, the people of Hungary, bear in a peculiar degree the responsibility for the calamities which have befallen Europe in the last five years. The war was precipitated by an ultimatum presented to Serbia by the Government in Vienna and requiring acceptance within 48 hours of a series of demands which amounted to the destruction of the independence of a neighbouring sovereign State. The Royal Government of Serbia accepted within the prescribed time all the demands except those which involved the virtual surrender of its independence, yet the then Austro-Hungarian Government, refusing all offers of conference and conciliation on the basis of that reply, immediately opened hostilities against Serbia, thereby deliberately setting light to a train which led directly to universal war. It is now evident that this ultimatum was no more than an insincere excuse for beginning a war for which the late autocratic Government in Vienna, in close association with the rulers of Germany, had long prepared, and for which it considered the time had arrived. The presence of Austrian guns at the siege of Liége and Namur is a further proof, if proof were required, of the intimate association of the Government of Vienna with the Government of Berlin in its plot against the public law and the liberties of Europe.

The Austrian Delegation appear to think that the responsibility for these acts rested solely on the Hapsburg dynasty and its satellites, and that by reason of the dissolution of that Monarchy through the victory of the Allies, the people of Austria can escape responsibility for the deeds of a Government which was their own Government and which had its home in their capital. Had the people of Austria, in the years preceding the war endeavoured to curb the militarist and domineering spirit by which the Government of the Hapsburg Monarchy was animated, had they made any effective protest against the war, or refused to assist and support their rulers in prosecuting it, some attention might now be paid to this plea. But the fact that the war was acclaimed on its outbreak in Vienna, that the people of Austria were its ardent supporters from start to finish, and that they did nothing to dissociate themselves from the policy of their Government and its Allies until they had been defeated in the field, makes it clear, that according to any canon of justice, they must be held to bear their full measure of responsibility for the crime which has brought such misery on the world.

There is, however, a further fact to which the Allied and Associated Powers feel bound to point. The later Hapsburg system became, in its essence, a system for maintaining the ascendancy of the German and Magyar peoples over the majority of the inhabitants of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This ancient and effete autoc-

racy, with its militarist traditions, was maintained in existence through the vigorous support of the inhabitants of Austria and of Hungary, because it gave to them a position of political and economic domination over their fellow subjects. It was the policy of racial ascendancy and oppression, to which the people of Austria gave their steady support, which was one of the deeper causes of the war. It led to those irredentist movements along the frontiers of Austria-Hungary which kept Europe in a ferment of unrest. It led to the growing dependence of Austria-Hungary on Germany, and consequently to the subordination of Austro-Hungarian policy to the pan-German plans of domination, and in the end it led to a situation in which the rulers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy could see no other way of preserving their own power than to deliberately set to work to destroy the liberty of a small and independent State which kept alive the vision of liberty among their oppressed brethren, which blocked the way to Constantinople and the East. In the opinion, therefore, of the Allied and Associated Powers, it is impossible to admit the plea of the Austrian Delegation that the people of Austria do not share the responsibility of the Government which provoked the war, or that they ought to escape the duty of making reparation to the utmost of their capacity to those whom they, and the Government they sustained, have so grievously wronged. The principles upon which the draft Treaty was based must therefore stand. Until the signing of the Peace the people of Austria are, and will remain, an enemy people. Upon its signature they will become a state with whom the Allied and Associated Powers hope and expect to maintain friendly relations.

2. The Austrian Delegation have further protested against the arrangements under the Treaty governing their relations with the new States formed out of the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Allied and Associated Powers feel bound to point out that the disabilities from which Austria will suffer will arise not from the provisions of the Treaty, but mainly from the policy of ascendancy which its people have pursued in the past. Had the policy of Austria-Hungary been one of liberality and justice to all its people, the Upper Danube States might have remained in friendly economic and political unity. As it was the policy of ascendancy produced one of the cruellest tragedies of the late war, when millions of the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary were driven, under pain of death, to fight against their will in an army which was being used to perpetuate their own servitude, as well as to compass the destruction of liberty in Europe. Many of these peoples protested against the war, and, for their protests, suffered confiscation, imprisonment or death. Many more, who were captured or escaped, joined the Armies of the Allies and played their

part in the war of liberation. But they are now, one and all, determined, and rightly determined, to set themselves up as independent States. They will trust Vienna no more. The policy of ascendancy has borne its inevitable fruit in the fact of partition, and it is this partition which lies at the root of Austria's troubles to-day. Vienna was made the economic and political centre of the Empire. Everything was artificially concentrated there. Outlying districts and railways were starved in order that the capital might thrive. The break-up of Austria-Hungary, cutting these centralised economic filaments in two, can hardly fail to inflict the severest blows upon the State of Austria and its capital. But the dissolution of the Monarchy, with its consequences, is the direct outcome of that fatal policy of domination for which the people of Austria are themselves principally to blame.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers, however, have no wish to add to the hardships of Austria's position. On the contrary, they are anxious to do all in their power to assist her people to accommodate themselves to their new position and to recover their prosperity, provided always it is not at the expense of the new States formed out of the late Empire. The break-up of the Monarchy has given rise to many difficult problems in the relations between the new States which under the Treaty are its heirs. It has always been recognised as reasonable that the relations between the citizens of the succeeding States should be regulated in certain respects differently from the relations between the citizens of Austria and those of the other Allied and Associated Powers. But, in view of the observations of the Austrian Delegation, the Allied and Associated Powers, while adhering to the general lines of the Treaty, have made considerable modifications in its economic provisions. The property of Austrian nationals in the territories ceded to the Allied Powers is to be restored to its owners free from any measures of liquidation or transfer taken since the Armistice, and is guaranteed similar freedom from seizure or liquidation in the future. Contracts between Austrian nationals and persons who acquire under the Treaty an Allied nationality are maintained without the option of cancellation. Provision is made to ensure to Austria the supplies of coal from Czecho-Slovakia and Poland upon which she is dependent, in return for the reciprocal obligation to supply certain raw materials. Outstanding questions affecting nationals of Austria, which require settlement between Austria and its inheriting neighbours, are to be regulated by separate conventions, and these conventions are to be drawn up by a Conference to which Austria will be admitted on a footing of equality with the other States concerned. Details of these and other concessions will be found in the annexed reply.

Finally, the Reparation Commission will be instructed to carry out the duties confided to it in a strictly humanitarian manner. It will have due regard to the vital interests of the community, and will permit any mitigations which it may consider required by the food situation in Austria.

4. As regards the territorial limits established for the Republic of Austria, the Allied and Associated Powers are unable to admit any modifications in the decisions already communicated. Those decisions were arrived at after months of careful examination, and the observations furnished by the Austrian Delegation have been found to contain no arguments which had not been considered by the Conference.

In general, the Allied and Associated Powers have endeavoured to determine the boundaries of the States formed out of the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in such an equitable way as to conduce to the lasting peace of Central Europe. Thus they have drawn for Czecho-Slovakia the historical frontiers of the crown of Bohemia, and, so far as Austria is concerned, they have only departed from this frontier in two minor instances where the economic interests of the new State appeared, and still appear, to outweigh the claims of the Austrian Republic. In the case of Yugo-Slavia the Allied and Associated Powers have so far as possible followed the admitted linguistic boundary. As regards Hungary they have included within Austria certain German-speaking districts hitherto included within the Hungarian frontier. They believe that the frontiers now arranged are those which will best guarantee the existence of all the peoples concerned, including the Austrian, without exposing them to anarchy or internecine competition.

As regards the Tyrol, the Allied and Associated Powers have been impressed by the fact that for decades the Italian people have suffered from the menace deliberately directed at their heart by the retention in Austro-Hungarian hands of military outposts commanding the Italian plains. In these circumstances they have thought it best to accord to Italy the natural frontier of the Alps, which she has long demanded.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers would further remind the Austrian Delegation that the Treaty of Peace makes special provisions for the protection of small communities such as the new Austria. It will no longer be possible for powerful empires to threaten with impunity the political or economic life of their lesser neighbours. The clauses relating to Ports and Waterways guarantee to Austria under international sanction access to the sea by land and water. The Labour clauses will help to preserve the rights and raise the standards of life of her working population. The minority Treaties will safeguard the political, religious and linguistic rights of minorities transferred

to a new sovereignty under the Treaty of Peace. The League of Nations is not only a protector of Austria's rights and liberty, to which the Allied and Associated Powers hope that the Republic of Austria will be admitted at a very early date, [*sic*]⁹ will not only protect the right of all signatories to the Treaty, but creates the means whereby such adjustments as facts or changing circumstances may prove to be necessary in the peace settlement itself, can be peacefully and lawfully made. These features of the settlement proposed should not be forgotten.

6. In conclusion, the Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that the modifications which they have now made in the draft Treaty are final. They wish further to state that if they have not replied specifically to every point in the reply of the Austrian Delegation, it is not because they have not taken them into careful consideration, nor must the absence of any reply be taken as an acquiescence in, or an approval of, these contentions, nor must the present reply be taken as an authoritative interpretation of the text of the Treaty.

The text of the Treaty which we send you to-day following upon that of the 20th July last, which had already undergone considerable changes since the original text of the 2nd June, must be accepted or rejected in the exact terms in which it is now drafted.

Consequently the Allied and Associated Powers require from the Austrian Delegation within a period of five days counting from the date of the present communication, a declaration informing them that they are prepared to sign this Treaty as it now stands.

So soon as this declaration has reached the Allied and Associated Powers, arrangements will be made for the immediate signature of peace at St. Germain-en-Laye.

In default of such a declaration within the period above specified, the armistice concluded on the 3rd November, 1918, shall be considered as having terminated, and the Allied and Associated Powers will take such steps as they may judge necessary to impose their conditions.

Please accept, Monsieur le Président, the assurances, etc.

⁹ This clause is misplaced and apparently is a typographical error. The final text of the letter, as printed in Senate Document No. 121, 66th Cong., 1st sess., p. 7, reads as follows: "The League of Nations to which the Allied and Associated Powers hope the Republic of Austria may be admitted at an early date is not only the protectress of the rights and liberties of Austria; it will protect not merely the rights of all the signatories of the Treaty; it institutes at the same time the organism by grace of which all arrangements may be made to intervene, in calm and legality, which events or new circumstances may render necessary in course of the settlement of the peace."

Appendix B to HD-43

[Translation ³⁰]

Draft of a letter, agreed upon by the Representatives on the Reparations Commission :—

United States	Mr. J. F. Dulles.
British Empire	Colonel Peel.
France	M. Loucheur.
Italy	M. d'Amelio.

In the carrying out of article 175 of the Conditions of Peace with Austria, the Reparations Commission can delegate such powers as it will judge proper to the section formed to consider the special questions arising from the application of the treaty.

Therefore :

The Commission shall receive instructions so that this special section may assemble in regular manner at Vienna and in the shortest possible time after the coming into effect of the treaty.

This section, acting as representative of the Reparations Commission in all matters relating to a survey of the resources and capacities of Austria, shall receive all the information which it may require and which is provided for in article 182 of the Conditions of Peace.

It shall be charged with "hearing all the arguments and testimony presented by Austria on all questions relating to her capacity to make payment" (Annex II of Part VIII).

To facilitate the presentation of documents and testimony, Austria will be represented before the section by a commissioner who will be summoned to the sessions of the section whenever it may be deemed necessary, but who shall not have the right to vote.

The section shall be charged with observance of the financial adjustments, with mediation between the interested governments under the conditions prescribed in article 211, and with naming arbiters upon demand of the interested governments.

Appendix C to HD-43
[Translation ³⁰][*Report of the Drafting Committee*]

ARTICLE 61 OF THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION

In response to the decision of August 27th [*28th*] last,¹¹ the Drafting Committee has agreed to submit to the Supreme Council the following opinion :—

³⁰ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹¹ HD-41, minute 3, vol. VII, p. 957.

(1) Article 61 of the German Constitution of August 11, 1919, is not consistent with the spirit of article 80 of the German Treaty.

(2) The dispatch of the note formulated below, and the insertion of the following stipulation in the Austrian Treaty would tend to prevent subsequent disputes:

(a) *Note to Germany:*

The Allied and Associated Powers, having taken note of the German Constitution of August 11, 1919, inform the German Government that they consider that the provision in article 61, paragraph 2, of the said Constitution does not satisfy the spirit of article 80 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, and that, in accordance with article 178 of that Constitution, the provision referred to above cannot have any effect out of harmony with the conditions stipulated in article 80 of the said Treaty of Peace.

(b) *Draft of an article to be inserted in the Austrian Treaty:*

The independence of Austria is inalienable except by consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Austria undertakes, therefore, to refrain, unless by consent of the said Council, from any act tending to compromise its independence directly or indirectly and by any means whatever, and particularly, before its admission as a member of the League of Nations, by way of participation in the affairs of some other power.

For the Drafting Committee,
HENRI FROMAGEOT

AUGUST 29, 1919.

Appendix D to HD-43

[Translation ¹³]

[*Report of the Drafting Committee*]

PARIS, August 26, 1919.

By its resolution of August 23 [22] ¹⁴, the Supreme Council has asked of the Drafting Committee the following question:

“Numerous points in the treaty must be settled by convention between interested states. What procedure is to be followed? To what arbitration is there to be an appeal if one of the interested states raises objections? Is article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which provides for a procedure, adequate?”

The Drafting Committee has the honor to reply as follows:

(1) Article 13 of the Covenant contemplates a dispute between members of the League of Nations, and is not applicable, therefore,

¹³ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹⁴ HD-36, minute 3, vol. VII, p. 789.

to a dispute with Austria so long as the latter is not included in the League;

(2) So far it would not appear that a method of arbitration or other procedure is provided by the treaty for the case under consideration;

(3) The following arrangement may be proposed:

In every case in which the present treaty provides for the settlement of a particular question between certain states by means of a special convention to be concluded between the interested states, it is now and hereafter understood among the High Contracting Parties that the difficulties which may arise in this respect should be settled by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, until such time as Austria may be admitted as a member of the League of Nations.

For the Drafting Committee,
HENRI FROMAGEOT

Appendix E to HD-43

Divergences in the Covenant

Report of the Committee shows that the French text is in many places capable of bearing a different interpretation to the English, though the English was the text originally agreed to.

Article 1. French text might mean that a signatory power who fails to ratify the Treaty might join the League by adhering. The English text makes it plain that it is only non-signatories who can adhere.

Again as to withdrawal. Withdrawal is only permissible if two years notice is given and all obligations have been fulfilled "à ce moment". Under the French text these words are ambiguous, but the English makes it clear that it applies to the moment of withdrawal.

Article 10.—in many ways the most important of the Covenant. The English text makes it clear that the guarantee is only against external aggression, whereas the French is vaguer and might imply a guarantee against aggression including internal.

The English text is necessary therefore to give precision to the meaning.

The German Treaty has now been signed and cannot be altered. In that Treaty the French and English texts are of equal value; consequently the divergences cannot be got rid of.

If the Austrian Treaty is signed with a provision that the French text shall prevail, additional complications to those given above will ensue.

e. g. China, having refused to sign the German Treaty will come into the League through the Austrian Treaty: her rights and her obligations under the League and those of other Powers towards her would be that of the French text alone. The somewhat serious

divergence in Article 10 under which the Powers undertake to preserve the Members from all aggression, including internal, in the French text, and from external aggression in the English text is of particular importance in the case of China.

It would be equally impossible in the Austrian Treaty to make the English text alone the predominant text, because that again would change the *status quo* created by the German Treaty.

The position of neutral States which are to adhere must be borne in mind. There is but one League and one Covenant, and it would be intolerable if a State might claim to have adhered under the Austrian Treaty and therefore be bound by slightly different rules.

The only course is to perpetuate the conditions of the German Treaty and to make the French and English text of the Covenant of equal value in all treaties in which the Covenant is reproduced.

The Labour Convention is also reproduced textually from the German Treaty and will appear in all the Treaties of Peace. Whatever rule is adopted as to the Covenant should apply to the Labour Convention.

To give effect to the suggestion the Drafting Committee should be directed to word the Final Clause as follows:—

The present Treaty in French, in English and in Italian shall be ratified. In case of divergence the French text shall prevail, except in Parts I and XIII where the French and English texts shall be of equal force.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, September 1, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Secretaries

Mr. H. Norman.
Sir George Clerk.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Saint-Quentin.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

Secretary

M. Paterno.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Mr. C. Russell.
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE M. de Percin.
ITALY Lt-Colonel Jones.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned :—

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Professor Coolidge.
Mr. A. Dulles.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Headlam-Morley.
Mr. A. Leeper.
Hon. H. Nicolson.
Mr. Carr.
Colonel Horlick.

FRANCE

M. Tardieu.
M. J. Cambon.
General Le Rond.
M. Aubert.
M. Alphand.
M. Kammerer.
M. Laroche.
Colonel Jourin.
M. de Montille.

ITALY

M. Stranieri.
M. Galli.
M. Brambilla.
Colonel Castoldi.
Capt. Rossi.

1. The Council had before it the text contained in Appendix "A".

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the Treaty before the Council was similar to that with Roumania already approved by the Council. There were three such Treaties, one with Roumania, one with Jugo-Slavia and one with Greece, all on the same lines.

Treaty With Serb-Croat, Slovene State for the Protection of Minorities

The Treaty with Greece would be ready in a few days. The Committee had had the advantage of consultation with M. Venizelos in regard to the last of these Treaties. The suggestions he had made had been very helpful. His attitude had been very different from that adopted by the other States. As to the Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the Delegation of that State had protested both against the principles of the Treaty as a whole, and also against its application to old Serbia. The first of these objections was no concern of the Committee. As to the second, the Committee was of opinion that the questions involved were questions of principle which should govern the whole policy of the State. The Committee thought that it was not practically possible to distinguish between one part of the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and another. Serbia in 1912 had had a population of three millions, but after the Balkan war, this population increased to five millions, and at the present time it amounted to twelve millions. The State, moreover, had changed its name and a Constituent Assembly was to be gathered in order to draw up the Constitution for the whole territory. The Committee therefore, thought it was fair to consider the whole as a new State. It did not think that the stipulations in the Draft Treaty represented any real derogation from the authority of the sovereign State.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the supervision of the Minority Clauses was to vest in the Allied and Associated Powers, or in the League of Nations.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the State conferred these rights on the Allied and Associated Powers pending the creation of a League of Nations, and thereafter stipulated that they should be transferred to the latter.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this provision satisfied him.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that there was agreement in the Committee on all points save one. Before proceeding to describe this point, he wished to draw attention to the very first sentence of the preamble. The date 1913 had been deliberately chosen in order to show that the Treaty had under consideration, not only the acquisition of territory made subsequent to the Great War, but also those which resulted from the Balkan War. This was the more necessary as the territory acquired in the Balkan war contained most of the

population for whom special minority legislation was necessary, for instance, Macedonia. All were agreed that a strong and a just Government was necessary in Serbia. It was even more necessary that the Government should be strong than that it should be just. Macedonia was now to be delivered to Serbia in perpetuity. The question arose whether any restriction, not contained in the general clauses, for the protection of Minorities, should be imposed on the Serbian Government in this area. The French Delegation was of opinion that nothing should be done in this sense. The argument was that freedom of religion and language were to prevail in Macedonia and that the population would have appeal to the League of Nations. The French Delegation thought this sufficient. The Italian Delegation on the other hand proposed a far reaching scheme amounting to a special form of autonomous Government for Macedonia. He would not explain this scheme as the British Delegation had not supported it. He would prefer that it should be explained by a member of the Italian Delegation. The American, British and Japanese Delegations proposed what was included in the first version of Article 12 (see Appendix "A"). The suggestion was that the League of Nations should have their representative living in the country, who should report to the League and give advice to the Serbian Government. It was thought the presence of such a representative would be beneficial to the population as well as to the Serbian Government and might help to avoid outbreaks of violence. It was proposed that this arrangement should last five years. He had taken the liberty of consulting the Secretary-General of the League of Nations unofficially. He, on his side, made no objection.

M. TITTONI said that he would not insist on the Italian proposal (see second version of Article 12, Appendix "A"). He was ready to adhere to the proposal of the majority.

M. BERTHELOT said that the view of the French Delegation was that the Article proposed by the American, British and Japanese Delegations constituted an obvious mark of distrust of the Serbian Government. It had a further objectionable feature in that it left Macedonia open to Greek and Bulgarian intrigue, instead of allowing it to merge into Serbia, as it more naturally should, since it became part of Serbian territory. He thought the proposal would make it very difficult for the Serbian Government to accept the Treaty, especially as no special reasons for this distrust could be alleged.

MR. POLK asked whether the proposal applied only to Macedonia.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that it was intended to apply not only to Macedonia, but also to areas in the neighbourhood of Albania, where a considerable part of the population was Albanian.

M. BERTHELOT said that those people, like other minorities, had certain guarantees, including appeal to the League of Nations. The view of the French Delegation was that the Serbian Government had not deserved any special mark of suspicion.

M. TITTONI observed that the measure was a temporary one, and that the Commissioner could be withdrawn after five years.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer to tell the Serbian Government that the League of Nations would establish a Commissioner in the country if disturbances arose. The Minority Treaties were already ill-received by the Poles and the Roumanians. He thought it very undesirable to incur the ill-will of the Jugo-Slavs as well.

MR. BALFOUR said that he also would like to avoid hurting the feelings of the Serbs. Apart from their feelings, however, he thought there were strong arguments in favour of the British, American, Japanese proposal. It was said that the people of Macedonia could appeal to the League of Nations if they were oppressed. Was it not better for the League of Nations to have an Officer on the spot who could report on the state of the country, rather than to receive Delegations from Macedonia in Geneva, Brussels or wherever the seat of the League might be? In the latter alternative, the League of Nations would have a poor chance of estimating the comparative mendacity of the reports brought to them. The Council had had experience of the kind of evidence supplied from the Balkans. There was equally hard swearing on both sides, and it was hardly ever possible to disentangle rights and wrongs. The Commissioner on the spot, assuming he were an able man, would know what really happened and he could give the League better evidence than could ever be obtained from rival Delegations. He did, however, think it was a serious matter to give offence to small Nations who were perhaps unduly sensitive about their sovereign rights. He was therefore inclined somewhat favourably towards M. Clemenceau's proposal; but it involved delivering Macedonia to the mercy of the Serbs until such time as the arrangement broke down.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the Committee had been influenced by the evidence of people with a knowledge of Balkan affairs. They had led the Committee to apprehend not legal injustices as in Poland, but outbreaks of illegal violence, such as massacres and petty persecutions. He ventured to suggest that if the outbreak of such forms of disorder were to be awaited, the object of the Conference would not be attained. He thought it could be fairly stated to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation that it was a matter of common knowledge that they would have trouble in governing certain areas, and it would be an advantage not only to the local populations, but also to their

Government, to have a representative of the League of Nations on the spot.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the adoption of the preventive system would cause the Conference to have great difficulties with the Serbs. On the merits, he thought Mr. Headlam-Morley was quite right, but the result of any stipulation such as he proposed would be to encourage a large section of the Macedonian population to have recourse to the Commissioner of the League of Nations in opposition to the Central Serbian Government. This would in the end probably come about, but he would prefer that it should come about as the result of the faults of the Serbian Government, rather than as the result of action by the Conference.

M. TITTONI said that he thought an extraordinary commissioner might possibly cause annoyance. The desired result might be obtained by extending the powers of Consuls in Macedonia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that conflict would inevitably ensue with any such system. It might even amount to the re-introduction of the "capitulations".

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the object of the Committee should be to do away with any reminiscences of the old control of the Powers. A very careful attempt had been made to avoid this difficulty.

MR. POLK said that he felt the same scruple as M. Clemenceau. He did not wish to hurt the national pride of the Serbs. On the other hand if nothing was done the Macedonians would suffer.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was for this reason that he suggested the threat of imposing a Commissioner. He suggested that a formula be introduced in the Treaty to the effect that the League of Nations would send a Commissioner to Macedonia, should trouble arise in the area. The Serbs would understand that they must behave.

MR. POLK asked whether M. Clemenceau suggested the insertion of this in the Treaty of Peace itself.

M. TARDEU said that he thought that if anything of the sort was said, it would be better to say it in a letter, but he did not think it desirable to say anything of the kind. Why should Macedonia be specially singled out?

MR. POLK asked whether the suggestion could not be made to the Serb, Croat Slovene Delegation. Their opinion might then be obtained.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that though the Delegation had not seen the draft Treaty, he was quite certain they would refuse to sign it. He did, however, think it urgent to submit the Treaty to them. They would certainly make comment on the Article as at present drafted. It was better to submit it to them in a strong form, in order to have a margin for concessions.

MR. POLK said he thought in the end it would be necessary to amend the Article in the sense suggested by M. Clemenceau. He agreed, however, that the Article in its present form might be shown to the Serbs.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the Committee wished genuinely to obtain the views of the Delegation. The Committee had not had the advantage of discussing the question with them in consequence of their uncompromising attitude. The conversations with M. Venizelos on the other hand had been very fruitful.

MR. BALFOUR asked what the Committee would do if the Serbs regarded the Article as such an insult to them that they refused to discuss it.

M. TITTONI suggested that the Article be so worded as not to impose a Commissioner, but to suggest the appointment of one if necessary.

M. TARDIEU said that whatever the situation in Macedonia might be, he did not think it right to add a special provision to the clauses, which in themselves were extremely unpopular. There were other areas in which disturbances might be expected. He did not look forward to the administration of part of Serbia by the League of Nations. Such a provision could not in any case be made general.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Commissioner, he thought, would not have an agreeable post. He would have no executive authority and no protection. He could only offer advice which might be neglected with impunity. There seemed to be areas in which mutual massacres were the only method of reaching conclusions.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that this was what the Committee expected would take place, if no arrangements were made in anticipation. There would be at once considerable agitation fostered by the friends of the Bulgars, in America, Great Britain and perhaps in France. They would claim the attention of the League of Nations; and the trouble would be aggravated.

M. TARDIEU said that if information was all that was desired, consuls could make reports.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that this was the old system, which it was desirable to eschew.

M. TARDIEU said that the old system included international *gendarmerie*. The appointment of a Commissioner appeared to reintroduce that system, in contradiction of the principles of the Conference, and in particular of the League of Nations.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that he accepted M. Tardieu's general criticism, but that he thought this special exception was justified.

MR. BALFOUR said that no doubt the Serbs, if they knew their own interests, would suggest the appointment of the Commissioner themselves, but it was clear they did not.

M. PICHON said that what chiefly shocked the world in the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was the violation of Serbian sovereignty. If the Conference were to adopt the same course, Serbia would refuse to sign. M. Pachitch had already declared quite clearly that he would not.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether the League of Nations had a right under the Covenant to send representatives to make an enquiry, should massacres take place.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the League had this power according to the terms of the Minority Treaties; in this instance, according to Article 11, the League of Nations could act if an infraction of the Treaty occurred.

M. CLEMENCEAU after reading Article 11, expressed the opinion that these stipulations were sufficient to protect Macedonian and Albanian minorities in the Serbian State.

MR. BALFOUR agreed that it would be easier in practice to give effect to Article 11, rather than to Article 12.

M. TITTONI suggested that the words "prendre telles mesures" be substituted for the words "procéder de telle façon" in the French text of Article 11.

(It was then decided to accept the Treaty as a whole, to expunge Article 12 entirely, to amend Article 11 by the substitution of the words "prendre telles mesures" for "procéder de telle façon", and, after the necessary drafting amendments, to communicate the Treaty to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation.)

2. M. TARDIEU explained the letter sent by M. Venizelos to the President of the Council on the 24th August. (Appendix "B".) He pointed out that since then a new element in the situation had been introduced by the telegram from President Wilson (Appendix "C"). This telegram set aside both the alternatives considered.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought that it was a very dangerous proposal to ask the Commissioner at Constantinople to take charge of an area containing 700,000 Greeks and 700,000 Turks, who would be in a continual state of warfare. He could not therefore accept the proposals made by President Wilson, but he was ready to listen to any new proposals that might be made.

M. TITTONI suggested that the question be adjourned, as no decision could be reached that day.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the Bulgarians were awaiting the Treaty, which must be completed without further delay.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if President Wilson adhered to his proposal it was not possible to reach a settlement.

Frontiers of
Bulgaria
in Thrace

MR. BALFOUR said that the future of Constantinople and Asia Minor need not be settled before the conclusion of the Treaty with Bulgaria. It was possible to say that Bulgaria should have nothing south or south-east of a given line. The fate of the territories outside that line might be reserved.

M. TITTONI said that if this plan was followed, difficulties would arise in Western Thrace. Eastern Thrace could be reserved without any difficulty, as it was occupied by Turkish troops. But the Bulgarians would be called upon to evacuate that part of Western Thrace they at present occupied. If so, they must be told to whom they were to deliver the country.

M. TARDIEU said that there was also a difficulty for Greece if the decision were adjourned until the fate of Constantinople had been settled.

MR. BALFOUR said that it was possible to distinguish between the questions at issue. The most pressing of the problems was to decide what was the boundary of Bulgaria. The other questions as to exactly how the parts of the Turkish Empire South of the Bulgarian boundary should be disposed of, could be for the time being deferred. As to President Wilson's telegram, he could not help feeling the President had not given sufficient consideration to the position of M. Venizelos. M. Venizelos was the only statesman in the Balkans who had sincerely tried to assist the Conference, and whose policy aimed at maintaining peace in the Balkans, yet if the American policy in Eastern Europe were carried out, Greece of all these States, would fare worst. Serbia would acquire three times as much territory as she previously possessed. Roumania, in spite of her constant defiance of the Conference, would double her population. Poland and Czechoslovakia, were created by the Conference itself. Greece, if a large Greek population in Thrace were not added to her, would hardly increase at all, except in national debt which was as great as Bulgaria's, even when the Bulgarian indemnity of £90,000,000 was counted in. He thought that it was not altogether fair to treat M. Venizelos in this manner nor did he believe it to be in the interest of Peace, especially as all Greece asked for was the application of the Fourteen Points. The President's message, however, must be seriously considered. He therefore suggested that a line be adopted for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria and that the attribution of all territories south of it be reserved.

M. TARDIEU said that to the reasons adduced by Mr. Balfour might be added the fact that Greece since the Armistice, at the instance of the Conference, had mobilised three more divisions than she had under arms during the war. She had increased her army from 9 to 12 divisions. Greece was the only Power which had increased her Army

since the Armistice. Out of 7½ million Greeks living in compact masses in Greece, Thrace and Asia Minor, 2,300,000 living at the very gates of their own country would be excluded from it by the President's plan. He did not think this would conduce to peace. There was also another aspect to the question. The Council had seen fit to deny the Hapsburgs the recovery of the throne in Hungary. If Greece were to be treated as was now suggested, King Constantine would be back on the throne within six months. He agreed that Mr. Balfour's solution would meet the practical necessity of framing a treaty for Bulgaria, but he thought the arguments raised against the President's message should be put to him.

MR. POLK said he would gladly send the arguments to President Wilson. He heartily agreed with what Mr. Balfour had said concerning the attitude of M. Venizelos during the Conference. This attitude had always been most loyal and generous. It was therefore most distasteful to the American Delegation to adopt any decision not immediately acceptable to M. Venizelos. He did not wish to enter into all the reasons which had determined President Wilson. He would only point out to M. Tardieu that, if all the Greeks outside Greece were allowed to join Greece, it was rather the territory round Constantinople than the territory round Adrianople which would become Greek. He felt sure that the danger of the restoration of Constantine was recognised by President Wilson.

(It was decided that the Central Territorial Committee should determine a boundary line in accordance with President Wilson's message, as the Southern frontier of Bulgaria. The portion of Western Thrace to be ceded by Bulgaria would be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. This territory would be occupied by British, French, Italian and Greek troops, the last being kept in the portion of this territory by general agreement attributed to Greece. The Treaty should, further, stipulate for Bulgarian access to a port on the Aegean.)

3. MR. BALFOUR said that he had sent M. Clemenceau's proposals (See H. D. 42, Minute 4),¹ to the British Government with a personal opinion in their favour, and was waiting to hear further as to representatives being sent out to confer regarding details.

Situation in
Armenia

(It was agreed the question should be adjourned.)

4. MR. BALFOUR said that he understood the policy of the Conference to be that repatriation of the German prisoners in British and American hands should be carried out without delay under the auspices of an Inter-Allied Commission. It was not intended that the Commission should delay

Repatriation of
Prisoners of War

¹ *Ante*, p. 5.

repatriation, even for an hour. The Commission itself was mere camouflage. He was ready to discuss any report the Commission might make, provided repatriation went on in the meantime. He did not, however, think that it was necessary for the Commission to make any report. All it had to do was to give a free hand to the British and American Authorities to carry out the repatriation. On Saturday he had heard that the engine drivers on the French trains said that they would take no German prisoner trains into Germany without a direct order from M. Clemenceau.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that no obstruction had been put by him on the process of repatriation.

M. ALPHAND explained the report made to the Council (Appendix "D") and the interpretation of its orders made by the Commission. He further pointed out that the Treaty stipulated that repatriation of prisoners should be carried out with the help of German rolling stock.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that it had not been intended that the Commission should make any arrangements with the Germans. All it was to do was to facilitate in every way the repatriation of the prisoners held by the British and the Americans.

M. MATSUI asked whether there was any objection to a discussion within the Commission regarding repatriation of prisoners held by the Japanese.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he saw no objection.

M. ALPHAND asked whether German civilian prisoners held by the French Government should also be repatriated.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the negative.

5. The Council had before it a draft note to the German Government regarding the violation of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 in the new German Constitution. (Appendix "E".)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he saw several solutions, none of which were entirely satisfactory. One was to tell the Germans that the Treaty would not be ratified unless they altered their Constitution. Another was to say that, as Article 178 of the German Constitution rendered Article 61 inoperative, the German Government was asked to acknowledge the nullity of the latter. The third idea that struck him was that the Council should avail itself of the article in the Treaty providing for a prolongation of the occupation of the Rhine if guarantees against German aggression appeared insufficient.

M. TARDIEU pointed out that Article 428 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany stipulated for something to take place after the lapse

Article 61 of the
New German
Constitution

of 15 years. The breach of the Treaty complained of had just occurred. It seemed a long time to wait before taking action.

MR. BALFOUR said he thought the notion of not ratifying the Treaty must be rejected. He thought, however, it would be quite legitimate to occupy more territory on the East of the Rhine should the Germans not amend their Constitution.

M. TARDIEU agreed with Mr. Balfour that action should be taken at once of such a kind as to discourage Germany from a repetition of the offence.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the German Government alone could do nothing. It could not alter the Constitution. It could interpret it but its interpretation could be called in question by another Government. Only the German Parliament could deal with the matter and the German Parliament was not sitting. He suggested that the German Government be told that it had committed a breach of the Treaty which could not be accepted, and that this breach must be remedied within a certain time, failing which the Allied and Associated Powers would take such action as they might think fit.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that such action might be the occupation of Frankfurt.

(It was decided that M. Berthelot should re-draft the message to the German Government regarding the breach of the Treaty constituted by Article 61 of the new German Constitution in the spirit of the discussion and that the new draft should be considered at the following meeting.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

ASTORIA HOTEL, 1 September, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-44

KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES

*Draft of a Treaty*²

Between

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY,
AND JAPAN, Described as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,
On the one hand;

And THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES,
On the other hand;

Whereas since the commencement of the year 1913 large accessions
of territory have been made to the Kingdom of Serbia and

² Dated August 22, 1919; draft in French and English.

Whereas the Croat and Slovene peoples have, of their own free will, determined to unite with Serbia in a permanent union for the purpose of forming a single sovereign independent State under the title of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and

Words in Brackets
Proposed by the
British and
Japanese Delega-
tions, Not
Accepted by the
French, American
and Italian
Delegations

Whereas the Prince Regent of Serbia and the Serbian Government have agreed to this union (and have agreed to summon a Constituent Assembly elected on a basis of free and universal suffrage for the establishment of the Constitution of the Kingdom), and

Whereas the Kingdom of Serbia has, in consequence, been transformed into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and has assumed sovereignty over the territories inhabited by these peoples, and

Whereas it is necessary to regulate certain matters of international concern arising out of the said accessions of territory and of this union and

Whereas it is desired to free Serbia from certain obligations which she undertook by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878³ to certain Powers and to substitute for them obligations to the League of Nations, and

Whereas the Serb-Croat-Slovene State of its own free will desires to give to the populations of all territories included within the State, of whatever race, language or religion they may be, full guarantees that they shall continue to be governed in accordance with the principles of liberty and justice.

For this purpose the following Representatives of the High Contracting Parties:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA, THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY, H. M. THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN, HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES.

After having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

The Allied and Associated Powers, signatories to the Treaty of Berlin of the 13th July, 1878, taking into consideration the obligations contracted under the present Treaty by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, recognize that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State is definitely discharged from the obligations undertaken in Article . . . of the said Treaty of Berlin.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 895.

Chapter I

ARTICLE 1

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2 to 8 of this chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no laws, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

ARTICLE 2

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of the Kingdom without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

ARTICLE 3

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes admits and declares to be Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian nationals habitually resident [or: having *indigénat*]^{3a} at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty in territory which is or may be recognised as forming part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Treaties with Austria, and Hungary respectively.

Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over eighteen years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained in the said Treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be open to them. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, except where it is otherwise provided in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and Hungary, transfer within the succeeding twelve months, their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in the territory of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

^{3a} Brackets here and in article 4 appear in the original.

ARTICLE 4

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes admits and declares to be Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality persons of Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian nationality who were born in the said territory of parents habitually resident [or: having *indigénat*] there, even if at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty they are not themselves habitually resident [or: having *indigénat*] there.

Nevertheless, within two years after the coming into force of the present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Serb-Croat-Slovene authorities in the country in which they are resident, stating that they abandon Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals. In this connection a declaration by a husband will cover his wife, and a declaration by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

ARTICLE 5

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have, under the Treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with Austria or Hungary, to choose whether or not they will acquire Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality.

ARTICLE 6

All persons born in the territory of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes who are not born nationals of another State shall *ipso facto* become Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals.

ARTICLE 7

All Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Difference of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Serb-Croat-Slovene national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Serb-Croat-Slovene national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals of other than Serb, Croat or Slovene speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

ARTICLE 8

Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

ARTICLE 9

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals of other than Serb, Croat and Slovene speech are resident adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from making the teaching of the (Serbo-Croat) language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

[The provisions of the present article apply only to territory transferred to Serbia or to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes since the 1st January 1913].^{2b}

ARTICLE 10

The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes agrees to grant to the Musulmans in the matter of family law and personal status provisions suitable for regulating these matters in accordance with Musulman usage.

The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes shall take measures to assure the nomination of a Reiss Ul Ulema.

^{2b} Brackets appear in the original.

The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes undertakes to insure protection to the mosques, cemeteries and other Musulman religious establishments. Full recognition and facilities shall be assured to Musulman pious foundations (Vakoufs) and religious and charitable establishments now existing, and the Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes shall not refuse to the creation of new religious and charitable establishments any of the necessary facilities guaranteed to other private establishments of this nature.

ARTICLE 11

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the *garantie* of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other part[y] thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

ARTICLE 12

In view of the peculiar conditions which have arisen in the former Ottoman provinces of Serbia, as a result of the wars of the last six years, and in order to inspire confidence in the populations concerned,

Proposed by the
British, American
and Japanese
Delegations—Not
Accepted by the
French Delegation

the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government undertakes to invite the Council of the League of Nations at its discretion to nominate a Commissioner who shall reside in the district and who shall advise the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government in its execution of the foregoing clauses. The functions of this Commissioner shall be advisory only, and he shall furnish periodical reports to the Council of the League of Nations.

The Commissioner and his staff shall be accorded diplomatic privileges, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government undertake[s] to give him all necessary assistance in the performance of his duties. His appointment shall in the first place be for five years, but will be renewable at the expiration of this period by a decision of a majority of the Council of the League.

OR

ARTICLE 12

I. The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes agrees to grant to the districts of Macedonia (within the boundaries fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers) autonomy in matters of language, instruction and religion as well as in questions of local administration.

Proposed by the
Italian Delegation—
Not Accepted by
the French
Delegation

II. A Central Administrative Council whose seat shall be at Monastir and an Administrative Council for each district shall have the power to regulate these matters, as well as all others over which jurisdiction shall be granted to it by the laws of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

The number of elective members in the Administrative Councils shall be at least three times as large as that of the *de jure* members.

The Religious Heads of each confession shall be *de jure* members of the Administrative Councils. The other members shall be elected in conformity with the laws of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

III. The Administrative sub-division of the Macedonian territory shall be made so as to group, as far as possible, the populations of the same nationality and religion.

IV. The Kingdom of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes agrees that the officials of the districts of Macedonia shall be chosen among the inhabitants of these districts.

V. The Governor of each district shall be appointed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, taking into consideration, as to their choice and designation, the numerical importance of the population as regards nationality and religion.

VI. An organic regulation shall be prepared, within three months after the signing of the Peace Treaty, to determine the powers and

the attributions of the Governors as well as the administrative, judicial and financial regime of the districts of Macedonia, taking as a starting point the preceding regulations on that matter.

Provisions shall be included concerning the right of the General Council to propose modifications to this regulation, in the course of its first session.

The final text, once decided upon, can be modified only on the initiative of the Scouptchina.

Chapter II

ARTICLE 13

Pending the obligations of new treaties or conventions, all treaties, conventions, agreements and obligations between the Kingdom of Serbia, on the one hand, and any of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand, which were in force on August 1st, 1914, or which have since been entered into, shall *ipso facto* be binding upon the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Proposed by the
American, French,
Italian, and
Japanese
Delegations

OR

The High Contracting Parties agree that all treaties, conventions, agreements and obligations to which on August 1st, 1914, the Kingdom of Serbia, was a party, or to which it has subsequently become a party, shall *ipso facto* apply to all the territories which are or may be recognized as forming part of the Kingdom of Serb-Croat-Slovenes.

Proposed by the
British Delegation

ARTICLE 14

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to make no Treaty, Convention or arrangement and to take no other action which will prevent her from joining in any general Convention for the equitable treatment of the commerce of other States that may be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations within five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes also undertakes to extend to all the Allied and Associated Powers any favours or privileges in Customs matters, which it may grant during the same period of five years to any State with which since August 1914 the Allied and Associated Powers have been at war or to any State which in virtue of Article 6 of Part X of the Treaty with Austria has special Customs arrangements with such States.

ARTICLE 15

Pending the conclusion of the general convention referred to above, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to treat on the same footing as national vessels or vessels of the most favoured nation the vessels of all the Allied and Associated Powers which accord similar treatment to Serb, Croat and Slovene vessels. As an exception from this provision, the right of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or of any other Allied or Associated Power to confine her maritime coasting trade to national vessels is expressly reserved. The Allied and Associated Powers further agree not to claim under this article the benefit of agreements which the states obtaining territory formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy may conclude as regards coasting traffic in the ports of the Adriatic sea.

ARTICLE 16

Pending the conclusion under the auspices of the League of Nations of a general convention to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit to or from any Allied or Associated State over Serb, Croat and Slovene territory, including territorial waters, and to treat them at least as favourably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails respectively of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation or ownership, as regards facilities, charges, restrictions, and all other matters.

All charges imposed in the territory of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on such traffic in transit shall be reasonable having regard to the conditions of the traffic. Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs or other duties.

Tariffs for transit across the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and tariffs between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and any Allied or Associated Power involving through tickets or waybills shall be established at the request of the Allied or Associated Power concerned.

Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.

Provided that no Allied or Associated Power can claim the benefit of these provisions on behalf of any part of its territory in which reciprocal treatment is not accorded in respect of the same subject matter.

If within a period of five years from the coming into force of this Treaty no general convention as aforesaid shall have been concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes shall be at liberty at any time thereafter to give twelve months notice to the Secretary General of the League of Nations to terminate the obligations of the present Article.

ARTICLE 17

All rights and privileges accorded by the foregoing articles to the Allied and Associated Powers shall be accorded equally to all States members of the League of Nations.

The present treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. It shall come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris.

Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.

The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy of the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Versailles, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.

Appendix B to HD-44

[Translation *]

[The President of the Greek Delegation (Venizelos) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)]

HELLENIC DELEGATION
AT THE PEACE CONGRESS

PARIS, August 24, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: About ten days ago M. Tardieu informed me, regarding the question of Thrace, that two solutions were in view.

According to the first, Greece would obtain in Western Thrace the Kazas of Xanthi and of Gioumouldjina, while the territories situated on the north of these Kazas would be left to Bulgaria, and

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

an international state would be made of the eastern part of Western Thrace. There would be accorded, besides, to Greece, Eastern Thrace having as its boundary on the north and the west the Turko-Bulgarian frontiers of 1915, and on the south a line passing from the Gulf of Xeros to a point south of Midia on the Black Sea.

The second of the solutions under consideration would attribute to Greece Western Thrace, except a part on the northwest, as well as the adjacent part of Eastern Thrace—about two-fifths of it. Only the city and port of Dedeagatch and the railway leading to it would be internationalized.

Between these two solutions I felt myself obliged to prefer the latter in order to avoid the great inconvenience of discontinuity in Greek territory.

M. Tardieu then suggested to me that I see Mr. Polk who had said that he would gladly telegraph my opinion to President Wilson and await a reply.

I had, in fact, an interview with Mr. Polk last Friday, August 15, and at his request I addressed to him on the same day a letter, of which a copy is attached,⁵ summarizing what I had just explained to him orally.

Unfortunately, up to the present moment, no reply has as yet come from President Wilson, and it has not been possible, therefore, for a decision to be taken by the Supreme Council on the question of Thrace.

This being so, I venture to inform you that since I am anxious to hasten the settlement of this question I should be disposed, if necessary, to accept even the first of the proposed solutions.

Nevertheless, in order to diminish the inconveniences attending this solution, it is necessary:

(1) that a right of commercial and military transit, in time of war as in time of peace, be accorded to Greece, not only across the territory of the international state, but also through the port of Rodosto.

(2) that the Greek and Moslem inhabitants of the territories to be included in the new international state, who were forced to leave their homes at the time of and during the Bulgarian occupation, shall be repatriated under the supervision and protection of an international commission and shall be reinstated in their possessions which were confiscated by the Bulgarian Government.

May I add, finally, that if this international state should be created, there would be no justification for incorporating also in the international state the purely Turkish population of 100,000 souls who inhabit the territories north of Western Thrace awarded to Greece.

Accept [etc.]

E. K. VENIZELOS

⁵ Does not accompany appendix B to HD-44.

Appendix C to HD-44

[Statement of President Wilson's Views on the Frontiers of Bulgaria⁶]

We are unable to justify in our own minds the acceptance of the suggested compromise.

The rejection of the proposals, it should be stated, is not on account of any lack of warm friendship for Greece or because of sympathy with Bulgaria. The loyal and worthy service rendered by the Greeks is by no means overlooked by us. We have furthermore given sympathetic consideration to their natural wish to include all territories inhabited by those of Greek blood within the boundaries of Greece. We cannot, however, allow our judgment regarding a settlement upon which depends the stability of future peace to be affected by sentiments of friendship and regard. If the United States is to be a signatory of the Bulgarian and Turkish treaties as well as one of the guarantors of the territorial settlements set forth therein, these settlements must not be based exclusively upon the principle of the national aspirations of a brave people or of reward. Primarily, they must be based upon the purpose of removing the causes of future wars and upon the permanence of the settlements, because of their reasonable and equitable nature. In our opinion these conditions are not met by the compromises suggested. The separation of the Greek territories and the separation of the territories of the international state would make neither for stability nor for continued peace.

Moved by a strong desire to meet the wishes of the Greek nation as far as is compatible with his conception of a settlement which is to be permanent in nature, the President would agree to the cession to Greece of the west portion of western Thrace, while the east portion of western Thrace as well as all of eastern Thrace should be included in the international state. According to this arrangement the division of the territory would be as follows:—in Western Thrace the eastern boundary of Greece would be a line running due north from the Aegean Sea through Maronia to a point just south of Chelepi. From that point the line would run in a westerly direction until it touched the 1913 Greek-Bulgar boundary. The territory of the international state in west Thrace would lie east of the Greek territory. It would be bounded on the north by a line commencing at the northeast corner of the Greek territory and running in an easterly direction through Karakalissa to the Maritza River and thence northward and following the Turkish-Bulgar boundary up to the

⁶ Based on telegram No. 2981 from Secretary Lansing to Mr. Polk, August 28, 1919, 4 p. m. (Paris Peace Conf. 868.00/194).

Black Sea. A land right of way to the Aegean Sea across the territory of Western Thrace included within the international state as well as the free use of the port of Dedeagatch should be granted to Bulgaria.

The foregoing settlement, in the President's opinion, appears to have elements of permanency which the others lack. The Greek aspiration to secure sovereignty over the greater part of Eastern Thrace is of course denied. In view, however, of the mixture of races in that region hostility and bitterness would be excited by the grant of sovereignty to one of the races. The populations would be free from national intrigues and quarrels if incorporated in the international state.

It may be pointed out that the maintenance of the government of Constantinople will be a constant and very considerable expense to the power or group of powers which is charged with the government unless a considerable territory is attached to it.

Appendix D to HD-44

[Translation ⁷]

COMMISSION ON PRISONERS OF WAR CONSTITUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF AUGUST 27, 1919 ⁸

Report to the Supreme Council

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council on August 27, the Interallied Commission on Prisoners of War has met, and has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council the following proposals:—

1. The subcommissions provided for in paragraph 2 of article 215 of the Treaty of Versailles will be immediately formed so far as concerns the United States of America and Great Britain.

These subcommissions, so far as they deal with prisoners now in France, should meet at Versailles, and, because of passage through France, French delegates should be associated with them.

2. The Japanese delegation has requested that the Japanese subcommission for the repatriation of prisoners in Japan be immediately constituted.

3. The Commission having ascertained that the Allied and Associated Powers acquiesce in applying by anticipation article 214 of the Treaty of Versailles, it is expedient to request forthwith the appli-

⁷ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

⁸ HD-40, minute 6, vol. VII, p. 945.

cation of articles 222 and 223, and to organize immediately the Commission to search for missing men, and to retrieve the property of prisoners and internees which has been kept by the German authorities.

Appendix E to HD-44

[Translation *]

[*Draft Note to the German Government*]

The Allied and Associated Powers have taken note of the German Constitution of August 11, 1919, and inform the German Government that the provisions in the second paragraph of article 61 are in absolute contradiction to article 80 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919.

Article 80, by which Germany has undertaken "to acknowledge and respect strictly the independence of Austria" and has agreed "that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations," was prompted by two considerations: on one hand, by the impossibility that the first result of the peace should be an increase of German population and strength by the union of Germany and Austria whose common action provoked the war; and on the other hand, by respect for the right of peoples to dispose of themselves as confided to the League of Nations, whose function it is to control the expression of that right and to weigh the proofs and guarantees given by Germany of a change of heart.

The Allied and Associated Powers consider that the second paragraph of article 61 of the German Constitution violates not only the spirit but also the letter of article 80 of the Treaty of Peace.

This violation is twofold: In the first place, article 61, in stipulating the admission of Austria into the Reichsrat, assimilates Austria to the German territories (*Deutsche Länder*) which composes the German Empire, an assimilation which is incompatible with respect for the independence of Austria.

In the second place, in granting and regulating the participation of Austria in the Council of the Empire, article 61 creates a political bond and a common political activity between Germany and Austria, absolutely opposed to the independence of Austria.

The Allied and Associated Powers are not in the least disposed to engage in a judicial controversy regarding this matter: at the meeting of June 28, 1919, before proceeding to the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the President of the Conference expressly reminded and declared to the German plenipotentiaries that the treaty

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

was a treaty of good faith, and was to be interpreted and executed as such. From the point of view of political action as well as from the point of view of interpretation article 61 of the Constitution is a violation of article 80 of the treaty. Article 178 of the German Constitution, which declares that "the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles cannot be affected by the Constitution," of itself establishes the nullity of article 61.

The Supreme Council warns the German Government, therefore, that it regards the maintenance of the terms proposed in the second paragraph of article 61 as a violation tending to prevent the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, and it invites the German Government to cause the suppression of those terms, and to advise at once of the steps taken to that effect.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 2, 1919, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Secretaries

Mr. H. Norman.
Sir George Clerk.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Saint-Quentin.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

Secretary

M. Paterno.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE Commander Bell.
FRANCE M. de Percin.
ITALY Captain Rossi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. Woolsey.
Professor Coolidge.
Dr. Johnson.
Dr. Scott.
Mr. Nielsen.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.
Mr. A. Leeper.
Hon. H. Nicolson.

FRANCE

M. Tardieu.
M. Fromageot.
General Le Rond.
M. Aubert.
M. de Montille.

ITALY

Colonel Castoldi.
M. Ricci-Busatti.

1. The Council took note of the new draft letter to the German Government, on the subject of the violation of the Peace Treaty, by virtue of Article 61 of the German constitution (see Appendix A).

Article 61 of
the German
Constitution and
the Violation of
the Peace Treaty
of Versailles.
(Reference HD-44,
Minute 5)¹

MR. BALFOUR said that he noticed that the Germans were only given fifteen days in which to reply. It might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to answer within such a period. Their Parliament was not now in session, and he thought it doubtful whether their parliamentary procedure, of which he knew nothing, would permit them to accede to the wishes of the Council within the period stated.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had foreseen the difficulty, but thought it was rather an advantage than otherwise, to give the Germans a short period within which to reply. They would be sure to object and to say that it was impossible, but the brief period imposed upon them in the letter would make it necessary for them to deal with the subject matter of the letter without delay.

(It was agreed that the draft letter, for communication to the German Government, calling their attention to the violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, by virtue of Article 61 of the new German constitution, should be accepted.)

2. MR. POLK stated that he had received a telegram sent from Colonel Goodyear to Mr. Hoover. It was stated therein that Colonel

Situation in
Silesia
Goodyear had been informed, by a telephonic message from General Dupont, that this latter officer had received no orders from M. Clemenceau to proceed to Silesia. The telephonic communication had been made on 31st August.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a later telegram to the effect that General Dupont was ready to start.

MR. POLK said that he would so inform Mr. Hoover.

3. M. TARDIEU explained the frontier line which the Central Territorial Commission proposed for acceptance by the Council (See Appendix B), with the assistance of a map.

Bulgarian Frontiers
in Thrace. (a)
Thracian Frontier
MR. POLK remarked that the line drawn on the map differed from the frontier proposed by President Wilson. The United States were, none the less, prepared to adopt the frontier line now proposed by the Central Territorial Commission.

(It was decided that the frontier line presented to the Council by the Central Territorial Commission and adopted unanimously by them, should be accepted.)

¹ *Ante*, p. 38.

M. TARDIEU explained the problem of the Bulgarian access to the Aegean, and said that the question had been dealt with by the Committee on Ports, Waterways and Railways, when it had discussed Article 24 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty.

(b) Bulgarian
Economic Access
to the Aegean Sea

The central point of the problem was whether Dedeagatch should belong to Greece, or whether it should be part of an International State. This was a question which, of course, only the Council could settle. If it should be decided that it were to belong to Greece, the Central Territorial Commission was of the opinion that a general clause ought to be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, guaranteeing to that country free access to the Aegean Sea by river and railway. The final allocation of Dedeagatch also raised the question of how the International Commission for that port ought to be constituted. The original proposal had been that the International Harbour Authority ought to be composed of a British, a Bulgarian and a Greek official. He considered that a French port officer should be added and, in addition, a representative of the United States, who would certainly act in a most impartial manner in all questions that came before him. His reason for suggesting a French representative was that France had been one of the Powers signatory to the Peace Treaty, assuring Greek independence.²

M. TITTONI said that whilst agreeing to M. Tardieu's proposals, he did not quite understand why no Italian representative was suggested for the International Harbour Commission at Dedeagatch.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would take note of M. Tittoni's suggestion.

MR. POLK said that it was important that a clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, guaranteeing free access to the Aegean Sea for that country; it was also important that Greece should have a free economic access to Eastern and Western Thrace.

M. TARDIEU said that Greek troops ought to occupy such territory as was definitely to be assigned to them by common consent. With regard to the remaining portion, he had consulted with Marshal Foch's staff and with that of General Alby. He had been told by these military experts, that one mixed Brigade, composed of six Battalions, and four Squadrons of Cavalry, would be necessary. There was, at the present moment at Dedeagatch, a force composed of two Battalions of French infantry and one Squadron of French cavalry: the French contribution could not be increased, except possibly by a small contingent of mountain artillery. The four Battalions and 3 squadrons of cavalry necessary to bring the force of occupation up to

(c) Military
Occupation of the
Areas in Thrace
Now Under
Discussion

² Treaty of London, May 7, 1832, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XIX, p. 33.

the strength required could be supplied by the other Allied Powers. If necessary, small reinforcements could be supplied by the Greek Government. He did not consider the situation to be disquieting, in view of the fact that troops were already in occupation, and others might be sent.

MR. POLK said that it would, in his opinion, be most unwise to send any Greek troops, for it would be absolutely impossible to get them out again. He thought it would be preferable to leave the Bulgarian forces in the area under discussion, since they would probably behave better under the threat of the eventual occupation of the territory by Greek troops. He added that no United States' troops would be available for any Inter-Allied occupation of Thrace. He was sure that no trouble would occur so long as Inter-Allied troops were used for the occupation of the country.

M. TITTONI said that the Italians already had one battalion in Bulgaria, and that, if an Inter-Allied occupation of the areas now under discussion took place, the populations would remain in a state of tranquillity, even though the military occupation were effected by small forces.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought Great Britain was in a position to make her contribution, but he did not like to make a definite statement without consulting his experts. He thought, however, that the British troops in Constantinople might be utilised.

(It was agreed that M. Tardieu should examine—

(a) The question of assuring free economic access to the Aegean Sea by river and railway to Bulgaria, by means of general guaranteeing articles in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

(b) The question of an Inter-Allied Military occupation of the territories in Thrace now held by Bulgarian troops.

(c) That his report on these subjects should be presented to the Council at an early date.

4. M. TARDIEU explained the proposed Roumanian frontier in the Dobrudja with the assistance of a map.

MR. BALFOUR said that the original idea of the Council had been that the southern portion of Dobrudja was properly speaking, Bulgarian but that as it was Roumanian territory, and as Roumania was an Allied and friendly Power, she could not be forced to cede any portion of her territory to an enemy State. At the present moment, however, Roumania had almost ceased to have that character. He had just received a telegram from Admiral Troubridge showing the grave situation in Hungary caused by the action of the Roumanian authorities. (See Appendix "C".)

MR. POLK said that the American Delegation had received similar information from General Bandholtz on the previous day.

M. TITTONI said that the four Generals were the source of information from which the Council ought to draw. He did not know why reports were being received independently, whilst the Inter-Allied Committee of Generals was in session.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that eight days had elapsed since a telegram had been sent to the Roumanian Government by the Council, and that no reply had been received.

M. TITTONI said that he thought the Council ought to receive a collective opinion on the situation from the four Generals. It was most important that the Council should be kept informed of their views, and he did not understand why they did not communicate their joint opinions more frequently. He thought that they ought to be called upon to do so.

MR. POLK said that the Roumanians had now been defying the Conference for an entire three weeks, and had given no answer to the numerous communications sent to them. Every kind of Note had been sent to them. Some were couched in moderate terms—some in more forcible language, and others in a menacing style. Each style had failed to produce any result, and he thought that the time for sending Notes was now over. All information received combined to show that the Roumanians intended to make a separate Peace with Hungary. They were making requisitions on their own behalf, and acting in a completely independent manner. It was inconceivable to him that Roumania should defy the Council, which had behind it the support of three Great European Powers, without receiving encouragement from some quarter or another.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had recently received a visit from Mr. Antonescu, who, when asked why no reply had been given to the communications of the Council, had answered that they were couched in too violent terms.

MR. BALFOUR then read a telegram from General Gorton and remarked that the last sentence contained in it did not seem to be connected with the first part (see Annex "D").

At this point the Council took note of all the telegrams received by the French Foreign Office and signed by the Inter-Allied Military Mission, since August 26th, on the subject of the situation in Hungary. (See Appendix "E".)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it appeared to him to be clear that the Allied Generals were not carrying out their original instructions, which had been that they should keep in communication with the Roumanian authorities, and report to the Council on what they discovered. Instead of doing this they were plunging themselves into political questions. He had come to the opinion that the Roumanian situation was now so grave that prompt measures were necessary in order to prevent it from developing further.

MR. POLK said that the Inter-Allied Generals at Budapest had originally attempted to carry out their instructions. They had got into communication with the Roumanian Authorities, as directed, but had found that it was of no use receiving polite assurances from the Roumanians, and taking note of promises which these latter had no intention of fulfilling. The Military Mission had been at Budapest for three weeks, and, having found that it was impossible to carry out their instructions as originally drafted, had none the less attempted to make themselves useful to the Council, and had, in consequence, got involved in political questions.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the moment had come to send an ultimatum to the Roumanians. He thought it should be communicated to them by some well-known public man, whose nationality was not a point of any importance.

MR. BALFOUR said that he had a plan which might be followed in conjunction with that of M. Clemenceau. It had for long been evident that the promises of the Roumanian authorities were of no use. The only success that the Council had obtained in its dealings with the Roumanians had occurred when the authorities of that country had been told that they must either accede to the wishes of the Council, or come into open conflict with the Allied troops. He gave as an example the action of Admiral Troubridge, who, when in charge of the monitors on the Danube, had resisted the Roumanian requisitions of barges, and the action of the Roumanian authorities in stopping the transit of food across the river. Admiral Troubridge's attitude had been firm, and, as it was backed by force, the Roumanians had given way. At the present moment the Council was unable to get any reply to its communications to the Roumanian Government, but although this was the case, he was certain that no Roumanian Statesman would take the responsibility of bringing the troops of his country into conflict with the Allied Armies. His proposal therefore, was to occupy some place in Hungary with a small body of Allied troops. He was sure that the Roumanians would never fight them. It might possibly be easier to send a force of warships into the Black Sea.

MR. POLK said that the only vessels belonging to the United States of America in the Mediterranean area were stationed at Fiume and Smyrna.

M. TITTONI said that, before taking the action proposed by M. Clemenceau, the Council ought to wait for a complete report from the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals at Budapest.

M. CLEMENCEAU, commenting upon Mr. Balfour's last remark, said that the Roumanians had recently got hold of the Paris press. He did not attach great importance to this, but, at the same time, he did not wish to let the French people think that he had performed a quasi-belligerent act against the Roumanians, without having previously

communicated an ultimatum to them. He thought that Allied war vessels might be sent into the Black Sea, pending a reply from the Roumanian Government, but that they should not be called upon to act until an answer had been obtained.

The three demands which he proposed to make to the Roumanians were:—

(1) that they should cease from making requisitions in Hungary, and should place all the material that they had seized at the disposal of the Council:

(2) that they should promise definitely that they would make no separate peace with Hungary:

(3) that they should withdraw their troops from Hungary.

M. TITTONI said that he thought that, before warships were sent to Roumania, a reply to M. Clemenceau's ultimatum ought to be obtained. With regard to the three demands which M. Clemenceau proposed to make to the Roumanian authorities, he agreed that the Roumanian Armies should be ordered to cease their requisitions, and place the material seized at the disposal of the Allies; he agreed that they should be ordered to make no separate peace; but before he could consent to ordering the Roumanians to evacuate Hungary, he thought the Council ought to be sure that the Roumanian withdrawal would not open the door to a recrudescence of Bolshevism, and a revival of a new series of Bela Kuns. A police force, sufficient to maintain order in that country, should be raised.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the occupation of Budapest by Roumania, and the continued defiance of the Council, was a situation quite as grave as any produced by a Bolshevik Government in Hungary.

M. TITTONI said that it might possibly be best to make the Roumanians promise that they would retire on receiving orders from the Council.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought that a decision ought not to be taken finally until the following day.

(At this point a general discussion as to the most suitable person to be entrusted with the ultimatum to Roumania, ensued. The names of Sir Eyre Crowe and Admiral Troubridge were mentioned in this connection.)

M. TITTONI said that he could not for the moment promise Italian participation in any Naval action that might ensue. With regard to the person who should be entrusted with the communication of the ultimatum, he thought that sending an Admiral to Bucarest would be like making a Naval demonstration without ships. He preferred that a diplomat should convey the orders of the Conference.

MR. POLK said that, in his opinion, the despatch of an ultimatum to Roumania did not bind the United States to subsequent Naval action.

(It was decided that the question should be adjourned to the following day.)

5. M. FROMAGEOT said that the Economic Commission had, on the previous day, presented the Drafting Committee with a clause, which it proposed should be added to Article 263 of the Peace Treaty with Austria (See Appendix "F").

Proposed
Addition to
Article 263 of
Peace Treaty
With Austria

The Drafting Committee could not do what it had been asked to, without the approbation of the Council, and was of the opinion that the proposed clause should not be added. In the first place there were difficulties, owing to the fact that, as the boundaries of the future Hungarian State had not been settled, it was hard to lay down rules as to the future status of all citizens now situated in the territorial area provisionally called Hungary. In the second place, Article 90 of the Peace Treaty with Austria clearly laid down that Austria should recognise the validity of all the provisions of the future Peace Treaty with Hungary. He therefore thought that the clause asked for by the Economic Commission should be added to the Hungarian Treaty, since it was obviously too late to put it into the Austrian Treaty.

(It was decided to reject the proposal of the Economic Commission to the effect that the special clause drafted in Appendix "E" ["F"] should be added to Article 263 of the Austrian Peace Treaty.)

It was agreed that a clause effecting the results required should be added to the Hungarian Peace Treaty.)

6. MR. WOOLSEY said that the reply to the Austrian Government on the subject of the Economic Clauses in the Peace Treaty, had referred to certain concessions made in a Note from the Council, dated, July 8th, 1919,³ and addressed to the Austrian Delegation. In view of the importance of the Note, and of the decision of the Council on August 28th,⁴ to refer the reply now being made to the Austrian Government, to the Drafting Committee, in order to ascertain whether changes in the Peace Treaty were necessary, on account of interpretative passages in the proposed reply, he made the following suggestion:—

Interpretations of
the Austrian Peace
Treaty Contained
in the Replies to
the Austrian
Delegation

"That the Note of July 8th, 1919, as well as any other Notes to the Austrian Delegation, containing interpretative passages on the Treaty of Peace, should likewise be referred to the Drafting Committee, to ascertain whether changes in the Peace Treaty might be necessary, on account of such interpretative passages."

He had another point which he wished to bring before the notice of the Council. On August 28th, the Council had decided that a Clause should be inserted in the proposed covering letter to the replies

³ Annex 2 to HD-2, vol. VII, p. 53.

⁴ HD-41, *ibid.*, p. 260.

to the Austrian Delegation, on the subject of the Peace Treaty, to the effect that the covering letter in question ought not to be taken as in any sense modifying the text of the Treaty. In view of the fact that the reply of July 8th, 1919, to the Austrian Delegation might be regarded as interpretative of the text of the Treaty, he suggested:—

“That the clause in the covering letter should be made to cover all replies made to the Austrian Delegation, and not only the covering letter under consideration.”

(These two proposals were referred to the Drafting Committee, who entered the room to report on them.)

M. FROMAGEOT said that, in answer to the first point raised by Mr. Woolsey, he would draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that the first edition of the Peace Treaty had been presented to the Austrians on June 6th. A long series of communications had followed; and the second edition of the Peace Treaty had been presented on July 20th. It was with this second edition that all replies to the Austrian Delegation were concerned, and it was therefore not necessary to discover whether replies of an earlier date than July 20th contained interpretative passages of a superseded text of the Peace Treaty.

(Mr. Woolsey's first proposal was therefore rejected.)

He thought that Mr. Woolsey's second suggestion ought to be adopted, and the phraseology of the covering letter altered, so as to meet the point.

(It was agreed that the wording of the general covering letter to the replies of the Austrian counter-proposals of the Peace Treaty should be so modified as to state that no passage in any of the replies should be regarded as an authoritative interpretation of the Peace Treaty.)

The Meeting then adjourned for a discussion *in camera*.

HOTEL ASTORIA, PARIS, 2 September, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-45

[Translation ⁵]

SEPTEMBER 2, 1919.

Draft of a Letter to the Germans

The Allied and Associated Powers have taken note of the German Constitution of August 11, 1919. They declare that the provisions in the second paragraph of article 61 constitute a formal violation

⁵ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

of article 80 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919.

This violation is twofold:

(1) Article 61, in stipulating the admission of Austria to the Reichsrat, assimilates that Republic to the German territories (*Deutsche Länder*) which compose the German Empire, an assimilation which is incompatible with respect for the independence of Austria.

(2) In admitting and regulating the participation of Austria in the Council of the Empire, article 61 creates a political bond and a common political activity between Germany and Austria, in absolute opposition to the independence of the latter.

Consequently, the Allied and Associated Powers, after reminding the German Government that article 178 of the German Constitution declares that "the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles cannot be affected by the Constitution," invite the German Government to take due measures to remove without delay this violation by declaring null article 61, second paragraph.

Without prejudice to any subsequent measures, in case of refusal, and by virtue of the treaty (particularly article 429), the Allied and Associated Powers inform the German Government that this violation of its pledges on an essential point will constrain them, if their just demand is not complied with, within fifteen days from the present date, to order immediately an extension of their occupation of the right bank of the Rhine.

Appendix B to HD-45

[Translation ⁶]

Report by the Central Committee on Territorial Questions on the Southern Frontier of Bulgaria

PARIS, September 1, 1919.

In accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Council, the Central Territorial Committee has examined anew the question of the southern frontier of Bulgaria, and has been guided by the views contained in the despatch from President Wilson.⁷

It has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council the following report, which it has adopted unanimously:

(1) The present frontier between Bulgaria and Greece should be rectified in the region to the north of Buk in order to deprive the Bulgarians of all facilities for attack on the town and bridge of

⁶ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

⁷ See appendix C to HD-44, p. 50.

Buk. This region is of small extent and has a sparse Mohammedan population, and the present frontier offers difficulties;

(2) As regards the southern frontier of Bulgaria in Bulgarian Thrace, the Committee is unanimous in recommending the adoption of the frontier defined in the attached annex.⁸

This annex has been drawn up in such form that it may be immediately inserted in the conditions of peace with Bulgaria;

(3) As regards the question of Bulgaria's freedom of access to the Aegean Sea, that question has been dealt with by the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways, in article 24 of the provisions to be inserted in the treaty of peace with Bulgaria.

This article having been drafted on June 21, and on the supposition that the port of Dédéagatch would belong to Greece, it is advisable to ask the Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways to make a new draft in accordance with present expectations.

The Committee believes that it should, on this occasion, draw the attention of the Supreme Council to the conclusions in the attached note from the French delegation,⁹ in the event that an international commission should be set up at Dédéagatch.

A similar note has been presented by the Italian delegation.¹⁰

It seems necessary to ask the Commission on Ports to take into account the considerations of the said note, because of the fact that that Commission has previously judged that it is not its province to take into consideration any political factors.

It seems to the Committee, moreover, needless to insert in the treaty with Bulgaria any provisions of detail which will be adopted by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to assure to Bulgaria free access to the Aegean Sea.

Annex I

Description of the Southern Frontier of Bulgaria in Thrace

From West to East:

The frontier of 1913-1915 between Bulgaria and Greece up to the point where it leaves the line of the watershed between the basins of the Mesta-Karasu on the south and of the Marica on the north in the neighborhood of point 1587 (Dibikli.)

Thence eastward to point 1295 at 18 Km. to the west of Kuschuk-Derbend on this line of the watershed.

Thence eastward to the point where it meets the old frontier of 1913 on the river Kizildeli Suja (Cetakca).

⁸ Annex I.

⁹ Annex II.

¹⁰ Annex III.

The line of the secondary ridge which closes on the south the basin of the Akcehisar (Dzuma) Suju.

Thence northward to the point where it meets the river Maritsa.

The frontier of 1913.

Thence to a point to be selected at about 3 Km. downstream from the station of Kadikoj.

The principal course of the Maritsa downstream.

Thence northward to a point to be selected at the tip of the salient which the frontier of the Treaty of Sofia of 1915¹¹ forms at about 10 Km. to the southeast of Mustafa Pascha.

A line to be determined on the spot.

Thence eastward to the Black Sea.

The frontier of the Treaty of Sofia of 1915, then the frontier of 1913.

Annex II

FRENCH DELEGATION

PARIS, June 25, 1919.

Note

The Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways has suggested a practical regime to guarantee to the Bulgarians, in case they find themselves excluded from Bulgarian Thrace, access to a port on the Aegean Sea (Cavalla or Dédéagatch) and the use of a direct railway line.

The regime must be guaranteed and carried out, in the absence of an agreement between the Greeks and Bulgarians, by an international commission. Having in mind only technical considerations, the Commission on Ports has proposed a commission of three members (a Greek, a Bulgarian, and an Englishman).

But the question is essentially political: It is necessary to prevent eventual recriminations, whether by Greeks or Bulgarians, if they are led to arbitrate under a single great power. Consideration should also be given to the fact that France, as well as England, is a guarantor of Greece, under the treaties of 1832 and 1863,¹² and must be represented on the same footing. Finally, there would be evident advantages in giving such a guarantee of impartiality in the Commission as would be represented by the presence not only of the delegates of qualified powers, but also of a power wholly disinterested in the question, such as the United States.

The projected commission, in accordance with these considerations (and in order to make sure always of a majority), should include five

¹¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cix, p. 879.

¹² Treaty of London, May 7, 1832, *ibid.*, vol. xix, p. 33; treaties of London, July 13, 1863, and November 14, 1863, *ibid.*, vol. lxxx, pp. 28 and 19.

delegates: a Greek, a Bulgarian, an Englishman, a Frenchman, and an American.

Annex III

ITALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE,
HOTEL EDWARD VII

PARIS, July 6, 1919.

The Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways decided, on the occasion of an inquiry into the question of free access to the Aegean Sea for Bulgaria, that a special convention between Greece and Bulgaria should define the settlement of this matter. In case of a failure to agree, a commission composed of one delegate each from Greece, Bulgaria, and Great Britain should be charged with laying down the conditions of an agreement (article 24).

The French Delegation, by a note of June 25¹³ addressed to the Secretariat General of the Conference, seemed to expect that this commission would receive certain powers in the matter of guaranteeing and carrying out the regime to be set up, and it suggested, therefore, that a representative for France and one for the United States be added to the commission.

The Italian Delegation is of opinion that the commission as contemplated in article 24 has no functions but those relating to the concluding of a special convention between Greece and Bulgaria to settle the conditions of free access to the sea.

This decision appears to be of the same sort as that which was adopted by the regime for the ports of Hamburg and Stettin, and the Italian Delegation has not, therefore, any remark to make. But in the event that changes are to be introduced into the composition of the commission in question, or that powers to insure and carry out the conditions laid down by the convention are to be entrusted to it, an Italian representative should be added to it upon the same footing as the other representatives.

In fact, all the powers stand upon a basis of perfect equality in this matter, for the regime which was provided flows from decisions which all the powers took in common agreement.

At the same time, the Italian Delegation invites attention to the fact that article 24 mentions only the ports of Cavalla and Dédéagatch, whereas in the formal engagement taken by Mr. Venizelos before the commission for the study of territorial questions affecting Greece (page 5), there is also a question of Salonika. The choice of this port by Bulgaria cannot be eliminated beforehand, especially

¹³ *Supra.*

since the port of Cavalla, not being directly connected by railway with the Bulgarian system, is not immediately available, and since the port of Dédéagatch, according to the same commission on Greek questions, has no real commercial value for Bulgaria.

Annex IV

PARIS, July 24, 1919.

Note

ACCESS BY BULGARIA TO CAVALLA OR DÉDÉAGATCH

In providing for the attribution of Bulgarian Thrace to Greece, an arrangement which would separate Bulgaria from the Aegean Sea, the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways suggested the insertion, in the treaty with Bulgaria, of a clause of which the essential terms are the following:

(1) Greece will give in lease to Bulgaria for 50 years a free zone reserved either in the port of Cavalla or in that of Dédéagatch, as Bulgaria may choose.

(2) Bulgaria shall enjoy special facilities for transit.

(3) A convention, which may be revised every ten years, will fix the conditions of this cession and the manner of its use.

(4) If the port chosen is Cavalla, a railway shall be built and operated by Greece to connect the port with the Bulgarian frontier.

The questions referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 would be, in case of disagreement between Greece and Bulgaria, submitted to the decision of a commission composed of one Bulgarian representative, one Greek, and one British.

The Commission on ports in making this suggestion, has taken a merely technical point of view, and has not taken into account certain political considerations of great importance to the proper functioning of the instrumentality thus created. This instrumentality has a role essentially impartial and judicial. In having only a single great power to participate in it, there is a risk of being open to accusations either by the Greeks or by the Bulgarians, who, after decisions are rendered, will attribute them to the attitude or the political interests of that great power.

The French Delegation considers that in order to give proper authority to the commission which is to function at Cavalla or Dédéagatch, it is advisable to have several great powers participate in it.

It considers that Great Britain and France, who are both guarantors of Greece, are naturally indicated for this task, and moreover that their intervention will be received by the Bulgarians themselves as a guarantee of impartiality.

Appendix C to HD-45

Decypher of Telegram From Admiral Troubridge, Buda-Pest, to Astoria

Unnumbered

D. 30 AUGUST, 1919.

R. 1 September 1919, 10:00.

Forward to War Office.

Following for Admiralty, begins:

Situation here is critical for Europe. Roumanians demand immediate acceptance by Hungarian Government of following conditions.

Occupation of Hungary for one year giving opportunity for preparing country for personal (*sic*) (?commencement of) union with Roumania. Immediate customs union with Roumania. Cession of strategic points near Szegedin on mouth of Maros River and Bekes Csaba. No treaties to be made with Great Britain or Jugo-Slavs. They state to Hungarian Ministers they have already an alliance with Italy in which Hungary must join in order to assume policy of encirclement of Jugo-Slavs. I have urged Ministers to refuse any armistice or treaty with Roumania and to follow the counsels of the Supreme War Council at Paris. It is necessary to recognise at once any Government formed here and support them with energy.

 Appendix D to HD-45

Paraphrase of Telegram From General Gorton, Budapest, Received Through U. S. Naval Communication Service, Paris, to Astoria, Paris

No. G 45

D. 30-31 AUGUST, 1919.

Admiral Troubridge has been told by Diamandy that the telegraphic despatches of the Supreme Council, dated 23rd and 25th August¹⁵ had not been communicated to him.

The veracity of this is doubtful, but Rumania continues to make requisitions. There is no doubt that Rumania is striving to establish a separate Treaty with Hungary; telegrams of 23rd and 25th might therefore be transmitted privately to the Hungarian Government with advantage.

¹⁵ Appendix A to HD-37, vol. VII, p. 819, and appendix C to HD-38, *ibid.*, p. 857.

Appendix E to HD-45

[Translation¹⁶]

Telegram of August 26 From the Interallied Military Mission, Budapest, to the Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris

No. 191. Urgent. Situation of Government in Hungary without change. Two delegations, one representing the small tenants, and the other the factory workers, have asked to see the Mission in order to request that they be represented in the new government. Another delegation calling itself Christian Socialist has come to protest against the departure of the Archduke, declaring that the result will be to deliver their country to the Jews and that Budapest ought to be called Judapest. The reply was made to all the delegations that the Interallied Mission could not meddle in the internal affairs of Hungary. No change in the attitude of the Rumanians. One single improvement in the situation since the arrival of the Mission—a certain quantity of provisions has been allowed to enter Budapest. It is believed that the Rumanians have the intention of withdrawing suddenly as soon as they shall have satisfied all their instincts for plunder. Meanwhile, all their acts, intentional or not, tend to deliver Hungary to bolshevism and chaos. General Holban in Budapest promised last week to arm immediately, with revolvers and sabres, 4,000 men in the police; but, instead of doing so, and in disregard of the instructions of the Mission asking him to keep all Rumanian troops on the east of the Danube except the garrison of Budapest, it is believed that he intends to take possession of all Hungary, and to disarm and suppress the little Hungarian nucleus of Admiral Horthy which constitutes the sole defense of Hungary against bolshevism in the event that the Rumanians should abruptly evacuate the country. These measures being in contemplation at the same time that M. Diamandy made his recent declaration stating that a longer occupation of Hungary by the Rumanians could only injure their prestige, give the impression that if Rumania finds the conditions imposed by the Supreme Council too harsh for her to accept, she will seize all she can and then hastily abandon Hungary, which because of the laxity of the Rumanian commanders, will be left without any means for defense against bolshevism and disorder. The Mission devoted the meeting of August 25 to matters of relatively small importance, excepting the report by the British officer sent to inspect trains entering Rumania by the Szolnok bridge.

¹⁶ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

The British officer reports that the bridge will not be repaired for two or three weeks, but that he saw near the crossing 150 locomotives, 200 to 300 empty freight cars, 4 aeroplanes in cars, 200 to 300 cars of military supplies, 300 tank cars, and between Szolnok and Budapest several hundred freight cars.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

[Translation ²⁷]

2V.N.250

*Telegram of August 27, 1919, From Budapest to the Supreme Council,
Peace Conference, Paris*

No. 197. No change shown in the situation of the Hungarian Government. The following telegram from Count Sigray, who signs as commissioner of the Government for Western Hungary, was transmitted from Vienna:

“The Rumanian troops are advancing toward Western Hungary, proclaiming that they come to reestablish order. We beg you to hear our protest against the activities of the Rumanians. In Western Hungary perfect order reigns in all districts, and the Hungarian and German populations are pursuing the business of peaceful reconstruction, which can only be disturbed by the undisciplined soldiery of the Rumanians.”

A great procession of Christian Socialists filed past the office of the Mission and sent delegates to ask for the protection of the Allied Powers against the return of the regime of Jews and Bolsheviks. The Mission stated that it could not intervene in domestic affairs, but that it would transmit the petition to the Supreme Council. No communication from the Rumanian Command, unless it be a report which is supposed to have emanated from the Hungarian Chief of Police. According to this report, four weeks will elapse before 4,000 men for the police can be enrolled. Only 40 men each day are being recruited. The reasons given are: the harvest, the number of prisoners detained in Rumania and Czechoslovakia, the bad train service. The total force of the police is 1,850, of which 205 are mounted. A report has reached us that yesterday the bridge which was repaired at Czonsggrade was tested: the trial locomotive fell into the stream.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

11:20 a. m.

²⁷ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

[Translation ¹⁸]*Telegram of August 28-30, 1919, From Budapest to the Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris*

No. 200. Since resignation of Archduke various deputations, two of several hundred persons each, have asked leave to present petitions to Mission.

Object of petitions generally is to prevent return of Jewish rule or bolshevism. It appears to Mission that in present plight of Hungary, with foreign occupation and absence of real government, it would be disheartening to people if no notice were taken of their appeal to Allied Powers. Consequently Mission proposes to receive deputations which cannot be avoided, to inform them it is expressly excluded from intervening in internal affairs of Hungary, but that it will forward their petitions to Supreme Council.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

2:22 p. m.

[Translation ¹⁹]*Telegram of August 28-30, 1919, From Budapest to the Supreme Council, Paris*

No. 206. The Commission has just received a letter from the new President of the Hungarian Council. It is addressed to the President of the Supreme Council and will be sent to you by the next courier. The following is the text of the letter:

“Mr. President: In accord with the action of the session of August 22 Prince Joseph, Governor of Hungary, and the government appointed by him, have resigned. The members of the new Cabinet are as follows:

President of the Council, Minister of the Interior: Etienne Friedrich, manufacturer.

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Count Imre de Czaky (appointed, but temporarily absent).

Under Secretary of State for the Interior: Edmond de Benitzky, former official.

Minister of Agriculture: Jules Rubinek, director of the National Agricultural Society; Under Secretary of State: Etienne Scabo Sokorapatka, farmer.

¹⁸ Translation is that filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/57.

¹⁹ Translation is that filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/58, revised by the editors.

Minister of Commerce: Franz de Henrich, merchant.

Minister of Finance: Jean Grunn, former official.

Minister of War: General Franz Schnitzer.

Minister of Food Control: Karol Ereky, engineer-merchant.

Minister of Public Worship and Industry: Karol Huszar, schoolmaster; Under Secretary of State: Julius Pokar, man of letters.

Minister of Justice: Georg Baloghy, judge.

Minister of National Minorities: Jakob Bleyer, university professor.

Minister of Public Hygiene: Andreas Czillery, physician.

Minister of Propaganda: Stephan Haller, man of letters.

Minister of Farmers: Gan Mayre, farmer.

Minister of Industrial Laborers: Daniel Olah, metal worker.

It has been and it will always be almost impossible to form a ministry that will at the same time satisfy the various military missions at Budapest and our numerous fragments of political parties and that will, besides, win the approval of the command of the royal troops of Rumania. One thing is, however, certain, that the Ministry as composed at present possesses the sympathy and absolute confidence of a large and decisive majority of the Hungarian people. The heads of the military missions have certainly had the chance to convince themselves of this. I have tried to consider and satisfy loyally all just desires as fast as they have come up for our consideration. Consequently there are represented in this Cabinet large and small manufacturers, merchants, officials, farmers and industrial laborers. Mr. President, during the time of the Bolshevik government of Bela Kun the party of Social Democrats amalgamated to form the party of Communists, which the Socialist leaders remaining here during the commune have always accentuated in all their speeches in the Soviet Congress, as well as in their official journal. For these Socialist leaders of the workers have not used their influence to defeat Bolshevism, but have either gone over to Bolshevism or have taken refuge abroad, and deserted the workingmen, who thus become the prey of the fatal idea of Bolshevism and of the terror of the Communist government. Their non-Bolshevik leaders who have gone abroad have put themselves in relation with the Entente, but have not come to the assistance of either the workingmen or the State. The Hungarian *bourgeoisie* does not wish to see the working class misled, a class to which it reserves an important place in its future policy; hence it is to the representatives of the real workingmen and not to the professional leaders of the Social Democrats that I addressed the invitation to join my Cabinet. Mr. President, in the interest of the possibility of productive work, I beg you to take measures to the end that the military missions at Budapest will refrain from trying to influence our internal politics, but will help to maintain order and to reestablish the economic equilibrium. My Cabinet has decided to hold the new elections to the National Assembly on the basis of universal suffrage (equal, secret vote, and by commune) as soon as possible, that is to say within three or four weeks. All Hungarians will recognize the legality of these elections. In order that no doubt may arise that the coming elections rest upon and express the free manifestation of the national will, I request you, Mr. President, to send us a commission of control for

these elections. It would be desirable that the Social Democrats form part of this commission. The elections will be held in territories, concerning which it will be possible to come to an agreement with the command of the royal troops of Rumania. Mr. President, until such time as we shall be able to put the government in the hands of the National Assembly, our provisional government desires to carry out the following tasks: the complete annihilation of Bolshevism, the restoration of administration and jurisdiction, security of food and continuity of production, safety of person and property, restoration and protection of political equality, and the preparations for the elections to the National Assembly. Mr. President, we request your support in the accomplishment of our duty and in our firm desire to reestablish constitutional life.

Please accept, Mr. President, the expression of my profound respect.
(Signed) Friedrich

The new President, Friedrich, was at the head of the former Cabinet, of which 11 out of 14 members figure in the new one. Information from several sources, as well as certain ascertained facts, have confirmed the impression that Herr Friedrich, supported by the Archduke, is working actively to remain at the head of the new Cabinet and to keep colleagues who will not hinder too seriously his political aims. Referring to the telegram of the Supreme Council of August 23,²⁰ which brought about the fall of the Friedrich Cabinet, we retain our first impression that a Cabinet formed in the above manner and presided over by Friedrich does not meet the requirements of the Supreme Council.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

[Translation ²¹]

BUDAPEST, August 29, 1919.

From: The Inter-Allied Military Mission.

To: The Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris.

No. 215. A telegram received yesterday by a member of the Mission inquires why, if the Mission considers that the Hungarian army is reduced to the effectives stipulated by the Armistice of November 13,²² the Supreme Council has not been advised of it; the telegram adds that the Supreme Council can not exact the withdrawal of the Rumanian army behind the line fixed by the Peace Conference until it can prove that all menace of military action on the part of Hungary against her neighbors is removed. Numerous messages sent by the Mission to the Supreme Council have declared that, with the excep-

²⁰ Appendix A to HD-37, vol. VII, p. 819.

²¹ Translation is that filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.9202/61.

²² Vol. II, p. 183.

tion of a small contingent, ill-equipped and counting less than 8000 men under the orders of Admiral Horthy, west of the Danube, the Hungarian army as an army has ceased to exist, and that the Rumanian forces have not evacuated Hungary because their presence is necessary until a Hungarian army sufficiently strong to maintain order in the interior can be organized. As the messages in question may have been ambiguous or inaccurately interpreted we wish to add now that, in the opinion of the Mission, the Hungarian army has for some time been reduced below the effectives mentioned in the armistice of November 13.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

[Translation²³]

[Telegram From the Interallied Military Mission in Hungary to the Supreme Council]

BUDAPEST, August 30-31, 1919.

To the Supreme Council, Paris.

No. 225. With regard to the telegram from the Supreme Council, sent under date of August 21,²⁴ concerning the establishment of control posts to prevent the export of goods into Rumania, the Interallied Mission has not sufficient personnel for that purpose, and requests that three additional officers be sent immediately to Budapest by each of the four Allied Powers, in order to establish control posts on the Theiss.

INTERALLIED MISSION

Appendix F to HD-45

[Translation²³]

TREATY WITH AUSTRIA

Addition to Article 263 Proposed by the Special Committee of the Economic Commission

All provisions of this section dealing with the relations between Austria or Austrian nationals and the nationals of the former Empire of Austria, apply also to the same relations between Austria or Austrian nationals and the nationals of the former Kingdom of Hungary who shall acquire of right, by application of the treaty

²³ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

²⁴ HD-35, vol. VII, p. 776.

of peace with Hungary, the nationality of an Allied or Associated Power.

ALPHAND
HUTCHINSON
H. ASHIDA
FRED K. NIELSEN
M. PILODI

Amendment to Article 265

At the beginning of Article 265, to read:

Questions concerning persons previously nationals of the former Empire . . .

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, September 3, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Secretaries

Mr. H. Norman.
Mr. P. Kerr.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Saint-Quentin.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

Secretary

M. Paterno.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Mr. C. Russell
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. E. Abraham
FRANCE M. de Percin
ITALY Capt. Rossi

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

The Hon. H. Gibson.

Dr. Lord.

Mr. A. Dulles.

Mr. Nielsen.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. A. Leeper.

Mr. Carr.

Col. Kisch.

FRANCE

M. Cambon.

M. Fromageot.

M. Serruys.

General Le Rond.

M. Cheyssou.

M. Hermite.

M. Massigli.

ITALY

M. Brambilla.

M. Ricci-Busatti.

M. Nagara.

1. **M. TITTONI** said that before beginning the business of the day, he wished to draw attention to a matter of considerable importance.

Evacuation of Albania The American Delegation had received news that on the evacuation of Koritza by French troops, General Franchet d'Esperey had ordered their replacement by Greek troops. He thought this would lead to great trouble.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not seen any report to that effect. Moreover, he did not think it likely that the information was correct. General Franchet d'Esperey had asked what he was to do after the evacuation. No orders had as yet been given.

M. TITTONI said that it was very necessary to give orders that Greek troops should not occupy Koritza when the place was evacuated by the French. The Mussulman population was preparing partly to emigrate and partly to form armed bands to resist the Greeks. He understood that the French evacuation was imminent and whether or not the news to which he had alluded was correct, he thought the question should be examined.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that French troops would certainly not stay in Koritza, but that on their departure it would be arranged that the place should not be occupied.

MR. POLK said that the news he had received was merely a rumour. He had written to M. Clemenceau to inform him.

M. PICHON said that the French Government agreed with M. Tittoni and had already informed the Greeks that they should not occupy Koritza.

M. BERTHELOT observed that Pogradek was also to be evacuated. It was common agreement that both Koritza and Pogradek belonged to Albania. It was also an agreed policy that no occupation of contested territories should take place without an order from the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that all documents on the subject be supplied to him in order that he should be able to give an opinion on the following day.

MR. BALFOUR asked that a note on the subject be prepared as he had not been given any information.

(The question was then adjourned to the following day.)

2. **M. CLEMENCEAU** said that on the previous day, Mr. Balfour had asked for an adjournment of 24 hours. He asked whether Mr. Balfour was able to give an opinion.

Roumanian Affairs **MR. BALFOUR** said that he agreed with the policy of sending a representative of the Council to Bucharest. He no longer thought, however, that Admiral Troubridge would be the best representative, as he had very rightly taken strong

action against the Roumanians. He thought a civilian representative would be better. The person selected should be ready to represent the views of the Council very strongly, but he should not have been previously identified with any controversial action. He begged to suggest M. Jonnart, who had carried out very difficult negotiations in Greece with conspicuous success. Should he agree to go, Mr. Balfour thought he would be the best possible representative.

M. PICHON said that he was convinced that M. Jonnart would not accept the mission. He had resigned the Governorship of Algeria in order to take up the work of reconstructing the devastated districts. He would not be ready to abandon this work.

M. TITTONI agreed that M. Jonnart would be an excellent appointment.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would ask M. Jonnart whether he was willing to go, but he did not expect him to accept. He asked whether Mr. Balfour could not make a British appointment in this alternative.

MR. BALFOUR said that another plan suggested to him was that in each capital the Roumanian diplomatic representative should be summoned and that the views of the Allied and Associated Powers should be clearly explained to him.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think this course would be sufficient to meet the case. He wished to send a single individual to represent the Council in Bucharest and who would return with the answer of the Roumanian Government.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the Council required more than an answer. It would be necessary for their representative to make public in Roumania the point of view of the Allied and Associated Powers. This point of view appeared to be much misunderstood in Roumania.

MR. POLK said that the Roumanians regarded America as their one enemy. A distinguished Roumanian had informed an American of this. When told that all the communications sent to the Roumanian Government had been sent collectively from all the Allied and Associated Powers, he had, in reply, drawn attention to the views expressed in the French Press.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that during the incidents between France and Italy, the French Press had been consistently pro-Italian. The pro-Roumanian attitude of the French Press at the present time was, in the main, due to the activities of M. Robert de Flers. On the other hand, M. Bratiano had said that M. Clemenceau was his worst foe. The Roumanians were certainly friendly with the Italians, but he trusted that the Italian Government was not offering them any encouragement.

M. TITTONI said that he occasionally saw M. Misu. On all occasions, he had impressed on him that the Conference took a very serious view of the Roumanian situation. He had warned him that Roumania was embarking on a very risky enterprise.

MR. POLK said that on further reflection, he thought it would be a good thing to summon the Roumanian Minister at the four capitals.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the object might be attained by recalling the Allied Ministers from Bukarest.

M. TITTONI said that this step should be reserved for a later stage.

MR. BALFOUR said that the results hitherto obtained by the discussion appeared to be (a) that a Commissioner must be found to represent the Council in Bucharest: (b) that M. Misu should be summoned to be present at the Council and that the Roumanian Ministers in Rome, London and Washington should be summoned by the Governments of those capitals. The Roumanian Ministers summoned should be warned that the Council regarded the actions of their Government with considerable disfavour and it should be explained to them that the Roumanian Government appeared to misapprehend the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers completely. (c) That they should be told that the Allied and Associated Powers were seriously considering the withdrawal of their representatives at Bucharest, as a token that they ceased to regard Roumania as one of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would see M. Jonnart on that very day. He asked Mr. Balfour meanwhile to endeavour to find a suitable Englishman for the post. He further asked that Mr. Balfour should draft a document explaining the Allied policy towards Roumania. Should the Roumanian Government reject the ultimatum addressed to them, the representative of the Council, on leaving Roumania, should bring back with him all the Allied and Associated Ministers and officers in the country.

(It was agreed that Mr. Balfour should draft a document explaining the policy of the Council towards Roumania, and that this document should be submitted to the Council on the following day.)

It was also agreed that both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour should endeavour to find a suitable representative of the Council to send to Bukarest.)

3. The interpreter read a letter from Mr. Hoover to M. Clemenceau (see Appendix A), stating that the amount of railway rolling stock in locomotives and wagons was much larger in Hungary than had been originally surmised. The rolling stock included equipment: formerly belonging to the Galician railways, and therefore due to the Polish Government; belonging to the Bohemian railways and therefore due to

Allotment of
Rolling Stock
Found in
Hungary

the Czecho-Slovak Government; belonging to the East Prussian railways and therefore due to the Polish Government; belonging to the Alsace-Lorraine railways and therefore due to the French Government; a considerable number of wagons belonging to the Trentino railways and therefore due to the Italian Government, and a large number of locomotives and wagons formerly belonging to the Roumanian railways and therefore due to the Roumanian Government. It seemed imperative that the Peace Conference should direct that the distribution of this rolling stock be dealt with by the Governments concerned; and Mr. Hoover recommended that the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council be authorised to undertake an immediate control of this rolling stock and that a preliminary distribution be authorised on the basis of the actual identification of the material.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it was proposed that the rolling-stock belonging to each country should be returned to that country, as, for example, former Polish rolling-stock to Poland, or whether the whole should be pooled.

MR. POLK suggested that, as the principle was not accepted, the matter should be discussed by the Commission on Reparations.

(It was then decided to refer Mr. Hoover's letter (Appendix "A") regarding the allotment among the Allies of rolling-stock found in Hungary, to the Organising Committee of the Reparations Commission, for study and early report.)

4. MR. POLK said that M. Paderewski was expected in Paris on the following day. He suggested that the consideration of this Treaty should be delayed until his presence could be obtained in the Council.

Treaty With
Poland Relating
to Eastern
Galicia

(It was agreed that the question should be discussed on the following Friday.)

5. The Council had before it the request from Dr. Benes contained in Appendix "B".

Demand of the
Czecho-Slovak
Delegation To Be
Heard on the
Subject of
Teschen

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought that this request should be accepted.

MR. BALFOUR said that if the Czecho-Slovaks were heard it would be impossible not to hear the Poles.

M. CAMBON asked that a solution of the question be hastened, as delay was causing great anxiety both in Prague and in Warsaw.

MR. POLK thought it might perhaps be best that the experts be heard at once, in order that the Council should be prepared for the hearing of the Czecho-Slovak and Polish delegates.

GENERAL LE ROND explained the report contained in Appendix "C". He said that on April 14th a report had been furnished by the joint Czecho-Slovak and Polish Committees, in which four Delegations pro-

posed a certain line, and the Italian Delegation suggested another line, more favourable to the Poles. This report had not been examined by the Council. The Inter-Allied Commission in Teschen had since unanimously adopted another line, and the matter had been referred by the Council to the united Czecho-Slovak and Polish Committees. The matter was examined by sub-commissions. Three delegations agreed on a line very similar to that recommended by the Inter-Allied Commission in Teschen. The French and British Delegations made certain objections. They thought that the line proposed involved certain political and economic difficulties. This was implicitly admitted by the other Delegations, as they regarded as necessary supplementary agreements between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to regulate the railway and coal situation between the two countries.

When the question had been studied in the joint meeting of the two Committees, the British and French Delegations had withdrawn their objections, and adhered to the views of the majority. The report finally made deliberately set aside the political aspect of the question, which was reserved for the decision of the Council. He was bound to point out that if the line recommended were accepted by the Council, it would be necessary for the Council to arrange for the signature of Agreements between the two parties for the regulation of the economic relations and railway communications between the two parts of the territory of Teschen. It was only on these terms that the frontier could be made acceptable to Czecho-Slovakia.

It was suggested that the study of these agreements should be referred back to the Joint Committees.

M. TITTONI said that he thought the line should be adopted, and then the means of rendering it acceptable to the parties should be studied.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was unable to accept a line until he knew what was required to render it acceptable.

MR. POLK said that the line formerly suggested would have required no such agreements as were now proposed. It gave a Polish population, however, to Czecho-Slovakia. The line now recommended broke up the economic unity of the country for ethnic reasons, and therefore required to be supplemented by economic agreements.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Council should hear Dr. Benes and a Polish representative before deciding.

M. TITTONI said that any line suiting the Czecho-Slovaks would *ipso facto* not suit the Poles. The political effect in either case might endanger the existing Governments. Nevertheless, he thought that economic and ethnic reasons should prevail, and that the Council should not be unduly influenced by the prospects of any Government in power.

(It was agreed that MM. Benes and Dmowski should be heard on the following day.)

6. M. SERRUYS said that, regarding Article 25, there had been in succession three proposals by Roumania. There was an Article in all the Treaties abrogating all Conventions made between the enemy Powers and Roumania, Russia or any portion of what had been the Russian Empire before or since the 1st August, 1914. Roumania had first wished to be excluded from these Articles, secondly, she had wished that the Articles should be identical in all the Treaties, thirdly, she had asked that the clause in the Treaty with Bulgaria should be so framed as not to affect the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913.¹ The Economic Commission had, therefore, proposed the following text for Article 25:—

Article 25 of the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria: "Bulgaria recognises as abrogated all Treaties, Conventions or Agreements concluded before the 1st August, 1914, or since that date up to the coming into force of the present Treaty, with Russia or with any State or Government the territory of which previously constituted any part of Russia as well as with Roumania, subsequent to the 15th August, 1916, up to the coming into force of the present Treaty."

The Economic Commission had thought this text acceptable, as all the economic agreements it was desired to abolish had taken place since the war. It was unnecessary to touch the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913. The Drafting Committee had been asked to examine the questions and had reached very similar conclusions. (See H. D. 31, Minute 2.)² The Drafting Committee pointed out that the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest only affected States parties to that Treaty and no others. (For the report of the Drafting Committee, see Appendix "D".)

(At this point, the members of the Drafting Committee entered the room.)

MR. BALFOUR asked why the Roumanians wished to maintain this Treaty.

M. SERRUYS said they wished it maintained because it affected Roumanian prestige and because Roumania did not wish to give up any rights it established in her favour. In any case, these considerations were not the concern of the Economic Commission.

MR. POLK said that the Council had no reason to bind itself to recognise this Treaty, as the Roumanians had offered no satisfaction on the Dobrudja question.

M. TITTONI said that the questions before the Council were:—

1. Could the Conference annul the Bucharest Treaty of 1913. The answer to this was in the negative.

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.

² Vol. VII, p. 686.

2. Could the Conference enact economic or territorial regulations out of conformity with the Bucharest Treaty. Seeing that the Allied and Associated Powers were not party to the Treaty of Bucharest, they had the right to do so.

MR. POLK asked whether the clause, as at present framed, did not imply some recognition of the Treaty of 1913?

M. SERRUYS said that the clause implied no such recognition. It only stipulated for the abrogation of Conventions made since August, 1916, and was silent on the subject of the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, as the Conference had not yet settled whether Roumania was a friendly or hostile country, it might be as well to postpone the decision.

MR. BALFOUR observed that this clause was necessary to complete the Treaty with Bulgaria.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not wish to help the Roumanians in any way, nor did he wish to take any action against them.

MR. HURST pointed out that the Treaty of 1913 was not only a bilateral agreement. It affected Roumania, Greece, Serbia, and, he thought, Montenegro. The Roumanians did not wish it abrogated as between themselves and the Bulgarians.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether only the Roumanians had asked for the framing of the article as it was now proposed.

M. SERRUYS replied that Roumania alone had made the request, but that Greek and Serbian representatives had been present in the Economic Commission and had raised no objection to the framing of the article as now proposed.

MR. POLK said that, if the Serbians and Greeks agreed, there appeared to be no reason why the Powers should not equally agree.

M. TITTONI said that, as, in his view, the Conference had no right to abrogate the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, he could not agree to any article tending to do so.

MR. POLK said that, though he thought the Conference would have a right to abrogate the Treaty of Bucharest, he was ready to agree to the adoption of the article as proposed.

(It was decided to accept the drafting of Article 25 as proposed above.)

7. MR. BALFOUR asked what remained before the completion of the Treaty with Bulgaria.

MR. HURST asked whether the Council had come to any conclusion regarding the frontier between Roumania and Bulgaria in the Dobrudja.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the Council had decided that Roumania could not, as she was an Allied Power, be asked to yield any terri-

Completion of
Treaty With
Bulgaria

tory to Bulgaria. This decision had been taken some time ago and had never been cancelled. The Council, however, had not concealed its feeling that Roumania ought to give up a piece of the Dobrudja which was clearly not Roumanian. Strained relations with Roumania would not, he thought, justify a change in this policy. If the Powers were to go to war with Roumania, the situation would doubtless be altered. He thought that, for the purposes of the Treaty with Bulgaria, it might be assumed that the old frontier in the Dobrudja was maintained, though this might be neither equitable or conducive to peace in the Balkans.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with Mr. Balfour.

M. TITTONI also agreed.

MR. POLK said that he would give his answer on the following day. (The members of the Drafting Committee then withdrew.)

8. (At this point, M. Cheysson entered the room.)

M. CHEYSSON explained the report of the Financial Commission on Articles 38 and 67 proposed by the Greek Delegation for insertion in the Treaty with Bulgaria. The question had been referred to the Financial Commission by a resolution of the 12th August. (See H. D. 29, Minute 5.)⁴ He pointed out that the Greek Delegation asked for specially favourable terms in respect to properties in territory to be ceded by Bulgaria to Greece. In all other cases of ceded territories, the acquiring State gave credit for the value of property accompanying the territory in the Reparations account. The Financial Commission saw no reason for exceptional treatment in favor of Greece. (For the report of the Financial Commission see Appendix "E".)

MR. BALFOUR asked what arguments were adduced by the Greek Delegation.

M. CHEYSSON said that no special arguments were put forward at all.

(It was decided to reject Article 38 proposed by the Greek Delegation for inclusion in the Treaty with Bulgaria.)

M. CHEYSSON observed that this decision carried the rejection of Article 67.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Italy paid Austria for the railway lines transferred to her.

M. TITTONI said that Italy paid for these lines in the Reparation Account.

(It was decided to reject Article 67 proposed by the Greek Delegation for inclusion in the Treaty with Bulgaria.)

Opinion of Financial Commission on Articles 38 & 67 of M. Venizelos' Proposals for the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria. (See Appendix C to HD-22)³

³ Vol. VII, p. 491.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 673.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

ASTORIA HOTEL, PARIS, 3 September, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-46

[*The Director-General of Relief (Hoover) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL
OFFICE OF

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RELIEF

PARIS, September 3, 1919.

M. GEORGES CLEMENCEAU,
*President of the Peace Conference,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,
Quai d'Orsay, Paris.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The great number of reports, which have come to my hands through the engineers who have been acting under the direction to me from the Supreme War Council in the co-ordination of railway operation in South Eastern Europe, indicate that the amount of railway rolling stock in locomotives and wagons in Hungary is much larger than was originally surmised. This rolling stock includes equipment formerly belonging to the Galician railways, and therefore due to the Polish Government; belonging to the Bohemian railways, and therefore due to the Czecho-Slovak Government; belonging to the East Prussian railways and therefore due to the Polish Government; belonging to the Alsace-Lorraine railways and therefore due to the French Government; a considerable number of wagons and cars belonging to the Trentino railways and therefore due to the Italian Government; and, of course, a number of locomotives and cars formerly belonging to the Roumanian railways and therefore due to the Roumanian Government.

Under all these circumstances, it seems to me imperative that the Peace Conference should at once direct that the distribution of this railway rolling stock should be taken up systematically on behalf of all the Governments concerned, and I would like to recommend that the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council be at once authorised to undertake the immediate control of all of this railway rolling stock, subject of course to the Allied Mission at Budapest, and that they should authorise a preliminary distribution of this railway rolling stock on the basis of the actual identification of the material.

The Communications Section, as you are aware, is comprised of eminent engineers representing the French, British, American and

Italian Governments, and would therefore seem to me to be the appropriate body to at once undertake this matter.

A decision on the above lines on your part would allay the very considerable amount of feeling now existing in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and elsewhere, with regard to the large diversions now being made to Roumania.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT HOOVER

Appendix B to HD-46

[Translation *]

[*The Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs (Benes) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PARIS, AUGUST 22, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to present to you on behalf of the Czechoslovak Delegation the following respectful request:

The Commission which is dealing with the question of Teschen has ended its labors. It appears that it has already transmitted its report to the Supreme Council.

The Czechoslovak Delegation presented its views before the Commission, and proposed a compromise which, in our opinion, would have been acceptable to both parties at once. I do not know what is exactly the opinion of the Commission, but I know that we have not been able to obtain the complete adhesion of the Commission. The interests of our Republic require us to try again, for the last time, to persuade the Supreme Council of the justice of our claims and of the spirit of moderation and of conciliation in which we proposed the compromise mentioned herein.

The problem for the Czechoslovak Republic is of mounting gravity; it is indeed absolutely vital to the future of our country. If it be impossible to consider our claims, which are in our opinion absolutely just and legitimate, the consequences would be very far reaching.

I venture, therefore, Mr. President, to request the Supreme Council, in the name of the Czechoslovak Delegation, to give us a hearing before it comes to a definitive decision.

Accept [etc.]

EDOUARD BENES

To H. E. Monsieur GEORGES CLEMENCEAU
President of the Peace Conference
Paris.

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Appendix C to HD-46⁶

Report Presented Jointly to the Supreme Allied Council by the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs on the Questions of Teschen and Orava

MANDATE AND SUMMARY OF MEETINGS

By two decisions, dated 12th, and 27th [25th] July respectively,⁷ the Supreme Council referred the questions of Orava and Teschen to the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs jointly, for examination and report.

The two Commissions together, after having proceeded to a general examination of the questions of Orava and Teschen, at their meetings of 23rd, and 24th July, entrusted more detailed examination of the question to a Sub-Commission composed as follows:—

General Le Rond (France) *Chairman*

Dr. Lord	}	(United States of America)
Mr. Dulles		
Hon. Harold Nicolson	}	(British Empire)
Lieutenant-Colonel Kisch		
Marquis Della Torretta	}	(Italy)
Mr. Stranieri		
Mr. Otchiai		(Japan)

This Sub-Commission met 5 times between 26th July and 18th August. It heard Mr. Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, and Mr. Dmowski, First Delegate of Poland.

During three meetings held on the 19th, 20th and 22nd August, the two Commissions in joint session, drafted the present Report, which was unanimously adopted and which they have the honour to submit to the Supreme Council.

I. QUESTION OF TESCHEN

Two facts necessitated further examination of the question of Teschen, i. e.:—

(1) The failure of the Cracow negotiations destroyed all hope of a direct agreement between the Poles and the Czecho-Slovaks on the subject of Teschen.

⁶ The English text filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.213302/2 has been substituted for the French text which accompanies the minutes as appendix C to HD-46.

⁷ HD-6, minute 2, and HD-13, minute 2, vol. VII, pp. 117 and 257.

(2) The members of the Interallied Commission of Teschen, who had studied the question on the spot for several months, unanimously agreed upon a line more favourable to the Polish claims than the line formerly proposed at Paris by the majority of the members of the two Commissions, and very similar to the line favoured by the minority at that time.

Moreover, since the 14th April (on which date the Note of the two Commissions relative to Teschen was transmitted to the Supreme Council) the doubts entertained by the Commissions as to the real aspirations of part of the population of the Teschen district—(which, although speaking Polish, seemed rather to be opposed to union with Poland)—have disappeared, owing to very definite information received from Teschen. This information represents that population as giving proof of such Polish national feeling as to establish, beyond serious dispute the fact that the ethnical factor is clearly in favour of the Poles in the three districts of Freistadt, Teschen and Bielitz.

Moreover, the position of Poland from the point of view of coal production has become uncertain owing to the institution of a plebiscite in Upper Silesia.

Taking into account the considerations set forth above, the members of the two Commissions have unanimously agreed that:—

(a) from the ethnographical point of view, the claims of the Poles to the three districts of Freistadt, Teschen and Bielitz are fully justified.

(b) from the economic and railway points of view, the attribution to Poland of the coal basin of Karwin and the Oderberg–Jablunkau railway would present most serious drawbacks to the Czecho-Slovaks, who would be dependent on Poland for coal and coke production and would also be compelled to construct expensive railway connections to maintain communication between the mining district of Mährisch-Ostrau and Czecho-Slovakia.

From the political point of view, the two Commissions are of opinion that it is not for them to take into account considerations of general policy, as falling beyond their competence and exclusively within the scope of the Supreme Council.

Consequently, the members of the two Commissions have weighed only the economic considerations, which are strongly in favour of the Czecho-Slovaks, and the ethnographical arguments, which are indisputably in favour of the Poles. They have felt obliged in principle to grant preference to the ethnical factor, because they have been unable to find any means of inducing the Polish population of the Teschen

district, whose national feeling is very strong, to live peaceably under Czecho-Slovak domination. At the same time they have thought it possible, by a number of provisions and guarantees not yet definitely determined, to lessen to a large extent the economic disadvantages imposed on Czecho-Slovakia by the attribution to Poland of the mining basin of Karwin and part of the Oderberg-Jablunkau railway.

Consequently, the two Commissions have the honour unanimously to propose to the Supreme Council the frontier line described in Annex I. This line only differs in a few details from the line unanimously proposed by the Teschen Commission.

At the same time, the two Commissions are unanimously of opinion that, in order to be fair, the settlement they propose must ensure that the Czecho-Slovak State be given reliable guarantees that Poland will contribute substantially towards meeting the deficit in the coal production of Czecho-Slovakia and will give her full transit facilities on the Oderberg-Jablunkau line until the completion of the railway construction required to join the basin of Mährisch-Ostrau with the Jablunkau pass.

They therefore request the Supreme Council:—

- (a) to decide as to the acceptance of the proposed frontier line;
- (b) if this frontier is accepted:—

(1) to refer back to them the question of determining the economic and railway concessions which Poland should in justice grant to the Czecho-Slovak State;

(2) to instruct them to draw up the clauses of a Treaty to be concluded between the principal Allied and Associated Powers, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, for the purpose of guaranteeing to the latter any concessions considered necessary;

(3) to authorise them to consult coal and railway experts with a view to the drafting of these clauses, and also to hear Czecho-Slovak and Polish Delegates on the subject.

The line described in Annex I follows generally the ethnical line of demarcation, leaving within Czecho-Slovak territory any districts the ethnographical character of which is uncertain. Indeed, owing to the fact that the Czecho-Slovak State is in greater need of coal than Poland, it seemed wise to give the Czecho-Slovaks the benefit of the doubt in that portion of the mining district where the ethnographical position was not perfectly clear.

Further, in the Jablunkau district a large number of Poles have had to be left in Czecho-Slovakia, owing to the necessity for ensuring to Czecho-Slovakia the free disposal of the Jablunkau pass, which is indispensable to them for ensuring railway communication between the Mährisch-Ostrau mining districts and Czecho-Slovakia.

The effect of the proposed line, from an ethnographical point of view, is shown by the following statistics, viz:—

AUSTRIAN CENSUS OF 1910

	<i>Territory assigned to Czecho-Slovaks</i>	<i>Territory assigned to Poles</i>
Total population	185, 625	249, 196
Czechs	105, 161	10, 443
Poles	62, 080	171, 770

According to the statistics of 1913 the production of coal is approximately as follows:—*

Total production	7, 595, 000 tons.
Portion of coal basin assigned to Poland.	3, 000, 000 tons (about 40%)
Portion of coal basin assigned to Czecho-Slovakia.	4, 595, 000 tons (about 60%)

As regards coke the approximate figures are as follows:—

Total production	1, 718, 000 tons.
Portion assigned to Poland	520, 000 tons (i. e. 31%)
Portion assigned to Czecho- Slovakia.	1, 198, 000 tons (i. e. 69%)

II. QUESTION OF ORAVA

A report submitted by an officer, after an investigation conducted on the spot, led one of the Delegations to request the Supreme Council to initiate a fresh examination of the question of Orava.

The members of the two Commissions unanimously consider that the fresh information furnished by this report involves a modification of their previous conclusions in favour of the retention of the former administrative boundary between Czecho-Slovakia and Galicia.

That frontier, although satisfactory from the geographical point of view was open to objection from an ethnical point of view in that it placed under Czecho-Slovak rule the north-eastern part of the Orava district—which Czecho-Slovakia and Polish ethnographical experts alike recognise as comprising a Polish majority.

The frontier now proposed by the two Commissions runs along a series of heights and is clear from a topographical point of view. Moreover it follows the line of ethnical division almost exactly without incorporating within Poland a single village found to contain a Czecho-Slovak majority.

* These figures are based on the report of the Teschen Commission. [Footnote in the original.]

In these circumstances, the two Commissions have no hesitation in proposing unanimously to the Supreme Council the adoption of the frontier defined in Annex 2. This line would assign to Poland a population of 25,000 inhabitants who are almost exclusively Polish.

JULES CAMBON

PARIS, August 22, 1919.

Annex I

*Frontier Between Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State in the
Teschen District*

From the point where the old frontier between Prussian Silesia and Austrian Silesia is met by the southern administrative boundary of the commune of Pudlau about $3\frac{1}{2}$ kilometres south of Oderberg eastwards,

this administrative boundary;

then the southern administrative boundary of the communes of Zablacez and of Polnischleuten to a point to be selected on the ground about 250 metres west of the point where the latter boundary is cut by the Polnischleuten-Orlau road;

thence southwards to a point on the Orlau-Dombrau road about 250 metres west of its junction with the road to Polnischleuten,

a line to be fixed on the ground at a distance of about 250 metres west of the latter road;

thence south-eastwards to a point on the western administrative boundary of the commune of Ober-Suchau about 1 kilometre south of the point where it is cut by the Ober-Suchau-Nieder-Suchau road,

a line crossing the Karwin coal basin, to be fixed on the ground in such a way as to respect as far as possible the integrity of the different mining concessions;

then passing between Mittel-Suchau and Ober-Suchau, leaving Suchau railway station in Czecho-Slovak territory;

thence south-eastwards to a point on the Teschen-Friedeck road about $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilometres south-west of the point where it crosses the river Stonowka,

a line following the western administrative boundaries of the communes of Ober-Suchau, Zywotitz, Tierlitzko, Grodische and Nieder-Trzanowitz;

thence eastwards to the junction of the administrative boundaries of the communes of Ober-Trzanowitz, Hnojnik and Wielopoly,

a line to be fixed on the ground passing through the point where the river Stonowka is joined by a tributary from the east about 2 kilometres north of Hnojnik;

thence eastwards to the point where the northern boundary of the commune of Trzitiesch cuts the river Rzeka,

this administrative boundary;

thence in a south-easterly direction to a point on the northern boundary of the commune of Niebory about 250 metres north-east of the point where it is cut by the Teschen-Niebory road,

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence in a south-easterly direction this administrative boundary to the point of the salient which it forms about 1,600 metres east of Niebory;

thence eastwards to a point to be selected on the administrative boundary between the districts of Teschen and Bielitz in the neighbourhood of point 864 (Kl-Czantory),

a line to be fixed on the ground cutting the Teschen-Jablunkau railway south of Trzynietz, leaving the Friedeck-Jablunkau road entirely in Czecho-Slovak territory and giving to the Czecho-Slovaks the fullest facilities for constructing a connection between the railways from Friedeck to Teschen and from Jablunkau to Teschen entirely in Czecho-Slovak territory, then following as far as possible the watershed between the two right-hand tributaries of the Olsa which pass respectively through Ober-Lischina and Vendrin;

thence southwards the administrative boundary between the districts of Teschen and Bielitz to point 989 about 6 kilometres east-north-east of Jablunkau;

thence south-eastwards to a point to be selected on the old administrative boundary between Austrian Silesia and Galicia about 1 kilometre south of point 894 (Ochozdito)

a line to be fixed on the ground passing through points 946 and 838, then through the junction of the Olsa and the Gliniany P., ascending this latter river, cutting the Jablunka-Milowka road near point 683 about 1,500 metres south-east of Istebna, then reaching and ascending the valley of the Czadeczka;

thence southwards the old boundary between Galicia and Austrian Silesia.

Annex II

Frontier Between Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State in the Orava District

The old frontier between Galicia and Hungary along the crest of the Beskiden to the point where it meets the watershed between the Novotnanka and the Zasihlanka near point 967;

thence eastwards to point 934 (Marsalkov-Grun),

this watershed;

then to point 783 (Kicbra) about 2 Km. north-east of Zubrohlava,

a line to be fixed on the ground passing through points 879 (Svin-

jarky), 1037 (Poperacka), 999 (Mlaki), 926 (Redikanovo), 922 (Vahanow-Vrch), 797 (Cropa) and between Rapcsa and Zubrohlava;

thence south-eastwards to the confluence of the Schwarze (Faekete) Arva and the Jelesna Voda,

a line to be fixed on the ground passing north-east of Bobro;

thence to the point where the railway from Czarnydunajec to Trsztena crosses the Jelesna Voda,

the course of the river upstream;

thence to point 1230 (Magura) on the old frontier between Hungary and Galicia,

a line to be fixed on the ground passing between Hladovka and Vitanova, then following generally the watershed between the Jelesna Voda on the east and the Orawica on the west;

thence southwards the old frontier between Galicia and Hungary.

Appendix D to HD-46

[Translation*]

[*Note From the Drafting Committee*]

PEACE CONFERENCE
SECRETARIAT GENERAL

PARIS, August 27, 1919.

Treaty with Bulgaria (Article 25, Economic clauses)

In response to the request made to it by the Supreme Council, on August 23 last, the Drafting Committee has the honor to transmit the appended note.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

[Enclosure]

BULGARIAN TREATY

(*Economic Matters*)

1. The Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 is not mentioned in article 25, as are also not mentioned all the other treaties not falling within the category of those declared abrogated.

None of these treaties either loses or gains validity as regards anyone by consequence of the said article 25.

2. The Powers recognize, simply by contrary inference, that the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 is not abrogated by the present Bulgarian Treaty.

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

The Treaty of Bucharest, not being abrogated, keeps the same validity which it has had up to the present, and keeps that validity in relation to the same Powers and no other.

3. The stipulation in article 25 must not, therefore, be interpreted, so far as concerns those Powers which had not recognized the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, as implying on their part a recognition of the territorial clauses contained in that Act, and particularly the clauses by which a part of the Dobruja was ceded to Roumania.

4. Finally, even if the Treaty of Bucharest were abrogated, that abrogation could not be likened to an annulment and entail of itself the disappearance of acquired rights, especially Roumania's title to sovereignty over the Dobruja. The abrogation affects the parts of the treaty which are yet to be carried out and leaves intact those which have been carried out.

Appendix E to HD-46

[Translation ¹⁰]

[*Report of the Financial Commission*]

PEACE CONFERENCE,
FRENCH DELEGATION,
COMMISSION ON FINANCE.

MINISTRY OF FINANCE.
PARIS, 27 August, 1919.

By a resolution of August 12, 1919,¹¹ the Supreme Council decided to refer to the examination of the Commission on Finance, articles 38 and 67 which the Greek Delegation has proposed for insertion in the treaty with Bulgaria.

The Secretariat of the Commission on Finance has the honor to inform the Secretariat General that the Commission on Finance sees no reason which might prompt, for the benefit of Greece, derogations from the principles assented to in all the treaties hitherto formulated.

It considers, therefore, that the general rule should be maintained, according to which a state receiving cessions of territory should pay for the public properties situated in the ceded territories; and that article 38, which has been proposed by the Greek Delegation, cannot be accepted.

The questions raised by article 67 are not within the purview of the Commission on Finance, except for the third item according to which Greece would enter gratuitously into possession of all the

¹⁰ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹¹ HD-29, minute 5, vol. VII, p. 673.

rights of the Bulgarian State in concessions for railways and tramways. This provision, which is contrary to the rules hitherto accepted, is not at all justifiable, in the opinion of the Commission on Finance.

As for paragraph 4 of article 67, the Commission on Ports, Waterways, and Railways believes its insertion needless; it considers that the question of frontier stations has been settled by the article in the conditions of peace with Bulgaria which corresponds to article 311, §2 of the conditions of peace with Austria.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, September 4, 1919, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Secretaries

Mr. H. Norman.
Sir George Clerk.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Saint-Quentin.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

Secretary

M. Paterno.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE Commander Bell.
FRANCE M. de Percin.
ITALY Captain Rossi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. Coolidge.
Dr. Lord.
Mr. A. W. Dulles.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Leeper.
Mr. Carr.
Colonel Kisch.

FRANCE

M. Cambon.
General Desticker.
General Le Rond.
M. Laroche.
M. Kammerer.
M. Hermite.

ITALY

Colonel Castoldi.
Comm. Stranieri.
M. Brambilla.
Barone Russo.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU drew the Council's attention to the objections of the German Government to the advanced Commissions of Control being sent at once. (See H. D. 36.8 and Appx. G.[J],¹ and also see Appendix A.) He added that in his opinion it would be better to postpone sending out the advance Commissions of Control for a certain time. This was the opinion of General Nollet, although Marshal Foch was of another opinion. In conclusion, he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers had no positive right to send out these advance Commissions of Control if the Germans now objected.

GENERAL DESTICKER said that the despatch of the full personnel of the Commissions of Control depended upon the date of the complete ratification of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Marshal Foch had been of the opinion that an advance detachment of the Inter-Allied Commissions should be sent forward at least ten days before the full Commissions arrived. This preliminary measure was necessary in order to prepare the work with which the Commissions would be concerned later on. The whole question, therefore, hinged upon the probable date of the final ratification of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch had thought that the Peace Treaty would be ratified by three Great Powers by 15th September.

M. TITTONI said that as far as Italy was concerned that would not be possible.

MR. BALFOUR then suggested that the German objections appeared to be based on the very large number of officers who were to be sent under present proposals. Would it not be possible to adhere to Marshal Foch's proposal, and, at the same time, reduce the number of Commissions despatched, by making one nation responsible for one particular department, another nation for another branch, and so on. The large number of the personnel was due to the fact that each Department contained Inter-Allied Representatives.

GENERAL DESTICKER said that he did not think that Mr. Balfour's proposal was practicable, and thought that it would be better to delay sending out the Commissions of Control for a few days in order to adhere to the original programme.

MR. POLK drew attention to the fact that the United States could not, for the moment, be represented upon the Commissions of Control.

(After some further discussion it was decided that no advance Delegation of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should be sent to Germany for the present.)

¹ Vol. VII, pp. 792, 806.

Demand of the Austrian Delegation for Prolongation of the Time Allowed for the Consideration of the Allied Reply 2. (It was agreed that the Austrian request for a prolongation of two days of the time allowed for the consideration of the Allied reply (see Appendix B.) should be granted.)

3. The Council took note of M. Misu's letter (see Appendix C.) to the President of the Peace Conference, stating that the telegrams of the Council to the Rumanian Government had, to a large extent, not been received in Bucharest.

Rumanian Affairs

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the situation was rather changed by virtue of M. Bratiano's plea. He had hardly credited it at first, but had, later on, come to the conclusion that there might be a certain degree of truth in the statement made.

M. TITTONI said that M. Bratiano's statements were to a certain extent borne out by notices appearing in the French press, to the effect that wireless telegraphic communication from Paris was somewhat interrupted.

MR. POLK said he understood that the French Minister at Bucharest had acknowledged the receipt of the dispatches for transmission to the Rumanian Government by telegram.

M. BERTHELOT said that this was not the case. The French Minister had not acknowledged the receipt of the dispatches under discussion, nor had he stated that they had been communicated by him to the Rumanians. In confirmation of this he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that a batch of telegrams received that morning by the French Foreign Office, from Bucharest, made no reference to the previous communications of the Council.

MR. BALFOUR said that he did not understand how the nonreceipt by the Rumanian Government of previous dispatches of the Council could be explained in any credible manner.

MR. POLK said that the Queen of Rumania had written a letter to Mr. Hoover, wherein she protested in the strongest terms against the United States' attitude towards her country. This was surely evidence that the Council's dispatches had been received.

M. PICHON said that the information on which the Queen of Rumania's letter had been based, might have been obtained from the public press.

M. TITTONI said that it would possibly be better to make use of the military organisation for the transmission of telegrams. He drew the Council's attention to the fact, that, according to Mr. Misu's letter (See Appendix C.), the Rumanian Government was now considering the possibility of withdrawing their armies from Hungary. This was the first occasion on which they had made any statement of the kind.

MR. POLK then read a letter from an American officer, who had had an interview with one of the Rumanian authorities in Bucharest. The conversation recorded in the letter was to the effect, that the Rumanians had occupied Budapest, and intended to stay there; that they intended to settle, and manage, their own affairs in their own way; that they had received an insulting letter from the Council, which they had answered in the most suitable way, by ignoring it; and that the Rumanians had nothing to fear from the Allies, who did not intend to follow their menaces up by effective action. This letter showed clearly that the Rumanians were conscious that they were treating the Council with contempt, and that they intended to continue to do so.

M. PICHON drew the Council's attention to a telegram received that morning from M. de Saint Aulaire,² and remarked that the information it contained somewhat contradicted that received by Mr. Polk. (See Appendix D.)

MR. POLK, commenting upon the telegram circulated by M. Pichon, said he thought it was the most amazing attempt to avoid the real issue that he had ever read. In view of the fact that the Allied generals in Budapest had been urging the Rumanian Government to form a *gendarmerie* for the maintenance of order, and had been positively opposed by them in any such measure, the statement contained in the telegram from M. de St. Aulaire that the Rumanians were anxious to restore order, was little short of ridiculous.

MR. BALFOUR said that he found it very difficult to believe, that the Rumanian Government was not playing with the Conference. The Roumanian authorities at Budapest, and the Roumanian representatives in the Allied capitals, knew by the papers, and from the Allied Generals at Budapest, what were the wishes of the Council. The Military Representatives at Budapest, in particular, had continually explained the wishes of the Council. It was folly to suppose that communications made to the Rumanians at Budapest were not sent on to the Central Government at Bucharest. The present complaint of the Rumanian Government, that they were in ignorance of the real wishes of the Conference, seemed well nigh incredible. He had not had time to weigh the evidence in support of their plea carefully; but it seemed to him that their present arguments were only advanced as part of an elaborate scheme of ignoring the wishes of the Allies, and of acting in whatever manner they themselves thought best. There was a remarkable agreement between the conversation of the American officer, communicated to the Council through Mr. Polk's kindness, and the actual facts of the case. He

² French Minister at Bucharest.

was far more inclined to believe the statements made by the Rumanian official to Mr. Polk's correspondent, than he was to give credence to Mr. Bratiano's assurances, that the Rumanian Government was still waiting for the instructions of the Council.

MR. POLK then communicated a further extract from the same letter, in which his correspondent stated that he had been informed by the Rumanian official, that the Allies had made a peace which was unfair to small nations; and that the Rumanians, therefore, intended to take the matter into their own hands, and to settle the matter equitably in their section of the world.

M. TITTONI said that the difficulties were increased by the fact that there was no properly constituted government at Budapest; if there had been one it would have been possible to collaborate with it, in setting up a force sufficient to maintain order, and, when this had been done, to ask the Rumanians to go.

MR. POLK said that M. Tittoni did not seem to have realised the exact nature of the difficulty. The Allied generals at Budapest had frequently urged the Rumanians to allow the Hungarians to form a police force. The Rumanians had positively obstructed any such measure. The Rumanian authorities had been asked, by the Council, not to devastate Hungary. The Council had been told in reply, that it was incumbent upon Rumania to get back the material taken from her at an earlier period of the war. The requisitions far exceeded anything that might have [been?] done under such a plea. About 4,000 sealed cars had gone across the Rumanian frontiers from Hungary, carrying everything that could possibly be requisitioned. He felt very strongly in the matter for a particular reason. There was, at the present moment, an American general officer in Budapest, who was being flouted by the Rumanian authorities. The situation was, therefore, so humiliating, that he felt the President ought to be advised to withdraw the United States general officer from Budapest.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed, in the main, with Mr. Polk, but thought it was difficult to act as though the Council were absolutely certain that the Roumanian Authorities were acting in bad faith.

MR. BALFOUR said, that, although some doubt might exist as to whether the Roumanian Government had received the telegrams of the Council, it was none the less certain that they were fully aware of the policy of the Allies.

MR. POLK said that a despatch had been agreed upon at the Meeting of the Council on the 23rd August (see H. D. 37, Minute 1);³ it had been published in the papers in Paris on the 26th August, and

³ Vol. VII, p. 811.

transmitted to the Generals in Budapest on the 27th. It must, therefore, have been sent on to Bucharest. If the Roumanian representative at each of the Allied capitals were summoned to the Foreign Office, and told that the Council was in earnest, he was certain that the situation in Roumania would improve. All information received through the United States Secret Service was to the effect, that the opinion prevailed among the Roumanian Authorities, that the Council was not serious in its intentions.

MR. BALFOUR then read the letter which he had drafted for communication to the Roumanian Government at Bucharest (See Appendix "E").

M. TITTONI said that the letter had been very well drafted. He suggested that in the first sentence of the second paragraph the words "rightly" or "wrongly" (not now shown in Appendix "E") should be deleted. The sentence as corrected would be a more impartial expression of opinion.

A long discussion then followed as to the method of communicating the letter to the Roumanian Government and

(It was decided that the letter drafted by Mr. Balfour should be taken by Sir George Clerk personally to Bucharest, and be presented by him to the Roumanian Government.)

(It was further decided that Sir George Clerk should also take copies of all telegrams previously sent by the Conference to the Roumanian Government⁴ and should communicate them with the aforesaid letter.)

4. M. BERTHELOT commented on the report contained in Appendix "F" on the subject of the immigration clauses for insertion in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria. He said, in conclusion, that, in his opinion, M. Venizelos' proposals were too complicated to be put into effect, and that it would be better for the States affected to set up mixed Commissions to settle the matter between themselves. He did not think that any clause ought to go into the Bulgarian Treaty.

MR. COOLIDGE said that the opinions expressed by M. Berthelot were not those incorporated in the report of the Commission on New States.

M. BERTHELOT said that the original report of the Commission on New States had been made more than a month previously. It was too late for the Council to enter into negotiations with the States

⁴Appendix C to HD-23, *ibid.*, p. 517; appendix A to HD-24, *ibid.*, p. 541; HD-25, *ibid.*, p. 555; appendix B to HD-26, *ibid.*, p. 615; HD-30, *ibid.*, p. 682; appendix C to HD-31, *ibid.*, p. 691; appendix A to HD-37, *ibid.*, p. 819; appendix C to HD-38, *ibid.*, p. 857.

Clauses Relative
to Immigration for
Insertion in the
Treaty of Peace
With Bulgaria

concerned, as proposed by M. Venizelos. In the meanwhile, the Drafting Committee were asking that a decision should be given, since they could not carry on with the work of drafting the Bulgarian Treaty unless the point was settled.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed:—

(1) That no clause on the subject of reciprocal immigration in the Balkans should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria.

(2) That the report of the Commission on New States (see Appendix "F") should be accepted, and that this Commission should be authorised to consult with M. Venizelos as to the best method of putting his proposals into effect.

5. At this point, Dr. Benes and MM. Paderewski and Dmowski entered the Council.

Question of Teschen M. BENES explained the question of Teschen to the Council with the aid of maps. He said that the problem should be looked at from four points of view, namely, the ethnographical, the historical, the economic and the political.

According to the latest statistics, there were in the Teschen area, 230,000 Poles, 150,000 Czechs, and 60,000 Germans. This Polish majority was questioned by the Czechs, who doubted the accuracy of the statistics. Owing to the policy of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the resistance of the Czechs to Austrian rule had been combated by every administrative measure that could be brought against them; and in consequence, the Austrian policy had been systematically to weaken any ethnographical statistics favourable to the Czecho-Slovak population. This could be seen from the fact that the figures given varied from one census to another. The German and Polish elements were generally grouped together; because these two sections of the population were always able to agree in their opposition to the Czechs. There were, in the mining district of the Teschen area, a large percentage of workmen, who were not, properly speaking, inhabitants of Teschen. The Austrian Authorities had assisted the Polish agitation in Teschen since the year 1873, when the centralising tendencies of the Viennese Government began to be put into effect. Since that date, Polish schools had multiplied, and a continuous effort had been made to replace the local Czech administration by Polish or German Authorities. The result of all this had been that the statistics of the Polish population had increased, but the Czecho-Slovak Government thought that false classifications had deliberately been introduced into the data on which the statistics were based. The population in Teschen did not speak the proper Polish language, but a dialectic mixture of Czecho-Slovak and Polish. It was even declared

(a) Ethnographical Considerations

that there were no villages in which separate Polish and Czech inhabitants lived side by side. There were, none the less, centres where the Czecho-Polish dialect was universally spoken. This showed that the population of Teschen, from an ethnographical point of view, was in a transitional state. There was further to be taken into consideration the tendency of the population towards a particular form of culture, and it was certain that the tendency of the population in the area was towards the adoption of Czech customs. All these facts combined to show that the Austrian statistics could not be trusted, or at least, that they presented only one side of the question. The Czech Government maintained that there were not more than 45 per cent of Poles in the Teschen area.

The situation of Czecho-Slovakia in the past, was of importance. That country had always identified itself with the ancient Kingdom of Bohemia, formed out of Moravia, Bohemia, and that portion of Silesia which included Teschen.

(b) Historical Considerations

The strife of the sixteenth century had almost exterminated the Bohemian population. A revival of Bohemian national sentiment had occurred later, but the moral sentiment sustaining it had been based upon the historical status of the Bohemian Kingdom, and the national unity of that country. Basing itself upon these feelings, Bohemia had always resisted the attempts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to force their country into a Central European Federation. They had never, in the past, abandoned their standpoint that the old Kingdom constituted a historic unit, and ought never to be divided. This sentiment was very deep, and existed at the present moment; the population could not understand the projected division of Teschen, at a moment when the ethnographical problem had not been finally resolved.

The coal question affected Czecho-Slovakia very deeply. There were large masses of coal in Poland, and in those parts of Upper Silesia which would undoubtedly be ceded to that

(c) Economic Considerations

country. Statistics showed that the total capacity of the Polish coalpits amounted to 86 billion tons; the pits in Czecho-Slovakia, including Teschen, only had a capacity of 9 billion tons. Czecho-Slovakia was essentially an industrial country. It had produced 70 per cent of the metal work of the old Austro-Hungarian Kingdom, 93 per cent of the sugar products of that country, and had worked a preponderating proportion of the blast furnaces employed in Austro-Hungarian industries. All this showed how much the Czecho-Slovak State was dependent upon a continuous supply of coal, and how little they were asking for themselves. The mines in Czecho-Slovakia were only capable of supplying the needs of the country for 250 years. Poland imported very

little coal from Teschen, and statistics showed that in the past, only 25 trucks were sent into Poland every day. The industrial character of Czecho-Slovakia obliged her to import coal from Silesia.

MR. POLK then asked whether some of the coal imported by Czecho-Slovakia did not go to Austria.

MR. BALFOUR also asked whether M. Benes' figures included the importation of lignite.

M. BENES, replying to Mr. Polk, said that a certain quantity of coal was transmitted to Austria through Czecho-Slovakia, but that two-thirds of the total importation remained in the last named country.

Replying to Mr. Balfour, he said that there was enough lignite in Czecho-Slovakia for the domestic needs of the country.

Passing to the Railway question, he drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the most important railway line, maintaining communication between Slovakia and the disputed coal districts, ran through Teschen. This railway was absolutely necessary for the transport of the products of Czecho-Slovakia. (M. Benes here illustrated his statement by a reference to a diagrammatic map, showing the great proportion of Czecho-Slovakian goods carried over the Oderberg-Kaschau line.) It was impossible for the new Czecho-Slovak Republic to build a new railway line on its own resources.

If the supply of coal upon which Czecho-Slovakia depended so greatly were taken from her, that country would have to rely upon Poland for the essential elements of her existence. Czecho-Slovakia

(d) Political
Considerations

was a more industrial country than Poland. Her sugar industries, her metallurgical works, and her blast furnaces could only be developed and continued by having a continuous supply of coal. If a decision were made unfavourable to Czecho-Slovakia, it would cause a great revulsion of feeling in that country. He had been surprised how deeply Czech feeling had been roused by the question. During the long negotiations of the past months, he had done everything in his power to calm the population of his country, but he had only been able to do so because his countrymen were hoping for a solution favourable to themselves. They now saw themselves faced with the possibility of a situation arising in which they would be deprived of these things which were necessary for the reconstruction of their country. He had always attempted to advocate moderate views, but he doubted whether his influence would prevail over the growing excitement in his country.

He would like to draw attention to the economic effects of diplomatic friction between his country and Poland. In a period of strained relations, Poland would only have to hold up the railway traffic into Czecho-Slovakia, to paralyse that country in 24 hours.

He would like the Polish representatives to understand that Czecho-Slovakia was not demanding rights over Polish populations, but merely putting forward a claim for things necessary for her very life. Czecho-Slovakia was surrounded by countries in a state of ferment, and the supply of materials necessary for her reconstruction was an absolute necessity to her, if she were to remain free of the existing political confusion in Central Europe. He had desired to see his country reconstituted on a firm economic basis as rapidly as possible, in order that he might make it a sort of rallying point for the political aims of western European policy. By doing so, he had hoped that her neighbours would gather round her, and that the western Powers would find a support for their policies in Czecho-Slovakia. Poland was necessarily involved in the politics of Eastern Europe. She was faced with all the difficulties of the Russian situation, in which she would be involved for a long time to come. For this reason, Poland would require the collaboration of Czecho-Slovakia, but this could not be given if the last named country were deprived of Teschen, which was regarded as essential to her economic existence. During the war, the Czech population had adhered to their wish for the integrity of their country. They had had the deepest faith in the policy of the Entente. He feared that if a decision unfavourable to Czecho-Slovakia were given on the Teschen question, there would be a deep and general reversion of feeling. He feared that the proposed solution of the Teschen question would give rise to a deeply hostile feeling towards Poland, which might be seen from the fact that the Radical Parties in Czecho-Slovakia were now adopting an inimical attitude towards Poland. In order to counteract this unfortunate sentiment amongst his countrymen, he had proposed a compromise, which he had hoped would satisfy both Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. He had originally suggested that the line of the Vistula should be the boundary between the two countries. It had been pointed out to him that larger concessions were necessary, and he had endeavoured, with success, to make popular opinion in his country, favour the concession of the whole of the Bielitz district to Poland. His own opinions had been regarded as heretical by his countrymen: notwithstanding this, he had accepted a solution, which he hoped would have satisfied both Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. More than this, he had always wished to advance conciliatory proposals in the case of Glatz. He had accepted a frontier between his country and Hungary, which placed 132,000 more Slovaks under Hungarian rule than there were Hungarians under Czech administration. He was now faced by a frontier line, proposed by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees, which divided the mining district into

two portions. Such a solution could not possibly be accepted. The artificial nature of the division proposed, could be seen by the well known fact that there was constant communication between the districts which it was proposed to separate: large numbers of workmen were continually moving from one area to another, and back. The new frontier line would interrupt free communication with Slovakia, and would oblige the Czech Government to construct a special railway line, which would practically run through one continuous tunnel. The German population were all in favour of maintaining the economic unity of the Teschen area. He did not wish to lay emphasis on this argument, which none the less, could not be completely neglected. He had recently received a Delegation, largely composed of miners and workmen, from the Teschen district. On the news being received that the Teschen Basin was going to be divided, large numbers of Polish workmen had protested against such a measure. It was to be noted, that many of the Delegates belonged to political parties quite averse to chauvinistic feeling (Socialists, Socialist Democrats, etc). None the less, they had expressed themselves strongly on the point, and had stated that they feared for the future. He did not think he was exaggerating when he said that this population now so profoundly disturbed, would act against the wishes both of the Polish and of the Czecho-Slovak Governments, and deal with the problem by independent action on their own account. At the present moment, strikes of a political character were occurring, in which Polish workmen were taking part. He had tried to keep the population quiet, but he had begun to feel that a conciliatory policy on his part was more and more difficult in face of a general movement of protest and indignation. Teschen would always be of secondary importance to Poland. The Poles had complained that an economic argument was being brought against their ethnographical claims. The Poles, themselves, had not hesitated to do the same when they thought that such arguments would be favourable to them. He desired, in conclusion, to ask the Conference to consider with the utmost care, all the arguments that he had brought forward, to weigh the grave political consequences which might follow a decision contrary to the wishes of the Czecho-Slovak population, and to take into account the immense sacrifices which Czecho-Slovakia had made in supporting the Entente throughout the war.

(It was agreed that the Polish Delegates should be heard on the following day, and the meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL ASTORIA, PARIS, 4 September, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-47

[Translation ⁵]

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
GENERAL STAFF

4243

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

September 3, 1919.

Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied
Armies.

To the President of the Council, President of the
Peace Conference (Secretariat).

I have the honor to send you herewith a copy of the report of Captain Laperche, Chief of Liaison with the German Delegation, transmitting the request made by M. von Lersner, on behalf of the German Government, to have the personnel of the delegations of the Commissions of Control reduced, or at least to postpone the date of their departure for Berlin.

I think I should, in this regard, make the following observations:

(1) It was at the express request of the German Government (letter of August 11, from M. von Lersner to the President of the Peace Conference) that the Supreme Council of the Allies took the resolution to send ". . . as soon as possible to Berlin, a reduced delegation composed of the president and the most important members of each Commission, in such manner that each power participating in the control would be represented . . . in order to fix, in agreement with the German Government, the methods of carrying out the provisions of part V of the treaty of peace."⁶

(2) The composition of the delegations of the three Commissions (60 officers, 12 interpreters, 77 men, 13 automobiles) was determined upon by the presidents of the Commissions in consideration of the duties devolving upon them and the necessity for having in each of them representatives of each power participating in the control.

It is not possible, therefore, to reduce their composition.

(3) The date of departure of September 5 was fixed, assuming on one hand that the delegations would require about 10 days to prepare the work of their Commissions, and on the other hand that the treaty of peace would come into force about the 15th of September.

I consider it indispensable that the Commissions of Control should be able to function upon the coming into force of the peace treaty.

⁵ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

⁶ HD-36, minute 8, and appendix J, vol. VII, pp. 792, 806.

The date for the departure of the delegations cannot be delayed, therefore, unless the ratification of the treaty of peace should take place at a date definitely later than September 15.

I have the honor to request that you will be good enough to inform me of the reply which I am to make to M. von Lersner.

By order, Chief of Staff
DESTICKER

[Enclosure]

Report by Captain Laperche, Chief of Liaison With the German Delegation

VERSAILLES, September 3, 1919.

This morning, in the course of an interview which he had asked to have with me, M. von Lersner communicated to me a despatch which he had received from Berlin on the subject of the approaching arrival of an Interallied military mission, announced in letter No. 4193, of August 31, 1919, from the Marshal, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies.

This mission, which is expected to leave Paris on September 5, is composed of 60 officers, 12 interpreters, 77 men, and 13 automobiles.

M. von Lersner begged me to transmit informally to the Secretariat of the Peace Conference, the remarks formulated on the subject by his Government:

The German Government points out that since this mission has only to prepare for the installation and to organize the work of the military commissions, which will not assume their function until after the coming into force of the peace treaty, the number of its members seems too great.

The German Government sees a serious disadvantage in the immediate dispatch of so large a mission, and earnestly requests that:

- (1) In case it is deemed necessary to send a mission at once, the size of its membership be reduced.
- (2) In case it is not deemed possible to diminish its membership, its departure be delayed for some time.

M. von Lersner was urgent in pointing out to me that the present arrival of such a mission would increase further the grave difficulties of internal politics which the German Government now has to confront. Public opinion in Germany would be surprised at the arrival of so large a military mission, since the work of the Interallied military commissions intended to supervise the carrying out of the provisions of the treaty, is not to begin until after the coming into force of the peace treaty, and the opposing political parties would find in this fact new grounds for conflict with the Government.

LAPERCHE

Appendix B to HD-47

[Translation *]

[*The President of the Austrian Delegation (Renner) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

DELEGATION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF GERMAN AUSTRIA

1162

SAINT GERMAIN-EN-LAYE, September 3, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: With regard to the notification which Your Excellency was good enough to give me in your note of the second of September,⁹ according to which a limit of five days would be fixed within which German Austria is to declare whether it is prepared to sign the treaty of peace, of which the text has been transmitted to it, I request the Supreme Council to grant me an extension of this limit until September 9.

The burdens which will have to be laid upon German Austria in virtue of the proposed text are such that no government could assume responsibility for them without submitting them to a vote of the National Assembly. With that in mind, I find myself obliged to go to Vienna to explain in person to the representatives of the people the situation in which we find ourselves and the serious consequences which the attitude of the young Republic will entail, whether it resigns itself to signing or refuses to sign.

The means of travel between Paris and Vienna are, at the moment, in such a state that the journey alone, going and coming, requires nearly five days.

Adding the time necessary for parliamentary action, the Conference will admit that a period of about eight days is the indispensable minimum of time required for deciding upon a grave problem on which hangs the existence of a whole people. I am confident, therefore, that I can look forward to having my request taken under sympathetic consideration by the Supreme Council.

I have the honor to add that, during my absence, I shall be represented by the Commissaire Général of the German Austrian Delegation and director in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Jean André Eichhoff.

Accept [etc.]

RENNER

H. E. the PRESIDENT OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE,
GEORGES CLEMENCEAU,
Paris.

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

⁹ Appendix A to HD-43, p. 19.

Appendix C to HD-47

[Translation ³⁰]

[*The Roumanian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference
(Clemenceau)*]

ROUMANIAN DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, September 3, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have just received a telegram from M. Bratiano, President of the Council in Roumania, informing me that, up to the morning of August 31 last, he had not received the note which was sent by the Conference and of which mention was made in the radiograms forwarded to Roumania by the telegraphic agencies.

M. Bratiano has received my telegrams announcing to him the prohibition of all military transports for Roumania, and he begs me to draw the special attention of the Conference to the dangerous and pernicious character of the policy adopted regarding Roumania.

As regards the affairs of Hungary, Roumania had the conviction that by the occupation of Budapest and the destruction of bolshevism she had rendered a great service to the general cause.

In consequence of the conditions which it is intended to create for Roumania, without any account taken of her sacrifices in men and supplies, the Roumanian Government is considering what interest it might have in withdrawing its troops beyond the Tisza, while declining all responsibility for the state of chaos into which would be plunged again that region of Europe which has been contended for by the Bolsheviki and the monarchistic reactionaries.

Accept [etc.]

N. MIȘU

H. E. Monsieur G. CLEMENCEAU,
*President of the Peace Conference,
and of the Supreme Council.*

Appendix D to HD-47

[Translation ³⁰]

[*Telegram From the French Minister in Roumania (Saint-Aulaire)
to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Pichon)*]

AUGUST 30, 1919.

[Received September 3—6:40 p. m.]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has told me that the Roumanian troops would evacuate Hungarian territory as soon as Hungary should

³⁰ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

have been disarmed and the Roumanians should have entered again partially into possession of the railway equipment which had been taken from them and with which they cannot dispense in safeguarding the economic interests of the country. As soon as this double objective shall have been attained, M. Bratiano told me, Roumania will withdraw its troops. The Hungarian question seemed to him, however, to be full of danger. The general impression is that after the departure of the Roumanian troops, Hungary will founder in bolshevism, at any rate that she will not develop toward the monarchical form, the only form capable, it seems, of maintaining itself without outside support. A democratic government could not make itself accepted unless the country continued to be occupied by Roumanian troops during the period of time necessary to enable it to organize itself and to create an armed force competent to ensure its defense and to maintain order.

M. Bratiano added that this was a general question, and that all the powers had the same interest in preventing Budapest from becoming once more a hotbed of anarchy which would soon spread to Vienna and perhaps even beyond. Roumania has no intention, nevertheless, of playing the rôle of policeman for the Entente against their wishes, and will not persist in maintaining its troops at Budapest, inasmuch as their presence has earned nothing so far from its Allies except reproaches which it considers it has not deserved.

SAINT-AULAIRE

Appendix E to HD-47

[Note From the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government]

The Associated Powers have watched with the deepest concern the recent developments of Roumanian policy in Hungary, which seem to indicate a deliberate resolve of her rulers to separate themselves from their Allies and pursue an independent course of their own.

So long as the Soviet Government of Bela Kun were attacking or threatening to attack the Roumanian Army with forces in excess of those permitted by the Armistice, the Roumanian Government were able to allege that self-preservation required them to occupy a strong defensive line on Hungarian soil, notwithstanding that the Conference had requested them to retire within their own newly drawn frontier. Whatever apparent force this argument may have once possessed it has none now. Events have demonstrated the military impotence of Bela Kun as clearly as his political bankruptcy: and assuredly no considerations of national security can any longer be urged by the Roumanian Government in defence of their recent action. Even if Hungary under its Soviet Government, did not completely

carry out the provisions of the Armistice, it was for the Associated Governments, by their collective action, to deal with the situation thus created, not for one of them in isolation to pursue a policy of its own devising. This however is exactly what Roumania has done, and in a manner which seems wholly without excuse. Hungary, suing for peace, already partially disarmed, in the throes of revolution, without allies and without food, has been overrun by troops, who under order from Bucharest, systematically strip it of every species of movable wealth, alive or dead, which seems worth the labour of transportation. Cattle, horses, agricultural implements, raw material, machinery, railway equipment, even the outfit of a children's hospital, choke the lines which lead from Buda-Pesth to Roumania. Wherever there are Roumanian soldiers, and Hungarian prisoners to work for them, everything is being taken that can be taken, however necessary it may be to provide employment in the towns or to raise food in the country. The economic problem presented by Hungary, in any case difficult of solution, is thus becoming rapidly impossible.

The Associated Powers are well aware of the provocation which Roumania has received. They make no excuses for her enemies. She was abominably treated by Hungary and the Allies of Hungary in their hour of triumph; and if she is now plundering on her own account, she has been herself most cruelly plundered. Doubtless the majority of her soldiers genuinely believe that, since they are only taking back what was once their own, their conduct needs no defence.

But though this may be true of the Roumanian soldiers, it cannot be true of the Roumanian Government. They must be well aware that this rough and ready method of exacting reparation is neither just to their allies nor expedient in the common interests. If indeed it did no more than impoverish Hungary and enrich Roumania it might be said, with truth, that both countries got what they deserved. But none knew better than the Roumanian Government that the policy of the Associated Powers takes account of far wider issues and far more complicated interests: for in the framing of that policy Roumanian delegates took their share.

The decisions then arrived at assume the truth of two principles, both of which are violated by the action of the Roumanian authorities in Hungary. The first is that while enemy countries are justly liable for all and more than all they are able to pay, this amount will be diminished not increased if they are made the victims of exactions which utterly destroy their powers of production. The second is that as the war was a common undertaking, the funds obtained for reparations should be divided on a fixed scheme among the allies who suffered loss.

Now the Roumanian Government, when they organised the plundering of Hungary must have been well aware that they were violating

both these principles. They must have known that they were reducing Hungary to a condition in which she was much more likely to be a charge upon Allied charity than to contribute to the reparation of Allied losses; and they must have known that what was taken from Hungary, belonged as of right to the general reparation fund and not to any single one among the belligerent Powers.

These considerations are so obvious in themselves, and have been so earnestly pressed upon the Roumanian Government, that the Associated Powers are reluctantly compelled to ask themselves whether Roumania still counts herself among their number. None of the events that have occurred during the last few weeks are of a nature to reassure them. Remonstrances addressed to Bucharest have remained without reply. Remonstrances addressed to Roumanian representatives at Paris have been of no effect. Remonstrances made in the name of the Conference by the Allied generals at Buda Pesth have been met with fair promises. But the promises have not been kept. Roumania has persistently treated Hungary as a conquered province, and herself as its conqueror, sole and irresponsible. There is no sign that she still deems herself a member of an Alliance, or that in her judgment the Five Great Powers who mainly won the war have any predominant claim to settle the terms of peace.

These are facts which the Conference note with the greatest regret. They acclaimed the entry of Roumania into the war: they rejoiced that after a succession of calamities which the Western belligerents were powerless to prevent, she was about to share to the full the fruits of their victory: they never doubted that she was to be counted among their Allies. Unhappily, they are forced against their will to doubt it now: and, in one way or the other, for good or for evil, their doubts must be resolved without delay.

They desire therefore a clear reply to the following questions:

Is Roumania prepared on a date to be fixed by the Conference to withdraw her troops from Hungary?

Is she prepared at once to cease appropriating to her use Hungarian property?

Is she prepared to surrender to the Reparation Commission the property already appropriated?

Is she prepared to co-operate loyally with the Associated Powers, and under their direction, in the task, of so restoring order in Hungary as to enable a responsible Government to negotiate terms of peace?

The Conference are most unwilling to believe that the Roumanian Government will hesitate to return an affirmative answer to all these questions. Their refusal would be an immeasurable misfortune. It would shatter the hopes of those who see in the unbroken co-operation of the Associated Powers the surest security for future peace; only

those would be content who hold that in the hour of victory no alliance can stand the strain of competing national interests. Whether Roumania would gain by a severance of friendly relations with her Western Associates, it is for Roumanian statesmen to determine. But the Conference must know, and know without delay, where they stand, and how they are henceforward to look upon a state they have been proud to call their Ally.

A. J. B[ALFOUR]

4. 9. 19.

Appendix F to HD-47

Report on the Subject of the Special Clauses Proposed by M. Venizelos

[Same as appendix F to HD-25, printed in volume VII, page 590.]

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, September 5, 1919, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Secretaries
Mr. H. Norman.
Mr. P. Kerr.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Saint-Quentin.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.
Secretary
M. Paterno.
M. Barone Russo.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.
Secretary
M. Kawal.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Mr. C. Russell.
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE M. de Percin.
ITALY Captain Rossi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

The Hon. H. Gibson.
Mr. Johnson.
Professor Coolidge.
Dr. Lord.
Mr. A. Dulles.

GREAT BRITAIN

Mr. A. Leeper.
Colonel F. H. Kisch.
Mr. Carr.

FRANCE

M. Tardieu.
M. J. Cambon.
General Le Rond.
M. Laroche.
M. Hermite.

ITALY

Colonel Castoldi.
M. Stranieri.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

Dr. Benes.

POLAND

M. Paderewski.
M. Dmowski.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had received a telegram from General Dupont, regarding the situation, in Silesia, which was reported as being very bad. (Appendix "A".) He had nothing to propose, but only wished to communicate the news to his colleagues.

Situation in
Silesia

MR. BALFOUR observed that nothing could be done until the Treaty was ratified. He hoped that this would take place in about 10 days.

MR. POLK said that according to Mr. Hoover, there was a prospect of the situation in Silesia improving.

2. The Council had before it a draft Article for insertion in the Treaty with Bulgaria, proposed by the American Delegation. (Appendix "B".)

Question of
the Dobrudja

MR. POLK said that, as his colleagues would remember, he had deferred his reply to the question of the frontier between Bulgaria and Roumania in the Dobrudja, at a previous meeting.¹ He had realised that there were many reasons against the insertion of any clause such as that suggested, in the Treaty itself. The American Delegation would be satisfied if a sentence to the same effect were inserted in the covering letter to the Bulgarian Delegation. It might then be suggested that the ultimate settlement should be in the hands, either of the Allied and Associated Powers or of the League of Nations.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the covering letter would only be sent to the Bulgarians after all their Notes regarding the Treaty had been received. In other words, several weeks would elapse before the letter was sent.

MR. POLK said that the Bulgarians would certainly raise the point in their comments on the Treaty. This would give an opportunity for making a statement on the subject.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Council should resolve to take up the subject again when the covering letter was considered. He was ready, himself, to state that the attribution of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria would be conducive to a lasting peace in the Balkans. Secondly, he thought that it was impossible, as long as Roumania remained an Allied Power, or, at the worst, a neutral, to insert any clause in the Treaty with Bulgaria, requiring a surrender of Roumanian territory. Thirdly, he thought that it would be well to consider the matter again at the time of drafting the final covering letter. By that time, the attitude of Roumania towards the Conference would be defined. The Council would then know what advice could be given to the Roumanians and what methods it was right to employ. In any case, it would not be possible to make Roumania yield territory unless she became an enemy State.

¹ HD-46, minute 7, p. 83.

Mr. POLK said that he agreed. He pointed out, however, that according to the future provisions of the Treaty with Hungary, Roumania stood a chance of receiving considerable accessions of territory in Transylvania and Bukovina. Her acquisition of these territories might be made contingent on her yielding ground in the Dobrudja.

Mr. BALFOUR said that this might be difficult, as the frontiers in Transylvania and Bukovina had been drawn on ethnological lines. It would be difficult to alter these frontiers, without violating the principles of the Conference.

Mr. POLK said that a close examination of the boundaries would probably reveal some instances on which the ethnological principle had not been strictly followed.

M. PICHON said that a serious question of principle was involved. The Conference, hitherto, had never attempted to revise Treaties anterior to the war.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought that dealing with the matter in a covering letter was not very practical. A promise to Bulgaria, by the Conference, that Roumania would be invited to yield territory, would amount to nothing. An invitation to Roumania to do so would equally amount to this. He wondered whether the basis of a bargain existed anywhere. Without a bargain, he thought nothing could be achieved.

M. TITTONI said that he did not think the question of the Dobrudja could be made corollary to the question of Transylvania or Bukovina. The matter of Bessarabia, however, remained. He would be inclined to ask Roumania to make a concession in the Dobrudja, as a condition of obtaining what the Commission recommended in Bessarabia.

Mr. POLK observed that he had not suggested making any promises at present.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the case would be the same in three weeks time.

M. TARDIEU observed that the advantage of the procedure suggested by Mr. Polk was that the Bulgarian Treaty could be proceeded with.

M. TITTONI said that he understood that the question of the Dobrudja would be considered at a later stage in connection with the question of Bessarabia.

Mr. POLK said that he was ready to adopt Mr. Balfour's plan; namely, first, that in principle, it was accepted as desirable that Roumania should yield a part of the Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria; second, that no clause to this effect should be inserted in the Treaty with Bulgaria; third, that the means of obtaining this result should be considered at the time of sending the covering letter to the Bulgarians. He wished it to be understood that nothing he had said

committed him to an offer of Bessarabia to Roumania in exchange for Southern Dobrudja.

(It was agreed that, for the purpose of the Treaty with Bulgaria, no change should be made in the frontier between Roumania and Bulgaria, as existing at the outbreak of War.)

3. At this point, M. Dmowski and later M. Benes, and still later M. Paderewski entered the room.

Question of
Teschen

M. DMOWSKI said that it was extremely painful to him to have to defend his cause against his friends, the Czecho-Slovaks. He had hoped that Poland and Czecho-Slovakia would always stand together throughout the Conference. Now they appeared as rival litigants before the Council. He thought that the independence of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia was not yet achieved, though the Conference had given a basis for both. In return Poland and Czecho-Slovakia owed it to the Allied and Associated Powers to be the defenders of peace in Eastern Europe. He himself had always defended the Czecho-Slovak cause as if he had been a Czecho-Slovak himself. He would continue to do so. He would always endeavour to secure a friendly agreement between the two neighbouring countries. He thought that the worst cause of conflict between neighbours was the subjection of one nationality to another. Should this take place, as between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, friendship between the two countries would never be possible. M. Benes had said that full rights would be accorded to the Poles in Teschen under Czecho-Slovak sovereignty. The first right of the Poles in Teschen was to belong to Poland. M. Benes had further said that the Polish claim was based on ethnographical reasons. This was not the case. He was prepared to leave ethnography to savants and philologists. Statesmen established their claims on the wishes of peoples. The Polish claim was based on the national sentiment of the populations in question: The population of Teschen was literate. It could not be treated like an inarticulate mass. Each man knew what his national feelings were. In the first Slav Congress at Prague in 1848, the representative of Teschen had joined the Poles, and the first newspaper published in Teschen during the nineteenth century had been written in Polish and not in Czech or in German. His thesis was that the country was not so much ethnically Polish as sentimentally and culturally Polish. The proof of this was that the Polish Delegation had suggested holding a plebiscite and this had been refused by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation. On the 5th of November of the preceding year, when the Austrian Monarchy broke up, the population of Teschen had, on its own initiative, made a provisional settlement of the country.² They had

² For text, see Délégation polonaise à la conférence de la paix, *Mémoire concernant la délimitation des frontières entre les états polonais et tchéco-slovaque en Silésie de Cieszyn, Orawa et Spisz* (Paris, 1919), Annex B4.

divided the country into two parts, and the line thus obtained had not aroused any protest either in Poland or in Bohemia. Both nations, therefore, seemed inclined to accept it. Difficulties had been made by the political leaders. The Czech people had been led to suppose that they could obtain the whole of Teschen from the Conference. When the decision of the Commission had been communicated in vague terms to the press in Bohemia, an organised protest by means of strikes was decided on. The Czech authorities had stopped trains running from Warsaw to Paris, had used troops to force the workmen to strike, and had even threatened to flood the mines should the men go to work. A German owner, whose Polish workmen wished to work in the mines had told them he could not guarantee their lives. In spite of pressure, nevertheless the miners had continued work. This indicated that the country was undoubtedly Polish, and unwilling to collaborate in the plan of solving the fate of the country by strikes. Mr. Benes had impugned the Austrian official statistics of the population in Teschen. He had said that the figures had been falsified in favour of the Poles, because of the consistent opposition of the Czechs. This was really not the case. The Austrian Government had been more anti-Polish in Teschen than anti-Czech, because their strongest adversaries in the area were the Poles. In 1900 the census showed 60% Poles, 23% Czechs, 15% Germans. In 1910 the proportion was, 54% Poles, 27% Czechs, 18% Germans. From these figures it followed that the Polish percentage was shown as diminished, just as the Czech and German percentage rose. It might be inferred that a pro-German policy tended to minimise the Polish element, and to increase the Czechs. Mr. Benes had introduced a number of economic reasons. These were very strong. Bohemia, being a highly industrialised country, needed coal and therefore desired to possess the mines, but it could not be laid down that need makes ownership. The Polish Delegation maintained that the balance should be in favour of the national sentiment of the population. By a very strict application of this principle, Poland had been deprived of Danzig, which was the lungs of Poland. Danzig represented far more for Poland than the mines of Teschen for Bohemia. It would not be possible to deprive the Poles of the advantage of a rule which had been made to operate against them in favour of defeated Germany. He wished to remain the friend of the Czecho-Slovak republic. Poland would desire to sell her coal to her neighbours. In this instance it was the quality of the coal that mattered. The coal derived from the Karwin Basin was convertible into coke. In Poland there was no coal of this character. Should Upper Silesia as a result of the plebiscite go to Poland, there would be some such coal in Poland, but not much. The gas works in Warsaw employed coal from the Karwin Basin. The Poles needed it

more than Bohemia, which had coke producing coal in other parts of the country. Bohemia needed ordinary coal. This could not be obtained from the Karwin Basin. Bohemia had always imported some of her coal from Upper Silesia. Should this country go to the Poles, Poland would now become her supplier. But the fact that Bohemia required coal from Upper Silesia was a poor reason for giving her the Karwin Basin. Bohemia would buy rather more coal than she used to, and Poland in return would import her industrial products. Poland was very ready to sign a Convention to supply Bohemia with enough coal for her industries. It would be far easier to settle the matter in this way, than by making an unfair settlement in Teschen. If the true national line were adopted, Poland would receive 51% of ordinary coal and 44% of coke out of the production of Teschen. The Polish Delegation was ready to yield a certain number of mining communes in which the population was not clearly Polish. This would reduce the Polish proportion to 29% of ordinary coal, and 22% of coke.

Polish ambitions were therefore not excessive. Poland required coke perhaps in a less degree than Bohemia because less industrial, but, nevertheless, she did need some. He thought the whole coal situation could be solved on these lines and by means of a Convention between the two countries. This would be far easier than by committing an injustice in Teschen, against which Poland would always protest and which would always disturb the peace. As to the railways, M. Benes had said that the Oderberg-Kaschau line was the principal communication between Bohemia and Slovakia. He begged to point out that this line had never served such a purpose before. It was the main line between Berlin and Buda-Pest. It carried coal from Upper Silesia to Hungary and to the Balkans. It was necessary not for Bohemia, but for Poland, when Upper Silesia became Polish. There were four other lines connecting Bohemia and Slovakia. Two of these needed small connecting tracks of 8 kilometres in one case and 12 kilometres in the other. If these tracks had not been laid, geography was not the culprit. It had been Hungarian policy to stifle the development of Slovakia. Now that Bohemia and Slovakia were united in one State, no such reasons existed. The Czecho-Slovak Republic would easily construct what was required and he undertook to prophesy that, in 20 years, Bohemia would be connected with Slovakia by at least 8 lines of railway. On the other hand, Poland required the railway from Oderberg to Kaschau to export coal from Upper Silesia. The map prepared by the Commission, which he had seen on the previous day for the first time, had somewhat alarmed him. In order to attribute to Czecho-Slovakia the southern portion of this railway, the Commission had handed over to Czecho-Slovakia the most Polish of the Polish areas in Teschen,—he might almost say the most Polish population in Poland.

There were few parts of Poland in which the population was 100 per cent Polish: in this area it was. The population had another characteristic. It was protestant in religion. These protestant Poles had always taken a very prominent part in the Polish national movement and it was these very people whom the Commission attributed to Czecho-Slovakia on the pretext that Bohemia required the southern part of the Oderberg-Kaschau railway, which, in reality, she did not require. It had been pointed out to him by a military authority that the line suggested by the Commission would give the Czechs a dominant position over the Polish part of the country. He put such considerations aside, as he did not wish even to contemplate the thought of war between the two countries. On national and economic grounds, he considered the Polish claim was right and he would only repeat what he had said at the beginning, that the essential condition for good relations between two neighbouring States, whose independence was not yet achieved and whose function was to be guardians of the peace in Central Europe, was to avoid the subjection of the population of either to the other. All he asked for was the application of the national principle which had been applied with considerable severity against Poland in favour of Germany.

M. BENES said that the local agreement referred to by M. Dmowski between the Czech and Polish population in Teschen had really been made according to the administrative districts which previously existed. It had not been intended that the question of ultimate sovereignty should, in any way, be pre-judged by this provisional settlement. In Bohemia, protests had not arisen, until the Polish Government had ordered mobilisation in the Polish part of the territory, as if the provisional settlement had established Polish sovereignty in the area. M. Dmowski had referred to various acts of Czech officials. He did not wish, himself, to go into such details, though he had numberless reports containing equivalent allegations against Poles. At Oderberg and Bogumin, Polish troops had forced the Czech workmen to sign a petition in favour of annexation to Poland. However, recriminations of this kind would be endless and he preferred to avoid the subject. M. Dmowski had argued that the census had been falsified against the Poles. In fact, the Czechs and Germans had never united against the Poles; the Poles and Germans had always combined against the Czechs. He had previously pointed out that the mines in Teschen only exported 25 wagon loads of coke to Poland. Bohemia, on the other hand, had to import coal from Upper Silesia, which was to become Polish. Upper Silesia contained quantities of coke producing coal. M. Dmowski had pointed out that Bohemia would always depend on Upper Silesia, that is to say, on Poland, for coal. This was too true, and Czecho-Slovakia only asked for what was strictly necessary, in order not to be at the mercy of every eventuality. M. Dmow-

ski had made use of the percentage of coal Poland and Czecho-Slovakia would obtain from Teschen should it be divided between them, but had made no mention of the immense resources in Poland. But Czecho-Slovakia required 30 million tons a year and only produced 26 million tons. Moreover, the Treaty forced Czecho-Slovakia to supply Austria with coal. This would leave the industries of the country entirely dependent on Poland.

As to the railways, it was true that there were communications between Bohemia and Czecho-Slovakia [*Slovakia?*], but M. Dmowski had omitted to state that the railway from Oderberg to Kaschau was the only line going through Slovakia from west to east. The hills in Slovakia went from north to south and no other railway could be built across the country. The Teschen question for Czecho-Slovakia was analogous to the question of Alsace-Lorraine for France. The culture of the country was Czech. This was evidenced by the habits of the people, their dress and the architecture of their houses. All these resembled what prevailed in Moravia. A large part of the admittedly Polish population of Teschen had declared in favour of union with Czecho-Slovakia; in case of a plebiscite, this population would vote in the same sense.

M. PADEREWSKI said that he was almost ashamed to join M. Dmowski against M. Benes. M. Benes however was a champion who would, he felt sure, be equal to both of them. In any case, he did not mean to be aggressive. No one more than himself desired good relations with Czecho-Slovakia. It was the destiny of the two countries to live in peace and it was also their duty. They owed it to the Allied and Associated Powers who had given them independence, to humanity and to their own exhausted peoples. Discord would not prevail between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia if M. Benes and he could make mutual concessions. The Teschen area interested Czecho-Slovakia because of its coal. It interested Poland because of its population. The arguments on one side were economic and on the other side national. M. Benes, taking as his model the judgment of Solomon, suggested cutting the country in two. Poland protested. It might be inferred on which side was real maternity. In any case, the child had reached the age of discretion and was able to say to which country it belonged. There were, in addition, impartial observers, among whom he quoted the work of two Bohemian savants. It was true that there were some villages in Teschen with a Czech majority. M. Dmowski had told the Council that Poland did not claim them. As the Polish Delegation had good reason to know, States were better off without alien minorities. M. Benes' remarks about coal might lead the Council to suppose that his country was in dire peril. Was coal so important a matter as to justify the subjugation of an unwilling population and the estrangement of a country nearly four times as big as Czecho-Slovakia?

On the same lines, what should Italy do, seeing that she had neither coal, oil nor forests? In reality, was Czecho-Slovakia so poor in coal? Out of a production of 26 $\frac{1}{4}$ million tons of lignite throughout the former monarchy, 83 per cent had been produced in Bohemia and 86 per cent of Austrian and Hungarian coal came from Bohemia. These figures proved Bohemia to be one of the richest coal-producing countries in the world, after Great Britain, America, and Germany. These figures were derived from an authority who would not be denied by M. Benes; they were derived from the work of President Masaryk. M. Benes had stated that Czecho-Slovakia needed 30 million tons of coal and had only 26 million. If President Masaryk's figures were not accepted, he would refer to statistics. In 1913, 34 million tons of brown and black coal (23 million brown and 11 million black), had been produced in Bohemia; divided among 13 million inhabitants, this represented two thousand kilos. per head of brown and 900 kilos. per head of black coal. Poland, in the same year, had produced 11,814,000 tons of black coal and 952,000 tons of coke for a population now amounting to 29 millions. This represented not even 400 kilos. per head. In view of the tragic situation in Upper Silesia, the Council could judge whether Poland could lightly abandon the coal of Teschen. If Upper Silesia became Polish, the situation would be different and Poland would make every concession in order to supply Czecho-Slovakia with the coal she required. This matter could be settled between the experts of the two countries. As to the railways, M. Dmowski had pointed out that all Czecho-Slovakia need do to perfect her communications was to build two lines measuring 8 and 12 kilometres. Poland wished to be a good neighbour to Czecho-Slovakia and was ready to bear half the cost of construction. Before concluding, he would like to quote an incident of his last journey to Poland. At the first frontier station in Teschen in an open field were gathered some 3,000 persons, mostly workmen, women and children. It was raining hard but he was received with songs, music and speeches. Several speeches were made. The one which struck him most was made by a workman, who said that the quarrel between the Poles and Czechs should be put an end to as soon as possible. The Czechs and Poles were both Slavs and cousins. The Czechs ought to have all the coal that could be spared, but no Polish land should be given to them and no Czech land to the Poles. The speaker might now be dead, as the place he lived in had been much oppressed by the Germans, who were shooting the Poles like rabbits. The moral of his speech had been understood in Warsaw. He hoped that it might be understood in Prague.

M. BENES said that Czecho-Slovakia was not only interested in Teschen for its coal. The country was connected with the rest of Czecho-Slovakia by history, culture and administrative bonds. Mere

figures could not determine the question. The future needs of Czecho-Slovakia must be taken into consideration. The statistics quoted by M. Paderewski were not conclusive. Production had been far more intensive in Bohemia than in Poland. On the other hand, the possibilities of production in Poland were infinitely greater than in Czecho-Slovakia. He had been himself as conciliatory as possible, but it must be remembered that he was not alone and that the peoples in both countries were passionate and excitable. It was better that each should be self-sufficient, as if either depended for vital necessities upon the other, there would be no solid peace. In other cases the Conference had sacrificed small minorities in order to establish lasting arrangements. This was a case in which this method should be put in practice, as had been done in the case of Ratibor against Czecho-Slovakia. Perfection could not be attained. If Poland and Czecho-Slovakia were independent of one another in respect of their vital needs, agreement between them would be easy. In any case, whatever the decision of the Conference, he would faithfully observe it and, in so doing, continue the policy he had consistently followed from the start, that of seeking friendship with Poland.

4. The letter contained in Appendix "C" was approved and signed by M. Clemenceau.

Instructions to
Sir George Clerk
on His Mission
to Bucharest

The note to the Roumanian Government (See H. D. 47, Minute 3 & Appendix "E")³ was signed by all the delegates.

5. The draft of Article 48 for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria (Appendix "D") was accepted, subject to the approval of Mr. Polk to be communicated later in the day to the Secretariat-General.

Access of
Bulgaria to the
Aegean Sea

(The meeting then adjourned.)

ASTORIA HOTEL, PARIS, 5 September, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-48

[Telegram—Translation⁴]

Report by General Dupont

BERLIN, September 1, 1919.

SILESIA AFFAIRS

According to the French Captain Poupard, who has just come from Silesia, the situation in that country is lamentable.

³ *Ante*, pp. 98 and 111.

⁴ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

The country lives under the terror created by the German troops. It is like Dinant or Lille, made even worse if possible by savage hatred against the Poles and rage at their own defeat.

As always where the Prussian soldiery displays its cruelty, everybody, Germans included, except functionaries and Hakatists, sigh for its departure and ask for order and peace under an Allied occupation.

As I have already explained to you, it will be difficult for the Government to get this idea accepted by the opposition parties. The Government is dependent on them through the army, which is unwilling to support it save on condition that it do whatever the army wishes. It is necessary, of course, to obtain consent, but it is also necessary that the people should acknowledge that their leaders are obliged to give consent. I fear, therefore, that persuasion will not suffice.

The strength of the forces for carrying out this occupation will depend essentially on the strength of the measures taken to force Germany's consent.

DUPONT

Appendix B to HD-48

[Translation ⁵]

Draft of an Article To Be Inserted in the Treaty With Bulgaria

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to examine the title to possession of the Dobrudja, and to invite Roumania to cede to Bulgaria any part of the Dobrudja where the Roumanians are in the minority and the Bulgars in the majority, under conditions which the Allied and Associated Powers shall consider just and equitable.

Appendix C to HD-48

[Translation ⁶]

[The President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau) to Sir George Clerk of the British Delegation]

PEACE CONFERENCE
THE PRESIDENT

PARIS, September 5, 1919.

MR. MINISTER: I have the honor to inform you that the Supreme Council has decided to request you to carry personally to Bucharest,

⁵ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

and to deliver to the Roumanian Government the attached note⁷ in which are summarized the views of the Conference on the present situation of Roumania with regard to the Allied and Associated Powers. You are likewise requested to communicate to the Roumanian Government the complete collection of telegrams⁸ which have been addressed to it by the Council. For that purpose, ten copies of the note and of the telegrams in question are annexed to the present letter.

I shall be obliged, therefore, if you will proceed as soon as possible to Bucharest as envoy of the Allied and Associated Powers; this does not imply that you are charged with making orally to the Roumanian Government an official comment upon the note from the Allies. Nevertheless you remain entirely free to reply, in a semi-official way, to every request for explanations which may be addressed to you by the Roumanian authorities, and to hold yourself ready, for that purpose, to enter into any conversations which you may judge necessary.

I may add that the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers in Roumania should, if necessary, accord you their cooperation and assistance for the accomplishment of your mission.

Accept [etc.]

[No signature on file copy]

His Excellency, SIR GEORGE CLERK,
Minister Plenipotentiary,
British Delegation, Paris.

Appendix D to HD-48

[Translation⁹]

BULGARIAN TREATY—PART III

SECTION III

THRACE

Article 48

Bulgaria renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title over the territories in Thrace which belong to the Bulgarian Monarchy and which, being situated outside

⁷ Appendix E to HD-47, p. 111.

⁸ Appendix C to HD-23, vol. VII, p. 517; appendix A to HD-24, *ibid.*, p. 541; HD-25, *ibid.*, p. 555; appendix B to HD-26, *ibid.*, p. 615; HD-30, *ibid.*, p. 682; appendix C to HD-31, *ibid.*, p. 691; appendix A to HD-37, *ibid.*, p. 819; appendix C to HD-38, *ibid.*, p. 857.

⁹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

the new frontiers of Bulgaria as described in article 27-30, part II (Frontiers of Bulgaria), are not at present assigned to any state.

Bulgaria undertakes to recognize the settlement which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will make in regard to these territories, particularly insofar as concerns the nationality of the inhabitants.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to ensure the freedom of the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea.

The conditions of this guarantee will be fixed at a later date.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, September 8, 1919, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT

**UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Secretaries

Mr. H. Norman.

Mr. P. Kerr.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta.

M. Berthelot.

M. Massigli.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

Secretaries

M. Paterno.

Barone Russo.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. Chapin.
 BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. E. Abraham.
 FRANCE M. de Percin.
 ITALY Capt. Rossi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Hon. H. Gibson.

Mr. A. W. Dulles.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Carr.

Colonel Kisch.

FRANCE

M. Jules Cambon.

General Desticker.

General Le Rond.

M. Laroche.

M. Kammerer.

M. Hermite.

ITALY

Col. Castoldi.

M. Ricci-Busatti.

M. Brambilla.

1. The Council had before it a Note from the Drafting Committee asking for instruction as to the language in which the Conventions replacing the Acts of Berlin¹ and Brussels² should be drafted. (See Appendix "A".)

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the Acts of Berlin and Brussels had been in French, and that some of their provisions were maintained, in the new Conventions.

Language To Be
Used in the
Conventions Taking
the Place of the
Acts of Berlin
and Brussels

MR. BALFOUR said that in view of this he agreed that the new Convention ought to be in French.

MR. POLK agreed.

M. TITTONI also agreed.

(It was decided that the Conventions replacing the Acts of Berlin and Brussels should be drafted in French.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Germans had first asked the Conference to send Commissions of Control to Germany before the Treaty came into force. Consequently advance detachments had been appointed and each of the Allied Powers had been represented in each section. The Germans had then sent a request that the despatch of the Commissions should be delayed as they appeared to them to be too numerous. The Council then decided to postpone the sending of the advance detachments (See H. D. 47, (1).)³ Now it appeared that the Germans withdrew their objection to the numbers and desired the Commissions to be sent at once. He suggested that the Commissions should accordingly be sent immediately and be composed in the manner already decided on. He was informed that General Nollet was ready to begin.

M. POLK said that it was understood that the United States could not make appointments for the present.

(It was decided that the advance delegations of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control should be sent to Germany forthwith.)

3. The Council had before it a reply from the German Delegation regarding the ultimatum of the Conference and a draft answer to this reply. (See Appendices "B" and "C".)

Reply to the
Note of the
German Delegation
Regarding Article
61 of the German
Constitution

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the draft a somewhat rough answer. It was the general desire that Germany should carry out the Treaty, but no one wished her to do so under compulsion, whether by arms or by blockade. This would be a misfortune not

only for Germany but for the Allied and Associated Powers. Germany should be given every chance of behaving reasonably. The

¹ General Act of Berlin, February 26, 1885, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXVI, p. 4.

² General Act of Brussels, July 2, 1890, William M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910), vol. II, p. 1964.

³ *Ante*, p. 97.

draft said very truly that the German Government was not the final authority on the interpretation of the Treaty, but the same might be alleged against the Allied and Associated Powers. The interpretation of the Treaty had now become a subject for jurists. He did not think that the Council was the final authority regarding its interpretation.

M. TITTONI observed that two points in the German reply had not been met in the answer. The first was a legal point. Article 178 of the German Constitution declared that no Article in the Constitution should affect the Treaty of Peace. Article 61 was thereby rendered ineffective. The second was, that in threatening the extension of the occupation, the Allies were not taking their stand on any Article in the Treaty. Neither of these points were met in the draft reply.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this had been deliberately done. He did not think that either of these points required a reply. It was hardly tolerable that Germany should violate the Treaty and that the Allies should remain bound by it. The question of legality should have been raised when the letter had been drafted on behalf of the Conference to the German Government. It was impossible now to withdraw from the position then taken up. He reminded the Council that the Austrians were at the moment represented in the German Assembly. This could not be tolerated. He was persuaded that if the Allies threatened to carry out what they had indicated, they would not be forced to execute their threats. Austria had not yet signed the Treaty and was not, therefore, bound in the same way as Germany, but it must be remembered that she protested against the clause that prevented her from joining Germany.

MR. POLK said that he agreed with M. Clemenceau's contention that the Allies could not withdraw from the position they had taken up. He thought that perhaps it might be as well to begin by answering the German arguments. When this had been done the Council could be as stiff as it wished. He would like to consult the Jurists in respect to the first part of the answer.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was quite ready to adopt this method and asked Mr. Polk to prepare the draft.

(It was agreed that a new draft answer to the German reply concerning Article 61 of the German Constitution should be prepared by Mr. Polk and submitted to the Council on the following day.)

4. The Council had before it a letter from M. Pachitch, dated September 4th, 1919 (Appendix "D"), protesting against certain of the provisions in the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, (see Appendix "E").

**Protest of the
Serb-Croat-Slovene
Delegation Against
the Treaty for
the Protection
of Minorities**

M. BERTHELOT said that the protest of the Delegation was a long one. The main desideratum was that

no mention in the preamble should be made of the year 1913, in order that Serbian sovereignty over territories acquired in Balkan wars should not be limited. The argument was that, as Serbia had settled her own affairs then without the help of Europe, the settlement she had made ought not to be called in question now.

M. TITTONI asked whether this request applied to a matter of form only or to a matter of substance. If only a matter of form was involved, he would agree. Otherwise, the effect would be that minority clauses would not apply to Macedonia.

M. PICHON observed that they would not apply to the part of Macedonia acquired by Serbia in the Balkan War.

M. TITTONI reminded the Council that the Commission had recommended the appointment of a Commissioner to reside in Macedonia on behalf of the League of Nations; the Council had decided against this.^{3a} It was now asked to go much further in the opposite direction and to exclude Macedonia from the protection of the League of Nations. This, he thought, was not acceptable.

M. BERTHELOT said that, if the passage of the preamble objected to by the Serb-Croat Delegation were suppressed, the change would be a matter of form, but the change carried with it an alteration to Article 9, the last paragraph of which would have to be struck out. This would have to be a substantial change. It was questionable, however, whether the Conference could enact any measures affecting the pre-war acquisitions of any State. If the last paragraph of Article 9 were suppressed, some other Article would be inserted to make the language and educational clauses applicable to Macedonia. This however represented intrusion in another form. It was questionable whether such intrusion was legitimate.

M. PICHON observed that, when the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913⁴ had been called in question in relation to the Roumanians, M. Tittoni had declared that the Conference had no power to modify pre-war Treaties.

M. TITTONI explained he had maintained the Treaty could not be abrogated, but that the Conference was free to introduce stipulations into its Treaties even in contradiction of the terms of that Treaty, by which they were not themselves bound. He observed that the Commission had unanimously decided that protection for minorities was necessary in Macedonia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not feel bound by the unanimous decision of the Commission. In his opinion, the Council could attach conditions to territory which it gave; it could not attach any conditions to territory previously acquired. He suggested that M. Berthelot should draft the additional clauses intended to preserve the

^{3a} See HD-44, minute 1, p. 30.

⁴ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.

linguistic and educational guarantees of the population in Macedonia before discussing the matter any further.

M. TITTONI said that the view of the British Delegate on the Committee had been that the Balkan settlement in 1913 was not final until its recognition by the Powers. This recognition had not taken place, as negotiations on the subject had been interrupted by the outbreak of the Great War.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Treaty of Bucharest was valid, even without a recognition by the Great Powers.

M. TITTONI observed that recognition was necessary to give the Treaty full authority from a diplomatic point of view. He reminded the Council of its previous conclusion, that the protection of minorities was even more necessary in Macedonia than elsewhere. It was now suggested that Macedonia should be excluded from the operation of the Treaties intended to protect minorities.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the problem was exactly as M. Tittoni stated. It was for this reason that he would like to see a new formula before continuing the discussion of the question.

MR. BALFOUR said that the discussion was concerned with two questions—one relating to international law and practice, and the other to the situation of the Macedonian population. In regard to the first, he thought there was no great difference of opinion between the French and British Delegations. Both thought that the Treaty of Bukarest of 1913 was not a completed transaction until ratified by the Great Powers. This ratification had not taken place because of the outbreak of the Great War. The French Delegation recognised that the general situation in the Balkans, especially regarding financial arrangements, was not final before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. The French and British Delegations were, therefore, in accord in thinking that the Great War had cut into the necessary completion of the Balkan settlement. This appeared to afford some justification to those who thought that on the legal point, the Conference had a right to alter what had been agreed on in the Treaty of Bukarest of 1913. On the other point, he thought that all were entirely agreed. Special protection for the Macedonians was necessary. Some means might be found of affording the Macedonians special protection in a manner satisfactory to the Powers, but it was unlikely to be satisfactory to Serbia. The Serbians thought that all they had acquired in 1913 should be outside the control of the Powers. The Powers thought that the considerable accession of territory to Serbia and the special difficulties of Macedonia justified them in exercising control.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that all he desired was to find a text which might be acceptable. The Minority Clauses were unpopular and must be made palatable by some concession.

MR. POLK said that the Council had previously concluded that Macedonia required a special guarantee.

M. BERTHELOT said it would be very difficult to find a formula reconciling (a) the absence of reference to 1913, and (b) special protection for the Macedonians. As the Treaty now stood, the Serbians would probably refuse to sign on the following Wednesday. He, therefore, suggested, that he be authorised to have an interview with M. Vesnitch. If M. Vesnitch agreed to a compromise, the situation might be saved. If not, the reference to 1913 could be preserved, and if the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation refused to sign the Treaty with Austria, the risk must be run. As to the minor points raised in the letter (Appendix "D"), he suggested that the Committee be allowed to dispose of them.

MR. POLK suggested that the compromise, as suggested by M. Berthelot, should, when drafted, be submitted to the Committee also.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the Delegation also asked for a modification of Article 11. He did not think this could be accepted, and he suggested that the request be refused.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this might be considered on the following day, together with the other points raised on the subject.

(It was decided that M. Berthelot should consult with M. Vesnitch as to a formula, affording protection to the population of Macedonia, in a manner acceptable to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation. This formula, if agreed on, should be submitted to the Council after consultation with the Committee on New States, to which the other points raised in M. Patchitch's letter (Appendix "D") were also referred.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had just received a letter from the Roumanian Delegation, offering to sign the Treaty with Austria, with a reservation, regarding Article 60, concerning minorities, transit and trade. (Appendix "F".)

Roumanian
Reservation
Regarding Article
60 of the Treaty
of Peace With
Austria

MR. BALFOUR asked whether any Power could sign a Treaty with reservations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this had not been permitted in the case of the Treaty with Germany. He thought it was necessary that a Power should sign, or should not sign.

M. PICHON observed that Article 60, which he read, covered the whole case of the protection of minorities everywhere.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the substitution of the expression "League of Nations" for the expression "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" might perhaps induce the Roumanians to be more tractable. If so, he would adopt the alteration. The Roumanian argument was, that if each of the Allied and Associated Powers considered itself the protector of minorities in Roumania, there would be no end to their troubles. If, on the other hand, the League of Na-

tions was the only Court of Appeal, the matter could be settled without repeated diplomatic interventions at Bukarest.

MR. BALFOUR observed that if the words "Principal Allied and Associated Powers" were deleted, and the words "League of Nations" introduced, Article 60 would stipulate that there should be a Treaty with the League of Nations. This appeared to be impossible.

M. TITTONI said that he understood the Clauses for the protection of minorities had been formulated by the Conference, and accepted by the Poles, Serbs and Czechs in the Treaties signed with these small States. The League of Nations had been introduced to supervise the execution, but the clauses had been framed by the Allied and Associated Powers and the Treaties had been signed with them. If so, it was hardly possible to mention clauses to be framed by the League of Nations, which did not yet exist, seeing that the clauses had already been framed by the Allied and Associated Powers. He thought Roumania must accept the clauses as laid down, but that she might be asked to accept the supervision of the League of Nations for the execution of these clauses. Since the other small States had agreed, Roumania must also agree.

M. PICHON pointed out that Roumania would only acquire the Bukovina from Austria. The area she was likely to obtain from Hungary, i. e., Transylvania, was far bigger. If Article 60 in the Treaty with Austria were confined to the Bukovina, possibly Roumania would accept. At all events, she would be on worse ground for refusing.

M. TITTONI said that if this would induce Roumania to sign the Treaty with Austria, the expedient might be accepted.

M. PICHON said that he was not certain that this would induce Roumania to sign.

MR. POLK said that he thought an exception in favour of Roumania could not be made. Poland had signed the minority Treaty, in spite of its extreme unpopularity in Poland. M. Paderewski had overcome great opposition before he was able to sign it. If Roumania were now allowed to evade a similar Treaty, M. Paderewski and his country would feel that they had been treated unjustly.

MR. BALFOUR agreed. He thought that Poland had deserved far better of the Conference than Roumania.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Polk's argument concerning M. Paderewski and Poland was very strong. If Roumania would not sign, he would like to know what effect this would produce on the rest of the Treaty.

M. TITTONI asked whether the Minority Clauses for Roumania were the same as those for the other new States.

M. BERTHELOT said that the clauses were the same for all. There was a special clause for the protection of Jews in Roumania, and this clause also applied to Poland.

(It was decided to consult the Drafting Committee on the legal issues involved.)

(The Members of the Drafting Committee then entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Fromageot what legal effect would result from the absence of Roumanian signature to the Treaty. Roumania was unwilling to sign the Treaty without making a reservation on Article 60. The Council was unwilling to allow her to sign with a reservation. What, then, was the situation, for Roumania, should her signature be refused, and for the powers that did sign?

M. FROMAGEOT said that if Roumania did not sign, she would not be a party to the Treaty, could claim no advantages under it, and be made subject to no obligations established by it.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Roumania would still be at war with Austria.

M. FROMAGEOT said that war could cease without a Treaty, just as it could begin without a formal declaration. War was a state of fact. War, for instance, had ceased between France and Mexico without a Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what would happen to the Bukovina.

M. FROMAGEOT said that, according to his personal opinion, Roumania could claim no rights over the Bukovina on the ground of a Treaty she did not sign.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Roumanians would doubtless stay in the country without the consent of the Powers. He asked whether she could acquire any financial or economic rights.

M. FROMAGEOT said that no such rights could be acquired under the Treaty, if Roumania did not sign it.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether Austrian rights in the Bukovina would be extinguished.

M. FROMAGEOT said that there was an article requiring Austria to give up her rights in the Bukovina. This article would stand, even though Roumania did not take up the inheritance. It might, perhaps, be stipulated that the abandonment of the rights in the Bukovina be made in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers, as it was clear that none but a signatory to the Treaty could acquire rights transferred by it.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would be possible to adopt the suggestion of substituting the League of Nations for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as it was their supervision that Roumania appeared to resent.

MR. HURST pointed out that if the League of Nations were substituted for the Allied and Associated Powers, the question regarding the protection of minorities would come before the Council of the League. By the constitution of the League, Roumania, if concerned, would have the right to be present in the Council. As no decision of the Council

was operative without unanimity, the mere presence of Roumania would secure no interference with her policy.

MR. TITTONI pointed out that a similar difficulty would arise in respect of the Treaty with Hungary. Roumania might be satisfied with the actual possession of the Bukovina and Transylvania without a title *de jure* to either, because she might argue that neither Austria nor Hungary would be able for a long time to dispute her possession. But in the case of Bessarabia, unless she acquired treaty rights, it must be clear to her that Russia, once she was restored to power, would certainly wish to regain the country. In this instance, Roumania would see that she required the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers or the League of Nations. This might be pointed out to her, and she might be influenced by this argument.

MR. POLK said that he was not prepared to bribe Roumania into good behaviour. He did not think that the Council had fallen so low as to be forced to resort to such tactics.

MR. TITTONI pointed out that he would not have made his proposal unless he had regarded Roumania as having a good title to Bessarabia.

MR. POLK said that he quite understood this.

MR. BALFOUR said that he thought the proper course was to make no mention of Bessarabia at all. He would confine himself to reasoning with the Roumanians, and pointing out that Poland, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, had all accepted similar treaties. This would put the Roumanians on bad ground for maintaining their refusal.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it might be added that Roumania had failed to carry out what she had undertaken to do under the Treaty of Berlin of 1878.⁵

MR. POLK thought it might be stipulated in Article [59?] that the surrender of the former Duchy of Bukovina should be made in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. BALFOUR said this would do away with any necessity for a letter to the Roumanian Delegation.

MR. POLK agreed that this might be reserved for use in case the Roumanians refused to sign. The change might be made by a special protocol added to the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought the Roumanians would be sufficiently punished if they did not sign, by the effects of their not being parties to the Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR said that he would accept any suggestion which did not involve a postponement of the signature of the Treaty.

M. TITTONI said that he would adhere to Mr. Polk's suggestion, if there were the time to spare. He pointed out that there was yet time

⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 895.

to penalise Roumania in the Treaty with Hungary, from which she expected to receive Transylvania.

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that a special protocol could be contrived, permitting Roumania to sign the Treaty with Austria, after the other Powers.

MR. POLK said that he had received visits from some of the Roumanian Delegation. He thought that the Roumanians wished to be conciliatory, but at the bottom of their attitude was a sense of grievance that they were not obtaining their due share of reparations. They thought that they were faring less well than France and Belgium in this respect.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought the best suggestion to adopt was Mr. Balfour's, namely, that an answer be sent to the Roumanians, arguing with them that Poland and the other new States had accepted the minority clauses. As to the Bukovina, Transylvania and Bessarabia, he thought it would be better to say nothing, but to wait and see what action the Roumanians would take.

(It was accordingly decided that no alterations should be made in Article 60 of the Treaty with Austria, and that Mr. Balfour should prepare a draft answer to the Roumanian Delegation, in the spirit of the above discussion, and that the draft should be submitted to the Council on the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL ASTORIA, PARIS, 8.9.19.

Appendix A to HD-49

[Translation *]

Note for the Supreme Council

PARIS, September 3, 1919.

The Commission which was directed by a decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 25⁷ to prepare the three conventions in French relating to the regime of the Congo Basin, in the matter of trade in arms and traffic in spirituous liquors, by which it is proposed to revise or replace the Acts of Berlin and of Brussels of 1885 and 1890 respectively, has now finished its labors.

The Acts whose revision or replacement is in question were drawn up in French only.

The Drafting Committee would be grateful if the Supreme Council would inform it whether, instead of using French only, it is advisable

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

⁷ FM-27, minute 3, vol. IV, p. 856.

now to use French and English, or French, English, and Italian,—the French text being authoritative in case of divergences.

It should be remarked that, since the new conventions allow certain provisions of the old instruments to stand, it seems difficult to adopt today a different procedure from that adopted in 1885 and 1890.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

Appendix B to HD-49

Translation

[*The President of the German Delegation (Von Lersner) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

THE PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN DELEGATION

No. 17

VERSAILLES, September 5, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: The Allied and Associated Powers are of the opinion, according to their note of September 2,⁸ that the provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2, of the German Constitution, on the subject of the right of German-Austria to participate in the Reichsrat, is a formal violation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty, and they require the German Government to take within fifteen days appropriate measures to avoid this violation by declaring Article 61, paragraph 2, null and void. On this subject, the German Government replies as follows:

In this connection, the German Delegation at Versailles called attention in its observations on the peace conditions, during the discussion of Article 80 of the Treaty, which observation was sent to the Allied and Associated Governments on May 29,⁹ to the fact that Germany had never had and would never have the intention of changing the Germano-Austrian frontier by force, but that it could not undertake to oppose a possible desire of the population of Austria to reconstruct the unity of the state with the lands of the old German stock. The Allied and Associated Governments replied in their note of June 16, 1919,¹⁰ that they took note of Germany's renunciation of any violent change of the Germano-Austrian frontier. The Germans concluded therefore that they would not be going counter to the prescriptions of Article 80 of the Peace Conditions; which ends in bringing forward the future possibility of a change to be brought about in the independence of Austria with the consent of the League of Na-

⁸ Appendix A to HD-45, p. 62.

⁹ Vol. VI, pp. 795, 832.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 926, 945.

tions, if this possibility could be brought about by the friendly *rapprochement* of the two nations, corresponding to the right of nations to self-determination. It is this interpretation which led to the insertion of the provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2, in the German Constitution. In the first part these provisions regulate the right of German-Austria to vote in the Reichsrat, purely and simply in case the union of the country with the German Empire takes place, without in any way dealing with the facts on which such a union might depend. In the second part of these provisions, the representatives of German-Austria are granted the right to a consulting voice in the Reichsrat until the union takes place. The independence of German-Austria, as well as the hypothesis admitted by Germany in the Peace Treaty of a change in that independence, were not to be infringed, for the provisions make the right to participate in the sessions of the Reichsrat depend on the free opinion of German-Austria, and bind the country to no relations of common or international law.

In spite of this state of affairs, the Allied and Associated Powers consider the admission of German-Austrian representatives as incompatible with the guarantees of independence for the country as specified by Article 80 of the Peace Treaty, because this admission would put this country on the same footing as the countries constituting the German Empire, because it would create a political bond between Germany and Austria and because it would bring about a political action common to the two countries. This interpretation by the Allied and Associated Governments brings forward an interpretation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty which is in opposition to the interpretation hitherto admitted by the Germans. In the presence of the note of the Allied and Associated Powers, Germany is not in a position to maintain the point of view she has held up to the present. Hence a change in the contents of the German Constitution is not necessary. The Allied and Associated Governments have already brought out in their note the fact that Article 178 of the Constitution stipulates very simply that the conditions of the Peace Treaty cannot be affected by the Constitution. This article was inserted with a view to avoiding all possible contradictions that might arise between the provisions of the Constitution and the conditions of the Peace Treaty, of which the interpretation is in many cases doubtful. The reserves formulated in this article cover all the provisions of the Constitution, including the above-mentioned provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2. Therefore, if the prescriptions of Article 61, paragraph 2, in themselves are in contradiction with a clause of the Peace Treaty, it results automatically that this prescription remains null and void. The German Government declares consequently that the provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2, of the Constitution are null and void, that specifically the admission

of German-Austrian representatives to the Reichsrat cannot be effected until the Council of the League of Nations consents, according to Article 80 of the Peace Treaty, to a modification in the relations which political law accords to German-Austria.

Although the affair in question is settled by the preceding declaration according to the desire of the Allied and Associated Governments, the German Government feels itself obliged to make the following fundamental remarks: from its point of view the German Government has never given, on the subject of the alleged contradictions between the German Constitution and the Peace Treaty, any occasion for a demand for explanation so peremptory as the terms of the note of the Allied and Associated Powers. If, in case of a refusal to meet their requirements, these Governments threaten to extend the zone of occupation, and if, in order to do this, they base their authority on Article 429 of the Peace Treaty, it is necessary to specify that the Treaty in no wise authorizes such a measure, quite independently of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments have not yet ratified the Treaty and that for this reason they cannot support their claim from the juridical point of view. Article 429 provides under certain conditions a longer period of occupation, but no territorial extension. Consequently, the German Government can see in the menace of such a measure only an act of violence profoundly to be regretted.

Accept,

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix C to HD-49

[Translation ²¹]

Draft of a Reply to the Letter of August 5 [September 5] From the German Delegation, on the Subject of Article 61 of the German Constitution

By their note of September 2 last, the Allied and Associated Powers called upon the German Government to take appropriate measures to undo promptly, by declaring null and void the second paragraph of article 61 of the German Constitution, the violation of article 80 of the treaty of peace of June 28, 1919, which has resulted from the promulgation on August 11, 1919, of the said article 61-2nd of the Constitution.

The German Delegation at Versailles, in its note of September 5 last, has submitted to the Allied and Associated Powers an interpretative explanation, which the German Government (which has no

²¹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

competence to interpret the Constitution authoritatively) states that it gives to the said Article 61-2nd of the German Constitution, and which in the opinion of that Government would render needless a modification of the Constitution.

Since this explanation does not constitute the reply which, by the note referred to above of September 2 last, the German Government had been called upon to give, the Allied and Associated Powers inform the German Delegation that, as the German Government has failed to meet this request, they will find themselves obliged, at the expiration of the time fixed and now current, to resort to the means provided for ensuring the strict execution of the treaty.

Appendix D to HD-49

Translation

DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM OF
THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

No. 3530

PARIS, September 4, 1919.

From: M. Nik. P. Pachitch.

To: M. Clemenceau.

The Delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes has received the project of the Treaty on the protection of minorities. It considers that the internal legislation of the S. C. S. State assures sufficient guarantees to the ethnic minorities; in fact, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbia with its principles of greater religious equality, with proportional representation and by a broad local autonomy, excludes all persecutions of minorities. The Constituent Assembly which will meet in the near future for the establishment of the Constitution of the S. C. S. State, will go even further in the matter of tolerance, in conformity with the spirit reigning in the present epoch. Therefore, the Delegation of the Kingdom of the S. C. S. regrets that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have deemed it necessary to give to the ethnic minorities an international guarantee which supposes a certain distrust with regard to the legislation and the administration of this State.

In spite of what has just been set forth, the present Delegation is ready to accede to the wishes of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, knowing that they have been guided in this question only by the principle of tolerance, and convinced that their intention was in no way to attack the sovereign rights of the S. C. S. State. However, although determined on accepting in principle the projected Treaty, the S. C. S. Delegation is obliged to ask that certain modifications be made to its text.

These modifications are of two kinds. Some aim at certain modifications of wording which, in the opinion of the present Delegation, should be adopted in the general interest. The others are of a more essential nature, but the Delegation hopes that they will also be adopted, being based on strong reasons of principle.

As rectification of wording, the S. C. S. Delegation proposes the following modifications in the Introduction itself.

The first alinea: "Whereas great acquisitions of territories have been made by the Kingdom of Serbia since the year 1913," should be omitted entirely, as these territories, in the opinion of the Delegation, cannot be made the object of this Treaty, as will be explained further on. For the same reasons should also be omitted in the 4th alinea the words: "of the said acquisitions of territories and".

The second and third alineas should be worded thus: "Whereas the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, who had already freed themselves and made themselves independent of Austria-Hungary, have of their own free will resolved to be united to Serbia and Montenegro in a permanent way with the intention of forming an independent and unified State under the name of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and, whereas the Kingdom of Serbia has agreed to realize this union and in consequence has been formed the Kingdom of the S. C. S. which has assumed the sovereignty over the territories inhabited by these peoples."

In the last alinea, instead of: "The Serb, Croat and Slovene States" should be substituted: "the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State." This modification should also be made in the following articles, where this wording is used, the same as the expression "Serb, Croat and Slovene nationality" should be replaced by the expression "Serbo-Croat-Slovene nationality", and the expression "Serbo, Croat and Slovene nationals" by the expression "Serbo-Croat-Slovene nationals"; the same modifications should be made to Articles 3 to 10.

Article 3 should be made to harmonize with Article 76 of the Treaty with Austria; therefore in the first line, after the word "recognizes," should be added: "within the limits of Article 76 of the Treaty with Austria." In the fifth line of the same article, instead of "of the Treaties with Austria and Hungary," it should read: "of the Treaties with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria", for in the preceding text it is a question of Bulgarian nationals who acquired the Serbo-Croat-Slovene nationality; or if no such persons can be found in the territories which shall be attributed to the S. C. S. State by the Treaty with Bulgaria, and not by those with Austria and Hungary. For the same reason in the 14th line instead of "Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary," it should be said: "of the Treaties of Peace with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria."

To Articles 3 and 4 the Delegation prefers the expression "having their citizenship" to that of "domiciled." In Article 7 the last alinea should be worded thus: "Notwithstanding the establishment by the Royal Government of an official language, reasonable facilities will be given to Serbo-Croat-Slovene nationals of languages other than the official language for the use of their tongue, either orally or in writing before the Tribunals."

In Article 9, line 3, instead of "The Serb, Croat or Slovene languages" put: "the official language."

Besides these modifications of a formal nature, the Delegation of the Kingdom of the S. C. S. proposes the following basic modifications:

In Article 9, a modification to which the Delegation attaches an importance of the first order should be introduced. The last alinea, the tenor of which is the following: "the provisions of the present Article shall be applicable only to the territories transferred to the kingdom of the S. C. [S.] since January 1, 1913" should be replaced by the following: "the provisions of the present treaty will be applicable only to the territories detached from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or Bulgaria and transferred to the Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes since August 1, 1914." If this modification were not adopted, the rights of sovereignty acquired from the Kingdom of Serbia, which it possessed on territories which belonged to it before the present war, would be jeopardized. As to these territories, united to Serbia "after January 1, 1913," she acquired them by an International Treaty on the occasion of which not only her present Allies, but even her adversaries at that time, Austria and Germany, did not deem it necessary to demand a limitation of her sovereignty in an interest of protection of minorities. It is precisely for these territories that Serbia waged for six years three bloody wars, and that is why any limitation of the sovereignty of the S. C. S. State in this Serbian region would represent, for its Government an absolute moral impossibility.

To Article 11 the Delegation also requests important modifications. According to the terms of this Article, the S. C. S. State engages to accord to ethnic minorities a certain proposition which would be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. Therefore, such a protection is not provided for the advantage of its nationals which might be as ethnic minorities, in the territories of other States which, like the S. C. S. State, have been increased or formed by the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This same Treaty provides for certain economic concessions to the S. C. S. State to the profit of its Allies, but only as reciprocity. This principle should also be adopted in the question of protection of minorities so that only the States which accord to the nationals of the S. C. S. State the protection which they demand for the profit of their own, shall take advantage of it.

The same Article provides that the future modifications of the projected Treaty shall be decided by the Council of the League of Nations, by a majority vote. Therefore, this Treaty being a bilateral act between the S. C. S. State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, such a procedure, which excludes the consent of the S. C. S. State, should not be adopted. However, the present Delegation would be ready to adhere to such a provision if it received the assurance that the future settlements of the League of Nations concerning the protection of minorities will be of general order and will not adopt an exceptional regime for the S. C. S. State.

Finally the second alinea of this same Article seems to be worded from the opinion of the present Delegation in a defective manner owing to the fact that it confers to the Council of the League of Nations, not only in the case of violations of the provisions of this treaty, but even in case of danger of such violations, the right to take measures and to give instructions the nature of which is not exactly defined. In that way the Council of the League of Nations could attribute to itself a discretionary power of precautionary policy not at all in conformity with the spirit of this Treaty. In fact according to this Treaty, the League of Nations must see that the rights guaranteed to ethnic minorities be respected. In case of an infringement of these rights, a judicial action would incontestably be justified, but such an action should be sufficient in itself. Other "measures" and other "instructions" would be useless in cases of violations of the right. Outside of this case, they would constitute a superfluous and misplaced interference in the internal administration of the country.

Therefore the Delegation proposes the following wording for the alinea in question :

"The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to call to the attention of the Council any infraction of any of the obligations and that the Council after having heard the Royal Government shall be able to refer the examination of such a question to the permanent court of Justice."

To Articles 13 and 15, the Delegation proposes to reduce the delay from five to three years, for it is a matter of temporary economic regime which limits the liberty of a decision of the S. C. S. State and the duration of which should consequently be reduced to the minimum.

In case the Supreme Council would consider itself unable to adopt the propositions above set forth, the present Delegation has the honor of begging it to be kind enough to hear it orally before coming to a definite decision for, owing to the formal instructions of its Government the Delegation of the Kingdom of the S. C. S. would be

placed in a difficult and impossible situation if its principal demands were not adopted.

Please accept, etc., etc.

For the Delegation of the
Kingdom of the Serbs Croats and Slovenes,
NIK. P. PACHITCH

Appendix E to HD-49

KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES

*Draft of a Treaty*¹²

Between

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY,
AND JAPAN,

Described as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,

On the one hand,

And THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES,

On the other hand,

Whereas since the commencement of the year 1913 large accessions of territory have been made to the Kingdom of Serbia and

Whereas the Croat and Slovene peoples have, of their own free will, determined to unite with Serbia in a permanent union for the purpose of forming a single sovereign independent State under the title of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and

Whereas the Prince Regent of Serbia and the Serbian Government have agreed to this union, and the Kingdom of Serbia has, in consequence, been transformed into the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and has assumed sovereignty over the territories inhabited by these peoples, and

Whereas it is necessary to regulate certain matters of international concern arising out of the said accessions of territory and of this union, and

Whereas it is desired to free Serbia from certain obligations which she undertook by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 to certain Powers and to substitute for them obligations to the League of Nations, and

Whereas the Serb-Croat-Slovene State of its own free will desires to give to the populations of all territories included within the State, of whatever race, language or religion they may be, full guarantees that they shall continue to be governed in accordance with the principles of liberty and justice,

¹² Dated September 2, 1919; draft in French and English.

For this purpose the following Representatives of the High Contracting Parties:

- THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
-
- HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA,
-
- THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
-
- HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY,
-
- H. M. THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN,
-
- HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES,
-

After having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

The Allied and Associated Powers, signatories to the Treaty of Berlin of the 13th July, 1878, taking into consideration the obligations contracted under the present Treaty by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, recognize that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State is definitely discharged from the obligations undertaken in Article 35 of the said Treaty of Berlin.

Chapter I

ARTICLE 1

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2 to 8 of this chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no laws, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

ARTICLE 2

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of the Kingdom without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

ARTICLE 3

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes admits and declares to be Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian nationals habitually resident [or: having *indigénat*]^{12a} at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty in territory which is or may be recognised as forming part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the Treaties with Austria, and Hungary respectively.

Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over eighteen years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained in the said Treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be open to them. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, except where it is otherwise provided in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and Hungary, transfer within the succeeding twelve months, their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in the territory of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

ARTICLE 4

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes admits and declares to be Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality persons of Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian nationality who were born in the said territory of parents habitually resident [or: having *indigénat*] there, even if at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty they are not themselves habitually resident [or: having *indigénat*] there.

Nevertheless, within two years after the coming into force of the present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Serb-Croat-Slovene authorities in the country in which they are resident, stating that they abandon Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals. In this connection a declaration by a husband will cover his wife, and a declaration by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

ARTICLE 5

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons

^{12a} Brackets here and in article 4 appear in the original.

concerned have, under the Treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with Austria or Hungary, to choose whether or not they will acquire Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality.

ARTICLE 6

All persons born in the territory of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes who are not born nationals of another State shall *ipso facto* become Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals.

ARTICLE 7

All Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Difference of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Serb-Croat-Slovene national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Serb-Croat-Slovene national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals of other than Serb, Croat or Slovene speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

ARTICLE 8

Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

ARTICLE 9

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals of other than Serb, Croat and Slovene speech are resident adequate facilities for ensuring that

in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from making the teaching of the (Serbo-Croat) language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

The provisions of the present article apply only to territory transferred to Serbia or to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes since the 1st January 1913.

ARTICLE 10

The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes agrees to grant to the Musulmans in the matter of family law and personal status provisions suitable for regulating these matters in accordance with Musulman usage.

The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes shall take measures to assure the nomination of a Reiss Ul Ulema.

The Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes undertakes to insure protection to the mosques, cemeteries and other Musulman religious establishments. Full recognition and facilities shall be assured to Musulman pious foundations (Vakoufs) and religious and charitable establishments now existing, and the Kingdom of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes shall not refuse for the creation of new religious and charitable establishments any of the necessary facilities guaranteed to other private establishments of this nature.

ARTICLE 11

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the consent of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

Chapter II

ARTICLE 12

Pending the conclusion of new treaties or conventions, all treaties, conventions, agreements and obligations between the Kingdom of Serbia, on the one hand, and any of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, on the other hand, which were in force on August 1st, 1914, or which have since been entered into, shall *ipso facto* be binding upon the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

ARTICLE 13

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to make no Treaty, Convention or arrangement and to take not other action which will prevent her from joining in any general Convention for the equitable treatment of the commerce of other States that may be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations within five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes also undertakes to extend to all the Allied and Associated Powers any favours or privileges in Customs matters, which it may grant during the same period of five years to any State with which since August 1914 the Allied and Associated Powers have been at war or to any State which in virtue of Article 6 of Part X of the Treaty with Austria has special Customs arrangements with such States.

ARTICLE 14

Pending the conclusion of the general convention referred to above, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to treat on the same footing as national vessels or vessels of the most favoured nation the vessels of all the Allied and Associated Powers which accord similar treatment to Serb, Croat and Slovene vessels. As an exception from this provision, the right of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or of any other Allied or Associated Power to confine her maritime coasting trade to national vessels is expressly reserved. The Allied and Associated Powers further agree not to claim under this article the benefit of agreements which the states obtaining territory formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy may conclude as regards coasting traffic in the ports of the Adriatic sea.

ARTICLE 15

Pending the conclusion under the auspices of the League of Nations of a general convention to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit to or from any Allied or Associated State over Serb, Croat and Slovene territory, including territorial waters, and to treat them at least as favourably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails respectively of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation or ownership, as regards facilities, charges, restrictions, and all other matters.

All charges imposed in the territory of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on such traffic in transit shall be reasonable having regard to the conditions of the traffic. Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs or other duties.

Tariffs for transit across the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and tariffs between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and any Allied or Associated Power involving through tickets or waybills shall be established at the request of the Allied or Associated Power concerned.

Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.

Provided that no Allied or Associated Power can claim the benefit of these provisions on behalf of any part of this territory in which reciprocal treatment is not accorded in respect of the same subject matter.

If within a period of five years from the coming into force of this Treaty no general convention as aforesaid shall have been concluded

under the auspices of the League of Nations, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes shall be at liberty at any time thereafter to give twelve months notice to the Secretary General of the League of Nations to terminate the obligations of the present Article.

ARTICLE 16

All rights and privileges accorded by the foregoing articles to the Allied and Associated Powers shall be accorded equally to all States members of the League of Nations.

The present treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall be ratified. It shall come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris.

Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.

The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy of the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Versailles, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.

Appendix F to HD-49

[Translation ²²]

[*The Roumanian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

ROUMANIAN DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, September 8, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: The Roumanian Delegation has the honor to inform the Peace Conference that, wishing to manifest its complete solidarity with the Allies, it is prepared to sign the text of the treaty presented to the Austrian delegates, in spite of the fact that many of the just demands of Roumania have been removed from the text, but that it could not subscribe to article 60 of the treaty, the present terms of which infringe upon the sovereignty of the Roumanian state

²² Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

and upon its political and economic independence which are brought directly into question.

The Roumanian Delegation has the honor, therefore, to request the Peace Conference to be pleased to consent that the following declaration shall be considered as forming an integral part of the treaty:

“The Roumanian Delegation, in signing the treaty of peace with Austria, cannot give its adhesion to article 60 of the treaty, relating to minorities, to transit, and to commerce.”

Accept [etc.]

N. MISU

ALEX VAIDA-VOEVOD

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 9, 1919, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. F. L. Polk.
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
Secretaries
Mr. H. Norman.
Mr. P. Kerr.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
Secretaries
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Saint-Quentin.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.
Secretaries
M. Paterno.
M. Barone Russo.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.
Secretary
M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA . . . Mr. C. Russell.
BRITISH EMPIRE . . . Lt-Commander Bell.
FRANCE . . . M. de Percin.
ITALY . . . Captain Rossi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items with which they were concerned.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dr. Scott.
Mr. Woolsey.
Mr. A. Dulles.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.
Brig-General Groves.
Captain Fuller.

FRANCE

M. Tardieu.
M. Jules Cambon.
M. de Peretti de la Rocca.
M. Fromageot.
M. Laroche.
M. Kammerer.

ITALY

Colonel Castoldi.
M. Ricci-Busatti.
M. Brambilla.

JAPAN

M. Nagaoka.

1. The Council took note of Mr. Polk's draft reply to the German Government's letter of 5th September.¹ (Appendix "A".)

Violation of the
Peace Treaty of
Versailles by Virtue
of Certain Articles
in the German
Constitution

MR. POLK said that he had referred the matter to Dr. Scott, who had consulted with the legal experts of the Drafting Committee, and prepared the note. It appeared that, in the opinion of these highly qualified jurists, the German answer had been technically correct. It therefore seemed to him that, before a further contention were raised with the German Government in a subsequent letter, the co-operation of the legal experts should be called for, in order to avoid making a legal mistake. He understood that the letter drafted by him had not been agreed to by M. Fromageot, although the other jurists of the Drafting Committee had been satisfied with it. He therefore requested that the Drafting Committee should be called in to advise the Council. He had only been given his draft a few minutes before entering the Council Chamber, and had, therefore, not had time to study it closely. He was not entirely satisfied with the form of the letter.

(At this point, M. Fromageot, Mr. Hurst, Dr. Scott, M. Ricci-Busatti and M. Nagaoka entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU explained to the Drafting Committee the problem before the Council, and briefly recited the events that had led up to the problem now before the Conference. He further explained the main points in the Notes of the Allied and Associated Governments, and of the German Government, on the subject of the violation of the Peace Treaty. Drawing attention to the proposed extension of military occupation on the right bank of the Rhine, and to the legal arguments that had been brought forward against such a measure, he said that he would rather resign his post than consent to France being left by the American and British Governments to enforce unassisted the provisions of the Peace Treaty. America, Great Britain and France had all demobilised and that was inevitable, but, if Great Britain and America refused to support France at the present juncture, the whole weight of enforcing the Peace Treaty would be thrown on his country, and a position would result which would be quite intolerable to him.

M. FROMAGEOT said that he had not agreed with the opinion of his colleagues on the legal issue for the following reasons. In a letter, dated 2nd September,² Germany had been called upon by the Allied Council to make special enactments by the Entente Governments whereby Article 61 of the Constitution, inviting Austria to participate in the legislation, and administration, of the German Reich, should be

¹ Appendix B to HD-49, p. 138.

² Appendix A to HD-45, p. 62.

rendered null and void. The demand of the Allied and Associated Powers had been clear; they had insisted upon the abrogation and nullification of Article 61. In their reply, dated 5th September, the German Government, whether knowingly or not he could not say, had repeated the request of the Allied and Associated Governments, but had repeated it in such a way as to introduce into it certain modifications. Instead of undertaking to make Article 61 of the German Constitution null and void, they had proposed to make it non-applicable and to give it no legal force. This was not meeting the Allied demand; for the Article in question remained part of the German Constitution, and could be made applicable, and given force later on. A mere admission of non-applicability was not what had been desired. In their letter, the German Government had given a special interpretation to Article 61 by virtue of a later Article in the same Constitution, (No. 178), which latter Article enacted, that no provision of the Peace Treaty of Versailles was affected by anything in the German Constitution. Now, the argument brought forward in this respect by the German Government might be good or might be bad. It did not appear to him to be acceptable. The conclusion could not be avoided that, if Article 61 were made non-applicable by virtue of Article 178, the argument could be reversed, and Article 178 be cancelled by Article 61. The Allied and Associated Governments had demanded the nullification of Article 61, and had threatened to take the necessary steps to force the German Government to make the necessary enactments. They had received, in reply, an interpretation, both of their original request, and of the Article at issue, by virtue of which it was alleged, that the measures foreshadowed by the Allied and Associated Governments would not be necessary. The Council might well repeat their original request, and state clearly that they were not concerned with the interpretation of the German Constitution, given in the German Government's letter of the 5th September. He suggested, in conclusion, that the demand for nullification should be repeated in the strongest and clearest terms in any letter that might be subsequently sent to the German Government; who should also be informed that the Allies would feel themselves to be absolutely justified in taking any measures necessary to enforce their demands.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked **Mr. Hurst** to explain his standpoint to the Council.

Mr. Hurst said that he could only express a personal opinion, because the matter had merely been the subject of conversation and discussion in the Drafting Committee, and had never been officially referred to them. He quite felt that the prestige of the Allied and Associated Governments demanded that the German Government

should be told that steps would be taken to enforce compliance with the demands that had been made to them. But a further question arose, which was whether the admission of the German Government, in their letter of 5th September, was not sufficient to afford the necessary satisfaction to the Council. The German Government had clearly admitted that Article 61 of their Constitution had no legal force. He asked whether there was a sufficient difference between this admission and the demands of the Council to justify further action. Would it not be enough to tell the German Government, that their admission of the non-validity of Article 61 had been noted and put on record. Another point arose, which was that, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, Austria could be admitted into the German Reich, subject to the consent of the League of Nations. This showed that the Peace Treaty itself did actually leave a means open to Austria, whereby she might eventually become incorporated into Germany. It might be argued that the Allied demand for the nullification of Article 61 was in contradiction to the terms of the Peace Treaty, which they themselves had drawn up. The real protection of the Allied and Associated Powers against an increase of strength to Germany, by virtue of the incorporation of Austria, came from the terms of the Austrian Peace Treaty. After signature, Austria would bind herself not to participate in the affairs of another State and to regard her independence as inalienable. This undertaking by Austria, combined with the admission contained in the German note, would, in his opinion, sufficiently protect the prestige of the Council, and the interests of the Allied and Associated Governments.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to three points, which he regarded as of primary importance. (1) He did not see why an Article in the Peace Treaty with Austria, preventing that country from joining Germany, was of any protection, unless the analogous article in the German Peace Treaty were upheld and enforced. What was good for one Treaty was good for another Treaty. Why should an Article in the Austrian Treaty be of any greater protection than an Article in the German Treaty? (2) The German Government was not qualified to interpret the German Constitution. In his opinion, no Government had such a right. (3) He wished to draw attention to a further Article in the German Constitution (No. 112), by virtue of which it had been enacted that no German citizen should be surrendered to a foreign government for trial or punishment. This article, taken in conjunction with No. 61, seemed to him to show a deliberate plan to violate the Peace Treaty; and this raised at once a very grave issue. He desired to assure the Council, that he had no wish to force quarrels; it was not in his character to do so. He was none the less deeply convinced, that the Ger-

man Government would use every means in its power to avoid carrying out the Peace Treaty fully. This was, after all, only to be expected; since such a line of conduct was conformable to the dictates of human nature. The Allied and Associated Governments were in danger, by the fact that demobilisation had been forced upon them irresistibly by public opinion in their own countries. But Germany was attempting to reassemble her forces, and would certainly continue to try to do so. He felt that he was, at that moment, testing the spirit of the Entente. If, after making a specific demand, the Council were to allow their orders not to be complied with, a succession of events would take place, which would bring about a very grave state of affairs. By trying to avoid a small crisis at the present moment, the Allied and Associated Governments would inevitably provoke a much graver one later on, at a date which the Germans themselves would choose.

MR. BALFOUR said that the decision, which the Council was called upon to take was one of the utmost gravity and importance. He agreed with much that the President had said; but had a few remarks to offer, and a separate suggestion of his own to add. He had listened to M. Fromageot's contention with interest, although he could not quite agree with it. He had understood him to say that it lay with the Allied and Associated Powers to say exactly what the Peace Treaty of Versailles meant. But it appeared to him (the speaker) that although the Allied and Associated Powers had a perfect right, originally, to insert whatever clauses they chose into the Peace Treaty, and to disregard, if they wished to do so, any complaint that the German Government might have to make upon the projected provisions, this original liberty of action did not so extend itself, after signature, as to give freedom of interpretation to the Allied and Associated Powers. Once the Treaty was signed, it seemed to him that it became a bi-lateral agreement, and that each separate signatory to the document could argue with other signatories on equal terms. It was none the less clear to him that the persons who had framed the German Constitution had deliberately attempted to draw it up in such a way as openly to challenge and possibly to violate, the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Their intentions might be described in English slang as a "try on". Article 112, to which the President had just called the attention of the Council, appeared to be a far worse violation of the Peace Treaty, than the Article upon which there had just been an exchange of notes. He felt amazed that not one of the Entente Governments had been told earlier that the new German Constitution was violating the Peace Treaty of Versailles, both in letter and in spirit.

He fully agreed with the President of the Council, that a moment would arise, when the issue between the Entente and the German

Government would be quite clear, and would have to be fought out by argument, or, possibly, by arms, or by the re-imposition of a blockade. But he did not know whether the Entente Powers were choosing a judicious ground for a dispute with Germany, if they forced a crisis on the debatable subject of the extent to which an invitation to Austria to join the German Reich, had violated the Peace Treaty of Versailles. Two most able and qualified men had just given divergent opinions on the legal issue. The differences of opinion, of which the Council had just taken note, would be repeated in the press of all European countries; if the present litigation between the Entente and Germany resulted in the forcible occupation of Frankfort. As soon as that important German base had been occupied by Entente troops, the press of Europe would pour out cataracts of legal and quasi-legal arguments; public opinion would take sides for and against the Entente, and, though some sections of public opinion would doubtless approve the action taken, there would be others which would bitterly dispute it. He suggested, therefore, that the conflict should be deferred, not because the Allied and Associated Governments doubted the justice of their contentions, but simply because they were not opening the conflict from an absolutely advantageous position. He proposed that a letter should be sent to the German Government, telling them, that, in the opinion of the Allied & Associated Governments, two articles of the German Constitution violated the Peace Treaty of Versailles, and that, although Article 178 of the same Constitution, declaring that no provisions contained therein violated the Peace Treaty might absolve them, any argument based on such ground appeared wholly unsatisfactory to the Entente Governments. The time would soon arrive when the intentions of Germany with regard to the Peace Treaty would be absolutely clear. But so long as the Council were only concerned with a prospective agreement between Germany and Austria, requiring the active co-operation of the latter power, before it could be effected, the issue before it was doubtful and unsatisfactory. On the other hand, Article 112 of the German Constitution, declaring that no German citizen could be subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, would, in a very few days, bring about a decisive issue. If this article were quoted in reply to a demand for the surrender of officers guilty of breaches of the laws of war, under the terms of the Peace Treaty, there would be no disagreement amongst jurists, who would be unanimous in thinking that the provisions of the Treaty were being defied and violated. As soon as the German Government should refuse to surrender military criminals, the Entente Governments would say that Article 178 had been drafted in order to throw dust in their eyes and deceive them as to the real intentions of the German Government and the German people. If Frank-

fort were occupied as a reply to such an open act of defiance, no argument would be possible, and the action of the Entente Governments would receive the moral support of all mankind. He therefore suggested, in conclusion, that a letter of warning, couched in the sternest language, should be sent to the German Government, telling them that, in the opinion of the Allied & Associated Governments, Article 178 of the German Constitution was binding upon them, and that they were expected to carry out, to the letter, the terms of the Peace Treaty signed by their plenipotentiaries, ratified by their Parliament, and agreed to, by the express provisions of their own Constitution.

MR. POLK said that he agreed, that a struggle with Germany for the enforcement of the Peace Treaty was inevitable. The Germans would, some time or another, make an effort to avoid its provisions; but he thought that the Council ought to choose its ground, so as to be quite certain that it was technically, that is to say legally, right. In view of the legal argument advanced by the German Government, to the effect that Article 178 of the German Constitution made Article 61 of no effect, he thought that any further reply sent by the Council ought to be carefully studied by jurists before dispatch. Until such an examination could be made he felt bound to withhold his final opinion.

M. TARDIEU said that attention had been called to the divergence of opinion amongst the jurists. He had, however, been struck by the fact that Mr. Hurst had advanced arguments far more political than legal in character. Would it not be possible to deal with the question on purely political grounds? Mr. Balfour had suggested that another basis should be chosen for the conflict, but by virtue of their letter of the 2nd September, the Allied and Associated Governments had joined with the German Government on a definite issue. Would it not be possible to adhere to the line previously adopted, more particularly as the new Article to which attention had been drawn (No. 112), showed clearly that the German Government wished, and intended, to violate the Peace Treaty as far as it could?

M. CAMBON said he had had a long experience of German methods, and of the mental attitude of the German people. He was convinced that, if the Council allowed itself to be entrapped in the meshes of legal argument, it would be giving encouragement to the German Government to advance more arguments of the same kind; and to obscure the issue, whilst they themselves pursued a persistent policy of violation, behind the cloud of dust they were throwing in the eyes of the Council. By allowing doubtful legal arguments to weigh with them, the Council would be entering on dangerous ground, and would inevitably lose its authority in the eyes of the German Government.

DR. SCOTT said that as Mr. Hurst's opinion did not seem to be very popular, he desired, from motives of loyalty, to say that he agreed with his colleague.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had fully understood Mr. Hurst's argument, but that it did not weigh with him strongly, as he had asked for a legal, and not a political expression of opinion from him. But the main question before the Council, a question which should not in any way be obscured, was whether the Peace Treaty was violated by virtue of Articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution. If the Council allowed itself to be blinded by the German argument on the subject of Article 178, it would very soon lose all its authority. When the Treaty was violated by one signatory, then, inevitably, the other signatory was no longer bound. He, personally, had no doubt that the German Constitution did actually violate the Treaty of Versailles. The Council had forwarded certain definite demands to the Germans, who had replied by an interpretation of the Treaty, and of their own Constitution. There was no country in the world where the Government had a right to interpret the Constitution. He wished to propose an immediate measure. Mr. Balfour had said that, by waiting two or three weeks, an issue would inevitably arise. His present proposal was to demand the surrender of certain Germans guilty of breaches of the laws of war, immediately and without delay. He desired to send a letter stating: that the reply of the German Government of the 5th September was not acceptable; that the Allied and Associated Governments had taken note of another Article in the German Constitution explicitly violating the Peace Treaty; and that the immediate surrender of certain persons, mentioned by name, should be effected. He agreed with Mr. Balfour that the position of the Council would be more advantageous if the conflict occurred on the subject of Article 112.

MR. POLK asked whether the surrender of certain German criminals could be demanded before the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

M. PICHON said that no steps could be taken before the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

A considerable discussion then followed as to the probable date of the ratification of the Peace Treaty by France and Italy, and it was thought that this could not take place in less than a fortnight.

MR. POLK asked whether an examination of the German Constitution could not be made, with a view to ascertaining all violation of the Peace Treaty that it might contain.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that no clearer instance of violation than that now before the Council was likely to occur again. He agreed with every word of what M. Cambon had said. The Council had made a demand which had virtually been refused. He noticed that all his

colleagues, with the possible exception of M. Tittoni, who had not yet expressed himself, were agreed that the demands of the Allies should be enforced. He therefore suggested that the whole question should be considered by every delegate, during the next twenty-four hours, and re-discussed at St. Germain, after the signature of the Peace Treaty with Austria, on the following day. If any means could be devised whereby Mr. Balfour's proposals could be connected with the present demand on the German Government, he would think such a line of action absolutely perfect.

M. TARDIEU drew attention to the necessity of making the Germans nullify the two Articles violating the Peace Treaty of Versailles. The best means of connecting Mr. Balfour's proposals with the demands previously made probably consisted in insisting on the nullification of the two Articles objected to.

MR. POLK said that certain political demands had been made to Germany, and it was evident that the German Government must be compelled to comply. He proposed to refer the question to the Drafting Committee, to see whether the legal and political sides of the question could not be reconciled. The Committee could prepare a report and submit it to the Council at their meeting at St. Germain on the following day. In conclusion, he emphasized the importance of being absolutely sure of the legal justification for any argument that might be brought forward in the next note to the German Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not see any legal difficulty, since the German Government had no right to interpret its own Constitution.

MR. BALFOUR said that doubtless the President of the Council was a better judge of that matter than he was himself. Great Britain was protected against interpretations of her Constitution, by the fact that it had never been defined in writing. On the other hand, the Council had been interpreting the German Constitution in the notes sent to the German Government, and it seemed to him, in consequence, that the Germans had an equal right to do what the Allies themselves were doing.

M. TITTONI said that in view of the fact that the Council was called upon to take action, on account of the violation of the Peace Treaty with Germany by Articles 61 and 112 of the Constitution of that country, he wished to draw attention to two points. Firstly, he agreed that Article 61 of the German Constitution absolutely violated the Peace Treaty. Secondly, with regard to Article 112, he thought that a reply that might possibly be made later on by the German Government ought to be considered before-hand. The Germans might quite well admit that the Allies had a right to demand the surrender of certain persons guilty of offences defined in the Peace Treaty. But such an admission on their part might be made without abrogating

Article 112 of their Constitution. When once the surrender of certain specified criminals had been made by the Germans, these latter might be justified in maintaining, that they had complied with the special provisions of the Peace Treaty, and could, from then onwards, give Article 112 full legal validity.

M. CAMBON said that it was not sufficient for the present German Government to say that Article 178 of the Constitution made Article 61 of no effect. The present Government might be followed by another, which would very likely maintain an opposite point of view, if it thought the circumstances favourable for doing so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that whilst everybody would be free to take opinions from whatever quarter they chose during the next 24 hours, he did not think that his own was likely to alter.

(It was decided that the question of the violation of the Peace Treaty by virtue of Articles 61 and 112 of the German Constitution should be discussed on the following day at St. Germain after the signature of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and that the Drafting Committee should give their opinion on the legal issues involved, to the Council.)

Reply to the Note of the Roumanian Delegation on the Subject of the Minorities Clauses in the Peace Treaty With Austria²

2. The Council took note of the draft letter to the Roumanian Delegation prepared by Mr. Balfour. (See Appendix "B".)

(The draft, submitted by Mr. Balfour was accepted. See Appendix "B".)

3. MR. POLK said that he had been informed by M. Vesnitch, that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates did not intend to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, on account of their objection to the Minorities Clauses contained in it.

Possible Refusal of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation To Sign the Peace Treaty With Austria

M. BERTHELOT said that he had interviewed M. Vesnitch at 8 p. m. on the preceding day. M. Vesnitch had said that it was impossible for him to sign the Austrian Peace Treaty without the express permission of his Government, and had added that he had previously interviewed Mr. Balfour. He had said that, if the Treaty on Minorities were to be applicable to the territories acquired in the first Balkan War, his Government would not allow him to sign. An agreement had been reached between them, whereby the Treaty in question might be made to apply to the whole of the new Serb-Croat-Slovene State. This would avoid mentioning either Macedonia, or the date 1913, in specific terms. M. Vesnitch had promised to telegraph this proposal to his Government, and hoped to have a reply by Wednesday morning. He had told M. Vesnitch of the grave responsibility that he would incur by not signing the Peace Treaty with Austria. Such a refusal might result in the

² Appendix F to HD-49, p. 152.

Serb-Croat-Slovene State losing all the advantages which it stood to gain from the Peace Treaty. He had told him that it seemed hardly reasonable to resign these great advantages on account of a question of "amour propre". It was possible that, even when the reply came from Belgrade, it would be in the negative. The obstinacy of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegates in the matter was very great.

(A long discussion then followed as to whether the signing of the Peace Treaty with Austria should be postponed to Thursday or Friday, and it was finally decided that the signature should take place at 10.0 o'clock on Wednesday as arranged.)

It was further decided that a protocol should be drafted, by virtue of which any of the high contracting parties might be allowed to sign the Peace Treaty within a period of three days.)

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Vesnitch had asserted, that he might be able to persuade his Government to sign the Peace Treaty with Austria, if the Council sent a letter to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government, expressing confidence in their liberal views, and telling them explicitly, that the Article on the subject of minorities in the Austrian Peace Treaty would be an end to their engagements in the matter. M. Vesnitch had alleged that Mr. Polk had given his approval to such a line of action.

Mr. POLK said that he had interviewed M. Vesnitch, who had explained that a letter on the lines described by M. Berthelot, had been sent to the Polish Government, when they had objected to the Minorities Clauses in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

M. BERTHELOT said that no such letter had ever been sent to the Polish Government.

Mr. POLK said that he had no objection, in principle, to sending a letter of the kind, although he had not suggested any such measure or expressed approval.

M. TITTONI said that he had no objection to such a letter being sent, so long as nothing contained in it could possibly modify the obligations imposed on Serbia by virtue of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and by the Minorities Treaty.

4. M. BERTHELOT said that certain alterations in the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State had been agreed upon by the members of the Committee on New States.

**Treaty Between
the Serb-Croat-
Slovene State and
the Allied and
Associated
Powers**

(It was decided that the Report of the Committee on New States (see Appendix "C") on the subject of certain modifications to be introduced into the Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, should be accepted.)

5. M. TITTONI said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the contents of a telegram received by him from General Mombelli. This officer stated that three-quarters of the Hungarian people were asking for the despatch of an Inter-Allied body of troops (who would be very well received), in order to ensure that the elections in Hungary should be carried out without intervention or disturbance. Such a measure was necessary if a stable Government, with which the Allies could treat, was ever to be set up in Hungary. The Allied troops would, moreover, be very well received.

Hungarian
Affairs

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not employ French troops on electoral business in Hungary or anywhere else. He did not think that Mr. Balfour or Mr. Polk could persuade their Governments to send British or American troops for such a purpose.

M. TITTONI said that he had merely wished to draw attention to the question, and was quite content that every delegate, on being duly informed, should assume whatever responsibility he thought fit.

6. (It was decided that the General Act revising the General Act of Berlin, February 26th, 1885,⁴ and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels, July 2nd, 1890,⁵ should be accepted, with the following modification.

Convention Re-
placing the Acts
of Berlin and
Brussels. (See
Appendix D)

Article 11, Page 8. The words "public order and good government" should be changed to "public security and order.")

The Meeting then adjourned.

HOTEL ASTORIA, PARIS, 9 September, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-50

[*Reply to the German Government's Letter of September 5, Draft Prepared by Mr. Polk*]

DRAFT

In their Note of September 2nd, 1919,⁶ addressed to the German Government the Allied and Associated Powers considered the nature and effect of Article 61, paragraph 2, of the German Constitution which permits the presence and the participation of Austrian Representatives in the German Reichsrat as if the Republic of Austria were in fact and therefore in law entitled to rights and privileges of a German State, rights and privileges which the Allied and Associated

⁴ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXVI, p. 4.

⁵ Malloy, *Treaties, 1776-1909*, vol. II, p. 1964.

⁶ Appendix A to HD-45, p. 62.

Powers held to be in express and formal violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on June 28th, 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one and Germany on the other hand. The Allied and Associated Powers therefore felt constrained to require the German Government to take within fifteen days appropriate measures to avoid this violation by declaring Article 61, paragraph 2, null and void.

After certain preliminary observations calculated to justify their conduct and their former interpretation of the Article and paragraph of the Constitution in question, the German Government replied on September 5th, 1919,⁷ as follows to the Note of the Allied and Associated Powers of September 2nd:—

“In spite of this state of affairs, the Allied and Associated Powers consider the admission of German-Austrian representatives as incompatible with the guarantees of independence for the country as specified by Article 80 of the Peace Treaty, because this admission would put this country on the same footing as the countries constituting the German Empire; because it would create a political bond between Germany and Austria and because it would bring about a political action common to the two countries. This interpretation by the Allied and Associated Governments brings forward an interpretation of Article 80 of the Peace Treaty which is in opposition to the interpretation hitherto admitted by the Germans. In the presence of the note of the Allied and Associated Powers, Germany is not in a position to maintain the point of view she has held up to the present. Hence a change in the contents of the German Constitution is not necessary. The Allied and Associated Governments have already brought out in their note the fact that Article 178 of the Constitution stipulates very simply that the conditions of the Peace Treaty can not be affected by the Constitution. This article was inserted with a view to avoiding all possible contradictions that might arise between the provisions of the Constitution and the conditions of the Peace Treaty, of which the interpretation is in many cases doubtful. The reserves formulated in this article cover all the provisions of the Constitution, including the above-mentioned provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2. Therefore, if the prescriptions of Article 61, paragraph 2, in themselves are in contradiction with a clause of the Peace Treaty, it results automatically that this prescription remains null and void. The German Government declares consequently that the provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2, of the Constitution are null and void, that specifically the admission of German-Austrian representatives to the Reichsrat cannot be effected until the Council of the League of Nations consents, according to Article 80 of the Peace Treaty, to a modification in the relations which political law accords to German Austria.”

The Allied and Associated Powers take note of and accept this Declaration as an express and formal Declaration by Germany that

⁷ Appendix B to HD-49, p. 138.

the provisions of Article 61, paragraph 2 of the German Constitution are, and that they remain null and void.

In view, therefore, of this Declaration made within the prescribed period of fifteen days the Allied and Associated Powers consider it unnecessary to enter upon a discussion at this time of the nature and extent of the obligations of Article 429 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, but the Allied and Associated Powers nevertheless deem it proper to remark in this connection that they reserve any and all rights, expressly or impliedly secured to them under this Article.

Appendix B to HD-50

Letter to the Roumanian Delegation

DRAFT PREPARED BY MR. BALFOUR

I beg to acknowledge, on behalf of the Conference, the receipt of your letter⁸ asking whether it would be permissible for the Roumanian Plenipotentiaries to append their signature to the Treaty with the Austrian Republic, subject to a reservation with regard to Article 60.

The Conference is of opinion that no such procedure is possible. The Treaty must either be signed as a whole or not signed at all. No middle course is admissible.

If the Conference rightly understand your communication, the Roumanian Government have resolved, in these circumstances, to withhold their signature altogether.

Such a decision would be a source of deep regret to the Associated Powers. It is not for them to question the wisdom of the Roumanian Government in thus separating themselves from their number. They may, however, be permitted to express their surprise that a Treaty, involving no principle which has not been accepted by other independent and Allied powers should be considered by the Roumanian Government as inconsistent with their dignity and independence, the more so as it relieves them of obligations accepted by them, under the Treaty of Berlin.

The Associated Powers venture to express the earnest hope that even at the last moment the Roumanian Plenipotentiaries will reconsider their decision, and thus maintain, unbroken, the solidarity of the Alliance.

BRITISH DELEGATION,

HOTEL ASTORIA, PARIS, 8 September 1919.

⁸ Appendix F to HD-49, p. 152.

Appendix C to HD-50

[Translation *]

[Report of the Commission on New States]

The Commission on New States has examined with the greatest care the various observations¹⁰ presented by the delegation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes regarding the draft of a treaty for the protection of minorities.

After discussion, it has taken the following decisions which it has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council:

1. Most of the modifications in form which were requested by the Delegation have been accepted.

2. In the second paragraph of the preamble, the Serbian Delegation asks that the wording be modified and that mention be made:

(1) of the fact that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes have already liberated themselves and made themselves independent of Austria;

(2) of Montenegro as designed to be incorporated in Yugoslavia.

On these two points it has been impossible to satisfy the Delegation, because on one hand it could not be affirmed that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were already liberated by their own efforts, as it is the Allies who liberated them, and on the other hand the fate of Montenegro has not yet been settled.

3. In accordance with the request of the Delegation, article 3 has been brought into harmony with article 76 of the treaty with Austria, and in the same article the phrase "of the treaties with Austria and Hungary" has been replaced by "of the treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria." Likewise the phrase "of the treaties of peace with Austria and Hungary" has been replaced by "of the treaties of peace with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria."

4. In articles 3 and 4 the Commission has acquiesced in replacing the word "domicilié" by "ayant leur indigénat."

5. As regards article 11, the Commission did not feel able to make any change in its draft. This clause appears in substance in all the treaties for the protection of minorities, and in regard to them it has been discussed at length. It is impossible to say, therefore, that an exceptional regime has been imposed upon Yugoslavia. As for the remark by the Delegation on the question of the right of Council of the League of Nations "to take such action and give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances," it should be remembered that this phrase was inserted upon a decision of the Supreme Council at the time when it was resolved not to lay down special conditions for Macedonia.

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹⁰ Appendix D to HD-49, p. 141.

6. In articles 13 and 15, the reduction of the time limit from five years to three could not be accepted by the Commission. These articles are identical with those which appear in the other similar treaties.

Appendix D to HD-50¹¹

[Translation¹²]

Report Presented to the Supreme Council by the Commission To Consider the Conventions Intended To Replace the General Acts of Berlin and of Brussels

At its meeting of June 25,¹³ the Council of Foreign Ministers approved the formation of a commission to consider two draft conventions intended to replace the General Acts of Berlin (February 26, 1885) and of Brussels (July 2, 1890), and prepared by the delegates of the British and French Governments. Of these drafts, which had been communicated to the American, Belgian, Italian, Japanese, and Portuguese Governments, the first related to the control of the trade in arms and munitions, the second to the regulation of the liquor traffic in Africa.

The Council of Foreign Ministers approved the list of delegates who were to consider these drafts, and who were proposed by the seven Governments concerned. It decided, at the same time, that the commission should also consider a third draft, prepared in the same manner, and relating to other matters dealt with in the General Acts of Berlin and Brussels.

The following members were designated by the seven Governments, to represent them on the Commission:

United States of America:

Mr. G. L. Beer.

Belgium:

Baron de Gaiffier d'Hestroy;

M. O. Louwers;

M. Galopin;*

Major Maury, *Secretary*.

British Empire:

Sir Herbert Read;†

Mr. C. Strachey.

¹¹ Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 181.4101/14.

¹² Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹³ FM-27, minute 3, vol. IV, p. 856.

*M. Galopin participated only in the consideration of the convention for the control of the trade in arms. [Footnote in the original.]

†Sir Herbert Read was able to be present only at the preliminary meeting. [Footnote in the original.]

France:

M. Duchêne;
 M. Merlin;
 M. de Peretti de la Rocca.

Italy:

Count Girolamo Marazzi;
 M. di Nobili Massuero, *Secretary*;
 for consideration of the Convention on the Trade in Arms,

and for consideration of the two other drafts:

M. dell'Abbadessa;
 Professor Anzilotti;
 M. di Nobili Massuero, *Secretary*.

Japan:

M. T. Yamakawa;
 Colonel Y. Sato;
 Major Osumi;
 M. R. Sawada, *Secretary*.

Portugal:

Colonel Norton de Mattos;
 Major T. Fernandes.

The Commission met on June 26, 1919, at 3 p. m., at the Ministry of the Colonies.

It elected as Chairman, M. de Peretti de la Rocca, Minister Plenipotentiary, sub-director of African Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and it decided upon its order of business.

At its first seven sessions, between the 7th and the 25th of July, the Commission considered the draft convention on the control of the trade in arms; from the 26th to the 28th of July, it discussed the draft convention on the regulation of the liquor traffic in Africa; the third draft was studied in four sessions, held between July 30th and August 2nd; finally, in a last session held on September 8th, the Commission approved the amendments in form suggested by the Drafting Committee. From these deliberations there came the three conventions which the Commission has the honor to submit unanimously for the approval of the Supreme Council.

Two of these conventions, the convention relating to the control of the trade in arms, and the convention on the regulation of the liquor traffic, provide for international bureaus under the authority of the League of Nations; the Commission did not consider itself competent to decide where these bureaus should be situated; it wished to point out, however, that they would have to carry on the work begun by the international bureau which was created at Brussels to enforce the Act of Brussels, and which has always functioned to the satisfaction of the powers signatory to that Act; there is no good reason, therefore, for giving up the bureau which has its seat at Brussels.

Two powers which are not represented on the Supreme Council, Belgium and Portugal, have already given their assent to these drafts, through their delegates on the Commission. These delegates pointed out that, as regards conventions of this kind which have only an indirect relation to the treaties of peace, their Governments could not accept changes in the text which had been worked out in common unless these changes were previously submitted to them.

The convention for the control of the trade in arms contains provisions regulating the trade throughout the world; it provides, moreover, that the signatory powers shall endeavor to obtain the adherence of all states, members of the League of Nations. The Commission also considered that it ought to profit by the presence in Paris of delegates of all the Allied and Associated Powers to request them to sign this convention now.

It would be desirable, likewise, to invite immediately the adherence of Liberia to the convention on the regulation of the liquor traffic in Africa and to the one for revising the General Acts of Berlin and of Brussels.

The Chairman of the Commission:

E. DE PERETTI DE LA ROCCA

PARIS, September 8, 1919.

Annex I

Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition

[For the text of this convention as signed September 10, 1919, see *Foreign Relations*, 1920, volume I, page 180.]

Annex II

Convention for the Regulation of the Liquor Traffic in Africa

[For the text of this convention as signed September 10, 1919, see *Foreign Relations*, 1928, volume I, page 429.]

Annex III

General Act Revising the General Act of Berlin of February 26, 1885, and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels of July 2, 1890

[For the text of this convention as signed September 10, 1919, see *Foreign Relations*, 1928, volume I, page 437.]

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in the Chateau of Saint Germain-en-Laye, on Wednesday, 10 September, 1919, at 11: 15 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Secretaries

Mr. H. Norman.
Mr. P. Kerr.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de Saint-Quentin.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

Secretaries

M. Paterno.
M. Barone Russo.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE Lt-Commander Bell.
FRANCE M. de Percin.
ITALY Captain Rossi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following also attended for the items with which they were concerned :

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dr. J. Brown Scott.
Mr. Woolsey.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Brig-General Seely.
Mr. Hurst.
Brig-General Groves.
Lt-Colonel Kisch.

FRANCE

M. Tardieu.
M. Cambon.
M. Fromageot.
General Le Rond.
Captain Ropert.

ITALY

Colonel Castoldi.
M. Ricci-Busatti.
M. Brambilla.

JAPAN

M. Nagaoka.

1. The Council took note of the following draft resolution with regard to the Air Convention:—

“That the Air Convention shall be signed with the least possible delay by the Contracting States, it being understood that it shall remain open for a period of six months for signature by such of those States as are not at present in a position to sign it.”

Mr. POLK drew the attention of the Council to the fact that he was unable to sign the Air Convention on behalf of the United States at the moment. It was even possible that the United States might not be able to give its adherence to the Convention, should the American Government maintain the reservations made by the American Delegates to the clauses relating to patents and customs duties.

(The draft resolution on the subject of the Air Convention was agreed to, subject to the reservation formulated by Mr. Polk, on behalf of the United States.)

2. MR. BALFOUR said that he had closely considered the question left over at the last meeting of the Council. He had prepared a draft note for transmission to the German Government, but was not wholly satisfied with it. The conclusion was rather long and not very decisive. Mr. Hurst had devised another plan, which seemed more effective than the mere despatch of a note. After reading his own draft Note (Appendix “A”) he called upon Mr. Hurst to explain his plan.

MR. HURST said that he had not been able to prepare any document which could be submitted to the Council. He had, on the previous day, made out a very rough draft, and had shown it to Dr. Scott. At the previous meeting he had been aware that the desire of the Council had been to formulate some plan of action, which would combine two separate ideas. Firstly, the two separate violations of the Peace Treaty should be drawn attention to. Secondly, whatever note, or communication, were sent to the Germans, they should be compelled to reply immediately. In addition to this, whatever line of action were adopted it should be of such a nature as to avoid adverse criticism in neutral countries. The solution that had seemed best to him was, to collect together all the admissions made by the Germans in their letter; to draw them up in the form of a protocol, which should be presented to the Germans for signature. When this had been done, their admissions would be given legal force, and be binding upon them. The Germans had admitted that the Peace Treaty and the Constitution were not in agreement. If, when presented with this admission in proper legal form, either the German

Violation of the Peace Treaty of Versailles by Virtue of Certain Articles in the German Constitution. (See HD-50, Minute 1)¹

¹ *Ante*, p. 155.

Government, or the Reichsrat, refused to ratify it, then the intentions of the Germans would be made clear. The Drafting Committee had agreed, generally, to this proposal, at their meeting. The manner in which the protocol and the note by which it was to be transmitted were to be drafted, was doubtful, and, before proceeding to work, it was necessary that his main idea should be approved.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he understood that the Japanese Representative on the Drafting Committee had a proposal of his own to make.

M. NAGAOKA then read his draft proposal. (See Appendix B.)

M. TITTONI said that he had understood, on the previous day, that the Council wished to force the German Government to make a special enactment, cancelling the Articles in their Constitution that were objected to. He understood M. Nagaoka's proposal to consist in demanding a declaration of nullification of the Articles in question, with the addition, that the Reichsrat should itself confirm the declaration.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Japanese proposal effected no more than what the Germans alleged to result naturally from Article 178 of their Constitution.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed with Mr. Hurst's proposal, which he considered to be the best solution of the difficulty. He proposed that the Drafting Committee should bring a draft legal instrument before the Council on the following day, of such a nature as to oblige the German Government to sign, in the form of a protocol, whatever they had admitted in their letter of the 5th September. The advantage of Mr. Hurst's proposal was, that the Germans would be unable to enter into lengthy negotiations. The measures proposed, therefore, seemed to him to be the wisest and the most effective possible.

MR. POLK said that he approved of Mr. Hurst's proposal also.

M. TARDIEU said that the draft protocol to be prepared by Mr. Hurst and the Drafting Committee, would have to be sent under the cover of a letter. He thought that some of Mr. Balfour's arguments and phrases might be put into the covering letter with great advantage.

(It was decided that the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft protocol, giving legal force to the admissions of the German Government in their letter of 5th September, and should present it to the Council at its meeting on the following day, together with a draft letter under cover of which, the aforesaid protocol should be transmitted to the German Government.)

3. M. CAMBON reported the decision of the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees on the subject of the demarcation line to be

adopted in the Teschen area, with the aid of a map.
Teschen He said that the Polish Delegates had provisionally approved of the line proposed, which was ethnographically correct.

M. TRITONI said that he had received a visit from **M. Benes**, who had admitted the justice of the new line, from an ethnographic point of view. He, (**M. Benes**) had, however, argued, that if a strict ethnographic line were to be adopted in the Teschen area, it seemed hardly fair, conjointly with such a decision, to put four millions of Ruthenes in Eastern Galicia under Polish jurisdiction. A solution might consist in making concessions to the Czecho-Slovaks in the Teschen area, to balance the very great political and economic advantages that were being conferred on the Poles by virtue of the Galician decision.

MR. BALFOUR said that he could not consider the analogy between the Galician and Teschen situations as very relevant, for two reasons; (1) the solution proposed for Eastern Galicia was provisional only, and was not intended to be a permanent settlement, and (2) the decision on the subject of Galicia had been arrived at because the Ruthenian population in that country could not stand alone. It was inevitable that the Ruthenians should eventually be placed under the rule of a non-Ruthenian State. Nothing parallel, or similar, to those considerations arose in the Teschen problem.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council proposed to discuss the Teschen question, which was quite difficult enough, without the Galician problem being added to it.

MR. POLK said that **M. Benes** had proposed to him a line of demarcation following the river Vistula. The line in question would, however, be quite unacceptable to the Poles; although **M. Benes** considered that, in proposing it, he was making concessions.

M. PICHON said that the Council had heard the point of view of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations.² The Czech Delegates had insisted that their interest in the Teschen area was centered on the coal that it contained; the Poles had asserted that their interest in Teschen was on a political basis, and was purely concerned with the Polish population in the disputed districts. It was therefore clear that the Poles were asking for population, and the Czechs for coal. A solution might be found by giving the whole of the **Karwin** district to the Czechs, and the indisputably Polish districts, in the remainder of the area, to the Poles. He did not think that the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees could be upheld.

MR. POLK said that, if such a line as that proposed by **M. Pichon** were adopted, it would separate the people working in the mines from their own homes, by a national frontier.

² See HD-47, minute 5, and HD-48, minute 3, pp. 102 and 118.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a situation similar to that foreseen by Mr. Polk existed in Northern France, Belgium and the Saar Basin. It had not given rise to any serious difficulties.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Poles regarded the Karwin Basin as a Polish district, as indeed it was. There was no serious objection to cutting the coal-field into two halves, because geological formations in other portions of the world were frequently divided politically. He was quite sure that the French frontier did not follow the geological structure of that country, in the northern districts, where the coal strata ran over into Belgium and into Germany. This fact did not, however, give rise to serious difficulties, but M. Pichon's proposal involved cutting off a Polish population from the place where it worked, and this constituted a grave danger for the future. His conviction on this point was not only that of the Expert Committees of the Peace Conference, but also that of the International Commission in Teschen, who had studied the question locally. It was very dangerous to try to improvise another solution, more particularly as the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees was really favourable to the Czechs, to whom it granted 60 per cent. of the coal produced, and 40 per cent. to the Poles. It could not possibly be said that, under such a solution, the Czechs were being deprived of coal.

M. TARDIEU said that it should not be forgotten, that the Poles contended, that they could not count on the Silesian coal-fields until the plebiscite in that country had been taken. This argument was ingenious, but it was none the less certain that the Poles would eventually obtain possession of the greater part of the Silesian coal-fields.

M. PICHON said that the Poles had repeatedly asserted that they did not care about coal.

MR. POLK said that M. Benes had stated to him, that either the line proposed by him (M. Benes) should be adopted, or a plebiscite should be held in the area.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Benes had stated to him, that the situation in Bohemia was now so grave that it would be preferable to the Czecho-Slovaks to risk a plebiscite, rather than to consent to a solution which they regarded as so hopelessly unfavourable to them, and equivalent, in their opinion, to a refusal of all their demands.

M. TITTONI said that, if a plebiscite were to be held, the area would have to be divided into two portions, as he had proposed for Radkersburg and Marburg, when these areas were under discussion.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Czech contention was that, if they could not possess the coal, they would be dependent upon their neighbours for it, and might be cut off from their necessary supplies at a time of diplomatic tension. M. Pichon's solution gave them the coal, and the rest of the Polish population to the Poles. By adopting it, the pres-

ent state of affairs would not be altered, since the coal areas were now occupied by the Czechs.

MR. POLK said that the difficulty was that, under M. Pichon's proposal, a proportion of the Polish Teschen districts would be ceded to Czecho-Slovakia.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Karwin coal district could more properly be compared to the Lens, than to the Belgian, coal district, for it was concentrated in a narrow area as in the case of Lens. The original proposals of the Joint Committees had been most favourable to the Czechs, but the proposals in question had now been withdrawn. Even by accepting M. Pichon's proposal, the Poles would be given far more than they had hoped for in the first instance. If, as he now thought possible, M. Benes could persuade his countrymen to consent to the new proposal, it was surely worth consideration.

MR. POLK said that M. Pichon's line would place 60,000 Poles under the administration of the Czechs.

MR. BALFOUR said that it should not be forgotten that even the line proposed by the Joint Committees gave a considerable number of Poles to the Czechs.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Benes had based a good many of his arguments on the solution to the Galician problem, contemplated by the Council. The proposed decision was very favourable to the Poles, and the impression left upon the Czechs was that, although the Council was ready to place 4 million Ruthenes under Polish jurisdiction, they were not prepared to make a concession far smaller, from an ethnographical point of view, in favour of the Czecho-Slovak State. This would, in consequence produce a very bad impression. M. Benes' attitude had been extremely moderate and conciliatory, and it would be a great misfortune if he found himself compelled to resign his post, on account of what he considered an unconciliatory attitude of the Conference. M. Benes' resignation would be a political consideration, not entirely relevant to the Teschen problem, but the possibility of it could not be disregarded, and ought to be duly considered.

MR. BALFOUR said that he understood that the line described to the Council by M. Cambon had been adopted unanimously in the Joint Committees. As M. Berthelot had not been a member of either Committee, he regarded his proposals as interesting, but not of sufficient authority to outweigh a unanimous proposal by an Expert Committee.

M. BERTHELOT agreed with Mr. Balfour and said that the Committees had been unanimous, but it should not be forgotten that their unanimous opinion, for the first six months, had been to adopt a solution far more favourable to the Czechs than any now proposed. They had subsequently altered their opinion, and this, when made known, would cause a bad impression in Czecho-Slovakia. The Com-

mittees had studied the problem from its ethnographical and economical sides, leaving out political considerations, which seemed to be for the Council to decide. The French representatives on the Joint Committee had originally objected strongly to the line reported on by M. Cambon that morning, but they gave their assent to it finally, in order to facilitate a solution of some sort. The consent of the French representatives had only been given on the understanding that the Poles should be obliged, by some means or another, to grant special facilities to the Czechs with regard to the coal and to the railways.

M. TITTONI said that he understood that the line described by M. Cambon would not be adopted without a special convention, assuring to the Czechs the special economic facilities described by M. Berthelot.

MR. POLK said that he had understood that the Joint Committees had been unanimous. If they had not been, the question ought obviously to be referred back to them.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Report of the Joint Committees had only been unanimous because the French representatives had given their consent, so as not to isolate themselves from their colleagues.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not understand the reasons that had prompted the French representatives on the Joint Committee to give their assent to a proposal of which they did not approve. He retained opinions independently of whether they were shared by others or not. He had thought M. Pichon's proposal a very good one, and had hoped that it might have been adopted.

MR. BALFOUR said that he saw grave objections to the adoption of M. Pichon's solution.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, whilst agreeing with Mr. Balfour, he was convinced that the coal question in Teschen was the outstanding problem.

M. CAMBON said it should not be forgotten that, in the Karwin Basin, which M. Pichon proposed to cede to Czecho-Slovakia, there were nearly 70,000 Poles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Balfour could not agree with M. Pichon. He, himself, could not agree with the Committee's proposals. He therefore proposed to refer the whole question back to the Joint Committees, who, as they had already changed their minds several times, could certainly do so again, and present another report. He would never accept a line cutting a coal basin into two, for such a solution would be like placing a man on one side of a frontier, his wife upon the other, and dividing the children up between the two.

M. CAMBON said that he admitted M. Clemenceau's objection, but drew the attention of the Council to the fact that it was just as unwise to devise a line giving the surface of the land to one country and the

subterranean deposits to another, and this seemed to be what was required of him [and ?] the Joint Committees.

(It was agreed that the Teschen question should be referred back to the joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees for report on the following day.)

4. MR. POLK drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the Bulgarian Delegation was objecting to having the Peace Terms presented to them without a formal diplomatic ceremony.

Presentation of
the Bulgarian
Peace Terms

M. DUTASTA further called attention to the fact, that the Bulgarians were asking for a period of thirty days, after the presentation of the Peace Terms, in which they might be allowed to draft their replies. Their request was based upon the plea that it would be necessary for them to take the terms to Sofia, and discuss them in the Bulgarian Sobranie.

(After some discussion, it was agreed that the Peace Terms to the Bulgarians should be formally presented to them at the Quai d'Orsay at a date which should be decided upon later.)

It was further decided that the Bulgarian Delegation should be given a period of 25 days after the presentation of the Peace Terms, for the preparation of their replies.)

The Meeting then adjourned.

HOTEL ASTORIA, PARIS, 10 September, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-51

[*Draft Reply to the German Note of September 5,³ Prepared by Mr. Balfour*]

BRITISH DELEGATION, PARIS.

The Conference have brought to the notice of the German Government a clause in the new German Constitution respecting German relations with Austria which is in direct contradiction with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace relating to the same subject. The German Government in effect reply that no clause, whatever be its plain grammatical meaning, can really be in contradiction with the Treaty of Peace because there is another clause in the Constitution which says that nothing the Constitution contains can affect the Treaty. By this ingenious device the German Constitution could evidently be so amended as formally to contradict every provision which the Treaty of Peace contains. It might for example enact that a German army of ten million men was to be maintained by conscription; and when the

³ Appendix B to HD-49, p. 138.

Associated Powers pointed out that this was not in conformity with a Treaty which narrowly limited the Army and forbade conscription, the German Government could reply that, if so, the Constitution itself in Article 178 provided a sufficient remedy for the evil by laying it down that nothing in the Treaty could be affected by the Constitution.

This case is imaginary. But it is not more extravagant than a similar experiment in legislation contained in the 112th Clause of the German Constitution. This enacts that no German citizen may be surrendered for trial before a foreign tribunal. The Treaty on the other hand lays it down that certain persons charged with grave offences against the principles of humanity and the Laws of War are to be surrendered and are to be tried by a foreign tribunal. Here then is a second case of contradiction between the Constitution and the Treaty: and presumably it will be excused in the same fashion as the first.

The German Note suggests that Article 61 was introduced in order to avoid "all possible contradictions between the Provisions of the Constitution and the conditions of peace in the Peace Treaty." The intention is excellent if it relates to those doubtful and accidental contradictions which the ingenuity of lawyers may detect in the language of two long and complicated documents. But we are not dealing with doubtful and accidental contradictions. Those of which we make complaint are assuredly open and manifest, and can hardly be other than deliberate. No one can believe that the framers of the German Constitution when they drew up Article 61 (and Article 112) were not aware that both were absolutely inconsistent with the engagements into which Germany had solemnly entered only a few weeks before.

This condition of things cannot be allowed to endure. If, as the Germans themselves proclaim when the Constitution and the Treaty clash, the Constitution must give way, it is their evident duty to bring these two great instruments into harmony by modifying the Constitution: and the Conference must insist that this duty be fulfilled.

Since, however, the legislative machinery for effecting this object is difficult to set in motion owing to the adjournment of the Reichstag, and since the further examination of the Constitution shows that Article 110 [112] must be amended as well as Article 61, the Conference are prepared to extend the period allowed for the amendments till the expiry of the first fortnight after the Treaty has been ratified. This will have two advantages. It will in the first place meet a technical objection raised by the German Government, based on the fact that the Treaty, though signed, is not yet in force. It will in the second place put to the proof the sincerity of the German argu-

ments based on Article 61. When the Treaty is ratified the Associated Powers will, in accordance with its provisions, demand the surrender of certain accused persons, to be tried in foreign courts. Unless the Constitution is amended, we shall then have a test case by which to determine the mode in which the German Government interpret the provisions of their Constitution when these are in conflict with their treaty obligations. If Article 61 be honestly interpreted, the substantive provisions of Article 110 [112] will have to be abandoned. If Article 110 [112] be acted upon, the Treaty of Peace will be violated in the eyes of all the world. The first alternative would discredit the Constitution: the second would bring about an immediate breach with the Associated Powers. Neither alternative can be good for Germany: and the Associated Powers are acting in her interests as well as in their own when they insist that a speedy end shall be put to ambiguities and inconsistencies which seem to be designed for no other purpose than to weaken the force of the most solemn and binding obligation.

Appendix B to HD-51

[Translation ⁴]

*[Draft Reply to the German Note of September 5, Prepared by
M. Nagaoka]*

The German Government, recognizing that the provision in article 61 of the constitutional law of August 11, 1919, is in contradiction to the terms of article 80 of the Treaty of Peace of June 28, 1919, and that the maintenance of the said provision of article 61 before an appropriate assent has been given by the Council of the League of Nations, might give rise to misunderstandings, in spite of the provisions of article 178 of the said constitutional law, declares, after approval by the Reichstag, that article 61, as well as all stipulations contrary to the Treaty of Peace, are null and void.

⁴ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, September 11, 1919, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

Secretaries

Mr. H. Norman.
Mr. P. Kerr.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de St. Quentin.

ITALY

M. Scialoja.

Secretaries

M. Paterno.
M. Barone Russo.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Mr. C. Russell.
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. E. Abraham.
FRANCE Capt. A. Portier.
ITALY Capt. Rossi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Dr. Scott.
Mr. Gibson.
Mr. A. Dulles.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. G. N. Barnes.
Mr. C. J. B. Hurst.
Colonel Kisch.
Mr. Hodgson.

FRANCE

M. J. Cambon.
M. Colliard.
M. Fromageot.
M. Laroche.

ITALY

M. Ricci-Busatti.
M. Stranieri.
M. Brambilla.
M. di Palma.

1. MR. BALFOUR said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to an urgent matter. He did not suggest the matter should be discussed immediately, nor did he wish himself to make any statement on the subject. He wished to hand in a document which he had himself received on the previous day from General Seely.¹ This document gave an alarming account of the development of aircraft industry in Germany. Internal civil aviation was being developed on an immense scale and German companies were buying up old army aeroplanes. The first difficulty which arose in this connection was whether those aeroplanes belonged to the Allies or to the purchasing companies. There was the additional risk that under the guise of civil aviation Germany was merely creating a strong offensive force, more especially as civil aviation was being heavily subsidised by the Government. He suggested that the French General Staff should study this matter and in the hope that this would be done, he begged to hand the document to the Chairman. (Appendix "A".) It was also worth noticing that German aircraft industry had already obtained a footing in neutral markets and it was certain that the foundation of German air power was the development of the aircraft industry. It appeared that the best military brains of Germany were being employed in the construction of aeroplanes.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would have the matter examined by the French General Staff.

(It was agreed that the question of aircraft construction in Germany should be reported on by Allied experts, and again brought up before the Council.)

2. (The Members of the Drafting Committee entered the room.)

MR. HURST read the draft contained as Appendix "B".

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had one observation to make. In the proposals made on the previous day, it had been suggested that the German Government should be given 15 days to obtain from the Legislative Assembly a repudiation of the Articles infringing the conditions of the Treaty. He did not lay any particular stress on the period of 15 days, but he thought some fixed period should be laid down. If the German Delegation protested that the period allowed them as too short, and asked for an extension, he would agree to it, but he did not think it proper to leave it to them to estimate the period themselves.

MR. HURST asked whether M. Clemenceau referred to a period for the signature of the instrument itself.

¹ Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Seely, British Under Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force.

Aircraft Industry
in Germany

Reply to Note of
German Delegation
Relating to Article
61 of the German
Constitution

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he referred to the ratification of the instrument by the German National Assembly.

MR. BALFOUR observed that the German Government was asked to undertake and present the instrument to the Assembly at its next Meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer, instead of the words "when it next assembles", to say "within 15 days after the coming into force of the Treaty", that was to say, upon ratification by three of the Great Powers.

MR. POLK asked how soon the German Delegation was to sign the proposed declaration.

(It was decided to introduce into the text, the word "forthwith" in this connection.)

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the German Delegation must have time, if they required it, to telegraph to Berlin. He also informed his colleagues of a telegram received that morning to the effect that the National Assembly was being summoned at Weimar to reconsider the provisions of the Constitution complained of. This was not official news, but informal information he had received.

(After a few slight verbal alterations, the draft reply and declaration as contained in Appendix "B", were accepted.)

3. (The Members of the Commissions on Polish and Czecho-Slovak Affairs entered the Room.)

M. CAMBON said that in accordance with the directions of the Council on the previous day, the two Commissions had met in the afternoon. The majority maintained their original opinions. He then read and explained the report of the Meeting contained in Appendix "C".

MR. BALFOUR said that he feared the result of the plebiscite in Teschen would be to deprive Czecho-Slovakia not of 40% of the coal, but of 100%. The territory was Polish and the Commission had attributed it to Czecho-Slovakia, because of the railway running through it connecting Bohemia and Slovakia. This railway would almost certainly become Polish property. Surely this was far more contrary to the interest of the Czecho-Slovaks than anything the Commission had proposed. Nevertheless, as M. Benes appeared to accept a plebiscite, it must be assumed that he knew his own business best.

M. CAMBON said that neither M. Benes nor M. Dmowski could be brought to accept either of the lines suggested in the Commission. Both, however, agreed to accept the plebiscite.

M. SCIALOJA said that it was impossible for the Council to refuse the plebiscite if both claimants agreed to it.

(It was then agreed that a plebiscite should be held in the Duchy of Teschen and in the districts of Spisz and Orava in accordance with the proposals of the Joint Commissions (Appendix "C"). The detailed organization of this plebiscite was referred for examination and report to the Joint Commission.)

4. (At this point, the members of the Labour Commission entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, on the previous day, he had come to an agreement with Mr. Barnes. It had been agreed that the Congress should be left free to invite the attendance of the German and Austrian Delegates or not. As it was practically a foregone conclusion that the Congress would invite them to attend, the French Government would facilitate the granting of passports in anticipation to the Germans or Austrians, who might be delegated to go to Washington.

MR. BARNES said that he had received information that President Wilson was willing to invite the German and Austrian Delegates to Washington.

MR. POLK said that this was not quite correct. The President said that he was willing that the Labour Congress should decide whether or not the German and Austrian Delegates should be admitted. He, himself, as Head of the American Delegation, had undertaken that no passport difficulties would be made on the American side, to prevent the Germans and Austrians from going to Washington, in the hope of being admitted to the Labour Congress.

MR. BARNES said that he was not sure that these arrangements would be satisfactory to the Germans and Austrians.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they should take what was being done as a sign of goodwill. He was himself making a step in the direction of conciliation, since, in the Council of Four, he had decided adversely.² Now that Peace was signed, he was ready to yield to some extent. He had been assured by the French Labour Representatives that they would be satisfied with the very thing he was now offering.

M. SCIALOJA said that Italian labour opinion required an implicit invitation to the Germans and Austrians. Otherwise, Italian working men would not attend the Congress. There were two distinct questions involved. The first was admission to the Congress and the second was admission to the International Organisation of Labour. As to the second, it must be left to the Congress to decide and each State could give its representatives instructions. The first, however, which involved the right to be heard in the Congress, could only be decided by the Council.

² CF-16, minute 14, vol. v, p. 681.

Admission of
German & Austrian
Delegates to the
Labour Congress
at Washington

M. CLEMENCEAU said that nothing would ever prevail upon him to extend an invitation on behalf of the Council to German and Austrian Delegates to attend the Labour Congress. He would not submit to pressure from Italian socialism, which had been consistently against the war and pro-German.

MR. BARNES observed that the Council had already decided that Germany would be admitted to the second meeting of the Labour Congress. Consequently, Germany would, *ipso facto*, be let into the International Labour Organisation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was no doubt the case. What he refused to do was to invite them, in the name of the Council, to attend the Congress at Washington. He was prepared to leave the question to the Congress.

MR. BALFOUR said that he was of the same opinion, but he would ask Mr. Barnes whether the abstention of the Italian Socialists would have any effect on Labour Organisations in other countries.

MR. BARNES said that it would have a certain effect. He had tried to anticipate it by telling British Labour Organisations that the admission of the Germans and Austrians depended upon the representation of Labour and Socialism in the Congress. This would be an inducement to Labour and Socialist representatives to attend the Congress.

MR. POLK said that he did not think the question was one the Council should decide.

M. SCIALOJA said that he was not a defender of the Socialists. There were in Italy, as in other countries, moderate and extreme Socialists. The Italian Government wished to support the former rather than the latter. He thought that public opinion should be made to feel that the Council was not opposing moderate demands.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Congress would almost certainly invite the Germans and Austrians to attend, and he would himself state in the Chamber of Deputies that the decision taken was taken in a conciliatory spirit.

(It was decided that the question of the admission of German and Austrian Delegates to the forthcoming Labour Congress at Washington should be left to the decision of that Congress. In the meantime, the Allied and Associated Governments would put no obstacles in the way of German or Austrian Delegates desirous of proceeding to Washington, in anticipation of a decision in their favour.)

5. MR. BARNES said that confirmation by the Council was asked for a resolution passed by the Labour Committee on the 4th June, 1919,

Rights &
Privileges of
Allied Workpeople
Admitted to Enemy
Territories and
Vice Versa

(See Appendix "B", to H. D. 41³). In spite of a decision taken some two or three months earlier, the principle embodied in this resolution had not found a place in the Treaty with Austria. The Italian Delegation had therefore suggested that a resolution be adopted by the Labour Commission. The resolution had been taken and it was hoped that the Council would endorse it.

MR. POLK said that, as the proposal involved questions of law, he was not prepared to state off-hand the attitude of the American Delegation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that German workmen at present engaged to work on the devastated districts of France, brought with them their own rights and privileges.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether foreign workmen going to England were also to have their own rights.

MR. BARNES said that the case did not arise in England, as a foreign workman was granted British rights even to the extent, after a certain period, of receiving a share in the National Health and Unemployment Insurances and Old Age Pensions.

MR. POLK said that he could not, for the time being, express an opinion, but he had no objection to the principle.

MR. BARNES observed that it was only the principle of reciprocity that was involved. It did not become binding on any given State, unless that State made individual agreements with another State.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was ready to vote the resolution.

(Subject to an announcement, at a future date, of the views of the American Delegation, the resolution passed by the Labour Committee on June 4th (See Appendix "B", H. D. 41,) was accepted as a general principle of the Conference.)

6. M. DUTASTA said that the Drafting Committee requested instructions as to the language in which the Air Convention should be drafted. Should it be, like previous Conventions, in French, English and Italian, the French text prevailing in case of divergence, or in French and English, each having equal authority, as in the case of the Conventions signed at Versailles?

M. SCIALOJA said that, as the Convention was very important for Italy, he desired an Italian text.

(After some discussion, it was decided that the Air Convention should be drawn up in English, French and Italian, the text in the two former languages having equal authority.)

³ Vol. VII, p. 963.

7. After some discussion, it was agreed :—

That the Bulgarian Delegation should be invited to receive the Treaty in the Salle de L'Horloge, at the Quai d'Orsay, and that the Greek and Roumanian observations just received should be discussed at the next meeting of the Council.

Presentation of the Treaty to the Bulgarian Delegation

8. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a letter from M. Pachitch (Appendix "D") stating that as the Government had resigned, the Delegation was bound to wait for authority before signing the Treaty of Peace with the Austrian Republic.

Signature of the Austrian Treaty by Representatives of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

9. MR. POLK drew attention to a telegram received from Budapest (see Appendix "E").

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not at all disposed to offer the Hungarian Government financial credits, nor was he prepared to see the Government of the country handed over to the Allied Generals at Budapest. He agreed, however, that it was desirable to send the Mission instructions.

Instructions to Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest

It was decided that the question of sending further instructions to the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest should be placed on the Agenda.

MR. POLK observed that Roumanians were under the impression that the United States alone, among the Allied and Associated Powers, raised objections against their conduct in Hungary. This impression had not been set right by Allied representatives on the spot. It was desirable that the Roumanian Government should be informed that the Council had acted only upon information received from the Inter-Allied representatives.

M. PICHON observed that as M. Clemenceau signed all the telegrams sent in the name of the Council, France was incurring a great deal of unpopularity in Bucharest, where it was supposed that France was particularly antagonistic to Roumanian ambitions. It had therefore been pointed out to the Roumanian Government that these telegrams emanated from the Council of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers and not from M. Clemenceau as French Prime Minister.

MR. POLK said that he thought it was the people on the spot who had created the impression that America alone was responsible for Roumanian troubles.

The Meeting then adjourned.

HOTEL ASTORIA, PARIS, September 11, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-52

[*Brigadier-General P. R. C. Groves, Aviation Adviser, British Delegation, to the Under Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force (Seely)*]

Copy. AS/C/595

BRITISH DELEGATION,
PARIS, 10 September, 1919.

DEAR GENERAL: The attached letter to General Masterman ⁴ from the German Aviation authorities contains the information you asked me to let you have regarding the German proposals to start civil aviation with war machines. The proposals may be summarised as follows:—

Six aerial post lines to be started from Cologne. The estimated number of aeroplanes required for one of these lines, viz., Cologne to Berlin, is 170. The Company has already bought 140 aeroplanes and other aircraft material from the German Government. It is claimed that these aircraft are exempt from delivery to the Allies as they are new and have never been used for warlike purposes.

As regards the above proposals, the six aerial post lines are, of course, capable of indefinite expansion. The estimated number of aeroplanes required for the Cologne-Berlin line, viz. 170, includes one-third for repair. This percentage for repair is insufficient, and the total number required would be at least 200. There would, of course, be no limit to the reserve which could be built up, and it is highly probable that several thousand aeroplanes would be required for the efficient working of these routes.

The 140 aeroplanes which the Company has bought from the German Government are the property of the Allies, as under the Air Clauses Germany is required to surrender all her naval and military aircraft, and these machines are all of military types.

The whole question, I think, hinges upon this point, namely, the type. So far as our information goes, Germany has not produced any distinctly civil types of aeroplanes since the Armistice. A Gotha which has been built since the Armistice, and has not been fitted with bomb-racks is, nevertheless, a Gotha, and could be adapted for war uses within 24 hours.

Although the Germans have consulted us with regard to the scheme outlined in the attached letter, they have already started civil aviation on a somewhat extensive basis, and there appears to be no doubt that the machines employed are converted war machines.

Furthermore, Germany has, as you are aware, carried out a wholesale exportation of her aircraft to neutral Powers, and this exportation

⁴ President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control.

is still in progress despite various remonstrances which have been made by the Armistice Commission and latterly by Marshal Foch, acting under instructions of the Supreme Council.

Owing to the delay in the ratification of the Treaty, the Air Clauses have already been to a large extent circumvented, and if Germany is permitted to regard a military machine adapted to civil purposes as a civil machine, the Air Clauses of the Peace Treaty will have little value.

A survey of the whole aeronautical position in Germany at the present moment would be lengthy, and in many respects incomplete, owing to lack of sufficient data, but I think there is sufficient information to warrant the following conclusions:—

- (1) That civil aviation in Germany is being heavily subsidised.
- (2) That the German aircraft industry, aided by the German Government, has attained considerable footing in neutral markets. It is to be remembered that Germany's aircraft industry is the foundation of her air power.
- (3) That the military brain of Germany intends to develop German air power under camouflage of civil aviation.

As regards (3), I do not think this can be prevented, as the Supreme Council was not willing to adopt the measures recommended for its prevention by the Advisory Aeronautical Commission. But I think that it is possible to delay the development of German air power by enforcing the air clauses to the letter. In order that this shall be done, it will be necessary for the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control, viz, General Masterman, to be given a free hand, and to receive strong support from the Supreme Council.

Yours sincerely,

P. R. C. GROVES

Major General The Rt. Hon. J. E. B. SEELY,
C. B., C. M. G., etc.,

Under Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force.

[Enclosure]

Copy

*Memorial About the Opening Up of an Aerial Post Service Between
Cologne, Hanover and Berlin*

The German "Flugverkerr-Aktiengesellschaft" has obtained the approval of the German Government to establish an aerial post service on 6 lines. The same are:—

From	Cologne	to	Berlin.
"	Cologne	"	Hamburg.
"	Cologne	"	Breslau.
"	Cologne	"	Munich.
"	Cologne	"	Stuttgart.
"	Cologne	"	Bâle.

For this purpose the Flugverkerr-Aktiengesellschaft has bought in Germany from the German Government the following unused aeroplane material:—

60 L. V. G. Cells.	Type C. VI.
30 " Aeroplanes	" C. VI with Bz. IV ue.
100 F. D. H. "	" C. VII " ditto.
10 F. D. H. "	" C. III " ditto.
200 Motors Bz. IV ue.	

In accordance with paragraph 202 of the Peace Treaty, these machines are exempted from delivery because, being perfectly new, they were never used during the war for warlike purposes and they are not destined for warlike purposes, because the Army is demobilized.

If the flying service is to be established in the near future, it is necessary that the Allies confirm the release of this aeroplane material.

In the first place it is intended only to open up the line Cologne-Hanover-Berlin. The connections by rail and post are unreliable on account of the general condition; but the linking up of the most important places in the occupied and unoccupied territory is for the German authorities of the greatest interest. At the same time it is intended to carry not only the German post but also the post of the occupation authorities.

It is intended to organize the aerial post service Cologne-Hanover-Berlin as follows:—

1. 17 intermediate stations are to be established on the line Cologne-Hanover-Berlin. Every intermediate station has at the disposal aeroplanes as well as motor cars, in order to be able to continue an interrupted flight without loss of time for the postal service.

2. In the first place the orientation of the aeroplanes takes place by land orientation; by installing the sending off and receiving apparatuses in the aeroplanes and by erecting arrow stations, it will by Spring be possible to direct the aeroplanes automatically by means of wireless telegraphy.

3. The following aeroplane material is needed for the line Cologne-Hanover-Berlin:—

17 Stations each with 2 aeroplanes	= 34 aeroplanes.
3 Principal stations each with 15 aeroplanes	= 45 " "
For every day service 2 times 12 aeroplanes = 24 aeroplanes to be changed from day to day	48 " "
Total	<u>127 aeroplanes.</u>

The least to be considered as being in repair is one-third, therefore 170 aeroplanes would be required. This great number of aeroplanes is necessary in order to make it possible to provide every intermediate station accordingly, and in order to be able to dispose of the necessary reserve machines.

4. The postal service will be arranged in such a way that the line will in each direction be covered 12 times per day. It is of the utmost interest that the line Cologne–Hanover–Berlin is opened up as early as possible. After release of the aeroplanes by the Allies the aerial post service will be started 4 weeks after its approval.

In order to be able to examine the correctness of the Company's statement about the material at disposal, and in order to keep control that the aeroplanes have all been rendered useless for any military purposes, it is suggested that the Allies appoint a control Officer at the expense of the Flugverkerr-Aktiengesellschaft.

SCHWINK, *Captain.*
German General Staff Officer,
Bridgehead, Cologne.

COLOGNE, 30 August, 1919.

Appendix B to HD-52

[Reply to the Note of the German Delegation Relating to Article 61 of the German Constitution]

By their Note of September 2nd,⁵ the Allied and Associated Powers have brought to the notice of the German Government a clause in the new German Constitution respecting German relations with Austria which is in direct contradiction with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace relating to the same subject.

The German Government by its Note of September 5th,⁶ reply that no article whatever be its plain grammatical meaning can really be in contradiction with the Treaty of Peace, because there is another clause in the Constitution which says that nothing the Constitution contains can affect the Treaty. By this ingenious device the German Constitution could eventually be so amended as formally to contradict every provision which the Treaty of Peace contains. It might for example, enact that a German Army of several million men was to be maintained by conscription; and when the Allied and Associated Powers pointed out that this was not in conformity with the Treaty which narrowly limited the German Army and forbade conscription, the German Government could reply that if so, the Constitution itself in Article 178 provided a sufficient remedy for the evil by laying it down that nothing in the Treaty could be affected by the Constitution.

The above, one may say, is an imaginary case, but it is justified when one reads in Article 112 of the German Constitution, as at

⁵ Appendix A to HD-45, p. 62.

⁶ Appendix B to HD-49, p. 138.

present drafted, that no German nationals can be surrendered for trial before a foreign tribunal, when the Treaty stipulates in precise terms that certain persons charged with offences against the laws and customs of war are to be surrendered for trial before a foreign tribunal.

According to the Germany reply, Article 178 was introduced in order to avoid "all possible contradictions between the provisions of the Constitution and the conditions of the Peace Treaty". The intention is excellent if it relates to those doubtful and accidental contradictions which the ingenuity of lawyers may detect in the language of two long and complicated documents. But, in this case it is not a question of doubtful and accidental contradictions. Those of which the Allied and Associated Powers make complaint are assuredly open and manifest, and can be hardly other than deliberate. No one can believe that the framers of the German Constitution, when they inserted Article 61 and settled the terms of Article 112, were not aware that their wording was irreconcilable with the engagements into which Germany had solemnly entered only a few weeks before.

This condition of things cannot be allowed to endure.

The German Government itself admits and declares that if the Constitution and the Treaty clash, the Constitution must give way.

In view of this admission, the Allied and Associated Powers call upon the German Government to place on record without further delay in the diplomatic instrument of which the text is enclosed herewith, the explanation which it has made to the Allied and Associated Powers in its answer of September 5th, 1919. This instrument must be signed at Versailles forthwith, by an authorised representative of the German Government, in the presence of representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and must be duly approved by the competent German legislative authorities within 15 days of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

[Enclosure]

Draft Declaration

The undersigned, duly authorised and acting in the name of the German Government admits and declares that all the provisions of the German Constitution of August 11th, 1919, which are in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, are null and void.

The German Government admits and declares that the second paragraph of Article 61 of the said Constitution is therefore null and void, and in particular that Austrian representatives cannot be

admitted to the Reichsrat, except so far as the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace should consent to such a change in the international status of Austria.

The present Declaration will be approved by the competent German legislative authority within 15 days of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

Done at Versailles the day of September 1919 in the presence of the undersigned representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Annex C to HD-52⁷

Joint Report Presented to the Supreme Council by the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs on the Question of Teschen

In fulfilment of the resolution taken by the Supreme Council on September 10,⁸ the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs met on the afternoon of September 10th to re-examine the question of Teschen. As a result, they were obliged to recognise the impossibility of defining a frontier line between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland acceptable to all the Delegations.

While the majority of the Commission (American, British, Italian and Japanese Delegations) declared that they still adhered to the conclusions of the Report of August 22nd,⁹ the French Delegation proposed a fresh line which the majority found themselves unable to accept.

I.—MAJORITY REPORT. (American, British, Italian and Japanese Delegations.)

The Supreme Council took exception to two points in the Report of August 22nd:—

(a) it divides the Karwin coalfields between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia;

(b) it is less favourable to Czecho-Slovakia than was the Report of April 14th.

As regards the first point, the majority of the Commission respectfully submits that this objection applies to several other frontiers which follow ethnical lines of division. The objection, moreover, is not a vital one, provided that the two nations concerned give proof

⁷ The English text filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.213302/5 has been substituted for the French text which accompanies the minutes as annex C to HD-52.

⁸ HD-51, minute 3, p. 174.

⁹ Appendix C to HD-46, p. 87.

of their mutual goodwill with regard to the settlement of the economic interests involved. Examples may be found in the case of the following coalfields:—

(1) The Franco-Belgian coalfield, which crosses the frontier between Valenciennes and St. Ghislain.

(2) The coal mines north of Aix-la-Chapelle, of which the chief mining area extends across the Dutch-German frontier.

With regard to the objection to the fact that the Report of August 22nd is less favourable to Czecho-Slovakia than the Report of April 14th, the attention of the Supreme Council is respectfully drawn to the following points:—

(a) The Report of April 14th was not a unanimous Report.

(b) The solution proposed in the Report of April 14th was not supported by the Interallied Commission at Teschen.

(c) The Report of August 22nd is ethnographically much more favourable to Czecho-Slovakia than to Poland, in that the whole Czech population of the Duchy, except 10,400, is incorporated in Czecho-Slovakia, while 62,000 Poles are lost to Poland.

(d) Since April 14th, the date of the first Report, the Treaty of Peace with Germany has been ratified by Poland. The majority of the Commission believes that the Poles of the Duchy of Teschen, living as they do on the border of the territory over which Poland already exercises sovereign authority, will no longer be content to accept the solution which might have been imposed in April last.

(e) Apart from the ethnographical results noted above, the proposed settlement assigns to Czecho-Slovakia the Jablunkau Pass railway, affording easy possibility of railway connection between the Mährisch-Ostrau mining basin and Slovakia.

(f) As regards coal, it assigns to Czecho-Slovakia 60% of the coal basin of Teschen, and 69% of that portion of the basin which produces coking coal.

The majority of the Commissions find themselves unable to recommend a frontier alignment more favourable to Czecho-Slovakia than that of the Commissions' Report of August 22nd, as any such recommendation would, in their opinion, involve grave injustice to Poland and lasting hostility between the two countries.

In the Report of August 22nd, moreover, the joint Commissions unanimously asked that, should the frontier proposed by them be accepted, the task of determining the economic and railway concessions which Poland should, in justice, concede to the Czecho-Slovak State, should be entrusted to them; these concessions would be guaranteed by a Treaty, the draft of which would be prepared by the Commissions.

If the solution proposed by the Majority is, despite the foregoing information, still unacceptable to the Supreme Council, the Majority considers that the only manner of arriving at an alternative solution of the question is by a plebiscite.

The general lines of such a plebiscite which is in principle acceptable to both parties, are indicated below.

II.—MINORITY REPORT. (French Delegation.)

The French Delegation considers that the frontier, as defined by the majority of the Commission, does not take moral considerations sufficiently into account; may leave lasting germs of discord between the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles, and consequently does not possess those characteristics which are essential to a definitive delimitation between two Allied countries; its adoption would therefore fail to give the guarantees desirable from the point of view of the maintenance of general peace.

The French Delegation considers that these serious drawbacks would to a large extent be avoided if the frontier line proposed in the previous Report of the Commission were altered as follows:—

(1). South of Teschen, in the Jablunkau district, the frontier would be carried more to the West so as to restore to Poland a fairly extensive stretch of land where the Polish element predominates, whilst leaving the Oderberg-Kaschau railway in Czecho-Slovak territory. The town of Teschen would be left to Poland.

(2). North of Teschen the frontier would rejoin the Olsa; it would follow that stream until the neighbourhood of the Oderberg-Cracow line; it would then turn westward, the Oderberg-Cracow line remaining in Polish territory and the town of Deutschleuten being attributed to Czecho-Slovakia; following the railway line closely, the frontier would, south of Oderberg, rejoin the line proposed in the previous Report of the Commission.

The whole of the Karwin coalfield would thus be attributed to Czecho-Slovakia.

It should be noted that the number of Poles living in the territory lying between the blue line (frontier proposed in the last report) and the red line (frontier proposed on April 14th) in the district north of Teschen does not exceed 70,000; the additional number of Poles who would be attributed to Czecho-Slovakia if the French line were adopted would obviously be much below that total. The short time allowed the Commission in which to present its Report has made it impossible to ascertain the exact number, from which, moreover, the number of Poles to be restored to Poland in the south would have to be deducted, in order to obtain an exact idea of the position of the Polish element.

Failing the acceptance of this solution, and in view of the serious political results which it considers that the adoption of the line proposed in the Report of August 22nd (blue line) must involve, the French Delegation is of opinion that the only solution calculated

to restore peace would be the consultation of the population by means of a plebiscite; all parties would have to submit to the result of the voting.

III.—PROPOSALS OF THE COMMISSION

In view of the fact that they are unable to recommend for the approval of the Supreme Council a frontier line accepted by the Five Delegations, and being nevertheless desirous of conforming to the instructions received to submit to the Supreme Council proposals unanimously adopted by their members, the two Commissions, although fully aware of the drawbacks of a solution of the kind, have decided to recommend the Council to settle the question by recourse to a plebiscite, should the Supreme Council not feel able to accept either of the two lines proposed. When questioned by the Commission, Messrs. Beneš and Dmowski declared their readiness to submit to a decision of this kind. When a member of the Commission pointed out to Mr. Beneš that the plebiscite might result in the establishment of a frontier less favourable to Czecho-Slovakia than that proposed by the Commission, the latter replied that even were an attempt made to impose the line of the Report of August 22nd he would claim a plebiscite.

The principle of a plebiscite being admitted by Czecho-Slovaks and Poles alike, and the results being accepted beforehand, it would be well to agree to it.

The plebiscite would take place under the following conditions:—

- (a) it would include the whole of the Duchy of Teschen;
- (b) the voting would take place by communes with the least possible delay;
- (c) the country would be occupied by Allied troops (one regiment of three battalions would apparently be sufficient);
- (d) the Duchy of Teschen would be temporarily administered by an Interallied Commission.

The latter Commission would define a frontier according to the results of the voting, and would submit it to the approval of the Conference.

(e) The Commission would have authority to propose to the Conference any draft economic agreement between Czecho-Slovakia and Poland that might be necessitated by the result of the voting.

It should be noted in this connection that Mr. Dmowski today renewed to the Commission the declaration which he had made at a previous meeting: "if Upper Silesia is attributed to her, Poland is ready to conclude with Czecho-Slovakia any agreements which the latter may desire for the supply of the coal which she requires."

(f) Finally, it would seem expedient to satisfy the Czecho-Slovak claims for the extension of the plebiscite zone to the territories of Spisz and Orava.

If the Supreme Council approves of the proposal which the Commission has the honour to submit, it will be necessary:—

(1) to instruct the Commission to consider the method of procedure for the plebiscite and to draw up draft regulations for that purpose;

(2) to call upon it to define the district known as the “territories of Spisz and Orava”, which does not correspond to any definite administrative area.

J. CAMBON,

Chairman of the Commission.

PARIS, September 10, 1919.

Annex D to HD-52

[Translation ¹¹]

DELEGATION OF THE
KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS
AND SLOVENES

PARIS, September 10, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: Referring to my letter of this morning, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Royal Government has just resigned, and that this delegation feels itself obliged, therefore, to await from the new Government the authorization to sign the treaty of peace with the Austrian Republic.

Please accept [etc.]

P. PACHITCH

His Excellency M. GEORGES CLEMENCEAU,
President of the Peace Conference,
Quai d'Orsay.

Appendix E to HD-52

Following is text of telegram (translation) sent by the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest to the Supreme Council under date of September 9th, 1919:

“In a letter copy of which will be sent you by next mail, President Friedrich informs the Commission that his Government has the confidence of the greater part of the country but he lacks the necessary support from the Entente.

That the Roumanian requisitions throw many workmen into idleness, compromising the next year's harvesting—that the Roumanian occupation prevents the collection of taxes, elections, organization of armed force.

He asks that the Entente furnish him financial credit.

¹¹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

He declares that if certain political parties are going to henceforth enjoy the support of the Entente and if the present Government is by this fact powerless to accomplish its duties, the Council of the Ministers will transmit the power to the Commission of Four Generals. The Commission demands instructions from the Supreme Council and considers it their duty to emphasize the embarrassing situation in which they are placed by receiving no response to their preceding telegrams. **Inter-Allied Military Mission."**

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Clemenceau's Room at the War Office, Paris, on Monday, 15 September, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O. M., M. P.

Secretary

Sir. M. Hankey, G. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Secretary

M. de St-Quentin.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

Secretary

M. Paterno

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:—

FRANCE

M. Tardieu.

Marshal Foch.

General Weygand.

1. **M. CLEMENCEAU** said he had received information that the Emir Feisal was due to arrive at Marseilles on the 16th instant, and he had given strict injunctions that the Emir Feisal was to be taken straight through to London. The French Officer who was attached to him would leave him at Calais.

Emir Feisal's Journey

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if M. Clemenceau would not like to see the Emir Feisal on his way through Paris?

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had understood that Mr. Lloyd George wished to see the Emir Feisal at once without his staying in Paris en route, and that was why he had given instructions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there had been some misunderstanding. He had only asked M. Clemenceau to expedite the Emir Feisal's journey because he had heard that there was a strike at Marseilles which might delay him. He had not the smallest objection to his staying in Paris on his way, and he would be very glad if the Emir saw M. Clemenceau. He said that he, himself, had received a telegram from Port Said to the effect that the Emir Feisal had sailed

on Saturday, and that it was believed he had gone to Malta in H. M. S. *Speedy*, but he was not certain as to whether it was the *Speedy* or a French ship.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he had no information in this regard and added that in accordance with the orders already issued, Emir Feisal would proceed to Calais. M. Clemenceau then drew attention to the Agenda which had been circulated.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the first question on the Agenda was the Conditions of Peace with Bulgaria. This, however, could not be dealt with until M. Tardieu was present.

**Conditions of Peace
With Bulgaria** (A message was sent to M. Tardieu, asking him to attend.)

3. (The Conference had before them a telegram from the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest, referring to the interference they were meeting with from the Roumanian Authorities, insisting on the embarrassing situation in which they were placed, and asking for instructions as to what action they were to take (Appendix "A").)

**Demand for
Instructions From
the Inter-Allied
Military Mission
at Budapest**

This was read by the Interpreter in English.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if his recollection was correct, the four Generals had been sent to Budapest in order to find out what was going on there. They had nothing to do with the form of Government in Hungary. They had received written instructions,¹ and this was a matter which could be easily ascertained. So far as he could remember, however, the questions now raised by the Generals had no relation to their original instructions, and he thought they called for no answer.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how it was possible to deal with the Roumanians until a despatch was received from Sir George Clerk, who had been sent to Bucharest. He himself was inclined to suspect the Roumanians of delaying Sir George Clerk's telegrams.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the only information he had received about Sir George Clerk was that he would like to get back home. He understood, however, that the Roumanians were taking matters into their own hands in Hungary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that according to the information he had received that morning, the Roumanians were looting the telephone receivers out of private houses. The Mission had actually seized 4,000 private telephone receivers.

MR. POLK said he had received a telegram to the effect that the Hungarians apprehended that the intention of the Roumanians was to leave Hungary suddenly in order to create such a situation as would

¹ Appendix B to HD-24, vol. VII, p. 542.

necessitate a speedy return. They had sent a detachment to guard the Depot of Stores left behind by Mackensen. The American General at Budapest reported that his personal relations with the Roumanian authorities had improved.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not see how the Allies could send a reply to the Commission's telegram.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they could not send a reply till they received Sir George Clerk's report.

MR. POLK suggested that the question as to what could be done for the provision of some forces for the maintenance of order in Hungary should be referred to the Military Representatives at Versailles, in order, if the Roumanians withdrew, to prevent the re-establishment of Bolshevism in Hungary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was not the concern of the Allies what action was taken in Hungary to prevent Bolshevism. That was the task of the Hungarians themselves. Each nation ought to deal with its own problem in this respect.

MR. POLK said that the Allies had a certain responsibility in the matter. The Hungarians had not been permitted to form a *gendarmerie*, hence, if the Roumanians withdrew in a spirit of spite, the Allies could not divest themselves of all responsibility for what happened in Hungary. If not Versailles, someone else ought to consider this problem.

M. TITTONI said that he did not think the Allies ought to interfere in the internal affairs of Hungary, but they had an interest in securing a stable government. He suggested the desirability that the Allied Mission of Generals, who appeared to be popular in Hungary, without undue interference, should exercise their moral influence to assist in the formation of a coalition government and of a local *gendarmerie*.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE at this point intervened to say that he was only in Paris for one day. He had not had an opportunity to study the questions on the Agenda paper, and did not feel competent to deal with them. Mr. Balfour had left behind him people who were competent to discuss these matters, for example, Sir Eyre Crowe. He thought that the Agenda should be left for these persons to clear up. He himself could render little assistance in these questions. On the other hand, there were two or three matters which he desired to discuss. He would be very grateful if his colleagues would agree to postpone the Agenda, and to discuss certain questions that he wished to raise. As a matter of personal convenience, he asked them to do this.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if there was any objection.

MR. POLK said that he would like to be in a position to hand the Bulgarians their Treaty to-morrow.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it would be desirable to do this, but that the rest of the Agenda might be postponed.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the first question he wished to raise was that of the future of the Conference. It was impossible for the Conference to continue in perpetuity governing Europe. The British Government had a special difficulty in the matter. Mr. Balfour could not remain any longer. Lord Milner would shortly be going to Egypt. Lord Curzon was incessantly engaged at the British Foreign Office, where there was a great deal to do, and Mr. Bonar Law had the House of Commons to look after. He could not find any Minister whom he could spare, who would be able to speak the mind of the British Government on questions of policy. There were one or two large questions which the Conference ought to clear up. After that, they would only have to deal with the Treaty with Turkey. He feared that this could not be settled finally for some months. At present the Conference was held up in the matter until President Wilson was able to declare the position of America in regard to Mandates. Until he did so, what useful purpose could be served by discussing the Treaty with Turkey? He did not know when we should be in a position to discuss it, but, in his view, it might not be until the end of November.

MR. POLK interjected that he thought the American position would be cleared up by the end of October. A Resolution had already been tabled in Congress in regard to the Armenian Mandate.

(At this point M. Tardieu entered, and explained that the Commission over which he presided was not yet quite ready to discuss questions raised by the Greek and Roumanian Delegations in regard to the Conditions of Peace with Bulgaria.

Consequently, M. Clemenceau decided that the whole of the Agenda should be remitted until the following day.

M. Tardieu withdrew.

The discussion on the future of the Conference was then continued.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought that Mr. Polk was rather sanguine. President Wilson had hoped that he would be able to announce the American position on Mandates in August or September. He felt, therefore, that the Conference could not found its procedure on the assumption that the American position in regard to Turkish mandates would be cleared by October. In

(a) Turkey any case the Conference would have to be reconstituted in November or later for the consideration of the Turkish Treaty. He did not think the Conference could be kept in continuous session until then.

Secondly, what was now important was to make provisional arrangements as regards the garrisons to be maintained in Turkey, and he would refer to this question later.

(b) *Russia* In addition, there was the question of Russia. In regard to this, he had two questions to raise. The first was as to whether M. Paderewski should be encouraged in the project he had formed for sending 500,000 men to Moscow. He himself had spent two hours with M. Paderewski on the previous day. M. Paderewski's attitude had been perfectly reasonable. He had said that if the Allied and Associated Powers wished the Poles to advance on Moscow, he was prepared to do it. The cost, however, would amount to Marks 30,000,000. a day. Later, he had said he could do it for £600,000 sterling a day, but this would really mean £1,000,000 sterling a day. Who would be willing to pay this? In addition to the sum required for maintaining the Poles, Denikin had another 500,000 men. Would these also have to be paid for, and if so, by whom?

The second question in regard to Russia arose in connection with the Baltic Provinces. As far as he could gather, Esthonia wanted independence, and did not much mind about Bolshevism. Apparently, they were at present contemplating discussing peace with the Bolsheviks. As regards Latvia and Lithuania, however, the Germans had been ordered by the Allies to quit, and had not moved. One set of people said that the Germans were a great force with which to meet Bolshevism. M. Paderewski, however, had said that to utilise the Germans was playing with fire. If Germans were employed, they would assuredly get hold of Russia. He himself did not feel sure that the Allied representatives in the Baltic Provinces, who included a British General, were sufficiently alive to the danger of using the Germans against the Bolsheviks. Hence, two problems arose:—

- (1) Were any further steps to be taken for supplying arms and money to the anti-Bolshevist forces in Russia, and
- (2) Were the Allies to use the Germans against the Bolsheviks?

In regard to the second point, if the Allies were not prepared to use the Germans, they ought to tell them to clear out. M. Paderewski's information was that the Germans had hundreds of thousands of men in the Baltic Provinces. They were constantly sending them officers and N. C. O's. M. Paderewski also said that the German War Office was equipping those troops. His (Mr. Lloyd George's) view was that the Germans ought to be cleared out.

M. CLEMENCEAU interjected that he was in full agreement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE continuing, said that he was anti-Bolshevist, but he did not want it to be the Germans who cleared the Bolsheviks

out. He also said that the Germans were giving land to German soldiers in the Baltic provinces and attracting volunteers there in large numbers by these means. Hence, he would ask the Conference to decide that the Germans should be cleared out of the Baltic provinces. He believed they had a right to do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they had not the right until the Treaty was signed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they had a right under the Armistice.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this could easily be ascertained.

(c) **Adriatic** MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that another question that the Conference ought to clear up was the situation in the Adriatic.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he and M. Tittoni were quite ready to discuss this, and would have a proposal to make.

(d) **League of Nations** MR. LLOYD GEORGE said yet another question was the first meeting of the League of Nations.

Finally he wished to raise the question of the trial of the ex-Kaiser and of the German Officers, for he felt that the Allies ought to be in a position to take action immediately the Treaty was ratified.

(e) **Trial of ex-Kaiser and Officers** 5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as regards Turkey it was impossible at the present moment to discuss the question of mandates. All that could be discussed usefully was the arrangements for the military occupation of the various spheres. He had discussed this matter with M. Clemenceau on Saturday, September 13th, and had handed to him an *Aide Memoire*, which he would now place before the Conference. (Appendix "B".)

(The *Aide Memoire* was handed round.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then gave a summary of what was contained in the *Aide Memoire*. He referred first to the final paragraph, in which it is stated, that the French Government having accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate despatch of French troops via Alexandretta and Mersina, for this purpose. Field Marshal Allenby had seen General Weygand on this subject on Saturday. The withdrawal of British troops from Cilicia was to take place immediately. The British troops would also be withdrawn from Syria, beginning on November 1st. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement,² Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo had been included within the boundaries of the Arab State. He therefore, proposed that the British troops should hand the garrisons of these towns over to the Emir Feisal. In

² Agreement between Great Britain and France, May 9-16, 1916, *Current History*, vol. xi, pt. ii, No. 3 (March 1920), p. 499.

other parts of Syria, west of the Sykes-Picot line, the garrisons would be handed over to French troops. In the first instance, British troops would be withdrawn to the line which the British Government conceived to be the boundary between Syria and Mesopotamia, and Syria and Palestine respectively. This would be the provisional boundary line. As regards the permanent line, if the British could not come to an agreement with the French Government and with Feisal, they were prepared to submit the question to the arbitration of someone nominated by President Wilson, if the President would accept this charge. The *Aide Memoire* also contained an arrangement as regards a railway outside the British zone, but this was a matter which would have to be settled as part of the permanent arrangements.

He had taken on himself the responsibility of sending for the Emir Feisal to Europe, because the British Government had entered into certain engagements with King Hussein, on the strength of which, the latter had given strong support to our forces. In consequence of these engagements, the Arabs had greatly harassed the Turks, and had kept some thirty or forty thousand of them constantly occupied and given us very material assistance in conquering the country. The Arabs had fulfilled their engagements and we were bound to fulfil ours. There was a suggestion in the French press, that the British Government had not told the French Government of their engagements with the Arabs. Consequently, he had promised M. Clemenceau on Saturday to hand him a document clearing up this point.

(At this point, Mr. Lloyd George handed M. Clemenceau a document, prepared in the British Foreign Office, on the question of whether the French Government had been notified of the engagements made by the British Government with King Hussein.)

Mr. Lloyd George, continuing, said that the Sykes-Picot agreement had also been based on the engagements of the British Government with the Arabs. In fact, the Emir Feisal declared that by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British Government had given away something which was promised to him, but the British Government could not accept this view, and felt certain they could convince the Emir Feisal on the matter. In their communications with King Hussein, they had always made it clear that in their view, the country west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo was not Arab in character. He hoped to be able to make it clear to the Emir Feisal that this point had been explained fully to the Emir's father in the letters sent to him by the British Government. In any case, it had been necessary to summon the Emir Feisal to Europe, in order to make the same declaration to him as to the French Government, as regards the withdrawal of the British forces.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the solution of the Turkish problem must be considered as a whole, otherwise great difficulties would be encountered. On the first point mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson had always thought he would be ready to announce the American attitude as regards mandates by the end of September or in October. In his personal opinion, however, a matter of six weeks would make no material difference. He, himself, had read Mr. Lloyd George's *Aide Memoire* and was preparing a reply. He had, however, of course, not yet had time to read the document handed to him that morning, in regard to the declaration to the Arabs and the notification to the French Government thereon. In his view, the question of an Arab Empire raised great difficulties, and the Governments concerned must take time to consider it. He desired to state that he reserved the right to discuss more fully Mr. Lloyd George's *Aide Memoire*. The pressing question today, on which he wished to have an answer from Mr. Lloyd George, was as to whether the occupation by French troops of Syria and Cilicia would be considered as not merely as part of the agreement suggested in the *Aide Memoire*, but as a definite acceptance of the agreement. It would not be possible for him to promise things he could not carry out. If Mr. Lloyd George was unable to come to France later to discuss the question, then he himself would be prepared to go to London. Until this later discussion, he could accept no condition in the *Aide Memoire*, other than the occupation by French troops. As for the question of sending French troops to Armenia, this was a very serious and grave responsibility for France to take. He offered to send French troops to Armenia because the Armenians were threatened with massacre, in order to render a service to the Conference. This offer, however, could not constitute a provision of an agreement since France was not desirous of going to Armenia and it would involve an enormous burden. For the moment, he merely wished to put this question :

"Does the sending of troops by France to Syria and Cilicia mean that he accepted the whole agreement?"

If it was so, he could not undertake to send troops.

(The answers to M. Clemenceau's questions, summarised below, were mainly interjected by Mr. Lloyd George, during the interpretation of M. Clemenceau's remarks.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Clemenceau would not be committed to the whole agreement by sending troops. It was the intention of the British Government to withdraw their troops from Syria and Cilicia in any event. The only point was, that in the Syrian portion, the British Government would, in accordance with their engagements, hand over their posts to French troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that it was no advantage for France to go to Armenia, which would cost them a great deal of money.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Field Marshal Allenby had informed him that the mere presence of troops in the places now occupied, had a good effect in averting massacres in Armenia.

MR. POLK observed that the present discussion was merely an exchange of views between his British and French colleagues. It was understood that the question would be debated hereafter as a whole.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, nevertheless, in loyalty, he had felt it necessary to notify the Conference, otherwise it might be said in the newspapers, that these arrangements were being made behind the backs of his colleagues.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was in agreement that Mr. Lloyd George was right to notify the Conference. In consequence, of Mr. Lloyd George's remarks, he would agree to replace the British troops in Syria and Cilicia by French troops, but as regards the rest of the *Aide Memoire*, he must reserve his opinion. When the question of the future of Turkey was considered as a whole, it might be possible to grant what could not be granted when the question of Syria was considered in isolation. He would always be ready to go to London.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the French military authorities should make the necessary arrangements with Field Marshal Allenby, who was now in Paris, for replacing the British garrisons within the zone proposed. He wished to be perfectly clear that M. Clemenceau had accepted that France should occupy Syria and Cilicia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that French garrisons would take the places evacuated by the British.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that was what he had understood. This was a purely provisional arrangement for the military occupation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as the British left the French would take their places. The matter did not really affect the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it did not prejudice the settlement of mandates or boundaries.

(M. Clemenceau instructed an Officer of his Staff to summon Marshal Foch and General Weygand to meet him at 3 p. m. to take his instructions on this question.)

For Conclusions, see Summary at the end.³

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of Russia, to which he had already referred, was very important.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not see how we
Russia
could accede to M. Paderewski's proposals.

MR LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Paderewski had stated that, if the Allied and Associated Powers did not want him to adopt the course he proposed, neither did he desire it. He, himself, suggested that

³ No summary accompanies file copy of minutes.

M. Paderewski should be told that the Powers did not desire him to act. Otherwise, he might be requiring pecuniary support.

M. TITTONI wished to be informed on two points. First, was M. Paderewski certain that Polish troops could reach Moscow, and, second, did he merely want facilities for raising money or did he want the Allies to finance the whole expedition?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the worst thing to do was to attempt to conquer Russia by means of the Poles. If British or French forces were operating, it was known that they were merely acting in the interests of Europe, but, if Polish troops were employed, it would rally the whole of Russia against them.

(At this point, it was agreed to summon M. Paderewski, Marshal Foch and General Weygand.)

MR. POLK said that there was an American interest in this. The Poles were in a serious economic position. The United States were prepared to help them to some extent, but were not ready to find money to enable them to wage war.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, replying to M. Tittoni's questions, said that M. Paderewski would require the Allied and Associated Powers to find the whole of the money. M. Paderewski was convinced he could capture Moscow. They all said that, but the question arose as to what would happen after Moscow was captured.

(The question of Russia was adjourned until the arrival of Marshal Foch and General Weygand.)

7. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not agree with Mr. Lloyd George about the future of the Peace Conference. Personally, he would be most happy to be able to leave these questions alone, but there were imminent several large questions. For example, the question as to whether Austria was to be allowed to join herself to Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was under the impression that Germany had given in.

M. CLEMENCEAU said she had not given in yet. In addition to this, there was the question of Silesia and that of the Baltic Provinces. Without a properly qualified British representative, the Conference could not sit. He suggested that Mr. Lloyd George should leave someone in Paris who should telegraph for instructions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was a matter of great difficulty. He had contemplated leaving Sir Eyre Crowe or possibly even Lord Milner. There was a great difference between Sir Eyre Crowe and Lord Milner. It was one thing to have a man who would merely telegraph for instructions, such as Sir Eyre Crowe. A representative of this type would not have the same authority as Mr. Balfour. The difficulty was that the British Government had no one to spare of the calibre of Mr. Balfour.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what he was to do if the Germans made some proposal requiring immediate decision?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it would be arranged through the Foreign Offices.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was a very slow procedure.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Conference was not a very rapid method of procedure.

MR. POLK said that, as regards the German-Austrian question, and the Silesian question, he thought no decision could be reached for ten days or so. Then would come the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty, and, later, the Hungarian Treaty. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that it might be better to postpone the Turkish Treaty. For the next ten days, however, when these great questions would be arising, he thought Great Britain ought to have a plenipotentiary in Paris. It would make a very bad effect in Europe if it was thought that the Conference was constantly waiting on the decision of Great Britain.

M. TITTONI said that he had believed himself to be of the same view as Mr. Polk, but he was not sure that this was the case. He thought it desirable to postpone the Conference for ten or fifteen days, in order to enable Great Britain to send representatives with full Powers.

MR. POLK said that the present moment was precisely the one at which it was impossible to suspend the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was best to speak frankly on this matter. It was no use for one or two Powers to be represented by persons with complete authority and others by persons who were only able to take decisions *ad referendum*. He could not send anyone with full authority. For six months he had been away in England, which was a country that required a good deal of governing, and he could not stay here himself. Nevertheless, if he left a representative, a decision could always be obtained from him on any point within twenty-four hours even, by telegraph or even by telephone. He presumed that even Mr. Polk could not take decisions on all questions. At any rate, he was not in the same position as President Wilson had been.

M. TITTONI said that he, himself, had full powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that the Conference was of no use unless all its members met on equal terms. He proposed to leave Sir Eyre Crowe here to clear up the outstanding questions of detail, but any great questions such as, for example, one raising the possibility of a march into Germany—could clearly not be left for Sir Eyre Crowe to settle. He could only settle details when the policy had been decided. In the question of Austria, for example,

Sir Eyre Crowe could not take a decision, and would have to refer to the Cabinet. That was not a proper Conference, when only some members could take full responsibility.

MR. POLK said he agreed to some extent. He thought the Conference ought to take up no new questions. His point, however, was that, for a week or ten days, he would like to keep up the appearance of the Conference or the effect throughout Europe would be very bad.

M. CLEMENCEAU urged Mr. Lloyd George to ask Lord Milner to stay.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE undertook to discuss the matter with Lord Milner.

(At this point, Marshal Foch and General Weygand entered. M. Paderewski, who had also been telephoned for, could not be found.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU explained to Marshal Foch that M. Paderewski had made a proposal for the employment of five hundred thousand

Poles to march on Moscow at a cost of 30,000,000 Mks.

Russia.
(Continued)

a day. Mr. Polk and he, himself, thought that the result would be to set the whole of Russia against the

Allies. The Conference, however, wished to know Marshal Foch's view.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Conference was face to face with a very dangerous proposal from several points of view. If it were a question of action by a great State fully settled, the matter would be different, but this was not the case with Poland, consequently, he did not think he could advise action by the Poles.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the second question arose in connection with the Baltic Provinces. Germany was gathering a very big force there. Although ordered to leave, the Germans were increasing their forces. General von der Goltz had now returned there. German soldiers were being attracted there by promises of land, amounting to a regular German colonization. He understood that, under the terms of the Armistice, the Allied and Associated Powers had the right to compel the Germans to leave. He wanted to know, whether, in Marshal Foch's view, first, the Allies had the right to demand the withdrawal of the Germans, and, secondly, whether the time had come to insist on their withdrawal.

MARSHAL FOCH said that, under the terms of the Armistice, the Allied and Associated Powers had the right to demand the German retirement from the Baltic Provinces. As to the means of compelling them to do so, a difficult question arose. Of course, starting from the basis of the Armistice, it would be possible to exert pressure on Germany from the Rhine, from Poland, or from both simultaneously. It was a matter of combining the two operations, and this wanted thinking out. In addition, there was the blockade.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, in Marshal Foch's view, the time had come to take some action.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the longer it was put off the harder it would be. Consequently, the sooner action was taken the better.

M. CLEMENCEAU reminded Marshal Foch that the question of an advance on the Rhine had been discussed in connection with the Austrian question. Did Marshal Foch think this method more efficacious than the sending of troops to disembark in the Baltic?

MARSHAL FOCH said that the latter proposal was out of the question.

M. CLEMENCEAU summed up Marshal Foch's recommendation as being to restore the Blockade and take action on the Rhine in combination with action in Poland.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Allies might also cease returning their prisoners or threaten to do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the result of the discussion was that Marshal Foch regarded it as possible to undertake operations to compel the Germans to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces.

MARSHAL FOCH said that was so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE strongly urged Marshal Foch to consider the question of clearing the Germans from the Baltic Provinces, and, subject to what the Marshal might say, he pressed that the Conference should make a demand as soon as possible. The presence of Germans in large numbers in the Baltic provinces was a real danger to the peace of Europe.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the answer of the German Government to Marshal Foch's demand for the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces had been received. The point of view of the German Government was that they had given orders but their troops refused to obey. In fact, they said they had no authority. Starting from that basis, it might be a good plan to send some important person, whether military or civilian, to the Baltic Provinces to see that the evacuation took place, and it might also be necessary to send reinforcements to replace the Germans and make a barrier against Bolshevism.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Poles might possibly be more profitably employed in this manner than by marching on Moscow.

MR. POLK said that the presence of Polish troops might not prove acceptable to the Lithuanians.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the true role for Poland was to provide a barrier on the one side against Bolshevism, and, on the other side, against Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if Marshal Foch could give a considered view on this question by 4 p. m. in the afternoon.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed to do so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Marshal Foch should see M. Paderewski.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed to do so.

MR. TITTONI said that General Dupont should be asked if the German reply was genuine or merely play-acting. The second suggestion he had to make was that enquiries should be made of General Gough.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that General Gough was now back in England and would not be returning to the Baltic.

M. TITTONI asked if there was anyone else there whom the Allies could consult on the subject. He would like to ask for information on the spot as to whether, after the withdrawal of the Germans, it would be necessary for the Poles to take their place in order to prevent the advance of the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this raised a question as to whether the Bolsheviks were worse than the Germans. He thought that the Bolsheviks would disappear, but the Germans would not.

M. TITTONI said that the only point he wished to know was whether it was necessary for the Poles to go to the Baltic Provinces.

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand withdrew)

9. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had received a letter from M. Clemenceau suggesting a meeting of the League of Nations at Washington in November. He felt very doubtful about this. He, personally, could not attend, although this was not very material. But by November, Peace would not have been made with Turkey, and probably the question of Mandates would not have been settled.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the point was that certain questions had to be settled by the League of Nations within fifteen days of the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

MR. POLK said that there were two or three questions which had to be settled by the Council of the League of Nations within 15 days of the signature of the Treaty, and the President of the United States of America was directed by the Treaty to call the first meeting of the Council. His proposal would be that the President should summon a meeting of the Council to take place in London or Paris, as soon as three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had ratified the Treaty, even though a representative of the United States could not attend; and that the sole object of this meeting should be to examine the questions which require action by the Council of the League within a short period after the coming into force of the Treaty. He did not know if the President would accept this, but he was prepared to recommend it to him.

M. CLEMENCEAU and M. TITTONI accepted Mr. Polk's suggestion, which was adopted.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what about the Labour Conference.

MR. POLK said that that would take place anyhow.

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he supposed that on the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the Allied and Associated Powers would send their joint demand to the Dutch Government for the surrender of the Kaiser.

Trial of the Kaiser

M. TITTONI said that he wished to notify the Conference merely for information, that the Italian Chamber had nominated a Committee of 44 to study the Treaty of Peace with Germany. It had been decided by 20 votes against 3 socialist votes that the Treaty should be ratified, but it had been agreed that the provisions for the trial of the Kaiser did not rest on a legal basis, because the crime had been defined after the event, and the tribunal had been designated by the persons who were charging the accused. This information was only of moral value, as the Treaty would be approved.

11. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as regards the trial of officers, he was in favour of meeting the views of the German Government, that the numbers to be tried should be limited. The first British list had consisted of hundreds, and he believed the same was true of the French list. He only wanted to make an example. To try very large numbers, would be to create great difficulties for the German Government, which he believed to be better than either a Bolshevik Government or a Militarist Government.

The Trial of Officers

M. CLEMENCEAU said he agreed the trial should merely be a symbol.

12. M. CLEMENCEAU said that since Mr. Lloyd George had left the Conference, he had given much thought to this matter, and had come to the conclusion that the best way to meet everyone's wishes was to hand Fiume City over to the Italians, leaving the port and railway to the League of Nations, and the remainder of the Hinterland to the Yugo-Slavs. He had talked the matter over with M. Tittoni, and thought it best to propose that he and Mr. Lloyd George should send a proposition on these lines to President Wilson.

Fiume

MR. POLK pointed out that a new scheme had been sent only the previous week to President Wilson, and no answer had yet been returned.

M. TITTONI said that there were two alternatives. Either that Fiume should be a Free Town or that a Free City should be created, or that Fiume should be given to Italy, the port and railway going to the League of Nations, and the remainder of the hinterland to the Yugo-Slavs. The Italian Government were most anxious to settle the

question, but they did not wish a wound to be inflicted on the Italian people. This was for Italy a moral reason of the first order in favour of the new plan. Italy could not think of detaching herself from her Allies. There was no question of this; and agreement must be reached. That was why he had come to this agreement with M. Clemenceau.

MR. POLK said he had sent a definite proposal to President Wilson and it was not possible now to change. He believed the new proposal had been made before, but had been refused both by America and Great Britain.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the proposal had never been put quite in the present form. Fiume, including the port and certain islands, had always been demanded by the Italians. From a private conversation he had had with M. Patchitch, he thought it possible that the new proposal might be more acceptable to him than any other. He himself would agree to anything which was acceptable both to President Wilson and the Italians. The question was not one which ought to split the nations in two. It was really too trivial. The difficulty was that it had become a "flag" to the Italians and Mr. Polk said that the recent revolution at Fiume had made it very difficult to settle on these lines.

M. TITTONI said that the revolution would first have to be suppressed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Mr. Polk should telegraph to President Wilson to the effect that this new proposal had been made. Of course it was difficult to explain the matter in a telegram, as one could explain it in conversation. But he thought it was worth while to send the new proposal.

MR. POLK said he must know exactly what the plan was.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, broadly speaking it was that the town of Fiume, with the river as boundary, should become Italian; that the port and railway should be handed over to the League of Nations; and that the Hinterland should go to Yugo-Slavia, and no islands would be handed over to Italy.

M. TITTONI said that the only islands to be handed to Italy were Lussin, Lissa and Pelagosa.

MR. POLK said that the Italian occupation of Lussin and the mainland would give Italy a strangle-hold.

M. TITTONI said that this region would be neutralised.

(After some discussion it was agreed that M. Tittoni should put the project in writing before the afternoon meeting.)

(The Conference adjourned until 4.0 p. m.)

HOTEL ASTORIA, PARIS, 15 September, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-53

[Translation *]

Telegram From Budapest on September 8, 1919, to the Supreme Council at Paris

No. 292. In a letter, of which a copy will be addressed to you by next courier, President Friedrich informs the Commission that his Government has the confidence of the greater part of the country, but that it lacks the necessary support of the Entente; that the Roumanian requisitions are reducing many workmen to idleness, endangering next year's harvest; that the Roumanian occupation prevents the collection of taxes, the elections, the organization of an armed force. It asks that the Entente guarantee its financial credit. It declares that if certain political parties are hereafter to enjoy the support of the Entente, and if the present Government is by that fact powerless to fulfill its duties, the Council of Ministers will hand over power to the Commission of the four generals. The Commission requests instructions from the Supreme Council, and thinks it ought to make plain to the Council the difficult position in which it finds itself in not receiving a reply to its earlier telegrams.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

 Appendix B to HD-53
*Aide-Mémoire in Regard to the Occupation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia Pending the Decision in Regard to Mandates*⁵

1. Steps will be taken immediately to prepare for the evacuation by the British Army of Syria and Cilicia including the Taurus tunnel.
2. Notice is given both to the French Government and to the Emir Feisal of our intentions to commence the evacuation of Syria and Cilicia on November 1, 1919:
3. In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area, regard will be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs:
4. In pursuance of this policy the garrisons in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia will be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo will be replaced by an Arab force.

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

⁵ Handed by Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau and placed before the Conference.

5. After the withdrawal of their forces neither the British Government nor the British Commander-in-Chief shall have any responsibility within the zones from which the Army has retired :

6. The territories occupied by British troops will then be Palestine, defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba, and Mesopotamia, including Mosul, the occupation thus being in harmony with the arrangements concluded in December 1918, between M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George.⁶

7. The British Government are prepared at any time to discuss the boundaries between Palestine and Syria and between Mesopotamia and Syria. In the event of disagreement in regard to the above boundaries, the British Government are prepared to submit the question to the arbitration of a referee appointed by President Wilson.

8. In accordance with the principles of the Sykes-Picot agreement the French Government shall not object to the Arab State granting to the British Government the right to construct, administer, and be the sole proprietor of a railway line connecting Haifa with Mesopotamia on a trace to be decided on after survey anywhere as far north as the latitude of Deir-*ez-Zor*. The British Government shall have the right to construct oil pipe lines as well as the railway line. The British Government shall, in addition, have a perpetual right at all times to improve the facilities of these railway and oil pipe lines and to transport troops along the railway, and these rights shall be exercisable even in time of war, without infringement of the neutrality of the French Government or of the Arab State. In the event of disagreement as to the trace of the railway line and oil pipe lines the British Government are prepared to submit this question to the arbitration of a referee appointed by President Wilson.

9. The British Government notify the French Government and the Emir Feisal of their intention immediately to carry out a survey with the object of finding, if practicable, a trace for the railway line and pipe lines entirely within the British mandate, in order to enable them to avoid the necessity of exercising the rights of construction referred to above :

10. Until the boundaries of Palestine and Mesopotamia are determined the British Commander-in-Chief shall have the right to occupy out-posts in accordance with the boundary claimed by the British Government :

11. The French Government, having accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate despatch of French troops via Alexandretta and Mersina for this purpose.

PARIS, September 13, 1919.

⁶ Described in IC-163A, vol. v, p. 1.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Clemenceau's Office at the Ministry of War, Monday Afternoon, September 15, 1919, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
The Hon. F. L. Polk	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George O. M., M. P.	M. Clemenceau
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
Mr. L. Harrison	Sir M. P. A. Hankey, G. C. B.	M. de St. Quentin
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Tittoni	M. Matsui
	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
	M. Paterno	M. Kawai
	<i>Interpreter—M. Camerlynck</i>	

The following were also present for the discussion of the first item:

M. Paderewski.
Marshal Foch.
General Weygand.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU explained to M. Paderewski that the council had invited him to attend to state his views regarding the Russian situation.

**Evacuation of the
Baltic Provinces
by Germany**

M. PADEREWSKI stated that the Polish Government were anxious to learn the view of the Allies with respect to Russia. At the present time the Germans were proceeding in their usual methodical and tenacious manner to extend their influence and control in the East. In the northern provinces the German Generals von der Goltz and Prince Lieven were holding out to be the enemies of the Bolsheviki but this was mere pretence on their part. In the south General Kraus was operating, and in the centre the Germans had one thousand instructors who were extending German influence and enlisting volunteers, offering thirty-five marks per day with a bonus of a thousand marks. These activities were carried on under the instructions of the German War Office as he knew from a secret general order to this effect which had come into his hands. He pointed out that the Polish Army was the one obstacle to coveted Germany. At the present time the Polish Army con-

sisted of 545,000 men under arms. If it were necessary 480,000 additional men could be raised in a few months. The present forces were now costing Poland some 30,000,000 marks or say 10,000,000 francs per day. If additional forces were raised there would then be a further cost to Poland of some 24,000,000 marks per day. Poland could not fight on indefinitely. He would therefore ask what were the plans of the Allies. The Polish Government will settle their plans in accordance with those of the Conference. Poland cannot afford to keep up or increase her large military establishment. She is a new State and is lacking in raw materials and war manufactories. If the decision of the Allies should be for Peace he was most anxious to know this as soon as possible for very advantageous terms of peace had been offered him by the Bolsheviki. The territorial ambitions of Riand [*Poland?*] had been fulfilled. Their advance against the Bolsheviki had been uniformly successful, and they had had a series of large and small victories. At present they had from thirty to thirty-five thousand Bolshevik prisoners. In conclusion he emphasized the importance of a rapid decision by the Conference, whatever it might be.

It was explained to M. Paderewski by M. CLEMENCEAU that he had asked Marshal Foch to prepare a plan of action in the Baltic Provinces. This plan was based on the cooperation of the Polish Army.

M. PADEREWSKI responded that the Polish Army was at the service of the Conference.

MARSHAL FOCH gave a brief outline of the plan now in course of preparation. His idea was to insist that the Germans should carry out their solemn engagements; first, the Armistice, and second, the Treaty when it shall have come into force. By the terms of the Armistice the Germans were required to withdraw from the Baltic Provinces at the pleasure of the Allies. He did not foresee any difficulty in meeting the situation after their withdrawal. The plan would be to substitute the control of the Germans by local governments in the several Baltic Provinces, and then to assist these local governments. It would be necessary for the Conference to select and appoint some prominent individual as their representative, who should be instructed to order the Germans to evacuate, and then advise the local governments to establish themselves. To ensure his instructions carrying weight a force would be needed, and it was therefore desirable that the Allies' representative should be able to turn to the Polish Army for this military support. It would be necessary to have a general on the spot. As a matter of fact there was a French General there. Marshal Foch suggested that this officer might be instructed to wind up the situation and have the Polish army ready if need be.

The Marshal explained that this was but a brief outline of his plan which would be ready for submission in 24 hours.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he liked the Marshal's idea. If nothing were done the Germans would overrun the Baltic Provinces and within a short time their power would be immensely enhanced. If action were not taken immediately, the situation would become far more difficult in the future. For his part, he would support the appointment of a French General. He would like, however, before a final appointment were made, to have the opportunity of passing upon any name that might be submitted.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Henrys was now in command of the Polish Army and would be a suitable appointee.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. He inquired whether Marshal Foch contemplated sending a demand direct to the German Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU believed that the Marshal should make a demand for immediate evacuation.

MR. POLK asked for a precise statement as to the plan proposed by Marshal Foch.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that the Marshal should require the Germans immediately to evacuate their troops from the territories outside of the frontiers of Germany, and inform them that if they failed to comply with his demand he would proceed to enforce it; that General Henrys should be appointed the representative of the Allied and Associated Powers to control the evacuation, and lastly, should be empowered to use the Polish Army if that were necessary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that he agreed with this proposal. It was understood, therefore, that in the event of a German refusal Mr. Paderewski would place the Polish Army at the service of the Allies.

M. PADEREWSKI expressed his agreement.

MR. POLK inquired whether there would not be a danger if the proposed plan were followed and it were necessary to use the Polish Army, that this would bring on the Silesian difficulty, the Dantzic difficulty and a war between Germany and Poland.

M. PADEREWSKI feared that the German Government would in Silesia, as in the Baltic Provinces, decline all responsibility as regards the actions of the German troops, claiming that the latter were no longer subject to their authority.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the Baltic situation and the Silesian situation were somewhat different. It was expected that the German Government would in all probability be willing to comply with the Allies' demands, but from the information in his possession it appeared that the Central Government had little control over the Eastern German Army and might not be able to enforce compliance with their orders. In that event the Eastern German forces would be outlawed and would be in much the same situation as were Morgan and

Drake in the time of Elizabeth, both of whom had been disavowed by the British Government. If the Polish Army were then to attack the German troops, how could the German Government claim that this would constitute an act of war on the part of Poland. In his opinion, the Silesian situation was quite different. Silesia was within the boundaries of Germany. The German Government was responsible for the situation there. This was very different to the Baltic provinces which were outside Germany and within Russia.

MR. POLK admitted that in a legal sense this was true. The question in his mind was whether the use of Polish troops in Lithuania would not result in reprisals all along the line.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE did not see that there was any alternative to Marshal Foch's plan other than the imposition of a Blockade.

MR. POLK stated that he had raised the question in order that when war came it should be thoroughly understood that the Council was responsible.

M. CLEMENCEAU desired to make it clear that Marshal Foch will demand that the German troops evacuate the Baltic Provinces and will warn those troops that he will be prepared to enforce the demand under the Armistice.

M. PADEREWSKI called attention to the fact that it was not merely a question of enforcing the evacuation of German troops but that it was necessary also to drive out the German officers. In Kovno there was a very numerous General Staff composed of Germans. It would be necessary to force them to leave. In this relation he referred to the fact that at least two of the Allied governments had been furnishing to the Lithuanians, supplies, munitions, etc. In his opinion this should cease, the Lithuanian Government being in the pay of Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed very earnestly the hope that there would be no interference with the Lithuanian Government. It was simply a question of forcing the Germans out. If it should become necessary for the Polish Army to intervene, it must be thoroughly understood that neither the Polish Government nor the Polish Army would interfere with the local governments. The plan now proposed contemplated merely a military occupation, if that should be necessary.

M. PADEREWSKI observed that the Council should not hold him responsible if the territories to be occupied by the Polish Army should declare themselves for Poland.

Referring to M. Paderewski's inquiry as regards the question of peace or war with the Bolsheviki, M. CLEMENCEAU explained that the Council did not desire that the Poles should march on Moscow. As far as he was concerned he would not make peace nor would he make war. He suggested that Poland could carry out the first part of the

proposed programme and by that time the Bolshevik situation would be clarified.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE called M. Paderewski's attention to the fact that Poland would be in a precarious position if the Baltic Provinces should become German. As it was, the Poles had advanced in the east beyond the boundaries of Poland. He understood that the Bolsheviks had only 80,000 men opposed to an army of 250,000 Poles.

M. PADEREWSKI replied that, owing to the state of the country, it was necessary for the Poles to maintain a considerable police force in that region.

MARSHAL FOCH considered that it would be very dangerous for Poland to open the Russian question on its Eastern frontier before settling the German question on its Western frontier. He believed it would be well to proceed step by step and consolidate the existing situation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE declared that he was in complete agreement with M. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch.

(M. Paderewski, Marshal Foch and General Weygand then withdrew.)

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should make a formal demand on the German Government immediately to evacuate the Baltic Provinces of Russia, and to withdraw their forces within the boundaries of Germany as defined by the Treaty of Peace. He shall further inform the German Government that if they do not comply with his demand he will take the necessary steps to enforce it.

It was agreed that General Henrys should be entrusted by the Allied and Associated Powers, as their representative, with the control of the evacuation of the German troops. Acting in the same quality, he shall have authority to use the Polish Army in case the Germans do not comply with the demand for evacuation.

In placing the Polish Army at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers, M. Paderewski indicated at the same time that there should be no interference by the Polish Government or Army with the local governments of the Baltic Provinces.)

2. M. TITTONI handed to his colleagues copies of the memorandum (Appendix A) which he had promised to give to them at the meeting in the morning.

Question of Fiume
and the Adriatic

MR. POLK asked what was the difference between the proposals which M. Tittoni was now presenting and those which the Conference transmitted to President Wilson a week ago.

M. TITTONI said that the Conference had asked President Wilson to make a choice between two solutions. The first was that Fiume should be a free city in an International State placed under the con-

trol of the League of Nations. The second was that the city of Fiume should be attributed to Italy, the port and the railway to the League of Nations and that the territories which in the first proposal would be attributed to the International State would be given to the Yugoslav State. He proposed that the second solution of the question should be adopted. One of his reasons for favouring this proposal was that Mr. Polk had told him that President Wilson had favoured a plebiscite in the free state. He was unwilling to agree to such a plebiscite.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what M. Tittoni meant exactly in saying that no concession would be made to the Yugoslavs in the valley of the Drin.

M. TITTONI meant that this disposition was found in the first memorandum for the reason that, as the Fiume Railway passed directly from Yugoslav to Austrian territory, he desired that the Trieste Railway should pass directly from Italian to Austrian territory. He had asked that Italy be given the territory known under the name of the Assling triangle which was inhabited by Slovenes but the possession of which was necessary for Italy to assure direct communication between Trieste and Austria. The Serbs had recognised that in Albania the frontier of 1913 was drawn on lines of ethnic justice but they demanded that the valley of the Drin be given to them in order that they might establish a railway there which would give them independent communication with the Adriatic. He thought that there was a complete analogy between the two cases and he would say to the Serbs, if they wished to have the Valley of the Drin they should give the Italians the Assling triangle and that if the Serbs contended that the Italians should be satisfied with the guarantee of the League of Nations for Assling they should be satisfied with the same guarantee for the Drin.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in effect M. Tittoni asked that the Council should send President Wilson a telegram telling him that the Council was in favour of the second of the two proposals recently submitted to his choice and that it was their strong desire that he accept this proposal.

M. TITTONI agreed that this was what he meant.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished to point out to M. Tittoni two points of his memorandum which would probably elicit objections from President Wilson. The President did not want Italian sovereignty in Fiume—though Mr. Lloyd George did not wish to insist upon this point. The President would also not be satisfied with having the diplomatic representation of Zara belong to Italy. He suggested that it would be more advisable to say that Zara should be able to choose its diplomatic representatives. Nothing would prevent its intrusting its interests to Italian agents.

M. TITTONI said that he had no objections to this solution. He wished to add, however, that this solution which Mr. Lloyd George criticized appeared in the proposals approved by President Wilson on the 7th of June.¹

MR. POLK said that he wished to repeat that the President had not given his definite approval to this rather summary note which had been prepared during a meeting of the Supreme Council for the purpose of serving as a basis for discussion between the Italian delegation and the Jugo-Slav delegation. He desired to say, in so far as Fiume was concerned, that he had received a telegram from President Wilson from which it appeared that the President was disposed to accept the first of the two solutions which had been presented to him in the name of the Conference. He feared that the President would be surprised to again receive a new proposal.

M. TITTONI said that it was not a question of a new proposal. The Conference would simply state that they preferred one of the two solutions between which they had asked the President to choose.

MR. POLK said that he desired to remind the Council of what had occurred. It had been agreed that M. Clemenceau, Mr. Balfour and M. Tittoni should address a joint telegram to the President. After he had made note of the text he had written to M. Clemenceau to point out to him the objections which the President would not fail to make. After the despatch of this letter M. Tittoni and M. Tardieu had come to see him and finally they had agreed as to a new text. He knew that even in this form the proposals were not in accordance with the views of the President. He had, however, transmitted them, pointing out that the British, French and Italian delegates recommended them, and insisted earnestly that the President should consent to settle the affair on one of these bases. He could not help but wonder what would happen if he should transmit to the President the new Italian proposals after one of the former proposals had been accepted. He asked to be permitted to examine M. Tittoni's plan before telegraphing and to be given time to consider what impression this communication was likely to make upon the mind of the President.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he agreed with Mr. Polk in thinking that it would not be fair to the President to submit a new proposal to him at the point which had now been reached.

M. TITTONI was prepared from the point of view of Italian interests to accept one or other of the two plans, even though the Italian people probably preferred the second, but only upon the condition that no change should be made in these proposals. If President Wilson should alter the first solution by introducing a plebiscite

¹ CF-52, minute 7, and appendix IV thereto, vol. vi, pp. 244 and 249.

it would be necessary for him to express his preference for the second proposal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that so far as he was concerned he was glad to accept the new Italian proposal but he wished to say again that he was unwilling to run the risk of making a new proposal to President Wilson after the latter had accepted another proposal.

M. TITTONI then suggested that the Conference wait. (*Alors attendons.*)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the sixth point of the Italian memorandum did not appear to him to be just to the Serbs. The Assling Railway was in existence and there was now a question of its use for Italian traffic only. On the other hand there was neither a railway in the Valley of the Drin nor a port at St. Jean de Medua. Certainly the Albanians would construct neither a railway line nor a port. If the Conference did not give the Serbs the opportunity of constructing them, they would be deprived of all access to the Adriatic. Moreover it should not be forgotten that it was necessary to secure the consent of the Jugo-Slavs to the arrangement which was being discussed.

M. TITTONI said that the Jugo-Slavs already had several outlets to the Adriatic and could construct the Railway line in question by another route. But, however that might be, the Italians were refused the Assling Railway because it ran through territory where the population was Slovene. He saw no reason for giving the Valley of the Drin to the Jugo-slavs where the population was Albanian and did not desire to be placed under the yoke of the Serbs. He was also willing to agree to a plebiscite; he was quite sure that the Albanians would not vote for the Serbs.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was not his intention to add the Valley of the Drin to the territory of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, but he believed that it was necessary to give the Serbs the right to construct a railway in the Valley of the Drin and that facilities for a port be granted them. He did not see that it would be of any use to give to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State the same rights on the Drin as would be given to Italy in the Assling territory because in the first case the railway existed already, and in the second case the line had not yet been constructed.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that the Council wait until the following day for the reply of President Wilson, of which Mr. Polk had spoken.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would be at the disposal of the Conference during the morning.

3. M. TITTONI said that according to information which he had just received Italian troops had surrounded the city of Fiume, and

Incidents
at Fiume

were blockading it from the land side. He asked that the Allied and Associated Powers should assist by using their ships of war in enforcing the blockade

from the sea.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they could not do otherwise than accede to M. Tittoni's wish. He considered it advisable, however, in order to avoid any misunderstanding as to the nature of the Allied intervention to issue a statement to the Press in the following language:

"On the request of the Italian Government the Allied and Associated Powers have agreed to participate in the maritime blockade of Fiume, which the Italian troops have already surrounded on land."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished it understood that the Allied and Associated Powers would lend the assistance of their warships which were on the spot but that they would not send other ships.

M. TITTONI said that he agreed to this but he asked that decision should be suspended until he should have had an opportunity to communicate with M. Nitti on the subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed and that the Allied and Associated Powers would take no action and make no public statement until M. Tittoni had confirmed his request.

(It was agreed that as soon as M. Tittoni had obtained the consent of the Italian Government the following press notice should be published.

"On the request of the Italian Government the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have agreed to participate in the maritime blockade of Fiume which the Italian troops have already surrounded on land.")

Signature of the
Treaty of Peace
With Austria and
the Treaty for the
Protection of
Minorities by
Delegates of the
Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received good news. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had informed him that they were prepared to sign without reserve the Treaty of Peace with Austria and the special treaty for the protection of minorities.

Rumanian
Affairs

M. TITTONI asked whether the intentions of the Rumanian Government were yet known. He added that for the past two weeks he had not received a single telegram from the Italian Ministry at Bucharest.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was quite likely that the Rumanians stopped the telegrams of the Allied and Associated representatives. But the question confronting the Council was more general. It was to find a means of forcing the Rumanians to obey the decisions of the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Rumanians would not refuse openly to obey the demands of the Conference. They found a means of obeying without obeying. In any case it was necessary to wait before taking action until there was a government with which to deal in succession to that of M. Bratiano, whose resignation had been announced.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was quite useless for the Conference to give orders if these orders were not heeded by the Allies. If this state of affairs continued the entire work of the Conference would be doomed to failure and the League of Nations would be condemned to impotence in advance, for the Conference was the predecessor of the League of Nations. He wished to add that it was most important not to permit the view to be held at Bucharest that the United States and Great Britain were the only great powers hostile to Rumania. He felt that he should say, as the deliberations were entirely frank, that the attitude of the French Minister at Bucharest was not such as to remove this impression.

MR. POLK said that it was desirable that the French and Italian Ministers at Bucharest should be seriously cautioned against these tendencies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he felt that this applied equally to the Quai d'Orsay.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, as his colleagues knew, he was in entire agreement with them as to the policy to be followed in regard to this matter.

5. MR. POLK said that he considered it important to reply to the request for instructions which had been addressed to the Council by the Inter-Allied Mission at Budapest.²

Instructions to
the Inter-Allied
Mission at
Budapest

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he believed that the Council had decided in the morning to await the return of Sir George Clerk.

MR. POLK said that he was raising a different question. Sir George Clerk's mission related only to Rumanian affairs. It was necessary for the Conference to inform the Allied Generals at Budapest without delay that they should encourage the formation of a local police force for the preservation of order after the departure of the Rumanian military forces. The Rumanian commander should at the same time be asked, so long as his occupation of Rumanian [*Hungarian?*] territory continued, to facilitate the constitution of these forces. Finally the Conference could not omit replying to the request for a loan which had been addressed to it by the Mission on the part of the Hungarian Government.

² Appendix A to HD-53, p. 216.

(After further discussion between different members of the Council it was agreed that the following telegram should be sent to the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest:

“We do not intend to interfere at all in the internal affairs of Hungary. Our only wish is the constitution of a stable government, if this is possible, and to this effect we invite you to let the Hungarian authorities know that we desire the speedy constitution of a *gendarmérie* force capable of maintaining order after the withdrawal of the Roumanian Army.

We therefore direct you to inform the Roumanian authorities of our intentions and at the same time to invite them in the most categorical way to give every facility so long as they keep Hungarian territory, for the formation and armament of this *Gendarmerie*.

In no case can there be any question of a loan.”)

The meeting then adjourned.

HOTEL CRILLON, PARIS, September 15, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-54

The Question of the Adriatic ³

1) **FIUME.** The city (*Corpus Separatum*) shall be placed under the sovereignty of Italy. There shall be no independent state of Fiume. Jugoslavia shall receive all the territories included in this state according to President Wilson's line (Island of Cherso included and Albona excepted).

All the territories that would have made part of the independent state shall be permanently demilitarised.

The Port of Fiume, with all facilities for its development as well as for the railways terminating there, shall be given over to the League of Nations, which shall make such arrangements as it shall see fit, both for the country of which this port is the outlet and for the city of Fiume itself.

The rights of ethnic minorities shall be guaranteed.

2) **DALMATIA.** All Dalmatia shall go to the Jugoslavs, except the city of Zara, which shall be a free city under the guarantee of the League of Nations, which shall recognise and encourage its intimate connection with the Italian State and Italian culture. The city shall be represented diplomatically by Italy.

Every facility shall be given to the commerce of the hinterland. The economic interests of Italy existing in Dalmatia and the rights of Italian minorities shall be guaranteed.

³ Memorandum handed by M. Tittoni to the other members of the Supreme Council.

3) ISLANDS. The only Italian islands shall be Lussin, Unie, Lissa and Pelogosa.

4) ALBANIA. To be independent, with a mandate given to Italy.

5) VALLONA. Italian sovereignty over the city, with the hinterland strictly necessary to its economic life and its security.

6) RAILWAYS. For the Assling Railway, Italy no longer makes any territorial demands, but demands only definite guarantees for the use of the line in Yugoslav territory. On the other hand, no territorial cession shall be granted to the Yugoslavs in the Valley of the Drin, but they shall receive there, as to the use of the railway to be constructed, the same guarantees as are given to Italy for the Assling Railway.

7) NEUTRALISATION. Italy demands the general neutralisation of the entire coast and of the islands from the Southern point of Istria to Cattaro, inclusive.

8) A Commission appointed by the Conference, on which each of the five Powers shall be represented by a delegate and an expert, shall as soon as possible trace the frontiers on the maps and draw up all details.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, September 17, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**
Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe.

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
Secretaries
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de St. Quentin.

ITALY
M. Scialoja.
Secretary
M. Barone Russo.

JAPAN
M. Matsui.
Secretary
M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Capt. Chapin.
FRANCE Cmdt. A. Portier.
ITALY M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. A. W. Dulles.
Mr. E. L. Dresel.
Mr. F. K. Nielsen.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Mr. Nicolson.
Mr. Waley.

FRANCE
M. Tardieu.
Marshal Foch.
General Weygand.
General Le Rond.
M. Laroche.
M. Kammerer.
M. Jouasset.
M. Serruys.

ITALY
M. Dell'Abbadessa.
M. Galli.
Colonel Castoldi.
M. Pilotti.

1. **M. CLEMENCEAU** said that he had requested Marshal Foch to be present at this meeting of the Council for the purpose of further studying the question of the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the German troops. He had received a letter from Mr. Polk regarding this matter. (The letter contained in Appendix "A" was then read to the Council.) He would like to know what answer had been given by Mr. Lloyd George in the course of his conversation with Mr. Polk.

Evacuation of the
Baltic Provinces by
the German Armies

MR. POLK stated that he did not like to quote the words of another person, but that he understood Mr. Lloyd George to say that he preferred to let matters stand as they were. Mr. Lloyd George had thought that the question should not be brought up again until the Germans had indicated a refusal to carry out the withdrawal, should they so refuse. He had answered Mr. Lloyd George that he believed the question should be brought up at once, and for this reason had written the letter to M. Clemenceau, which had just been read.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Marshal Foch might read the instructions which he proposed to send to General Henrys.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had sent the instructions to General Henrys in accordance with the decision reached by the Council.¹ He had told him that the principle of an ultimatum to Germany had been decided upon, but that his opinion was asked before the same should be transmitted to Germany.

MR. POLK asked whether it was agreed that the Council should take no decision until the receipt of the answer from General Henrys.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that his instructions to General Henrys had been based on the fact that the principle of an ultimatum had been decided upon. If this ultimatum was now considered as conditional, it would be necessary for him to modify the instructions which he had sent.

MR. POLK pointed out that he was not opposed to an ultimatum, but wished solely to formulate objections to the use of the Polish troops.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the sending of an ultimatum without deciding upon the means to carry it into execution would be a useless procedure. He had made a study of this question and believed that the Polish troops constituted the only force which could be used. If the Council were of the opinion that no use could be made of these troops, it was unnecessary to send an ultimatum.

MR. POLK stated that the feeling of the American Delegation on this question was that the use of Polish troops against Germany in the Baltic provinces would be to cause hostilities, which had been suppressed in Upper Silesia with great difficulty, to spring up again. A

¹ HD-54, minute 1, p. 218.

military operation of this character would certainly lead to war between Germany and Poland. It was extremely necessary to maintain the situation in Upper Silesia in a calm state, in order not to increase the actual difficulties of the coal shortage. After the Treaty had been ratified by three great Powers, Upper Silesia would be occupied by Interallied troops. When this occupation became a fact, and when no further disorders in the coal districts were likely, the Council might then decide to use the Polish forces. He was not opposed to their eventual use, should the need arise.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in view of Mr. Polk's statement he believed the best course at present was to adjourn the discussion and to take the question up again when Upper Silesia should be occupied by the Interallied troops.

MR. POLK said that the matter seemed to him particularly serious. The Council was obliged to decide whether it was preferable to allow the Germans to remain in Lithuania for the moment, or drive them therefrom even at the risk of shutting down the production of coal in Upper Silesia. He had talked with Mr. Loucheur and with Mr. Hoover, who had both stated that the cutting off of the coal supply would have very serious consequences. He had talked with Mr. Tittoni on the previous evening regarding the matter and the latter had agreed with him that an unnecessary risk would be run through this operation.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the Conference alone was capable of choosing between these two political courses of action.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he personally regretted that this operation, which he believed excellent, should not take place. In the face of the opposition of the American Delegation, however, the matter must be suspended, for it was exceedingly dangerous to commence it without being sure of carrying it to a successful completion.

MARSHAL FOCH said that on three separate occasions threats had been sent which had not been followed up.

MR. POLK said that the gravity of the situation in Silesia appeared worthy of considerable thought and should compel the Council to hesitate.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would hesitate if he believed that the proposed action in the Baltic provinces would have an effect on the situation in Silesia, but he was not of this opinion.

MR. POLK answered that he had recently interviewed the different American representatives, who had arrived from Poland, Silesia and the Baltic provinces, namely, Mr. Gibson, Colonel Goodyear and Colonel Greene. These gentlemen were all of the opinion that the coal situation would be seriously aggravated and threatened should the proposed action be taken. He had also seen Mr. Paderewski and

had asked him whether he was ready to bear the expenses of the operation in question. Mr. Paderewski had replied that France was to bear the expense. He had then informed Mr. Paderewski that the United States would not incur any obligations therein. He believed, however, that it would be well to ask General Henrys what his opinion in the matter might be.

MARSHAL FOCH said that General Henrys could only report on one element of the problem, namely, the condition and state of the Polish Army. It should not be lost sight of, however, that the Council, in insisting upon the evacuation of the Baltic provinces, was simply carrying into effect one of the clauses of the Treaty. The Allied and Associated Powers should stand together on this matter. It should be understood that the Polish Army would be in charge of the operation, but it would be supported both by the Czecho-Slovak troops and the Allied detachments on the Rhine. General Henrys would answer that he could not defeat Germany with the Polish forces alone—more particularly should Germany be able to concentrate all her troops against Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Poles had notified the Council that they possessed an army of 450,000 men.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that these figures were accurate but that this force would not be sufficient to defeat Germany and that the Allies would risk seeing Poland severely dealt with, which was obviously not a situation to be desired.

MR. POLK said that he had no objections to the sending of an ultimatum, but only to the use of Polish troops. He believed that another method of pressure to compel the execution of the ultimatum could be found, either from an economic standpoint through the Economic Council, or by the retention of prisoners of war. He did not think that the risk of starting a new war between Poland and Germany should be run, because no one of the Powers was at present disposed to render financial aid to Poland. On the other hand, economic pressure might be exceedingly effective. For example, the Germans at the present time are in the process of borrowing money from the United States through the agency of private banks. The Council might put a stop to this procedure. The recent example of Rumania, who had acted as an agent of the Allied and Associated Powers, seemed to him extremely unsatisfactory and should not lead the Council to stir up a similar operation elsewhere. He suggested therefore that an ultimatum might be sent, making use of economic pressure.

M. TARDIEU said that the retention of the prisoners of war constituted an excellent means of pressure as well, for their immediate

repatriation was necessary to the internal political situation of Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that Marshal Foch should read the text of an ultimatum which he had prepared, and that if such text were satisfactory to the Council, it might be modified in the way suggested by Mr. Polk.

MARSHAL FOCH then read his proposed letter to the German Government (see Appendix "B").

MR. POLK stated that he found this text satisfactory.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the steps which had been discussed as a method of pressure would be sufficient to bring about the execution of the matters covered in the note.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Polk was favorable to an economic means of pressure, such as a blockade.

MR. POLK said that he was particularly anxious not to commit the Council at the present time to the use of the Polish Army. He did not wish to intimate that this Army might not be made use of at some future time, but he wished to leave the decision of this question open.

MARSHAL FOCH said that on three different occasions ultimatums couched in mild language had been sent to the German Government on the following dates: June 18, August 1 and August 24.

MR. POLK remarked that as the Council had already sent three ultimatums a fourth was scarcely necessary. The best method of procedure would be to notify Mr. von Lersner that the Council insisted upon the carrying out of the Armistice in question, and that in case of refusal certain measures, such as blockade, other means of exerting economic pressure, retention of prisoners of war, and, as a last resort, the use of the Polish Army, had been decided upon.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this notice should be in writing.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he was prepared to draft the text of such a letter, as he was familiar with the question. An answer had been received from the Germans to the effect that they were willing to evacuate the territory in question but that they could not enforce the execution of their orders.

(It was decided that General Weygand should submit to the Council at its next meeting, a draft letter to the German Delegation demanding the withdrawal of the German forces from the Baltic provinces. This letter should draw attention to the means of exercising pressure on the German Government proposed by Mr. Polk, viz., blockade and other economic pressure, retention of prisoners of war, and possible use of the Polish forces.)

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand then withdrew.)

2. Upon the proposal of Mr. Scialoja the resolution taken on September 11 (H. D. 52, minute 6)² regarding the languages used for the convention on Aerial Navigation was modified to read as follows:

“It was decided that the Convention on Aerial Navigation should be drafted in English, French and Italian, each text to be of equal authority.”

3. (At this point the members of the Central Territorial Commission entered the room.)

M. TARDIEU stated that the Greek Delegation had sent a letter to the Central Territorial Commission on September 13 relative to certain points with regard to the territorial clauses of the Bulgarian Treaty (see appendix C). The Central Territorial Commission had been of the opinion:

1. That the request put forward by the Greek Delegation is ethnographically just.

2. That the line proposed by the Greek Delegation should, from a geographical point of view, be modified in accordance with the red line on the map annexed to the commission's report.

The Italian delegate, in view of the principle put forward by the Greek Delegation, suggested a change in the line of Western Thrace to the advantage of Bulgaria.

The American delegate, while not denying the weight of the opinions of the other delegations, drew attention to the inconvenience which would result from changing a line already unanimously decided upon and it further did not believe itself to be in a position to advance an opinion without a more careful study of the whole question.

Mr. POLK said that he had certain objections to formulate. President Wilson, before his departure, had personally proposed a line of demarkation. He had already agreed to a considerable modification of this line and did not feel that he had authority to make a further change therein. He pointed out that he had already consented to the taking of certain territories in the region of Adrianople from Bulgaria, although there was a large population of Bulgarians in such territories. He could do nothing further along these lines and in addition felt that the proposed change, even though ethnographically just, was unsound from a geographic point of view.

(It was decided to reject the proposal of the Greek Delegation with regard to a further modification of the frontiers of Bulgaria in Western Thrace.) (See appendix “C”.)

² *Ante*, p. 187.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the necessity of asking the Bulgarians to withdraw their troops from Western Thrace as they were still occupying that region as well as the Stroumitza salient. This occupation might last for a long time, as the Bulgarian delegation had requested a period of twenty to twenty-five days in which to prepare their answer to the Peace Conditions of the Allies. The Bulgarian occupation compelled the Allies to maintain troops in the neighborhood which were not absolutely necessary. He suggested that the Bulgarians might be told that the Allies were likely to grant them the delay requested, on condition that they would evacuate the territories in question immediately.

Evacuation of
Western Thrace
by the Bulgarian
Troops

MR. POLK asked what forces would relieve the Bulgarian troops.

M. TARDIEU answered that the military experts believed that three battalions only would be necessary to maintain order in Thrace. This force was already on the ground and there was in addition a division in Sofia which could profitably be recalled. He pointed out that there was no question of inserting a clause in the Bulgarian Treaty regarding this matter.

MR. POLK said that as the matter had no place in the Bulgarian Peace Treaty he proposed the consideration of the Treaty itself be terminated and the proposition of M. Tardieu be adjourned to the following day.

(This proposal was accepted.)

(Mr. Tardieu then withdrew and Mr. Kammerer entered the room.)

M. KAMMERER said that the Greek Delegation had, on September 15 sent to the Secretary General some additional remarks relative to the political clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

(b) Political
Clauses.
Article 56

(See appendix "D".) The Committee on New States had prepared a report on the matter which had been submitted to the various delegations (see appendix E).

(It was decided to accept the following clause proposed by the Greek delegation for insertion in Article 56, with regard to the protection of minorities and voluntary emigration:

Article 56, paragraph 2: "Bulgaria undertakes to recognize the provisions which the Allied and Associated Powers shall deem opportune relative to reciprocal and voluntary emigration of ethnic minorities."

M. KAMMERER continuing said that the Greek Delegation had also asked that a paragraph be added to Article 50 dealing with the protection of minorities. (See Appendix D.) The Committee on New States believed that the Treaty should be limited to general provisions with regard to the different religious sects, and therefore that by accepting the addition proposed by the Greek delegation the risk would be incurred of enter-

Article 50

ing into details and thereby creating a precedent. For this reason the Committee on New States had recommended that the Council reject the Greek proposal.

(It was decided to reject the paragraph proposed by the Greek delegation for insertion in Article 50 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty.)

M. LAROCHE said that the Greek Delegation had proposed a change in Article 44 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty (See appendix F). By this proposal the Greek Delegation asked solely that it be treated in the same manner as the Slav [*Serb*]-Croat-Slovene State, and it had appeared difficult to refuse the addition requested. The Drafting Committee upon being consulted had approved of the text drawn by the Greeks.

(After a short discussion it was decided to insert the following paragraph in Article 44 of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, in accordance with the request of the Greek Delegation :

“Bulgarian nationals, however, who became resident in this territory after October 18, 1912, will not acquire Greek nationality without a permit from Greece.”)

M. KAMMERER said that the Greek Delegation had formulated certain objections with regard to Article 46 by which Article Greece agreed to execute a special treaty for the protection of minorities. The refusal to execute the article was based on the fact that no additional territory was given to Greece by the Bulgarian treaty. The committee on New States was of the opinion that this point was well taken and therefore proposed that Greece, while agreeing to sign the clause of the Bulgarian treaty obligating her to execute the minorities treaty, should not be compelled to sign the latter treaty until such time as she should be assured of the grant of new territories.

(It was decided that a letter should be sent by the President of the Peace Conference to the Greek Delegation requesting the latter to accept Article 46 of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty and notifying them that the special treaty provided for in this article would not be submitted for signature until such time as the Conference should be able to make known to the Greeks the territory which might be attributed to them.)

M. KAMMERER said that the Greeks had in addition raised certain objections with regard to the signature of special clauses in the treaty with Greece. The Committee on New States had rejected all the Greek proposals with the exception of that dealing with the option of nationalities. Should the Council accept the proposal of the Committee a simple modification of Article 3 of the proposed treaty with Greece would give effect to the objection.

Article 44

Article 46

Special Treaty
With Greece

(It was decided that Article 3 of the proposed treaty between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece should be so modified as that the first paragraph should read as follows:

“Greece recognizes as Greek nationals with full rights and without any formalities Bulgarian, Turk (or Albanian) nationals domiciled at the date of the entry into force of the present treaty, on territory transferred to Greece since January 1, 1913.[”]

(At this point Mr. Laroche and Mr. Kammerer withdrew, and Mr. Jouasset entered the room.)

MR. JOUASSET said that the Greek Delegation had formulated certain objections relative to the reparations clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria (See Appendix “F”). The Commission on the Reparation of Damages had studied these criticisms and had submitted its report in the matter to the Secretary General. (See Appendix “G.”)

It was decided to accept the proposal of the Reparations Commission with regard to Article 121, the sixth paragraph of which should be amended to read as follows:

“These sums shall be remitted through the Interallied Commission referred to in Article 130 of this part to the Reparation Commission created by the Treaty of Peace with Germany of June 28, 1919, such as it is constituted by the Treaty with Austria of September 10, 1919, (Part VIII, Annex II, Paragraph 2); This Commission is referred to hereinafter as the Reparations Commission. It will assure the effecting of payments in conformity with the arrangements already made.”

After a short discussion it was decided to accept the proposal of the Reparations Commission and to add the following additional paragraph to Article 127:

“In addition to the deliveries mentioned above, the Interallied Commission shall have the authority, should they recognize it as possible, to attribute to Greece, Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State during the two years which shall follow the entry into force of the present Treaty, such quantities of livestock as may appear to them justified; the value of these deliveries shall be placed to the credit of Bulgaria.”

MR. JOUASSET then read that portion of the report of the Commission on Reparations dealing with this question. (See Appendix “G”, Paragraph II.) He said that the French Delegation had made a proposal which, after liquidation of the debts and credits of Bulgaria to Germany, gave the Reparations Commission the right to decide whether the remainder of the Bulgarian debt should be demanded or whether Bulgaria should be granted certain terms or intervals of payment, or a complete remission of the debt. Such a formula would be simple and would not commit anyone to a fixed course of action in the future. It

(c) Reparation
Clauses

Delivery of
Livestock by
Bulgaria

Debts of Bulgaria
With Relation
to Germany,
Austria, etc.

would have the further advantage of giving satisfaction to the five small States and of nullifying any pretext which the latter might have to refuse advance payments accorded them by the Allies. On the other hand, if a part of the debt were remitted in the first instance to Bulgaria, an enemy Power, the small States might take advantage of this precedent and refuse to settle their debts to the Allies.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the debt of Bulgaria in relation to Germany and Austria should not be compared to the debt of the different small States with relation to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The British Delegation was of the opinion that changes in the text of the Treaty would constitute a sign of weakness and that the most simple course to pursue was to uphold the text in its present form.

MR. POLK said that it was certain that Bulgaria could not pay more than it was actually called upon. To make a change in the article in question would be to raise false hopes in the minds of the small Powers, that they might obtain something which they were certain not to receive. He therefore believed that the text as drafted should be upheld.

MR. SCIALOJA said that the French proposal simply transferred the difficulty to the Reparations Commission. This would lead to a delay of three months, during which time Bulgaria would not be able to obtain the credit which she needed. It was to be feared that in addition she would dispute certain of her debts, and such a loss of time might even result in the enhancement of the payment of such sums as she indisputably owed for the purpose of reparations.

(After a short further discussion, it was decided to make no change in the text of Article 124 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.)

(At this point Mr. Kammerer and Mr. Jouasset withdrew, and Mr. Serruys entered the room.)

MR. SERRUYS said that the Roumanian Delegation had presented three proposals regarding Articles 171, 175 and 177 of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria. (See Appendix "H".) The Economic Commission had studied these proposals and had submitted a report thereon to the Secretary General indicating its opinion. (See Appendix "I".)

(After a short discussion, it was decided to accept the report submitted by the Economic Commission :

Article 171: The English text of Article 171 being the only one which is accurate, it was decided to revise the French and Italian texts to conform therewith.

Article 175: It was decided to maintain the text of this Article without change. The benefit of capitulations in Bulgaria in favor of Japan is upheld but is not to be extended to all the Allied and Associated Powers.

(d) Economic
Clauses

Article 177: The Roumanian proposal was rejected and the Article maintained without change.)

4. On the proposal of M. Clemenceau, it was decided that the text of the conditions of the Peace with Bulgaria should be presented to the Bulgarian Delegation at the meeting of the Supreme Council on Friday, September 19, 1919, at 11:00 o'clock, in the Salle de l'Horloge, Quai d'Orsay.

Presentation of
the Treaty of
Peace to the
Bulgarian
Delegation

The Meeting then adjourned.

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, September 17, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-55

[*Mr. Frank L. Polk to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

PARIS, September 16, 1919.

DEAR MR. CLEMENCEAU: I have been giving a good deal of thought to the subject we discussed yesterday, namely, what to do with the German forces in Lithuania. After taking the matter up with our experts and with my colleagues I have come to the conclusion that it would be most unwise at the present moment to authorize the use of the Polish troops against the Germans in case of their refusal. It would, in our opinion, probably bring on trouble in Silesia, thereby threatening, if not destroying, the coal supply of Central Europe, a serious thing in itself, but it would also bring on a conflict between the Poles and the Baltic Provinces. Mr. Gibson, our Minister to Poland, is convinced that General Henrys will be of the same opinion. It would seem, therefore, wiser not to commit ourselves to the use of the Poles at present, but to wait until we see what attitude the Germans will take and then decide the question.

In the light of existing circumstances I think this has a further advantage, inasmuch as after the Treaty is ratified the German military forces will be reduced and Allied occupation of Silesia will be possible.

I saw Mr. Lloyd George this morning and told him what our view was and attempted to see you, as I thought it was important that you should know our decision at the earliest possible moment. I will tell Mr. Tittoni this afternoon and will bring the matter up at the Conference tomorrow so that our views can be formally recorded. I regret to have to change my views, but under the circumstances I feel I made a mistake yesterday in consenting to this arrangement.

Believe me [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

M. CLEMENCEAU

*President of the Peace Conference,
Quai d'Orsay, Paris.*

Appendix B to HD-55

[Translation ³]*Note for the German Government*

3rd Section

SEPTEMBER 16, 1919.

(1) Article XII of the Armistice of November 11 stipulates that: "German troops at present in territories which before the war belonged to Russia shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they were on August 1, 1914, as soon as the Allies shall think best, after taking into account the internal situation of these territories."

Article 433 of the Treaty of Peace confirms these provisions in all points.

(2) The Allied and Associated Governments, who on several occasions have requested Germany to carry out the evacuation of its troops from the Baltic Provinces,^{*} have decided that this evacuation should be accomplished without any delay.

Moreover, they are prepared to take, in agreement with the Governments of the Baltic Provinces, all suitable measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security in the Baltic territories after the withdrawal of the German troops.

(3) The German Government is called upon, therefore, by the present note, to proceed immediately to the complete evacuation of its military forces from the Baltic Provinces, under the conditions and within the time limits of which the particulars are laid down in No. 5 hereafter.⁴

This complete evacuation is to apply not only to self-contained units, but also to general staffs and departments, and to all isolated German military units now stationed in Russian territory.

(4) The German Government is held responsible for the carrying out of these stipulations.

In case of non-execution, the Allied and Associated Governments have determined upon the necessary measures to enforce respect for their decision.

In the event that they should be obliged to resort to these measures, all the German military remaining in Russian territory would be made prisoners of war.

³ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

^{*} Notes of June 18, No. 3039; of August 1, No. 3637; and of August 24, No. 4050. [Footnote in the original.]

⁴ No. 5 does not accompany the minutes.

Appendix C to HD-55

GREEK DELEGATION
TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE

Supplementary Remarks on the Peace Conditions With Bulgaria

PARIS, September 13, 1919.

Pursuant to its note of September 9 the Greek Delegation has the honor to submit to the examination of the Supreme Council of the Conference the following supplementary remarks on the subject of the frontier line indicated in Articles 27, 30 (page 22).

The proposed frontier in Western Thrace is composed of two parts, one of which runs from west to east, the other from north to south; the latter follows for most of its length the Bulgarian Turkish frontier of 1913.

If this second part of the line were to be definitely maintained it would offer, from the ethnographic and military points of view, serious disadvantages, to which the Greek Delegation thinks it its duty to call the attention of the Supreme Council of the Conference.

I.

The Bulgarian Turkish frontier of 1913 in Western Thrace, south of the Arda, cuts in two, and more or less at right angles to the *thalweg* of this river, the basin of the Kisildeli, a tributary of the Maritsa.

The trace proposed would leave thus to Bulgaria the upper valley of the Kisildi, taking in the principal part of the *casa* [*Caza?*] of Orta-koui.

Now, except for the north-west district, in which are grouped most of the Bulgarians living in the region (4060 souls) the rest of the *casa* has a population essentially Mussulman and Greek; the first numbering 15,273 souls, the second, 14,562. This would therefore be subjecting nearly 30,000 inhabitants to the Bulgarian yoke, from which, after having equally suffered from it, Greeks and Mussulmans ask only to be delivered.

II.

To avoid this serious disadvantage, the Greek delegation has the honor to propose that, in this region, the Bulgarian frontier be traced along the crest which closes the basin of the right bank of the Arda, from Douk-Doumanlik-Dag (east extremity of the Tokatjik) to midway between the villages of Papas-koui and Orta-koui, then

following the crest which runs from south to north, west of the village Karatope, as far as the course of the Arda; then the course of the Arda to its junction with the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier of 1913; and from there, the line of this frontier to the Maritsa.

This line would not only be more in conformity with the ethnographic situation of the country, but it would offer, from the strategic point of view, an incontestable advantage over the frontier indicated in Articles 27 and 30.

[Appendix D to HD-55]

[Translation *]

HELLENIC DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONGRESS

The Secretariat of the Greek Delegation, in continuation of its previous comments on the subject of the conditions of peace with Bulgaria, has the honor to submit to the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference:

(1) A draft of a paragraph to be added to article 50 of the draft treaty with Bulgaria, concerning the protection of minorities.

(2) A draft of a paragraph to be added to article 56, on the subject of the protection of minorities and relating to voluntary emigration.

PARIS, September 15, 1919.

SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Quai d'Orsay.

[Enclosure 1]

TREATY WITH BULGARIA

Draft of a Paragraph To Be Added to Article 50 of the Treaty With Bulgaria

(Protection of Minorities)

“The adherents of the Greek Patriarchate who will elect to continue to reside in Bulgaria are attached, from the ecclesiastical point of view, to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Their communities in Bulgaria are recognized as legal persons, capable in particular of holding property and of maintaining churches and schools which use the Greek language, and in which freedom of attendance is guaranteed.”

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

[Enclosure 2]

TREATY WITH BULGARIA

Draft of a Paragraph To Be Added to Article 56

(Protection of Minorities and Voluntary Emigration)

Article 56, paragraph 2

“Bulgaria undertakes to recognize the provisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall adopt regarding the reciprocal and voluntary exchange of racial minorities.”

 Appendix E to HD-55
Report of the Commission on the New States

BULGARIAN TREATY

Reciprocal and Voluntary Emigration in Macedonia

On September 4 the Supreme Council accepted the report of the Commission on the new States on a proposal of Mr. Venizelos tending to the establishment of mixed commission to facilitate the emigration in Macedonia.⁹ It authorized that Commission to agree with Mr. Venizelos on the best way to give full effect to the proposals of the latter, the principle of which had seemed excellent to the Commission on the new States.

However, since the Drafting Committee had asked an immediate answer as to the final draft of the Bulgarian Treaty, which was to be delivered the next day, the Supreme Council has decided to give up any insertion in that Treaty of the clauses relative to reciprocal emigration in the Balkans, clauses whose drafting have not yet been discussed.

Following the decision of September 5 [4], the Commission on the new States has entered into relation with Mr. Venizelos who declared himself in accord in principle with the proposed text. But the Greek Delegation observed that if no provision on that subject was inserted in the Treaty with Bulgaria there was no possibility to make that State accept that draft willingly.

That remark is correct. Since, on account of a delay, the Treaty with Bulgaria had not yet been delivered and it does not seem that it is going to be delivered for several days, the Commission on the new States, unanimously in accord with the Greek Delegation takes the

⁹ HD-47, minute 4, and appendix F, pp. 101, 114.

liberty to submit to the Supreme Council the following draft which should be imposed on Bulgaria as *alinéa* 2 of Art. 56 in the section on the protection of the minorities:

“Bulgaria undertakes to recognize the provisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall deem opportune relative to the reciprocal and voluntary emigration of the ethnic minorities.”

Appendix F to HD-55

[*Note From the Greek Delegation*]

REMARKS ON THE PEACE CONDITIONS WITH BULGARIA

After having noted the peace conditions with Bulgaria which the Secretary General of the Conference communicated to it yesterday, the Greek Delegation hastens to submit to the examination of the Supreme Council the following remarks, which it requests the Council to take into account in the final draft of the Treaty which will be presented to the Bulgarian plenipotentiaries.

I.—POLITICAL CLAUSES

(Articles 44 and 46.)

1.—Article 44 contains no reserve on the subject of the automatic acquisition of Greek nationality by Bulgarian nationals established in the territories assigned to Greece.

It is otherwise, in Article 39, on the subject of the acquisition of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationality, which is acquired by Bulgarian nationals established in the territories assigned to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State later than January 1, 1910, only by virtue of an authorization from this state.

This provision is inspired by analagous clauses contained in the Peace Treaty with Germany (Articles 36, 53, 91, and 112) on the subject of the settlement of the questions of nationality in the relations of this state with Belgium, France, Poland and Denmark.

The Greek Government has already, before the Commission on the New States, expressed the wish that, by analogy, it be specified that the acquisition of Greek nationality only by its authorization to the Bulgarian nationals who may have established themselves on the territories assigned to Greece, later than the beginning of the Balkan Wars (October 18, 1912) or than the Treaty of Bucarest (August 10, 1913),⁷ which brought them to an end.

⁷ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658

The Greek Delegation has, in consequence, the honor to propose that Article 44, on the model of Article 39, be completed by a second paragraph as follows:

“However, Bulgarian nationals who may have established themselves in these territories later than October 18, 1912, shall be able to acquire Greek nationality only on the authorization of Greece.”

2.—Article 46, relative to certain engagements on the part of Greece concerning the protection of minorities and the freedom of transit, does not seem to find its proper place in the Treaty with Bulgaria. Analogous provisions, inserted in the Treaty with Germany, for Poland, or in the Treaty with Austria, for Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, figure in these treaties as the counterpart of the territorial acquisitions realized by the said states by virtue of these treaties.

Article 46 has no counterpart in the Treaty with Bulgaria, since Greece realizes no territorial acquisition by this Treaty.

It would be, it seems, better placed in the later treaty which is to settle the new frontiers of Greece, on the subject of which the Greek Delegation has the honor to recall the fact that it maintains territorial claims in Thrace.

II.—REPARATIONS

(Articles 121, 124, 127)

1. Article 121, paragraph 6, establishing the powers of the Reparation Commission on the subject of the payment of the war indemnity imposed on Bulgaria, mentions the Commission created by the Treaty with Germany. However, since the signing of that Treaty, the composition of the Reparation Commission has been changed in the Treaty with Austria (Article 175 and Annex II, Article 2), which admitted to it, under certain modalities, the collaboration of a Greek delegate.

If the Reparation Commission were to remain from [*for?*] Bulgaria as it was created by the Treaty with Germany, Greece would not be represented on it, while the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would. There would thus be created a situation strange, to say the least: Greece would have a representative for Austria, with whom she has interests relatively secondary, while she would have none with Bulgaria, with which her interests are vital and of first importance.

The Greek Delegation is of the opinion that it would be just and logical to change Article 121, paragraph 6, taking as a basis the aforesaid texts of the Treaty with Austria; a Greek delegate should be added to the Commission, with the right to take part in the debates and to vote whenever questions concerning Greece were being examined.

2. Article 124 stipulates that Bulgaria recognizes the transfer provided by Article 261 of the Treaty with Germany and the corresponding articles of the Treaty with Austria, Hungary and Turkey, to the profit of the Allied and Associated Powers, of all the credits of her former Allies with regard to her. But it adds, in its second paragraph, that the Allied and Associated Powers undertake to enter against Bulgaria no further claims under this head, for the reason that they have taken these credits into account in fixing the sum to be paid by Bulgaria at two billion, two hundred and fifty million francs (2,250,000,000 francs).

Under the form of a remission of debt, this is a liberality pure and simple, which, shown to a hostile country charged with so many misdeeds, seems all the more unjust and shocking since it is done at the expense of Allied and friendly states, who have suffered cruelly from the war and have been the victims of Bulgaria.

However unusual may be the form of such a clause in a chapter dealing with the reparation due by Bulgaria, one might, as to content, understand it if by fixing at 2,250,000,000 francs the sum total to be paid by this state, the extreme limit of its capacity to pay had been reached.

But it is nothing of that sort. The Delegations of the principal states concerned have tried to establish, and they think they have established, before the second Sub-Commission on Reparation, that Bulgaria can perfectly well pay more as reparation. No account has been taken of their argument, but it has never been shown to be false.

As to the Greek Delegation, it can only continue to be of the opinion that the sum of 2,250,000,000 is far within Bulgaria's capacity to pay.

It considers, therefore, that Article 124 consecrates a veritable injustice, by depriving Greece of a part of the right that she acquires by virtue of Article 261 of the Treaty with Germany, not only because the sum total fixed by Article 121 is far below Bulgaria's ability to pay, but also because, as a result of the proposed liberality, Bulgaria will find herself in regard to her foreign debt, in a situation more favorable than her neighbors, and notably Greece.

Under these conditions, the Greek Delegation is of the opinion that if it is just to take into account Bulgaria's ability to pay, it would be entirely iniquitous not to take into account the ability of Greece, in order to avoid a disproportion of charges between the two countries which would make it possible for Bulgaria to rise in spite of her crimes, while it would condemn Greece to vegetate in spite of her sufferings and her victory.

The Greek Delegation appeals to the Supreme Council's sense of justice to request the suppression of paragraph 2 of Article 124.

3. Article 124 [127] obliges Bulgaria to deliver to Greece, as restitution of animals taken by her in the course of the war from Greek territories, various categories and quantities of livestock, forming a total of 12,015 head.

More than once the Greek Delegation has already had the honor to call the attention of the Reparation Commission to the fact that the livestock removed by Bulgaria reaches a total of 313,411 head, of which 87,087 were carried away by the Bulgarians of Eastern Macedonia after the armistice and in express violation of its provisions.

The quantity fixed by Article 127 therefore represents only 4% of the total losses of Greece, or 15% of the losses after the armistice.

Greece might doubtless be satisfied with this if Bulgaria were not able to make larger restitution without her livestock suffering greater loss than she imposed on her neighbors. But this is not true. According to Bulgarian statistics themselves, Bulgaria had in 1910 nearly thirteen million head of livestock; since then, her livestock has considerably increased by natural increment, by the acquisition of livestock in the provinces acquired after the Balkan Wars, and finally as the result of innumerable thefts from Serbia, Rumania and Greece. In Greece, on the contrary, the livestock, diminished by the Bulgarian thefts, has literally been decimated to supply for three years the most urgent needs of the Allied and Greek troops, which, on account of the difficulties and dangers of transport, have very often been obliged to live off of the country.

Under these conditions, the quantities of livestock which Article 125 [127] indicates as being due to Greece, beyond the fact that they are infinitesimal in proportion to the losses suffered by the Greek livestock, represent only an insignificant part of the assets that Bulgaria might consent to abandon to her neighbors, still keeping a number of livestock greater than theirs.

The Greek Delegation insists, therefore, that Bulgaria be obliged to deliver to Greece at least the quantity of livestock taken by her after the Armistice, that is, 87,087 head.

Appendix G to HD-55

COMMISSION ON
REPARATION OF DAMAGES

FINANCE MINISTRY,
PARIS, September 12, 1919.

Note for the Secretariat General of the Conference

The Secretariat of the Reparations Commission of the Peace Conference having received in the evening of September 11th, three letters

emanating from the Greek (Annex I attached hereto),⁸ Rumanian (Annex II) and Serb-Croat-Slovene (Annex III) Delegations, and concerning the project of the Treaty with Bulgaria, the Reparations Committee met on September 12th at 10:30 to deliberate on the matter.

The Commission esteemed in the first place that the letter from the Jugo-Slav Delegation called for no action.

Concerning the request of the Greek and Rumanian Delegations, which introduced three important questions, the Commission emits the following views:

I.—REPRESENTATION ON THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION

The Commission proposes to the Supreme Council that satisfaction be given one of the requests of the Greek Delegation and that, in consequence, the sixth paragraph of Article 121 of the Peace Conditions with Bulgaria be modified as follows by adding the underlined words below:

“These sums shall be remitted through the Inter-Allied Commission referred to in article 130 of this part to the Reparation Commission created by the Treaty of Peace with Germany of June 28, 1919, such as it is constituted by the treaty with Austria of September 10, 1919 (Part VIII, Annex II, paragraph 2); this commission is referred to hereinafter as the Reparations Commission. It will assure the effecting of payments in conformity with the arrangements already made.”

This modification causes Greece, Poland, Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Czecho-Slovakia to have representation by a common delegate to the Reparations Commission when the Commission will take up the application of the Treaty with Austria. The actual text does not accord representation to Greece, Poland, Rumania or Czecho-Slovakia.

On the other hand, the Commission did not think it possible to agree to the request made by Greece, that she be accorded a special representative on the Reparations Commission.

II.—THE DEBTS OF BULGARIA WITH RELATION TO GERMANY, AUSTRIA, ETC.

The Greek Delegation protests against Article 124, Paragraph II, of the Peace Conditions with Bulgaria, by which the Allied and Associated Powers, although supporting the transfer for their profit of the credits of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Turkey on Bulgaria,

⁸ The annexes do not accompany the appendix. For the text of the Greek letter, see appendix F, *supra*.

in fact they undertake to formulate no claim under this head against this latter Power.

The Commission deemed that it was not necessary to modify Article 124 because the limit of Bulgaria's paying capacity appeared to it to be reached by the obligations imposed on that country as reparations and because they thought it preferable that all the sums the payment of which are to be obtained from Bulgaria be paid under a reparations head.

A proposition made by the French Delegation, tending not to have this remission of debt officially affirmed, or to leave it open only to possibility, was not recognized; the American and British Delegations pronounced themselves against it and the Italian Delegation expressed reserve.

III.—DELIVERY OF STOCK BY BULGARIA

The Greek and Rumanian Delegations request that the totals carried in Article 127 of the Peace Conditions with Bulgaria be raised regarding the delivery of stock which Bulgaria is to make to their countries.

The Commission does not think this request opportune. But it appeared to the Commission possible that provision be made that supplementary deliveries might, at the will of the Inter-Allied Commission which will operate at Sofia, be attributed to the countries interested. These deliveries would be subordinate to economic, political and other possibilities—they would be calculated by the Inter-Allied Commission itself and would be made, no longer as a restitution claim and aside from reparations, but under the head of reparations and their value would be placed to the credit of Bulgaria.

In consequence the Commission proposes to add to Article 127 an additional paragraph conceived as follows:

“In addition to the deliveries mentioned above, the Inter-Allied Commission shall have the authority, should they recognize it as possible, to attribute to Greece, Rumania and to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State during the two years which shall follow the entry into force of the present treaty, such quantities of stock as may appear to them justified; the value of these deliveries shall be placed to the credit of Bulgaria”.

For the American Delegation:	E. L. DRESEL
For the British Delegation:	S. D. WALEY
For the French Delegation:	G. JOUASSET
For the Italian Delegation:	M. D'AMELIO

Appendix H to HD-55

RUMANIAN DELEGATION
TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, September 9, 1919.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

The Rumanian Delegation to the Economic Commission, while thanking the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference for sending the draft of the Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, which it has just received, wish to call attention to the fact that, probably by an error in the transposition of a phrase in the text of Article 171 of the French edition, the following draft is found in this text:

“Bulgaria recognizes as being and remaining abrogated all treaties, conventions or agreements that she has concluded, before August 1, 1914, or since that date, until the entry into force of the present Treaty, with Russia or with any other State or Government whose territory formerly constituted a part of Russia after August 15, 1916, as well as with Rumania, until the coming into force of the present Treaty”.

in place of the draft, which corresponds exactly with the draft of the same article in the English and Italian editions, should be as follows:

“Bulgaria recognizes as being and remaining abrogated all treaties, conventions or agreements that she has concluded, before August 1, 1914, or since that date until the entrance into force of the present Treaty, with Russia, as well as with Rumania, after August 15, 1916, until the entrance into force of the present Treaty.”

In calling your attention to this subject, the Rumanian Delegation requests that arrangements be made to change the text to conform with the latter draft, before it is sent to the Bulgarian Delegation.

Although it has already stated in its note of August 30, 1919, handed to the Secretariat General of the Economic Commission, relative to Article 244, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with Austria, which corresponds with Article 177, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with Bulgaria, that the provisions of these texts do not apply to Rumania, the Rumanian Delegation thinks, nevertheless, that it should call the attention of the Conference to the fact that the provisions contained in the texts are contrary to the good and just principles admitted in the Treaty with Germany in favor of all the Allied and Associated Powers.

Consequently, the Rumanian Delegation requests that in the Treaty with Bulgaria a return be made to the principles which, in the matter of liquidations, have been admitted in the Treaty with Germany.

The Rumanian Delegation to the Commission on Prisoners has the honor to communicate to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference the satisfaction that it feels at seeing admitted in the Treaty with Bulgaria Article 113, proposed by the Rumanian Delegation—to which adhered also the Delegations of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Greece, referring to the Inter-Allied Investigating Commission on the subject of prisoners of war and interned civilians. The drafting of this article constitutes an act of profound justice towards the unhappy prisoners of war and interned civilians, in whose name we beg you to accept our heart-felt thanks.

Appendix I to HD-55

CONFERENCE ON
PEACE PRELIMINARIES
ECONOMIC COMMISSION

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PARIS, September 12, 1919.

From: The Secretary General of the Economic Commission.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

The Rumanian Delegation has entered three objections to the text of the Treaty with Bulgaria, concerning Articles 171, 175 and 177.

Concerning Article 171, the decision taken by the Supreme Council on September 3¹¹ admits of no doubt, and it is evident that the text as it appears in the Treaty arises from an error, as is shown moreover in the obvious divergence between the French Text and the Italian Text.

The French text should be changed so as to read: "as well as with Rumania after August 15, 1916, until the entrance into force of the present Treaty". (*ainsi qu'avec la Roumanie après le 15 août 1916 jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du présent traité.*)

In the Italian text the change has been made; it is necessary to add: "until the entrance into force of the present treaty". (*fine all'entrata in vigore del presente trattato.*)

Concerning Article 175, paragraph 2, it has not seemed possible to extend this provision to all the Allied and Associated Powers, because in that case the benefit of the capitulations in Bulgaria would have been accorded to Powers which are themselves subject to that regime. The Text is therefore to be maintained, unless the Supreme Council decides otherwise.

¹¹ HD-46, minute 6, p. 82.

Article 177 of the Treaty with Bulgaria takes into account the principles accepted in the Treaty with Germany (Articles 297 *h*, 2) and in the Treaty with Austria (Articles 249, *l*, and Article 267).

In this matter, the remarks contained in the Rumanian Note of September 9¹² seem to be without foundation.

D. SERRUYS

*Secretary General of the Economic Commission
of the Peace Conference*

¹² Appendix H, *supra*.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Thursday, 18 September, 1919, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Hon. F. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja
Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Mr. C. Russell
FRANCE Captain Portier
ITALY M. de Carlo

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items with which they were concerned.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

General Bliss
Hon. H. Gibson
Lt. Col. Greene
Major Tyler
Mr. A. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

Hon. H. Nicolson
General Gough
General Sackville-West
Colonel Kisch
Captain Abraham

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
General Weygand
M. Tardieu
M. Laroche
M. de Montille

ITALY

Colonel Castoldi
M. Galli
M. Dell'Abbadessa

M. PICHON said that M. Clemenceau would not be able to attend the meeting and that he had asked him to make his excuses for him.

I. M. PICHON said that he thought the question should be examined at once. He did not think it necessary to read the two letters which

Mr. Barnes had sent to M. Clemenceau on September 12 and September 17. (See Appendix "A".)

Admission of
German and
Austrian
Delegates to the
International
Labor Congress
at Washington

MR. POLK said that Mr. Barnes had concluded his letter of September 12 by saying that, as M. Clemenceau had learned on the preceding day, Mr. Polk had refused to involve his Government, although on the previous day he had given both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Barnes to understand that this accomplishment was within the range of possibility. He did not believe that this statement was quite correct. He had talked that morning with M. Clemenceau, who agreed with him. He did not think that it was the duty of the American Government to invite the German and Austrian delegates to attend the Conference at Washington. He thought that if the Council maintained its resolution of September 11,¹ and if the German and Austrian delegates were invited to take part in the work of the Congress, the American Government would be entirely prepared to facilitate their voyage and accord the necessary passport facilities, in order that these delegates could go to Washington in anticipation of being invited to attend the Conference. Mr. Barnes had not exactly understood him when he said that the American Government were prepared to invite the delegates.

M. PICHON said that the American Government was ready to facilitate the journey of the delegates and that the American Government would inform the two countries in question.

MR. POLK said that the American Government would do this if the Council entrusted them with this task and they would not do it on their own initiative. When the question had previously been discussed, the Italian delegate had raised the question of an invitation. M. Clemenceau had energetically refused to agree that this invitation should be sent in the name of the Council and Mr. Balfour and he had held the same view. What Mr. Barnes asked was that the American Government take the responsibility for this invitation and communicate it to the German and Austrian delegates. He felt that this could only be done if the American Government were requested by the Council to do so.

M. PICHON said that Mr. Polk had stated what had occurred. The Conference had rejected the proposal of M. Scialoja and had taken the resolution which was still in force. The question now was whether

¹ HD-52, minute 4, p. 185.

the American Government would consent to inform the German and Austrian delegates that they could go to Washington, that the necessary arrangements for the journey would be made and that they should await the decision of the Congress at Washington, which alone was able to decide as to whether or not they were to be admitted.

MR. POLK said that he did not wish to continue a discussion which concerned only a question of form. He was ready to inform the German and Austrian delegates unofficially in the name of the American Government, that they would receive every facility for their journey. He thought the time might be saved if Mr. Barnes, Mr. Gompers and their French and Italian colleagues informed the German and Austrian delegates unofficially that they would undoubtedly be permitted to participate in the Conference.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he agreed with Mr. Polk that it was simply a question of form. He desired to say, however, that Mr. Barnes, in his letter of the 12th September, proposed simply that the decision taken by the Council on the preceding day be communicated to the German and Austrian Governments through the medium of the Secretariat General.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that it had been said that the notification in question should be communicated unofficially. Any communication from the Secretariat General would, of necessity, be official.

MR. POLK said that the American Delegation were prepared to make this communication, if they were directed by the Council to do so.

M. SCIALOJA said that he thought it would be desirable to add to the communication that the American Government were prepared to facilitate the journey of the delegates, who should go to Washington before the opening of the Congress, in order that if they were permitted to participate, the work of the Congress should not be delayed. He considered it important that the workmen of the Allied and Associated Countries should be able to say to their colleagues that the Council had not wished to make this invitation official, but that it had taken every precaution unofficially to ensure its decision being communicated to the German and Austrian delegates.

(It was agreed that the American Delegation should be requested in the name of the Conference to communicate to the German and Austrian Delegations the decision of September 11, 1919, regarding the admission of German and Austrian delegates to the International Labor Congress at Washington.)

II. M. PICHON said that on the preceding day General Weygand had been asked to prepare a text of a note to be addressed to the German Delegation.

GENERAL WEYGAND then read the draft of the note. (See Appendix "B".)

MR. POLK said that the note provided for the evacuation not only of German units, but also of individual Germans, who, after being demobilized, had joined Russian units. He thought that the Allied and Associated Powers would be taking a risk in making a demand which the German Government might not be able to fulfil. He did not know what the United States Government would be able to do, if a situation arose where American citizens had enlisted in Mexican and Cuban units. He felt considerable doubt as to the legal obligations of the Germans in this matter.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he had received documentary proof to show that the German Government encouraged enrollment of Germans in Russian military units, and paid them by giving them land in Russia. This land did not belong to the German Government and the position of that Government was clearly illegal. General Gough was present and could give the Council much interesting information.

MR. POLK said that he had also received the same information as to the action of the German Government. He thought that action, such as had been described, could be provided against in the future. But he did not know whether the Council could demand that the Germans now there could be given up. It was a complicated legal question and he would be very glad to hear the views of M. Berthelot and M. Fromageot.

M. BERTHELOT said that entire companies had passed into the Russian Army. The draft could however be modified, so that note would be taken of Mr. Polk's remarks.

MR. POLK said that the question was one of international law, so far as facts were concerned. Mr. Paderewski had shown him documents which proved that these acts were abetted by the War Office at Berlin. He was satisfied with General Weygand's draft in many respects, but he thought the text too broad.

M. PICHON asked Mr. Polk whether he would be prepared to accept the draft in principle. It would be given to M. Fromageot, who would revise it from a legal point of view.

MR. POLK said he was prepared to do this, if M. Fromageot collaborated with Mr. James Brown Scott.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the military authorities thought that the threat in the last paragraph of the note was strong enough to have the desired effect.

MARSHAL FOCH replied that he did not think so. It was the fourth communication on this subject, which had been made to the German Government. He saw no reason why it should be treated differently from the others. He suggested that the Council hear the opinion of General Gough.

MR. POLK asked whether Marshal Foch thought that the threat to use Polish troops would have the desired effect.

MARSHAL FOCH said that it was not only the question of the use of Polish troops; that the Allied Governments should bring pressure to bear with all their power and all their troops. Thus, there would be a beginning of action and the Allied and Associated Powers would be quite ready to march forward if the necessity therefor should arise.

MR. POLK said that there was a threat of military measures in the last lines of the draft note. There were objections to sending this fourth note, and he thought that the end desired could be accomplished by bringing economic pressure to bear. He was ready on his part to inform the German bankers that they would not be permitted to borrow money in the United States.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had nothing to say in regard to this suggestion.

(At this moment General Gough entered the room.)

M. PICHON said that the Council would be grateful if General Gough expressed his views on the subject of the Baltic Provinces.

GENERAL GOUGH said that in his opinion the greatest danger in Northern Russia was the German danger. It was far more serious than the danger of Bolshevism. There was no doubt that there was a military plot in this region, and that General von der Goltz was at the head of it. The plan consisted in colonizing the Baltic States and raising a strong Russo-German Army, which would be outside of the territory of the Allies, and, in a certain degree, independent of the German Government. The persons responsible for this movement aimed at joining certain Russian parties, who were represented by General Yudenitch,² or if not by General Yudenitch himself, then by persons surrounding him. A great many people were ready to accept the German authority, as they considered it a means of regaining their rights and privileges at Petrograd, and in the surrounding regions. The German authorities did not hesitate to make promises to these people in this sense. If the Allies permitted this force to become constituted, the first result would be destruction of the happiness and liberties of the people of the Baltic Provinces. Then, the independence of Finland would be threatened. If the Allies permitted this plot to succeed, a series of murders and fighting and a state of tyranny would result, in the Baltic Provinces and perhaps in Russia. These peoples, instead of being given peace, would be given a sword. There was also a great danger that this Russo-German force would some day be used against the Allies themselves. It was not impossible, in view of the demobilization of the Allies, that the Russo-German forces would outnumber the Allied forces in a few years,

² Gen. Nicholas N. Yudenitch, commander in chief of the White Russian forces in the Baltic Provinces.

and a very grave menace for Europe would consequently result. He believed that the Allied and Associated Governments should insist upon the immediate withdrawal of the German Military Government and of the German forces. It would next be necessary to establish order and to lend assistance to the Governments of the Baltic Provinces, not only in giving them money, but in lending money, to let them pay for the goods which they would need from the Allied and Associated Powers. In other words, commerce should be restored. The Baltic peoples were rich enough to pay. He added that the peoples of the Baltic Provinces were well disposed toward the Allies. They differed very radically from the German and Russian population as well as from their own aristocracy, the Baltic barons, who were the descendants of the former German conquerors. The great middle class population was well disposed toward the Entente and had a cordial hatred of Germany. If the Allies assisted them in organizing, there would be a barrier, not only against Germany, but against Bolshevism as well. These people were radicals and democrats, but had no liking for Bolshevism. They would not accept Bolshevism, unless they were overrun by Germany or deserted by the Allies. In the latter event, they would undoubtedly prefer Bolshevism to German rule. If the Allied and Associated Powers established peace and restored the prosperity of the Baltic peoples, it would be possible to give these peoples a free hand as regards Central Russia, and even to authorize them, if they wished it, to make peace. The Bolshevik danger was nowhere more threatening than in the interior of Russia, and the populations of these districts were desirous of resuming trade relations with the Baltic populations. Such relations would have a desirable effect.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question before the Conference was to consider the best means of compelling the German Government to withdraw its troops from the Baltic Provinces. It had been said that the German authorities favored the enrollment of their demobilized soldiers in Russian units. He wished to know what power the German Government had over the army of General von der Goltz, and its commander. He questioned whether Germany had really disarmed. He asked whether, if the demobilization should take place on the spot, it would not facilitate enlistments into Russian units.

GENERAL GOUGH replied that the army of General von der Goltz would obey the orders of his [*its?*] commander. It was not a fact that the German Government had no authority over these troops, nor that they had favored demobilization on the spot and filled the country with military workmen. The Letts would murder these workmen, if they were left alone. The Germans in Latvia were soldiers. They were not demobilized and obeyed the orders of General von der Goltz.

They could impose themselves on this region only by force. It had been intended to found colonies of these men in the Baltic Provinces, but this had not as yet been done.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the orders of General von der Goltz would also be obeyed by isolated soldiers in Russian units.

GENERAL GOUGH said that he believed that they would. He held this opinion on account of a similar case, which had occurred previously. When the Germans had evacuated Riga, they had provoked numerous conflicts. There existed at that time a Landwehr battalion composed of 9000 men, of whom 5000 were Germans. The Commander, Fletcher, was a German, as were most of his officers. In spite of protest from certain persons in the Baltic Provinces, it had been possible to send Fletcher, his officers and men, to Mitau, to join their army, and Fletcher himself had returned to East Prussia. To-day this Landwehr battalion was commanded by a British officer, Colonel Young, and there was not a single German in it. There was nothing to be feared on that side. It would be enough if the Germans left the country and the Lettish Government were thoroughly installed, so as to be able to ward against any dangers. There was no doubt of the fact that no German civilian could remain in these regions after the German army had left. They would be massacred by the population immediately.

MR. POLK asked whether the situation in Esthonia and Lithuania was different.

GENERAL GOUGH said that Lithuania had received more assistance from the Allies and was in a position to restore herself more rapidly. Esthonia, on the other hand, had been abandoned to the Germans for many months.

MR. POLK asked General Gough what he thought would be the effect if the Allies used Polish troops to force the Germans to evacuate the Baltic Provinces.

GENERAL GOUGH replied that the use of Polish troops would lead to great confusion in the country and there would be ceaseless fighting. In his opinion, it would be advisable to search for other means, for the Allies ran the risk of seeing the Poles defeated and Poland reconquered by Germany. It was necessary to seek means of establishing peace and not of provoking new wars.

MR. POLK asked General Gough whether he thought that economic pressure could be brought to bear.

GENERAL GOUGH replied that he thought this could be done, but both economic and moral pressure should be used at Berlin. If the German Government acted in good faith and really desired to withdraw these troops, there was nothing to prevent the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. At the moment, the German Government was

really waiting to see which was the stronger, the Peace Conference at Paris, or General von der Goltz. There was no doubt that a plot existed and that the German Government were the masters of its fate, for the German Government were in a position [to] recall General von der Goltz, if they wished to do so.

M. MATSUI asked how large the German forces in question were.

GENERAL GOUGH replied that it was difficult to give the exact numbers. The Germans had organized a sort of military cordon which prevented contact with the populations of the regions which the Germans occupied. He believed that the army was composed of from 40,000 to 100,000 men. He believed that the latter figure was too high, but he was not sure. He called attention to the fact that the German forces in the Baltic Provinces were supplied by a railway crossing East Prussia and terminating at Mitau. It would be a simple matter to stop this traffic and thereby endanger the rationing of the German forces. On the other hand, the evacuation of the German troops could be effected by way of Riga, although the Germans alleged that this was impossible. In the Libau district there were five German ships, which could be used for this purpose.

MR. POLK said that there was also at New York a number of German ships, which would be available.

M. MATSUI asked whether there would be a danger of Bolshevism in these regions after the Germans had withdrawn.

GENERAL GOUGH said that this danger would not exist, because the population was anti-Bolshevist, and, furthermore, because the Bolsheviks were anxious to conclude peace with the Baltic Provinces, and were to recognize their independence up to a certain point. In any event, the Baltic Provinces were able to defend themselves by force of arms.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if the German troops were dependent upon East Prussia for their supplies, the situation would improve after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, which provided for the occupation of Memel and the neighboring districts by Allied troops. The Treaty also provided for Interallied occupation of Allenstein. The army of General von der Goltz would consequently find itself isolated and without liaison with East Prussia, for it could communicate only with a small part of East Prussia, which would itself be isolated. He expected that the treaty would be ratified in about three weeks' time and suggested that it might be advisable to await the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

GENERAL GOUGH said that this was the case, but that General von der Goltz was not a person who would ignore these facts, and it was quite likely that he had availed himself of the delay by organizing stocks of provisions and munitions which would enable him to main-

tain himself for several months. It would be preferable to act immediately, for delay gave the Germans two advantages:—in the first place, it constantly diminished the moral influence of the Allied and Associated Governments in the country, by showing that the decisions of the Conference were not obeyed; in the second place, it gave the Germans time to prepare an offensive, if they intended to make one, and to accumulate all that was necessary for this operation.

(M. PICHON thanked General Gough for his statements and General Gough then withdrew.)

M. PICHON said that he had received the amendments prepared by M. Berthelot based upon the observations of Mr. Polk.

M. BERTHELOT said that the article concerning the Germans isolated in the Russian forces could be changed so as to read as follows:

“mais encore à tous les militaires allemands en groupe ou même isolés, qui sur la suggestion ou avec l'appui des autorités allemandes, ont nominalement pris du service . . .”³

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether it was proposed that this text be adopted. He found himself in a somewhat delicate situation, for the original proposal concerning the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces had come from his Prime Minister. It was Mr. Lloyd George, who had proposed that Polish troops be utilized.⁴ After these proposals had been made, it had been decided that a note should be prepared in this sense.⁵ The information, which had been given that day, showed that it would not be advisable to utilize Polish troops. The situation therefore was now quite different. If the Allied and Associated Governments did not add a threat and were not prepared to carry it out, the ultimatum would not be effective. Under these circumstances, he hesitated to agree to its being despatched. He asked whether it would not be more advisable to write a note to the German Government, saying that the Allied and Associated Powers did not believe the arguments which the German Government had used, that these Governments knew that the German Government were in a position to insist upon the evacuation being effected, and that they were convinced that the German Government could carry it out. The German Government should be further informed that as they had not effected the evacuation nor paid any attention to the previous notes of the Council, the Allied and Associated Governments proposed to sever all commercial relations with them and to decide upon other measures of a similar nature. In his opinion, it was advisable to make no further

³ “but also to all German military, in groups or isolated, who upon the suggestion or with the approval of the German authorities, have nominally taken service . . .” [Translation by the editors.]

⁴ HD-53, minute 8, p. 211.

⁵ HD-54, minute 1, p. 218; appendix B to HD-55, p. 241.

demands, but to put the German Government face to face with a *fait accompli*. Before deciding upon this course, it would be necessary for all the Governments to agree as to the steps which they were prepared to take. So far as he was concerned, he would be glad to consult his Government, for it was probable that there would be complications, so far as interrupting certain steps, which were already being taken, such as the repatriation of prisoners of war, was concerned, and he was not certain that the British Government would agree to the imposition of the blockade. If a decision were taken after forty-eight hours, the members of the Council would have an opportunity to consult their Governments and they could then decide upon the action to be taken.

MR. POLK said that in awaiting this decision, he would confer with members of the American Delegation and have it made known to Baron von Lersner at Versailles, that the American Government would suspend all financial agreements.

(It was decided to postpone the decision concerning the despatch of a Note to the German Government, relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, for 48 hours, in order to permit the various Delegates to consult their Governments as to the various means of pressure which could be brought to bear.)

(At this point Marshal Foch and General Weygand withdrew.)

III. M. PICHON said that the question had been raised on the preceding day and that Mr. Polk had then asked that it be postponed until the following day.

M. TARDIEU read the draft resolution which he had prepared, which was worded as follows: "It is decided that the Bulgarian Government evacuate Western Thrace and the Strumitza Loop. General Franchet d'Esperey will give the necessary instructions for the evacuation and for the occupation of the evacuated territory by Greek troops, (in the region of Xanthi and Gumuldjina) and for the occupation of the remaining territory by Allied troops."

MR. POLK said that he believed that the line went too far. Xanthi and Gumuldjina were beyond the line. He could not agree to have Greek troops occupy regions other than those which were to be attributed to them by the Peace Treaty.

M. TARDIEU said that he was of the same opinion.

MR. POLK said that General Bliss and the American Delegation believed that the proposal was a dangerous one and that it would lead to incidents similar to those which had occurred at Smyrna. He thought that trouble in this region was bound to occur and that the Allied Governments did not have the troops at their disposal, which

Immediate
Occupation of
Western Thrace
by Inter-Allied
Military Forces

it would be necessary to send there. He objected to the entire proceeding and wished to protest and he would take no responsibility for what might happen for there would be no American troops in that country. He proposed that in the first place the territory should be occupied by French troops and that the Greek occupation should take place after the French occupation.

M. TARDIEU said that General Franchet d'Esperey, whom he had consulted, did not believe that trouble would result. He thought, however, that the text of the draft resolution should be altered so as to be satisfactory to Mr. Polk.

MR. POLK said that General Chretien^o held the same view that he did. So far as he was concerned he could only accept the proposal with the reserve already expressed and because of the fact that no American troops were to be sent. He asked whether it was proposed to maintain the local administration.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought it would be inadvisable for the Council to bind themselves, for the Bulgarians might refuse to take the responsibility.

MR. POLK suggested that the matter be referred to the Central Territorial Committee.

M. TARDIEU said that he proposed to suppress the last two lines of his proposition, from the words "by Greek troops", and to add a second paragraph, which would be worded as follows: "This occupation will be undertaken first by Allied troops, who will be replaced by Greek troops in the zone indicated on the map enclosed herewith. The local administration will be continued."

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the words "by Allied troops" meant that Greek troops would participate equally in the occupation of the other zone.

M. TARDIEU said that this was not meant and that he referred to troops of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

M. SCIALOJA said that it should be clearly understood that occupation by Greek troops was to be limited to the zone in question, and that these troops would not participate with the troops of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the occupation of the other zone.

MR. POLK said that it was important that the line should be definitely established before it was brought to the attention of the military authorities.

M. TARDIEU said that this matter could be left to the Committee.

(After a short discussion, in the course of which Mr. Polk renewed his reservation and declared that the proportion of Greek troops

^o Gen. Paul Chretien, of the French Army, Commander of the Allied forces in Bulgaria.

appeared to him too great in proportion to that of the Allied troops, the following resolution was adopted:

1. It was decided that the Bulgarian Government should evacuate Western Thrace and the Strumitza Loop. General Franchet d'Esperey should give the necessary instructions for this evacuation and for the occupation of the evacuated territory.

2. The occupation should be effected by Allied troops.

3. These troops might be Greek in the zone indicated in the map, attached herewith, when the Commander in Chief should consider it possible; the rest of Western Thrace should be occupied by Allied troops, other than Greek troops.

4. The local administration would be continued.)

Delivery of
Conditions of
Peace to the
Bulgarian
Delegation

IV. M. PICHON said that the Conditions of Peace would be delivered to the Bulgarian Delegation on the following day at the Quai d'Orsay at 10:30 a. m.

MR. POLK said that representatives of the American Press had asked him whether they would be admitted to this ceremony.

M. PICHON said that the meeting would be different from those which had taken place with the German and Austrian Delegates. It had not been anticipated that representatives of the Press would be present. It had been intended to transmit the conditions of peace to the Bulgarians through the medium of M. Dutasta, the Secretary General of the Conference, without any ceremony of any kind. M. Stancioff, the Secretary of the Bulgarian Delegation, had said that he thought this procedure somewhat uncomplimentary to the Bulgarian Delegation. The Supreme Council had then decided that the delivery of the Conditions of Peace should take place at the Quai d'Orsay in the presence of the Council.

MR. POLK said that he was willing to accept the opinion of the majority, but he wished to place himself upon record as saying that he believed that the Conference had throughout shown a tendency to ignore the presence of the other Delegations. He knew that the heads of some of these Delegations felt that they had been ignored. The Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and other Delegations particularly interested, felt that the matter was one which concerned them very closely and that they should be present at the ceremony.

M. PICHON said that it would be possible to invite the Head of each of the Delegations.

(After a short discussion, it was decided to invite to the Ceremony of the Delivery of the Conditions of Peace to the Bulgarian Delegation:

Two Representatives of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and one Representative of each of the other Allied Powers who were signatories of the Treaty.

It was also decided that Representatives of the Press should be authorized to be present at the Meeting and that there should be five Representatives of each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and two of the other Powers.)

The meeting then adjourned.

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, September 18, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-56

[*The British Minister Without Portfolio (Barnes) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET,
2, WHITEHALL GARDENS, S. W.,
12 September, 1919.

MY DEAR MONSIEUR CLEMENCEAU: As arising out of your decision yesterday,⁷ I am venturing to drop you a line, and, if I am breaking all the diplomatic rules and regulations, please understand that I am doing so because I do not know what they are, and possibly you may have ways and means of putting things through the proper channel.

Your resolution of yesterday, authorised the American Government to pass German and Austrian delegates into America, and also that their passports should be visé on the way. But it makes no provision for America or any other Government taking the initiative in inviting the Germans and Austrians to proceed to America; and as you heard yesterday, Mr. Polk declined to commit his Government, although to you and me the day before, he indicated that it might be done. My suggestion is that the decision of yesterday should be sent on to the German and Austrian Governments by your Secretariat.

Yours sincerely,

GEORGE N. BARNES

*Copy of a Letter in Course of Transmission From Mr. G. N. Barnes to
Monsieur Clemenceau*

Telephoned From London 5 p. m., September 17

MY DEAR MONSIEUR CLEMENCEAU: I understand that the Heads of Delegations will consider tomorrow the suggestion I made in my letter to you of the 12th instant, viz:—that the decision taken on the previous day regarding admission of German and Austrian delegates to the Washington Labour Conference should be communicated to the German and Austrian Governments by your Secretariat.

⁷ HD-52, minute 4, p. 185.

It is not too much to say that the whole future of the Labour-Organisation may depend on the decision to be taken on this subject tomorrow.

Yesterday I saw the leading members of the Parliamentary Committee of Trades Union Congress who told me they could take part in the Washington Conference if the suggestion I had made to you were adopted; otherwise they definitely assured me they must abstain, and this would entail the abstention of representation of organized labour from Great Britain and probably elsewhere.

This would mean the shipwreck of the Washington Conference. The Parliamentary Committee meet to decide the question finally tomorrow, and I beg that I may be placed in a position to assure them that my suggestion to you has been adopted.

Yours sincerely,

G. N. BARNES

Appendix B to HD-56

[Translation *]

[Draft Note to the German Delegation Relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces]

MR. PRESIDENT: The German Government's note of September 3 postpones once more, under unacceptable pretexts, the carrying out of the obligations undertaken by Germany by virtue of the provisions of article 12 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, afterwards confirmed by article 433 of the treaty of peace.

The Allied and Associated Governments refuse particularly to admit that the German Government, in order to avoid the responsibility incumbent upon it, can shield itself behind the alleged inability to enforce obedience of its orders by the troops in the Baltic regions.

They call upon the German Government, therefore, to proceed without any further delay to the evacuation of their troops from the Baltic Provinces, and to apply this evacuation not only to the self-contained German units and to their general staffs and services, but also to all isolated German officers and soldiers, including those who, after demobilization, have taken service in the ranks of organized Russian corps in the Baltic Provinces.

The evacuation must be started immediately, continued without interruption, and completely accomplished within the period of one month, ending on October 20.

In case of non-execution within the prescribed conditions and time limit, the Allied and Associated Governments intend to take, without

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

further notice, all measures of coercion which they shall judge appropriate, and to maintain them in force until the complete execution of evacuation, such as the total or partial renewal of the blockade of Germany, the immediate cessation of all economic or financial facilities from which Germany now benefits through the Allied and Associated Powers or their nationals, the suspension of the repatriation of the prisoners of war, and if necessary, military measures designed to ensure directly the carrying out of their decisions.

Please accept [etc.]

His Excellency M. VON LERSNER,
Chief of the German Delegation,
Versailles.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, September 19, 1919, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk.	Sir Eyre Crowe.	M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>
Mr. L. Harrison.	Mr. H. Norman.	M. Berthelot. M. de St. Quentin.
ITALY	JAPAN	
M. Scialoja.	M. Matsui.	
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>	
M. Barone Russo.	M. Kawai.	

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Captain Chapin.
FRANCE	Commandant Portier.
ITALY	M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned :

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Hon. H. Gibson.
Mr. A. W. Dulles.
BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sackville-West.
Colonel Kisch.
FRANCE
M. Tardieu.
M. Loucheur.
M. Cambon.
General Le Rond.
ITALY
Colonel Castoldi.
M. Galli
M. Brambilla.

1. MR. POLK asked whether any news had recently been received from the Military Mission in Hungary.

M. PICHON said that he had received a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated September 12-13. (See Appendix A.) Several cypher telegrams had also arrived but had not yet been decoded. In view of this fact he proposed that the question be adjourned until the meeting of the Council on Monday.

**Situation in
Hungary**

MR. POLK said that he was in favor of M. Pichon's proposal because he had received word from General Bandholtz to the effect that the latter was in process of organizing a police force for Budapest and hoped to conclude the negotiations on that day. Undoubtedly information on this subject would be available by Monday.

(It was decided to adjourn the discussion on this question until Monday, September 22nd.)

2. (At this point M. Tardieu entered the room.)

M. TARDIEU stated that, in accordance with the resolution taken by the Council on the previous day,¹ he had received from Messrs. Dulles and Nicolson a paper indicating a line of demarcation of the zones in Western Thrace. (See Appendix B.) This note, to which a map had been annexed, he was not able to accept, for he had understood that the region of Gumuldjina was to have been incorporated in the area in question.

MR. POLK said that he had no fundamental objection to the eventual attribution of this territory to Greece, but that he could not consent to its occupation at the present time by Greek troops.

(After a short discussion it was decided to delay action on the resolution taken by the Council on September 18th and to further study the question of the occupation of Thrace by the Allied troops at a future meeting of the Council.)

(M. Tardieu then withdrew.)

3. M. CAMBON read from and commented upon Report No. 5, transmitted to the Council by the Commission on Polish Affairs, on the subject of the status of Eastern Galicia. (See Appendix C.)

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in view of the fact that Poland, within its present boundaries, did not comprise all the territories which it possessed prior to its partition, he believed that it would be preferable to omit the second paragraph of the Preamble, which read as follows:

"Seeing that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the partition of the latter."

(It was decided to delete the following paragraph from the text of the Preamble to the Treaty:

"Seeing that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the partition of the latter.")

M. CAMBON said that the Commission had been unanimous upon the draft of Articles 1 to 11 (inclusive) of the Treaty.

(b) Articles 1 to 11, (inclusive)

¹ See HD-56, minute III, p. 263.

Occupation of
Western Thrace
by the Allied
Troops

Status of
Eastern Galicia

(a) Preamble

(It was decided to accept the first eleven articles as drafted by the Polish Commission for insertion in the proposed Treaty, regarding Eastern Galicia.)

M. CAMBON read the text of Article 12 as proposed by the Polish Commission, together with the additional paragraph to this article proposed by the British delegation.

MR. POLK said that he wished to ask **M. Cambon** a question regarding this article. In the first phrase the following clause appeared, "The Diet of Eastern Galicia shall legislate on the following matters." He wanted to know whether, in the opinion of the Commission, this gave the Galician Diet the exclusive power to legislate upon the subjects enumerated in the article in question.

M. CAMBON said that such was the intention of the Commission.

M. PICHON added that the Diet would have complete sovereignty for the questions involved.

M. CAMBON said that the Commission had been unanimous upon all the paragraphs in question. Nevertheless, the British delegation had asked that the following clause be added to the text: "Agrarian legislation passed by the Polish Diet shall only become applicable to Eastern Galicia if and when it is confirmed by the Eastern Galician Diet."

He added that agreement had not been reached upon this clause. The American, French, Italian and Japanese delegations had been opposed to inserting it and the British delegation had insisted upon its being put in. The Council was therefore obliged to decide the question.

On July 6th the Polish Diet had passed an agrarian reform law of extreme importance which marked the beginning of the social transformation in Poland. By the provisions of this law the State became the owner of all forests in Poland. The Agrarian organization of the Polish Republic was to be based primarily on the peasants' farms, the creation of new farms by colonization and the enlarging of those actually in existence. The State was to decide upon the division of the land and in this process was to create large reserves by the following means:

- (1) From lands of which it was the owner;
- (2) Lands belonging to members of old reigning families or to branches of the latter;
- (3) Domains of the Russian Peasants' Bank and of the Prussian Colonization Commission;
- (4) Domains of the Bishopricks, Congregations, Convents, Monasteries or other public institutions;
- (5) Domains formerly belonging to congregations, but not yet partitioned;

(6) Lands acquired through speculation and belonging to persons who had been convicted of having participated therein.

The six categories of lands above mentioned were to furnish the basis upon which the distribution should first be made. Thereafter the distribution was to continue by withdrawing land from each large owner. Right of ownership was to be limited, no one individual to be allowed to possess a farm larger than 180 hectares. In certain regions, however, where the interests of agriculture might make it necessary, this maximum area could be increased to 400 hectares.

He pointed out that these were the principles of reform which had been imposed upon the party of the Right, which represented the large landed proprietors. The latter did not appear to have accepted their defeat and were already preparing to contest viciously the passage of each of the organic laws necessary to effectuate this scheme. He added, for the information of the Council, that the above law had only received a majority of two votes.

It appeared that the above provisions, which were very broad and diametrically opposed to the ideas regarding private property which had been held up to the present time, were not considered liberal enough by the majority of the Galicians. However, that may be, the question is to know whether these provisions can be applied "*hic et nunc*" to Galicia by the Polish administration or, whether, at the time a Diet shall be constituted in Galicia, the latter should give its opinion upon the application of this legislation or itself enact a special law. The British delegation believed that it was necessary for the Galician Diet to be called upon to give its opinion. The other delegations thought that this Agrarian law gave sufficiently favorable terms and adequately upheld the rights of private property owners vis-à-vis to [*sic*] the peasant class.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was in reality a larger one than the mere enforcement of a particular law, the merits of which he did not wish to pass upon at the present time.

The main idea which had guided the Council in all its discussions on the autonomy of Eastern Galicia had been that a people was being dealt with who had retained marked sympathy for certain of its neighbors, more particularly Russia. It had always been the desire of the Council to look to the future with the possibility that this people might wish to ally itself with a regenerated Russia or any Ukrainian state which might be formed. It had been desired to allow the separation to be made from Poland, if such state of affairs became possible, and consequently the autonomy of the country was preferable to a mandate over it entrusted to the Poles. He thought that a line should be drawn between those matters on which uniformity of legislation could

be obtained without difficulty and issues on which the people of Eastern Galicia should be permitted to legislate alone. Uniformity on agrarian questions was difficult to attain. No obstacle should be placed in the way of an ultimate union of Eastern Galicia with Russia, and it therefore should not be made impossible for this province to separate itself from Poland. He did not wish to argue in favor of such a separation, but believed that the door should be left open for a move in the direction of Russia. By so doing the Powers would give Galicia a free hand and would avoid creating difficulties, of which agrarian legislation might well be one.

He pointed out that the Council might be guided by England's experience in relation to Ireland, in which country agrarian questions had always been the most difficult of solution. England had never imposed its agrarian legislation on Ireland and was thankful that the same had not been done. England could never be charged with having forced its own system of laws on the Irish. The United States furnished another example of a country for whose well being uniformity of laws was not necessary.

He did not wish to criticize the law in question, but pointed out that no guarantee existed against its repeal. The Poles might be tempted to enact legislative measures hostile to the interests of the Galician people, and it was for that reason that he believed all laws of an agrarian nature should be submitted to the approval of the Galician Diet. The most simple method to obtain this result would be to add agrarian questions to the list of matters within the jurisdiction of the Diet of Eastern Galicia, which are set out in Article 12. Great danger would be run through the imposition of legislation purely Polish in character because many of the large property holdings in Galicia were actually in the hands of Poles and the temptation to impose a system favorable to their interests would be very great.

M. CAMBON said that he would like to refer to Article 16 for discussion with Article 12, for the two stood together and a decision of the Council on one would have its effect on the other. He then read the two texts proposed for Article 16 and pointed out that this Article in substance brought up the question as to whether or not Eastern Galicia was to be allowed representation in the Diet of Warsaw.

He was fundamentally opposed to the British proposal for the reason that, whether it was desirable or not, the fact that the government of the Galician state was entrusted to Poland placed in the hands of the Polish Government representation of Eastern Galicia abroad. All questions of general administration would be settled at Warsaw. It was therefore necessary that Eastern Galicia be permitted to take part in all questions of high policy in the Polish Diet. The Diet of

Galicia could deal with the other matters as indicated in Article 12. It was therefore necessary not to state in the decision that representation of Galicia with Poland should be disregarded.

With reference to the agrarian legislation, he pointed out that this question was bound up with the decision which would be taken on Article 16, for if the Council granted Galicia representation in the Polish Diet her representatives in this body could make themselves heard to good effect.

MR. SCIALOJA said that, although the Italian representative on the Polish Commission had supported the majority opinion, he thought it would be well to make a slight change. He did not favor the addition proposed by the British delegation however, but inclined to the second proposal made by Sir Eyre Crowe, namely, to insert agrarian legislation in the list of matters included in Article 12. If such a change were not made Eastern Galicia might be deprived of all rights of enactment of agrarian laws, should she refuse to accept the legislation of the Polish Diet. According to M. Cambon's statements, it was probable that the Galicians would go further in the matter than the Poles had already done. This meant that they were not satisfied with matters as they stood and it would therefore do them an injury to crystalize the present situation and prevent them from improving it.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he agreed with M. Cambon in believing that Articles 12 and 16 were closely allied. All the points raised by the British delegation were intimately connected one with another, and the same arguments as had been brought forward for agrarian questions prevailed in regard to compulsory military service. He wished, however, to further discuss the representation in the Polish Diet. Assuming that this representation existed, the danger might arise that certain Polish members of the Diet would wish to impose on the Galicians an agrarian scheme favorable to Polish interests. The Galician representatives, being in a minority, could not effectively block the measure. In cases where matters of general interest arose it was probable that Galicians and Poles might vote on the same side, but in cases of special legislation the Galician minority would be absolutely powerless. If this argument were true, the Commission was correct in saying that the question of representation had a direct bearing on Article 12. He further wished to call attention to the meaning of Article 13, and the right of temporary veto accorded to the Governor therein. This article provided sufficient guarantees to prevent the legislation of the Galician Diet affecting Poland adversely.

M. PICHON asked whether Mr. Paderewski had not stated that Poland could not accept the Treaty under these conditions.

GENERAL LE ROND said that the Sub-Commission had heard the Polish delegation on the subject four times. In the first place, Mr.

Paderewski, later Mr. Dmowski, and later Mr. Dabsky, the author of the Polish agrarian law had appeared before it. Mr. Daiko, representing the Ruthenians, had also appeared before the Commission. This body was therefore entirely alive to all the difficulties which Sir Eyre Crowe had brought up and to all the arguments in answer thereto.

The Agrarian reform was based on a general banking scheme which was to be uniform throughout the country. It appeared difficult to organize a similar system within a country so limited as Galicia, and of such a small population. The reform was also based upon a system of local committees, giving guarantees to the people analogous to those existing in Posnania and other provinces. The points raised by the British delegation were irreconcilable with the solutions proposed by the majority. The representatives of the Polish Government had stated that they could not accept a Treaty in which their government would be deprived of the right to dictate agrarian reform.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that there was much to be said for the arguments presented by General Le Rond, but he did not believe that they went to the root of the matter. He was fully alive to the difficulties from a practical point of view which would result from allowing Galicia to legislate independently, in the event that she should exercise her rights in a manner which did not meet with the approval of the Polish Diet. He believed that the people themselves would be competent to avoid all complications of this nature and they might even declare themselves favorable to uniformity of legislation. It did not devolve upon the Council, however, to force them to such uniformity. Furthermore, Galicia was not such a small country as General Le Rond had given the impression, for it contained practically four and one-half million inhabitants. There would, consequently, be no insurmountable difficulties in establishing an agrarian system for this country even though certain complications might arise from the banking point of view. The argument put forward by General Le Rond did not therefore seem to him of sufficient weight to overthrow his proposal of granting the Galicians a voice in the legislation.

MR. POLK said that he was greatly influenced by the arguments put forward by Sir Eyre Crowe. He wished to submit a proposal which had just been made by Mr. Gibson, which might help the situation to a certain degree. This would consist in adding the following clause to the addition proposed by the British delegation: "In case of a rejection of the Polish law by the Galician Diet, the latter will have the right to legislate on this question." This solution would have the advantage of permitting the Galician Diet to adopt the Polish legislation should this body so desire.

M. CAMBON pointed out that it was perhaps unwise to anticipate a refusal and base the Galician right of legislation upon this. He

suggested that it would be sufficient to provide: "The Galician Diet shall give its opinion on the possibility of applying Polish law." In this way the body would of necessity be consulted.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Mr. Cambon's proposal appeared rather vague and would open the way to misunderstandings, while clearness in the matter was greatly to be desired. The danger might be that the Poles could say that they had asked the opinion of the Galician Diet, that the latter had not agreed, and nevertheless it made no difference to them.

M. PICHON suggested that the agrarian laws might be settled by agreement between the two Diets.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the fact remained that Article 13 gave the Polish Governor an absolute right of veto.

MR. POLK said that he approved the second British solution, namely, the insertion of agrarian questions in Article 12. The difficulty could be covered by adding that, if the Galician Diet had not legislated on the matter within a given period, the Polish law would apply.

MR. SCIALOJA said that it might be also added to the laws of Article 13, which are subject to an absolute veto of the Governor.

M. CAMBON drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the agrarian law might lead to disturbances within the country, and that the Polish Government might charge the Allies with turning over to them the administration of a country without granting them the means of handling disturbances which might arise through the application of agrarian laws. The majority of large estates in Galicia were in the hands of the Poles. These estates were to be partitioned in favor of Ruthenes. This was a fruitful source of conflicts between different interests and of dangers which might easily lead to a revolution. He thought, therefore, that the Polish Government should be left the means of exercising its authority. Too much importance should not be given to these details, however, as the system which was being inaugurated was only temporary.

M. PICHON said that he had a proposal which he believed would settle the matter. This was to adopt the proposition presented by Sir Eyre Crowe, and add the following paragraph thereto:

"In case of persistent dispute between the two Diets, the question will be brought before the Council of the League of Nations."

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this proposal would, in effect, permit the League of Nations to enact the agrarian laws.

M. PICHON said that the Covenant of the League contemplated arbitration as one of the essential roles of that body.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the League of Nations would therefore be called upon to decide between two bodies of law. To bring this

about it was necessary that the Galician Diet should be given a legislative power by the Treaty.

After a short discussion, it was decided :

(1) that legislation on agrarian questions should be included within the competence of the Galician Diet, and inserted in Article 12 of the proposed Treaty;

(2) that agrarian legislation should be included among the laws over which the Polish Governor has the right of veto (Article 13), but that if the Governor's veto be maintained for more than one year the question should be automatically brought before the Council of the League of Nations for decision.

It was further decided that the above resolution should be referred to the Commission on Polish Affairs for insertion of its provisions in the Treaty.

(d) Articles
14 and 15

These two articles were accepted without change.

M. CAMBON read and commented upon Article 16.

(e) Article 16

He said that the organization provided for therein, which was to protect the rights of Galicia, would lack a proper foundation if Galicia were not represented in the body of the Polish Diet. It should be understood that the Galician representative would take no part in the matters which were exclusively Polish.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he recognized the weight of the arguments put forward by M. Cambon, but that he did not wish to express an opinion as to the root of the matter. He wished particularly to remark that the question had been the object of much academic discussion up to the present time, and that the idea involved had rarely been applied from a practical point of view. Under the former German Constitution Bavaria was granted special rights, but in practice it had been found impossible to prevent the Bavarian representatives from taking part in the body of the Reichstag, in the discussion of matters which were entirely foreign to the special interests of Bavaria. The question of knowing whether States with partial autonomy could obtain representation in a larger Parliament was one of the most contentious which could be found, and had given rise to much discussion and often contradictory conclusions on the part of men of high intelligence in all countries of the world. Mr. Balfour, who had special experience of Government in Ireland, had more than once called attention to the grave difficulty of finding a satisfactory solution of this question. Several bills proposed on the Home Rule question had broken down precisely on the point of the Irish representation in the British Parliament. It was, therefore, very natural that his Government should feel a certain hesitancy in imposing a fixed and definite scheme on another people in a matter which is so much a matter of controversy. The British Delegation felt that a solution along the lines proposed by Mr. Cambon might perhaps be reached. He did

not wish to criticise it, nor to exclude the possibility of its eventual adoption, but he did not wish to force it at the outset on the people concerned. It was within the province of these people to decide the question in the last analysis.

MR. POLK said that the British proposal contemplated the intervention of the League of Nations if desired by "both parties". He wished to suggest for consideration of the Council, a substitution of the words "either party" for the words "both parties". He wished also to propose for the consideration of the Council that Galicia be granted two or more representatives in the Polish Diet, until such time as a definite decision in the matter might be arrived at. These representatives might have a consultative voice, with the right to take part in the discussion of matters concerning Eastern Galicia but would not be accorded a vote. Representation of this kind would be similar to that enjoyed by the Territories in the United States, as distinguished from the active and voting representation of the States. This proposal was a temporary measure solely and he thought the Council might deliberate profitably thereon.

The discussion of Article 16 was then adjourned.

(At this point M. Loucheur entered the room.)

4. M. PICHON said that a letter had been received from the Austrian Delegation with regard to the shortage of coal in Austria. (See Appendix "D".)

**Coal Supply of
Austria**

M. LOUCHEUR said that he wished to inform the Council at once that he had not waited for the ratification of the Treaty before giving orders to increase the coal supply in Austria as soon as possible. He had personally given orders in this matter but he could not guarantee that he would be completely successful, for the shortage of coal in Central Europe was so great that the industries of Czecho-Slovakia were likewise threatened. He suggested that he might draft a letter to the Austrian Delegation informing them of the steps which have been taken.

It was decided that M. Loucheur should submit to the Council a draft letter to the Austrian Delegation, informing the latter of the steps which have been taken to offset as far as possible the coal shortage existing in Austria.

(M. Loucheur then left the room.)

5. MR. POLK said that he was not ready to discuss this matter because there were certain differences of opinion existing thereon about the military representatives.

**Allowances for
Officers of the
Inter-Allied
Commissions of
Control**

(It was decided to adjourn the discussion of this question until Monday, September 22.)

The Meeting then adjourned.

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, September 19, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-57

Telegrams From Sir George Clerk Transmitted Through the French Minister at Bucharest

SEPTEMBER 12, 1919.

On account of the delay incident to the formation of the new Cabinet I have on this day presented the note² of the Conference to M. Bratiano.

SEPTEMBER 13, 1919.

The note was presented yesterday to M. Bratiano. M. Bratiano informed me today that he had decided not to publish the text of the note fearing that, because of public sentiment, this publication rendered it more difficult to reach a complete accord with the Entente, which he is extremely anxious to attain.

I therefore request that steps be taken to prohibit publication in Paris or elsewhere.

I am transmitting by special report the result of my interviews, but the Rumanian Government declares that its only wish is to work in complete agreement with the Supreme Council on the Hungarian question.

Appendix B to HD-57

Note From British and American Experts

OCCUPATION OF WESTERN THRACE BY ALLIED TROOPS

The American and British Delegates to the Central Territorial Commission having been asked by their French and Italian colleagues to arrive at an agreement regarding the line of demarkation of the zones of Western Thrace, which may be occupied respectively by the Greek army and the other Allied Contingents, have agreed on the following:

"A line (such as indicated on the map hereto annexed)³ starting from point 1900 on Kartal Dagh and running toward the South to a point where the Aksu river enters the Aegean Sea (see the British map, scale 1: 1,000,000).

The detachments of Grecian soldiers should occupy no territory to the East of this line.

It is understood that this temporary fixing of the zones of military occupation for the Greek and Allied troops shall in no wise prejudice the decisions which may be eventually taken concerning the future Eastern frontier of Greece in this region."

DULLES
NICOLSON

SEPTEMBER 18, 1919.

² Appendix E to HD-47, p. 111.³ The map referred to does not accompany the minutes.

Appendix C to HD-57

Report No. 5, Presented to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Polish Commission

CONSTITUTION OF EASTERN GALICIA

Instructions, Enumeration of Meetings and Division of the Report

At its sitting of the 25th June, 1919,⁴ the Council of Foreign Ministers discussed the question of the future of Eastern Galicia, and adopted the following resolutions:—

1. That the Polish Government be authorised to occupy with its military forces Eastern Galicia up to the River Zbrucz.
2. That the Polish Government be authorised to utilise any of its military forces, including General Haller's army, in such occupation.
3. That the Polish Government be authorised to establish a civil Government in Eastern Galicia under an agreement with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, which shall be conditioned to preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the territory and the political, religious, and personal liberties of the inhabitants.
4. That the agreement shall be predicated upon the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as to their political allegiance, the time for the exercise of such choice to be hereafter fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or by a body to whom they may delegate that power.
5. That the drafting of the agreement be referred to the Polish Commission, subject to revision by the Drafting Committee.
6. That the Polish Government be forthwith advised of the foregoing decisions, and of the propriety of acting immediately upon Articles 1 and 2.
7. That the military representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Poland be advised of those Articles of agreement.

In conformity with paragraph 5 of this resolution, the Polish Commission discussed the question of the Constitution of Eastern Galicia at its meeting of the 30th June, and decided to entrust it for preliminary study to a sub-commission composed of:—

General Le Rond (<i>Chairman</i>)	France.
Dr. R. H. Lord	United States of America.
Mr. F. B. Bourdillon	British Empire.
Marquis della Torretta	Italy.
Mr. Otchiai	Japan.

This Sub-Commission held twenty-six meetings from the 30th June to the 18th August.

It heard the Polish Delegation four times. It further invited, on two occasions, the Galician members of the Ukrainian Mission to

⁴ FM-27, minute 1, vol. iv, p. 848.

Paris to lay before it the wishes of the Galician Ruthenians. Not considering themselves empowered to recognise the principle of the resolution of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the 25th June, these representatives declined the invitation of the Commission. Finally, the Commission heard the representatives of the National Council of the Jews of Galicia, and those of the Carpatho-Russian Party.

At its meeting of the 20th August the Commission examined the report of the Sub-Commission. At another meeting held on the 23rd August the Commission heard the declaration made by Messrs. Paneyko and Tomashivsky in their personal capacity concerning the conditions under which a provisional attachment of Eastern Galicia to Poland would be acceptable to the Ruthenians of Galicia. The Commission finally adopted the Sub-Commission's report with certain modifications.

The Draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland has, moreover, been submitted in conformity with paragraph 5 of the above Resolution of the Council of Foreign Ministers to the Drafting Committee, which has approved it after making certain verbal alterations.

The Commission has the honour to submit to the Supreme Council of the Allies the following report, which falls into three divisions:—

The first explains the general principles on which the Commission have based the Draft Treaty.

The second contains the text of the Draft Treaty, together with a proposal in regard to the final settlement.

The third division contains the arguments urged by the Majority in support of the text proposed by them in regard to the articles of the Treaty as to which unanimity was not reached, together with the considerations urged in favour of the text proposed by the Minority.

As regards the second division, the instructions of the Commission do not empower it to include in the Treaty a clause regarding the final settlement. The Commission felt it to be its duty, however, to propose that a clause should be inserted in the Treaty fixing the time at which the Powers should decide on the date and conditions of the plebiscite. The Commission was confirmed in this opinion by the declaration of the representatives of the Ruthenian party of Eastern Galicia, who urged that such a provision was essential in order that the régime established by the Treaty might be accepted peacefully by the Ruthenian population. The Commission therefore draws the attention of the Supreme Council to the proposal added at the end of the Draft Treaty.

I.—General Principles

In elaborating the project for the organisation of Eastern Galicia which is here submitted, on the basis of the instructions given to it, the Commission has been guided by the following principles:—

(a.) That the authority which the Polish Government is to exercise in Eastern Galicia during the period of the provisional régime ought to be strong enough to enable it to maintain order and tranquillity in this distracted and turbulent country; to carry through the great work of economic reconstruction, of which Eastern Galicia so much stands in need and to exercise a certain check upon the possible excesses of autonomous local bodies elected by a population very insufficiently prepared for complete self-government.

Hence, for instance, the rather wide powers assigned to the Governor of Eastern Galicia, notably the veto accorded to him with respect to Legislation passed by the Diet.

(b.) That the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia ought to receive all guarantees for their civic, national, and religious rights, for all those special interests which differentiate them from the people of Poland.

The Commission believes that this need is largely met by:—

Article V (according all liberties granted to citizens of the Polish State, especially complete religious liberty);

Article VI (guarantees for freedom of speech, of the press, of public meeting, and association);

Article VII (complete equality of Polish and Ruthenian languages and provision as to schools);

Article VIII (extending to Eastern Galicia all the guarantees for minorities contained in the Separate Treaty with Poland of the 28th June);⁵

Article IX (guarantees against systematic colonisation of the territory from without).

(c.) That the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia ought to receive a wide measure of autonomy.

In accordance with this principle, the project submitted by the Commission provides for:—

An East Galician Diet with wider competence than that of the Galician Diet under the Austrian régime (Articles X–XV).

A cabinet of ministers responsible to this Diet (Articles XXII–XXIII).

A special judiciary with a Supreme Court at Lemberg (Articles XXVII–XXIX).

(d.) That in defining the limits of the autonomy of Eastern Galicia, due consideration must be given to the fact that:—

1. In the case of this relatively small territory, and in view of the comparatively short time that the provisional régime is to last, it does not seem wise or practical to set up in Eastern Galicia all the machinery of a completely separate State;

2. That many governmental matters, which involve broad general interests and require much technical knowledge and political experi-

⁵ *Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. III, p. 3714.*

ence, can better be handled by the Government and Parliament at Warsaw than by the Diet of Lemberg.

3. That Poland ought to be placed in a position to discharge the responsibilities which she has undertaken with regard to Eastern Galicia.

These considerations have led the Commission to recommend that such matters as representation abroad, the customs, railway, post and telegraph system, and, in general, all affairs not expressly reserved to the East Galician Diet, should be treated as common to Eastern Galicia and Poland, and should be assigned to the legislative sphere of the Diet of Warsaw, in which Eastern Galicia would be in a position to assert its rights.

[II.]—*Treaty Relating to Eastern Galicia*

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and Poland;

Being desirous of putting an end to the unhappy conflict which has long devastated Eastern Galicia, and of establishing in that country a régime which shall assure as far as possible the autonomy of the territory and safeguard the personal, political and religious liberty of its inhabitants until the time when they are called upon by a plebiscite, which is for the present postponed by reason of the disturbed condition of Eastern Europe, to declare their wishes with regard to the final political status of the territory;

Seeing that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the partition of the latter;

And that Poland is now, in the opinion of the Allied and Associated Powers, the State best able to re-establish free and well-ordered government in Eastern Galicia;

And desiring to conclude a Treaty to that end;

Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries the following, viz:

Who having communicated their full powers found in good and due form have agreed as follows:

CHAPTER I.—STATUS OF EASTERN GALICIA

ARTICLE 1

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers transfer to Poland, subject to the conditions set out in the present Treaty, particularly in Article 2, all rights and title devolving on them from Austria in conformity with Article 90 of the Treaty of Peace signed on over the part hereinafter defined of the former Austrian "Kronländer" of Galicia and Bukovina:

(A.) On the West:

From the point where the old frontier between Austria-Hungary and Russia is met by the eastern administrative boundary of the commune of Belzec south-westwards,

this communal boundary;

then southwards the administrative boundary between the districts (Politische Bezirke) of Cieszanow on the west and Rawa-Ruska on the east;

then south-westwards the administrative boundary between the districts of Cieszanow and Jaworow, but cutting off the salient formed round the village of Lipowiec by a line to be fixed on the ground passing about 2 kilometres north of this place;

then southwards the administrative boundary between the districts of Jaroslau and Przemysl on the west and of Jaworow, Mosciska, Sambor and Stary Sambor successively on the east;

then southwards to the salient about 1 kilometre southeast of point 519 (Radycz);

the administrative boundary between the districts of Dobromil and Stary Sambor;

thence south-westwards to the salient made by this administrative boundary about 15 kilometres south-west of Chyrow and about 2 kilometres south-east of point 733.

a line to be fixed on the ground cutting the Chyrow-Sambor railway about 2 kilometres east of Chyrow, then following the watershed between the basins of the Strwiaz and the Dniester:

thence southwards to its junction with the frontier of Czecho-Slovakia, about 2 kilometres south of point 1335 (Kalicz),

the administrative boundary between the districts of Dobromil and Liska on the west and of Stary Sambor and Turka on the east. The frontier, however, will diverge from this administrative boundary in the two following places, where it will be determined on the ground:

(a.) where the administrative boundary passes west of the Chyrow-Lutowiska road, so as to leave this road entirely in Polish territory;

(b.) in the neighbourhood of Bobrka, so as to leave this place in Polish territory.

(B.) On the South-West:

From the point defined above to its junction with the boundary of the Bukovina, the old frontier between Galicia and Hungary.

Point 1655 which is the point of the Carpathians common to the basins of the three rivers Tisza, Visso and Czeremosz, is the point of junction of the three frontiers of Eastern Galicia, the Ruthenian territory of the Czecho-Slovak State and Roumania.

(C.) On the South-East:

From the point defined above north-eastwards to its junction with the administrative boundary between the districts of Horodenka and Sniatyn, about 11 kilometres south-east of Horodenka,

the old boundary between the Bukovina and Galicia;

thence north-eastwards to a point to be chosen in the course of the Dniester about 2 kilometres below Zaleszczyki.

a line to be fixed on the ground passing through points 239, 312 and 317;

thence to the point where the old frontier between Austria-Hungary and Russia leaves the Dniester in a northerly direction, about 3 kilometres west of Jvanets,

the principal channel of the Dniester downstream.

(D.)—On the East and North:

From the point in the Dniester defined above to the point where it meets the eastern administrative boundary of the commune of Belzec;

the old frontier between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

A Commission composed of six members, five nominated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and one by Poland, will be appointed fifteen days after the coming into force of the present Treaty to trace on the spot the boundaries described above, in so far as provision therefor may not already have been made by other means. The decisions of this Commission will be taken by a majority, it being understood that in the event of an equality of votes the Chairman will be entitled to a second vote; its decisions shall be binding on the parties concerned.

The expenses of the Commission shall be borne by the revenues of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 2

Poland undertakes to organise Eastern Galicia, which shall constitute an autonomous territory, within the boundaries fixed in Article 1.

Poland further undertakes to hold or allow to be held a plebiscite of the inhabitants with regard to the final political status of the territory, on a date and under conditions to be fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or by any other body which they may appoint. She recognises in advance the limits and status which, as the result of this plebiscite, may be definitively determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or by the body appointed by them.

ARTICLE 3

During the régime established by the present Treaty, the treaties and agreements concluded or to be concluded by Poland shall take effect in Eastern Galicia unless it is otherwise stipulated.

ARTICLE 4

The interests of nationals of Eastern Galicia in foreign countries shall be protected by the diplomatic and consular agents of Poland.

ARTICLE 5

All liberties in private and public matters, all political rights, and all rights reserved to minorities, which are assured in Poland by the Polish laws, shall be assured in Eastern Galicia. In particular, the most complete religious freedom shall be guaranteed. The Orthodox Greek Catholic Church shall enjoy the same rights as the Roman Catholic Church.

ARTICLE 6

Poland undertakes that the laws applicable in Eastern Galicia regarding freedom of public meeting, association, speech, and the press shall take into account the special status of the territory, and shall ensure to the inhabitants the most complete liberty compatible with the maintenance of order and with the observance of the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 7

Polish and Ruthenian shall be recognised, on the same footing, as the official languages of Eastern Galicia, and shall enjoy the same rights.

Without prejudice to the guarantees assured to minorities by Article 8, each commune or municipality shall have the right to decide whether the Polish language or the Ruthenian language or both shall be taught in the primary public educational establishments.

Legislation on the subject of public instruction in secondary and higher educational establishments shall be within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia provided for in Article 10, subject to the provisions of Article 13.

In the allocation of public funds to the three grades of education, instruction given in Polish and instruction given in Ruthenian shall each receive its fair share.

ARTICLE 8

The provisions of the Treaty concluded on June 28, 1919, between the High Contracting Parties are hereby applied to Eastern Galicia,

and shall be interpreted as follows: (1) The obligations imposed on the Polish Government by that Treaty shall be equally binding on the authorities of Eastern Galicia, within the measure of their competence; (2) the guarantees provided by that Treaty in favour of racial minorities, on the implicit assumption that the majority is Polish, shall apply equally in the event of the majority proving to be Ruthenian.

ARTICLE 9

There shall be no systematic introduction into Eastern Galicia of colonists from outside.

CHAPTER II.—DIET OF EASTERN GALICIA

ARTICLE 10

There shall be in Eastern Galicia a Diet composed of a single Chamber elected by universal secret suffrage with proportional representation. The right of voting shall belong to both sexes without distinction.

A general election shall take place every five years. In the event of the dissolution of the Diet, a general election shall take place within a period of three months after such dissolution.

The Polish electoral laws shall apply to the elections to the Diet of Eastern Galicia, subject to the above provisions.

ARTICLE 11

The Diet shall be convened by the Governor provided for in Article 19, who may also adjourn it, close the session or dissolve the Diet.

The Diet shall hold two ordinary sessions in every year.

ARTICLE 12

The Diet of Eastern Galicia shall legislate on the following matters:—

- (1.) Exercise of public worship;
- (2.) Public education;
- (3.) Public relief;
- (4.) Public health;
- (5.) Provincial, district and local roads, and railways serving local interests;
- (6.) Encouragement of agriculture, trade and industry, including measures for facilitating credit, purchase or sale, for developing the employment of new technical processes, and for assisting research and experiments;
- (7.) Application of the general laws on the subject of control of water for irrigation or power purposes;

(8.) Application of the general laws on the subject of the organisation and administration of municipalities and districts;

(9.) Taxes to be collected for the local budget of Eastern Galicia.

(10.) All other matters with which the Diet of Poland shall have given it authority to deal.

Each year the Diet of Eastern Galicia shall vote, on the proposition of the Governor, the budget on matters within its competence.

Additional clause proposed by minority.

Agrarian legislation passed by the Polish Diet shall only become applicable to East Galicia if and when it is confirmed by the East Galician Diet.

ARTICLE 13

Laws passed by the Diet shall be transmitted to the Governor by the President of the Diet. Any such law may, within one month from such transmission, be vetoed by the Governor acting on his own proper authority. This right of veto shall be overridden if, within a period of one year from the date at which it was exercised, the law is again passed by the Diet by a majority of two-thirds. In legislation concerning public secondary and higher education the Governor's right to veto shall, however, be absolute.

ARTICLE 14

No member of the Diet may be prosecuted or proceeded against in any way by reason of speeches, opinions or votes made, expressed or given in the Diet or on its Commissions.

During a session no member of the Diet may be arrested or prosecuted before the criminal courts without the authority of the Diet, except in the case of persons taken *in flagrante delicto*. The detention or prosecution of a member of the Diet shall be suspended during the whole of the session, should the Diet so require.

ARTICLE 15

The Diet shall draw up its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President and other officers.

The Supreme Court of Lemberg referred to in Article 27 shall decide all questions raised as to the validity of elections to the Diet.

CHAPTER III.—REPRESENTATION OF EASTERN GALICIA IN THE POLISH DIET AND ADMINISTRATION

ARTICLE 16

The electors of Eastern Galicia shall participate in the elections to the Polish Diet. With this object, the Polish laws with regard

to the election to that Diet shall be extended to Eastern Galicia, subject to the reservation that proportional representation must be maintained in that territory.

The deputies elected in Eastern Galicia shall not take part in the deliberations of the Polish Diet on legislative matters of the same nature as those within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia.

Alternative Article proposed by minority.

ARTICLE 16

A subsequent agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia, made with the collaboration of the League of Nations if desired by both parties, shall decide the question whether and by what means Eastern Galicia shall be represented in the Polish Diet. This agreement shall be subject to the approval of the Polish and Eastern Galician Diets.

ARTICLE 17

The Polish Diet shall have the right to legislate for Eastern Galicia on all matters not within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 18

The Polish Council of Ministers shall include a Minister without portfolio appointed by the Head of the Polish State from among the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia. This Minister shall represent Eastern Galicia.

Special bureaux for the affairs of Eastern Galicia shall be organised in each Polish Ministry dealing with such affairs.

A high Ruthenian official shall be attached to the Polish Council of Ministers to act as adviser to the Council in matters particularly concerning Ruthenians and in the affairs of the Orthodox Greek Catholic Church.

CHAPTER IV.—ADMINISTRATION OF EASTERN GALICIA

ARTICLE 19

The executive power in Eastern Galicia shall be entrusted to a Governor, who shall be appointed by the Head of the Polish State, by whom he may also be relieved of his functions.

ARTICLE 20

The Governor shall be responsible for the maintenance of order and public safety; he shall ensure the execution of the laws voted by the Polish Diet and the Diet of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 21

Subject to the right of veto provided in Article 13, the Governor shall promulgate the laws voted by the Diet of Eastern Galicia within a month from the time when they shall have been transmitted to him by the President of that Assembly.

ARTICLE 22

The matters within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia shall be under the direction of Ministers appointed by the Governor and responsible to the Diet. The Diet shall determine the number, duties, and salaries of such Ministers.

ARTICLE 23

Matters not within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia shall be under the direction in Eastern Galicia of Heads of Departments placed under the control of the Governor.

ARTICLE 24

The acts of the Governor as regards the matters referred to in Article 12 shall require the countersignature of a responsible Minister, except in the exercise of the right of veto.

ARTICLE 25

The Governor shall appoint public officials. Polish or Galician laws, as the case may be, may, however, prescribe another method of appointment as regards subordinate officers. They may also determine the conditions required for appointment to any particular office.

The officers in the services dealing with matters referred to in Article 12 shall be appointed on the nomination of the responsible Minister.

ARTICLE 26

Eligibility for public offices shall not in principle be subject, either *de jure* or *de facto*, to any conditions in respect of race, religion or language.

Officials shall, subject to any necessary exceptions, be recruited in Eastern Galicia. Regulations issued by the Governor on the proposal of the Head of the department concerned, or of the responsible Minister, as the case may be, may prescribe that certain classes of official positions shall be reserved exclusively for natives of Eastern Galicia or persons fulfilling the conditions laid down by these regulations.

In making choice of officials from among candidates with equal qualifications, the numerical importance of the different national groups shall be taken into account.

CHAPTER V.—JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF EASTERN GALICIA

ARTICLE 27

The Court of Lemberg will constitute a Supreme Court for the entire territory of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 28

The judges of Eastern Galicia, with the exception of those for whom an elective system may be adopted, shall be appointed by the head of the Polish State on the nomination of the Governor.

The judges shall be irremovable; they shall only be deprived of office on a decision to that effect by the Court of Lemberg acting as the supreme disciplinary Council of the magistracy.

ARTICLE 29

Punishment imposed by the Eastern Galician courts shall be executed in Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 30

The Head of the Polish State shall have the right of pardon in respect of persons convicted by the courts of Eastern Galicia.

CHAPTER VI.—FINANCIAL RÉGIME OF EASTERN GALICIA

ARTICLE 31

The financial régime for Eastern Galicia shall be determined by a Polish law in conformity with the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 32

Property situated in Eastern Galicia formerly belonging to the Austrian Government, to the "Kronländ" of Galicia, or to the Austrian Crown, as well as private property in this territory of the former Royal Family of Austria-Hungary, is, subject to the conditions laid down in Article 204 of the Treaty of Peace between the High Contracting Parties and Austria, transferred to Poland, who shall provide for the administration of such property.

ARTICLE 33

Property at present appropriated to public services shall continue to be so appropriated. It shall not cease to be so appropriated except

in accordance with legal procedure and on the recommendation of the authority charged with the administration of such services.

During the temporary régime established by the present Treaty, the property referred to in Article 32 may not be alienated nor subjected to charges the effect of which would outlast the duration of the said régime; leases outlasting the régime shall in any case cease to have effect three years after the establishment of the final status referred to in Article 2 if they have not been expressly confirmed during this period. The above provisions are, however, not to be taken as preventing the employment of the aforesaid property for purposes of agrarian reform or of works recognised as being of public utility.

The provisions of this Chapter in no way prejudice the allocation of the said property to be made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the event of Eastern Galicia being in whole or in part separated from Poland.

ARTICLE 34

Additions to domanial property or property appropriated to the public services shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of Articles 32 and 33; they shall be the subject of a special account to be adjusted on the final determination of the status of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 35

In the event of Eastern Galicia bearing the expense of any services of which in Poland the expense is borne by the State, Polish legislation shall fix the corresponding proportion of the proceeds of the general taxes raised in Eastern Galicia which shall be transferred to the budget of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 36

The budget of Eastern Galicia shall comprise:

- (1) As regards expenditure, the expenditure connected with the matters referred to in Article 12;
- (2) As regards revenue,
 - (a) the proportion of the proceeds of the general taxes determined in accordance with Article 35;
 - (b) the proceeds of supplements of the general taxes, voted by the Diet of Eastern Galicia;
 - (c) the proceeds of taxes imposed by the Diet of Eastern Galicia.

ARTICLE 37

The Polish Government shall be responsible for the service of the debts which, under Articles 199 and 200 of the Treaty of Peace between the High Contracting Parties and Austria, are to be assumed

by the territory of Eastern Galicia. In the event of this territory becoming either as a whole or in part separated from Poland, its contribution shall be determined in conformity with the principles laid down in Article 199 of that Treaty.

CHAPTER VII.—MILITARY ORGANISATION

ARTICLE 38

Laws in force in Poland relating to military service may be applied by Poland in Eastern Galicia.

The contingent thus recruited shall form special units in the Polish army. In time of peace these units shall perform garrison duty in Eastern Galicia.

Alternative Article proposed by minority

ARTICLE 38

There shall be no compulsory military service in Eastern Galicia.

CHAPTER VIII.—TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 39

Until the Assembly of the Diet, the Governor of Eastern Galicia shall administer the territory in conformity with the provisions of the present Treaty. In regard to matters which according to the present Treaty are within the competence of the Polish Diet, the Polish laws shall be introduced in Eastern Galicia by promulgation by the Governor. In regard to matters within the competence of the Diet of Eastern Galicia, the laws and regulations in force on July 28, 1914, shall be applied without being promulgated anew.

The Governor shall take the necessary measures for the initial constitution of the administrative services. He shall fix the number of Ministers and the division of duties between them, the number and the division so fixed being maintained until modified by the Diet.

The Governor shall take the necessary measures with a view to the election of the Diet of Eastern Galicia at the earliest possible date in the conditions laid down in Article 10, so that the Diet may be able to assemble at the latest within a period of nine months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. It will be the duty of the Governor to assure the freedom of the voting, in conformity with the provisions of Article 6, and to proceed without delay to the convocation of the Diet.

The régime established by Chapters I to VI of the present Treaty shall come into force in every respect upon the assembly of the first Diet. Compulsory military service shall not be introduced in Eastern Galicia before that date.

ARTICLE 40

No inhabitant of Eastern Galicia shall be disturbed or molested by reason of his political attitude between July 28, 1914, and the coming into force of the present Treaty.

III.—Consideration of the Articles in Regard to Which the Commission Was Not Unanimous

The Commission is unanimous in recommending thirty-seven of the articles in the accompanying plan for the organisation of Eastern Galicia. In the case of Articles 12, 16, and 38 the reasons for the divergent recommendations presented by the majority (four Delegations, viz., the American, French, Italian, and Japanese), and the minority (the British Delegation) may be set forth as follows:—

ARTICLE 12 (Agrarian Legislation.)

Opinion of the Minority.

The minority held that the conditions of land tenure in Eastern Galicia differed so materially from those in Poland, and that the agrarian question was so intimately bound up there with the question of nationality, that legislation designed for Poland would require material modification in order to be adapted to Eastern Galicia.

They further held that while there were objections to the placing of agrarian legislation exclusively within the sphere of the East Galician Diet, it would be manifest injustice to the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia if their system of land tenure were to be entirely remodelled by an extraneous Government without their consent and during a brief temporary régime.

As no form of representation at Warsaw could in itself guarantee to Eastern Galicia representatives a decisive influence on any particular question, the minority held that agrarian legislation passed by the Polish Diet should only be applied in Eastern Galicia with the consent of the Diet of Eastern Galicia (Article XI [XII], additional clause).

Opinion of the Majority.

The other Delegations held that it would be both unwise and unnecessary to allow the Galician Diet a veto on the agrarian legislation passed by the Diet of Warsaw.

The agrarian reform just passed by the Polish Diet is of so liberal and satisfactory a character that it would seem to be only in the interest of the Galicians themselves to ensure its speedy and integral application in Eastern Galicia.

The inhabitants of this territory will have an opportunity to make their wishes and interests respected during the process of carrying

out this reform, since its application will depend on the local committees to be formed for this purpose.

In the case of such a complex matter as agrarian legislation, it might in practice prove very difficult to secure complete agreement between the two Diets of Warsaw and Lemberg, and any failure on their part to agree would serve only to hamper or to imperil the whole agrarian reform in Eastern Galicia.

The requirements of an agreement in such a matter between two widely separated and widely different parliamentary bodies appears to be a novelty in constitutional law, and very probably it would turn out to be an unworkable arrangement.

ARTICLE 16 (representation of Eastern Galicia in the Polish Diet).

Opinion of the Majority.

Four Delegations held that for reasons both of justice and of practical necessity Eastern Galicia ought to be represented in the Polish Diet, and to be represented by deputies elected in accordance with the same rules as apply to elections in Poland.

For, according to the principles accepted by all the Delegations, the Diet of Warsaw will have power to levy taxes in Eastern Galicia, and to pass many kinds of laws which will apply to that territory. Most of the ministerial bureaux at Warsaw will, in a greater or less degree, have jurisdiction over Eastern Galicia. Therefore, unless the people of this province are to send deputies to the Polish Diet, they will have no effective voice in matters which vitally concern them. Such representation ought to be considered as an indispensable right granted to them, rather than as a burden imposed upon them.

The alternative proposal of one Delegation that this question should be left to be settled by voluntary agreement between the Polish Government and the Galician Diet, subject to the mediation of the League of Nations, is open to grave objections.

The present Treaty is based on the idea that the fundamental questions concerning the relations between Eastern Galicia and Poland are to be settled by this Treaty. The question of representation of Eastern Galicia in the Polish Ministry is certainly one of the most fundamental questions, and there would seem to be no reason why it should be left to a later voluntary agreement any more than most of the other questions touched upon in this Treaty.

The Polish Government would be justified, if only on formal grounds, in objecting to the proposed mediation of the League of Nations in such a question. For during the period of the provisional régime Eastern Galicia will be only a partially autonomous province under the sovereignty of Poland, and it may be doubted whether any Government at present can be induced to ask for the mediation of the League of Nations between itself and its subjects.

Finally, the competence of the Ministry of Eastern Galicia is actually defined by the terms of the Treaty in Articles 11 and 22. The question with which, in virtue of the British text, the Ministry would have to deal lies entirely beyond its competence, and serious difficulties may accordingly be feared in consequence of the conclusions which certain Ruthenian political leaders might attempt to draw from this ambiguity.

Opinion of the Minority.

The minority Delegation held that it was desirable to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to the fact that the representatives in Paris of the Ruthenian population, which forms the majority of the population of Eastern Galicia, had expressed themselves as strongly opposed to direct representation in the Polish Diet, which appeared to them only compatible with annexation to Poland.

The Delegation held that it is shown by the experience of legislatures in which racial minorities have been represented, that such representation fails to secure any effective influence for the minority in matters which concern them, and proves only a cause of obstruction and inefficiency to the Assembly. As in Eastern Galicia the Ruthenian population were resolutely opposed to direct representation in the Polish Diet, the Delegation felt that no useful purpose could be served by the sending of an unwilling nationalist party to Warsaw which would only embitter the relations between the two races. It would be infinitely preferable that the question should be postponed for six months until the Diet of East Galicia had met, when a form of representation could be devised which would have the consent of both parties.

The Delegation therefore held that this question, which was of a particularly complicated nature, could only be satisfactorily settled by an agreement to be reached locally between the Polish Government and the Minority of Eastern Galicia, with the collaboration, if desired, of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 38 (Military Service).

Opinion of the Minority.

The minority held that in view of the fact that the Ruthenian population had resisted Polish occupation by force of arms for six months, the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia could not forcibly be compelled to serve in the Polish army. A voluntary force could be raised under Polish supervision for the defence of the territory.

Opinion of the Majority.

As long as the troubled situation in Central and Eastern Europe renders the system of obligatory service necessary in almost every country in that part of the world, and in view of the special danger threatening from Bolshevism, it seems difficult to refuse to the Polish

Government in principle the right of introducing in Eastern Galicia the same form of service as exists in Poland within the measures of what it finds just and prudent. Eastern Galicia will enjoy the protection of Poland and all the rights which the other provinces of Poland possess. There would seem to be something inconsistent with elementary notions of justice therefore in excusing Eastern Galicia from contributing to its own defence or bearing its fair share of the common burden.

A system of voluntary service only would probably yield no tangible results in the way of troops, and would certainly be regarded by the other populations subject to the Polish State as a case of most unfair discrimination in favour of East Galicia.

Proposal With Regard to the Final Settlement

With regard to the Final Settlement, the Commission considers it to be its duty to submit to the Supreme Council of the Allies the following proposals which, if approved by the Council, could be added at the end of Article 2:—

Ten years after the exchange of ratifications of the present Treaty the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or such other body as they may appoint, shall, after an enquiry into the situation, determine both the date at which the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia shall be called upon to express its wishes in regard to the final settlement and the manner in which this consultation shall be carried out.

Appendix D to HD-57

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Note No. 1225 from the Austrian
Delegation September 18, relative
to the coal situation in Austria
with an annexure. (Dispatch from
Renner at Vienna.)

Translation

CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

No. 1225

ST. GERMAIN-EN-LAYE, September 18, 1919.

From: Herr Mayrhauser, Chargé d'Affaires

To: Monsieur Dutasta, Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

According to instructions that have just reached me, I have the honor to request Your Excellency to communicate to His Excellency the President of the Peace Conference, as soon as possible, the inclosed dispatch from the Chancellor of State, Herr Renner, on the subject of the frightful coal shortage prevailing in Austria.

MAYRHAUSER
Chargé d'Affaires p. i.

No. 2434
ad. No. 1225

Dispatch From the Chancellor of the Republic of Austria, Herr Renner, to His Excellency the President of the Peace Conference, Georges Clemenceau

MR. PRESIDENT: Austria, and especially its capital, are in a desperate situation on account of the disastrous fuel shortage.

From next Sunday public life will be partially paralyzed by the most rigorous measures of economy; service on the street railways will be suspended, the use of electricity by private individuals will be reduced to the minimum; moreover, unless some relief comes at the last moment, it will be absolutely necessary to close all the factories fed by the Vienna power stations. By this fact, more than one hundred thousand workmen will be thrown out of work.

The Austrian Government has up to the present worked desperately to keep the people supplied with work and to prevent the disastrous consequences of the lack of employment. Now, this sudden and enormous increase in the number of men out of work would make the maintenance of social order impossible. The results of such a condition would be incalculable, and there would be no limit to its action.

In the Peace Treaty of September 10 (Article 224), the Powers were pleased to provide a regulation by which the indispensable quantity of coal will be supplied to Austria by Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. Now, the humanitarian intention and the principles of international justice that inspired this clause would be illusory if before the Treaty goes into force the Austrian people, so harshly tried by the war, are, by the lack of fuel, deprived of the necessities of life and given over to economic and social ruin. In fact, in spite of negotiations constantly carried on with the two Powers mentioned and in spite of the insistent claims of the Austrian Government, we have come to the present pass.

I appeal therefore to the noble intentions revealed in the Peace Treaty, addressing to the Supreme Council the urgent request to give us its powerful support and to exercise its great power over the states in question, in order to save the Austrian nation from collapse, as well as from the dangers of anarchy, thereby preventing the catastrophe with [which?] Central Europe is seriously threatened.

Knowing that Your Excellency and the Supreme Council are not deaf to the appeals of a suffering nation, I have the firm hope that at this fateful and decisive hour for new Austria the Powers responsible for the new order of things in the world will give it aid.

RENNER

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, September 22, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE •	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk	Sir Eyre Crowe	M. Pichon
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. H. Norman	M. Dutasta M. Berthelot M. de Saint Quentin
ITALY		JAPAN
M. Scialoja		M. Matsui
<i>Secretary</i>		<i>Secretary</i>
M. Barone Russo		M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Mr. C. Russell
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE	M. Massigli
ITALY	Lieutenant de Carlo

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
General Bliss
Mr. A. Dulles
BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sackville-West
Hon. H. Nicolson
Mr. Carr
Lt. Col. Kisch
FRANCE
M. Cambon
M. Laroche
General Le Rond
M. Tardieu
M. Hermite
Colonel Roye
ITALY
M. Castoldi
M. Galli
M. Brambilla
M. Dell'Abbadessa

1. M. TARDIEU read the joint proposal of the British and American representatives upon the Central Territorial Committee, who had asked their French and Italian colleagues to agree to the line of demarcation of the zones of Western Thrace, which could be occupied by the Greek Army and by the other Allied Military Forces (see Appendix A).

Occupation of
Western Thrace
by Inter-Allied
Troops

He proposed to alter the last paragraph in the following manner:

“The zones of occupation thus fixed do not prejudice in any degree attribution of territory either to Greece or to the International State.”

This proposition was accepted.

(It was decided to accept the text (see appendix A as modified).)

2. M. CAMBON said that the Commissions for Polish and Czecho-Slovak affairs had submitted for the approval of the Council a plan for the organization of the plebiscite in the Districts of Teschen, Spisz and Orava. The Commissions were unanimous in proposing the addition to Article 4, first paragraph, of the following:

Plebiscite in the
Duchy of Teschen,
and in the Districts
of Spisz (Spis)
and Orava

“and in any event within a maximum period of three months after modification of the present decision as foreseen by Article 9.” (See Appendix B.)

He read a letter which he had received from M. Benes (See appendix C) asking that the arrangements for the plebiscite include special provisions concerning the right of option of the populations in the territory where the plebiscite was to be held. The Commission in agreement with the Drafting Committee thought that the question raised by M. Benes ought not to be dealt with in the draft which was submitted for the approval of the Council. It was for the Allied and Associated Powers to enter into such agreements with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, after the plebiscite had taken place, as appeared to them necessary, and to take such steps as they considered advisable as regarded the right of option of the population. The Commission desired to call attention to the urgent need of sending an Inter-Allied Commission, and for Inter-Allied occupation of the country where the plebiscite was to take place.

SIR E. CROWE said that he had no objection to the report of the Commission, but he desired to state that the British Military authorities disapproved of occupation by small forces from several of the Allied States. They believed that it would be far more advantageous, if the powers divided the zones of occupation, and each Power were charged with the occupation of a particular zone. The question had been discussed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and by

General Weygand. The French Military Representative thought that the resolution already taken by the Supreme Council prevented a discussion of the problem as a whole.¹ Under these circumstances he suggested that the Council reconsider its former decision and authorize the Military Representatives at Versailles to discuss the matter. It would be necessary to give the Military Authorities full latitude.

GENERAL LE ROND said that at the meeting of August 25 between General Weygand, representing Marshal Foch, Field Marshal Sir H. Wilson and General Bliss the subject of the organization of the Inter-Allied Armies of Occupation had been discussed. The occupation of the Klagenfurt Basin and of Thrace had been foreseen, but not the occupation of Teschen. Under these conditions they had estimated that five Divisions would be sufficient. The Army of Occupation could be Inter-Allied. The contingents of each of the Powers would be autonomous and the Supreme Command designated by the Supreme Council. General Weygand, acting for Marshal Foch, had maintained that the Allies had a collective responsibility. The occupation would be an Inter-Allied occupation everywhere. He had considered the political view. For reasons of a practical nature the British Representative on the other hand believed that the occupation of a fixed zone should be confided to a single power. England would occupy the Balkan territory, France, Upper Silesia, Italy, the Klagenfurt Basin and America, Dédéagatch. He wished to add that, in view of the recent decisions of the Supreme Council, the occupation of Klagenfurt and of Dédéagatch no longer entered into the question. On the other hand, General Bliss, who was present at the Conference, had made no communication exposing the American point of view.

SIR E. CROWE said that the British Military Authorities felt so strongly that they hesitated to send troops to any part of the world, until this principle had been settled.

MR. POLK asked whether there was any provision in the Treaty on the subject of occupation.

SIR E. CROWE replied that there was no such clause, insofar as Inter-Allied occupation was concerned.

MR. POLK asked whether the question had been considered by the Military Authorities at Versailles.

SIR E. CROWE said that he believed that the question had not been considered. The Military Authorities were not in a position to examine the question in view of the previous decision of the Council.

MR. POLK said that the question could be referred to the Military Representatives again as an open question for report on the advantages of the two systems.

¹ See HD-27, minute 7, vol. VII, p. 625; HD-37, minute 4, *ibid*, p. 815.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Treaty with Germany provided for occupation by Inter-Allied Military Forces. There was an obvious necessity. It was evident, from what had taken place in Roumania and Hungary, that a single power, which had been in fact only the mouthpiece of the decisions of the Council, could be given by public opinion the entire responsibility. It was the Conference which took the responsibility and it was therefore absolutely necessary that the responsibility should be divided, in the same manner as the authority.

MR. POLK said that he realized that the question had a political importance, but in certain cases, and the case of Teschen was one, there was no political difficulty to be feared. It was absurd from a practical point of view to send a mixed contingent from three different Powers. This entailed a special organization for provisioning each contingent and created a complicated situation. He asked whether it would not be possible for a single Power to represent in the District of Teschen. Dantzig would be occupied by a naval Power, but on the other hand, the occupation in Silesia would be Inter-Allied.

M. BERTHELOT said that he laid great weight on the moral side of the question and that to decide that the occupation of a certain territory should be entrusted to the troops of a single power was equivalent to creating a sphere of influence to the advantage of that Power. The equilibrium between the Powers would be far better maintained by a joint occupation. He thought that a formula could be found by which the great majority of the troops could be furnished by a single Power, and that the other Powers would be represented in the Inter-Allied forces by officers.

MR. POLK said a result of this nature could be reached. The Inter-Allied representation would be assured by delegates of the Powers in the Commissions for which the Treaty provided. These Commissions would each have an escort furnished by their countries; the main part of the forces of occupation would remain furnished by a single power.

GENERAL LE ROND said that there was no particular difficulty in the case of Teschen. It should be remembered that the District of Teschen was adjacent to Upper Silesia, which was to be occupied by two divisions. The troops sent to Teschen could easily be rationed from Upper Silesia.

MR. POLK said that he believed that Mr. Balfour had never admitted the principle of the Inter-Allied occupation of Upper Silesia.

M. BERTHELOT said that Mr. Balfour had raised the question, but he had never formally pronounced himself against Inter-Allied occupation. He (M. Berthelot) wished to again emphasize the importance of not creating a sphere of influence or zones of action in which one Power was particularly interested.

SIR E. CROWE said that he agreed on this point, but he wished to add that the zones of occupation were under the authority of Inter-Allied Commissions. It was these Commissions which were responsible; the troops placed at their disposal were only police forces. The principle of joint responsibility was clearly safeguarded.

M. BERTHELOT said that so far as Upper Silesia was concerned the treaty called for Inter-Allied occupation. If this occupation were confided to the troops of a single Power, there was a danger that the Germans would have cause for complaint. In addition, the Supreme Council had taken a definite resolution on this subject on 8th August. It had specified at that time that Marshal Foch, in agreement with the Allied General Staffs should weigh, on the one hand, the advantage to be gained by representation by all the Allies in all the forces of occupation, and, on the other, the disadvantages which might result both from eventual differences between soldiers of Allied contingents as well as from difficulties in connection with the provisioning of each force. Marshal Foch was to present a report on the subject to the Supreme Council.

MR. POLK asked whether the report had been sent.

M. BERTHELOT replied that it had been sent and distributed.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the date of the report was a matter of importance. He asked whether the force, whose organization had been discussed at that time, had not been intended, not for the mere occupation of Upper Silesia, but for the purpose of driving out the Germans.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was a question of the Peace Treaty.

GENERAL LE ROND said that it was agreed that the total strength should be two divisions (four brigades), and that each of the Powers was to furnish a brigade. Each brigade would be assigned to a special sector. The practical difficulties which might arise would therefore be less difficult to deal with. In addition, the Allied and Associated Powers would be complying with the terms of the Treaty and the principle of joint responsibility would be safeguarded.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Treaty with Germany provided for the occupation of Upper Silesia by troops of the Allied and Associated Powers, but that that did not necessarily mean by troops of all the Allied and Associated Powers. The troops of a single Power could in fact act as the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. BERTHELOT said that to admit this would be to put the text of the treaty on the rack.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did not agree, nor did he see why it would not be necessary to send Japanese troops as well.

GENERAL LE ROND said that Japan was not represented on the Commission for the occupation of Upper Silesia.

M. PICHON said that the appendix to Article 88 of the Treaty of Peace provided that Japan should not be represented on this Commission. It might be possible to refer the question again to the military representatives at Versailles pointing out to them that they should take note both of the text of the Treaty, which could not be changed, and of the views of the British delegation.

M. BERTHELOT said that in the meeting of the Supreme Council of August 8th, Mr. Balfour had not opposed the system of Inter-Allied occupation. He had merely pointed out the difficulties of provisioning an Inter-Allied force and proposed that the General Staffs study a system of compensation by which England, for example, could furnish a larger portion of the Inter-Allied contingent along the coast, and a smaller one in Upper Silesia. The total strength of the force furnished by each of the Allies would remain the same. It was only the redistribution in the zones of occupation which would change. He wished to repeat that it was most important not to put the material and political questions on the same footing and that the difficulties ought not be exaggerated. The political question was of extreme importance. It was necessary that the responsibility should be supported equally by all and that no spheres of influence, where one nation would benefit more than another, should be created. There were possibly districts, where the difficulties, as well as the possible advantages, were greater than in others, and it was not possible to admit the principle that a single nation should be in occupation there. As far as the material question was concerned, he thought that it could be solved without much difficulty. As an example, where difficulties and responsibility had fallen upon a single Power he wished to cite the example of Bulgaria. The French had acted as a police force of the Allies and they were the only ones who had incurred expense and burdens. England had expressed the intention of coming to the assistance of France, but France had received nothing beyond the offer of forty Hindu soldiers. He understood that so far as the United States was concerned, there were serious moral and material difficulties, but he believed strongly that it was advisable for the Great Powers to be together in the same zones.

M. CAMBON said that it was important to remember that in the eyes of the people the International Commissions did not count and that it was the military command, and that only which in their eyes was responsible. He wished to recall to Sir Eyre Crowe's mind, without any intention to criticize, an incident in history. In a certain century a distinguished prisoner² had been placed under the surveillance

² Napoleon Bonaparte.

of an Inter-Allied Commission, in which even France was represented, but it was England which was charged with the custody of the prisoner and it was England which bore the weight of the responsibility.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the two cases were not quite the same, for here the Council was dealing with a part of Germany. He understood in regard to the question before the Council that the military representatives at Versailles were limited by a decision of the Supreme Council. If the question were again referred to Versailles, no result would be reached unless the former resolution of the Council were modified. It was necessary to authorize the military representatives to study the matter as an open question and to ask them to make a report.

M. BERTHELOT agreed, but said that the question of principle would first have to be regulated. The military representatives at Versailles were not in position to decide. It was for the Supreme Council to give instructions when a decision had been made as to whether or not the occupation was to be Inter-Allied, the contingents from the various powers being proportioned according to some system to be devised.

M. PICHON said that the Versailles Council had never studied this question. The subject had been examined in a special conference between General Weygand, representing Marshal Foch, Field-Marshal H. Wilson and General Bliss. He suggested that no decision be taken until Sir Eyre Crowe had had an opportunity of consulting his Government and receiving new instructions.

It was decided:

(1) to accept the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions in regard to the plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen, and in the districts of Spis and Orava;

(2) to add at the end of the first paragraph of article 4, respecting the plebiscite at Teschen, the following:

“(within the shortest possible time . . .) and, in any event, within a maximum period of three months after notification of the present decision as foreseen by Article 9”;

(3) that the members of the Inter-Allied Commission charged with organizing the plebiscite should not be chosen from among the members of the Inter-Allied Commission now at Teschen;

(4) that members of the Inter-Allied Commission be nominated as soon as possible, with the reservation that the American representatives would only participate unofficially until the Treaty was ratified by the United States Senate.

3. COLONEL ROYE read and commented upon the procès verbal of the meeting held on August 28th by the Inter-Allied Commission charged

Allowance for
Inter-Allied
Commission of
Control in
Germany

with fixing the rate of commutation to be allowed the officers serving on the Commission of Control at Berlin. (See Appendix D.)

M. SCIALOJA said that he accepted the proposals of the Commission in regard to the amount of pay, but he wished to see the principle established that officers of the same rank belonging to different armies should draw the same pay while serving on this mission, and not receive during this time the pay provided by the regulations of the army to which they belonged.

MR. POLK said that the United States had no officers in this Commission and had therefore not taken a part in the discussion, but he desired to place himself on record as saying that he did not agree with the principle that Germany should pay the difference between the different rates of pay of officers of the same rank.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question of principle was very important and that the Italian proposal raised great difficulties. In fixing the rates of pay it would be necessary to consider the customs and manner of living in different countries.

M. SCIALOJA said that this was true, but that in this case it was a question only of officers who were called upon to live in the same country.

M. PICHON said that he would find it difficult to accept the Italian proposal. There was another point which should be made definite. The rates of pay had been fixed in marks. He asked what would happen if the rate of the mark rose.

GENERAL ROYE replied that the Commission had agreed that if the rate of the mark changed, the scale of pay would be revised.

M. PICHON said that in view of this and because it was not a question of the gold mark, a fixed rate for the mark should be established.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that it was not a question of the rate, but of prices prevailing in Germany. It was these prices which should fix the amount of the rates of pay in question.

It was decided :

(1) that the proposals of the Inter-Allied Commission charged with fixing the rate of commutation to be allowed to the personnel serving on the Commissions of Control should be accepted, and

(2) that the scale of pay should be altered every three months according to the economic conditions of the cost of living in Berlin.

4. M. SCIALOJA said that it had been announced that French troops would evacuate Koritz at the end of the month of September. There would be serious inconveniences, unless this city were occupied after the departure of the French troops.

M. PICHON said that the evacuation had been decided upon, but that no date had been fixed, and that for this reason it was not necessary for the Council to discuss the question.

Evacuation of
Koritz by
French Troops

5. M. BERTHELOT said that M. Benes was most anxious that the question of the repatriation of Czech troops in Siberia should be finally settled. He was leaving on that day. The question was an important one for if the state of things existing was allowed to continue Bolshevik propaganda would make headway among these troops. Public opinion in Czecho-Slovakia attached great importance to the repatriation of the troops in question. There were a number of difficulties, but if the repatriation could be begun it would have a very good effect. The Czechs were endeavoring to obtain the necessary tonnage from Japan, but they were in doubt as to whether they would be able to succeed. On the other hand, they did not have the means of making payment at Vladivostock to cover the cost of transportation of these troops. They had asked the British government to advance the amount necessary, just as France had advanced the cost of the maintenance of these troops in Siberia. It was for Great Britain and the United States to regulate the question of tonnage. M. Benes did not ask for a definite reply. It would be sufficient if he could be told that the subject was being favorably considered by the two Governments.

MR. POLK said that he was not able to give a definite reply on that day. He had suggested to Washington that the American Government undertake a third of the expenses of repatriation, the two thirds being paid by Great Britain and France.³ In regard to ships, there were the German ships which had been used for the repatriation of American troops. The use to which these ships could now be put would have to be decided by the Supreme Economic Council, or by the Maritime Transport Council at London. He felt that the United States had a great responsibility, and he would do everything on his part to secure a solution of the matter which would satisfy the Czechs.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Government would advance the money necessary for the cost of repatriation by sea. The British Government had accepted the principle and there were only questions of detail to be settled.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that in view of the political importance of the question, Sir Eyre Crowe should point out to his Government the importance of bringing the matter to the attention of the Maritime Transport Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was somewhat delicate. The French and British Governments had not come to an agreement as to the use to which the ships which had become available should be put.

M. BERTHELOT said that in view of the importance of the political interests at stake, he did not doubt but that the French Government

³ See telegram No. 4204, September 13, 1919, 11 p. m., to the Acting Secretary of State, and later correspondence, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, pp. 295 ff.

would make every effort to reach a solution which would make it possible to give the Czechs satisfaction.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Government shared this view.

MR. POLK said that he would not cease to emphasize the political importance of the question.

6. M. PICHON said that the declaration by the Allied and Associated Governments had required of the German Government in regard to Article 61 of the German Constitution would be signed that afternoon at Versailles, at four o'clock.

German Reply in
Regard to Article
61 of the German
Constitution

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Appendix A to HD-58

[Joint Proposal of the British and American Representatives Upon the Central Territorial Committee Concerning the Occupation of Western Thrace by Allied Troops]

[Same as appendix B to HD-57, printed on page 279.]

Appendix B to HD-58

Text of Resolution Proposed to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Execution of the Treaty Relative to the Organization of the Plebiscite in Teschen, Spisz, and Orava

Translation ⁴

SEPTEMBER 17, 1919.

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, Principal Allied and Associated Powers,

Anxious to place the Duchy of Teschen and the territories of Spisz and Orava, as they are delimited below, under a sovereignty in conformity with the wishes of the inhabitants;

Have resolved to proceed there to a popular consultation offering all the necessary guarantees of loyalty and sincerity;

And have decided what follows:

I

Within the territories which, on April 1, 1914, constituted the Duchy of Teschen and within the territories of Spisz and Orava, as they are delimited below, the inhabitants shall be called to designate

⁴ Translation is that filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.213302/84.

by suffrage if they desire to be united to Poland or to the Czecho-Slovak State.

1.—Region of Spisz.

a) All the communes of the political district of Starawies (Szepesofaiu or Altendorf).

b) The communes on the part of the Kesmark district (Kiez Mark) which are North-West of the waterline between the basins of the Dunajec and the Poprad, including the communes whose territory is crossed by that line.

2.—Region of Orava.

All the communes of the political district of Trszciana (Trzciana) and of Nameszto (Namiestow).

II

The territories mentioned in paragraph I, shall be placed under the authority of an International Commission charged with the provisional impartial administration and the organization of the plebiscite.

Those territories, at a date fixed by the Commission, shall be evacuated by the Polish and Czecho-Slovak troops, which may be there and shall be occupied, in whole or in part, by the troops of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The Commission shall have its seat at Teschen and shall be composed of the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, one representative per Power.

Its decisions shall be taken by majority vote, the President having the casting vote.

The Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments are asked to each appoint one representative to that Commission with a consulting vote.

The Commission shall have full powers to decide all questions which might be raised by the execution of the present decision. It shall have the assistance of technical advisors chosen by it among the local population.

III

The Commission shall have the necessary powers allowing it to insure the maintenance of public order and the regular administration of the country. For that purpose it shall have at its disposal the troops of occupation, and, if it deems it advisable, a police recruited from the native inhabitants of the country.

It shall be within the jurisdiction of the Commission to interpret itself the powers which shall be entrusted to it and to determine in what measure it shall exercise them and in what measure these powers can be left in the hands of the existing local authorities.

IV

The Commission shall organize the plebiscite in conformity with the provisions of the present decision and shall proceed to it within the least possible time.

It shall take all the measures necessary to insure the liberty, the sincerity and the secrecy of the vote. It can notably pronounce the expulsion of any agitator or of any person who might have, in any way, tried to falsify the result of the plebiscite by corruption or intimidation.

V

The right of suffrage shall be granted to any person, without distinction of sex, who shall fulfill the following conditions:

- a) To be twenty years of age on January 1, 1919;
- b) To have his domicile or denizenship (*Heimatsrecht*) in the region submitted to the plebiscite prior to August 1, 1914;

The persons exercising a public function or having, as officials, acquired the right of denizenship shall not be permitted to vote.

Persons condemned for political misdemeanor previous to November 3, 1918, might be granted the right to vote.

Each one shall vote in the commune where he is domiciled or in which he has the right of denizenship.

The result of the vote shall be determined by commune, according to the majority of votes in each commune.

VI

At the closing of the vote the number of votes in each commune shall be communicated by the Commission to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers together with a detailed report on the operations of the vote and a proposal for the trace which should be adopted as frontier between Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State, taking into account the wish expressed by the inhabitants as well as the geographic and economic situation of the localities. Besides, the Commission shall inform the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of the conditions in which an economic accord between Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State shall henceforth insure to both countries the communications and the supply of coal to the best of their respective interests.

VII

As soon as the frontier shall have been fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, they shall notify Poland or the Czecho-Slovak State, as the case may be, that their authorities have to take in hand the administration of the territory which has been recognized as being

Polish or Czecho-Slovak; the said authorities shall proceed then within the month following that notification and in the manner prescribed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

As soon as the administration of the country shall have been thus insured by the Polish or Czecho-Slovak authorities, according to the case, the powers of the Commission shall come to an end.

VIII

The costs of the army of occupation and the expenditures of the Commission, as well for its functioning as for the administration of the zone, shall be borne by Poland and by the Czecho-Slovak State in proportion of the area of the territories which, according to the plebiscite, shall be recognized as placed under the sovereignty of Poland or of Czecho-Slovakia; the distribution shall be made by the Commission.

IX

The present decision shall be announced within a week to the Polish Government and to the Czecho-Slovak Government by the Government of the French Republic.

Given at Paris, this 1919.

Appendix C to HD-58

Translation

CZECHO-SLOVAK
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

From: Edward Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
To: Monsieur Dutasta, Secretary General of the Peace Conference,
Paris.

I have the honor to send you herewith the text of a supplementary article to the Regulation concerning the execution of the plebiscite in Teschen Silesia, which I request you to transmit to the Territorial Commission. I am very anxious that this article be taken into consideration when it comes to the final settlement of the conditions under which the plebiscite will be carried out in Teschen Silesia.

I take the liberty of adding at the same time the copy of a plan of regulation concerning the same subject, that I have submitted to the Territorial Commission under the presidency of M. Jules Cambon, containing the conditions under which the Czecho-Slovak Delegation accepted the principle of the plebiscite in Teschen Silesia.

EDWARD BENES,
Minister.

[Enclosure]

REGULATION CONCERNING THE EXECUTION OF THE PLEBISCITE IN TESCHEN
SILESIA*Supplement Proposed by Czecho-Slovakia*

14

The inhabitants of Teschen Silesia shall enjoy the right of option provided by Article 80 of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, with the sole change that the period of six months fixed by the said article shall begin, for them, with the definite assignment of their country.

CONSIDERATION

By the provisions of Section VI, Part III, of the Peace Treaty with Austria, there is no doubt that the population of Teschen Silesia will have, after the final assignment of this country, the right to opt either for Poland or for Czecho-Slovakia. Now, it is not Article 79, but Article 80, that will be applicable to the exercise of this right; but as the said article provides for the exercise of option during the six months following the entrance into force of the Treaty of St. Germain, and as the definite assignment of Silesia may not take place until after this date, it is important to insert in the regulation of the Silesian plebiscite the amendment proposed above.

Summary

1. Fundamental provision stipulating that the population of the former Duchy of Teschen shall be called upon to name the State to which they wish to be attached.
2. Evacuation of the territory by Polish and Czech-Slovak troops, disbanding of military and semi-military clubs existing in this territory. Occupation of the territory by interallied troops.
3. Establishment of an international Plebiscite Commission.
4. Powers of the said Commission.
5. Definition of the persons having the right to vote.
6. Drawing up the lists of voters.
7. Provision for the place of voting.
8. Establishment of local plebiscite commissions.
9. Method of balloting.
10. Determining the results of the plebiscite.
11. Decision of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.
12. Consequence regarding the resumption of authority by the governments concerned.

REGULATION CONCERNING THE EXECUTION OF THE PLEBISCITE IN TESCHEN
SILESIA

1

In order to ascertain the will of the population of Teschen Silesia concerning its union with one of the states concerned (Czecho-Slovak or Polish), the inhabitants shall be called upon by vote to declare whether they desire to be attached to Czecho-Slovakia or Poland.

2

As soon as this decision of the Supreme Council goes into force, and within a period not to exceed 15 days, the Czecho-Slovak and Polish troops shall evacuate the aforesaid territory.

All the military and semi-military clubs (militia, etc.) formed in said territory by the inhabitants of the country shall be immediately disbanded and disarmed. Those members of said clubs not domiciled in said territory shall evacuate it. The entire country shall be occupied immediately by interallied troops.

3

The country shall be placed immediately under the authority of an international Commission of 3 members, whose president shall be appointed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the Czecho-Slovak member by the Government at Prague and the Polish member by the Government at Warsaw, both to be members of the present Polish-Czecho-Slovak Commission on Teschen.

4

The Commission shall enjoy all the powers exercised by the Czecho-Slovak Government or the Polish Government (*Rząd krajowy*), except in matters of legislation or taxes. It shall, moreover, be substituted for the Government of the country as it was on October 28, 1918. All subsequent changes shall be declared null and void.

The Commission shall itself have competence to interpret the powers conferred on it by the present regulations, and to determine in what degree it shall exercise these powers and in what degree they shall be left in the hands of the existing authorities.

Order shall be maintained by the Commission, with the assistance of the troops, which shall be at its disposal, and, as far as it shall judge necessary, it shall be assisted by the police recruited from the natives of the country. The communal police and the *gendarmerie* shall be maintained.

The Commission shall provide at once for the replacement of the authorities of the country, and if necessary give orders for the evacuation and proceed to the replacement of local authorities. In case this evacuation should not be possible the Commission is to take the necessary measures to prevent the officials from abusing their official position to influence the vote.

It shall take all necessary measures to insure the freedom, sincerity and secrecy of the vote. It shall, notably, have the power to order the expulsion of any person who may in any way whatever attempt to falsify the result of the plebiscite by maneuvers of corruption or intimidation.

The Commission shall have full power to pronounce on all questions to which the execution of the present conditions may give rise. It shall call to its assistance technical councillors which it will choose from among the local population.

The decisions of the Commission shall be taken by majority vote.

To avoid complications arising from the fact that there are two different monetary systems in the country, the use of the respective coinage shall be maintained in the present zones "west and east of the present line of demarkation". No one shall be compelled to accept bank notes in use in the other zone.

5

The vote shall take place within two months after the present decision comes into force.

The right of suffrage shall be accorded to all persons, without distinction of sex, under the following conditions:

- a) that they have passed their twentieth birthday, and
- b) that they have acquired denizenship (*domovske pravo*, *Heimatsrecht*) in a commune of the country of Teschen before August 1, 1914.

Each person shall vote in the commune in which he holds denizenship, or in his domicile in the country of Teschen. All persons having the right to vote, and being in the Czecho-Slovak or Polish army, or being interned or incarcerated for any reason whatever, shall be enabled to exercise freely their right to vote.

6

To effect the vote, lists of voters shall be established by the mayors "respectively by the presidents of the administrative commissions", under their personal penal responsibility, within 15 days from the entrance into force of the present decision. Claims against these lists

may be entered up to the day of voting and shall be judged by the local plebiscite commissions provided in Article 8, and by the international Commission mentioned in Article 3, as a last appeal.

7

The voting place for the communes whose population exceeds 5000 shall be that commune itself; for the other communes it shall be the capital of the judiciary district. All communes in question shall vote separately.

8

In each voting place a local plebiscite commission shall be established to superintend the execution of the suffrage of all the communes in question. This Commission shall be composed of 3 members, one Czech, one Pole and one German, who shall be appointed from among the inhabitants of the country by the International Commission (see Article 3).

 Appendix D to HD-58

Translation

INTERALLIED MILITARY
COMMISSION OF CONTROL
Office

PARIS, September 2, 1919.

From: General Nollet, President of the Interallied Military Commission of Control.

To: President Clemenceau.

In pursuance of a resolution of the Peace Conference, dated August 18,⁵ the special Interallied Commission met on August 28, with myself in the chair, to fix the rate of commutation to be allotted to the officers appointed to serve on the commissions of control of the execution of the Treaty.

I have the honor to send you herewith the minutes of this meeting.

I am of the opinion that the figures decided upon by the Commission reconcile as far as possible the points of view, necessarily different, of the delegations of the various nationalities.

I did not think we should discuss the commutation to be allotted to generals presidents of commissions, or to the presidents of sub-commissions.

As to the latter, I propose to fix their service commutation at 5,000 marks a month.

⁵ HD-32, minute 11, vol. VII, p. 707.

This will give them a material situation inferior to that of General Dupont, who is a brigadier-general and who has under his orders a personnel of officers considerably smaller, but who is head of a mission.

NOLLET

[Enclosure 1]

INTERNALLIED COMMISSION CHARGED WITH FIXING THE
RATE OF COMMUTATION TO BE ALLOTTED TO THE OFFI-
CERS SERVING ON THE COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL AT
BERLIN

PARIS, August 28, 1919.

MEETING OF AUGUST 28, 1919

Minutes

I. The Commission, constituted as provided in S4 of the report of the Supreme Council of War, dated August 14, 1919, met at 10 o'clock, at 4 bis. Boulevard des Invalides, with General Nollet in the chair.

It was composed as follows:

Military Delegates:

Colonel Roye (France)
General Bingham (England)
Major Pergolani (Italy)
Major Hisamara (Japan)
General de Guffroy (Belgium)

Naval Delegates:

Lieutenant Michelier (France)
Captain Fuller (England)
Commander Gonzenbach (Italy)
Captain Anno (Japan)

Aerial Delegates:

Major Polimarchetti (France)
Colonel Burdett (England)
Colonel Chelso (Italy)
Major Katsuki (Japan)
Lt. Colonel Tournier (Belgium)

Financial Delegates:

M. Benoix (France)
Brigadier-General Goligher (England)
Captain Maranzini (Italy)
Mr. Kasuma (Japan)
Int. Marlier, represented by the officer delegated (Belgium)

II. The President gives the history of what has already been done in the matter of fixing commutation and informs the members of the Conference of the following documents:

a) Letter of July 28, 1919,⁶ from General Nollet to Marshal Foch on the subject of a plan of commutation to be allotted to the French personnel of the Military Commission of Control.

⁶ Appendix E (annex) to HD-22, vol. VII, p. 496.

b) Letter of July 28, 1919,⁷ from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference.

c) Resolution of August 2, 1919,⁸ of the Peace Conference, referring the proposition of Marshal Foch to the military representatives at Versailles.

d) Report of August 14, 1919,⁹ of the military representatives to the Supreme Council of War.

e) Resolution of the Peace Conference of August 18, 1919, approving the propositions of the preceding report and deciding to appoint a special commission.¹⁰

III. The Commission first recognizes the fact that it is necessary to insure to the officers, during their stay in Germany, a situation that will relieve them of all anxiety of a material nature for themselves and their families, and will make it possible for them to maintain towards the Germans the prestige suitable to their functions.

It asserts on the other hand that the estimation of this commutation must be as moderate as possible.

The very prestige of these officers, which implies certain obligations for them, would suffer from the slightest exaggeration in their style of living.

Moreover, it is necessary to burden as little as possible the first payment to be made by Germany, from which the commutation will be drawn.

IV. Brigadier-General Goligher, British financial expert, makes a few remarks on the uniformity of the rate of commutation, a commutation which will be constant, though added to very unequal salaries; and on the role of the financial experts at the conference, notably on their right to vote.

The President replies that since the first point has been already treated by the Supreme Council it does not seem that it can be discussed. As to the role of the financial experts, they have, as well as the other members, a vote in the deliberations, their presence at the conference being particularly justified by the nature of the subjects to be discussed and their influence on the Budgets of the Allied nations.

V. Next the question is asked whether the rate of commutation will vary according to the residence of the officers.

It seems certain that the officers serving in the provinces will have lower daily expenses than those at Berlin. On the other hand, they must travel more frequently, so that the total expenses would be practically equivalent.

⁷ Appendix E to HD-22, *ibid.*, p. 496.

⁸ HD-22, minute 6, *ibid.*, p. 486.

⁹ Appendix E to HD-32, *ibid.*, p. 711.

¹⁰ HD-32, minute 11, *ibid.*, p. 707.

The Commission next asks whether the daily commutation will be the same for all, it being understood that the officers in the provinces will not draw extra mileage.

VI. The discussion on the rate itself of the commutation is then opened, taking as a basis the original project (the letter of July 28, 1919), a project which was itself drawn up according to the rate of commutation allotted by the French Government to the members of General Dupont's mission, and according to information furnished by Comptroller Gaillard, now at Berlin.

The British delegation proposes to allot to subaltern officers a fixed commutation inferior to the figure in the project. There would be added to this supplementary commutations corresponding to expenses resulting from special missions confided to each officer.

The President calls attention to the fact that distinctions between officers called upon alternately to fill a sedentary position and distant missions would lead to complications. He thinks it preferable to fix a lump commutation, it being understood that this commutation will include all expenses except lodging and the expenses of travelling, properly so-called.

General Bingham supports this point of view, but he declares that under these conditions the figure of the original project is too low for the subaltern officers and that it must be raised.

Basing their views on the experience of officers already sent on missions in Germany, the Italian and Belgian delegations and the representatives of British, French and Italian aviation also insist on raising the figures of the original project.

Finally the following figures were agreed on, entailing a considerable reduction for generals, colonels and lieutenant-colonels, and an increase for the subaltern officers:

A. Officers

Generals	9000 marks
Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels	7500 “
Majors	7000 “
Subaltern officers	6500 “

To this monthly commutation shall be added a monthly commutation for heads of service and heads of districts:

Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels	2500 marks
Majors and officers of lower rank in case they perform the above functions.	2000 “

B. Enlisted Men

Non-commissioned officers	3300 marks
Privates	2000 “

Brigadier-General Goligher, British financial expert, and Mr. Benoit, French financial expert, express reserves on the above figures, which they find very high.

On the other hand, the Italian and Belgian experts are of the opinion that the increase made in the course of the conference in the commutation of the subaltern officers is justified.

VII. It is next made plain that the Allied civilian personnel employed in the commissions, such as experts, interpreters, secretaries, etc., will have a right to commutation corresponding to an assimilation of rank which will be determined by the presidents of commissions in each particular case.

VIII. The Commission lays it down as a principle that the scale of commutation must not take into account the family expenses incumbent on the officers and men, the commutation being intended to insure the proper scale of living for the officer himself, relieving him from all anxiety as to his family.

In the same way, the Commission is of the opinion that the commutation for clothes cannot be fairly put to Germany's charge, and that it is for each Government to fix it if it sees fit.

The same is true for the travelling expenses of the officers' families, who may join them in Germany.

IX. The Allied Governments reserve the right to change the table of commutation in case of any notable change in the economic conditions of life in Germany.

It is moreover to be foreseen that the total charge resulting from the maintenance of the commissions will be notably lightened when the work of control shall be sufficiently advanced to allow the number of officers to be dismissed.

NOLLET

[Enclosure 2]

Translation

LT. COLONEL T. R. UBSDELL, D. S. O.
BRITISH DELEGATION
PARIS

D/333

Relative to the meeting of the Commission which is to propose the rates of commutation to be allotted to the Allied officers going into Germany, with the Commissions of Control, I send you herewith the copy of a memorandum drawn up by me on the subject of the discussion which came up.

The objection which I raise should be inserted in any minutes submitted to the Supreme War Council.

Signed: illegible
Financial Councillor

A. P. O. S. 31

B. Troops cantoned in France

AUGUST 30, 1919.

To General Nollet, Chief of the Interallied Military Commission of Control.

Sent with reference to the minutes of the commission appointed to fix the commutation to be allotted to the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates going into Germany with the Interallied Commissions of Control.

T. R. UBSDELL
Lt. Colonel

LT. COLONEL T. R. UBSDELL, D. S. O.
BRITISH DELEGATION
PARIS

D/333

To the General Chief of the British Section of the Inter-Allied Military Commission.

A meeting was held in Paris on August 28 on the subject of the commutation to be allotted to the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates serving on the Commissions of Control going into Germany.

I learned the day before that a message had been received at the Ministry of War authorizing me to be present at the meeting as financial councillor.

Before the meeting I had a conversation with General Bingham and the other British representatives. The interallied conference took place in General Nollet's office.

The propositions made seemed to me to be of an unjustified liberality, and I stated my opinion clearly to the British representatives before the meeting.

General Bingham was disposed to adopt my point of view on this subject, but insisted vigorously on the advantage of according sufficient commutation to maintain the prestige of the Allies in the German cities and provinces. The British Malcolm Commission and the French Dupont Commission were the only bases furnishing a comparison. The rates allotted by these two commissions differ up to a certain point; the French commission giving the larger allotment. This is probably due to the fact that the pay of French officers and men is considerably lower than in the British army. It has specified that the expenses of the commission would fall on Germany. I brought out the fact that this was not a sufficient reason for granting unjustified commutation. In the first place, all sums spent for the commissions would constitute a first levy on the indemnity of reparation, and this would diminish the total amount available, supposing that Germany should be unable to pay the entire amount exacted for reparation; in the second place, it seemed to me to be a bad thing

to give the Germans the idea in any way whatever that these commissions are making a profit; and in the third place, if the commission receives commutation unjustifiably high it might create a precedent and we may be sure that it will be a source of future difficulties for the officers sent or left there.

The position of the financial representatives at this conference (British, French, Italian, Belgian and Japanese) was precised as follows:

Although their opinion will be asked and their remarks will be welcomed, they had not the right of veto, but any proposition coming from them would be examined when the question should be referred to the Supreme War Council.

I raised objections on the following points:

1.—On the proposition that the same rate should be allotted to all nationalities. It is clear that the Italians, for example, are in favor of high commutation, because their pay is relatively very low; the tendency would be therefore that the rates should approach the highest amount, if the proposition were accepted. My objection was noted, but the commission decided to adhere to its first view.

2.—On applying the same rate to Berlin and to the provinces. In the Malcolm Mission different rates are applied to Berlin and to the provinces, and I think that up to the present there has been no complaint on this subject. I stated that if they fixed the same rate for Berlin and the provinces the officers at Berlin would doubtless protest energetically, saying that their expenses are greater than those of the officers living in the smaller cities. It was decided however to accept the principle of a single rate, although noting my objection.

3.—On the rates in general, because they are too high in their total amount, in view of the fact that the lodging is to be free (but board is to be paid). The commission decided that it was essential that the lodging should be free, and my objection was noted.

I may say that, in a general way, the representatives shared my views; the Japanese representative, without taking any definite position, was inclined to be on our side. But the Italian and Belgian representatives were both in favor of the maximum rate. As the British Treasury does not have to support all the financial charges directly, I think I understand how no right of veto was accorded to me.

It was stated that the pay of civilian clerks brought by the British authorities would be that normally paid for the corresponding civil position in their own country, and that their commutation would be established according to the same rules as those of the non-commissioned officers working with the Commission.

Moreover, it was proposed to grant further commutation, mileage for night travel for the personnel of the commissions that will be

obliged to leave their permanent residence. I do not exactly understand what will be the situation of the officers in regard to the ordinary commutation granted in time of war. But doubtless this question will be settled by the war office. It seems to be that they should not receive commutation for field service, or any of the special commutations granted by General Order No. 501 of 1914.

Signed: illegible.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 23, 1919, at 11 a.m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de St. Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja
Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF..... Captain Chapin
BRITISH EMPIRE..... Captain Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE..... M. Massigli
ITALY..... M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned :

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Carr
Hon. H. Nicolson
Lt. Col. Kisch

FRANCE

M. Cambon
M. Laroche
General Le Rond
M. Hermite
Colonel Roye

ITALY

M. Galli
M. Brambilla.

1. MR. POLK said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to a matter of extreme importance before the order of the day should be taken up.

German Tank
Ships

At the time of the Armistice the German Government had been in possession of fourteen oil tank

ships which had not been disposed of under the terms of the armistice. At a conference in Brussels in March, 1919, the Germans had asked to be allowed to retain these ships on account of the pressing need for oil existing in their country. It had been agreed that they should be allowed to keep them. Simultaneously the Supreme [Economic?] Council had agreed that Germany should be allowed to receive shipments of oil and for that purpose to retain the fourteen ships. Later, when the question of the reparations to be made for the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow had arisen, the question of the fourteen ships had again been raised. At this time also the Germans were allowed to retain them. These ships had been prepared for use and were to be sent to the United States for transport of oil, the delivery of which had been contracted for and partly paid. On August 15th Admiral Charlton, President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, had directed that these ships be delivered to the Firth of Forth to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Interallied Maritime Transport Council. Some time about September first the American representative on the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission had protested against this delivery, and the question had been raised at a meeting of the Interallied Maritime Transport Council. The American representative had urged that the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers was alone competent to deal with this question, but his protests had not been heeded. At the meeting of the Supreme Economic Council held at Brussels on September 20th the question of the disposition of these ships had been raised. He had sent a telegram to the Council, asking them to delay action on the matter, but this wire had not been received and presumably had been lost in transmission.

The Supreme Economic Council, on which the United States was not represented, had upheld the decision of the Interallied Maritime Transport Council and had ordered the ships to be delivered to the Firth of Forth. The American Government believed that this constituted a breach of the agreement made with Germany and, furthermore, that neither the Interallied Maritime Transport Council nor the Supreme Economic Council had jurisdiction in the matter. The Supreme Council alone was the body competent to decide on the disposition of the ships and he urged that instructions be given that the order of the Supreme Economic Council be held in abeyance pending the decision on the question by the Supreme Council.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had been present on the previous evening at a meeting which had taken place at M. Clemenceau's room, at which M. Berenger, who was one of the representatives of the French Government at the meeting in Brussels on September 20th, had made a report on the matters discussed at this meeting. In the light of

M. Berenger's statements it was clear that he was not aware of the points which had been raised by Mr. Polk. He had gathered the impression from the conversation that there was disagreement between the British and French Governments on the subject of the disposition of the tank ships, but he wished to add that he was not cognizant of the matter which Mr. Polk had presented to the Council.

MR. POLK said that it was necessary to stop delivery of these ships being made from Hamburg until the Council had arrived at a decision in the matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was not familiar with all the aspects of the question, and that he would have to consult his government.

MR. POLK said that an order of the Supreme Economic Council had actually been given in the matter and that it would be necessary to suspend the execution of this order until a decision had been reached.

MR. BERTHELOT said that he believed the action would be taken in London, and it was therefore necessary to advise the authorities in that place.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the matter seemed to him slightly involved. There had been so many bodies which had dealt with this question that it was not exactly clear to which body the order should be sent.

MR. POLK said that to make sure the order should be sent to every body which had dealt with the question.

M. PICHON said that he was in favor of having the order for the delivery of the ships held in suspense until the matter had been decided upon by the Supreme Council. He pointed out, however, that the holding up of this order did not affect the question of the final distribution of the ships.

MR. POLK said that this was also his understanding of the matter. The United States had not been represented on the Supreme Economic Council. The Interallied Maritime Transport Council had felt that it had no authority to order the delivery of the ships and had consequently referred the matter to the Supreme Economic Council, despite the protest made by the United States. The Economic Council had taken jurisdiction of the matter and had given the orders for the delivery of the ships to the Firth of Forth. It was to this body that the resolution of the Council should be sent without delay.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would notify the authorities in London in any case.

(It was decided that the fourteen oil tank ships, which Germany had been allowed to retain at the time of the armistice, should not be delivered to the Allies until such time as the Supreme Council has agreed upon their ultimate disposition.)

(It was further decided that the Supreme Economic Council, which had given the orders for the delivery of the ships in question, should be

instructed to take immediately the necessary steps to cancel these orders.)

2. SIR EYRE CROWE said that in paragraph three of the resolution, taken by the Supreme Council on the previous day, (H. D. 58 Minute 2),¹ he thought that a slight error had occurred. This paragraph, which read as follows:

“That the members of the Interallied Commission, charged with organizing the plebiscite, should not be chosen from among the members of the Interallied Commission now at Teschen.”

had appeared in the report submitted by the joint Czecho-Slovak Polish Commission as a mere expression of opinion of that body.

He did not understand that the Commission had taken a definite resolution on this point and he did not wish to criticise it as a decision. He was not in a position to agree that it should be carried out, but would be obliged to refer to his government. It was possible that sufficient personnel might not be found to send a different British representation for the Plebiscite Commission than that of the Interallied Commission now at Teschen. He thought it would be well for each government to have free hand in the matter of this resolution.

MR. LAROCHE said that at the meeting of the Joint Czecho-Slovak and Polish Commission on September 10th Colonel Kisch, the British representative had suggested that the Interallied Commission actually at Teschen should be reinforced with additional members for the purpose of supervising the plebiscite.

He, Mr. Laroche, had answered that the Commission now at Teschen should be completely withdrawn and a new Commission sent there for the purpose of the plebiscite. His reasons in so urging were that the commission at present in Teschen had been there for such a long time, and had been so mixed up in local quarrels and difficulties that it was possible it would not have sufficient prestige to carry into effect its orders regarding the plebiscite. Colonel Kisch had agreed with this opinion. This agreement had enabled Mr. Cambon to state that even though no decision had been taken by the Commission on the point, this body was strongly in favor of the paragraph referred to by Sir Eyre Crowe.

MR. CAMBON said that he was all the more determined to maintain his recommendation of the previous day for the reason that two letters had been received in the interval; one was from Mr. Paderewski and the other from Mr. Benes. Mr. Benes had said that the Czecho-Slovak Government could not agree to the continuation in power of the present Commission at Teschen, because of the numerous complaints which had been received against that body, as well as

¹ *Ante*, p. 300.

the complaints which it had made against the local authorities. It was highly desirable that a new Commission should be installed for the purpose of the plebiscite. Mr. Paderewski, in a letter written to Mr. Clemenceau, had spoken of the warlike atmosphere which existed throughout Upper Silesia and which necessitated a military intervention. He earnestly requested the immediate organization of a commission to carry out the plebiscite in that region, and further stated that such a body should send an appreciable number of officers ahead as an advance detachment. In this instance both the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles were in accord, and the Council should conform to their desires and send a new Commission there immediately.

MR. PICHON said he understood that Sir Eyre Crowe would recommend this proposition to his government.

MR. POLK said that, in order to spare the feelings of the present members of the Commission in Teschen, it would be as well that the matter should appear in the form of a recommendation of the Czecho-Slovak-Polish Commission, rather than a resolution of the Council.

(It was decided that the third paragraph of the resolution taken by the Council on the previous day (H. D. 58, Minute 2) be amended to read as follows:

"3. That it was preferable that the members of the Interallied Commission charged with organizing the plebiscite should not be chosen from among the members of the Interallied Commission now at Teschen.")

3. M. PICHON said that the Council had neglected at its last session to decide upon the entertainment allowances to be granted to the head of the Interallied Military Commission of Control and to the heads of the Subcommissions thereof.

Allowances for
Officers of the
Interallied
Commissions of
Control

COLONEL ROYE said that General Nollet proposed to grant an entertainment allowance of 5,000 marks per month to each of the general officers acting as presidents of the Subcommissions. This would insure to these officers a financial situation slightly inferior to that enjoyed by General Dupont, who had been Chief of the French Military Mission in Berlin during the armistice. General Nollet had not made any proposal in regard his own remuneration.

M. PICHON suggested that General Nollet should receive the same allowances as General Dupont had been granted.

COLONEL ROYE pointed out that this would not be feasible, as General Nollet would have four hundred officers under his orders as compared with twenty-five who had been under the command of General Dupont. He proposed 10,000 marks a month for General Nollet.

M. PICHON suggested that these figures might be accepted, subject to a revision to be made every three months.

MR. POLK directed the attention of the Council to the fact that the United States was not voting in this matter, as it had no representation on the Interallied Commissions of Control.

It was decided:

(1) that the following monthly entertainment allowances be made to the President of the Interallied Military Commission of Control in Germany and to the Presidents of the Subcommissions thereof, respectively:

for the President of the Commission, 10,000 marks
for the Presidents of the Subcommissions, 5,000 marks

(2) that these allowances, as well as those of the remainder of the personnel of the Commissions, should be revised every three months, according to the economic conditions of the cost of living in Germany.

4. M. PICHON said that each delegation had received copies of the telegrams sent by Sir George Clerk and that it might be well to await the return of the latter to Paris before discussing the information contained in his telegrams.

(The Council had before it the telegrams from Sir George Clerk, dated Sept. 16th and 19th. See Appendices "A", "B", "C".)

M. BERTHELOT said that he had been instructed by M. Clemenceau to inform the Council that he, M. Clemenceau, considered M. Bratiano's answer, as expressed in Sir George Clerk's telegrams, as conciliatory. This opinion was further strengthened by the fact that the Roumanian Government had made several proposals seeking to conciliate their position with the demands made by the Council. Colonel Antonesco had arrived in Paris to settle the military questions with the Council. In addition, M. Bratiano had stated that he was prepared to release the material for the reconstruction of the bridge across the Save River, which he had held up pending the return by the Serbians of the material which they had removed from the Banat. Furthermore, in order to avoid being charged with stirring up Bolshevism in Hungary, and for the purpose of assisting the Hungarians to form a police force, the Roumanian Government was prepared, on withdrawing its forces from Hungary, to leave one division in Budapest under the command of the senior Allied General in that city. This measure would be for the purpose of maintaining order until the Hungarians were in a situation to guarantee it. Lastly, M. Bratiano was prepared to furnish a list of the requisitions made by the Roumanians in Hungary and agreed that these should be thrown into the general pool for the purpose of the reparations to all the Allies.

Situation in
Hungary. Tele-
grams From Sir
George Clerk

In view of the conciliatory nature of these proposals, M. Clemenceau had believed that the delivery of arms and munitions to the Roumanian Government, agreed upon with the French in 1917, which had been temporarily held up, should be resumed. He had accordingly given orders that these shipments be resumed.

MR. POLK said that he was somewhat surprised that M. Clemenceau had taken this responsibility alone, as the decision to stop all shipments of material to Roumania had been taken by the Five Powers constituting the Council.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had not understood that the Council had reached a decision on this matter. He believed that M. Clemenceau had simply made an offer to suspend the French shipments, which were being made in execution of a contract entered into in 1917, and that this offer had been accepted by the Council. In addition, M. Bratiano had given the impression that France alone had suspended its shipments, for the British Government was actually negotiating with the Roumanians for the delivery of naval material and the transport of Roumanian material from Archangel. Italy was also in the process of establishing an economic agreement with Roumania.

MR. POLK said that on August 25 (see H. D. 38, Minute 3)² the Council had taken a formal resolution to suspend shipments of material of all kind to the Roumanian Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Sir George Clerk had telegraphed to the effect that the shipments of British war material to Rumania had been stopped by virtue of the resolution of the Council referred to by Mr. Polk. The former had recommended, however, that, if the answer of the Rumanian Government was considered satisfactory by the Council the embargo on the shipments should be raised.

MR. BERTHELOT admitted that there had been a resolution which had slipped his memory for the time being, and that this placed a different aspect on the situation.

MR. PICHON suggested that the Council would do well to await the arrival of Sir George Clerk.

MR. POLK agreed with Mr. Pichon, but drew attention again to the fact that the French Government had issued orders to recommence its shipments. He said that this placed him in an embarrassing position as he had stopped all American shipments immediately after the resolution referred to had been passed. It was extremely necessary for all the Allies to act together in this matter. Mr. Bratiano and his representatives had promised much, but up to the present had done nothing. In the communication made to Sir George Clerk on the subject of requisitions, the Rumanians had distinctly reserved

² Vol. VII, p. 836.

everything which they had taken during the fighting. This reservation might be extended to include everything which they had removed from Budapest. They also said that they would retain all material which had formerly belonged to them. The Allied Generals in Budapest were in an undignified position, and he could not agree with his colleagues that the Rumanian answer was conciliatory.

SIR EYRE CROWE said it would be well to adjourn the matter pending the return of Sir George Clerk. He had received information by telegram to the effect that the Rumanians had made exorbitant requisitions in Hungary and that the actual situation in Budapest was very different from that which the Rumanians themselves described.

MR. BERTHELOT said that it would not be difficult to suspend the order given by the French Government to continue the shipments to Rumania.

MR. POLK said it would be better that this should be done.

(It was decided that the resolution of the Council of August 25, (H. D. 38, Minute 3) be upheld, and that no shipments of material to Rumania should be authorized at the present time.

It was further decided to adjourn the discussion of the question of Rumania until the arrival of Sir George Clerk from Bucharest.)

5. (At this point Mr. Paderewski entered the room.)

MR. PADEREWSKI said that the Polish Government had studied the question of Eastern Galicia, on which the Council had deliberated. In this matter it had been guided not only by reasons of State, but also by the sincere desire to ascertain in what measure the provisions of the Polish Commission had carried out the wishes of the Supreme Council. He had consulted the Parliamentary Commissions of the Polish National Assembly, and numerous delegates from the people of all parts of the country, and also the Ruthenians, and he was sorry to inform the Council that the results had not been satisfactory. Galicia was one of the regions which had been greatly devastated, and more civilians had been killed therein than in any other country. Since the armistice a civil war had deluged Poland with blood and the Ukrainians, led by the Germans, had carried havoc into the country. At the moment when the Allies were silencing the German guns on the Western Front, the Germans had been in process of devastating Poland and Galicia.

Moved by the sufferings of these people the Peace Conference had endeavored to establish order, security, and justice in Galicia, and had, therefore wished to grant autonomy to that country. He pointed out, however, that Poland itself had already granted autonomy to Galicia, by virtue of the Polish Diet. As this was the

Hearing of Mr.
Paderewski on
Question of
Eastern Galicia

case, and the province in question had been completely restored to order Poland was at a loss to understand the decision taken by the Peace Conference.³

It was not easy for him to translate the feelings of a multitude of people, but intense pain had been caused to Poland by the rigor of the Council's decision to cut out of its body politic a province which had been a part of Poland since the 14th Century. He realized that his country was too weak to enforce its historic rights. Poland once extended from the Baltic to the Danube, from the Elbe to the Dnieper, but it was not the wish of that country to claim Moravia and Slovakia from its good neighbors the Czecho-Slovaks.

Poland's rights to Galicia were not based upon past history, but upon the present and future. It was not a correct statement that only the urban population in Eastern Galicia was Polish and that the rural population was Ruthene. The population of the rural districts was largely Polish and in certain regions the proportion was as high as 50 per cent. At the time of the Austrian domination, 85 per cent of the direct taxes in Eastern Galicia had been paid by Poles. Poland, while not basing its claims on the past, was obliged to insist upon the present, as its national existence was at stake.

The city of Danzig, and the railway line leading from Warsaw there, an essential outlet for the Polish State, had been denied to Poland on the question of nationality because the population was largely German. On the other hand in Upper Silesia, on the request of the Germans a defeated enemy power, a plebiscite had been granted—in a region which was essentially Polish, as admitted by the Germans themselves. And now Poland was faced with the loss of Lemberg, the population of which was 85 per cent Polish, for the temporary regime proposed for Galicia meant a certain loss of that country.

This temporary regime proposed by the Council brought joy to the hearts of the Germans. Instead of law and order existing in the country, its results would be continual conflicts of all kinds. A permanent electoral campaign would be carried on. German Agents, the very men who had killed Polish women and children, would constitute the members of the Galician Diet. The temporary regime furthermore, from an economic point of view, would prevent the exploitation of Polish resources in Galicia, especially in the oil districts where much Allied capital had been invested. It would be Poland's duty to furnish the help necessary for the reconstruction of the country. If at the end of the temporary period provided for Galicia be snatched from Poland, from what source would Poland draw its reimbursement?

³ HD-57, minute 3, and appendix C thereto, pp. 270 and 280.

He further pointed out that neither Admiral Koltchak, as representing Russia, nor General Petlioura, as representing the Ukraine, disputed Poland's just claims to Eastern Galicia. He had only heard of the proposed Treaty by rumors as he had not seen the proposed text of the document. He believed, however, that it comprised three clauses which were extremely prejudicial to Polish Interests.

These were: First, the entrusting of the agrarian reform to the Galician diet; Second, the fact that Galicia was not to be represented in the Polish diet; and lastly that the inhabitants of Galicia were not to be submitted to the compulsory military service of Poland.

On the first point he said that the Polish Government alone should be entrusted with the agrarian reforms in Galicia, as otherwise the Galician diet, inspired by German influence, would only look to the despoiling of their Polish neighbors.

On the second point he felt that it was impossible that two million Poles living in Eastern Galicia should not have a voice in the Diet at Warsaw.

As regards military service it would not be just to accord the Galicians all the rights and privileges of the Polish government without subjecting them to its obligations.

The general scheme of the Treaty seemed to him to be to detach Galicia from Poland at the earliest possible moment. The temporary regime provided for meant the loss of Lemberg and all Eastern Galicia, a loss which Poland could not endure and survive. Poland would never forgive its delegates to the Conference should it lose Eastern Galicia. It was obliged to defend this territory as it would defend its own body. Galicia had given poets, heroes and statesmen to Poland. He entreated the Council not to impose on Poland the temporary regime for Eastern Galicia provided by the Treaty. He asked that the treaty be not upheld, if the Council desired to see a firm allied state in Central Europe.

In conclusion he asked that Galicia be granted to Poland and promised that the latter would govern it in the interests of humanity and justice, and that no complaints except from the German interests, would be heard.

6. MR. POLK suggested that the Council was not making much progress with the agenda at each of its meetings. He therefore suggested that the meetings should take place earlier in the day, or twice a day, or that Committees may be made use of to a greater extent. In addition, he proposed that where unanimity had been reached upon a question in the discussions of any Commission, this matter be placed at the head of the agenda each day and the reading of the report of the Commission be omitted.

Work of the
Council

M. PICHON said that he and M. Clemenceau would be unable to attend meetings of the Council in the afternoon as they were both engaged at the French Chamber.

After some further discussion, it was decided:

(1) that the meetings of the Council should take place at 10:30 o'clock each morning.

(2) that matters upon which unanimous decisions had been reached at the Commission hearings, should be placed at the head of the agenda for each day and the reading of the Commission's report thereon be omitted.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, September 23, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-59

*Decypher of Telegram From General Bandholtz, Bucharest,
Transmitted From United States Signal Corps, Paris*

D. September 16, 1919.

R. 10:20, September 19, 1919.

[MESSAGE FROM SIR GEORGE CLERK]

74. Following from Bucharest; request transmission to Supreme Council:

No. 2 (R)

I arrived at Bucharest Thursday September 11th but owing to Ministerial crisis and absence of Ministers, summoned by the King to Sinaia, was unable to transmit communication on that day.

Mr. Bratiano resigned from Office on the morning of September 12th but told me that he would continue to direct affairs until his successor was appointed and that he considered it incumbent on him to do all in his power to hasten an agreement with the Supreme Council although he no longer held political position qualifying him to give formal and final reply to the Note from the Supreme Council.⁴

I accordingly delivered the Note and copies of the previous telegrams⁵ to Mr. Bratiano at the same time explaining my position as defined in my instructions from M. Clemenceau. I also assured Mr. Bratiano of the desire of the Supreme Council to reach friendly understanding and cordial co-operation with the Roumanian Government.

⁴ Appendix E to HD-47, p. 111.

⁵ Appendix C to HD-23, vol. VII, p. 517; appendix A to HD-24, *ibid.*, p. 541; HD-25, *ibid.*, p. 555; appendix B to HD-26, *ibid.*, p. 615; HD-30, *ibid.*, p. 682; appendix C to HD-31, *ibid.*, p. 691; appendix A to HD-37, *ibid.*, p. 819; appendix C to HD-38, *ibid.*, p. 857.

This morning Mr. Bratiano gave me a summary of his views on the Note. His Excellency said that some of it both in form and substance (French—*fond*) seemed to him unjust to Roumanian Government and founded on evidence that required corroboration; if it lay with him to give a formal reply he would be obliged to refer to points which did not correspond to the situation of Roumania and which misrepresented her actions. It was not, however, under such a discussion that he intended to set forth his conclusions for he neither wished nor intended to say anything that might further embitter the situation as he was most anxious to re-establish relations of mutual and friendly confidence. Roumania had always realised (? "importance of" omitted) good relations with Allies and had never intended to depart from them. Isolated acts of abuse might have occurred during the Roumanian advance as happened in every similar case, but they were entirely against Mr. Bratiano's policy and instructions, and, where proved would be punished. Roumania most of all of the Allies required settled and prosperous Hungary on her frontiers and self-interest alone urged moderation.

As regards requisitions Mr. Bratiano gave me an explanation which I am sending in separate telegram. He added that Colonel Antonesco, D. M. O. left for Paris on (? August 22nd) and would give all necessary information on the subject.

For one thing Mr. Bratiano assumed full responsibility. When last Hungarian advance failed and became retreat he ordered Roumanian army not to stop until they had taken Budapest. Mr. Bratiano felt that for security of Roumania and Europe generally this was essential and his action seemed to him, though unauthorized so patently in general interest that he had not hesitated to take it rather than refer to Paris and risk refusal such as he had experienced before. As regards the four questions put to Roumania in the Note.

(1) Mr. Bratiano was not only ready but anxious to withdraw Roumanian forces who were heavy charge on the Government and who ought to be at home for the harvest. Failing any arrangements for close co-operation of Allies presence of Roumanian Army aroused resentment of certain parts of Hungarian people without gaining in return the gratitude of Hungarian Government and of the elements of order who, thanks to the army, could organise themselves. On the other hand Allied powers suspected and fettered the action which the Roumanian army thought to take in the general interest. Bratiano had accordingly issued instruction for withdrawal to begin at once though he was not confident what the result would be in Hungary. I said, presumably Hungarian authorities would be given facilities to constitute police force in evacuated zone for maintenance of law and order.

(2 and 3) No requisitions were allowed beyond military and railway material and supplies for army of occupation while payment in money or requisition bonds was always made for supplies. Bratiano was ready to agree that reparation commission should make an inventory of all requisitions which had not been carried out by Roumanian forces under arms and that value of such as belonged to general stock should be subtracted from Roumania's share but he considered that in view of Roumania's particular interest he was justified in making condition that Roumania should be represented on commission charged with this duty.

(4) Order and responsible Government in Hungary were more essential to Roumania than to anyone but he, Mr. Bratiano, insisted that collaboration ought to be real and that Roumania should not be asked to carry out orders without previous consultation and consideration, and he further dwelt on the fact that Roumanian army could only help Hungarian Government which while having understanding with the Powers must also be in agreement with Roumania.

(I understand this somewhat obscure phrase to mean that Roumania's interests are so (decidedly) (geographically?) concerned with future relations with Hungary, that a Hungarian Government must give guarantees which will satisfy Roumania as well as the Great Powers.) Mr. Bratiano to whom I have shown this telegram authorizes me to say it conveys in summarized form his attitude towards the 4 questions asked of him by the Supreme Council.

(Signed—CLERK)

Appendix B to HD-59

Translation

Telegram

SEPTEMBER 19, 1919.

Received: September 20, 1919.

From: Sir G. Clerk, Bucharest.

To: Supreme Council, Paris.

Mr. Bratiano, much excited by the story of the children's hospital, asks me to inform the Conference that he has received from Budapest a report proving that the doctors directing the children's hospital in this city have declared in writing that neither the Roumanian authorities nor any Roumanian subject in this hospital has taken away any medicine, dressings, or other sanitary objects, and that consequently the children's lives have not been endangered. The military authorities at Budapest have requested the inter-Allied Commission to investigate this affair.

Appendix C to HD-59

Translation

Telegram

BUCHAREST, September 19, 1919.

Received: September 22, 1919.

From: Sir G. Clerk.

To: Sir Eyre Crowe, Hotel Astoria, Paris.

Although I have not received a reply to my telegrams addressed to the Supreme Council, Mr. Bratiano tells me that he has learned indirectly from Paris that these telegrams have been considered as forming the basis of an agreement.

I propose, therefore, to leave here Monday. A longer stay on my part might be used by political parties to further their own interests. Mr. Bratiano has moreover explained to me his opinion on the situation in Hungary with more detail and more precision, and has asked me to take his declaration to Paris. I am going to Budapest, where I will arrive Tuesday evening, and where I hope to see Mr. Diamandi and the Allied Generals. I will leave for Vienna and Paris the next day by the fastest way.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, September 25, 1919, at 10: 30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk	Sir Eyre Crowe	M. Tardieu
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. H. Norman	M. de St. Quentin
ITALY	JAPAN	
M. Scialoja	M. Matsui.	
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>	
M. Barone Russo	M. Kawal.	

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Mr. C. Russell
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE	Commandant Portier
ITALY	Lieutenant de Carlo.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned.

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. A. Dulles
Mr. F. K. Nielsen

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Carr
Mr. Nicolson
Lt. Col. Kisch
General Sackville-West
Commander Lucas, R. N.

FRANCE

M. Cambon
M. Laroche
General Le Rond
M. Lazard.

ITALY

M. Brambilla
M. Dell'Abbadessa.

1. M. TARDIEU said that M. Pichon would be unable to be present on account of the session of the Chamber and had therefore asked him to make his excuses for him to the members of the Council and to act in his place.

Convention of the
Plenary Labor
Commission

The Secretariat of the American Delegation had transmitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference a note con-

taining a telegram addressed by Mr. Gompers¹ to M. Arthur Fontaine² (See Appendix "A"). He wished to ask whether Mr. Polk was in position to say for what reason this meeting had been called and whether the members of the Council had any objections to the meeting of the Commission.

MR. POLK said that he had no information as to the reasons of the meeting.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it was unfortunate that the Council was without information as to the reasons for the meeting.

M. TARDIEU said that it would be possible to call the Commission together and to await further information as to the subjects to be discussed at the meeting.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was ready to telegraph to Mr. Barnes, but he had a further question to ask, and that was where the Commission was to meet. It would be difficult to take a decision on this point without knowing the reasons for the meeting.

MR. POLK said that he had received a telegram from Washington dated September 23rd, according to which Mr. Gompers had stated that the Plenary Labor Commission would meet in Paris between September 25th and October 5th and that it was hoped that no decision to recommend postponing the Conference would be taken until further information in the premises was telegraphed. It would probably be possible to find a method to enable the United States to participate in the Conference, whether the Treaty was ratified in time by the Senate or not.

M. TARDIEU proposed that the Council summon a Representative of the Ministry of Labor and that the discussion of the question be postponed until his arrival.

M. LAZARD then entered the room. He said that he was not fully acquainted with the object of the meeting and that M. Fontaine, who would be in a position to inform the Council better than he, was, at the moment, in Rome. He was able to say, however, that the telegram from Mr. Gompers did not come entirely as a surprise. In the unofficial meeting held by several of the members of the Commission on September 7th, a number of members of the Commission expressed a desire to hold a further meeting, but nothing was said which would indicate what the subject of discussion would be. The telegram came unexpectedly and as a surprise, because the situation was the same now as it was a fortnight ago.

¹ Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor; United States representative and President, Commission on International Labor Legislation.

² Arthur Fontaine, French representative and Secretary-General, Commission on International Labor Legislation.

MR. POLK said that he thought the best plan would be for him to telegraph Mr. Gompers in order to ascertain the nature of the subjects which would be discussed at the meeting.

M. TARDIEU agreed, but added that he wished to point out that the French Government was entirely disposed to call the Commission together.

M. LAZARD said that Mr. Gompers asked that the meeting take place before the 29th. At present that appeared impossible and it would seem better to meet early in October.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that that was his opinion, especially as the place of meeting had not been fixed.

M. TARDIEU said that the Council would wait for further information. He understood that Mr. Polk would telegraph to Washington, and that Sir Eyre Crowe would communicate with Mr. Barnes.

2. MR. POLK said that at the last meeting it had been decided that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to take immediately the necessary steps to guarantee the delivery to the Allies of fourteen German oil tank ships.³ According to information which he had received no orders on the subject had been given in London.

German Oil
Tank Ships

M. TARDIEU said that he was informed that the Supreme Economic Council had been acquainted with the decision of the Council, but he was without information as to whether the order had been carried out or not.

MR. POLK said that it was necessary for the Supreme Economic Council to immediately carry out the measures which were asked of them, as in the meantime the ships would be delivered.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he telegraphed to London to arrange that an expert be sent to him to furnish information on the subject.

MR. POLK said that in any event Admiral Charlton should be directed to keep the ships where they were until further orders were received.

M. TARDIEU said that the situation appeared to be as follows: The Supreme Economic Council, which was in possession of the resolution of the Supreme Council, thought that there was something to be said in connection with the matter. The French Government held the same view. In 48 hours the Conference would be in possession of the Supreme Economic Council's proposals.

MR. POLK said that in awaiting this decision it was most urgent that the ships should not be moved.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had telegraphed to London in regard to the matter.

³ HD-59, minute 1, p. 323.

M. LAROCHE said that only the Armistice Commission was in position to stop the delivery.

MR. POLK said that he considered it essential that the Supreme Council should act, for up to the moment it appeared to him that the only steps taken in the matter had been through the kindness of Sir Eyre Crowe.

M. TARDIEU said that if a resolution was taken in a sense of what Mr. Polk asked, the Council would be doing exactly what had been done on the preceding day.

(M. Tardieu then read the resolution taken on September 23rd, H. D. 59.)

MR. POLK said that in any case it would be necessary for the Supreme Council to take steps which had been asked of it. If they had not done this, it was necessary to know the reasons. The Armistice Commission should be asked to suspend all action.

M. TARDIEU said that that had been decided at the previous meeting. He would ascertain in the afternoon just what the Supreme Economic Council had done and whether they had executed the order of the Conference and in what manner.

3. M. TARDIEU said that the question before the Council was the report of the Spitzberg Commission and a draft Treaty which had been refused [*revised?*] by the Drafting Committee (see Appendices B & C). The members of the Commission were unanimous, and, in view of the resolution taken by the Council at the last meeting,⁴ he did not believe that it would be necessary to open a discussion of the question.

M. SCIALOJA said that it would not be necessary to read or to discuss the report, but that it would be necessary to take a vote.

M. LAROCHE said that the conclusions of the report were as follows: (1) The Commission submitted to the Council the text of a draft Treaty, which had been modified in form by the Drafting Committee in such a manner as to make the French and English texts agree; (2) The Commission proposed that, as regarded the signature of the Treaty, the Treaty be communicated, first to the Norwegian Government, which would state whether it agreed. The other contracting parties would then be invited to state within a space of six weeks time whether they were prepared to sign.

It was decided to accept:

(1) the report addressed to the Supreme Council by the Spitzberg Commission, and

⁴ For resolution concerning procedure in the Council meetings, see HD-59, minute 6, p. 332.

(2) to approve the draft Treaty as prepared by this Commission and revised by the Drafting Committee.⁵

4. M. TARDIEU read an extract of a letter from Lord Milner to M. Dutasta dated August 14th, 1919 (See Appendix "D"). The Special Commission on Mandates at its meeting in London on August 5th had unanimously proposed that the Portuguese claims to the triangle of Kionga should be recognized. (This proposal was adopted.)

Portuguese Claim
to Kionga

It was decided:

to accept the proposal made by the Special Commission on Mandates at its meeting of August 5th, and to recognize Portugal as the original and legitimate proprietor of this part of the former German Colony of East Africa, situated south of the Rovuma and known as the "Kionga Triangle."

5. M. TARDIEU read a letter of September 14th, 1919, addressed by M. Tittoni to the President of the Conference asking that the Military Representatives at Versailles should be directed to study the question of organization of a military, naval and air control for Austria. (See Appendix E.) The proposal was adopted.

Organization of
Inter-Allied
Commission of
Control in Austria

It was decided:

that the permanent Military representatives at Versailles should be directed to prepare, together with the Naval and Air representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, a detailed proposal, in view of the constitution of Interallied Commissions of Military, Naval and Air Control, which should be charged to see to the execution by Austria of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

6. SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had received a telegram from Sir George Clerk who had proposed returning to Paris unless the Supreme Council directed him to remain. He had telegraphed to Sir George Clerk that the Supreme Council would undoubtedly desire to discuss the matter. Upon receiving this telegram Sir George Clerk decided to remain. He finally telegraphed him to come to Budapest and from there to Paris. He thought that this telegram had not reached him.

Mission of Sir
George Clerk

M. TARDIEU said that he was grateful for this information, but he could not see that anyone was to blame for the delay.

MR. POLK said that the Relief Administration had a telegraph line to Budapest and that he would be glad to place this wire at Sir Eyre

⁵ For text of the treaty signed February 9, 1920, see *Foreign Relations*, 1920, vol. 1, p. 78.

Crowe's disposal for any telegrams which he might desire to send to Sir George Clerk.

7. **SIR EYRE CROWE** said that **Mr. Lloyd George** was more than ever convinced that firm action should be taken to force the Germans to evacuate the Baltic Provinces. **Mr. Lloyd George** wished, but he would not press the point, that Polish troops should be utilized. He was now charged by the British Government to make a new proposal. The Allies had pledged themselves in previous conversations with the Germans to facilitate the importation into Germany of food-stuffs of which Germany was in great need, and they had authorized the Germans to communicate to the Supreme Economic Council a list of articles which they particularly needed. He proposed that the Supreme Economic Council should be asked to stop the shipment of food-stuffs and other necessities to Germany and that the German Government be notified accordingly. **Mr. Lloyd George** thought that this would have a very good effect. He thought also that the American Government were prepared to stop all financial transactions with Germany. If these measures were insufficient it would be necessary to take whatever further steps seemed advisable. **Mr. Lloyd George** had always advocated the utilization of the Polish Army and he now proposed that the head of the British Naval Mission in France place himself at the disposal of **Marshal Foch** to study with him the question of what military and naval measures might be advantageous at a future date. He had prepared the draft of a note (See annex F), the first three paragraphs repeating the words of the note prepared by **General Weygand**,^{5a} which had already been discussed. It would be necessary to change the end of the third paragraph in such a way as to take into account the remarks which **Mr. Polk** had made at the last meeting.⁶ The end of the note would be drafted in the manner which he had pointed out. If the American Delegation consented, it would be possible to insert a supplementary paragraph respecting the suppression of financial transactions.

M. TARDIEU said that if he understood the British proposal correctly, it called for immediate action, first, the refusal of the German demands for the furnishing of food for Germany; second, the refusal of credits. If these measures were insufficient the British Government were willing to consider the question of military action. He agreed with this proposal, but wished to make two remarks, one as to form, and the other as to substance. In regard to form, the British Delegation proposed that the Allies reserve the right to take further steps. This was the fourth time that the question had been raised, and, in view of this

^{5a} Appendix B to HD-56, p. 267.

⁶ HD-56, minute II, p. 256.

fact, it seemed to him that the least which could be done, if the Allied and Associated Governments wished to make a real threat, was to take actual steps. He proposed, therefore, that the note should say that, if the Allied and Associated Governments did not receive satisfaction, they would take other steps.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would accept this modification.

M. TARDIEU said that he remembered that Mr. Polk had said that it might be advisable to stop the repatriation of German prisoners of war. He asked whether Sir Eyre Crowe had referred this matter to the British Government, and whether he had received any instructions.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that he had received no instructions from his Government on this point.

MR. POLK said that he was convinced that something ought to be done. He preferred action to a threat. In a conversation which had recently taken place at Versailles between Colonel Logan and Baron von Lersner, Colonel Logan had not failed to call attention to the bad impression which the attitude of the German Government had made upon the American Government. Colonel Logan had pointed out that it was most important that Germany should take action, and had let him understand that if the action were delayed, America would take definite steps. Baron von Lersner had replied that it was a political question and that the Army which was in the hands of the reactionaries would not obey the Government which was powerless. Colonel Logan then said that this explanation was not satisfactory and that if the German Government had no power it had better withdraw. It was necessary that that Government should take immediate measures to prove its good faith. He added that Colonel Logan had not spoken in the name of the Council, but the Germans had learned unofficially the view of the United States.

M. TARDIEU asked whether the Council were in agreement as to the first three paragraphs.

MR. POLK said that there remained the question of the alteration of the last phrase and that he would propose a draft.

M. TARDIEU said that he thought that it would not serve a useful purpose to fix a delay and to say at the soonest possible moment for from the present moment the Allied and Associated Governments proposed to take action.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would ask his Government whether it would be possible to make any statement in the note regarding the holding-up of the repatriation of the German prisoners of war, but he wished to ask if the repatriation of the prisoners of war were stopped it would necessarily apply to all the Allied Powers and whether it would not be possible to speak of a total of [*or?*] partial

holding-up of the repatriation. He did not think that the British Government were prepared, so far as they were concerned, to stop the repatriation completely for the work of repatriation was in operation and it was difficult to stop it.

M. TARDIEU said that this would nevertheless be a most efficacious method of action.

M. SCIALOJA said that he agreed that this method could be most usefully employed.

M. TARDIEU said that for the sake of their own peace it was most necessary for the German Government that the repatriation be continued. If the repatriation were stopped pressure would be brought upon the German Government by the German people themselves. It was, therefore, highly important that an expression of this threat be made in the note.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if the proposal was accepted he thought it would be advisable that the decision of the Council be made known to the public through the press. He wished to ask, however, what Powers had consented to the proposed repatriation of the German prisoners of war in their custody.

M. MATSUI said that Japan was in a difficult situation. The repatriation had begun. He asked whether the prisoners' transports should be held up en route, for instance at Singapore. That would be difficult. He thought that it would be preferable to adopt the formula: "total or partial suspension of repatriation."

M. TARDIEU said that the American, British and Japanese Governments had consented to the repatriation, but that the German Government had received a communication in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers. He wished to recall the terms of the note which had been addressed to the German Delegation and which had been prepared by Mr. Balfour.

(M. Tardieu then read the text of the declaration of the Allied and Associated Powers relative to the repatriation of prisoners of war. See H. D. 41.)⁷

He said that it would be possible to insert in the reply the following phrase: "at the same time the Allied and Associated Powers, with reference to Paragraph 2 of their declaration of August 28th last, pointed out that the benevolent measures respecting the anticipated repatriation of German prisoners of war was to take place either for all the prisoners or for part of them."

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to make it quite clear that if the British Government did not interrupt the repatriation of prisoners of war they were not acting counter to the resolution of the Council.

⁷ Minute 2, vol. VII, p. 957.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to point out that if the British Government continued to repatriate the prisoners, the threat of the Council would be vain, and, in that event, he thought it would be better to make no threat. It would be necessary to ascertain from Sir Crowe and Mr. Polk whether Great Britain and America were prepared to interrupt the repatriation of prisoners.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to point out that the interruption of the repatriation would be far more prejudicial to Great Britain than to Germany.

M. TARDIEU asked whether Mr. Polk was in a position to furnish a paragraph in regard to the refusal of credits.

MR. POLK said that he would take up the matter on that day.

M. TARDIEU said that in any event it would be possible to refer the draft reply to the Drafting Committee in order that the Committee could agree upon a reply which would include Mr. Polk's draft paragraph and the proposal of the British Delegation.

MR. POLK said that he wished to point out that it would not be possible for him to receive a reply by the following day.

(It was decided:

(1) that the Drafting Committee should prepare a note to the German Delegation concerning the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by Germany;

(2) that the Drafting Committee should take as a basis for its work the note prepared by General Weygand and modified by the British Delegation (Appendix F) with the changes in text approved by the Council;

(3) that the text prepared by Mr. Polk should be noted; and,

(4) that in case the American and British Governments agreed to an interruption of the repatriation of prisoners of war, an additional paragraph should be prepared to notify the total or partial interruption of the repatriation of German prisoners of war.)

8. M. TARDIEU said that the Council had received new proposals from the Blockade Commission (See Appendix [G]).

MR. POLK read and commented upon the annex to this proposal (See Appendix H).

SIR EYRE CROWE said that his experts did not consider the American proposal sufficient. They thought that the following text should be adopted. (See Appendix I.) The British experts thought that this proposal would renew [*sic*] a number of difficulties. There would be no blockade. There would be no capturing of ships. Vessels would be instructed to turn back. They would be informed that there was danger ahead. If they still persisted they would be made to turn back.

Blockade of
Soviet Russia

MR. POLK asked what would happen if the ships refused to obey the orders given them.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they would not refuse.

M. MATSUI said that he thought that it was quite probable that they would refuse.

COMMANDANT LEVAVASSEUR said that the British proposal was a make-shift. If a ship wished to pass there was no method of stopping it. He desired to point out that from the day when peace was signed with Germany no warship had any longer the right to stop a merchant ship. If a merchant ship wished to pass in spite of the injunctions of the Allied warships there was nothing that could be done. The former proposals made it possible to avoid these dangers. He asked what would happen if a cruiser should meet a German convoy escorted by destroyers which insisted upon passing. He thought that this was a question which ought to be carefully studied.

M. TARDIEU said that it was most important to avoid taking decisions which could not be applied. The British proposal undoubtedly presented serious inconveniences. He thought that so far as the American proposal was concerned it would be inconvenient to permit the Commander of each warship to judge as to the action which he chose to exercise. In both cases there was no impression of an operation well conceived and likely to be pressed to a successful conclusion.

COMMANDANT LEVAVASSEUR said that in the proposals formerly presented the Commanders of ships of war were vested with the authority of all the Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that that would also apply to the British proposal. It would be communicated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the neutral Governments.

M. TARDIEU agreed, but said that in the British proposal it was the means of execution which were inadequate.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he could not agree, for the British proposal gave vessels of war the right of turning back merchant ships.

M. SCIALOJA said that the proposal would not foreshadow any possible action in the event that merchant ships refused to obey the order.

COMMANDANT LEVAVASSEUR said that he thought that in preparing the proposal for which he acted as spokesman, provision was made for the right of turning back ships.

M. TARDIEU said that in fact there was a blockade without the right of capturing cargoes.

MR. POLK said that he thought that there was danger of creating a new kind of blockade which would not be recognized in International Law. In view of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments were not at war with Soviet Russia, they would be creating a danger-

ous precedent. The United States would not give clearance to vessels desiring to leave American ports for Russia. The danger lay in the case of leaving Scandinavia or Germany.

M. TARDIEU asked Mr. Polk whether the reserve contained in the American proposal was sufficient to satisfy him.

MR. POLK replied that it was. He added that if a neutral ship were stopped in its course, for example a Danish ship, the Allied and Associated Governments exposed themselves to the payment of damages.

COMMANDANT LEVAVASSEUR said that the note of the Allied and Associated Governments would be addressed to the neutral Governments. If these Governments accepted the contents no difficulty would arise.

M. TARDIEU said that the agreement of these Governments would serve as the basis for this new form of blockade.

MR. POLK asked what the situation would be if the neutral Governments did not accept. The notification would not bind them or protect the Allies against claims for damages.

COMMANDANT LEVAVASSEUR said that in one case as in the other the situation would be the same. It was a question of a blockade which was not a blockade.

MR. POLK said that he would be equally frank and that if they wanted a blockade, the best means would be to declare war against Russia.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it should be remembered that the warships were carrying on hostile operations in the Baltic against the Bolsheviks according to the orders of the Allies. It was necessary to give them means of fulfilling their mission.

M. TARDIEU agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the difficulty should not be exaggerated. A few ships would be stopped, they would learn that they could not pass and soon no ships would appear.

MR. POLK said that the United States hesitated to create precedents. In the present war they had had difficulties with the precedents of the American Civil War.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to call Mr. Polk's attention to the observation of Sir Eyre Crowe with which he entirely agreed. The Allied fleets in the Baltic were in fact playing the role of war vessels on war service. That being the case, he could not see how it was less serious to stop merchant ships than to bombard Cronstadt. A difficult question of form ought not to be sufficient to prevent a solution of the question. In view of these facts, he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe, that even if the Allied and Associated Powers ran the risk of having to pay damages, they should be willing to take the risk in view of

the present situation. There were many examples in history of pacific blockades, for example the case of Greece and of China. The pacific blockade had a recognized place in International Law.

MR. POLK said that it was not a question of a pacific blockade.

M. TARDIEU said that he did not agree. The blockade in question was a means of coercion.

M. SCIALOJA said that in order to conform to the regulations of International Law, it would be necessary to communicate the state of blockade to the Soviet Government, but in view of the fact that that Government was not recognized, he did not see that strictly speaking it was a question of blockade. He thought that it was rather a question of International police and that the precedents in this sense should be examined.

M. TARDIEU said that the Council agreed as to the practical utility of the measures proposed. But Mr. Polk objected to the precedents which would be created. He suggested that the legal advisors be asked to study the precedents and find a formula to which all could agree. So far as the execution of the blockade was concerned the proposals of the Naval representatives would be adopted. He did not wish to delay the solution of a question which had already been too much delayed, but what he proposed appeared necessary.

M. CAMBON said that he wished to recall precedents which existed. Great Britain and France had often used the pacific blockade as a means of coercion. The examples of Greece and of China had recently been mentioned. The difficulty in the present case was that there was no Government in Russia to which a notification of the blockade could be communicated.

M. LAROCHE said that the very fact of there being no Government would justify a measure of International police.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to sum up the situation as he saw it. It would be possible to impose a pacific blockade if a Government existed to which a notification of the blockade could be made. No such Government existed. It was therefore necessary to trust to the ingenuity of the legal advisors to find a means of justifying a measure of International police.

MR. POLK agreed that the question should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(It was decided:

(1) to request the Drafting Committee to immediately examine the arguments in International Law upon which the blockade of Soviet Russia could be based; and,

(2) to call to the attention of the Drafting Committee the fact that the absence of a Government in Soviet Russia recognised by the Powers prevented the Powers from notifying that Government in the regular way of a state of blockade.

9. **M. CAMBON** read and commented upon the proposal of the Commission on Polish Affairs which it was hoped would be consistent with the opinion formerly expressed by the Supreme Council on the subject of agrarian legislation in Eastern Galicia. (See Appendix J.)

Status of
Eastern Galicia

MR. POLK said he had no objection to make to this text.

M. TARDIEU recalled the declarations which **M. Paderewski** had made before the Supreme Council.⁹ **M. Paderewski** had stated that he could not admit that the agrarian question was not one for the National Assembly at Warsaw to decide.

M. CAMBON said that he wished to add that in a private conversation, **M. Paderewski** had told him that he was in favor of the League of Nations scheme. **M. Paderewski** had insisted that the attribution of Eastern Galicia be made in a definite way. If he (**M. Cambon**) might express a personal view, he wished to add that the Council were going beyond their rights in entrusting the fate of an entirely agricultural district to a population the majority of which was not Polish.

MR. POLK said that **M. Paderewski** had opposed, above everything else, the provisional character of the statute. He (**Mr. Polk**) thought that it would be possible to satisfy **M. Paderewski** in suppressing the provisional character and in altering certain points of the proposal. With this end in view he had prepared a memorandum (See Annex "K"). He felt that in establishing a provisional regime the Council were allowing the existence of a region in the Central Europe which would become a dangerous centre of discord.

M. CAMBON said that he shared this view, but that he thought there was still another reason for giving Galicia more complete autonomy. Poland would be much more disposed to accept a more complete autonomy for Galicia if she knew that there was a question of definite organization. The question could not be solved on that day and it would be necessary to send the American memorandum to the Commission, but on this point it would be necessary for the Council to express an opinion by which the Commission could be guided. They should give their view as to whether East Galicia should be definitely attributed to Poland. He wished to point out that the American memorandum (Chapter I, Sec. B) dealt with this subject.

M. SCIALOJA said that in effect Eastern Galicia would be placed under a Polish mandate.

M. TARDIEU said that this would not be altogether the case for this mandate would not have a temporary character.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he could not agree to the Council's suppressing the temporary character of the statute. He recalled the

⁹ HD-59, minute 5, p. 330.

fact that the British Government had originally opposed the union of Eastern Galicia with Poland. He had accepted a compromise because a plebiscite had been promised. Now the idea of the plebiscite had been given up. He could not, without instructions, accept this solution in view of the fact that it completely altered the principles which had been previously raised.

MR. POLK proposed that the American memorandum be simply referred to the Commission.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to hold to what he had previously said, purely as his own opinion.

M. SCIALOJA said that it conformed to the proposal previously made by M. Sonnino.

(It was decided:

to refer to the Committee on Polish Affairs the memorandum presented by the American Delegation (Appendix K).)

10. GENERAL LE ROND read and commented upon Report No. 6 of the Commission on Polish Affairs [Appendix L].

MR. POLK said he approved the proposals of the Eastern Frontiers of Poland Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he also approved of these proposals, but he wished to ask in what form the Council intended to communicate the decisions which they had taken to the Polish Government. He thought that the question of form was most important.

M. LAROCHE said that it would be sufficient to inform the Polish Government that the territories lying west of the line traced by the Commission would be definitely attributed to Poland.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether it would not be necessary to include a Treaty.

M. LAROCHE said that in any case it was not a question of a Treaty defining the eastern frontiers of Poland but a Treaty according certain territories to Poland.

MR. POLK said that it would be possible to give Poland her choice between two solutions:

(a) The acceptance of the minimum line proposed in the Committee's reports, with the assurance that this line would not prejudice any future negotiations regarding this frontier after the reestablishment of Russia or the obtaining of satisfactory information regarding the desires of the people to the east of this frontier; or,

(b) leaving the determination of this eastern frontier entirely open until such time as Russia and Poland considered it possible to make a definite settlement.

M. LAROCHE proposed that the Drafting Committee be requested to find a formula, taking the Report of the Commission as a basis.

(It was decided:

(1) to accept the conclusions of Report No. 6 of the Committee on Polish Affairs; and,

(2) to request the Drafting Committee to study, in taking the report as a basis, the means by which these decisions should be communicated to the Polish Government.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Appendix A to HD-60

[*The Secretary General of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary General of the International Labor Commission*]

PARIS, September 23, 1919.

The Secretary-General of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the International Labor Commission of the Peace Conference, and begs to advise that the American Commission is today in receipt of the following telegram dated Washington, September 22, 1919, and addressed to Mr. Arthur Fontaine by Mr. Samuel Gompers:

“For Fontaine, General Secretary, International Labor Commission, from Gompers:

“Will you please convoke meeting full Labor Commission which prepared Labor Convention to meet as soon as possible and not later than September 29th.

‘I suggest you consult with Barnes as to whether meeting should be in Paris or London. Gompers.’”

To the SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR COMMISSION,
Quai d'Orsay, Paris.

Appendix B to HD-60

[Translation¹⁰]

COMMISSION ON SPITSBERGEN

Report to the Supreme Council on Spitsbergen

The Commission on Spitsbergen appointed by decision of the Supreme Council on July 7¹¹ has examined, in accordance with the mandate received by it, the “claims of the various powers relative to Spitsbergen,” and, after due consideration, has prepared a draft treaty

¹⁰ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹¹ HD-1, minute 5, vol. VII, p. 39.

which it has the honor to submit for the approval of the Supreme Council.

The Commission first made a complete inquiry concerning the viewpoints of the interested powers. It kept in touch with the Minister of Norway in Paris and also requested the Minister of Sweden in Paris to set forth the views of his Government on this question, Sweden and Norway, with Great Britain and Russia, being the countries having the most important interests in Spitsbergen.

The Commission also wished to learn the desiderata of the other powers. The Minister of Denmark in Paris informed the Commission that his Government would not oppose Norway's demands; on the other hand, the Netherlands Government indicated that in its opinion the Spitsbergen archipelago should be placed under mandate of a power by the League of Nations and that if, on the contrary, the sovereignty of Spitsbergen were given to a new State, it would be obliged to reserve its rights. Finland considered that she should not be left out of the negotiations, requesting that her nationals might engage in fisheries and other industries in Spitsbergen.

As for Russia, the representatives in Paris of the Government and of Admiral Koltchak have transmitted to the Commission a detailed memorandum which has been given attentive consideration. The Russians accept in principle that the sovereignty of the archipelago be given to Norway, it being understood that a certain number of conditions safeguarding Russian interests shall be guaranteed by Norway, conditions in accordance with those accepted by the conference of 1912 held at Christiania.

As the archipelago is actually in a territory not belonging to anyone, everyone agrees upon the necessity of ending this state of affairs by giving it a definite status.

Two solutions have been considered to bring this about:

A first solution proposed by various powers and by certain members of the Commission consisted in giving Norway a mandate in the name of the League of Nations.

A second solution, advanced by Norway, provided for the assignment of the sovereignty of the archipelago to this power, subject to certain guarantees stipulated in favor of other countries.

Considering the great interests possessed by Norway in Spitsbergen, its proximity to the archipelago, and the advantage of a definitive settlement, the Commission unanimously agreed on the second solution, against which the powers most immediately concerned formulated no objection.

Form of the Treaty Under these conditions, it was necessary to prepare a treaty to be entered into by all the powers having interests in Spitsbergen, including the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. In the preamble of the draft below,¹² the nine powers mentioned represent the High Contracting Powers.

Acquired Rights The sovereignty of Spitsbergen having been assigned to Norway, it was necessary, in order to reserve the interests of the High Contracting Parties, to state how the rights acquired in the archipelago were to be definitively established, and then, how the acquisition and enjoyment of new rights should be regulated thereafter.

The Commission first of all concerned itself with guaranteeing fully the acquired rights belonging to all the nationals of the contracting parties or of powers who will adhere subsequently. All these acquired rights are recognized as valid in principle (art. 6), in order to enable the Norwegian Government to grant with certainty the necessary titles to property, and the applications for recognition of acquired rights presented by the Government of the party concerned will be examined by a commissioner of Danish nationality named by the Danish Government (Art. 1 of the annex to art. 6).

Claims A special procedure has been provided for the consideration of claims regarded as litigious by the Commission (art. 2 of the annex to art. 6). A court organized in the manner specified will decide cases in the last resort and convey its decisions to the interested Governments, and in any case, to the Norwegian Government. The latter will then confer the titles of property to the applicant whose claims have been recognized by the court.

New Rights All questions concerning rights acquired prior to the present treaty having thus been settled, the Commission considers that as regards new rights to be acquired and the enjoyment of these rights, the principle to be applied is treatment of perfect equality between the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties (Art. 7). It is upon this basis that all the clauses of the treaty have been formulated.

Mining Regime It has been specified in article 8 that the Government of Norway will have to prepare a mining regime applicable to Spitsbergen, based on the principle of equality for all nationals of the High Contracting Parties. The imposts, duties, etc. collected in Spitsbergen are to be devoted exclusively to this territory and the maximum proportion of taxes that may be imposed on the exportation of ores has been fixed. The draft mining

¹² Appendix C.

regime will be submitted by the Norwegian Government to the other contracting parties, which will be able, in the time permitted, to refer this system of regulation to the examination of a commission.

According to the draft treaty, it is forbidden to establish any naval base in Spitsbergen or to use this region for war purposes (art. 9).

**Naval Bases
Prohibited**

In order to guarantee the rights of Russians in the archipelago until the time when a recognized Russian Government will be in a position to give its adhesion to the treaty, it has been stipulated (art. 10) that by exception all claims made by Russian nationals shall be presented, in the conditions stipulated, by the Danish Government, which will be asked to use its good offices for this purpose.

Russian Subjects

If the text below is accepted by the Supreme Council, the Commission has the honor to propose the following procedure: The treaty will first be communicated to the Norwegian Government which will at once make known whether it gives its adhesion. The eight other contracting parties will then be requested to announce within six weeks whether they are willing to sign the treaty. After the expiration of this period, those powers which have not replied will still be able to adhere subsequently, but only as third powers, in accordance with article 11, when an invitation will be extended to the third powers by the French Government, after ratification of the treaty signed by the High Contracting Parties. All the powers mentioned in the preamble as High Contracting Parties which declare within six weeks their readiness to sign the treaty, will be requested, at the end of the six-week period, to appoint their plenipotentiaries to sign at Paris.

**Procedure To Be
Used in Signing
the Treaty**

SPITSBERG

Appendix C to HD-60

[Draft Treaty Relating to Spitsbergen]

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA; HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF DENMARK; THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC; HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY; HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN; HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF NORWAY; HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS; HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SWEDEN,

Desirous, while recognising the sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, including Bear Island, of seeing these

territories provided with an equitable régime, in order to assure their development and peaceful utilisation,

Have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries with a view to concluding a Treaty to this effect:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

.....

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND AND THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EMPEROR OF INDIA :

.....

And:

FOR THE DOMINION OF CANADA :

.....

FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA :

.....

FOR THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA :

.....

FOR THE DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND :

.....

FOR INDIA :

.....

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF DENMARK :

.....

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC :

.....

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY :

.....

HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN :

.....

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF NORWAY :

.....

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS :

.....

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SWEDEN :

.....

Who, having communicated their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties undertake to recognise, subject to the stipulations of the present Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, comprising with Bear Island or Beeren-Eiland, all the Islands situated between 10° and 35° longitude east of Greenwich and between 74° and 81° latitude North, especially West Spitsbergen, North-East Land, Barents Island, Edge Island, King Charles Land, Hope Island or Hopen-Eiland, and Prince Charles Island, together with all islands great or small, and rocks appertaining thereto.

ARTICLE 2

Ships and nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equally the rights of fishing and hunting in the territories specified in Article 1 and in their territorial waters.

Norway shall be free to maintain, take or decree, suitable measures to ensure the preservation, and if necessary, the re-constitution of the fauna and flora of the said regions, and their territorial waters; it being clearly understood that these measures shall always be applicable equally to the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties without any exemption, privilege or favour whatsoever, direct or indirect, to the advantage of any one of them.

Occupiers of land whose rights have been recognised in accordance with the terms of Articles 6 and 7 will enjoy the exclusive right of hunting on their own land: (1) in the neighbourhood of their habitations, houses, stores, factories and installations, constructed for the purpose of developing their property, under conditions laid down by the local police regulations; (2) within a radius of 10 kilometres round the headquarters of their place of business or works; and in both cases, subject always to the observance of regulations made by the Norwegian Government in accordance with the conditions laid down in the present Article.

ARTICLE 3

The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in Article 1; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality.

They shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the exercise and practice of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters, and no monopoly shall be established on any account or for any enterprise whatever.

Notwithstanding any rules relating to coasting trade which may be in force in Norway, ships of the High Contracting Parties going to or coming from the territories specified in Article 1 shall have the right to put into Norwegian ports on their outward or homeward voyage for the purpose of taking on board or disembarking passengers or cargo or for any other purpose.

It is agreed that in every respect and especially with regard to exports, imports, and transit traffic, the nationals of all the High Contracting Parties, their ships and goods shall not be subject to any charges or restrictions whatever which are not borne by the nationals, ships or goods which enjoy in Norway the treatment of the most favoured nation; Norwegian nationals, ships or goods being for this purpose assimilated to those of the other High Contracting Parties, and not treated more favourably in any respect.

No charge or restriction shall be imposed on the exportation of any goods to the territories of any of the Contracting Powers other or more onerous than on the exportation of similar goods to the territory of any other Contracting Power (including Norway) or to any other destination.

ARTICLE 4

All public wireless telegraphy stations established or to be established by, or with the authorisation of, the Norwegian Government within the territories referred to in Article 1 shall always be open on a footing of absolute equality to communications from ships of all flags and from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, under the conditions laid down in the Wireless Telegraphy Convention of July 5, 1912,¹³ or in the subsequent International Convention which may be concluded to replace it.

Subject to international obligations arising out of a state of war, owners of landed property shall always be at liberty to establish and use for their own purposes wireless telegraphy installations, which shall be free to communicate on private business with fixed or moving wireless stations, including those on board ships and aircraft.

ARTICLE 5

The High Contracting Parties recognise the utility of establishing an international meteorological station in the territories specified in

¹³ *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 3048.

Article 1, the organisation of which shall form the subject of a subsequent Convention.

Conventions shall also be concluded laying down the conditions under which scientific investigations may be conducted in the said territories.

ARTICLE 6

Subject to the provisions of the present Article, acquired rights of nationals of the High Contracting Parties shall be recognised.

Claims arising from taking possession or from occupation of land before the signature of the present Treaty shall be dealt with in accordance with the Annex hereto, which will have the same force and effect as the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 7

With regard to methods of acquisition, enjoyment and exercise of the right of ownership of property including mineral rights in the territories specified in Article 1, Norway undertakes to grant to all nationals of the High Contracting Parties treatment based on complete equality and in conformity with the stipulations of the present Treaty.

Expropriation may be resorted to only on grounds of public utility and on payment of proper compensation.

ARTICLE 8

Norway undertakes to provide for the territories specified in Article 1 mining regulations which, especially from the point of view of imposts, taxes or charges of any kind, and of general or particular labour conditions, shall exclude all privileges, monopolies or favours for the benefit of the State or of the nationals of any one of the High Contracting Parties, including Norway, and shall guarantee to the paid staff of all categories the remuneration and protection necessary for their physical, moral, and intellectual welfare.

Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted exclusively to the said territories and shall not exceed what is required for the object in view.

So far, particularly, as the exportation of minerals is concerned, the Norwegian Government shall have the right to levy an export duty which shall not exceed 1% of the maximum value of the minerals exported up to 100,000 tons, and beyond that quantity the duty will be proportionately diminished. The value shall be fixed at the end of the navigation season by calculating the average free on board price obtained.

Three months before the date fixed for their coming into force, the draft mining regulations shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the other Contracting Powers. If during this period one or more of the said Powers propose to modify these regulations before they are applied, such proposals shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the other Contracting Powers in order that they may be submitted to examination and the decision of a Commission composed of one representative of each of the said Powers. This Commission shall meet at the invitation of the Norwegian Government and shall come to a decision within a period of three months from the date of its first meeting.

ARTICLE 9

Subject to the rights and duties resulting from the admission of Norway to the League of Nations, Norway undertakes not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in the territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification in the said territories, which may never be used for warlike purposes.

ARTICLE 10

Until the recognition by the High Contracting Parties of a Russian Government shall permit Russia to adhere to the present Treaty, Russian nationals and companies shall enjoy the same rights as nationals of the High Contracting Parties.

Claims in the territories specified in Article 1 which they may have to put forward shall be presented under the conditions laid down in the present Treaty (Article 6 and Annex) through the intermediary of the Danish Government, who declare their willingness to lend their good offices for this purpose.

The present Treaty of which the French and English texts are both authentic shall be ratified.

Ratifications shall be deposited in Paris as soon as possible.

Extra-European Powers may confine their action to informing the Government of the French Republic, through their diplomatic representative in Paris, that their ratification has been given, and in this case, they shall transmit the instrument as soon as possible.

The present Treaty will come into force, in so far as the stipulations of Article 8 are concerned, from the date of its ratification by all the signatory Powers; and in all other respects on the same date as the mining regulations provided for in that Article.

Third Powers will be invited by the Government of the French Republic to adhere to the present Treaty duly ratified. This adhesion shall be effected by a communication addressed to the French

Government, which will undertake to notify the other Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed.

Done at Paris, the 1919, in duplicate, one copy to be transmitted to the Government of His Majesty the King of Norway, and one deposited in the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to the other signatory Powers.

ANNEX

1

(1) Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, notification of all claims to land which had been made to any government before the signature of the present Treaty must be sent by the Government of the claimant to a Commissioner charged to examine such claims. The Commissioner will be a judge or jurisconsult of Danish nationality possessing the necessary qualifications for the task and shall be nominated by the Danish Government.

(2) The notification must include a precise delimitation of the land claimed and be accompanied by a map on a scale of not less than 1/1,000,000 on which the land claimed is clearly marked.

(3) The notification must be accompanied by the deposit of a sum of one penny for each acre (40 ares) of land claimed, to defray the expenses of the examination of the claims.

(4) The Commissioner will be entitled to require from the claimants any further documents or information which he may consider necessary.

(5) The Commissioner will examine the claims so notified. For this purpose he will be entitled to avail himself of such expert assistance as he may consider necessary, and in case of need to cause investigations to be carried out on the spot.

(6) The remuneration of the Commissioner will be fixed by agreement between the Danish Government and the other Governments concerned. The Commissioner will fix the remuneration of such assistants as he considers it necessary to employ.

(7) The Commissioner, after examining the claims, will prepare a report showing precisely the claims which he is of opinion should be recognised at once and those which, either because they are disputed or for any other reason, he is of opinion should be submitted to arbitration as hereinafter provided. Copies of this report will be forwarded by the Commissioner to the Governments concerned.

(8) If the amount of the sums deposited in accordance with clause (3) is insufficient to cover the expenses of the examination of the claims, the Commissioner will in every case where he is of opinion that

a claim should be recognised, at once state what further sum the claimant should be required to pay. This sum will be based on the amount of the land to which the claimant's title is recognised.

If the sums deposited in accordance with clause (3) exceed the expenses of the examination, the balance will be devoted to the cost of the arbitration hereinafter provided for.

(9) Within three months from the date of the report referred to in clause (7) of this paragraph, the Norwegian Government shall take the necessary steps to confer upon claimants whose claims have been recognised by the Commissioner a valid title securing to them the exclusive property in the land in question, in accordance with the laws and regulations in force or to be enforced in the territories specified in Article 1 of the present Treaty, and subject to the mining regulations referred to in Article 8 of the present Treaty.

In the event, however, of a further payment being required in accordance with clause (8) of this paragraph, a provisional title only will be delivered, which title will become definitive on payment by the claimant of the further sum required of him.

2

Claims which for any reason the Commissioner referred to in clause (1) of the preceding paragraph has not recognised as valid will be settled in accordance with the following provisions:

(1) Within three months from the date of the report referred to in clause (7) of the preceding paragraph, each of the Governments whose nationals have been found to possess claims which have not been recognised will appoint an arbitrator.

The Commissioner will be the President of the Tribunal so constituted. In cases of equal division of opinion, he shall have the deciding vote. He will nominate a Secretary to receive the documents referred to in clause (2) of this paragraph and to make the necessary arrangements for the meeting of the tribunal.

(2) Within one month from the appointment of the Secretary referred to in clause (1) the claimants concerned will send to him through the intermediary of their respective Governments statements indicating precisely their claims and accompanied by such documents and arguments as they may wish to submit in support thereof.

(3) Within two months from the appointment of the Secretary referred to in clause (1) the Tribunal shall meet at Copenhagen for the purpose of dealing with the claims which have been submitted to it.

(4) The language of the Tribunal shall be English. Documents or arguments may be submitted to it by the interested parties in their

own language, but in that case must be accompanied by an English translation.

(5) The claimants shall be entitled, if they so desire, to be heard by the Tribunal either in person or by counsel, and the Tribunal shall be entitled to call upon the claimants to present such additional explanations, documents or arguments as it may think necessary.

(6) Before the hearing of any case the Tribunal shall require from the parties a deposit or security for such sum as it may think necessary to cover the share of each party in the expenses of the Tribunal. In fixing the amount of such sum the Tribunal shall base itself principally on the extent of the land claimed. The Tribunal shall also have power to demand a further deposit from the parties in cases where special expense is involved.

(7) The honorarium of the arbitrators shall be calculated per month, and fixed by the Governments concerned. The salary of the Secretary and any other persons employed by the Tribunal shall be fixed by the President.

(8) Subject to the provisions of this Annex the Tribunal shall have full power to regulate its own procedure.

(9) In dealing with the claims the Tribunal shall take into consideration:

- (a) any applicable rules of International Law;
- (b) the general principles of justice and equity;
- (c) the following circumstances:

(i) the date on which the land claimed was first occupied by the claimant;

(ii) the date on which the claim was notified to the Government of the claimant;

(iii) the extent to which the claimant has developed and exploited the land claimed. In this connection the Tribunal shall take into account the extent to which the claimants may have been prevented from developing their undertakings by conditions or restrictions resulting from the war of 1914-1919.

(10) All the expenses of the Tribunal shall be divided among the claimants in such proportion as the Tribunal shall decide. If the amount of the sums paid in accordance with clause (6) is larger than the expenses of the Tribunal, the balance shall be returned to the parties whose claims have been recognised in such proportion as the Tribunal shall think fit.

(11) The decisions of the Tribunal shall be communicated by it to the Governments concerned, including in every case the Norwegian Government.

The Norwegian Government shall within three months from the receipt of each decision take the necessary steps to confer upon the

claimants whose claims have been recognised by the Tribunal a valid title to the land in question, in accordance with the laws and regulations in force or to be enforced in the territories specified in Article 1, and subject to the mining regulations referred to in Article 8 of the present Treaty. Nevertheless, the titles so conferred will only become definitive on the payment by the claimant concerned of his share of the expenses of the Tribunal.

3

Any claims which are not notified to the Commissioner in accordance with clause (1) of paragraph 2, or which not having been recognised by him are not submitted to the Tribunal in accordance with paragraph 1, will be finally extinguished.

Appendix D to HD-60

Extract From a Letter of Lord Milner to M. Dutasta

LONDON, August 14, 1919.

Pursuant to my letter of July 15, I have the honor of informing you that the Special Commission on Mandates held a meeting at London on August 5.

Concerning the Belgian and Portuguese claims in German East Africa, the Commission unanimously decided to propose:

PORTUGUESE CLAIMS. 1. That the claim of Portugal, according to the terms of which Portugal desires to retain the possession of the part of the former German colony of East Africa which is situated to the south of the Rovuma and which is known under the name of "Kionga Triangle" was recognized; and that no question of mandate was raised in this case, as Portugal is the original and legitimate proprietor of the territory in question, and that the present acknowledgment of her claim may justly be considered as an act of restitution.

2. That it was not desirable to give a mandate to Portugal over any part of the former German colony of East Africa north of the Rovuma.

MILNER

Appendix E to HD-60

Translation

ITALIAN DELEGATION TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE
HOTEL EDOUARD VII

PARIS, September 14, 1919.

From: M. Tittoni.

To: M. Clemenceau.

The Peace Treaty with Austria having been signed, I think that in conformity with the decisions taken by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers at the meeting of June 26 last¹⁵ relative to Germany, the Military Representatives at Versailles should be entrusted with the studying of the organization of Commissions of Military, Naval and Aerial Control for Austria. I wish you would be kind enough to submit for the approval of the Supreme Council the following resolution:

RESOLUTION

The Permanent Military Representatives at Versailles are charged with preparing, together with the Naval and Aerial Representatives of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, a detailed project with a view to the formation of Interallied Commissions on Military, Naval and Aerial Control, charged with assuring the execution of the military, naval and aerial clauses of the Peace Treaty by Austria.

Please accept, etc.

TITTONI

Appendix F to HD-60

[Translation¹⁶]*Draft of a Note To Be Sent to the German Government*

(British Proposal)

The German Government's Note of September 3 postpones once more, under unacceptable pretexts, the carrying out of the obligations undertaken by Germany by virtue of the provisions of article 12 of the armistice of November 11, 1918, afterwards confirmed by article 433 of the treaty of peace.

¹⁵ CF-93, minute 14, vol. VI, p. 702.¹⁶ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

The Allied and Associated Governments refuse particularly to admit that the German Government can, in order to avoid the responsibility incumbent upon it, shield itself behind the alleged inability to enforce obedience of its orders by the troops in the Baltic regions.

They therefore request the German Government to proceed without any further delay to the evacuation of their troops from the Baltic Provinces, and to apply this evacuation not only to the self-contained German units and to their general staffs and services,

<p>(This phrase will be modified in order to take into account observations presented previously by Mr. Polk.)</p>	}	<p>but also to all isolated German officers and soldiers, including those who, after demobilization have taken service in the ranks of organized Russian corps in the Baltic Provinces.</p>
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The evacuation must be started immediately, continued without interruption, and completely accomplished with the least possible delay.

The Allied and Associated Governments give warning by this note that until they are satisfied their demand is being effectively executed, they will not entertain any of the applications by the German Government for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials, which the Supreme Council at this very time is studying. They have, consequently, given instructions to the Supreme Economic Council not to examine these applications.

(Here should be inserted an analogous paragraph concerning the interruption of financial transactions.)

In the event the German Government continues not to comply with their demand, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right of taking any other measures which they may consider necessary in order to see that the clauses of the armistice are executed.

Appendix G to HD-60

Note on Blockade of Bolshevik Russia

[The same, except in French, as the note attached to appendix H, *infra*, with a final paragraph which reads as follows:

[Translation]

“It will be understood that the war vessels of an Allied or Associated Power charged with the execution of the above measures, will act in the name of all the Allied and Associated Powers.”]

Appendix H to HD-60

Blockade of Russia

(1) The Blockade Council has modified the draft note regarding blockade of Russia (hereto attached) as indicated thereon. There was no agreement, however, on the final paragraph which was left for the action of the Supreme Council.

(2) It is suggested that the final paragraph be:

(a) Deleted entirely,

or

(b) Made to read: "It will be understood that each of the Allied and Associated Powers will lend its sanction to the measures taken by the war vessels of any one of them to carry out this policy insofar as such measures are not in its opinion contrary to international law."

Draft

[Annex]

Note

BLOCKADE OF BOLSHEVIST RUSSIA

The avowed hostility of the Bolsheviks toward all governments and the international program of revolution which they are spreading abroad constitute a grave danger for the national security of all the Powers. Every increase of the strength of the Bolsheviks would increase the danger and would be contrary to the desire of all peoples who are seeking to reestablish peace and social order.

It is in this spirit that the Allied and Associated Governments, after raising the blockade of Germany, have not authorized their nationals to take up commercial relations with Bolshevik Russia; these relations indeed could only be effected through the agency of the chiefs of the Bolshevik Government, who, disposing at their will of the products and resources which commercial liberty would bring them, would thereby achieve a considerable increase of their strength and of the tyranny which they are exercising over the Russian populations.

Under these conditions, the Allied and Associated Governments request the Government to be good enough to take immediately in agreement with them the measures indicated below to prevent its nationals from engaging in any commerce with Bolshevik Russia and to assure that it will rigorously execute this policy.

a) Refusal of clearance papers to every ship going to Russian ports in the hands of Bolsheviks or coming from said ports;

b) Establishment of a similar measure for all merchandise destined to be sent to Bolshevik Russia by any other way.

c) Refusal of passports to all persons going to Bolshevik Russia or coming from it (except through understanding with the Allied and Associated Governments for special cases);

d) Disposition with a view of preventing banks from doing business with Bolshevik Russia.

e) As far as possible, refusal by each government to its own nationals of facilities of correspondence with Bolshevik Russia by post, telegraph or wireless.

Appendix I to HD-60

[British Draft Note on Blockade of Russia]

“On account of the military operations which are taking place in the Gulf of Finland, mariners are warned against the dangers to themselves of going there.

“With a view to avoid accidents, for which they cannot be responsible, the Commanders of the Allied and Associated Forces in the Baltic, will direct all merchant ships, which are found proceeding up the Gulf of Finland, to stop and turn back.”

Appendix J to HD-60

[Translation ¹⁸]

Proposal of the Commission on Polish Affairs

(Addition to Article 12 of the Draft of the Statute for Galicia)¹⁹

However, with regard to agrarian legislation the right of veto cannot be overridden by the Diet, but in case any such measure, vetoed by the Governor, is within one year again voted by the Diet with a majority of two-thirds, the question shall be immediately referred to the Council of the League of Nations which shall by a majority vote take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

With regard to the laws respecting public instruction in secondary schools and universities, the veto of the Governor will be absolute.

¹⁸ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹⁹ Appendix C to HD-57, p. 280.

Appendix K to HD-60

Memorandum

[Presented by Mr. Polk]

SEPTEMBER 25, 1919.

The following suggestions are submitted with a view to reconciling as far as possible the present draft of the Treaty on East Galicia²⁰ including both the views of the majority and of the minority, and the objections which Mr. Paderewski expressed as regards

- I The Provisional Nature of the Settlement
- II Agrarian Legislation
- III Representation in the Polish Diet
- IV Military Service

I. THE QUESTION OF THE PROVISIONAL NATURE OF THE SETTLEMENT

A. In the preamble the following phrase is to be omitted entirely: "until the time when they are called upon by a plebiscite, which is for the present postponed by reason of the disturbed condition of Eastern Europe, to declare their wishes with regard to the final political status of the territory."

B. In Article 2 the second paragraph is to be omitted. This paragraph reads:

"Poland further undertakes to hold or allow to be held a plebiscite of the inhabitants with regard to the final political status of the territory, on a date and under conditions to be fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or by any other body which they may appoint. She recognizes in advance the limits and status which, as the result of this plebiscite, may be definitively determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or by the body appointed by them."

C. In Article 33 the word "temporary" is to be omitted from Paragraph 2, and Paragraph 3 is to be entirely omitted. Paragraph 3 reads:

"The provisions of this Chapter in no way prejudice the allocation of the said property to be made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the event of Eastern Galicia being in whole or in part separated from Poland."

D. To replace the provisions which have been dropped, it is suggested that the following clause be inserted as Article 39:

"The stipulations in this Treaty are matters of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations.

²⁰ Appendix C to HD-57, p. 280.

They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Poland hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification whatsoever of this Treaty in whole or in part which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

“Any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction of any of these obligations, and the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

“Any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Polish Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Polish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.”

(This article is borrowed with modifications from the minority treaties and is similar to an obligation which Poland had already assumed in its minority treaty.)

II. AGRARIAN LEGISLATION

It is suggested that the arrangement proposed by the Supreme Council be maintained namely: agrarian legislation should be included in Article 12 as a subject of legislation in the Diet of Eastern Galicia. However, Article 13 should be modified in such a way as to include agrarian legislation in the category for which the Governor's veto cannot be overridden by the Diet and to provide for a reference to the League of Nations in the event of a dead-lock. The second paragraph of Article 13 would then read:

“However, with regard to agrarian legislation the right of veto cannot be over-ridden by the Diet, but in case any such measure, vetoed by the Governor, is again voted by the Diet with a majority of two-thirds, the question shall be immediately referred to the Council of the League of Nations which shall by a majority vote take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.”

III. REPRESENTATION IN THE POLISH DIET

As on this point Mr. Paderewski is especially insistent, it is proposed to accept the article suggested by the majority, which provides for the representation of East Galicia in the Polish Diet.

IV. MILITARY SERVICE

It is proposed to accept the majority report, providing for Polish military service in Eastern Galicia, with the following changes:

Original Text	Revised Text
<p>“Article 38, Laws of [<i>in</i>] force in Poland relating to military service may be applied by Poland in Eastern Galicia.</p> <p>“The contingent thus recruited shall form special units in the Polish army. In time of peace these units shall perform garrison duty in Eastern Galicia.”</p>	<p>“Article 38. Laws in force in Poland relating to military service may be applied in Eastern Galicia.</p> <p>“The contingent thus recruited shall form special units which in time of peace shall perform garrison duty in Eastern Galicia and in time of war shall be available for national defense.”</p>

Appendix L to HD-60²¹

Report No. 6, Submitted to the Supreme Allied Council by the Commission on Polish Affairs

EASTERN FRONTIERS OF POLAND

In its Report No. 2 to the Supreme Council dated 22nd April 1919, on the subject of the Eastern frontiers of Poland, the Commission on Polish Affairs thought it necessary to postpone any proposal regarding the line of the frontier to the south of the latitude of Kholm; it considered that this frontier could not be fixed until after the settlement of the question of Eastern Galicia.

At the same time, the Commission proposed:—

- (a) that in certain districts situated to the East of the frontier line submitted by the Commission to the approval of the Conference, an enquiry should be made into the ethnological, linguistic and religious character and as to the wishes of the inhabitants;
- (b) that this enquiry should be made, if possible on the spot.
- (c) that a definite settlement of the question of the Eastern frontier of Poland should be made as soon as a Russian Government had been established, with which the Great Powers could deal in regard to this question.

The Commission now considers it to be its duty to submit fresh propositions to the Council on the points which thus remained in abeyance.

²¹ The English text filed under Paris Peace Conf. 181.213202/10 has been substituted for the French text which appears here as appendix L.

1. FRONTIER SOUTH OF KHOLM

In virtue of a resolution passed on June 25 by the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs,²² the Commission has considered a draft Statute for Eastern Galicia; this Statute formed the subject of Report No. 5 which the Commission had the honour to submit to the Supreme Council.²³ In these circumstances the Commission considers that it is now in a position to propose a line for the Polish frontier to the south of the latitude of Kholm.

Appendix 1 of Report No. 2 should therefore be completed as follows:—(penultimate line)

“Following this administrative boundary, then the *Thalweg* of the River Bug upstream to its junction with the former frontier between Russia and Austria (Galicia)”.

The frontier line of the Bug proposed by Report No. 2 and the present Report formed the frontier between the Kingdom of Poland and Russia from 1815 to 1912.

From the geographical point of view the line of the Bug constitutes a satisfactory frontier, indisputably superior to any other to be found in this flat region, which is destitute of natural features. It assigns to Poland a territory occupied by a mixed population, with a considerable percentage of Little Russians in the neighborhood of the Bug, who have, however, always lived and still live in complete harmony with the Poles without showing any separatist tendencies. It is also necessary to point out that since the commencement of the war, part of the Little Russian population has quitted the country, the emigrants having been replaced by Poles. It is probable that, at the present date the area in question contains a majority of Polish inhabitants.

Moreover, this region has formed part of Poland for close upon six hundred years; it has only been separated from her on two occasions: in 1912, by the former Russian Government, which was pursuing in the Province of Kholm a Russianising policy condemned even in Russia by liberal opinion; and in 1918, by the intervention of the German and Austrian Governments, at the time of the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.²⁴

Finally, from the economic point of view, the territory is closely connected with Poland, and the trend of all its intercourse is far more towards the West than towards the East.

For these reasons the Commission is unanimous in proposing to the Supreme Council the line described above.

²² FM-27, minute 1, vol. iv, p. 848.

²³ Appendix C to HD-57, p. 280.

²⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442.

2. TERRITORY SITUATED TO THE EAST OF THE FRONTIER PROPOSED ON 22ND APRIL

Having at its meeting of 27th August completed the task of fixing the boundaries of the indisputably Polish territory which can immediately be assigned to the Polish State, the Commission considered whether it were possible under existing conditions to deal with the question of the territory of mixed populations situated to the East of the frontier proposed on April 22, with regard to which it had put forward in its report No. 2 the principles recalled at the commencement of the present Report.

The Commission was unanimous in the opinion that new factors had intervened since April 22 rendering it impossible to make any progress in the near future with the question of the assignment of this territory.

(a) The greater part of the territory in question is occupied by Polish forces engaged in the conflict they have undertaken against Bolshevism;

(b) In its Note of May 27 [26],²⁶ addressed to Admiral Kolchak, the Supreme Council stipulated that "in the event of the frontiers and also the questions concerning the relations between Russia and Poland not being settled by an agreement, all these matters should be submitted to the arbitration of the League of Nations".

In his reply,²⁷ which was acknowledged by the Allied and Associated Powers,²⁸ Admiral Kolchak stated, on the other hand, that "the definitive ratification of the delimitation of the frontiers between Poland and Russia must be postponed until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly".

At present it is impossible to foresee at what dates there will come into being the regular Russian Government whose co-operation is necessary to the definitive determination of the Eastern frontiers of Poland.

The Commission does not, however, overlook the fact that the prolongation of the present state of uncertainty offers very serious disadvantages, both to the population and to the Polish Government; it is necessary to put an end to this uncertainty. The Eastern frontier of Poland as defined in Report No. 2 and in the present report, represents a provisional frontier to the extent that, in the future, other territory situated to the East of that line may be incorporated with Poland. The Commission considers, however, that this frontier might be declared definitive as regards the territory situated to the

²⁶ Appendix I to CF-37, vol. vi, p. 73.

²⁷ Appendix II to CF-60, *ibid.*, p. 321.

²⁸ Appendix I to CF-62, *ibid.*, p. 356.

West of the same line, where the sovereignty of the Polish State would henceforth be complete and permanent.

To sum up, the Commission unanimously recommends to the Supreme Council that the Eastern frontier of Poland, as described in Reports Nos. 2 and 6 of the Commission on Polish Affairs, should be considered as marking the line to the West of which the Polish Government may, from now onwards, legally exercise all rights appertaining to sovereignty.

JULES CAMBON
President

SEPTEMBER 1, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, September 26, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Tardieu
later M. Cambon

Secretary

M. Dutasta
M. de St. Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja

Secretary

M. Barone Russo.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Captain Chapin.
BRITISH EMPIRE Captain Hinchley-Cooke.
FRANCE M. Massigli.
ITALY M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned.

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

General Bliss
Mr. F. K. Nielsen

BRITISH EMPIRE

Hon. H. Nicolson
General Sackville-West.
Lt. Col. Kisch.

FRANCE

General Weygand
M. Laroche
M. Kammerer
M. Pieyre.

ITALY

M. Dell'Abbadessa.
M. Pilotti.

1. M. TARDIEU read the following memorandum of the Secretariat-General with regard to the action taken on the resolution of the Supreme Council of September 23rd:¹

German Tank
Steamers

“The resolution of the Supreme Council dated September 23rd in regard to the German oil steamers was

¹ HD-59, minute 1, p. 323.

transmitted on the 23rd to the Supreme Economic Council by the Secretariat-General.

The Supreme Economic Council forwarded the resolution on the morning of September 24th to its permanent Committee in London.

The latter body immediately brought the matter to the attention of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission which functions likewise in London. This body gave the necessary orders at once to suspend the departure of the ships in question."

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had received a telegram from Lord Curzon dated September 25th (See Appendix "A"). He pointed out that the important portion of this telegram was that the Allied Maritime Transport Executive believed that the question of the disposition of the ships was one for the Supreme Council. The A. M. T. E. had recommended that the tank steamers be allocated to Allied management along with other vessels to which claim had been put forward under the terms of the Armistice. The first voyage, however, would be for the transport of oil to Germany. He added that in the event that the steamers had already left for the Firth of Forth they would be diverted and allowed to proceed to the United States for their cargo of oil.

MR. POLK said that he was happy to hear of the measures which had been taken.

M. TARDIEU said that he would at once communicate Lord Curzon's telegram to the French members of the Supreme Economic Council.

2. (The Council had before it the proposed Treaty with New States prepared by the Commission on Political Clauses, together with the report of that Commission accompanying the Treaty. See Appendices "B" and "C".)

M. LAROCHE in commenting upon the Treaty and the report, said that the Commission was unanimous in the text of the clauses of the Treaty. It had not been unanimous on the question of what Powers should be parties to, and signatories of, the Treaty. The majority of the Commission had thought that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the document, but the United States had formulated an objection to its participation in the signature. The United States Delegation had felt that the matters embraced in the proposed Treaty were not broad questions resulting from the breaking up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and therefore of direct concern to all the Allied and Associated Powers, but were rather questions of local interest concerning only the new States and the States possessing ceded territory. If the Treaty came into force it would import [*impose?*] a specific legal obligation only on the directly interested Powers. The United States felt therefore that it was neither desirable nor advisable

Proposed Treaty
With New States
Clauses Relating
to Reciprocal
Relations in
Transferred
Territories

that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should be signatories to the Treaty, although representatives of these Powers, in participating in the framing of the proposed articles, might be able to assist in facilitating the negotiations among the Powers directly interested.

As opposed to this point of view, the majority of the Commission had felt that it would be necessary for all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to sign, for otherwise the Treaty would be deprived of its authority in the eyes of the New States. Although the Commission felt that the interests of the New States had been carefully safeguarded by the Treaty and that the clauses were for the common good of all, the latter might distrust a Treaty which did not carry the signatures of all the Allied and Associated Powers. Should the United States refuse to sign, the important point arose as to what steps the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers should take. It was possible for the Four Principal Allied and Associated Powers to sign, even though the United States did not do so. The second method of procedure would be to make a united presentation of the Treaty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the New States and jointly recommend that the same be signed by them.

MR. POLK said that this was a matter which Secretary Lansing had had before him, prior to his departure for the United States. Mr. Lansing had felt that the Treaty was one between friendly Powers and involved no enemy states. He had taken the position that it was not necessary for the American signature to appear, as he felt that it was difficult to justify the interests which United States might have in signing.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, following out the reasons advanced by M. Laroche, he believed that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the Treaty. The British Empire had no immediate interests in the matter but he believed that it should be a signatory power. He thought that, even in the absence of a United States signature, all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign. A joint action of this kind would give the smaller States the impression that all the large Powers were interested in the matter, because the Treaty formed a portion of the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He was willing, however, to be guided by the wishes of the majority of his colleagues.

MR. SCIALOJA said that he believed a refusal of the United States to sign the Treaty was a pure matter of internal interest. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers had taken part in Treaties in which they had no direct interest, as for example, in the case of Spitzbergen. He pointed out that the United States had been represented on the Commission on Political Clauses, had taken an active

part in the framing of the Treaty, and presumably had therefore felt that matters of general interest were being settled. He was unable to urge Mr. Polk to sign the Treaty against the wishes of his Government. He would like to ask Mr. Polk, however, whether he would agree to a joint presentation of the Treaty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the small States urging the latter to sign the same. In this way the Treaty would be given moral force.

MR. POLK said that he had no objection to this method of procedure.

MR. MATSUI said that the Japanese Empire had no particular interest involved, but as the Treaty concerned the general liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign. In view of the United States' objection, and by taking advantage of the period of twenty days proposed between the presentation of the Treaty and the signature, he would obtain the instructions of his Government in the matter. He would recommend, that the Japanese Empire be a signatory party. Should M. Scialoja's proposition be accepted, however, he would have no difficulty in joining on behalf of Japan in the common presentation by the five Principal Powers.

M. LAROCHE said that he gathered from the discussion that the Council agreed to approve the text of the Treaty and that the Treaty itself should be presented to the new States by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers jointly with a recommendation that it be signed by the former. Furthermore a period of twenty days was to be accorded the New States between the time of presentation and the signature of the Treaty. He added that it was extremely necessary to decide upon a fixed period in order to prevent the matter being drawn out and any of the New States taking advantage of this to avoid signing.

M. TARDIEU said that as it was better for all the great Powers to take the same attitude on the question, he proposed that M. Laroche's solution of the matter be adopted.

It was decided:

(1) That the text of the proposed Treaty with the New States (Clauses Relating to Reciprocal Relations in Transferred Territories) prepared by the Commission on Political Clauses should be accepted.

(2) That the proposed Treaty should be presented to the Delegations of the interested states by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers jointly. The latter should impress upon the Delegations of the New States the necessity for the signature of the Treaty in question, and should request them to obtain the consent of their Governments as soon as possible, but in any case within a period of twenty days, at the expiration of which the Treaty should be signed in Paris by the plenipotentiaries of the interested States.

(At this point M. Tardieu left the room and M. Cambon took the chair.)

Repatriation of
Czecho-Slovak
Troops in Siberia

3.)

Distribution of
Allied Troops in
the Plebiscite
Areas

4.)

Report of the
Commission on
Baltic Affairs on
the Occupation
of Memel

5.)

(These questions were adjourned)

6. The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch, dated August 21st, 1919, (See appendix D).

MR. POLK said that there was no objection to the proposals contained in this note from the point of view of the United States.

Recommendation
of Marshal Foch
That the Military
Experts Under
Article 163 of the
German Peace
Treaty Should Be
Members of the
Inter-Allied
Commission of
Control Under
Articles 203 and
210 of the Treaty

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British representatives agreed with Marshal Foch's proposals.

M. SCIALOJA said he had no objections to formulate.

M. MATSUI said that he was not entirely familiar with the question.

GENERAL WEYGAND commented and explained briefly the note in question.

M. MATSUI said that he had no objections to present.

It was agreed that:

The Conference of Military Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers provided for by Article 163 of the Peace Treaty to determine the reduction of effectives to be imposed on Germany for each period of 3 months following the coming into force of the Treaty, should be composed of the presidents and of the most important members of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control constituted in conformity with articles 203-210, and chosen in such a way that all the Allied and Associated Powers be represented in the said Conferences.

The President of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control should be charged with deciding the composition of this Conference and the dates of its sessions in agreement with the precedents of the Naval and Aerial Commissions.

Communication to
German Government
Relative to the
Evacuation
of the Baltic
Provinces

7. (This question was adjourned.)

8. (The Council had before it a note from the Commission on Execution of the Treaty Clauses, asking that the German Government be requested to notify the Allied and Associated Powers of the Government property in German territory to be ceded to Poland.) (See Appendix E.)

Note From the
Commission on
Execution of the
Treaty Clauses
Relative to German
Property in
Territory To Be
Ceded to Poland

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was prepared to accept the proposals contained in the note.

MR. POLK said that he was likewise prepared to accept the same, but wished to reserve his final decision until he had consulted the United States expert in the matter. (Mr. Polk later notified the Secretariat-General that he had no objections to formulate.)

It was decided: to accept the proposals in the note of the Commission on Execution of the Treaty Clauses. (See Appendix E.)

It was further decided to request the German Government to furnish the Allied and Associated Powers all information relative to all Government property, which is required to be turned over to Poland within the territory to be ceded to the latter, under the terms of the Treaty with Germany.

9. (The Council had before it two notes of The German Delegation dated respectively August 1st and August 5th (See Appendixes **F and G**), together with a proposed reply thereto submitted by the Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the German Treaty. (See Appendix H).)

The Question of Eupen and Malmedy MR. POLK said that he had a slight change to propose in the text of the reply. In the 3rd paragraph (English text) the expression, "with the sole reservation that the League of Nations might later order the return to Germany of the whole or part of these territories," appeared. He believed that the use of the word "might" in this connection was not strictly in accordance with Article 34 of the Peace Treaty and the covering letter sent to the German Delegation on June 16th, 1919.² As the text now stood the proposed reply stated in substance that the League of Nations might disregard the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of Eupen and Malmedy, whereas, the covering letter referred to had said that, in the cases of the territories which it was proposed to transfer from Germany to Denmark and Belgium, this transfer would only take place as the result of a decision of the inhabitants themselves taken under conditions which would insure complete freedom of vote.

He proposed that the word "might" should be changed to read "will".

M. LAROCHE said that Article 34 of the Treaty with Germany did not impose a fixed obligation upon the League of Nations to return the territory in question to Germany, should the majority of the population express its wish in that direction. He thought that a moral obligation was imposed upon the League of Nations but not an absolute one. The text of the reply as it stood seemed to him to clearly express the obligation created by the article in question.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he agreed with M. Laroche's interpretation of the matter.

² Vol. VI, p. 926.

M. LAROCHE added that the change proposed by Mr. Polk might result in adding something to the Treaty which was not included therein.

(After some further discussion on the matter Mr. Polk withdrew his proposal for the change in question, and

It was decided that the reply to the German notes on Malmedy and Eupen, as submitted by the Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the German Treaty, be accepted.)

10. (The Council had before it a letter from the British Delegation dated August 26th. (See Appendix I.)

Question of
Publication of
Documents
Connected With
the Treaty With
Germany

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the matter in question was of small importance but that he wished to obtain the decision of the Council before taking any action thereon. It had been originally agreed that the final text of the German Treaty should alone be made public, and that the preliminary conditions of peace as handed to the Germans should be kept secret. However, the different notes which had been exchanged between the German Delegation and the Allies had appeared in the newspapers of several countries. Some of the passages in these notes were rendered unintelligible by the fact that they referred to clauses which had been proposed for the Treaty and later modified or withdrawn. These clauses had not been made public coincidentally with the notes. The British Government wished to publish the clauses referred to in the notes as Annexes to the latter, but before so doing was anxious to obtain the approval of the Supreme Council.

M. CAMBON asked whether it was desired to publish all the clauses which had been omitted from the final Treaty or only those to which reference had been made in the notes in question.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that only those referred to in the notes were contemplated.

MR. POLK asked whether the Treaty as originally presented to the German Delegation had not been published in the Allied countries, as it had been made public in Germany.

SIR EYRE CROWE answered that it had not been possible to publish it in the British Empire because by so doing the Houses of Parliament would have been entitled to have the Treaty before them and to discuss the same even before it was known whether or not Germany would accept it. The mere fact that the preliminary Treaty had appeared in Germany did render its presentation to the British Parliament necessary.

M. CAMBON asked that the decisions might be adjourned until he had had an opportunity to consult Mr. Clemenceau.

M. SCIALOJA pointed out that this was a mere question of form in view of the fact that publication had actually been made in many countries.

M. CAMBON said that there was a difference between official and unofficial publication.

(It was decided:

to adjourn the decision of this question until the following day.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, September 26, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-61

Telegram From Lord Curzon to Sir Eyre Crowe, September 25, 1919

GERMAN TANK STEAMERS

The Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission referred this question to the A. M. T. E. on August 29th, with the knowledge of the American Representative on that Committee, Mr. J. F. Dulles. At the meeting of the A. M. T. E. held on September 17th, Mr. Anderson, who represented the United States, handed in to the Supreme Economic Council a memorandum with reference to the question. This memorandum was signed by Captain Tobey, U. S. N.

It was accordingly decided by the A. M. T. E. that the questions should be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council. Mr. Anderson concurred in this decision. The recommendation which the A. M. T. E. forwarded to the Supreme Economic Council was substantially as follows:—

“Allocate the tank steamers to Allied management along with other vessels to which claims were put forward under the terms of the Armistice, and, at any rate for their first voyage, use them for the transport of oil to Germany.”

The representative of the United States on the A. M. T. E. intimated that if the Supreme Council, by adopting this resolution, should approve the revocation of the clause in the Brussels Agreement^{2a} whereby these German tank steamers were provisionally exempted, no objection would be raised and on September 30th [20th] the Supreme Economic Council confirmed the resolution by the A. M. T. E.

No promise has been given to Germany with respect to these steamers nor have the Germans raised any objection to surrendering them but have, on the contrary, prepared them for surrender and have

^{2a} G. Fr. de Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international*, 3 sér., tome XI, p. 232.

furnished them with coal only for the journey to the Firth of Forth. No breach of faith with Germany is therefore involved.

Neither the A. M. T. E. nor the Supreme Economic Council has any knowledge of the decision of the Supreme Council mentioned in your telegram of yesterday.

A full report is being sent for the information of the Supreme Council by the President of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

In view of a report received from H. M. S. *Coventry* that a seaman's strike is imminent at Hamburg the tank steamers were ordered to the Firth of Forth on September 23rd., and the Ministry of Shipping put forward a strong plea that the action already taken should not be interfered with.

The following is the passage referred to:—"This action was in contradiction with the resolution of the Supreme Council, which had decided, in view of the pressing need of oil in Germany to leave these ships in German hands."

Appendices B and C to HD-61

[Translation *]

Report Presented to the Supreme Council by the Commission on Political Clauses

SUMMARY OF THE PAPERS

1. Purpose and Composition of the Commission
2. Report of the Commission
3. Conclusions
4. Text of the Articles of the Treaty.

SEPTEMBER 2, 1919.

COMMISSION ON POLITICAL CLAUSES

The Supreme Council, in its meeting of July 11, 1919,⁴ decided to name a Commission to examine M. Sonnino's proposal that certain political clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Austria be applied to all the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This Commission is composed of five members, one member for each of the following great Powers: United States of America, British Empire, France, Italy [, Japan].

The Commission was able to hear the representatives of the interested States.

* Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

⁴ HD-5, minute 4, vol. VII, p. 101.

MEMBERS

Composition of
the Commission*United States of America*

Mr. Fred W. Nielsen

British Empire

Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley

France

M. Laroche

Italy

M. M. d'Amelio

Japan

M. Adatci

Equally assisted at the meeting as technical experts:

British Empire

Mr. H. J. Hutchinson

France

M. Tirman

Italy

M. A. Dell'Abbadessa

M. Pilotti

Japan

M. Kato

M. Kawai

M. H. Ashida

Secretary of the Commission: Baron Pieyre

The Commission has heard:

Representatives
Heard*For Poland*

M. Stanislas Patek

M. Ladislas Grabski

M. Roman Rybarski

For Roumania

M. Ef. Antonesco

For the Serb-Croat-Slovene State

M. Ivan Zolger

M. Velizar Yankovitch

For Czecho-Slovakia

M. Jean Kramar

M. Hugo Vavrecka

REPORT TO THE SUPREME COUNCIL BY THE COMMISSION ON POLITICAL CLAUSES

AUGUST 29, 1919.

In accordance with the mission assigned to it by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, pursuant to the resolution of July 11, 1919, the Commission on Political Clauses of the Treaty with Austria examined M. Sonnino's proposal that certain political clauses of the peace treaty with Austria be applied to all the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

These labors have resulted in the preparation of a draft treaty to be concluded between the Allied States to which Austrian or Hungarian territory has been or will be transferred or which came into existence as a consequence of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. The new order thus created raises, in effect, with regard to the immediate relations of the interested States and those of their respective nationals, problems which it is important to settle. Their settlement, by contributing to the establishment of a basis for perfect reciprocity of economic and legal relations between the States concerned, will have the most beneficial influence upon the development of confidence and friendly relations among these powers.

A treaty of this nature, in which only Allied States participate, should necessarily be agreed upon freely by all powers concerned. For this reason, the stipulations therein could not be of the same character as the analogous stipulations which had been drawn up as a result of a treaty of peace imposed on Austria, an enemy State.

The Commission has therefore modified the original text which was based on the treaty with Austria. Furthermore, with a view to facilitating the conclusion of this agreement, it received semiofficially, the delegates of the new States. Taking into account their observations, it modified certain clauses, while it abolished others or drafted new ones, seeking thereby to render more certain the adherence of the interested States.

However, the Yugo-Slav delegates made a general observation. Considering the clauses submitted for their examination only of subordinate character, they expressed the opinion that a treaty of this kind should be much broader in scope, of a nature to include questions of the status of nations, consular conventions, customs, and navigation, etc. In deference to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as well as the other Allied States which would accept the treaty, the Yugo-Slav delegation, nevertheless, accepted in principle the articles of the draft pre-

Work of the Commission**Object and Nature of the Treaty****Reservations of the Yugo-Slavs**

pared. It has made only two reservations: first, for article 3, which provides for a term of five years, whereas it would like to see 3 years fixed as the maximum term; second, for articles 4 (coastal trade) and 5 (fisheries) which it would like to make subordinate to the question of the restitution of Yugo-Slav boats. According to the Yugo-Slavs, since this question has not yet been settled, all semblance of reciprocity is removed from these two clauses.

Likewise, the Roumanian delegation, not having received adequate instructions from its Government, did not consider it could pledge itself, even unofficially, to accept the different articles of the treaty. It was able, however, to furnish some interesting observations, which were taken into account during the discussion of the articles.

**Reservations of
the Roumanians**

The Commission was unanimous in believing that certain of these measures, which had not been provided for in the treaty with Austria, since it was an enemy State, should supplement the provisions of the latter document. This was taken into consideration for certain articles of the treaty with Austria, which as a consequence were revised, particularly those having to do with nationality clauses; thus article 42, which referred only to Italy, was extended to other Allied States to which Austrian territory has been transferred or which have come into existence through the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary; it is the same for the communication of archives of interest to the transferred territories (article 93).

**Application to
Austria and
Hungary**

The draft treaty contains other stipulations without political interest, but having features of general interest which it would be desirable, for the immediate relations of the territories of former Austria-Hungary, to have extended to Austria and Hungary as soon as the peace has been signed. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of August 8 [6] ⁵ a special provision of the draft provides the possibility for these two States to participate in these measures. It is in the same spirit that the present Commission, in accord with the Economic Commission, presented to the Supreme Council, which adopted it in its session of August 28, ⁶ the text of an article to be inserted in the treaty with Austria, by the terms of which questions concerning the nationals of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy not mentioned either in the present treaty, or in the treaty of peace with Austria, will be made the subject of special conventions drafted at a conference made up of delegates of the powers concerned.

⁵ HD-25, minute 12, vol. VII, p. 562.

⁶ HD-41, minute 5, and appendix A, *ibid.*, pp. 958 and 962.

As the Supreme Council may note in the preamble of the treaty, the participation of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in this agreement is specified. It is not a question of their direct intervention in the clauses of the treaty which are obligations only for the States to which Austrian or Hungarian territory has been or will be transferred or which have arisen from the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. But, it seemed to the Commission, with the exception of the opinion expressed by the American delegation, that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, having determined, by the success of their arms, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and contributed thus to the creation of new States or to the cession of important territories to States already existent, could not disregard the future of these States and have the duty of facilitating the conclusion of an accord determining the reciprocal relations of the territories separated from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

But it is undeniable that the participation of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the treaty drafted, while not implying any obligation for them, will have the result of conferring on this document a "patronage" which will give it moral authority of a nature to render negotiation less difficult.

It cannot be concealed that, if they are left to themselves, the new States, at the risk of allowing their populations to endure the inconveniences caused by the delay in the settlement of questions which it is at the same time urgent to determine, will reach agreement only with difficulty, either because of mutual distrust which makes them suspicious of arrangements clearly suggested by their own interests, or because of the desire to have joined to this settlement those other questions of a political or economic nature, for which they desire a speedy solution, but whose addition to the present Treaty would only complicate the negotiations still more.

CONCLUSIONS

Consequently, the Commission has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council the draft treaty hereto annexed, the text of which has been reviewed by the Drafting Committee, requesting that it will:

1. Kindly approve the text of the articles;
2. Approve likewise the participation of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the treaty for the reasons given above and set forth in the preamble;
3. Decide that the draft treaty shall be transmitted to the delegations of the States concerned while informing them that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers recommend their signatures, and invite them to obtain the adherence of their governments as soon as possible,

and, at the latest, within a period of 20 days, at the expiration of which the plenipotentiaries of the States assenting will proceed to Paris for the signing of said treaty.

The American delegation, by order of its Government, expressed as follows the views of the Government of the United States concerning the participation of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the negotiations of the treaty drafted.

Views of the
United States
Delegation

The issues which are the subject of the treaty drafted are not questions of broad scope resulting from the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and affecting directly all the Allied and Associated Powers, but actually local questions directly interesting only the new States and the States to which territories have been ceded, including one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Italy. If the treaty comes into effect, it will impose the legal obligations determined only on the States directly concerned. It is therefore neither desirable nor judicious that all of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should be signatories of the treaty, although, by their participation in the elaboration of the articles drafted, the representatives of these powers were able to be of assistance in facilitating the negotiations among the powers directly concerned. It is for this reason that the United States, without wishing to influence the decision of the other powers on this subject, does not desire to appear among the signatories of the treaty.

*Draft Treaty With the New States*⁷

CLAUSES RELATING TO THE RECIPROCAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
TRANSFERRED TERRITORIES

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND IRELAND AND OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS BEYOND THE SEAS, EM-
PEROR OF INDIA,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ITALY,
HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC,
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF ROUMANIA,
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE SERBS, THE CROATS AND THE SLOVENES,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC,

⁷ Printed from the English text which parallels the French text in file copy.

Whereas by the success of their arms the Allied and Associated Powers have precipitated the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and by thus restoring national life to the peoples who were anxious to free themselves from the said Monarchy have brought about the creation of new States or the transfer of important territories to States already existing; and

Whereas this new condition of affairs has given rise in the immediate relations of the States concerned and in those of their respective nationals to questions which it is necessary to determine; and

Whereas the settlement of these questions, by contributing towards the establishment on a basis of complete reciprocity of economic and legal relations between those States, must have the best influence on the development of ties of confidence and friendship between them;

Being desirous of establishing by a common agreement the principles and provisions in accordance with which the question thus arising should be settled, and of confirming by this means the friendly union which exists between the High Contracting Parties;

Have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries, with a view to concluding a convention to this effect, namely:

- The President of the United States of America,
.....
- His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,
.....
- And
for the Dominion of Canada,
.....
- for the Commonwealth of Australia,
.....
- for the Union of South Africa,
.....
- for the Dominion of New Zealand,
.....
- for India,
.....
- The President of the French Republic,
.....
- His Majesty the King of Italy,
.....
- His Majesty the Emperor of Japan,
.....

The President of the Polish Republic,

His Majesty the King of Roumania,

His Majesty the King of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes,

The President of the Czecho-Slovak Republic,

WHO having communicated their full powers found in good and due form have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Allied States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has been or may be transferred, or which have arisen from the dismemberment of that Monarchy, mutually undertake to restore to one another such of the articles referred to below as may be in their respective territories.

1. Archives, registers, plans, titles and documents of every description relating to the civil, military, financial, judicial or other administrations of the transferred territories. It is agreed, moreover, that the States specified above will, in general, reciprocally communicate to one another, all records, registers, plans, titles and documents of any description relating to the civil, financial, judicial or other administrations referred to in this paragraph, which have no military character, and which, while forming part of their archives, may concern at the same time the organisation of one of the other States above mentioned;

2. Records, documents, objects of antiquity or art, and all scientific and bibliographical material taken away from the invaded territories, whether they belong to the State or the provincial, communal, charitable or ecclesiastical administrations, or other public or private institutions;

3. Articles of the same nature taken since June, 1914, from the transferred territories, with the exception of articles purchased from private owners.

In the event of one of the objects the restitution of which is provided for by the present Article being in the possession of a private person who is national of one of the said States and claims that he has become the legal owner thereof, the State to which the object is to be restored may be required to indemnify the owner, if his good faith is established, in accordance with the law in force in his country at the date of the signature of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

The Allied States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has been or may be transferred, or which have arisen from the dismemberment of that Monarchy, shall take the necessary measures with a view to ensuring among themselves the restitution provided for by paragraphs (a) and (f) of Article 297 and by Article 238 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and by Article 249, paragraphs (a) and (f) and by Article 184 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, and by any corresponding Articles in the other Treaties of Peace, in so far as the property, rights and interests to be restored to the nationals of the said Allied States (including companies and corporations in which they are interested) are in the territory of one of the said States.

The compensation provided for by the said Articles shall be borne by the countries by whom such compensation is payable in accordance with the said Treaties of Peace.

ARTICLE 3

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 289 of Part XII of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, the Allied States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has been or may be transferred, or which have arisen from the dismemberment of that Monarchy, undertake temporarily to maintain upon their own railway lines, on their navigable waterways, in their ports and in their maritime services connected with the ports of the transferred territories, a régime of tariffs of such a nature that the flow of traffic established before the war shall be subject to no changes which may favour the ports of the Powers with whom the Allied and Associated States have been at war, to the detriment of the Adriatic and Black Sea Ports.

This temporary provision shall terminate at the expiration of a maximum period of five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, unless in the meantime special agreements have been concluded between the interested States on the subject of their transport régime.

ARTICLE 4

During a maximum period of three years from the coming into force of the present Treaty each of the States to which maritime ports belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy shall have been transferred under the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary will accord to all other such States the right of engaging in the coasting trade between these ports by means of vessels which are registered in one of the said ports for this kind of navigation, and subject to the

same conditions as under the former Monarchy in respect of the tonnage employed and the rules of navigation.

ARTICLE 5

During a maximum period of three years from the coming into force of the present Treaty the provisions relating to fishing rights contained in the final protocol annexed to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of November [*February*] 11, 1906, between Italy and Austria-Hungary⁸ (*ad* Articles 18 and 19, paragraph 2) shall remain in force between the States receiving territories bordering on the Adriatic which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, account being taken of the conditions existing before the war so far as concerns tonnage, description of vessels and the method of fishing.

ARTICLE 6

Persons, companies and commercial undertakings, including insurance companies, nationals of one of the Allied or Associated Powers, who before the war had established the headquarters of their business or industry in one of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy assigned to one of the said Powers, shall have the right, during a period of five years, to carry on their trade, profession, business or industry in any one of the other transferred territories on the same conditions as persons, companies, undertakings or insurance companies, nationals of the Power exercising sovereignty over that territory.

During the above mentioned period the persons, companies, undertakings and insurance companies, and their property, rights and interests shall not be subject, in the territories in question, to any higher tax or charge than shall be imposed on the persons or undertakings, property, rights and interests of nationals of the States exercising sovereignty over such territories. No measure in derogation of their rights of property shall be imposed upon them in any of the territories in question which is not equally applied to the property, rights and interests of nationals of the States in question and which does not in any event involve suitable compensation.

If, at the expiration of the above period of five years, no special agreements have been concluded in this respect between the States concerned, the present undertaking shall be prolonged for a further period of five years.

In so far as Poland is concerned, it is agreed that this Article shall only apply to insurance companies.

⁸ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xcix, p. 575.

ARTICLE 7

The following provisions shall apply so far as regards relations between persons having their habitual residence in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which have been or may be transferred under the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary:

(a) If one of such persons was during the war outside the territories of the former Monarchy, or was imprisoned, interned or deported for political or military reasons, all periods of prescription or limitation of rights of action, whether they began to run before or after the outbreak of war, shall be treated as having been suspended in such transferred territories for the period from the date at which such person found himself in one of the situations above referred to until the expiration of a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

In the case of persons who have been in one of these situations owing to an act of the Hungarian Government, this period of three months shall run from the coming into force of the Treaty with Hungary.

(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) shall apply to the periods prescribed for the presentation of interest or dividend coupons or for the presentation for repayment of securities drawn for repayment or repayable on any other ground.

(c) No negotiable instrument made before the absence, imprisonment, internment or deportation referred to in paragraph (a) shall be deemed to have become invalid by reason only of failure to present the instrument for acceptance or payment or to give notice of non-acceptance or non-payment to drawers or endorsers or to protest the instrument or to complete any formality during the said periods.

Provisions may be made by special agreement between the Governments concerned to meet cases in which the rights of persons referred to in this Article shall have been prejudiced by measures of execution taken in the territories transferred under the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary on account of failure to perform any act or comply with any formality.

ARTICLE 8

Contracts concluded between persons residing in territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which are transferred to Allied States under the Treaties of Peace shall be maintained, except in cases of cancellation in accordance with the law under which such contracts were entered into. Nevertheless, contracts for the purchase or sale of overseas goods made before January 1, 1917, shall be cancelled, except in respect of any debt or other pecuniary obligation arising out of any act done or money paid thereunder.

ARTICLE 9

A special agreement to be made between the States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has been or may be transferred or which have arisen from the dismemberment of that Monarchy shall regulate the payment of all civil, ecclesiastical or military pensions due to former Austrian or Hungarian nationals, including former Austro-Hungarian nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who have become nationals of the said States under the Treaties of Peace which have decided the future of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

ARTICLE 10

Special agreements shall determine the division of the property of associations or public corporations carrying on their functions in territory which is divided in consequence of the Treaties of Peace which have decided the future of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

ARTICLE 11

Special agreements between the States to which territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has been or may be transferred or which have arisen from the dismemberment of that Monarchy shall provide for the interests of persons resident in, or companies having their headquarters in, the transferred territories, particularly as regards civil rights, commerce and the exercise of professions.

ARTICLE 12

After the coming into force of the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary, the High Contracting Parties will admit those States as parties to the special agreements provided for under the present Treaty, it being understood that such participation shall not involve, in the case of the said States, any modification of the provisions of the said Treaties of Peace.

The present Treaty, in French, in English and in Italian, shall be ratified as soon as possible.

Each Power will address its ratification to the French Government, who will inform all the other signatory Powers.

The ratifications will remain deposited in the archives of the French Government.

Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

The present Convention will come into force for each signatory Power from the date of the deposit of its ratification, and from that moment that Power will be bound in respect of other Powers which have already ratified.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention.

Done at in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.

Appendix D to HD-61

[*Note From Marshal Foch*]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
GENERAL STAFF

No. 4047

G. H. Q. August 21, 1919.

NOTE

Article 163 of the Peace Treaty says, concerning the redemption of the German forces, that:

“at the end of the 3 months which shall follow the going into force of the Treaty, and at the end of each subsequent period of 3 months, a conference of military experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall determine the reductions to be made for the following three months so that, on March 31, 1920, at the latest, the total of the German effectives shall not exceed the maximum figure of 100,000 men provided for by Article 166 [160].”

On the other hand, Articles 203-210 provide for the constitution of Interallied Commissions of Control representing the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers with the German Government and charged with the supervision of the regular execution by the latter of all the clauses of Part V of the Treaty.

It seems indispensable to select these military experts provided for by Article 163 from amongst the Interallied Commissions of Control which, by the very reason of their mission, shall be in possession of all the elements intelligently to decide the reductions of effectives to be fixed for Germany for each period of 3 months.

By proceeding otherwise, that is to say by choosing experts outside of these Commissions of Control, one would substitute at the moment of taking important decisions a new commission, consequently incompetent, for commissions already organized and well qualified.

As a consequence, we have the honor to submit to the Supreme Council of the Governments the following resolution :

“The Conference of Military Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers provided for by Article 163 of the Peace Treaty to determine the reduction of effectives to be imposed on Germany for each period of 3 months following the going into force of the Treaty, shall be composed of the presidents and of the most important members of the Interallied Commissions of Control constituted in conformity with Articles 203–210, and chosen in such a way that all the Allied and Associated Powers be represented in the said Conference.

“The President of the Interallied Military Commission of Control shall be charged with deciding the composition of this Conference and the dates of its sessions in agreement with the presidents of the Naval and Aerial Commissions.”

P. O. Le Major General
WEYGAND

Appendix E to HD-61

Translation

[*Note From*] *Committee on the Execution of the Political Clauses of the Treaty With Germany*

PARIS, September 5, 1919.

The circular hereto annexed from the German Financial Minister, remitted to the Peace Conference by the Polish Delegation, expressly states (Article 3) : “It is necessary to supervise as regards these acts etc., which establish the exact value of all the property before being remitted (to Poland) does not fall into Polish hands, etc.”

The Committee on the Execution of the Political Clauses of the Treaty with Germany estimates that, on the contrary, the German Government is obliged to communicate to the Allied and Associated Governments all information concerning this property, and is of the opinion that the Conference should inform the German Delegation of it.

[Annex]

MINISTER OF FINANCE

S. J. 1657

BERLIN, July 14, 1919.

According to Article 256 of the Peace Treaty, the States which are to take possession of German territories will also take possession of all the domains and of all the property of the German Empire and of the German States which is found on the said territories.

The domains situated in the territories which are not yet occupied by the Poles shall be ceded to the Polish Government according

to a method established beforehand. As it is possible that the cession will take place very soon—it is necessary to take the necessary measures at this time for the determining of the bases according to which the beneficiary state will pay indemnities for the domains acquired. Therefore, in accord with the cointerested parties, I draw up the following:

1. All the services are instructed to prepare as soon as possible two copies of the Conventions concerning the delivery of all state property administered over by them. As instructions have been given concerning this matter on several occasions, a regulation of uniform indications is judged as superfluous. However, it is none the less necessary to be guided by the following indications:

a) It is absolutely necessary to avoid specifying the value of the domains in the course of the negotiations, it is necessary, on the contrary, to make a summary exposé of the general condition, an exposé in which account could be taken in the appraisalment, of the location, extent of the lands, number of buildings, rooms in the buildings, condition of the culture in the property and in the forests.

b) An exact and separate list must be made of the objects to be delivered. A short explanation must be given concerning objects of special value. These documents should not be considered as inventories.

c) The office through which the delivery is to be made must be accurately indicated on the first page.

2. The two copies concerning the delivery negotiations must be signed by the assignor and assignee. A copy shall be remitted to the Service of State which takes possession of the domains and the second immediately returned to the competent Minister. Should it be difficult to obtain the signature of the service representing the assignee, the two copies of the *pourparlers* must be returned to the competent Minister.

3. It is necessary to supervise as regards these Acts . . . etc., which establish the exact value of all the property before being remitted, does not fall into Polish hands. It is necessary therefore that all the documents concerning this question be remitted to the service which should retain the documents not destined to be remitted. In returning the documents concerning the negotiation to the competent Minister the place where they had been sent must be designated at the time.

4. All these provisions refer as well to all the domains of the State which belonged to the former Kingdom of Poland and which according to Chapter 92, Art. 3, of the Peace Treaty shall be returned to Poland without indemnity. Everything relating to the elucidation of the appurtenances of the domain of the former Kingdom of Poland must be brought to the attention of the said service under No. 3.

5. It is not necessary, for the time being, to prepare the negotiations concerning the delivery of the domains in the districts submitted to a plebiscite or in the *arrondissement* of Memel.

But all these provisions are applicable to the territories attributed to the free city of Dantzig.

6. Regarding the property of the administration of the railroads—a special order of the Minister of Public Works is to be followed.

Signature

COURT OF APPEALS AT MARIENWERDER

JULY 17, 1919.

To The Judge of the Court of Appeals.

To The *Procureur* of the Court of Appeals.

i. A. 49

10265

This copy is brought to the attention of the Court in order that the necessary measures may be taken. Referring to Chapter No. 3 it should be noted that all the acts and all the documents concerning the matter as well as the elucidations annexed should be sent to the Court of Appeals at Elbing.

SHELHAN

Appendix F to HD-61

THE PRESIDENT OF
THE GERMAN DELEGATION

VERSAILLES, August 1, 1919.

To His Excellency, M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference.

MR. PRESIDENT: Following up my note of July 13, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the Belgian administrative controller at Eupen has sent the following notice to the Council of the Circle and to the Mayor of the town of Eupen:

“Since the signature of Peace and by its ratification, Germany has renounced all its rights over the circles of Eupen and Malmedy, since from that time it has been necessary to direct administrative affairs while awaiting other more complete measures, I feel called upon to ask you to avoid treating further, insofar as possible with the German administrations. I think that you should only treat with the German administrations in liquidating your business affairs or in asserting your rights. In any event, all the orders of Berlin have no value whatsoever. Insofar as the regency of Aix-la-Chapelle is concerned, I deny it all jurisdiction in the circle of Eupen. I dare to hope that you will immediately try to follow out this measure; I declare myself

entirely disposed to direct you in the affairs under your jurisdiction and this in the interest of your administration and that of Belgium.

“The administrative controller of the Circle of Eupen
Signed: Leon Xhafflaire.”

The German Government requests that the substance of this notice be brought to the knowledge of the Belgian Royal Government. The German Government believes that the Belgian Royal Government will inform the administrative controller that such interference in the administration of the Circle of Eupen is not admissible until the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, and that, particularly, the relations of the local authorities with the Regency of Aix-la-Chapelle and the other administrative authorities must not, until then, be hindered in this way.

Accept, etc.

FREIHERR VON LERSNER

Appendix G to HD-61

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

VERSAILLES, August 5, 1919.

To: His Excellency, M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference.

MR. PRESIDENT: Referring to my note of August 1,¹⁰ I have the honor to communicate the following to Your Excellency:—

According to information from Herbesthal, the Belgian local Commander in that place has notified the Director of the railway station that the Herbesthal station and the other stations situated in the Eupen Circle were, in the next few days, to be taken under Belgian Administration. At the same time, he requested that the station officials be informed that, in case they desired to enter Belgian service the Belgian Administration would continue to pay them their customary salary and allowances. Since the Local Commander has been contemplating the transfer, in the next few days, of the stations to Belgian Administration, he seems to be under the erroneous impression that the provisions of the Peace Treaty regarding the Circles of Eupen and Malmedy had already come into force, by the signing of the Treaty.

The German Government begs that the request be transmitted to the Royal Belgian Government to instruct the officer mentioned, as well as the other Belgian Military and Civil Authorities in Eupen and Malmedy, among whom similar erroneous impressions seem to exist, concerning the legal status, and to call their attention to the fact that all measures, contemplated on the part of Belgium as a result of the

¹⁰ *Supra*.

present relinquishment of sovereignty over the two Circles by Germany, can only be carried out when the Peace Treaty in its relations between Germany and Belgium, has come into force.

With regard to the possible taking over of the railroad officials, the German Government calls attention to the fact that the officials are not in a position, independently, without the approval of the Government which appointed them, to dispose of their services. The officials have been informed that negotiations concerning the question of officials are in the hands of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that special negotiations by individual authorities and officials would not be binding for the Government.

The German Government would, on its side, deem it expedient if, during the period until the decision of the people as to the final lot of the Eupen and Malmedy Circles, the smallest possible number of changes would be made in the railway personnel as well as in the rest of the Civil Service. It is of the opinion that, according to the agreements referred to in the note of July 13, concerning the execution of the provisions of the Peace Treaty pertaining to the district of Moresnet and the Circles of Eupen and Malmedy, precisely the taking over of the railway personnel and such railway questions should be dealt with, as demand a punctual settlement, in order that, after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, the desired, orderly continuation of traffic on the lines and of rail communications across the frontier may be assured, which would also be in the interest of the other Powers concerned with the occupation of Rhine territory.

Accept, etc.

FREIHERR VON LERSNER

Appendix H to HD-61

Proposed Reply to German Notes on Malmedy and Eupen,¹¹ as Submitted by the Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the German Treaty

Translation

COMMITTEE ON THE EXECUTION
OF THE CLAUSES OF THE PEACE
TREATY

The Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Peace Treaty has the honor to recommend for the approval of the Supreme Council the appended draft of answer to the notes of the German Delegation dated August 1 and 5 relative to the measures adopted by the Belgian authorities in the circles of Eupen and Malmedy.

SEPTEMBER 5, 1919.

¹¹ Appendices F and G, *supra*.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of August 1 and 5.

The measures adopted by the Belgian authorities in the circles of Eupen and Malmedy seemed to have caused the German Government an emotion which is hard to understand.

According to Article 34 of the Peace Treaty, Germany renounces in favor of Belgium all rights and titles over the territories which are making up the circles of Eupen and Malmedy, with the sole reservation that the League of Nations might later order the return to Germany of the whole or part of these territories, if, according to formalities determined by the same article, the majority of the population expresses the desire to do so.

According to these provisions the sovereignty over those territories in question shall pass effectively to Belgium as soon as the Treaty goes into force, namely the day of the signing of the first *procès-verbal de dépôt* of ratifications, if on this day the Belgian ratifications have been deposited. The obligation to proceed to a proper consultation within the forms fixed by Article 34 in no way affects the sovereign rights of Belgium.

The Belgian Government shall therefore, from the going into force of the Treaty, have to provide for all the public positions in the ceded territories; the railroad employees are among the officials whose nomination it will have to see to.

In taking at once the measures for the transfer of sovereignty and in preparing measures which are of a nature to facilitate that transfer later, the Belgian authorities, far from overstepping their rights, have only in view the interest of the populations of the territories which will soon pass under Belgian Sovereignty.

Besides, while waiting for the going into force of the Treaty, it is perfectly right for the Belgian authorities, as occupying power, to get into direct relations with the employees of the administration of Prussian railroads.

The Belgian Government does not refuse however to negotiate with the German Government regarding the questions relative to the execution of the Treaty, either within the circles of Eupen and Malmedy, or within the neutral Moresnet and the Prussian Moresnet. The only condition placed upon such negotiation is that the German government does not contest in any way the value of the sovereign rights of Belgium as they are recognized by the Treaty of June 28 over the territories dealt with in Articles 32, 33 and 34 of that Treaty.

Please accept, etc.

Appendix I to HD-61

BRITISH DELEGATION

PARIS, August 26, 1919.

To Secretary General Dutasta.

It has been promised to the British Parliament that the publication of the Peace Treaty with Germany in its final form would be completed by that of the other annexed documents so as to constitute a complete historical document. However, in order to make certain later documents fully intelligible, it would be well to publish at least certain parts of the first draft of that treaty.

It is however difficult to proceed thus in view of the fact that the former Supreme Council has decided that the Peace Treaty with Germany should be published only in its final form. To conquer this difficulty it is now proposed to place in a column opposite the corresponding part of the final text the parts of the first draft [which?] were later modified. This proposal has been submitted to the Prime Minister and has received his approval. Consequently, I have the honor to ask Your Excellency to kindly submit it to the examination of the Supreme Council in view of obtaining, if possible, the adhesion of the other representatives to the procedure suggested.

I can add that the German Society of the League of Nations has published the primitive text of the Treaty in English, French and German, that it seems certain that that publication has met with a great success in Germany and in the neutral countries and that a great number of copies have been introduced into the Allied countries. It is therefore evident that the publication of the excerpts of the primitive text would reveal nothing which is not already known.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, September 27, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman

Hon. H. Nicolson

FRANCE

M. Pichon

Secretary

M. Dutasta

M. Berthelot

M. de St. Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja

Secretary

M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Mr. C. Russell
 BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
 FRANCE M. Massigli
 ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned.

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. J. B. Scott,

Mr. E. L. Dresel.

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Groves,

General Sykes,

General Sackville-West,

Lieutenant-Colonel Kisch,

Lieutenant-Commander Dunne,

Mr. Ibbetson-James,

Mr. Brigstocke.

FRANCE

M. Claveille,

M. Loucheur,

M. Berenger,

M. Laroche,

Commander Levavasseur,

M. Fromageot,

Captain Roper.

ITALY

M. Galli,

Admiral Orsini,

Lieutenant-Colonel Guidoni,

Lieutenant-Colonel Piccio.

M. Ricci-Busatti.

JAPAN

M. Nagaoka.

1. The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation of September 24th (See appendix "A").

German Oil Tank Ships M. LOUCHEUR said that he wished to make a brief summary of what had taken place. The Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council had taken decisions in regard to the distribution of the German Oil Tank Ships which had, in accordance with the Brussels decision, been left temporarily to Germany. At a meeting which had taken place in London, it had been decided upon request of the American Delegate that the question should be referred for a definite decision to the Supreme Economic Council. The Council had met at Brussels on the 20th September. Unfortunately an incident had occurred which was the cause of the present discussion. A telegram sent to Brussels by the American Delegation had arrived in a mutilated condition. It was necessary to ask for a repetition which had arrived too late. When the Supreme Economic Council confirmed the resolution of the A. M. T. E. it believed that it was acting in full accord with the views of the American Delegation. He wished to call the attention of the Council to the following points: (1) The German Oil Tank Ships had been left to Germany only temporarily and the Inter-Allied Council at London was alone competent to decide as to their allocation. It was not a matter for the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission. It was a question of a distribution made by virtue of the Armistice. The American Delegation held that it had been decided to leave these ships to Germany to assure the transport of oil. There was a disagreement on this point. The Ships had not been left indefinitely to Germany and the proof of this lay in the fact that, far from protesting against giving up the ships, the German Government had given orders for their delivery. (2) That the Standard Oil Company claimed that the ships belonged to it because the Company owned all the stock of the German Company which owned the ships in question. He wished to say with reference to this point that that was a question which could not be dealt with at the moment and was a matter for the Reparations Commission.

Mr. POLK said that he agreed that the question should not be discussed at present.

M. LOUCHEUR said that his next point was: (3) That the ships ought not to lie idle. There was a shortage of tonnage from which all the world, including Germany, suffered. There was no doubt but that Germany needed oil and it was necessary to furnish it. The Standard Oil Company was prepared to furnish credit to Germany for oil and asked that the ships in question be placed at its disposal for the purpose of effecting the delivery. He wished to suggest, as his own opinion, the following:

The German ships in question would be turned over to the Powers in accordance with the decision of the A. M. T. E. They should immediately undertake a voyage to transport oil furnished by the Standard Oil Company to Germany with the understanding that the Standard Oil Company should open a credit of sufficient length of time to make it unnecessary to ask Germany at an early date to use part of its gold supply to pay for the oil.

MR. POLK said that he would like to ask whether the decision taken in London provided for a definite or only temporary allocation of these ships.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that it was only a question of temporary allocation.

M. HENRY BERENGER said that the distribution had been made in the following manner and that with the exception of the American Delegate there had been a unanimous opinion. The percentage of losses during the war had been taken into consideration and on this basis France had received 50 percent of the tonnage (30,000 tons dead weight and 23,000 tons gross weight), Italy 10,000 tons and Belgium 12,000 tons. It had been decided that Great Britain should receive three-quarters of the remainder, and America one-quarter. The reasons for this decision were as follows. Of the 47 German Oil Tank Ships existing at the outbreak of the war, 17 had taken refuge in American ports; 5 had been destroyed; 14 were discovered at Hamburg and 7 had not been found. The Shipping Board had opened an investigation to ascertain where these ships were. They were the ships which were to be divided between Great Britain and the United States and their value was considerable. The distribution had been made in accordance with the terms of the Armistice and were effective until the moment when, after the Treaty of Peace became effective, the Reparations Commission should take definite steps as to the final division of the ships in question. Of the 14 ships found at Hamburg, only 11 were available. Of these 7 belonged to the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, two to the Deutsche Erdoel Gesellschaft, and two to Messrs. Albrecht.

MR. POLK asked whether the 11 ships would be used for a voyage to Germany.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that they would, and that, if the question of making a second voyage should arise, it would be necessary for the Supreme Council to re-examine the question.

M. HENRY BERENGER said that M. Loucheur's proposal was in conformity with the resolution taken by the A. M. T. E. He wished to make certain points clear, and to ask whether it was the Standard Oil Company alone which should furnish Germany with the oil which was needed. There were other American Companies. He asked

whether a contract existed and whether part of the price had already been paid. Mr. Polk had said so a few days before and the *New York Herald* had published his statement. He also wished to ask whether the Standard Oil Company was prepared to make a long term credit. The representatives of that company, who had called upon him on the preceding day, had made no definite statement on that subject.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he wished to point out that Germany could not dispose of her funds without the authorization of the Financial Commission. It was proposed to notify Germany that she should make contracts with whatever American company she wished to and it was the duty of the Financial Commission to examine the conditions of payment. It was there that the question of a long term credit would be passed upon.

MR. POLK said that he was certain that no money had passed but he would ask for complete information and would be glad to furnish such information to the Council. He wished to ask under what conditions the ships would be navigated and by what crews they would be manned.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the ships would fly the flag of the nation to which they had been allocated temporarily and also the Inter-Allied flag.

M. HENRY BERENGER said that, so far as the officers and crews of these ships were concerned, it had been decided, and Germany had made no objections, that they should be manned by officers and crews of the Allied nations in question.

MR. POLK said that, if he understood correctly, there was no question of the ships being allocated to the United States. The suggestion had been made that the United States guarantee their return. He was willing, if the Naval Armistice Commission desired it, to give an assurance on this subject. It was understood that the Standard Oil Company could not keep these ships which they claimed as their property.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he considered it important that the Armistice Commission should be notified without delay and that a telegram should be transmitted to them on that day.

It was decided :

(1) that the provisional exemption of tankers granted at Brussels on the 14th March, 1919, should be cancelled. This cancellation should be without prejudice to any previous action taken by the A. N. A. C. ;

(2) that the vessels should be delivered for temporary management to the Allied and Associated Governments according to the decision decided on by the A. M. T. E. on the 17th September, 1919, under the usual armistice terms which should in no way prejudice the final decision to be made by the Reparations Commission provided for by the Treaty of Versailles ;

(3) that, should the German Government so desire, the said ships should be employed under the above terms for one voyage for the conveyance of oil to Germany; should a second voyage be asked for by the German Government, the matter would be again referred to the Supreme Council;

(4) that in consequence the said vessels should be sent forthwith to the Firth of Forth in compliance with the instructions of the A. N. A. C.

The Council also took note of Mr. Polk's declaration to the effect that he was prepared

(1) to give assurance that no payment had as yet been made by Germany for the delivery of the oil in question and

(2) to furnish to the Naval Armistice Commission, if they should desire it, an assurance that the vessels in question would not be retained by the United States.

2. The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation of the 26th of September (see Appendix "B").

Authorization for
German Ships To
Proceed to
Turkish Ports

M. LAROCHE read and explained the note presented by the French Delegation. The proposals contained in this note were adopted.

It was decided:

(1) that the German ships authorized by the Permanent Allied Naval Armistice Commission to proceed in Turkish waters and in the Black Sea could not make any movements other than those for which provision would be made in the *laissez-passer*:

(2) that upon approaching Turkish waters and in the Black Sea each of these ships should carry at least one representative of the Allied and Associated Powers;

(3) that they should in addition fly the Inter-Allied, blue, white and blue, flag;

It was also decided:

that this resolution should be communicated for action to the Permanent Allied Armistice Commission at London.

3. MR. POLK brought to the attention of the Council the résumé of certain conversations which had taken place at Versailles between an

Communication to
the German
Government
Relative to the
Evacuation of the
Baltic Provinces

American Representative and Baron von Lersner (see Appendix "C"). He wished to add that Baron von Lersner desired to emphasize the point that the Allied and Associated Governments should make a distinction between the German Government and the German people. They should make the threat to the German people in such a form as to make them understand the harm which their Government was doing in supporting the military party. Baron von Lersner said that the movement in the Baltic Provinces was clearly

reactionary in character. He (Mr. Polk) desired to make it clear that the American Delegation did not agree with what Baron von Lersner had said. He (Mr. Polk) felt strongly that it was entirely possible for the German Government to stop rationing the army of General von der Goltz by closing the East Prussian frontier.

M. BERTHELOT said that there was serious grounds for doubting the good faith of the German Government in this matter.

M. PICHON said that on that very morning the newspapers had published a telegram from Berlin which contained a report from the German Conservative Press in regard to an exchange of letters between the British General Burt and General von der Goltz. General von der Goltz had used most insolent language to General Burt. He had threatened to break all relations with him and to expel British subjects from the territories under German occupation. He expressed the hope that the German Government would reply to the "injurious pretensions" which the Entente Mission thought themselves able to address to a German General in a foreign country, in a befitting manner.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this letter only strengthened the opinion of his Government that it was necessary to take action as quickly as possible.

M. FROMAGEOT read the draft note to the German Delegation prepared by the Drafting Committee in accordance with the resolution¹ taken by the Council on the 25th of September (see Appendix "D"). He said that in the first paragraph on the 2nd page the Drafting Committee had substituted the words, "all troops" for the words, "these troops", which appeared in the draft previously prepared by the British Delegation.² The Committee had desired in this manner to refer to all German troops, no matter under what authority they were. They desired also to omit the last sentence of the third paragraph on the 2nd page, which actually dealt with a matter of interior arrangement. It was hardly necessary to notify the Germans of the instructions given to the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. POLK said that America was not represented on the Supreme Economic Council and for this reason he wished to ask if the German demands in question were pending before the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission.

M. FROMAGEOT said that if there was any question the words "Supreme Economic Council" could be removed wherever they appeared.

¹ HD-60, minute 7, p. 342.

² Appendix F to HD-60, p. 364.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it had been decided to act immediately. The use of the future tense as in the words, "they will be forced", tended to weaken the weight of the action.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the Committee had had a scruple upon the subject. They remembered that the Allied and Associated Powers had promised Germany in July that the blockade would be raised after Germany had ratified the Treaty. The Committee had wished to use an expression which would show that they were not unmindful of the former engagement which had been taken and that they took recourse to these measures only because Germany had failed to live up to her obligations. It would be simpler to say, "they will take into consideration", at the end of the paragraph; they would suppress the words "Supreme Economic Council" wherever they occurred.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council had just decided to furnish oil if the supply of foodstuffs under discussion was to be stopped. It should be understood that the Supreme Council were in a position, if they considered it advisable, to cancel the decision which they had just taken.

M. PICHON said that the Council were in agreement on this point, but that he did not consider it advisable to notify the Armistice Commission of this reservation.

M. FROMAGEOT said that in case the Council decided to hold up the repatriation of the German prisoners of war, the Committee had prepared a formula which could be inserted before the last paragraph on page two and which stated that the repatriation of German prisoners of war would be stopped from that day.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought this formula was too definite. In spite of his repeated telegrams, he had so far not received instructions from his Government. When the subject had been previously discussed, the Council had spoken of a total or partial suspension of repatriation.

M. PICHON said that he thought it would be better to make no mention of prisoners of war.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was an efficacious means of pressure, even though it was somewhat objectionable.

MR. POLK said that he thought it would be advisable to make some intimation on the subject through the Press.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that at the meeting at which Mr. Lloyd George had been present, it had been decided to send the ultimatum through the intermediary of Marshal Foch.⁵ Later they had thought of addressing the German Delegation.⁶ Now they had returned to

⁵ HD-54, minute 1, p. 218.

⁶ HD-55, minute 1, p. 231; HD-56, minute II, p. 256; HD-60, minute 7, p. 342.

the formula of the ultimatum. He thought it would produce a stronger effect if it was communicated to the German Government through the intermediary of Marshal Foch. From a technical point of view, he wished to say that all questions concerning the Armistice had been taken up with the German Government through the intermediary of Marshal Foch and in this particular case the question was one relating to the terms of the Armistice.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the note of September 23rd [3rd?] had been addressed to Marshal Foch.

MR. POLK said that he had no objections to this procedure.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he suggested the advisability of making the note public.

M. PICHON said that the Press could be informed of the note on that day, and the terms could be published on the following Monday.

It was decided :

(1) to accept the draft note to the German Government respecting the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces prepared by the Drafting Committee with the modifications in text approved by the Council (see Appendix "E").

(2) to transmit this note to the German Government through the intermediary of the Marshal, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies;

(3) to notify the press of the transmission of this note and to make public the text on the 29th of September.

It was also decided :

that the Council, in conformity with the spirit of this note, should reserve the right to stop, if they should consider it advisable, the cargoes of oil, the delivery of which to Germany had been authorized by the Council.

4. M. FROMAGEOT read and explained a note of the 18th of September addressed by the Drafting Committee to the Supreme Council on the subject of the Air Convention which had been adopted by the Supreme Council at its meeting of September 10th.⁷ (See Appendix "F").

The Proposals of the Committee were adopted except in regard to Article 18 respecting which the following discussion took place :

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Article raised very delicate questions. If the Article were entirely suppressed the result might be that aircraft might, upon landing in a foreign country, be prevented from flying for an indefinite period, on the ground that some breach of patent had taken place. He wished to have it stated definitely that in a case of this kind the aircraft would not be detained.

Note From
the Drafting
Committee on the
Air Convention

⁷ HD-51, minute 1, p. 173.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the same question had arisen in the Automobile Convention and at that time it was considered advisable to omit the Article. In point of fact there was no danger that aircraft would be detained for months. It would be sufficient to avoid detention to deposit a bond. It was possible to maintain the article under discussion, but there was no doubt that certain of the Powers would make reservations.

CAPTAIN ROPER said that the French Delegation had made a reservation in respect of this Article for the purpose of protecting industrial property. They could not agree that a foreigner knowingly committing a breach of patent should land in France and leave without being disturbed. The detention of the aircraft in question appeared to be the only method of dealing with the situation, but in view of the fact that the Legal Advisers of the Conference were of the opinion that industrial property would be equally well protected if after their detention the deposit of a bond were called for, the French Delegation would withdraw their reservation against Article 18 upon condition that the last sentence, concerning suits to be brought in the country of origin against the aircraft, be eliminated.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was willing to accept the suppression of such a statement. He suggested that the Article be referred to the Drafting Committee which should endeavor to modify it, so that the right of detention or seizure should be limited by the right to set the aircraft free upon the deposit of a bond.

M. PICHON said that he would agree to this.

M. MATSUI said that he was obliged to make a reservation. His Government was not yet in possession of the text of the Convention. A period of six months had been allowed in which each Power might say whether or not it agree.

MR. POLK said that the United States had also made a reservation and understood that they would be given a period of six months in which to communicate their reply.

It was decided:

(1) that the Drafting Committee should be called upon to modify the text of Article 18 of the Convention Relative to Air Navigation in such a manner as to make it possible for aircraft to avoid detention for violation of patent by depositing a security.

(2) to accept, with reference to Articles 15, 22, 24, 34, and 36 the proposals of the Drafting Committee. (See Appendix "F".)

5. M. BERTHELOT said that he was directed by M. Clemenceau to say that he considered it inadvisable to publish portions of the Conditions of Peace in their original text. He was not opposed to the publication of all of the text and of the notes which had been exchanged in the premises with the German Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he agreed in principle, but the publication of the whole of the text might be somewhat expensive. He would refer the matter to his Government.

(The question was adjourned)

6. SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented upon a note from the British delegation, dated September 24th, proposing that an article be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary identical with Article 310 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria. This article provided for an understanding with the parties interested to enable a state to use sources of electric and hydraulic energy, which, by reason of the formation of new frontiers, were situated in the territory of another state. (See Annex "G".)

Insertion in the Treaty With Hungary of an Article Identical With Article 310 of the Treaty With Austria

(The British proposal was accepted.)

(It was decided:

to request the Drafting Committee to insert an article in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary identical with Article 310 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria.)

7. (The Council had before it a memorandum from Mr. Hoover asking that a Committee be formed to make arrangements for and undertake the repatriation of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia (See Annex "H").)

Creation of a Commission To Study the Repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian Prisoners in Siberia

M. BERTHELOT said that the Council would, without question, be unanimous in approving Mr. Hoover's proposal. It was a question of humanity, but he felt that it should be understood that, before repatriating the Germans and others, it would be necessary to repatriate the fifty thousand Czecho-Slovak troops who were at present in Siberia.

MR. POLK said he agreed with M. Berthelot. There were a number of difficult questions in connection with the repatriation of these prisoners, just as there were in the case of the Czecho-Slovak troops, but as the question of the repatriation of the latter was being considered at the present time, it would be possible to study at the same time the questions relating to the Germans and Austrians.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he felt some doubt as to whether the nomination of a Commission would bring about practical results.

M. PICHON thought that there might be favorable results and that they would lead to a means of repatriating the Czecho-Slovak troops.

(It was decided:

that a Commission composed of one American, British, French, Italian and Japanese officer should be created to deal with the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia.

It was also decided:

that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.)

Signature of the
Decision Taken
by the Principal
Allied and
Associated Powers
for the Organiza-
tion of a Plebiscite
at Teschen

8. (The signature then took place of the decision previously taken by the Council for the organization of a plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen and in the districts of Spisz and Orava.⁸

The decision was signed by Mr. Polk, Sir Eyre Crowe, M. Pichon, M. Scialoja and M. Matsui.)

(The meeting then adjourned)

Appendix A to HD-62

Translation

[FRENCH DELEGATION]

SEPTEMBER 24, 1919.

Note on the German Tank Vessels

ORIGIN OF THE QUESTION

The Brussels Protocol concerning merchant tonnage⁹ is only the result of several interviews, notably those of Treves of January 15-17 and of Spa of March 4.

The surrender of the German merchant fleet was stipulated by Article VIII of the Convention renewing the Armistice signed at Treves on January 16.¹⁰ This article provided, to settle the details of execution, the conclusion of a civil agreement, which was signed in the same place on January 17.¹¹

The Germans not having fulfilled their obligations, a meeting of experts was held at Spa. Admiral Hope, Chief of the Allied Delegation, submitted a note with two memoranda annexed, one relative to finances and the other dealing with tonnage. This latter memorandum defines the nature of the exemptions accorded and confirms clearly their revocability.

The Germans, without raising objections to the terms of the memorandum, declared that they could not deliver their vessels without obtaining precise guarantees of food.

Therefore the whole question of food supply, tonnage and finance was treated again at Brussels on March 13 and 14, 1919.

⁸ HD-58, minute 2, p. 300.

⁹ Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3 sér., tome XI, p. 232.

¹⁰ Vol. II, p. 11.

¹¹ Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3 sér., tome XI, p. 214.

The exemptions accorded, whose provisional character is emphasized in every particular case, form the subject of the first paragraph of Annex V/a (tonnage) of the Brussels Protocol.

Concerning the tank vessels the drafting is perfectly clear; it is in fact stipulated that "for the moment, the Associated Governments would not insist on the delivery of the tank-steamers".

Other exemptions granted at that time have since been revoked, for example those covered in paragraph 3 of S 1 of said Annex V/a.

POINT OF LAW

A. Status of the vessels.

Consequently the tank-steamers in question, included in the German fleet that is to be handed over to the Allies, remain still at their disposal.

In March the Allies agreed not to insist on the immediate delivery solely because of the abundance of tank tonnage at that time available (on this subject see the English and German stenographic reports of the discussions).

The Allies are therefore perfectly justified, in law, in demanding the delivery of these steamers, and the Germans moreover can not refuse them (see on this subject the telegrams exchanged between the *Coventry* and the Admiralty).

B. Competence.

On February 4, the Allied Council of Maritime Transports asked the Supreme Council to sanction the creation of an organism charged with dealing with all questions relative to enemy vessels.

The Supreme Council referred this letter for decision to the Supreme Economic Council, which in the meantime had been constituted, to decide among other questions those brought up by the application of the armistice (other than strictly naval, military or political questions).

It is under these conditions that the Supreme Economic Council decided the question in its session of February 25, 1919 (paragraph 17 of the minutes).

Since that time numerous questions brought up—not only on the subject of the assignment or reassignment of the enemy vessels, but also on the extension of the restriction of exemptions granted—were always decided without reference by the Supreme Economic Council (notably the exemption of the vessels between 1600 and 2500 tons and the withdrawal of the exemption of food for the German army in *Curland*).

There is so little question about this that in the note that the American Delegate addressed to the Allied Executive of Maritime Trans-

ports on September 17, this Delegate asks that the question be decided by the Supreme Economic Council.

The Supreme Economic Council and the A. M. T. E. have therefore received explicit powers from the Allied and Associated Governments for all enemy vessels, whatever their status.

POINT OF FACT

The inclosed note of the Allied Executive of Maritime Transports¹² sums up this point perfectly, and the French Delegation has accepted it completely.

On receipt of this note, the Supreme Economic Council took the decision which is entered as follows in the minutes of the meeting of September 20th :

"315 [316]—DELIVERY OF GERMAN TANK STEAMERS TO THE ALLIES

The President of the Transport Executive states the question and asks the Council to ratify the proposals contained in the note of the Transport Executive (document 291).

He calls especial attention to the note of the American Delegate (annex B) in this document, requesting that the Supreme Economic Council be asked to decide on the revocation of the provisional exemption in regard to these vessels granted by the Brussels Agreement.

The Council, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Supreme Council at the time of the Brussels Agreement, decides to approve the proposal of the Transport Executive, as follows :

1. That the provisional exemption of the German tank steamers granted at Brussels shall be revoked. This revocation shall go into force without affecting any measure previously taken by the permanent Naval Armistice Commission.
2. That the vessels shall be delivered to the management of the Allied and Associated Governments under the ordinary Armistice conditions.
3. That if the German Government desires, the vessels shall be employed, at least for one voyage, in carrying petroleum destined for Germany.

It is recalled that the American Delegate of the Transport Executive declared that if the Supreme Economic Council approves of the revocation of the exemption, no objection would be raised by his Government to these resolutions.

The French Delegation declares that it will insist to the French Ministry of the Navy that the *Vesta* be sent to Italy."

The present situation is therefore as follows :

1. The Supreme Economic Council, ratifying the proposition of the A. M. T. E., presented in agreement with the Permanent Naval

¹² Does not accompany the appendix.

Armistice Commission (P. A. N. A. C.), has decided that the vessels in question could not in any case be authorized to fly the German flag.

2. These organizations agree with the Germans that the vessels in question be delivered to the Allies and fly the Interallied flag, under the general conditions fixed for the German boats delivered to the Associated Powers after the Armistice (see telegrams P. A. N. A. C.).

3. The Supreme Economic Council, ratifying the proposals presented by the A. M. T. E. at the request of the Committee of Organization of the Reparations Commission (itself acting at the instigation of the American Delegate), has decided that if the German Government so desires, these vessels shall be assigned to carrying petroleum bought by Germany.

The interests of the German supply are thus safeguarded in the method favored by the American Government for the food supply.

In fact the transport of petroleum is assured under the same conditions as that of the American supplies, and, since the furnishing depends only on the transport, Germany's supply of mineral oils is assured.

In point of law there can be no connection between the delivery of petroleum to be made by American private interests and the execution of Armistice Clauses.

Appendix B to HD-62

Translation

FRENCH DELEGATION

SEPTEMBER 26, 1919.

Note

GERMAN VESSELS EN ROUTE TO TURKEY

On September 5, a German boat, the *Diana* is signaled en route from Pireus to Constantinople.

The French and British High Commissioners called the attention to the fact that the arrival of a German boat in Turkish waters would produce the worst impression. Besides, it would be contrary to the terms of article 23, of the Armistice Convention with Turkey, thus conceived: "Twenty three: obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the central Powers".

The High Commissioners give orders to the Allied forces to prevent the German vessels from passing through the Dardanelles.

On September 8, the French Government approves the instructions given by its High Commissioner and invites its representatives in London and Rome to see that the interdiction ordered by the High Commissioners be maintained.

On September 15, the French High Commissioner announces that a German, arrived with a permit from the Interallied Commission of Repatriation of War Prisoners in Berlin, announces the near arrival of seven German ships for the repatriation of German prisoners in the Near East and the Black Sea, with a cargo destined for Bulgaria and authorized to take some freight on their return trip.

The French Embassy in London to which this information is communicated notified that indeed:

Taking into account the resumption of normal economic relations with Germany, the Interallied Naval Commission of Armistice has authorized seven ships to go to the Near East and the Black Sea. Three of those vessels have cargoes for Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia, the other four are intended for the transportation of German prisoners. They have all already left the German ports.

By reason of the general shortage of tonnage, it would be hard to make them turn back: an important tonnage would be lost for several weeks. Moreover, they are carrying cargo destined for Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia.

On the other hand the inconveniences which have given rise to the instructions given by the High Commissioners in Constantinople would become still more serious on account of the fact that the Germans have spread the news that, in spite of these instructions, their flag would soon reappear in Turkish waters.

Under these conditions, it is proposed that orders be given so that:

1.—these vessels be allowed to make no other operations within Turkish waters and the Black Sea except those for which they have a permit.

2.—that on their approach of Turkish waters and the Black Sea, each vessel should receive on board a representative of the Allied and Associated Powers.

3.—that they fly on their stern the Interallied flag, blue, white and blue.

Appendix C to HD-62

[*Résumé of Certain Conversations Between an American Representative and Baron von Lersner*]

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

VERSAILLES, September 26, 1919.

The German Government has for weeks been taking the greatest pains to withdraw the insubordinate troops from the Baltic provinces and Lithuania. The troops, in case of their continuing to disobey orders, have been threatened with the stoppage of food supplies, pay and all canteen service. General von der Goltz had summoned to this

effect the leaders of all detachments to his headquarters. General von der Goltz has in point of fact followed all the instructions of the Government. He is now recalled, because he failed to carry through the orders of the Government. It must be admitted that in military quarters they fear that his successor will have still greater difficulty to succeed in obtaining the necessary authority against the insubordinate troops. The troops in the Baltic Provinces are partly demoralized.

In order that the Allied and Associated Governments may form a correct idea of the situation in the Baltic Provinces, and in order to further the prompt evacuation of the Baltic Provinces as desired by the German Government themselves, the latter agree that a mixed German Interallied Commission should proceed to the Baltic Provinces.

The German Government deem it desirable that this Commission should travel via Berlin and should ascertain by direct negotiations with the German Government that Germany is willing to further the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces in every way.

In order to hasten the evacuation the German Government have proceeded to execute the decision taken in the former Cabinet Council to stop the pay of the troops, and have given orders that all troops, who refuse to obey the command to return, are to receive no more pay. Orders have been likewise given that all refractory troops shall lose their claims to maintenance or pension. The Minister for Public Defense has, already a few days ago, despatched a special officer to Courland, who sends daily reports on the situation there and receives orders from Berlin.

It is of great consequence to the German Government that Interallied representatives should cooperate in the German-Interallied Commission, also on account of the fact that German Nationals established in the Baltic Provinces [wish?] to flee from the country together with the retreat of the German troops. They do not wish to experience another summer there under Bolsheviki rule. It is a case of 170,000 people, whose lives and property have to be protected. Germany is in no way in the position to procure, within the Empire, dwellings and food for these German subjects, established up to the present in the Baltic Provinces. After the retreat of the German troops they would have to be placed under the protection of the Entente.

Up to the present time adventurers from all parts of the Empire have been trying, contrary to the wishes of the German Government, to join the troops in the Baltic Provinces. Sharp admonitions have been issued against these tendencies. The frontier has been closed; soldiers, who, nevertheless, endeavour to pass the frontiers are fired upon. All supplies of ammunition to the Baltic troops have been strictly prohibited for weeks past.

The government have for the present deemed it preferable not to publish in the German press, as has been proposed, the menace of American reprisals, in order that no panic should arise from the impending occupation of further German districts. However, orders have been given to acquaint the troops of the Baltic Provinces at once with the threatened reprisals, in order that they may see the extent of the danger in case that they should not return.

It is absolutely erroneous that a great proportion of the German people by open or clandestine means are supporting the troops in their insubordination. On the contrary the opinion prevails in Germany that the troops can in no case hold out any longer in the Baltic Provinces. Even the leading Conservative paper *Kreuz-zeitung* wrote last Wednesday that it is wise and necessary to put a stop to the existing state of affairs in the Baltic Provinces, and drew the attention to the necessity of good German relations with the Lettish and Lithuanian people, as well as with their newly arising states.

A further question to be discussed with the Interallied Commission is the following:

What is to become of the Russian detachments which remain in the Baltic Provinces, standing partly between the German troops.

Appendix D to HD-62

[Translation ¹⁴]

*Draft of a Note to the German Delegation on the Subject of the
Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces*

(Proposal of the Drafting Committee)

According to the terms of article XII of the armistice of November 11, 1918, Germany subscribed to the following engagement:

“All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Austria-Hungary, Rumania, or Turkey shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914;

All German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.”

Under date of August 27, the Marshal of France, Commander in Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies, made known that the time had come for Germany to evacuate the said territories and summoned the German Government to proceed thereto immediately.

¹⁴ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

By its note of September 3, the German Government endeavored to evade the engagement above referred to, by alleging pretexts which the Allied and Associated Powers are unable to consider.

The Allied and Associated Governments refuse particularly to admit that the German Government can, in order to avoid the responsibility incumbent upon it, shield itself behind the alleged inability to enforce obedience of its orders by the troops in the Baltic regions.

They therefore request the German Government to proceed without delay to the evacuation of all German troops, staffs and services included, now in the Baltic provinces. The German Government will immediately take the necessary steps to withdraw within the aforesaid boundaries all German officers and soldiers who have enlisted since demobilization in Russian corps organized in the said Baltic provinces and will withhold authorization for and strictly forbid enlistment in said corps.

The evacuation must be started immediately and must continue without interruption.

The Allied and Associated Governments hereby notify that until they are satisfied that their demand is being effectively executed they will not entertain any of the applications submitted to the Supreme Economic Council by the German Government for the supply of food-stuffs and raw materials. They have, consequently, given instructions to the Supreme Economic Council not to proceed with the examination of any of these applications.

Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Governments will refuse all financial facilities which the German Government is enjoying at the present time or which it is seeking from the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals.

In the event of noncompliance on the part of the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers will take such measures as they shall judge necessary to enforce the aforesaid terms of the armistice.

Appendix E to HD-62

Note to the German Government From the Allied and Associated Governments

SEPTEMBER 27, 1919.

According to the terms of Article XII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, Germany subscribed to the following engagement:

All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Austria Hungary, Rumania, or Turkey shall with-

draw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914, and all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.

Under date of August 27, the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies, made known that the time had come for Germany to evacuate the said territories and summoned the German Government to proceed thereto immediately.

By its note of September 3, the German Government endeavored to evade the engagement above referred to, by alleging pretexts which the Allied and Associated Powers are unable to consider.

The Allied and Associated Governments refuse particularly to admit that the German Government can, in order to avoid the responsibility incumbent upon it, shield itself behind the alleged inability to enforce obedience of its orders by the troops in the Baltic regions.

They therefore request the German Government to proceed without delay to the evacuation of all German troops, staffs and services included, now in the Baltic provinces. The German Government will immediately take the necessary steps to withdraw within the aforesaid boundaries all German officers and soldiers, who have enlisted since demobilization, in Russian corps organized in the said Baltic provinces and will withhold authorization for and strictly forbid enlistment in the said corps.

The evacuation must be started immediately and must continue without interruption.

The Allied and Associated Governments hereby notify that until they are satisfied that their demand is being effectively executed they will not entertain any of the applications put forward by the German Government for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. They have consequently given instructions not to proceed with the examination of any of these applications.

Furthermore the Allied and Associated Governments will refuse all financial facilities which the German Government is enjoying at the present time or which it is seeking from the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals.

In the event of non-compliance on the part of the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers will take such measures as they shall judge necessary to enforce the aforesaid terms of the Armistice.

Appendix F to HD-62

Translation

Note to the Supreme Council

PARIS, September 18, 1919.

The Drafting Committee has finished drawing up, in view of its signature, the Convention on Aerial Navigation, adopted by the Supreme Council in its Session of September 10.¹⁵

On that subject, the Drafting Committee has the honor to call the attention of the Supreme Council to the reservations made by several Delegations which are in disaccord relative to the following articles:

1) *Article 18*—That article solves certain questions of International Law in matters of industrial ownership (exemption of seizure in case of counterfeit, attribution of judicial jurisdiction).

Nothing seems to prevent the signatory powers from making reservations on that article. The pure and simple suppression of that article can be conceived. The silence of the convention as regard automobiles creates a precedent.

2) *Article 22*—Alineas 1, 2, and 5, (Right of Police for the States over their atmosphere) are the result of the principle of sovereignty established by article 1. Their maintenance is therefore not necessary.

The Drafting Committee considers that it is not necessary to solve those general questions, apropos of a technical regulation of aerial navigation which makes the subject of the present Convention.

Later agreements can regulate these questions of a purely judicial nature, if need be.

3) *Article 34*—(International Commission on Aerial Navigation).

Cuba protests against the mode of the Constitution of that Commission.

The Drafting Committee considers that this provision adopted by the Commission is the basis of the Convention, which each state is free to sign or not—and that reservations on that score are practically equal to a refusal to sign.

4)—The United States have made reservations on articles 15, 24 and 36; the objections refer to questions of an internal nature and of customs.

But a time limit of six months has been provided for the signing of the Convention, precisely to settle these difficulties.

Under these conditions, the Drafting Committee has the honor to propose to the Supreme Council:

1.—*Article 18*. Either suppress that article, or accept the reservations which the signatory powers wish to add to their signature.

2.—*Article 22*. Suppress that article.

3.—*Article 34*. Take no account of the Cuban protest.

¹⁵ HD-51, minute 1, p. 173.

4.—*Articles 15, 24 and 35.* Make no objection to the provisional reservations made by the United States.

For the Drafting Committee,
HENRI FROMAGEOT

Appendix G to HD-62

Translation

PARIS, September 24, 1919.

From: The British Delegation.

To: M. Dutasta.

The remarks formulated by the Austrian Delegation regarding the water and the electric light installations in the city of Klagenfurt resulted in, as is known to Your Excellency, the addition of a new article (No. 310) in the Peace Treaty with Austria at the last moment.

This article is drawn up in general terms in such a way as to be applicable to all similar cases and might be advantageously inserted in the Peace Treaty with Hungary.

However, the drafting committee does not feel authorized to adopt this line of action without the approbation of the Supreme Council and, consequently, I have the honor to suggest that this matter be submitted to an examination by the Council in the course of an early meeting.

Accept, etc.

(signature)

Appendix H to HD-62

[*Note From the Director General of Relief (Hoover)*]

REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR FROM SIBERIA AND ELSEWHERE

It appears that there are some 200,000 German-Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia, and that these prisoners are suffering greatly and are a constant menace to the Siberian Government. There are also certain Polish prisoners and civilians now scattered all over the world who will require more systematic assistance at repatriation, but there is an entire deficiency of funds with which to pay the incidental expenses. There are probably also other odd lots of expatriates of various nationals as the result of the war, who need systematic repatriation. It would appear to me that this problem requires definite organization, and I should like to submit the following plan in the matter for action by the Council.

First, that a Commission, comprising a British, French, American and Italian military officer, should be set up and undertake the management of this repatriation. That this Commission should com-

municate their appointment to the Austrian, Hungarian and Polish and other Governments, and that they should offer to undertake the repatriation, provided funds are placed to their credit in advance by each of the Governments concerned.

It would appear to me that if such a body is set up under capable officers that they would be able to work out a solution in this manner and to secure from the Allied Governments the necessary shipping and other services which would be necessary. They could invite a delegate of each of the Governments concerned to sit with them in respect to the matters which concerned such a Government and they could engage the necessary staff to carry on the work. They would probably need to appeal to the various Allied Governments and to charitable societies for some assistance in respect to prisoners originating from quarters unable to supply these funds, but, in any event, they would create a center around which all effort of this kind could be directed.

With the repatriation of the Allied troops nearing completion, it would appear to be an appropriate moment for the erection of such a body. I attach two memoranda on the subject indicating the volume of the problem involved, the first from the British authorities on "Prisoners in Siberia", the second from the Polish Officer for Repatriation.

HERBERT HOOVER

26 JULY 1919.

[Enclosure 1]

FOOD SECTION

Memorandum From British Delegates

EX-ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR IN SIBERIA

There are about 200,000 German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war in Siberia. They are in a destitute condition, and it is considered essential, both on humanitarian and political grounds, that food and clothing should be supplied to them. The representatives in Siberia of the Danish and Scandinavian Red Cross Societies have undertaken to carry out the work if they are supplied with funds, estimated at £100,000 a month. The Austrian Government have offered to provide the funds for their nationals, and the British Foreign Office stated on the 24th of June that the Hungarian Government stated that they were unable to contribute to the expenses, but asked that notwithstanding the Relief should be carried out.

It is suggested that the best way to deal with the problem (which has now become a very pressing one) would be to ask the Director General of Relief to approach the Red Cross authorities in order that

they may make the necessary arrangements to receive the contributions of the Austrian and Hungarian Governments, and to carry out such measures of Relief as are possible with the finance thus made available.

It is possible that on re-consideration the German Government would also consent to provide the necessary finance. It may be mentioned that the Austrian representative who deals with this matter is at present at St. Germain.

It is suggested that the Red Cross representatives should be informed that the Allied Governments will permit the necessary remittances to be made by the ex-enemy Governments concerned and will facilitate the Relief measures undertaken as far as possible.

S. D. WALEY

7/7/19

[Enclosure 2]

Translation

CENTRAL POLISH OFFICE FOR THE
REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR,
CIVILIAN REFUGEES AND WORKMEN

Memorandum on Polish Repatriation

by

Stanisław Gawronski

up to the 1st June 1919

In reply to your esteemed communication of the 11th July, I hasten to communicate to you:

1. The approximate figures of Polish subjects in foreign countries awaiting repatriation.
2. The number of foreigners actually in Poland whom it is necessary to repatriate.
3. The number of foreign prisoners of war, interned civilians, refugees and work-people which the Central Polish Repatriation Office has transported across Polish territory at Polish national expense.

I

From the figures possessed by the Central Office for Repatriation of prisoners, interned civilians and refugees at Warsaw, the following Poles still await repatriation in foreign countries:

1. Germany, in which is included the occupied territories and the provinces recaptured by France:

a) 15,000 to 20,000 Polish prisoners of war, the vast majority of which are invalids, wounded and sick (Polish Consul-General, Berlin).

b) about 600,000 Polish workers interned in Germany during the war and taken by force during the German occupation of Polish territory formerly belonging to Russia.

Germany: total between 615,000 and 620,000.

This figure does not include interned civilians and workers, formerly Russian subjects in Posnania, and the Polish subjects of foreign nationalities (Lithuanians, Ruthenians, Jews, etc.) of which the Central Repatriation Office has not adequate figures.

2. Russia: prisoners of war who were formerly soldiers in the Russian Army, who had been evacuated by force from the Polish territory formerly belonging to Russia and occupied by Germany during the war.

a) Russia in Europe, in which is included the Ukraine and the Don country. The figures which are obtainable at the moment, having in view the state of war with the Bolsheviks and the absolute lack of communications, are very incorrect. Taking as a basis the original figures obtained by the Polish Poor Relief organization which functioned in the territory of the Russian Empire during the war, and deducting the number of repatriated people up till the first of June, a certain number who enlisted in the Allied armies in Russia, and those who have already gone over the Hungarian and Roumanian frontiers, there remain in Russia in Europe between 165,000 and 180,000 Poles to be repatriated.

b) Siberia: about 40,000. These figures come from Polish organizations in Siberia, and are confirmed by various Allied and neutral missions.

c) Caucasus and Turkistan: about 20,000 (Polish organizations).

d) Finland, Murmansk, Archangel: 3,000 (Polish delegates at Archangel).

e) Baltic Provinces: about 3,000 (*idem*).

Russia: total between 231,000 and 246,000.

3. Austria: between 20,000 and 25,000, of which 17,000 are registered by the Polish Mission at Vienna as being in that city or its immediate environs.

4. Hungary: about 30,000, of which 20,000 registered at Budapest by Major Tabaszynsky of Colonel Vix's Military Mission as coming from the south-eastern provinces of Russia.

5. Roumania: about 30,000 from the south-eastern provinces of Russia, (Polish Mission at Bucharest).

6. Serbia: at least 6,000, of which the condition is most deplorable. (Special Polish Mission.)

7. Albania: about 3,000 (Special Polish Mission).

8. Greece: about 1,000 (Special Polish Mission).

9. Jugo-Slavia: about 2,000 (Special Polish Mission).

10. Turkey, Europe and Asiatic: between 10,000 and 15,000 (Special Polish Mission).

11. Denmark: 1,000

12. Holland: 1,000

13. England: 3,000

14. Italy: 5,000 (Polish Consul-General at Rome).

15. France: in which is included the English and American camps:—between 15,000 and 20,000 prisoners of war and between 10,000 and 12,000 workers and refugees, in which are included the refugees from Odessa brought by sea to Marseilles.

RECAPITULATION

1) Germany	615,000 to 620,000
2) Russia	231,000 to 246,000
3) Austria	20,000 to 25,000
4) Hungary	about 30,000
5) Czecho-Slovakia	“ 2,000
6) Roumania	“ 60,000
7) Serbia	“ 6,000
8) Albania	“ 3,000
9) Greece	“ 1,000
10) Turkey	10,000 to 15,000
11) Denmark	about 1,000
12) Holland	“ 1,000
13) Italy	“ 5,000
14) England	“ 3,000
15) France	25,000 to 32,000

Total in round figures . 1,010,000 to 1,050,000

Polish subjects prisoners of war, interned civilians and refugees awaiting repatriation.

In this figure of between 1,010,000 and 1,050,000 are not included the Polish subjects of foreign nationalities from the German provinces allotted to Poland by the Peace Treaty. The number of these Polish subjects is not very large, but they must be taken into consideration when arranging the repatriation of Polish subjects who are prisoners of war in the French, English and American prisoner of war camps.

II

The number of foreigners in Poland whose repatriation is necessary and indeed urgent is difficult to formulate. It increases from day to day. Above all there are the Russian subjects fleeing before the Bolshevists and placing themselves under Polish protection after having passed the Polish Bolshevist front. These refugees arrive with their wives and children in a deplorable state, ragged, verminous, starving, bring with them every sort of disease. Among these there are many Bolshevist agents, who under the pretext of fleeing before the Bolshevists penetrate into Polish territory in order to carry out dangerous Bolshevist propaganda. Apart from these and in spite of the Allied order forbidding Germany to repatriate Russian prisoners of war across Polish territory, there are constantly arriving from Germany prisoners who are Russian subjects, who having in view the lack of forces to guard the Polish frontier,

cross this frontier on foot and disseminate themselves little by little in Polish territory. The number of these men vary from between 500 and 2,000 per week. The numbers have greatly diminished during the last few weeks. These prisoners of war who are Russian subjects, are also without any means of existence, and naturally they have to be lodged and fed at the expense of the Polish Government.

The number of Russian subjects actually on Polish territory can be said without exaggeration to be between 250,000 and 300,000. The larger part of these prisoners are Russian subjects, but among them is a large number of Jews and Ukrainians and also small parties of White Russians, Lithuanians, and others. Having in view the lack of provisions, the lack of medical requirements and disinfectants, the absolute lack of linen and clothes, the absolute lack of means of transport and the lack of work, all these people without resources or means of existence are a heavy burden on the Polish Government, and present a real danger from the moral and medical point of view, not only for Poland, but for the whole of Western Europe in general.

III

The number of foreign prisoners of war recorded as having passed through Polish territory from November 1918 to the first June 1919 at the expense of the Polish Government is stated below :

1) Russians	481, 171
2) Germans	7, 640
3) Lithuanians	5, 930
4) Ukrainians	14, 235
5) French	1, 549
6) Serbians	524
7) Hungarians	19, 792
8) Italians	1, 266
9) Bulgarians	171
10) Czechs	10, 427
11) Roumanians	1, 865
12) Austrians	6, 583
13) English	62
14) Belgians	17
15) Americans	5
16) Turks	871
17) Various	3,050
TOTAL	555, 158

This total of 555,158 foreign prisoners is very much below the actual figure, as the Central Repatriation Office did not at first take into account the foreign prisoners of war transported by Galicia, and consequently figures were lacking. Immediately after the Armistice,

on account of internal troubles in Germany and the withdrawal of Austrian authorities from Polish territory, the number of foreign prisoners of war in Polish territory was so large that tens of thousands of Russian, German and Austrian prisoners of war were transported from east to west and from west to east of the Polish frontiers without being recorded on account of the impossibility of exercising control. It would be perfectly just and not an exaggeration to augment the total of 555,158 by at least 150,000.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, September 29, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja
Secretary
M. Galli

JAPAN

M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF..... Mr. C. Russell
BRITISH EMPIRE..... Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE..... M. Massigli
ITALY..... M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned.

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Rear Admiral McCully, U. S. N.
Colonel Browning, U. S. A.
Mr. James Brown Scott

BRITISH EMPIRE

Major General Sir F. Sykes
Major General Groves
Mr. Brigstocke
Lt. Colonel Kisch
Commander Macnamara
Mr. Sherman
Commander Lucas

FRANCE

General Belin
M. Laroche
M. Seydoux
M. Kammerer
M. Fromageot
Commander Le Vasseur
Captain Roper

ITALY

Admiral Orsini
Lt. Colonel Piccio
General Cavallero
M. Ricci-Busatti

1. (The discussion on the British memorandum on this subject was postponed to enable Sir Eyre Crowe to receive instructions from his Government. Mr. Polk also wished to consult his Government before the matter was brought before the Council.)

German Ships
Sold During the
War to Dutch
Navigation
Companies

Sale of Air
Material by the
German
Government

2. CAPTAIN ROPER said that Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany specified that war material should be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers after the Treaty came into force. In order that this article might be carried out after the Treaty came into force, it was important that this war material should not be alienated in any way or exported from Germany. The Allied and Associated Governments had addressed two notes to the German Government on the subject.¹ The German Government had replied by a letter dated September 8th² sent through the Armistice Commission declining to agree to the obligations placed upon the article by the Allied and Associated Governments. As information was constantly received to show new breaches by Germany, Marshal Foch proposed to the Supreme Council that a resolution be taken that all air material in Germany should be considered as war material and should be stored as war material until such time as the Interallied Air Control Commission had decided as to its nature.

(Captain Roper then read and commented upon a letter from Marshal Foch of September 25th, (See Appendix A).)

Mr. POLK asked whether the question was one of the Armistice.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that it dealt with Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace.

MR. POLK asked whether what was now said was not broader than the statements of the resolution of August 6th.³ The words used were, "destroyed and used." He questioned whether the use of the word "used" was not beyond the powers of the Council.

CAPTAIN ROPER said that if the Germans used the material in question they would take occasion to destroy it, if they could, on the ground of accidents, or they would be able to use the material for other purposes. If they were given a free hand they would undoubtedly transform the material. There had been examples of repeated infractions by the Germans, and in order to avoid these it was essential that the material should be stopped [*stocked*].

MR. POLK asked whether the Commission of Control would have the power to decide as to what material was civil and what military.

¹ The first note, dated August 8 (Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/121), transmitted the text of the proposals accepted by the Supreme Council on August 6, HD-25, minute 14, vol. VII, p. 563. For text of the second note, dated August 22, see appendix C to HD-37, *ibid.*, p. 823.

² See appendix A to HD-78, pp. 811, 815.

³ HD-25, minute 14, vol. VII, p. 563.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that the Commission would have this power.

M. SCIALOJA said that it was important that the position of the Council should be founded on firm ground. It was not possible to apply the Treaty before it was ratified. He suggested that a Provisional Commission of Control might permit the Germans to use aircraft which were not military. He thought that the Council were asking for more than under the Treaty they were entitled to ask.

MR. POLK asked whether the Commission had arrived in Germany.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that the advance party had arrived. The Germans were anxious to postpone the discussion of the subject until the Treaty came into force. Under these circumstances the procedure proposed by M. Scialoja would not be applicable. In its resolution of August 6th the Supreme Council had declared its right of property over this material; they therefore had legal rights. During the last month the Germans had several times violated their engagements and Marshal Foch had declared that, unless the Supreme Council took firm and determined action, he was not in a position to obtain any results.

M. SCIALOJA asked whether it was proposed to stop [*stock*] all the aircraft in question.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that the Technical Experts who had discussed the subject in the Commission on Aerial Clauses, had unanimously declared that there were no civil aircraft in Germany, if by that aeroplanes constructed since the Armistice and upon new plans were meant. Today the Germans had requested permission to use seven hundred aeroplanes for the Postal Air Service and this request was undoubtedly made to conceal their real purpose in endeavoring to keep back from the Allies a large number of aeroplanes.

MR. POLK asked whether M. Scialoja was satisfied as to the legal right.

M. SCIALOJA replied that he would withdraw the reservation he had previously made.

MR. POLK asked Captain Roper if he referred to aeroplanes built since the Armistice.

CAPTAIN ROPER said that he referred to aeroplanes built before the Armistice.

MR. POLK asked whether the Commission would have the power to discriminate between aeroplanes built before or since the Armistice. He also asked whether General Weygand had any objection to the German Postal Air Service.

CAPTAIN ROPER replied that he had no such objection after the Treaty became effective, but he wished to point out that at present it was only a maneuver on the part of the Germans to avoid fulfilling their obligations under the terms of the Treaty. In the opinion of the Technical Experts, there was no defense for the scale upon which the German Postal Air Service was being planned.

MR. POLK said that there was no legal obstacle of prohibiting the Germans building and exporting aeroplanes which had been built since the time of the Armistice upon new plans.

CAPTAIN ROPER said that in the first place it would be necessary for the Commission to examine these plans and that pending the ratification of the Treaty the material in question should be stopped [*stocked*].

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Supreme Council had decided on August 6th that the price of all material sold from the supplies which, according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace, were to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers, should be refunded to the Allied and Associated Powers. He thought that it was time to apply this resolution.

CAPT. ROPER explained that in a telegram of Aug. 23rd sent to the German Authorities by Marshal Foch * through the medium of General Nudant there was no mention of refunding this sum because the telegram contained a special authorization for the delivery of certain material to General Yudenitch and to the Czecho-Slovak Government. Marshal Foch had been desirous of assuring the delivery of this material in view of the fact that he had no other means at the moment and it seemed at the time advisable to make no mention of the amount of the sum collected. He thought that the moment had now arrived and that Germany should be required to refund the money.

It was decided :

(1) that all air material now in Germany should be considered as war material and as such could neither be exported, sold, loaned, utilized or destroyed, but should be stocked until such time as the Inter-Allied Air Commission of Control should have taken a decision to determine its nature;

(2) that the German Government should pay to the Allied and Associated Governments the amount of the sales already made.

It was also decided :

that Marshal Foch should be charged with communicating this decision to the German Government.

3. The Council had before it a report from the Supreme War Council of September 5th (see appendix "B") regarding the principles which should govern the distribution of the aeronautical material to be given up by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey in accordance with the terms of the clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

Report From
the Military
Representatives at
Versailles on the
Distribution of
Air Material

M. PICHON asked whether the Council were unanimous.

GENERAL BELIN said that the American Military Representative had objected to the exclusion, with the exception of Belgium, of the smaller Powers. He said that in a report of May 22nd [*21st?*] to the

* Appendix C to HD-37, vol. VII, p. 823.

Supreme Council the Military Representatives had given a list of the articles of war material which each of the Allied Powers should be entitled to possess. In this list there was no mention of air material. In view of the fact that air material had not been included, the Military Representatives did not consider that a distribution should be made among the smaller states.

M. PICHON asked Mr. Polk whether he insisted upon this reservation.

MR. POLK replied that he did not.

M. MATSUI said that it was stated in the report that dirigibles which were in a fit state to fly were to be allotted as far as possible to those Allied countries which on account of their situation were in a position to remove them without dismantling them. In order to avoid any misunderstanding which might arise, he desired that the Conference take note that in accordance with the view of the Japanese Delegation, this statement should not modify the principle of distribution which had been announced elsewhere. The exchange of dirigibles, mentioned in the statement above, should only be made in cases where it was impossible to transport the dirigibles without dismantling them and where the dirigibles could be exchanged against other dirigibles, which if they were not in a fit state to fly, nevertheless, possessed the mechanism which would render them equal in value. The Japanese representative on the Commission had informed the President of the Commission of the desire he had just expressed.

M. PICHON asked whether there were any other objections.

MR. POLK called attention to the fact that the American Military Representative had stated that he was not prepared to recommend that the United States be included as a recipient of any air material which was the property of a country with which she had not been at war.

GENERAL BELIN said that there would be, of course, no objection to accepting this reservation.

It was decided:

to accept the report of the Supreme War Council of the 5th of September regarding the principles which should govern the distribution of the aeronautical material given up or to be given up by Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

4. GENERAL BELIN read and commented upon a report from the American, British and French Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles of the 12th September regarding the eventual restitution to the Allies of the rolling stock removed beyond the armistice frontier in violation of the Treaty of Villa Giusti. (See Appendix "C".)

Removal of
Rolling Stock
Beyond the
Armistice Frontier
in Violation of
the Armistice of
Villa Giusti

(He then proceeded to read a note by the Italian military representative setting forth the Italian view.)

He wished to reply briefly to the point which the Italian Military Representative had raised.

With reference to the first point, he wished to remark that the observations of the Italian Representative had been made after the signature of the Treaty had taken place. The Armistice was binding, but the signature of the Treaty of peace would bring about a new set of conditions. It appeared advisable to leave to a commission the right of deciding as to the distribution to be made of the rolling stock in question. It was necessary that measures taken for carrying out the terms of the Armistice should not conflict with the carrying out of the terms of the Treaty of Peace. In the Treaty of Peace, there were clauses which called for the cession of railway lines with a fixed amount of railway material. It would be regrettable to remove the material by virtue of the terms of the Armistice, when it would be necessary to return it a short time later in view of the Treaty of Peace.

With reference to the second point, he thought that it was chiefly a question of form.

With regard to the third point, the Italian Delegate had said that the term "Allies" applied to those who were entitled to be so described at the date of the signature of the Armistice. He replied that he had followed the terms of the resolution of the Supreme Council.⁵ It was the prerogative of the Commission to make the distribution among the Allies. There was no doubt that Jugo-Slavia would not be entitled to a share, but Serbia was an Ally at the time of the Armistice and would be entitled to participate in the distribution in question. It was not for the Council at Versailles to give more details as to the distribution.

With regard to the fourth point, he said that there was no inconvenience in principle, but he desired to maintain the reserve without prejudice to the clauses of the Treaty of Peace. He questioned whether it was advisable to hand over material to Italy which would later be attributed to another Power.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that he could not agree with the view of his American, British and French colleagues. He thought that the question was a purely military one. The questions in regard to the Armistice were quite separate from questions in regard to the Treaty of Peace. He did not think that the repatriation of rolling stock had anything to do with the Treaty of Peace. It was still an Armistice question. It was the duty of the military representatives to study the question as an Armistice question, and it was for the Supreme Council to take into consideration the political aspect. With regard to the first two points in his note he had nothing to add.

⁵ HD-25, minute 11, vol. VII, p. 562; see also appendix C, *post*, pp. 446-447.

With reference to the third point, as he considered that the question was of a purely military nature and as that the Armistice concerned only the Powers who were allied at the moment, he thought that it was necessary to apply the Armistice clauses in regard to rolling stock in the manner in which they had originally been conceived.

With reference to the fourth point, he wished to say that as the terms of the Armistice had given Italy the right to receive, in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers, all the material belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, he could see no reason why an exception should be made in the case of rolling stock.

GENERAL CAVALLERO replied that the Italian army had been designated to receive all the Austro-Hungarian war material in the name of the Allied Powers and the United States of America.

M. PICHON said that the position of General Diaz⁶ in this matter was exactly the same as that of Marshal Foch. General Diaz acted in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if there had not been a further Armistice with Hungary.

GENERAL BELIN said that there had been an armistice concluded by General Franchet d'Esperey,⁷ but that it had not been recognized by Italy.

M. SCIALOJA said that there were two questions to be considered. One was a question of form and the other of substance. He did not see how, particularly as the Treaty had not been ratified, it was possible to leave the firm ground of the Armistice for the Treaty; for the Treaty had not entered into force. The position of General Diaz, with reference to the Armistice of Villa Giusti, was the same as that of Marshal Foch, with reference to the Armistice with Germany. He thought that it might be possible, instead of constituting a Commission in the place of General Diaz, to establish certain rules of execution. He agreed that there was rolling stock now in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and that it would be complicated and unnecessary to return it to Italy to be again returned to Serbia, but this should not disturb the juridical basis. It would be possible to give the railway material to General Diaz, who could charge someone on the spot to receive it in his name.

GENERAL BELIN said that it had not been the purpose of the Military Representatives to propose that someone be substituted to act for in the place of General Diaz. What they had desired was that the question, which was very complicated, should be studied by a Commission. Mr. Hoover had suggested that the Inter-Allied experts, who were on the spot, could examine the question and communicate in due course the result of their study to the Supreme Council. It would then be the duty

⁶ Gen. Armando Diaz, Chief of the General Staff of the Italian Army.

⁷ Military convention between the Allies and Hungary, signed at Belgrade November 13, 1918; signed for the Allies by delegates of the general commander in chief, Franchet d'Esperey; for text, see vol. II, p. 183.

of the Supreme Council to express their opinion, but it was necessary first for the question to be thoroughly studied. He considered that the Commission should be given authority to examine the question and to propose to the Supreme Council a new partition. All that he asked was a study of the question. In his opinion there were no persons better qualified to do this than the Inter-Allied Technical Commission. He thought that if this plan were adopted at the present time, it would avoid trouble in the future.

M. SCIALOJA proposed that the Commission communicate its findings to General Diaz. He thought that General Diaz would probably agree. He did not think that it was possible for the Supreme Council to apply the terms of a Treaty which was not yet in existence; for, at the moment, only the armistice was in existence. If the proposals were acceptable to General Diaz, he would find the means of carrying them out.

M. PICHON proposed that the Italian Delegation be requested to take up the matter with General Diaz. He added that he considered it important that if General Diaz accepted, the Powers act in conformity.

MR. POLK asked whether the question was not also raised by the terms of the Armistice with Hungary.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that in the present case, it was only a question of rolling stock within the lines of the Armistice of Villa Giusti.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that General Cavallero who was the direct representative of General Diaz, had said that General Diaz would be unwilling to accept.

M. SCIALOJA said that General Diaz would not be willing to accept the substitution of a Commission in place of himself, for it was he who was responsible for the application of the Armistice.

MR. POLK said there was no question of substituting any authority for that of General Diaz. So far as he understood it, it was purely a question of investigation and report. At the time that the report was received the Council could take a decision as to what States were entitled to receive the railway material in question. He did not see how that question could be left to General Diaz alone, or in fact to any military representative alone.

M. SCIALOJA said that in this case General Diaz was not acting as an Italian General, but as the representative of the Allied and Associated Powers. His position was similar to that of Marshal Foch.

MR. POLK said that he had no doubt that cases must have arisen where Marshal Foch was not in a position to take action until information which the Supreme Council desired had been obtained and a decision taken by the Council.

M. SCIALOJA said that if the Commission were brought into communication with General Diaz he would have no objection.

MR. POLK said that the information was for the Supreme Council. If the report showed that the Armistice had been violated it would be the duty of the Supreme Council to take a decision and for General Diaz to see that it was carried out. The Powers could not authorize any military representative to act until the necessary information had been obtained by the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it was necessary to decide whether the Inter-Allied Commission of experts should be taken from the Transportation Section of the Supreme Economic Council or the Reparations Commission.

GENERAL BELIN said that he agreed that it would be necessary to make such a choice. Mr. Hoover had written to M. Clemenceau on September 3d⁸ and had proposed that the subject be entrusted to the Transportation Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. POLK pointed out that Mr. Hoover had left Paris, and that there was no longer an American Representative on the Supreme Economic Council. He suggested, therefore, that the matter should be left to the Reparations Commission.

It was decided:

(1) that the rolling stock, which had in violation of the Armistice been removed beyond the Armistice line of the 3rd November, 1918, should be delivered to the Allies and the United States of America;

(2) that the Reparations Commission should investigate on the spot all matters relating to the breaches of the Armistice above referred to and propose as quickly as possible to the Supreme Council such measures as might be necessary to insure in this respect the execution of the clauses of the Armistice on the understanding that these measures should [not?] in any way produce [*prevent?*] an execution at a later date of the clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

5. The Council had before it a report from the Inter-Allied Naval Advisers of the 13th September in regard to submarine engines and motors surrendered by Germany in place of certain submarines which were broken up in German yards or sunk on passage to England, (see Appendix "D").

M. PICHON asked whether the Naval Representatives were unanimous in their opinion.

MR. POLK said that they were unanimous, but that the United States Representative wished to add a clause worded as follows: "An appraisal and inventory of this material shall be made by a Naval Committee from the five principal Allied and Associated Powers."

Distribution of
German
Submarine
Engines and Parts

⁸ Appendix A to HD-46, p. 85.

It was decided:

to accept the report of the Naval Advisers of the 13th September (see appendix "D") on this subject of submarine engines and motors surrendered by Germany in place of certain submarines which were broken up in German yards or sunk on passage to England, and to add the following clause, "An appraisal and inventory of this material shall be made by a Naval Committee from the five principal Allied and Associated Powers."

6. M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon a memorandum with reference to the draft note previously prepared (see H. D. 60, Appendix G),⁹ in regard to the blockade of Soviet Russia. (See Appendix E.) He proposed to add in the third paragraph the words "in conformity with the measures contemplated by Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations."

MR. POLK said that before the United States Government would be in a position to take action it would be necessary for internal action to be taken in the United States.

M. FROMAGEOT said that Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant was framed to meet a situation like that which existed at present. It provided for the rupture of commercial and economic relations. In cases where the League of Nations did not wish to resort to war the Covenant of the League of Nations foresaw the use of economic pressure when war was not to be employed. He felt that the difficulties in regard to the question of blockade would be removed in this way.

MR. POLK said that M. Fromageot's suggestion raised difficulties in his mind. The League of Nations did not yet exist, and the machinery for which the Covenant of the League provided, could not become effective until the League of Nations was actually in force. He did not see how the United States could adopt the policy proposed at the present time as the United States had never agreed to a pacific blockade. The Council were endeavoring to meet the situation by the establishment of a pacific blockade. In his opinion it was a declaration of war which was really needed.

M. PICHON said that the Council found themselves in the same position as at the time of the last discussion. They would have no commercial relations with Soviet Russia themselves and they did nothing to ask the neutral countries to adopt the same policy.

MR. POLK said that he thought that the best plan would be to wait until after the winter, and see how the situation was by that time.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it was necessary to give some instructions to the Allied Naval Officers in the Baltic Sea. He asked what action these officers could take with ships which they were stopping.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 365.

The report of the Drafting Committee did not cover the question of instructions. The Naval Officers were acting upon their own authority. He recalled that it had been previously proposed to make a collective request to the neutral Governments. He wished to ask his United States Colleague whether he would have any objection to such a note being sent. He thought that a step would be taken if a collective representation were made to the Swedish Government. He had a suggestion to make, but at the moment he had no authority for committing his Government. He wished to ask whether the British and French Governments were willing to authorize their Naval Commanders to turn ships back. If, for example, a Swedish ship were stopped, the Naval Commander would be in a position to state that the subject had been formally communicated to the Swedish Government by the Allied and Associated Governments, who were awaiting a favorable reply.

MR. POLK said that he was willing to accept the draft if the last paragraph were omitted. He had suggested a substitute for the paragraph.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he could not answer for the decision of the British Admiralty, but he would refer the subject to them.

M. PICHON suggested that the Drafting Committee be directed to prepare a note to the Neutral Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Council were already in possession of a draft of such a note.

M. PICHON said that the note could be transmitted with the omission of the proposed paragraph respecting the League of Nations, and the last paragraph.

M. SEYDOUX read to the Council two communications received from the French Legation at Stockholm. (See Appendix "F".) After reading these communications, M. Seydoux said that he thought that they contained matters of great interest. It was evident that the Swedish Government not only considered that a blockade existed, but that they had notified their own nationals that navigation was prohibited in the Gulf of Finland.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that these communications tended all the more to show that the reply of the Swedish Government to the note of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be favorable.

M. PICHON said that, pending a decision, the British and French warships in the Baltic should turn back ships bound for Soviet Russia.

M. SEYDOUX said that it would be possible, either by adding a paragraph to the note or by making a verbal communication to the neutral Governments, to say that British and French war vessels would continue to act in respect to ships entering the Gulf of Finland as they had been acting up to the present.

(It was decided :

(1) that the attached note (See Appendix "G") should be transmitted to the neutral Governments in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers;

(2) that the neutral Governments should, at the same time, be notified verbally that the British and French warships in the Gulf of Finland would continue to turn back ships bound for seaports in Soviet Russia.)

7. M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon a memorandum of the 29th of September prepared by the Drafting Committee (See Appendix "H"). He added that the formation of a Commission to delimit the frontiers between Austria and Hungary was all the more necessary because Article 27 specified that the new frontier between Austria and Hungary should be fixed upon the spot. It was also necessary to arrange for changes of nationality of persons residing in territory transferred from Hungary to Austria.

Insertion in the Treaty of Peace With Hungary of an Article Providing for the Constitution of a Commission To Delimit the Frontier Between Austria and Hungary

M. SCIALOJA said that he agreed with what M. Fromageot had said. He wished to point out, however, that there still remains a large number of articles in the Treaty of Peace with Austria which had not as yet founded [*found?*] counterparts in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He reserved the right to present drafts of the articles in question.

(It was decided :

(1) to request the Drafting Committee, in view of the delimitation of the frontier between Austria and Hungary, to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, clauses providing for the constitution of a Commission to delimit the frontier between Austria and Hungary;

(2) to request the Drafting Committee to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary articles relative to the nationality of the inhabitants of Hungarian territory ceded to Austria.)

8. MR. POLK read a telegram dated September 24th from General Bandholtz, American Representative on the Inter-Allied Military Commission at Budapest, in regard to Roumanian seizures (See Appendix "I"). He said that the information contained in this telegram showed only too clearly that the Roumanians were not willing to obey the wishes of the Allied Powers. The Roumanian Representative told one thing to one Allied Representative and another thing to another. They were apparently entirely unwilling to obey the orders of the Allied Generals who represented the Council.

M. PICHON said that it was most important to await Sir George Clerk's arrival before taking any action in regard to Roumania.

Telegram From General Bandholtz at Budapest

MR. POLK said that, while waiting, statements made by the Roumanians themselves should not be entitled to much consideration.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Roumanian Government was trying to stir up trouble between the Allies. There was a serious situation between Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

M. PICHON said that according to information which he had recently received from Belgrade the situation between Roumania and Serbia was better and might improve.

(The meeting then adjourned)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, September 29, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-63

Translation

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
GENERAL STAFF
1st Section

No. 4665

G. H. Q., September 27, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

To: The President of the Council.

Pursuant to your letter of September 26, 1919, transmitting to me copy of the letter of the Chargé d'Affaires of France, to the Netherlands, relative to suspicious importations of German planes in Holland, I have the honor of asking you, with a view to putting an end to the illicit traffic in aeronautic material, which Germany continues to practice, in spite of the notification which was given her of the resolution of August 22,¹⁰ to be kind enough to submit to the approval of the Supreme Council of the Allies the following resolution:

"All aeronautic material existing in Germany should be considered as war material and as such cannot be exported, alienated, lent, utilized, destroyed, but must be stocked up till the moment when the Interallied Commission on aerial control will have pronounced itself on its nature."

I have already addressed a request of this kind to the President of the Council, the Minister of War (Army Staff, G-3, September 25, number 2644 [4644], (copy of which is enclosed).

Major General
WEYGAND

¹⁰ HD-36, minute 4, vol. VII, p. 789.

[Enclosure]

Translation

STAFF OF THE MARSHAL
 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
 First Section

No. 4644

SEPTEMBER 25, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: The President of the Council.

Ministry of War, (Army Staff G-3-A.)

Enclosed herewith I am returning the report of September 20 of the General Director of Aeronautics,¹¹ relative to the opening of an aerial postal service in Germany, which you transmitted to me September 23, 1919, under number 8712. 13.S/3.

I am of the opinion that it is not possible to inform the German Armistice Commission of this question, such as it is set forth.

The decision taken by the Supreme Council of the Allies to forbid the sale, cession or exportation of all German aeronautic material has already been notified twice to the German Government (enclosed herewith copy of notes number 3765, of April [August] 7, and 4111 of August 26.).¹²

To these two notifications the German Government replied by the note Wako No. 641,¹³ copy of which is enclosed, in which it makes all its reserves on our way of interpreting the aerial clauses of the Peace Treaty, and proposes to leave this question in suspense until the moment when it can be solved by the Commission of Control.

To address a protest relative to the establishing of an aerial postal service in Germany, would be to again desire to open a discussion on this question with the German Government. This discussion would be fruitless. To be brief, I have the honor of asking you to be kind enough to submit to the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Allies the following resolution which I shall then communicate to the German Government.

“All aeronautic material existing in Germany should be considered as war material and as such cannot be exported, alienated, lent, utilized, destroyed, but must be stocked up till the moment when the Interallied Commission on Aerial Control will have pronounced itself on its nature.”

Major General
 WEYGAND

¹¹ Not enclosed with file copy of this note.

¹² See footnote 1, p. 430.

¹³ See appendix A to HD-78, pp. 811, 815.

Appendix B to HD-63

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

S. W. C. 467

VERSAILLES, 5 September, 1919.

Report Regarding the Principles, Which Should Govern the Distribution of the Aeronautical Material, Given Up or To Be Given Up by the Central Powers (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey), in Accordance With the Terms of the Clauses of the Peace Treaty

At a Meeting held on 1st August, 1919,¹⁴ the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers decided:—

“To ask the Military Representatives at Versailles, with whom would be associated a Japanese Representative, to submit a proposal concerning the principles to govern the distribution of all aeronautical war material to be given up by the Central Powers in conformity with the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.”

The Military Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION

(1) That Article 202 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany prescribes that:

“all military and naval aeronautical material . . . must be delivered to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”;

(2) That Article 148 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria prescribes that:

“all military and naval aeronautical material must be delivered by Austria and at her own expense to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”;

(3) That similar prescriptions have been adopted in regard to Bulgaria and Hungary;

(4) That the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers has already contemplated the principle of a limitation of armaments for all small States, including Allied and Associated States;

(5) That the recommendations made on the subject of this limitation by the Military Representatives, especially in their Report of the 21st May, 1919, contain no provisions for the maintenance by the said small Powers of any Military aviation as part of their armed forces;

¹⁴ HD-21, minute 12, vol. VII, p. 461.

AND TAKING FURTHER INTO CONSIDERATION

That certain types of aircraft, aeroplanes, hangars, technical machines, instruments, etc., possess or may possess a special interest for the States that are carrying on studies and experiments with a view to the advancement of aeronautics,

HAVE THE HONOR TO SUBMIT TO THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE PRINCIPAL ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS THE FOLLOWING UNANIMOUS CONCLUSIONS:—

(1) All aircraft matériel given up by the enemy States shall be entered on a single list which shall be divided into various headings, e. g.:

- (a) Complete aircraft.
- (b) Aircraft engines of all types.
- (c) Aircraft instruments of all kinds.
- (d) Airships.
- (e) Kite balloons.
- (f) Hangars.
- (g) All other aircraft parts specified in the Treaty.

The Inter-Allied Commission of Control classify the matériel entered under each heading according to types, and for each type in order of value.

(2) The Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Belgium shall participate in the distribution.*

(3) All captured aircraft fit to fly and aircraft motors shall be returned to the nation from which the same were taken.

(4) The Powers participating in the distribution shall in addition receive samples of:

- (a) Each different type of aeroplane.
- (b) Spare engines.
- (c) Spares.
- (d) Kite balloons with their hangars.

* The American Military Representative invites attention to the following reservation made by Admiral Knapp, American Air Adviser:—

“The Powers with small interests have with the exception of Belgium been completely excluded from participating in the distribution of enemy aircraft. Belgium has been admitted and there would appear to be no reason either on ground of right or justice why one small Power should be included and the remainder excluded. As far as he is aware none of the small Powers except Belgium have been consulted, and he refuses to subscribe to any recommendations which do not contain any reference to the wishes of those small Powers, and which appear almost to treat the Allies as enemies.

“For practical reasons connected with the Budget allotments the possibilities of utilisation, the lack of specially trained personnel, and the relative importance of the parts played by these States during the war, Admiral Knapp has not without hesitation decided to accept the proposal to limit the distribution of the airships to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; but he does not desire to commit himself further.

“This reservation applies also as a natural consequence to the percentages prescribed for the distribution of the aeronautical matériel, which will remain to be distributed after the allocation of the samples and airships.” [Footnote in the original.]

(5) Drawings of each type of aircraft and all other aeronautical matériel shall be supplied on demand to all the Powers participating in the distribution, whether the same have or have not received a sample of the matériel in question.

(6) Airships.

(a) The two best airships of the 70 Class or above shall be allotted the first to France, the second to Great Britain.

(b) The other airships of all types, including those of the 70 class or above, if any exist, shall be entered on a single list by classes, and each class in order of value, and allotted to the Powers participating in the distribution. Each Power shall in turn exercise one choice in the following order until the whole has been distributed:—

- (1) United States of America.
- (2) Italy.
- (3) Great Britain.
- (4) France.
- (5) Japan.
- (6) Belgium.

(NOTE: In view of the fact that the dismantling of an airship for transport by land or sea means practically dismantling the whole structure, it is suggested that, whilst conserving the right of the several governments to claim the receipt of its share of the dirigibles as provided above, those airships which are in a fit state to fly, should be allotted as far as possible to those Allied countries which on account of their situation are in a position to remove them without dismantling them.)

(7) Airship Hangars.

One of the largest hangars shall be allotted to France and a second to Great Britain.

The remainder shall be classified in order of value and allotted as has been above specified for airships.

While safeguarding the principles set forth above, it is suggested that:

For reasons of geographical convenience, France should be allowed to take as far as possible a part of her share from those hangars which are situated in the occupied territories and in Belgium (outside the proportion which should fall to the latter country).

For the same reasons, England should be allowed as far as possible to choose an airship hangar which is believed to be at Jumboli or some other place in Bulgaria as part of her share.

(8) Hydrogen Plant.

One machine of the latest type shall be allotted to France and one to Great Britain.

The remainder shall be distributed as above indicated.

(9) Aircraft and Matériel left over after the above-mentioned Distribution—that is to say, Aeroplanes, Seaplanes, Engines, Spares, Armament, Instruments, etc.

This matériel shall be classified under each heading in order of value. The matériel falling in each class so obtained shall then be grouped in lots of 20.

The Powers participating in the distribution shall receive individually from each of these lots the quantities to be determined on the following percentage basis:—

France	30%	(e. g., 6 out of each lot of 20)
Great Britain	30%	do do
U. S. A.	15%	(e. g., 3 out of each lot of 20)
Italy	15%	do do
Japan	5%	(e. g., 1 out of each lot of 20)
Belgium	5%	do do

GAL. BELIN
Military
Representative,
French Section,
Supreme War
Council

H. W. STUDD
Br-General,
Military
Representative,
British Section,
Supreme War
Council

UGO CAVALLERO
Military
Representative,
Italian Section,
Supreme War
Council

P. D. LOCHRIDGE
Military
Representative,
American Section,
Supreme War
Council

TANAKA
Major-General,
Japanese Military
Representative

NOTE: The American Military Representative is not prepared to recommend that the United States of America be included as a recipient of any air material which was the property of any country with which she has not been at war.

Appendix C to HD-63

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL
S. W. C. 470 (87. MR)

VERSAILLES, 12 September, 1919.

Report Regarding the Eventual Restitution to the Allies of the Rolling Stock Removed Beyond the Armistice Frontier in Violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers at a Meeting held on 6.8.19. passed the following Resolution:—

"It is agreed to submit to the Military Representatives at Versailles, for examination and report, the question of the eventual restitution to the Allies of the Rolling Stock removed beyond the Armistice frontier in violation of the Armistice of Villa Giusti".

The French, British and American Military Representatives* of the Supreme War Council at Versailles

CONSIDERING—

(1) That Paragraph 3 of the Armistice of Villa Giusti contains the following prescription:—"All military and railway equipment of all kinds (including coal) within these territories to be left *in situ* and surrendered to the Allies and America according to special orders given by the Commander-in-Chief of Forces of Associated Powers on different fronts";

(2) That in spite of this prescription it appears that a part of the rolling stock has been removed beyond the Armistice line and that up to the present only a small part of this material has been restored;

(3) That the surrender of no other rolling stock has been imposed on the Austro-Hungarian Empire by the Armistice of Villa Giusti;

(4) That Article 157 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria maintains in force and permanently applies the Armistice clause referred to in (1) above;

(5) That Article 199 of the said Treaty "Confirms the surrender of all material handed over or to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the Armistice of November 3rd, 1918 . . . and recognises the title of the Allied and Associated Powers to such material."

RECOMMEND—

(a) That the rolling stock which has in violation of the Armistice been removed beyond the Armistice line of the 3rd November, 1918, should be delivered to the Allies and the United States of America;

(b) That an Inter-Allied Commission of Experts, such as the Transportation Section of the Supreme Economic Council or the Reparations Commission, should be provided with the necessary powers to investigate on the spot all matters relating to the breaches of the Armistice above referred to, and to propose as quickly as possible to the Supreme Council all such measures as may be necessary to ensure in this respect the execution of the clauses of the Armistice,

*The Italian Military Representative dissents for reasons given in the Note attached. Annexure A. [Footnote in the original.]

on the understanding that these measures shall in no way prejudice the execution of the clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

GAL. BELIN, K. C. B., K. C. M. G. <i>Military</i> <i>Representative,</i> <i>French Section,</i> <i>Supreme War Council</i>	H. W. STUDD <i>Brig-General,</i> <i>Military</i> <i>Representative,</i> <i>British Section,</i> <i>Supreme War Council</i>	P. D. LOCHRIDGE <i>Military</i> <i>Representative,</i> <i>American Section,</i> <i>Supreme War Council</i>
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Annexure A to S. W. C. 470

Note by the Italian Permanent Military Representative

The Italian Permanent Military Representative is unable to accept the Report of the French, British and American Military Representatives for the following main reasons:—

(1) The question referred to the Permanent Military Representatives by the Supreme Council relates to the Armistice and must therefore be dealt with as such, that is to say without reference to the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace, more especially as only the clauses of the Armistice are now in force, whereas the Treaty of Peace will not become valid until after ratification;

(2) The French, British and American Permanent Military Representatives only admit the violation of the Armistice in a dubious manner, whereas not only does the Supreme Council clearly affirm this in its Resolution, but Austria herself has officially recognized the fact, so much so that she has already commenced the restitution of the Rolling Stock wrongfully removed;

(3) The restitution of the Rolling Stock wrongfully removed beyond the line of the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918, must be made to the Allies and to the United States of America strictly in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the said Armistice, by "Allies" being understood those who were entitled to be so described at the date of the signature of the Armistice. The Report of the Permanent Military Representatives is not clear on this point;

(4) It is necessary clearly to lay down that the material wrongfully removed must be handed over to Italy, who will receive the same on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers. No other Power can in fact be charged with the execution of the clauses of the Armistice of the 3rd November, 1918, which was concluded by Italy alone in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers.

UGO. CAVALLERO
Military Representative,
Italian Section,
Supreme War Council.

VERSAILLES, 12 September, 1919.

Appendix D to HD-63

[*Report of the Naval Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers*]

SUBMARINE ENGINES AND MOTORS, SURRENDERED BY GERMANY IN PLACE OF CERTAIN SUBMARINES WHICH WERE BROKEN UP IN GERMAN YARDS OR SUNK ON PASSAGE TO ENGLAND

QUESTION OF DISPOSAL

[1.] The British Admiralty has represented that certain machinery, which is described above, is being held in trust for the Allied Naval Armistice Commission. Owing to lack of space this material cannot all be placed under cover, and in view of the approach of winter weather it is liable to serious deterioration. Its disposal is, therefore, an urgent matter.

2. A detailed list of this material is given in Table I, which is attached.¹⁵ A smaller amount, demanded by the Allied Naval Armistice Commission, but which has not yet arrived from Germany, is shown in Table I, *a*.¹⁵

3. A meeting of the Naval Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, to consider the question, was held at the French Ministry of Marine, Paris, on 11 September, 1919.

4. It was unanimously decided:—

(*a*) That the approval of the Supreme Council should be asked to carry out the division of the material in accordance with the accompanying list shown in Table II.

(*b*) That this division should form no precedent for the division of other naval material surrendered by enemy Powers.

(*c*) That the proposed division should be carried out as soon as possible after its approval by the Supreme Council.

N. A. McCULLY
FULLER
RONARCH
RUSPOLI
IDA

For
United States of America
British Empire
France
Italy
Japan

PARIS, 13 September, 1919.

¹⁵ Not attached to file copy of appendix D.

[Enclosure]

TABLE II

Total H. P. available for distribution---- 72,260 H. P.

Country	Actual H. P. allocated
Great Britain-----	40,140 plus 3,000
France-----	10,360 " 3,000
Italy-----	5,860 " 3,000
U. S. A.-----	900 " 3,000
Japan-----	" 3,000
	57,260 15,000
Total-----	72,260

Engine erected for	Port or stbd	H. P. per engine	Stored at	Motor	Stored at
<i>Great Britain</i>					
U.143-----	S.	3,000	Barrow	1	Barrow. 1 charging engine at Wallsend and 1 charging motor at Cammel Lairds for U.145
Not known-----	S.	3,000	Cammel Laird	2	Barrow
U. 127-----	P.	1,750	Wallsend	2	N. B. D. Co.
U. 165-----	S.	1,750	N. B. D. Co.	2	Barrow
U. 170-----	P. & S.	1,200	Wallsend	2	Barrow
UB. 158-----	P. & S.	530	Cammel Laird	2	Barrow
U. B. 89-----	3 P.	530	Cammel Laird	6	Cammel Laird
136-----	&				
133-----	3 S.				
U. C. 106-----	2 P.	300	Barrow	4	Barrow
108-----	2 S.				
U. C. 107-----	P.	300	Barrow	1	Barrow
U. C. 110-----	P.	300	Barrow	1	Barrow
U. C. 111-----	S.	300	Barrow	1	Wallsend
U. C. 114-----	P.	300	Barrow	1	Barrow (marked for U. C. 112)
U. C. 114-----	S.	300	Barrow	1	Barrow (marked for U. C. 113)
U. 150-----				2	Barrow 2 charging
149-----				2	Barrow motors at Cammel Laird
U. 145-----				2	Barrow
				2	Barrow Not marked—probably for 1200 H. P. eng.
U. 173-----	S.	3,000	Wallsend	1	Barrow
U. C. 113-----	P.	300	Barrow	1	Wallsend
		40,140			
		3,000			
		43,140		34	
<i>France</i>					
U. 142	P.	3,000	Barrow	1	Barrow 1 charging Engine & Motor at Barrow
U. 142-----	S.	3,000	Wallsend	1	Barrow
U. 144-----	P.	3,000	N. B. D. Co.	1	N. B. D. Co.
U. 168-----	P. & S.	1,200	Wallsend	2	Barrow
UB 137-----	P. & S.	530	Barrow	2	Barrow
UC. 107-----	S.	300	Wallsend	1	Barrow
UC. 109-----	P. & S.	300	Barrow	2	Wallsend
		10,360			
		3,000			
		13,360		10	

Engine erected for	Port or stbd	H. P. per engine	Stored at	Motor	Stored at
<i>Italy</i>					
U. 173	P.	3,000	Barrow	1	Barrow 1 Charging Engine & Motor at Barrow
UC. 115	P. & S.	300	Barrow	4	Wallsend
UC. 116	P. & S.	300	Wallsend	1	Barrow
UC. 111	P. & S.	300	Wallsend	1	Wallsend
UC. 112	P. & S.	300	Barrow	2	Wallsend
U. 169	P. & S.	1,200	Wallsend	1	Barrow
UB. 166	P. & S.	530	Wallsend	2	Barrow
		5,860			
		3,000			
		8,860		12	

U.S.A.

U. 143	P	3,000	Barrow	1	Barrow 1 Charging Engine & Motor at Barrow
UC. 113	S	300	Barrow	1	Wallsend
UC. 117	P & S	600	Cammell Laird	2	Cammell Laird
		900			
		3,000			
		3,900		4	

Japan

U. 144	S	3,000	N. B. D. Co.	1	N. B. D. Co. 1 Charging Engine & Motor at N. B. D. Co.
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LIST OF ENGINES IN SUBMARINES WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO JAPAN AND U. S. A. FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES

Country	If used during War	Date of Commission	Surface	Submerged
<i>Japan:</i>				
U. 46	Yes	1916	2 M. A. N. 6 cyl. 4 cycle Diesel 2000 H. P.	A. E. G. Motors 1600 H. P.
U. 55			ditto 2400 H. P.	ditto 1600 H. P.
U. 125	No	1918	No particulars	
U. C. 90	No	1918	"	
U. C. 99	No	1918	"	
U. B. 125	Yes	1918	2 6 cyl 4 cycle Diesel. 1060 H. P.	? Motors 1000 H. P.
U. B. 143	No	1918	No particulars	
<i>U. S. A.</i>				
U. 140	Yes	1918	2 6 cyl 4 cycle M. A. N. Diesel 4250 H. P.	? Motors 3000 H. P.
U. 117	Yes	1918	No particulars	
U. 111	Yes	1918	2 Augsburg 6 cyl 4 cycle Diesel. 2400 H. P.	? Motors 2000 H. P.
U. B. 88	Yes	1918	2 6 cyl 4 cycle Diesel. 1060 H. P.	? Motors 1000 H. P.
U. B. 148	No	1918	No particulars	
U. C. 97	No	1918	No particulars	

Appendix E to HD-63

[Memorandum From the Drafting Committee]

The Drafting Committee have the following observations to make:

(1) In the actual circumstances it is perhaps difficult to speak of a blockade, it being understood that the Powers have different views of the legality of a blockade without the existence of a state of war.

(2) The measures proposed, involving the prohibition of all commerce, of all financial relations and of all communications, extend beyond the naval measures commonly called blockade.

(3) On the other hand, if the Supreme Council is of opinion that coercive measures, quite outside any war action, are necessary against Soviet Russia, the principle enshrined in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations justifies as a means of coercion, the adoption by the Powers, who do not wish to resort to armed force, of economic pressure which consists in the immediate rupture of all financial or commercial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse, the cessation of all communications, financial, commercial or personal.

The proposed scheme appears to be in conformity with the principle referred to above.

The Drafting Committee add that in its opinion it would be advantageous to refer to this in the third paragraph of the scheme.

 Appendix F to HD-63

[Translation ¹⁶]

BLOCKADE OF SOVIET RUSSIA ¹⁷I.—*An Account in the "Stockholm Dagblog", August 15, 1919*

On August first, the Swedish motorship *Per*, out of Sölderberg, reached Björkö, en route to Petrograd. The captain of said ship, John Fröberg, applied immediately to the military authorities of Björkö to inquire whether they were acquainted with the exact location of mine fields between Björkö and Petrograd.

The ship in question appearing suspicious, they proceeded to inspect its cargo and they discovered that it had on board 111 tons of clay tubes of gas, destined for the Soviet Government. Since Finland is in a state of war with the Bolsheviki, the cargo has been confiscated. Consequently, last Saturday they took the Swedish ship to Viborg, where the cargo has been landed. Because the tubes are sealed together, they are going to open them at the end of the examination.

¹⁶ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹⁷ Communication from the French Legation at Stockholm read to the Council by M. Seydoux, of the French Delegation.

The crew consists of 10 persons, of which two are women (all these persons are of Swedish nationality).

II.—*Communiqué Given to the Press by the Swedish Government (August 14)*

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that it has, after some time, obtained the necessary information to ascertain the views of the British and American authorities with regard to the prohibition against Swedish ships going to Petrograd. The Americans consider that the prohibition of any navigation to the coast of Soviet Russia exists at all times and assert that the rumor which has spread that an American vessel arrived at Petrograd with a cargo of foodstuffs is without any foundation. Such a definitive reply has not yet been given by the British; nevertheless it comes out in references that the Foreign Office concludes that all navigation to Russia is in fact impossible, the submarine mines rendering impracticable the entering of Petrograd.”

III.—*Communiqué Published September 17*

“Continuing the information already given concerning the impossibility for Swedish ships to go to Russia, the Svenska Telegram Bureau, after questioning the Department of Foreign Affairs, has learned that the French authorities have likewise recognized that a blockade of the Gulf of Finland is maintained and that French war vessels were preventing ships destined for Petrograd from continuing their voyage.”

IV

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden has informed the Minister of France at Stockholm that as a fact no Swedish vessel would have made any effort to force the blockade except one boat, the *Eskiltuna III*, which was too small to be subjected to the obligations of an authorization to depart from Swedish waters. Since the time it sailed for its destination of Russia with a cargo of mowing machines, there has been no news of it. The commandant of our naval division, whom I have questioned at the request of the Swedish Government, has replied that as long as nothing has been learned of the fate of the *Eskiltuna* which had not yet been captured, possibly it has been sunk by a mine or been the victim of a storm.

Appendix G to HD-63

Note to the Neutral Governments

[The same, except in French, as the note attached to appendix H to HD-60, printed on page 366.]

Appendix H to HD-63

(Translation)

[*Memorandum From the Drafting Committee*]

SEPTEMBER 29, 1919.

NOTE

The Treaty of Peace with Austria changes the frontier between Austria and Hungary, but does not provide Commissions of Delimitation to fix upon the spot the line of the new frontier.

There should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary an article similar to those which were inserted for all the other new frontiers fixed by the Treaties:

"A Commission of five (or seven) persons, three (or five) of whom will be appointed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, one by Hungary and one by Austria, will be set up fifteen days after the coming into force of the present Treaty, to settle on the spot the new frontier line described in Article . . . , Paragraph"

Appendix I to HD-63

[*Telegram From the American Representative on the Inter-Allied Military Commission at Budapest (Bandholtz) to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace*]

BUDAPEST, September 24, 1919.

Received 7:03 p. m. 26th.

88. Despite promise to deliver rifles and machine guns for distribution by Mission as needed to organize police, Roumanian Commander today sent letter stating there would be additional delay of a week or more, and furthermore attached such conditions to delivery as to nullify its value. The Mission wrote him a letter to effect; that on nineteenth it had been explained to him that immediate organization of the local Police was urgent necessity, that he had promised to deliver ten thousand rifles and forty machine guns by twenty-third for distribution to Hungarian Police by this Mission assisted by Roumanians, he had not kept his promise and that new and unheard of conditions that he had now attached to arms delivery were tantamount to refusal to assist, and that this Mission would hold him responsible for any disorder that might result from lack of suitably armed police and would notify the Supreme Council accordingly. It was proposed to add he could show his good intentions by giving at once three thousands rifles. I refused positively to place myself

or nation in a position to [of] dickering for three thousand rifles which might likewise be refused and was sustained by Colleagues. Roumanians have removed Friederich[']s private telephone and seized auto. General Gorton requests that copy of foregoing as well as copy of my number 87 be furnished British Commission.

BANDHOLTZ

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, September 30, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**
Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary
Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE
M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretary
M. Dutasta.
M. Berthelot.
M. de St. Quentin

ITALY
M. Scialoja

Secretary

JAPAN
M. Matsui.

Secretary
M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Captain Chapin
BRITISH EMPIRE Captain Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE M. Massigli
ITALY M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Rear Admiral McCully
Colonel Logan
Colonel Browning
Major Tyler
Mr. E. L. Dresel

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sackville-West
Lt.-Col. Kisch
Mr. McFadyean
Mr. Ibbetson-James
Mr. Forbes-Adam
Mr. Bourdillon

FRANCE
M. Loucheur
M. Clementel
M. Tardieu
General Weygand
General Belin
M. Laroche
M. Kammerer

ITALY
M. Brambilla.

1. (The Council had before it a report of the Supreme War Council dated April 22nd, 1919, on the subject of cost of maintenance of the troops of occupation in Rhenish territory. (See Appendix "A".))

Cost of Allied
Armies of
Occupation
in Germany

M. LOUCHEUR explained that the question under discussion was the cost of the armies of occupation from the signing of the Armistice until the ratification of the Peace Treaty. He then read and commented upon the report of April 22nd, summarizing the present status of the matter.

An Allied Subcommittee which had met at Spa had undertaken to define the phrase "expenses of maintenance of the troops of occupation" ("dépenses d'entretien des troupes d'occupation"). This body had decided upon the following definition for this phrase:

"During the present Armistice, which includes war occupation, by expenditures for the upkeep of the troops of occupation of the Rhenish territories, are meant all the expenditures imposed upon the Allied Governments for the daily life of the occupying troops as well as all those brought about by the obligation of maintaining constantly the fixed effective of these troops and to keep them in such a state as to allow them at any time to resist an aggression or to resume hostilities immediately."

Upon the basis of this definition, the expenses of maintenance had been determined upon at the following rates per man per day:

For the French Army,	Fcs. 16.60
For the Belgian Army,	Fcs. 16.13
For the British Army,	Fcs. 17.06
For the American Army,	Fcs. 31.14 (The dollar figured at Fcs. 5.70).

During the course of the discussions the Belgian and later, the British delegates had agreed upon the adoption of an average uniform figure for all the occupying armies, and which would be the cost of maintenance of one man per day for the French Army. The American delegate had inclined to adopt this solution, but General Pershing subsequently rigorously opposed the same. The Conferences at Spa, therefore, had resulted in a disagreement.

The question thereafter came before the Reparations Commission, but the same differences of opinion arose in this body. In his capacity as president of the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission, he now wished to bring the matter before the Council for decision.

The opinion of the French delegation was based on the following arguments: In the first place, when the Council created the Commission for the Left Bank of the Rhine, in which the United States was represented by General Bliss and Mr. J. W. Davis, the British Empire by Lord Robert-Cecil and Field-Marshal Wilson, France by Marshal

Foch and M. Loucheur, the question of the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation had arisen. At various times during the discussion the Commission had thought that it would be well to adopt the French price as an average figure. Marshal Foch had even suggested that it would be well to adopt a lower figure for the cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation after the ratification of the Peace Treaty, and only include within the phrase "expenses of maintenance to be borne by Germany", the cost of food and billeting. It had been upon this basis that the calculations had been made to reach the sum of 240,000,000 marks gold yearly, as the maximum cost of maintenance of the armies of occupation after the ratification of the Peace Treaty. This figure had been agreed upon in a proclamation which had been signed on June 16th, 1919 by President Wilson, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd-George (C. F. 73 A. Minute 2 and Appendix).¹ Mr. Lloyd-George had even expressed the opinion that it would be well to reduce the cost of this maintenance to the minimum.

These arguments appeared to him to be sound, and he added that wherever the question of reaching an average figure had arisen in the Peace Treaty, the French figure had been adopted, as, for example, in the matter of pensions and allowances. He therefore strongly urged that the French rate be adopted in this instance, and that it be taken as a basis for calculating the cost of maintaining the armies, not only before the ratification of the Treaty (total maintenance), but also after such ratification (partial maintenance).

MR. POLK asked whether the figures agreed upon by President Wilson applied to the cost of upkeep of the armies after the ratification of the Treaty.

M. LOUCHEUR answered that this was the case, and he added that it applied more especially from the moment at which Germany carried out the military obligations incumbent upon her by the Treaty.

MR. POLK said that he had always believed that the question at issue was the same during the entire period of occupation; namely, that each occupying country should be paid its expenses of occupation by Germany. The cost of maintenance of the American Army during the armistice had amounted to a certain figure, and this Germany was called upon to repay. M. Loucheur's suggestion appeared to him to place a new interpretation upon the matter, as he had always believed up to the present time that the total cost of maintenance was under discussion, and not merely the cost of food and billets.

M. LOUCHEUR said that a slight misunderstanding was apparent. The French proposition had been that it was necessary to make a distinction between the maintenance prior to the ratification of the

¹ Vol. VI, pp. 521 and 522.

Treaty and that subsequent thereto. The difficulty of the situation lay in another direction. The fact existed that the American soldier cost his Government Fcs. 31.14, while the French soldier cost only Fcs. 16.60. What he asked was that, in order to make a calculation as to what Germany should pay each occupying Power, the same figure should be taken as a basis for each of the Allied Armies. He remarked further that when the same question had arisen regarding the pensions called for as part of the reparations, it had been agreed that the calculation should be made on the basis of the French rate.

MR. POLK said that the matter resolved itself into ascertaining how much the American Armies cost the United States. The question was not one between the United States and its Allies, but rather between the United States and Germany. The situation would not be helped by the fact that the French and Belgian Governments were reimbursed in full for their expenses, while the United States was but partially repaid. The result would be that the American Treasury Department would be obliged to pay the difference, with the consequent danger that further burdens might be placed upon the American taxpayer. The moment the latter discovered that they would be obliged to pay a portion of the expenses of maintaining an army of occupation, they would demand the recall of this force.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the matter was one which interested all the Allies in general, for it was Germany who was called upon to pay. The more money which Germany was obliged to use in paying for the armies of occupation, the less she would have for the reparations claims.

MR. POLK answered that he believed the United States would consent to accept reimbursement for the time being upon the basis of the average figure determined upon (French rate). The difference between the sum thus reimbursed and the actual cost of maintenance might be included in the sums due the United States by way of reparations.

M. LOUCHEUR called attention to the fact that, as the Treaty imposed an absolute priority for the sums representing the costs of maintaining the armies of occupation, the difficulty would not be done away with.

MR. POLK replied that he would be willing to waive the priority for that portion of the expenses of maintenance which would be included in the reparations figure. The all important point was that the American Treasury Department should not have to defray any of the expenses of the armies of occupation.

M. LOUCHEUR said that in view of the propositions which Mr. Polk had put forward, he would like to study the matter somewhat more fully. His only wish in that question had been not to prejudice the reparations account.

M. PICHON drew the attention of the Council to the fact that, at the time the rate of allowance for the officers of the Commission of Control had been determined upon, it had been expressly stated that Germany would be called upon to pay the same, but not the salaries of the officers.²

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British delegate on the subcommission at Spa had stated that he would accept the compromise figure if the same were accepted by all the Governments involved, but that no definite decision had been given in the matter. He thought that in view of the attitude of the United States, the British Government would stand by its first proposal, as it was not favorably disposed to sustaining a burden for the maintenance of its armies of occupation. The question at issue was very complicated and raised many technical points. He wished to know to what competent body the Council thought of referring the matter.

M. LOUCHEUR said that there was a body already in existence; namely, the Subcommission for the Cost of the Armies of Occupation, which was attached to the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission.

(It was decided:

that the question of the cost of the armies of occupation should be referred to the special subcommission of the Committee on the Organization of the Reparations Commission for further examination and report.)

2. GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon a memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated September 24th, (See Appendix "B").

The Lithuanians had asked for permission to receive 50,000 litres of fuel oil which Germany was in a position to turn over to them. From a military point of view, Marshal Foch had raised no objections to this request, but a political question was involved therein; namely, that of trading with the enemy, and this was beyond the Marshal's jurisdiction. Should the delivery be sanctioned, it was necessary that adequate steps should be taken to insure the fact that the Germans themselves should not be benefited by this fuel oil.

MR. POLK asked whether any guarantee actually existed that a military organization under German control would not profit by the delivery.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the matter could await the ratification of the Peace Treaty, at which time the Allies would be in a position to supervise the delivery.

Proposed
Supply of Oil
by Germany to
Lithuania

² HD-32, minute 11, vol. VII, p. 707; HD-58, minute 3, *ante*, p. 305.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Military Authorities agreed with General Weygand, but that there were two difficulties in the situation. In the first place, the Council would be deciding to authorize a delivery of fuel oil at the same moment that it had resolved upon the exercise of economic pressure on Germany; and in the second place, no information was at hand as to whether an actual guarantee could be had that the oil would not benefit Germans in the Baltic Provinces. He proposed that Allied Representatives in these provinces should be asked whether, if the Council were to authorize the delivery, they could guarantee that it would not benefit the Germans.

(It was decided:

to request the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to ascertain from the Allied Military Authorities in the Balkan [*Baltic?*] States whether the latter were able to guarantee that such oil, as the Allied and Associated Governments might authorize to be delivered to the Lithuanians, should not fall into the hands of German organizations.)

3. (The Council had before it a memorandum of the Supreme Economic Council dated September 29th, 1919. (See Appendix "C").)

Proposal of the
Economic Com-
mission Relative
to the Procedure
To Be Followed
for the Supply of
Foodstuffs and
Raw Material
to Germany and
Austria

M. CLEMENTEL said that the Supreme Economic Council had created a Supply Committee whose function was to insure that the Allies should not become competitors in the world markets for the purchase of articles of prime necessity. At the time when the Germans and Austrians are to be allowed to make purchases on their own account the Supreme Economic Council believed that it would be advantageous to prevent the former enemies from competing with the Allies in the markets, and thus contributing to a rise in the prices of indispensable articles. For this reason the Supreme Economic Council believed that the Committee of Supply should be consulted regarding the German requests. The problem had already arisen in matters of finance and shipping, at which time it was decided that the competent Commissions should be responsible to the Supreme Economic Council with regard to the requests of the Allies, and to the Reparations Commission relative to the applications made by the Germans, because it was to the latter Commission that the German requests would be made. The United States of America was not represented at the present time on the Supreme Economic Council, a most regrettable fact, but they were represented on the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission. They might, therefore, be represented on the Supply Committee on behalf of the Reparations Commission. The other Allies might be represented both from the point of view of the Reparations Commission and of the Supreme Economic Council. In this manner

one single Commission, on which all the Allies were represented, would be competent to deal with the situation.

MR. POLK said that he regretted his inability to accept at the present time the proposal put forward by M. Clementel. He had talked with Mr. Hoover prior to the departure of the latter and they had both been of the opinion that the United States should not be represented on the Supreme Economic Council. On the other hand, they should be represented for all questions of reparations. The matters within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Economic Council, such as division of foodstuffs and coal, were questions which were of vital importance to Europe but not of interest to the United States. Consequently, the latter had no need of representation in this body. It was only on the Reparations Commission that the American Representatives could advantageously function. Therefore, in view of Mr. Hoover's opinion, and also that of the American Treasury Department, he was unable to agree with M. Clementel at the present time.

M. CLEMENTEL replied that it was not a question of asking the United States to take part in the work of the Supreme Economic Council, however greatly this might be desired. The matter was simply to know whether the buyers of the Supreme Economic Council were to ignore the German and Austrian purchasers, and whether or not these two groups were to become competitors.

MR. POLK said that he had realized that the question would come up for discussion in the Council and had therefore telegraphed his Government for instructions in advance. These had not yet been received, and until they should be he was unable to take any decision in the matter. He therefore requested that the discussion be adjourned, but said that in the interval Mr. Dresel and Colonel Logan might discuss the matter with M. Clementel.

(The discussion of the proposal of the Supreme Economic Council regarding the procedure to be followed for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Austria was adjourned.)

4. (The Council had before it a note of the Supreme Economic Council dated September 20th, 1919. (See Appendix "D").)

(At the request of Mr. Polk, the detailed examination of this note was adjourned until such time as the proposal of the Supreme Economic Council for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials to Germany and Austria should be considered.)

5. (The Council had before it a note of the Supreme Economic Council requesting the appointment by the United States of America of an arbitrator for the distribution of shipping on the Danube (See Appendix "E").)

Appointment of Arbitrators for the Division of Tonnage on the River Danube

MR. CLEMENTEL said that article 300 of the Peace Treaty with Austria provided for the appointment by

the United States of America of one or several arbitrators, whose duties would be to distribute among the interested parties the tugs and other vessels forming part of the commercial fleet of the Danube River. In a telegram from Budapest, Admiral Troubridge urgently requested that the American Arbitrator provided for in the Treaty should begin his work as quickly as possible. The Supreme Economic Council therefore asked that the United States hasten the appointment of its arbitrators.

MR. POLK said that the Austrian Treaty had not yet been ratified by any Government. He would take the responsibility of naming an arbitrator but he did not believe that such an appointment would result to any good effect in view of the fact that Austria itself had not yet ratified the Treaty. Sir Eyre Crowe had called his attention to the fact that a similar article existed in the German Treaty and that, following the ratification of this document by Germany, a special arrangement had been made and an arbitrator nominated. The same procedure might be followed in this instance with regard to Austria without waiting for the ratification by the American Senate. Colonel Logan could take up the question with Mr. Clementel.

It was decided:

that Colonel Logan should confer with Mr. Clementel with regard to the nomination of the American Arbitrators provided for by article 300 of the Austrian Peace Treaty (Distribution and Control of shipping on the Danube).

6. (The Council had before it two letters from Mr. Venizelos dated August 22nd and September 28th respectively (See Appendices "F" and "G").)

MR. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the letter of September 28th.

MR. POLK remarked that the question had been raised, while Mr. Balfour was sitting in the Council, as to the exact powers of the Greek Officer who had been authorized to follow the labors of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna.

of Inquiry at Smyrna.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that a resolution in this matter had been taken by the Council on August 14th (See H. D. 31, Minute No. 3),³ as follows:

"It was decided:

that the previous decisions of the Council (See H. D. 12, article #5)⁴ should be explained to the High Commissioner at Constantinople in the sense that the Greek Representative should not be present at the meetings of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna. All necessary

³ Vol. VII, p. 687.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

Protest From the
Greek Delegation
Regarding the
Composition and
Functioning of
the Commission
of Inquiry at
Smyrna

data should be communicated to him, however, and similar facilities should be given to a Turkish Representative, if subsequently appointed."

MR. BERTHELOT answered that Mr. Venizelos maintained that the Allied Commissioners had kept Colonel Mazarakis completely in ignorance of their labors and have not even furnished him with the minutes of their meetings.

MR. CLEMENCEAU said that this appeared excessive. A telegram should be sent at once to Constantinople instructing that the minutes should be communicated to the Greek Representative and, should the latter have any complaints to make thereon, he should present the same to the Commission. The attention of the representatives should also again be drawn to the former resolutions of the Council in the matter.

It was decided:

- (1) that the minutes of the meetings of the Commission on Inquiry at Smyrna, including the testimony of witnesses, should be communicated to the Greek Representative attached to this Commission;
- (2) that said Representative should be asked and permitted to notify the Commission of any criticisms which he desired to formulate regarding the matters in question.

7. (The Council had before it a memorandum from the British Delegation dated August 11th, 1918 [1919], (See appendix "H").)

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the events at Smyrna had indisputably called forth a certain number of complaints against the Greek and Turkish Governments. The Commission of Inquiry which had been appointed might form a sub-commission on the ground to deal with these protests. It might be, however, that such a proposal was now too late as a telegram had been received from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated September 8th, stating that the Greeks had already formed such a Commission. In view of this fact he asked that the Council permit him to telegraph Constantinople for further information and to await the receipt of this before formally presenting his proposal.

(The study of the British proposal was adjourned until such time as Sir Eyre Crowe should receive additional information.)

8. MR. POLK said that it would be as well to adjourn this matter pending the receipt of an answer from the Swedish Government on the subject of the Blockade of Soviet Russia.

(The question was adjourned.)

British Proposal
for the Investi-
gation of Com-
plaints Arising
Through the Inci-
dents at Smyrna

Question of the
Aaland Islands

Questions of
Karelia and
Petchenga

9. (The Council had before it a report of the Baltic Commission dated August 25th, 1919, in this matter, (See Appendix "I").)

MR. KAMMERER read from and commented upon the report in question and said that the Commission had not made any proposal to the Council. They asked merely whether, despite the absence of a responsible Russian Government and regardless of the fact that Petchenga was situated in Russian territory, they might be allowed to study the means of giving satisfaction to the desires of Finland.

MR. CLEMENCEAU answered that he was prepared to authorize the Commission to make such a study, but that neither he nor any of his colleagues at the present time recognized their right to dispose of Russian territory.

MR. KAMMERER remarked that in 1862 a discussion had taken place between the Governments of Finland and of Imperial Russia for the cession of the port of Petchenga to Finland. An agreement had been reached but had not been executed and its validity was even open to doubt.

SIR EYEE CROWE said that the Council might later have to discuss the question with the Finns and it would be well to have a solution ready at that time.

(It was decided:

that the Baltic Commission should be authorized to make a study of the ways and means by which the claims of Finland for a modification of its frontiers in Karelia and the district of Petchenga might receive satisfaction.)

(The meeting then adjourned)

HOTEL CRILLON, PARIS, September 30, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-64

Report of Supreme War Council, April 22, 1919, Relative to Cost for Maintenance of Troops of Occupation in Rhenish Territory

Translation

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE

VERSAILLES, April 22, 1919.

REPORT RELATIVE TO THE COST FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE TROOPS OF
OCCUPATION IN RHENISH TERRITORY

According to the terms of Article 9 of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, "the upkeep of the troops of occupation in the

Rhenish territories (not including Alsace-Lorraine) is at the charge of the German Government.”

An Interallied sub-Commission sitting at Spa was asked by the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies to define the exact meaning of the expression “upkeep of the troops” and to determine the scope of the obligation which would thus result for Germany.

DEFINITION OF THE EXPENDITURES OF UPKEEP

The members of the sub-Commission have unanimously decided upon the following terms:

“During the present Armistice, which includes war occupation, by expenditures for the upkeep of the troops of occupation of the Rhenish territories, are meant all the expenditures imposed upon the Allied Governments for the daily life of the occupying troops as well as all those brought about by the obligation of maintaining constantly the fixed effective of these troops and to keep them in such a state as to allow them at any time to resist an aggression or to resume hostilities immediately.”

“It results from this definition that the expenditures of upkeep must include not only those pertaining to the alimentation of the personnel and of the animals, their lodging and their cantonment, but also those caused by their salary and the accessories.—Salaries, quarters, heat, light, clothing, equipment and harnessing,—armament and rolling material—aviation, treatment of the sick and wounded, veterinary service and remount service, service of transport of every kind (railroad, maritime and fluvial transportation, motor trucks, etc.) that of communication across France and, in a general way, all the expenditures for all the administrative or technical services whose functioning is necessary for the instruction of the troops and for the maintenance of their effectives and of their military power.”

This definition gave rise to no observation on the part of Marshal Foch nor on the part of the members of the Peace Conference.

EVALUATION OF COSTS

The sub-Commission of Spa has, according to this definition, determined average daily cost in each army per officer, per man and per animal and by multiplying it by the effectives have determined the cost by day and by month.

The total expenditure per month has thus been evaluated at a little more than 600,000,000 francs.* No difference of opinion came out on the subject of that calculation.

CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE PAYMENT SHALL BE MADE BY GERMANY

Considering the amount of the costs which, at the end of the fourth month of occupation, will have reached about two and a half billion

* See the detail of it on table No. 1 appended. [Footnote in the original. The table appears as “Table A” in the Department’s files.]

francs, and considering that it is materially impossible to ask Germany for the immediate payment of such a sum, the Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies was led to look for the means of establishing a distinction between the various expenditures included in the definition of the upkeep costs.

—a first category of expenditures corresponding to the alimentation of men and animals should alone be immediately paid by Germany.

—a second category including all the other expenditures brought about by the upkeep of the troops of occupation should be paid later by the enemy as war costs.

For the evaluation of the expenses of the first category, the Marshal considered that an average daily evaluation of 6 francs per man and 3 francs per animal could be admitted, the same for all the allied armies.

This solution was studied by the sub-Commission of Spa.

In the first session held at Spa, on February 23rd, the Delegates of the various Allied Armies agreed without any serious objections.

But in the two later sessions of the same said sub-Commission, held in Paris on February 27 and 28th, various Delegates raised objections.

The British Delegates considered that, from the point of view of payment, it was not advisable to make a distinction between the various categories of expenditures included in the definition of upkeep expenditures.

If the Germans cannot pay in its entirety every periodic payment, the sums that they shall be able to pay shall be received as payment on account to be deducted from the total periodic payments, but not as a complete liquidation of certain categories of expenditures.

They accept the adoption of a single daily price for all the armies, and which shall be the French price.

The British Military Representative at Versailles calls attention to the fact that the transaction proposed by the British representative on February 28th is valid only if all the armies of occupation accept the French daily rate. That rate has not been accepted by General Pershing in his letter of March 8th.⁵ As a consequence, the British proposal is not maintained.

The British thesis is the following: the integral bill for upkeep cannot be divided, such as it has been established and distributed for each of the Allied and Associated Armies, no part of that bill of upkeep can be settled by payment on account by Germany. In other words, the upkeep bill as a whole is entitled to the priority of the German payment.

This opinion seems to have been adopted by the Supreme Council since: article V of the clauses relative to the reparations, accepted by the Supreme Council, stipulates the payment of a certain sum

⁵ *Post*, p. 468.

in gold in 1919 and in 1920 "out of this sum the expenditures of the army of occupation since the Armistice shall first be paid, provided that the supply in food and raw materials which the Allied and Associated Governments shall deem essential to allow Germany to meet their obligations of reparation, can be paid out of the said sum, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments."

The American Delegate is of the opinion that the expenditures of the troops of occupation should be established *en bloc* according to the definition admitted and the immediate payment of the greatest possible part of the sum to be paid on that account by Germany should be insisted upon immediately and divided among the Allies proportionally to the total claim for each army.

On March 6th [8th], in a letter to Marshal Foch, General Pershing writes what follows:

"March 8, 1919.

My dear Marshal: Since the question of the upkeep of the troops of occupation has been submitted to me, I have the honor of informing you that my ideas on that subject are the following:—

1) The upkeep expenditures such as they are defined in the minutes of the session of the Armistice sub-Commission of January 9, 1919, representing [*represent?*] the obligations assumed by Germany toward the United States.

2. Considering that the average daily up-keep of the American Army is higher than that of the other armies, the United States cannot accept that the French average daily up-keep expenses be taken as a base in estimating the German obligations towards the United States.

3. Considering that Germany is not in a position at the present time to assume the total of her obligations towards the United States, the United States accepts for the time being, to receive payments from Germany on account, in the same proportion as those that Germany is to pay per man and per horse to the Allied Governments.

4. The sums received from Germany in execution of the provisions specified in paragraph 3, shall be credited by the total of the sums due, but shall not be imputed as complete or partial liquidation of certain accounts or of special expenses.

5. The United States reserves, and shall reserve the right to collect from Germany all balances due at the present time or in the future on German obligations which shall not have been already liquidated; this collection may be made from any source; either from the funds or properties in possession of the United States, or any others which might in the opinion of the United States be or become available.

The preceding conclusions have the approbation of the Financial Councillor of the United States at Paris.

Pershing

General Bliss, American Military Representative at Versailles, wishes to have the following considerations added:

"The solution of the question as to how much each Allied or Associated Power should receive according to the Armistice terms with Germany, for the upkeep of their armies in occupied German territory, seems to me to have been the object of a confusion resulting from the introduction of an outside question. I understand that an objection might be raised by the Germans against this or that interpretation of the French work upkeep (*entretien*), but I cannot understand why there should be any difference of opinion among the Allied or Associated Governments.

This difficulty seems to have arisen from the fact that our efforts have been directed to arriving at a definition of the Interallied word '*entretien*' while in reality, for each Government this word means: the cost of 'the upkeep' of its own army. All that this Government has the right to exact under the heading 'upkeep' should be collectable by this Government, notwithstanding the fact that the sum collected might vary according to the army.

Another difficulty seems to arise from the belief on the part of some that whatever amounts may be recovered by the respective Governments constitute a credit for these Governments, when they are simply reimbursements of justified expenses which they have incurred. Therefore, I observe in one of these documents that it is stated if we exact under the heading 'Maintenance' anything else but subsistence and lodging, the British and notably the American Government will receive more considerable sums than the French Government. This fact deserves consideration if the sums thus levied by the respective Governments are to go to their treasuries as profit, thus increasing the total sum, which was already on hand. Truly, the payments effected by each Government under the heading 'Maintenance' of its army of occupation, produce a void in the coffers, more considerable in one coffer than in the other. But in any case the sums collected simply fill the gaps, whatever they are, leaving each treasury in the state where it was before. For the needs of the special question interesting us, it is of little importance that the pay of an army be more or less higher than that of another army; it is of no more importance that an army of occupation be more important than another. The fact pure and simple is that the occupation ended, unless all the expenses be reimbursed by Germany, the deficit created in the coffers of a Government could virtually be filled by means of a reimbursement effected by Germany, when the deficit of the treasury of another Government would continue to exist.

The acceptance of the proposed French definition on the meaning of the word 'Maintenance' really means that the United States are requested to contribute to [*sic*] a certain considerable sum taken from its treasury. To whom shall this sum be paid? Certainly not to the Germans, for it is known that we have the intention of exacting from the Germans the very last cent that we can get from them. To whom then shall be destined this contributed sum? Evidently to those Allies who are expecting according to the conditions of the Peace Treaty to obtain a contribution on the part of Germany.

The question therefore becomes not a question of definition of 'Maintenance', but of policy. As American, and in order to reach

a decision on the line of conduct to follow, I should like to know what proportion of the contribution that I must impose upon myself will go to Great Britain, what proportion will go respectively to Belgium, France, Italy, and to Japan. I should like to know if I must impose upon myself a contribution to the profit of these Powers with the exception of Belgium and France and for these two latter countries, for what sum I should tax myself to the profit of one and how much to the profit of the other.

My opinion is the following: the United States participate[d] to [*in.*?] the common cause under the form of the totality of their expenses in the maintenance of their armies during the war. I do not see why the United States should pay the maintenance expenses of their army of occupation during the armistice and after the signing of the Peace Treaty, when these expenses should be paid by Germany. I am of the opinion that like the other Governments, the United States had the right to exact the payment of all their expenses for their army of occupation and to recover as much of the amount of these expenses that we can make Germany pay. I beg you to recall that there is another considerable expense that the United States would have the right to exact payment from Germany. The United States are beginning to replace gradually their considerable army raised by conscription, at present in German territories, by volunteer troops taken from the regular army. These troops must be transported at great expense from the United States to Germany. When their presence in Germany will no longer be needed, they must be transported back to the United States. These operations are in a large measure effected to the profit of the Allied and Associated Powers and not to that of the United States. Nevertheless, the United States have not the intention of presenting the bill for this transportation to Germany. If after the settlement effected by Germany, the United States desired to attribute this sum to one or the other of their Allies, they will have the option of doing so; but they will have the privilege of choosing which one of the Allies shall bear this contribution. To insist that these just expenses remain unpaid by Germany, simply to allow our Allies to take possession of them and to share them amongst themselves, does not seem reasonable to me, nor to any other American. The American Military Representative adheres therefore to the meaning of the phrase 'maintenance costs' such as has been defined in the minutes of the Session of the sub-committee on the Armistice of January 9, 1919, and accepted by the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Corps in his letter addressed to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, under date of March 8, 1919.[?]

Belgian opinion—The Belgian Delegate while accepting the definition on January 9, and preferring the immediate payment of all expenses if possible, is disposed to accept the immediate payment of the expenses of the first category, such as defined by Marshal Foch and to postpone to a later date the payment of the other expenses which would be inscribed under the chapter "War Expenses". If the solution to divide the expenses into two categories were accepted, the Belgian Delegate is disposed to accept a general and average rate based upon the average rate of the French army.

French opinion—The French Delegate shares the viewpoint of the Belgian Delegate.

Italian opinion—The Italian Military Representative set forth today that the Italian contingent having been sent in the occupied territory since March 12, 1919, there is reason to comprise the maintenance costs of these troops in the total of the expenses which Germany shall reimburse as costs for the maintenance of the armies of occupation in Germany.

On this subject, the Italian Military Representative states that he is of the same opinion as the French Delegate, that is to say that the expenses should be divided into two categories:

A—one of which is payable immediately (food and cantonments).

B—the second shall be paid later as "War Expenses". The average daily cost of each category can be figured for the Italian troops in the same measure as for the French troops.

The French Military Representative to the S. W. C.

BELIN

The British Military Representative to the S. W. C.

SACKVILLE-WEST

The Italian Military Representative to the S. W. C.

RENZO TONI

The American Military Representative to the S. W. C.

BLISS

[Enclosure]

Table A

EXPENSES

Armies	Average Daily Cost				
	Per Officer	Per Man	Per Horse	Per Officer	Per Man
				Not including expenses of animals	Including expenses of animals
French Army.....	33. 60	13. 92	6. 56	14. 54	16. 61
Belgian Army.....	26. 22	13. 81	6. 15	14. 319	16. 127
British Army.....	38. 96	14. 34	6. 19	15. 52	17. 06
American Army.....	52. 48	28. 34	8. 63	29. 38	31. 14

(1) The expenses included in the above table are as follows:

Subsistence of personnel and of animals—lodging and cantonments—

(a) pay and accessories—quarters, heat and light—clothes—equipment and harness—armament and rolling stock—(Maintenance and normal wear)—aeronautics (Maintenance and normal usage)—care of sick and wounded—veterinary and remount services—transport services of all kinds—lines of communication.

(a) [(b)] Are not included in the valuation of the expenses only the accessories and small objects that the Allies are called upon to furnish, it being understood that lodging and cantonment in the full sense of the word are furnished in kind by the German Government and according to proceeding in force in the German army.

NOTE. These figures are subject to modification following increases in pay and the cost of living.

Appendix B to HD-64

Note From Marshal Foch Relative to the Delivery of Petroleum by Germany to Lithuania

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE
ALLIED ARMIES
GENERAL STAFF

General Direction of Army
Supplies and Communications
No. 153, C.R.F.

G. H. Q. September 24, 1919.

NOTE FOR THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, has been informed by the Military Section of the British Delegation in Paris of a request made by the Lithuanians asking authorization to receive 50,000 litres of petroleum which the German Commissariat in Berlin is willing to cede to them.

This cession is requested by the Lithuanians for their army.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies has the honor to submit this question for the decision of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, with the advice that, if the cession is authorized, it is indispensable that measures be taken which will guarantee that the petroleum will be received by the Lithuanian authorities and not by an organization under German control.

Major-General
WEYGAND

 Appendix C to HD-64

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

PARIS, September 29, 1919.

Note for the Supreme Council

The Supreme Council has forwarded to the Supreme Economic Council, with a request for their views, a note, copy of which is hereto annexed,⁶ and which was addressed to the Council by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, on the procedure to be followed for the examination of the German demands for supplies in alimentary stuffs and raw materials.

The Supreme Economic Council examined, at the same time, a report which was made to them by the Interallied Consultative Committee on provisioning regarding the same request which had been entrusted to it by the French and British Governments. The Council also

⁶ Does not accompany the minutes.

examined a letter from the Austrian Delegation relative to the needs of that Country, in which a report had been established by the Consultative Committee on Provisioning.

These different documents are annexed hereto.⁷

In the course of the discussion which is exposed in the minutes hereto annexed, it was recognized that a close coordination was necessary between the labors of the Reparations Commission and the different Committees attached to the Supreme Economic Council which the Allied Governments had appointed to examine the questions relative to the food supplies and the provisioning in raw materials.

The Supreme Economic Council believes that the requests presented by the Central Empires are susceptible of affecting not only the interests confided to the Reparations Committee provided for by the Peace Treaty, but also, as is evident, the supply interests of all Europe on account of the limited margin available for the provisioning.

Consequently the Supreme Economic Council deems it expedient to present the following demand to the Supreme Council :

“The Supreme Economic Council requests the Supreme Council to give instructions to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission and also to the Reparations Commission itself to proceed in the following manner in all the questions which concern authorization for the purchase of supplies and raw materials in execution of Article 235 of the Peace Treaty with Germany and similar clauses contained in the other Peace Treaties.

The programs drafted, and the purchase orders of material and supplies to be given by virtue of these Articles should be submitted to an examination by the Committee on Raw Materials and by the Consultative Provisioning Committee attached to the Supreme Economic Council.

These Committees shall, at the same time, determine the conditions of purchase which shall seem to them particularly suitable to prevent speculation and unjustified increase in the cost of living throughout the world”.

Appendix D to HD-64

[Note of the Supreme Economic Council on the General Economic Situation of Europe]

GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN EUROPE

(Note by the French Delegation for the Permanent Committee)

I. The labors of the Consultative Food Committee have established the fact that it is not because of any insufficiency in foodstuffs that

⁷ Do not accompany the minutes.

the world is threatened with famine. As regards Raw Materials (the report of the Raw Materials sub-committee was not to hand at the time of drafting this Memorandum) it does not seem as if the deficits, which may cause grave difficulties to certain industries are such as to threaten the general stability of the world.

Neither does it appear that sea-going tonnage, although there are grave obstacles to its utilisation, caused by the bad working of the land transport, is at the moment insufficient to the needs of international relations. Amid the ruins and disorders resulting from five years of war, one general cause can be isolated. If this cause were to disappear many of the difficulties would remain to be overcome. But if [it] persists, all efforts will be in vain.

II. All over the world, the vast operations of credit necessitated by the war, have depreciated currency. But the disproportion between the respective depreciations of each national currency is considerable. Each country has depended to a different degree on the outside world for its war supplies. Some countries have been able to maintain a great part of those of their industries which are productive of exchangeable securities. Others have had to divert the greater part of their industries [to] the production of war material. These latter are dependent on the former for their Raw Materials and for a great part of their manufactured products. This break in the former equilibrium of exchange has caused a break in monetary relations. The disparity in value between the various national monetary tokens is daily increasing in proportion to the unstable equilibrium of exchange. Their mutual relations vary from day to day. It is sufficient to follow the exchange quotations of countries which have the same monetary system (e. g. French francs, Belgian and Swiss francs, pesetas, lire, lei, etc.) to realise that their enormous variations make international exchange impossible.

III. Money having virtually ceased to be exchangeable between them, or rather money having ceased to perform its function as a medium of exchange, each country, which has available products or services possessing an international value, tends to place them under its control in order to use them for the regulation of its own imports. On the other hand, in order to limit at home as much as possible the rise in the cost of life, which is a consequence of the general monetary depreciation, each government is tending to use this control either to limit exports and create an artificial abundance or to fix double prices, the lower price for its nationals, the higher price for foreign

countries, the latter calculated so as to compensate the loss made by the effect of the former.

IV. The solution of European difficulties is, therefore, above all a financial solution. It is necessary that a current of credit should be able to develop in a continuous circuit throughout Europe. No European country can be the source of this current. Each of these countries is itself confronted with great difficulties, almost all are under the necessity of borrowing on their own account. Many of them, whose resources, though unequal, are great, can only utilise those resources for themselves. But if they were themselves propped, some of them would be able to place their experience and their organisation at the disposal of Europe.

To sum up, the supply of the greater part of Europe, above all of the new states of Eastern Europe, of Germany and of Austria, cannot, it seems, depend on the European Powers in their present state for these Powers are all at the moment debtors.

It is the business of the Supreme Economic Council to affirm that the well-being and security of the two hemispheres are closely related and interdependent, and the work of reconstruction is obligatory upon all, each to the measure of his power.

20 SEPTEMBER, 1919.

Appendix E to HD-64

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
PARIS, FRANCE

Telegram

From: Budapest.

To: Communication Section, Supreme Economic Council, Paris.

The opening of Danube has caused great activity in shipping circles. New Danubian states and British shipping companies engaged in negotiations for transfer of shipping from former owners are unable to complete transactions and commerce operations owing to doubtful title of ships in river. It is imperative for welfare of all Danubian countries and river navigation that the American Arbitrator referred to in treaty should commence his arbitration with the least possible delay. No. 44.

ADMIRAL TROUBRIDGE^a

^a Admiral Sir Ernest C. T. Troubridge, British Admiral commanding on the Danube.

Appendix F to HD-64

GREEK DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONGRESS

PARIS, August 22, 1919.

From: E. K. Venizelos.

To: President Clemenceau.

During its session of July 18th⁹ the Supreme Council of the Conference decided to send an Investigation Commission of four members representing the Allied and Associated Powers to Smyrna.

As soon as I learned of that decision, I hastened to expose to Your Excellency, through a letter dated July 19th,¹⁰ the reasons for which it did not appear to me either just or in conformity with the customs that the party investigating the conduct of the Greek Army pursue its investigation without the participation of a Greek representative.

Two days later, July 21st, the Supreme Council informed me that I was at liberty to designate a Greek officer who would be authorized to follow the labors of the investigation commission, who would not, however, have the right to vote or authorization to take part in the drafting of the conclusion of the Commission.

Although this measure gave but very partial satisfaction to the legitimate *amour-propre* of the Greek Army, I accepted it, as I do not have the habit of creating difficulties for the Great Powers. Consequently, I decided to designate Mr. Alexander Mazarakis, Colonel in the General Staff, to follow the labors of the Investigation Commission, and, in a letter dated July 31st, I informed the General Secretariat of the Conference of my decision, and at the same time requested them to notify the other members of the Investigation Commission.

The Commission was established at Constantinople last week and immediately commenced its labors by taking the testimony of certain witnesses. The representative of the Greek Government at once requested that Colonel Mazarakis be invited to proceed to Constantinople in order to follow these investigations. The Investigation Commission, however, deemed it preferable to not have the Greek Delegate present during the interrogations as his presence might intimidate certain witnesses; and considered it sufficient to communicate the depositions to him after the sessions and to keep him informed of the progress of the Commission.

This procedure was giving the most restrictive interpretation to the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council under date of July 31st

⁹ HD-11, minute 4, vol. VII, p. 207.

¹⁰ Appendix E to HD-12, *ibid.*, p. 249.

[21st]¹¹ and further diminished the role assigned to the Greek Delegate who, deprived of the right to vote, found that he was still further deprived of the privilege of being present at least during the labors of the Commission.

Unfortunately, still another humiliation awaited him, the representative of the Greek Government at Constantinople has, in fact, just informed me that the Investigation Commission informed him that on Tuesday last, August 20th, following instructions received from Paris, a Turkish officer is to be admitted on the same footing as the Greek officer and with exactly the same privileges in following the investigations.

I can not, Mr. President, but express the very painful surprise which the announcement of these new measures has caused me, and I appeal to your sentiment of justice with a view to obtaining redress.

To place a Greek officer on an equal footing with a Turk officer in an investigation being conducted in a country occupied by the Greek Army, is not only to inflict an unjust humiliation on that army and to forget that it is there as a representative of the Allied and Associated Powers, but to lose sight of the fact that a state of war is still existing between Greece and Turkey; it is to disregard the services rendered to the common cause by Greece, the serious wrongs committed toward the Entente by Turkey, and her crimes against Christian populations; finally, it is to suppress all distinctions between victors and vanquished and to confound, in an unjust and deceptive equality, enemies and friends.

I must, furthermore, Mr. President, insist upon the necessity of modifying the measure adopted by the Commission to proceed to the interrogation of witnesses in the absence of the Greek officer. The investigation which has already commenced in Constantinople and which will be continued in Smyrna, although solicited long ago by the Greek Government, but in vain, was decided upon by the Supreme Council as the result of a complaint made to the Conference by the Cheik-ul-Islam.¹² It has pleased the Supreme Council, in acceding to this demand, to place the Greek Army of occupation in the position of accused. The Greek officer authorized to follow the labors of the Commission appears, in consequence, as its legitimate defender. It is inconceivable that he not be authorized to be present during the interrogations of witnesses. The Commission appears to fear that his presence might intimidate certain witnesses: I ask what would be thought of a Judge who, for a similar motive, would expel the lawyer for the defense from the court. In civilized countries far from expelling the defense during the examination, the law neces-

¹¹ HD-12, minute 5, *ibid.*, p. 238.

¹² Appendix A to HD-10, *ibid.*, p. 200.

sitates his presence as an essential guarantee for the defendant, because his presence gives him an opportunity to check the statements of the witnesses, to demand that they give complementary explanations, and to procure, if need be, new testimony; in short, to allow him to anticipate the errors into which the examining judge might be led.

I trust, Mr. President, that you will not find my application for this common right in the investigation which has been decided upon in Smyrna to be exaggerated, and I am convinced that the Supreme Council, recognizing the absolute justice of this demand, will hasten to accede to it.

Accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix G to HD-64

GREEK DELEGATION TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, September 28, 1919.

From: M. Venizelos,
To: M. Clemenceau.

On July 21 last, the Supreme Council of the Conference notified me of the resolution, copy of which is appended.¹⁴

In conformity with that resolution, a Greek officer was authorized to follow the work of the Commission of Inquiry in Asia-Minor; he was not to have the right of vote in the Commission and could not take part in the drafting of its conclusions.

I appointed Colonel Alexandre Mazarakis of the General Staff to follow the work in the conditions indicated in the resolution. The Secretariat General of the Conference was asked to notify the members of the Commission of Inquiry of the nomination of that officer.

Contrary to the measures adopted by the Supreme Council and which I believed my duty to accept, although it only gave partial satisfaction to my request, Colonel Mazarakis was not authorized to be present at the hearings before the Commission of Inquiry, under the pretext that his presence might intimidate certain witnesses.

He has not even received communication of the depositions of those witnesses. He was not kept in touch with the progress of the inquiry. The character of that procedure is openly contrary both to the letter and the spirit of the resolution which the Supreme Council communicated to me on July 21.

I feel obliged to protest against that arbitrary procedure and have the honor to ask you, Mr. President, to be so kind as to propose to the Supreme Council to order immediately a new inquiry to be made

¹⁴ Does not accompany this appendix; see HD-12, minute 5, vol. VII, p. 238.

in conformity with the resolution of July 21, with the cooperation of Colonel Mazarakis.

You must agree with me that in such a serious question I cannot give up the right which had been recognized on July 21 to the Hellenic Government by the Supreme Council of the Conference, and that the conclusions of the Commission without any participation of the Greek officer during the hearing of the witnesses cannot be considered as the result of a procedure which would have taken into account the right of defense.

In asking, after my preceding communication, for the resumption of the inquiry, I am making an appeal to the sentiments of justice of the Supreme Council who is not going to repeal a decision to which the Commission of Inquiry did not conform.

Please accept,

E. K. VENIZELOS

Appendix H to HD-64

*[British Proposal for the Investigation of Complaints Arising
Through the Incidents at Smyrna]*

NOTE FOR THE SUPREME COUNCIL

Numerous claims for compensation for damages and losses in connection with the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the surrounding districts are being preferred against both the Greek and Turkish Governments.

It would be a great advantage to have claims of this sort investigated on the spot whilst the acts out of which they arise are still recent, and where it is possible to collect evidence to rebut the statements of claimants.

It is therefore resolved that the duty of investigating these claims be entrusted to the Inter-Allied Commission already appointed to enquire into the incidents in the Smyrna district. This could best be done by furnishing the several Commissioners with sufficient staff to enable them to set up a Sub-Commission which would conduct the investigations and submit their recommendations as to the amounts claimed against the Greek and the Turkish Governments respectively, which should receive the support of the Allied and Associated Governments.

PARIS, August 11, 1919.

Appendix I to HD-64

ITALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE
HOTEL EDOUARD VII

PARIS, August 25, 1919.

From: M. Torretta

To: Secretary General Dutasta.

The Commission on Baltic Affairs has recently heard the Finnish Delegation which exposed to it the desire of the Finnish Government to obtain a modification of the frontier of Finland in Carelia and in the district of Petchenga.

It seemed to the majority of the Commission that according to the 4th condition contained in the note addressed to Admiral Koltchak on May 27¹⁵ and saying that "in case the frontiers and the other relations between Russia and Finland could not be regulated by an agreement between the two parties, these questions should be submitted to the arbitration of the League of Nations," the Commission is therefore not competent to recommend a final solution of the questions themselves.

The minority of the Commission, however, while recognizing the [im]possibility of arriving for the present to a final settlement is of the opinion that the Commission should proceed to the examination of these questions in order to submit to the Supreme Council proposals for a provisional settlement of the questions concerning the district referred to.

In order to decide the line of conduct to be followed, the Commission has examined the proceeding [*sic*] declaration of the Conference on this question.

1. At the session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of May 3,¹⁶ when it was a question to recognize the independence of Finland, it was decided that: "After the recognition of the independence of Finland . . . , the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France shall instruct their representatives to insist with the Finnish Government so that it accept the decisions of the Peace Conference regarding the Finnish frontiers."* This indication and others have encouraged the Finnish Government to expect from the Peace Conference some manifestation on the question of the frontier referred to. It seemed to the minority of the Commission that, for these motives, it would be difficult for the Conference not to take interest completely in this question.

2. The decision of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, May 3, last, is however previous to the communication made to Admiral Koltchak, which bears the date of May 27 and contains the following

¹⁵ Appendix I to CF-37, vol. VI, p. 73.

¹⁶ FM-11, minute 2, vol. IV, p. 662.

*No Italian Representative was present at this meeting. The Japanese representative had reserved the opinion of his Government, which, however, adhered later to the decision adopted. [Footnote in the original.]

passage: "the independence of Finland and Poland shall be recognized and in case the frontiers as well as the questions concerning the relations between Russia and those countries should not be regulated by an agreement, all these questions should be submitted to the arbitration of the League of Nations." This communication clearly indicates that the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has modified its original point of view. It is indeed after the adoption of this new point of view that the Commission on Baltic Affairs abstained from tracing the frontier of Esthonia, Lithuania, Latvia, etc. . . .

3. Finally the Commission on Baltic Affairs expressed, in its meetings with the Supreme Council on August 1, the opinion "that there was no need to grant a hearing to the Carelian Delegates since a decision on their requests could not be taken in view of the fact that, for the present, there exists in Russia no legal government whose opinion would be necessary."

Under these conditions, it seems to the majority that the Commission should not be authorized to handle a possible change of the Finnish frontier in the very region aimed at by the requests of the Carelians.

The minority of the Commission remarked however, that while sharing the opinion expressed in its answer, it did not exclude the possibility of some declaration of a general order on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments regarding the frontiers of Carelia and that, besides, this answer in no way affected the Petchenga question which was the most important.

The Commission also took into consideration other arguments pro and con the examination of this question:

The majority remarks that, during the discussion of the proposal to make a declaration to the Governments of the Baltic States, the Supreme Council had, in its session of July 26,¹⁷ raised among other objections that of the susceptibilities of the Russian elements. The question of Carelia and Petchenga, which are Russian territories situated beyond the present frontier of Finland would raise much more serious questions. Indeed, it will be a question of infringing upon the territorial integrity of Russia, without taking into account that any modification of the frontiers in Carelia would inevitably threaten the safety of the Mourmansk Railroad which is the sole means of communication of Russia with the open sea in the north. The importance of this line has however been sufficiently proved during the war.

The minority of the Commission made the following remarks:

a.—that the Conference had already taken up a question which touched to [*sic*] the territorial integrity of Russia when it recognized the independence of Finland.

b.—that it would be difficult to leave entirely undefined, for an equally undefined period, the duration of which is impossible for the present to foresee, the "Status" of these regions. In the case of Petchenga, notably, the Government of Finland was anxious to pro-

¹⁷ HD-15, minute 8, vol. VII, p. 324.

ceed as soon as possible to the development of the harbor and to the construction of a railroad connected with the Finnish lines, but it was impossible to do so as long as there were no indications on the opinion of the principal Allied and Associated Powers concerning its claims in this district.

c.—that it shared entirely the opinion of the majority of the Commission on the importance to preserve to Russia a complete control over the Mourmansk railroad and that it wished that this point be put in evidence in all the declarations of the Allied and Associated Governments on the questions.

d.—that, however, since Petchenga, whose district was the principal point of the discussion, was situated about 60 miles (95 kms) from the Mourmansk Railroad, and since the present Finnish frontier did not approach that railroad at any point less than 40 miles (65 kms), it seemed to it that the safety of this line of communication should in no way be threatened by a modification of these frontiers.

In view of the uncertainty of the decision to be taken in this matter, the Commission on Baltic Affairs unanimously recognized that it was opportune to ask the Supreme Council for instructions, and notably if it should study the question of Carelia and Petchenga and formulate recommendations.

Begging you to kindly notify the above to the Supreme Council, please accept, etc.

TORRETTA

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, October 2, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe.

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau,
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta,
M. Berthelot,
M. de St. Quentin.

ITALY

M. Scialoja.

Secretary

M. Barone Russo.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Captain Chapin
BRITISH EMPIRE	Captain Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE	M. Massigli
ITALY	M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Camerlynck

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned.

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Colonel Logan.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Lt. Col. Kisch.
Major Money
Mr. Ibbetson-James

FRANCE
General Weygand
M. Tirman
M. Max Lazard
M. Seydoux

ITALY
Maggiore Rugu.

1. (The Council had before it a letter from the Legation of the Netherlands dated August 9th, (Appendix "A") together with a note from the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission, dated August 20th (Appendix "B").)

Negotiations
With Holland
Regarding
Article 354 of
the German
Peace Treaty,
Relative to
Modification of
the Convention
of Mannheim

M. TIRMAN, in explanation of the matter in question, said that Article 354 of the German Peace Treaty upheld the Convention of Mannheim of 1868,¹ with certain modifications. The first of these dealt with the

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LIX, p. 470.

composition of a Commission charged with supervising the control of the traffic on the Rhine, and the second with technical matters regarding the navigation. Following the Treaty of Frankfort in 1871² the Convention of Mannheim had remained in force but the French representative on the Commission had been replaced by a delegate from Alsace-Lorraine. It was clear that in order to modify the Convention at the present time Holland should consent thereto, as it was a signatory power. The question before the Council was to determine in what manner the Government of the Netherlands should be invited to participate in the negotiations for a further modification of the Convention of Mannheim. He felt that the Council itself was the proper body to address the invitation in question.

MR. POLK said that he was not familiar with the details of the question but that he believed it to be one which interested France and the British Empire especially. He therefore suggested that it would be well to convoke a Commission composed of representatives of these two countries to consider the question.

M. TIRMAN replied that it was a question of execution of a clause of the German Peace Treaty and that the Council itself, which was the proper body to supervise such execution, should issue the invitation to the Dutch Government.

MR. POLK asked what procedure M. Tirman suggested in the matter.

M. TIRMAN said that the President of the Council might address a formal invitation to the Government of the Netherlands.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that there were two phases of the matter. In the first place, it was necessary to obtain the agreement of the Dutch Government to a further modification of the Mannheim Convention. In the second place, the question might arise of the eventual participation of the Netherlands in the General Convention provided for by Article 338 of the German Peace Treaty, regarding the rivers which were to be internationalized.

M. TIRMAN agreed that two questions were involved. In the first place there was a necessity of executing a clause of the German Peace Treaty at once. On the other hand, Article 354 gave a temporary character to the organization set up in the Peace Treaty. A general Convention was provided for for the international rivers, and the Treaty further stipulated that if the general Convention should not agree with the Convention for the Rhine the latter should be modified. It was known that the Netherlands were desirous of taking part in the General Convention, and it appeared that the Treaty gave them all the guarantees in this matter which they might wish.

At all events, the Treaty provided that the General Convention should not become absolute until it had been approved by the League of

² *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXII, p. 77.

Nations. Holland had already asked to be admitted to the League of Nations. Furthermore, the Treaty provided that if a General Convention were not agreed upon, the Central Commission of the Rhine (in which The Netherlands were represented) would be charged with drawing up a definite convention for that river. In any case, the Dutch Government would receive satisfaction.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked to what Conference the Dutch Government was to be invited, whether it was to be one between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or a meeting of the delegates of the Governments composing the Central Rhine Commission. If the invitation was to a Conference of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the United States of America would be represented therein, while Switzerland, a state vitally interested in the question, would not. On the second hypothesis, the United States would not be represented while Switzerland would be.

M. TIRMAN said that he believed the conference should be between representatives of all the Powers who were to be members of the Central Rhine Commission, but that the meeting should take place under the auspices of the Council in order not to exclude the Great Powers which were not represented on the former body. The conference should take place in two phases. The Dutch Government should first be invited to agree to the modification of the Convention of Mannheim, of which it was a part. One of the modifications would be the admission of Switzerland, which was not at the present time a party to the Convention. Thereafter the Swiss Government should be invited to participate in the remainder of the negotiations.

(It was decided :

(1) that the President of the Peace Conference should invite The Netherlands Government to take part in the negotiations provided for by Article 354 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, relative to the modification of the Convention of Mannheim of 1868;

(2) that the negotiations in question should take place under the auspices of the Supreme Council, between the interested Allied Powers (who are represented on the Central Rhine Commission, in accordance with Article 355 of the German Peace Treaty), and The Netherlands Government;

(3) that the Swiss Government should later be invited to take part in the negotiations.

2. (The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch dated September 29th, 1919, (See Appendix "C").)

GENERAL WEYGAND in explanation of the note in question said that the Polish Authorities had addressed a request for supplies to Marshal Foch in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Forces. This request appeared to Marshal Foch in all respects worthy of satisfaction, for according to the statements of General Henrys and other officers of the

Note From
Marshal Foch
Supporting a
Request for
Military Sup-
plies From the
Polish Govern-
ment

Inter-Allied Staff who had been in Poland the Polish Army was in great need of the supplies asked for. With the exception of General Haller's troops, the army was insufficiently equipped. For example, in one regiment there were only two overcoats per company. A continuation of this state of affairs, in view of the approaching winter, would lead to an exceedingly critical situation from the point of view of the morale of the Polish Army and might cause a retreat of this force from the line of the Beresina. Marshal Foch, believing that it was to the interest of the Allies to maintain the Polish Army intact, wished to support the request which had been formulated. In the letter to the Council he had included only such requests as he believed to be of prime importance and which should be granted at once if the situation were to be saved.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how it was planned to transport this material to Poland, assuming that it was available.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Allied Headquarters had already studied this problem. The transportation question was indeed a difficult one. The Port of Danzig was only available for the supply of food for the civilian population. Germany, of course, would not be prepared to permit supplies for the Polish Army to cross its frontiers. It had, therefore, been necessary to search out other routes. At the present time one regular train was running daily to Poland via Italy, which might be made use of. In addition the Italian Government was prepared to permit four trains per week to pass by way of the Brenner. Furthermore by using the route through Switzerland, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia it was possible to obtain two trains per day. For the latter transport, however, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia had asked that France should guarantee the expenses and furnish the coal. It was impossible for France to do this alone and it would consequently be necessary to add this charge, in addition to the expenses for the supply of material, to the account of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The total transport under this scheme would be twenty-five trains per week or about one hundred monthly. He had figured that the 600,000 uniforms requested would take approximately ninety-five trains or, in other words, that the shipment of these could be completed in somewhat less than a month's time.

MR. SCIALOJA asked whether the four trains proceeding by the Brenner route would interfere with the shipments of material which were now being made to Poland under contract between that country and Italy. Should the arrangements as outlined by General Weygand be put into effect he would like to have it understood that they should not prejudice the shipments which Italy was now making.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that there would be no difficulty in continuing the shipments referred to by Mr. Scialoja, and that the four trains which he had mentioned would be in addition to those shipments.

It was first necessary that Marshal Foch's Staff should agree with the Headquarters of the other Allied Armies as to what material could be shipped to Poland. Unquestionably this material would not all be concentrated at one point. He was anxious to obtain the authorization of the Council to consult the other Allied Headquarters in this matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had not yet been able to take this question up with his Government. He believed that the best method of procedure would be to instruct the Council of Military Experts at Versailles to study the question. This body had already formulated a general scheme for the supply of material to troops fighting the Bolsheviks, and it was therefore probable that they could quickly arrive at a solution in the matter. In the meantime he would consult his Government.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he feared much time would be lost by referring the matter to Military Experts at Versailles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the difficulty might be overcome by instructing the Versailles Council to act without delay.

MR. POLK said that the question from his point of view was largely a financial one. He agreed in the main with General Weygand's remarks.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that during such time as Mr. Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe were discussing the matter with their Governments the Military Experts at Versailles could be studying the practical means of executing the matter. The Polish Army was of great importance to the Allies as it constituted one of the best means of coercing Germany. It was very necessary to maintain this army in the field owing to the fact that Great Britain, the United States and France had so largely demobilized their troops.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Council at Versailles should be instructed to turn over the matter to Marshal Foch's Headquarters for execution. He would collaborate with General Belin throughout the examination of the question.

It was decided :

to refer the request for material received from the Polish Ministry of War and approved by Marshal Foch, to the Allied Military Experts at Versailles and to instruct the latter to make an examination of the question with the least possible delay and report thereon to the Council.

It was further decided :

that the carrying out of the recommendations of the Allied Military Experts, if and when approved by the Supreme Council, should be entrusted to the Headquarters of Marshal Foch.

Designation of
Members of the
Commission for
the Repatriation
of German, Aus-
trian and Hun-
garian Prisoners
of War From
Serbia [Siberia]

3. SIR EYRE CROWE said that as it had already been decided that the Commission for the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war from Siberia should function in Paris and not in Siberia, the only question before the Council was that of nominations for this Commission. After a short discussion,

It was decided:

that the Commission for the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war from Siberia should be composed as follows:

America, United States of:

Colonel James A. Logan.

British Empire:

Lt.-Colonel Black.

France:

Lt.-Commander Fabre.

Italy:

(Not yet designated.)

Japan:

Major Katsuki.

It was further decided:

that the said Commission should function in Paris.

4. (The Council had before it a note from General Weygand relative to the repatriation of Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Yugoslav and Rumanian troops in Siberia (Appendix "D").)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the note in question suggested a modification of the second paragraph of the resolution passed by the Council on September 27th in this matter. (The paragraph in question, (H. D. 62, Minute 7) read as follows:

"It was also decided: that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia.")

As there were a considerable number of the troops of other Allied Nations in Siberia in addition to the Czecho-Slovak forces, it was proposed to substitute the following paragraph for that quoted above:

"It was also decided that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Yugoslav and Rumanian troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners."

He was of the opinion that this procedure should be adopted.

MR. POLK said that he had just received word from Washington

that the German Government had been negotiating for the repatriation of its prisoners of war from Siberia, and had arranged with a Japanese steamship company for the chartering of six vessels for this purpose.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that M. Matsui ascertain the truth of this information, and if the facts were exact, the six vessels in question should be turned over for the use of the Allied Governments.

M. MATSUI said that he had no information on the subject but that the repatriation of German prisoners in the hands of the Japanese was going on, and the negotiations referred to by Mr. Polk might conceivably be for this matter.

(It was decided :

to modify the second paragraph of the resolution taken by the Council on September 27th, (H. D. 62, Minute 7) so that the same should read as follows:

“It was also decided: that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Yugoslav and Rumanian troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.”)

5. (The Council had before it a proposal submitted by the British Delegation, dated September 30th, 1919, asking that the Russian Battleship *Volya* be transferred to General Denekin (Appendix “E”).)

Proposal To
Deliver the
Russian Battle-
ship “Volya” to
General Denekin

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this matter had been brought up before the Council on account of the fact that the Russian Battleship involved had been turned over to the Allied and Associated Powers under Article 29 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918. The consent of the Council to its transfer to General Denekin was therefore necessary.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he personally had no objection to this transfer taking place.

MR. POLK said that he personally had no objection to formulate, but that he would consult the American Naval experts and notify the Secretary-General of his decision in the matter later in the day.

(Mr. Polk later stated that the American Delegation had no objection to the procedure proposed.)

(It was decided :

that the Russian Battleship *Volya*, handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers under Article 29 of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, should be transferred by the British Admiralty to General Denekin.)

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Secretary-General of the International Labor Commission, relative to applications

Applications
From Finland,
Norway and the
Netherlands for
Admission to the
Labor Congress
at Washington

made by Finland, Norway and The Netherlands for admission to the Labor Congress at Washington (Appendix "F").)

MR. POLK said that the matters raised by the note in question should be left to the Labor Congress for decision.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Mr. Polk and asked merely that the United States Government should permit the representatives of the countries in question to go to the United States, by issuing them the necessary passports.

MR. POLK said that he would have the same letter addressed to the representatives of Finland, Norway and The Netherlands as had been sent to the German and Austrian Labor Delegates (See H. D. 52, Minute 4; ³ and H. D. 56, Minute 1.)⁴

(It was decided :

that the questions raised by the note of the Secretary-General of the International Labor Commission relative to the admission of delegates from Finland, Norway and The Netherlands to the forthcoming Labor Congress at Washington, should be left to the decision of that Congress.

It was further decided :

that the American Delegation should notify the Secretary-General of the International Labor Commission that no obstacles would be placed in the way of Finnish, Norwegian or Dutch delegates desirous of proceeding to Washington in anticipation of a decision in their favor by the Congress.)

7. SIR EYRE CROWE said that there were two possible ways by which the Neutral Governments might be informed of the decision of the Council regarding the Blockade of Soviet Russia. First, a joint notification might be made in each of the neutral capitals by the diplomatic representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Secondly, a note might be sent by M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, to the Diplomatic Representatives of the Neutral countries in Paris.

MR. POLK said that the second solution proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe seemed to him to be the more practical one.

(After a short discussion, it was decided :

that M. Clemenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, should address a note to the Diplomatic Representatives of the Neutral Powers at Paris informing them of the decision of the Council regarding economic pressure to be exercised upon Soviet Russia.)

Procedure To Be
Followed in
Notifying Neu-
tral Governments
Regarding the
Blockade of
Soviet Russia

³ *Ante*, p. 185.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 255.

8. (The Council had before it a note from the Austrian Delegation dated September 17th, regarding the disturbances that had occurred in the Comitats of Western Hungary (Appendix "G").)

Note From the Austrian Government Regarding the Situation in the Comitats of Western Hungary

M. BERTHELOT said that the Austrian Government asked that Allied Officers be sent to Western Hungary to protect the population from the disturbances which were occurring there at the present time.

They further asked that an Interallied Commission might be sent to Oedenburg to prevent a repetition of the acts of violence which had occurred there, and to supervise the conduct of the Hungarian troops at the time of the evacuation of the territory in question.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it was a question of enforcing certain terms of the Austrian Treaty.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that officers might be detached for this duty from the Allied Military Missions at Vienna.

M. SCIALOJA said that there were still Hungarian troops in this territory because the new boundary between Austria and Hungary had not yet been officially notified to the Hungarian Government.

M. PICHON admitted that this was the case, and stated that the reason therefor was that no recognized Government had as yet been set up in Hungary.

MR. POLK suggested that the Allied Generals in Budapest should be informed officially as to the frontier between Austria and Hungary and should be instructed to convey this information to the Hungarian authorities.

(It was decided:

(1) that an Interallied Military Commission, composed of officers to be drawn from the Allied Military Representatives at Vienna or Budapest, should be sent to the Comitats of Western Hungary to assist in the maintenance of order in the territories granted to Austria by the Treaty of Saint Germain;

(2) that this Mission should be under the orders of the Allied General Officers at Budapest;

(3) that the Allied Generals at Budapest should be officially informed of the frontier between Austria and Hungary, as defined in the Peace Treaty of Saint Germain.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, October 2, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-65

(Translation)

NETHERLANDS LEGATION

No. 3681

From: Loudon.⁵

To: President Clemenceau.

By order of my Government, I have the honor to forward to Your Excellency a note relative to the provisions of the Peace Treaty concerning the regime of the Rhine, hereto annexed.

I would be deeply grateful to Your Excellency if you would kindly bring this note to the attention of the President of the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways.

Accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

[Enclosure]

[Note From the Netherlands Government]

Article 354, 2nd alinea, of the Peace Treaty establishes that in case of opposition regarding certain of the provisions of the Mannheim Convention, of October 17, 1868, and of the provisions of the General Convention referred to in Article 338, regarding their application relative to the Rhine, the provisions of the General Convention shall have precedence.

The Netherlands Government is perfectly aware of the High importance of a General Convention of the nature indicated, even if it is obliged to act contrary to Treaties existing between certain Powers. It esteems, however, that in such a case the collaboration of these Powers in the elaboration of the General Convention is indispensable, whether or not they be signers of the Peace Treaty. Such collaboration is especially indispensable at the time a question affecting the countries traversed by the great rivers which shall be controlled by the General Convention. It is the more important in that a profound study of the regime of these rivers—as well concerning the text of the Treaties as concerning their application—becomes necessary before the provisions of this Convention be definitely decreed.

It is true that a country non-signatory of the Peace Treaty, can, if it is a member of the League of Nations, become associated as such to the approbation of the General Convention which Article 338 requires on the part of the said League, but this is in no way equivalent to a direct collaboration.

In view of the preceding and considering the special situation of the Netherlands which form the delta of the three international rivers,

⁵ Dr. Jonkheer J. Loudon, Netherlands Minister at Paris.

the Netherlands Government believes itself justified in soliciting participation on an equal footing in the elaborations of the General Convention referred to in Article 338, and in the negotiations in connection with it.

Appendix B to HD-65

PEACE CONFERENCE
COMMISSION ON PORTS,
WATERWAYS AND RAILWAYS

PARIS, August 20, 1919.

The Secretary General of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways.

To the Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

I have the honor to inform you that, at its last meeting the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways decided to direct the attention of the Supreme Council of the Allies to the necessity of opening as soon as possible, in view of the application of the Treaty with Germany, negotiations with the Dutch Government, within the purview of Article 354 of the Treaty, relating to modifications of the Convention of Mannheim of 1868.

ROBERT HAAS

Appendix C to HD-65

OFFICE OF THE MARSHAL
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF
THE ALLIED ARMIES

General Staff G-2
4-bis, Bd. des Invalides

PARIS, September 29, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch,
To: President Clemenceau.

I have the honor to transmit you herewith a memorandum from the Polish Government stating the needs of Poland and how urgent it is to satisfy them.

Since the beginning of the war, Poland, the theatre of active operations, was subjected to the ebb and flow of the opposing armies. Little by little, it has been despoiled of all the things which are necessary to her existence; food, clothing, railroad material, factory material, raw materials; there remains to her no reserves.

Until now, by utilizing her last resources, and thanks to the favorable season, Poland has been able to form and maintain an army of 500,000 men, which, with the greatest valiance, has interposed between the Russian and Hungarian Soviets and has forced the Russian red armies to a quick and important withdrawal. That army is more than

ever necessary to her; none of her frontiers is as yet settled, her internal situation has not been stabilized. The Russian Bolshevism still sees in her the principal obstacle which stopped its march towards the West; for Germany she is the obstacle which prevents her from colonizing Russia. Indispensable as it is to Poland, that army is none the less necessary to the Entente.

Now, that army is at present in the most complete destitution, as President Paderewski stated and as it has been noted by General Henrys and the officers sent by him on mission.

A large part of the army is still dressed with cotton uniforms; shoes, linen, overcoats, blankets, are lacking. That destitution has already had a bad influence on the health and the morale of the men which had both been maintained excellent until now. The results will be very much more serious when the first cold shall be felt in those regions where winter comes early [and?] is frightfully severe.

Munitions are lacking: the Polish army has at its disposal only from 50 to 80 rounds per gun.

Means of transportation are insufficient. There remains on the Polish railroads only $\frac{1}{3}$ of the locomotives and $\frac{1}{2}$ of the cars which circulated before the war; add to that that materials is [*sic*] in bad condition.

Taking into account from the request of the Polish Government only those of an immediate need, in order to exist the Polish Army should receive

about 600,000 equipments and especially warm clothing and overcoats, half for the beginning of October and the other half before the middle of December.

—munitions first, cartridges for infantry and machine guns, 75 and 155 shells and caissons;

—100 locomotives and 1500 cars for the special service of the army.

Poland can procure that material only by appealing to the great Allied and Associated Powers.

That help was favorably considered by the Supreme Council on June 27.⁶

I have the honor of asking you to kindly communicate immediately to the Supreme Council the request of the Polish Government, on account of the approaching bad season, and to present to it the following resolutions:

"1. The Great Allied and Associated Powers agree to contribute, as far as possible, to satisfy immediately the material needs of the Polish army.

"2. As a consequence, the General Staff of Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army, is charged with:

⁶ CF-96, minute 5, vol. VI, p. 726.

a) fixing, after agreement with the Allied General Staffs, the participation of each of the Allied and Associated Powers to the delivery of material to the Polish army;

b) to study and to execute the shipment of that material to Poland in the best conditions of safety and rapidity."

P. O., Major General
WEYGAND

[Enclosure]

Memorandum on the Necessity of a Prompt and Effective Help From the Allies to Poland

The Polish armies have reached the line Berezina-Horyn. Pushed back by force, the soldiers of the Republic of the Soviets are withdrawing rapidly.

The Polish State, hardly reborn, has made danger disappear on that side, the danger which threatened the results of the Peace of Versailles.

But that success reached until now by Poland's own means has no longer a local character today: it is already an event whose political scope increases from day to day, whose result is growing constantly; at the same time the efforts required by it are becoming too heavy for the rather small forces of the young State.

Poland, surrounded on all sides by her enemies, deprived of natural strategic frontiers, Poland, ruined by the war, with a very insufficient net of means of communications, engaged in a struggle on two fronts, has done her best to continue that struggle and to liberate the invaded regions, but she no longer can stand the weight alone.

Her army is suffering from lack of munitions and food stuffs; her soldiers, to the exception of the units organized in France, are badly and insufficiently clothed, often barefooted, without linen. Under these conditions, how can they spend the rigorous winter of Volhynia, where in the marshes and in the forest cold, famine and diseases are going to attack them. Already now, the mobilization of the classes called cannot be finished for lack of material. Besides, on account of the lack of armament and munitions, clothing and equipment, Poland shall be forced to demobilize very soon part of her divisions.

Consequently, the present state of affairs can be resumed in these words:

"Necessity of an urgent and effective help."

That help must bear on three essential points whose necessity is very urgent:

I. Clothing and equipment for the troops.

II. Sufficient reserves of munitions (taking into account the very different systems of armaments.)

III. Improvement of communications so that the necessary transport might arrive in Poland still on time, before the beginning of winter.

The rapid solution (before winter) of those questions alone will allow Poland to fulfill her task up to the end.

The Polish Army comprises at the present time 540,000 soldiers whose morale is excellent in spite of the above mentioned privations.

On November 15, Poland shall call the class of 1900 whose effectives might give 101,500 recruits.

On January 15 and March 15, part of the class of 1901 which is estimated at 75,000 men.

I. Taking into account the indispensable equipment for the army at the front for the winter season and the necessity to complete it before the month of October, 1919, Poland shall need before March 31, 1920, the material enumerated below:

	<i>Complete Uniforms and Linen</i>	<i>Complete Equipment</i>
For the recruits called on January 15 and March 15 . . .	78, 200	75, 200
For the recruits already called and trained but not yet equipped	66, 000	76, 000
For the Winter	540, 000	108, 000
Wear and tear and exchange of the old equipment on account of the bad quality of the cloth	417, 300	27, 300
Total	<u>1, 200, 000</u> [1, 101, 500]	<u>378, 000</u> [286, 500]

To cover those needs we have at present in our warehouses about: 30,000

Bought but not yet delivered (from France) 50,000 complete

Part shall be furnished by the country. Aside from that we must receive from abroad within the following time limits:

	<i>1/X 1919</i>	<i>15/X 1919</i>	<i>1/XX 1919</i>
Coats	400, 000	100, 000	100, 000
Pants	400, 000	100, 000	100, 000
Blouses	100, 000	100, 000	200, 000
Loll bands		100, 000	50, 000
Ear laps			200, 000
Flannel shirts	300, 000	200, 000	100, 000
Under drawers	300, 000	200, 000	100, 000
Sock, (pairs)	600, 000	400, 000	200, 000
Gloves	100, 000	100, 000	100, 000
Shoes (large size)		200, 000	
Soles (pairs)	100, 000	100, 000	100, 000
Sweaters	200, 000	100, 000	100, 000
Blankets	300, 000	100, 000	100, 000
Haversacks or bags	200, 000	200, 000	100, 000
Break sacks	200, 000	200, 000	100, 000
Cantine with cup	200, 000	200, 000	200, 000
Cartridge boxes	400, 000	400, 000	200, 000
Mess kits	300, 000	150, 000	150, 000
Belts	300, 000	200, 000	100, 000

Considerable clothing stocks which the Americans have left in France could at least satisfy part of the above mentioned needs.

II. Armament and Munitions. Table below indicated on the one hand the number of arms and munitions already ordered (but not yet

delivered) and on the other hand the necessary material not yet bought for lack of credit.

Designation	Ordered but not yet delivered	Necessary but not bought for lack of credit	Number of cars	
			Transport total	Per month
Rifles and muskets of various types and systems.....	36, 000	150, 000	180	60
Machine guns and ammunition wagons.....	220	400	120	30
Ammunition for muskets and machine guns.....	220, 000, 000	120, 000, 000	1, 000	200
75 mm. guns.....	400	-----	200	50
Ammunition wagons.....	750	-----	400	100
Ammunition for 75's.....	400, 000	800, 000	1, 200	240
Ammunition wagons for 105's.....	50	-----	30	-----
155 shells (short) and ammunition wagons.....	240	-----	120	40
Cartridges for 155 shorts.....	10, 500	220, 000	1, 000	100
Mountain Guns 65 m/m.....	30	-----	30	10
Shells for 65 m/m mountain guns.....	30, 000	-----	60	20
Cartridges size 120.....	4, 000	-----	20	10
Different Artillery Materiel.....	-----	-----	100	20
Total.....	-----	-----	4, 660 [4, 460]	900 [880]

Aside from these needs of war material properly speaking, the absence of many other things is especially felt in the country.

In the first place, medical products and sanitary articles, rubber, automobiles (especially trucks), motors, spare parts, tools, harnesses, leather articles, etc.

III. For all those needs it is very important that the delivery should be assured before winter in a sure and rapid manner.

For that purpose, the first necessity for Poland is to be connected with the west by arteries of communication whose output shall insure the transportation of all the articles bought by Poland.

Up to the present those transportations arrive in Poland through 4 routes of a small output, notably:

I. Two trains daily (Polish) through Modane, Turin, Leoben, Vienna, Bohumin, Warsaw (lately stopped).

II. From two to four trains daily through Gdańsk, Mława, Warsaw, reserved exclusively for foodstuffs.

III. One train weekly from Italy with artillery material and ammunitions.

IV. From three to six trains daily through Coblenz, Ems, Wilhelmshöhe, Halle, Glogau, Leszno.

At the present time only the first three of those lines are functioning, not very satisfactorily. The line across Germany is no longer used.

Since those lines of communication are very insufficient, it would be extremely necessary in order to insure a rapid liaison with the West:

I. To enlarge or eventually to build freight stations, and tracks for unloading in the most important points of Poland, as for example Warsaw, Lodz, Cracow, Lwow, Jaroslaw, Modlin, a work which Poland could undertake herself.

II. Increase the output of the existing lines, above mentioned, by more frequent trains, using especially the German line Gdańsk, Mława, and the Italian line. One could for example have 3 or 4 Polish trains daily. By utilizing for the transportation of foodstuffs the waterway of the Vistula, one could use to a maximum the Gdańsk line which could thus render great service.

III. Open new lines of communications as for example through Braila (15 locomotives will be necessary for that purpose), or through Switzerland.

IV. To reinforce the rolling stock of the Polish railways which at present is in a pitiable state, namely;

	for a number of kilometres of:
In the Warsaw districts	3,226 kms.
In the Radom "	1,546 "
In the Cracow "	1,924 "
In the Leopold "	2,050 "
In the Stanislaw "	1,128 "
Total	<u>9,834</u> [9,874]
and military railways:	
wide gauge	1,138 kms.
normal gauge	2,735 "
narrow gauge	936 kms.
Total	<u>4,809</u> kms.

Poland only owns at present:

4,525 passenger cars
1,269 box-cars
244 mail cars
21,901 covered freight cars
7,178 uncovered freight cars
21,272 coal cars
56 refrigerator cars
100 "foudre" cars
114 poultry cars
234 cattle cars
2,474 tank cars.

60,375 [59,367] cars, 2,110 of which must be returned abroad since they do not belong to the Polish Government.

For that number of cars we have at our disposal only 2,354 locomotives, 1,200 of which are worn and cannot be of service without serious repairs.

The above mentioned figures which do not include the Posnania system, nor that of the reoccupied regions in the East, but include only the central part of Poland within the limits of the Congress of Vienna and Galicia; they show the imperious and urgent necessity of reinforcing the railroad material of Poland by at least:

2,500 locomotives and 70,000 freight cars.

It is only through a similar reorganization that the arteries newly created, as well as those already existing, would form a system of communication by which Poland would receive the supplies indispensable for the maintenance of the present situation and for her advance to the East.

Poland appreciates at its true worth the support which has been given her up to the present time.

The arms, munitions and generous assistance furnished by France, have permitted her to attain a brilliant success of very important extent.

The aid furnished by the United States and Great Britain in the form of hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies has saved millions of people from death by hunger.

It is with a heart full of gratitude that the Polish people agree to offer payment in blood for the maintenance of world peace as fixed in the basis of the Congress at Versailles.

But the necessity of the assistance explained above becomes each day more and more urgent. The result of this assistance would be the definite assurance of peace in the Orient.

Without this assistance—it is the needless loss of efforts and sacrifices; Poland would be placed on the eve of an inevitable crisis which could well be followed by the entire ruin of the country and of the army.

This is the reason why Poland, once again in a difficult situation, appeals to her Allies and calmly and confidently awaits their energetic assistance.

SOMKOWSKI

General and Vice Minister of War

Appendix D to HD-65

Note From General Weygand Suggesting an Amendment to the Resolution of September 27, 1919, Relative to the Repatriation of Czecho-Slovak Troops in Siberia, So As To Effect Also the Repatriation of Polish, Jugo-Slav and Rumanian Troops in Siberia

OFFICE OF THE MARSHAL
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
ALLIED ARMIES

General Staff
2nd Section

Paris, 4 bis Boulevard des Invalides

No. 3966

PARIS, September 28, 1919.

Marshal, Commander in Chief Allied Armies

to

The President of the Council
(Secretariat of the Peace Conference.)

The Supreme Council of the Allied Powers on the 27th of September adopted the following resolution :

“It is decided that a Commission composed of one American, British, French, Italian and Japanese officer should be created to deal with the repatriation of German, Austrian and Hungarian Prisoners in Siberia.

“It is also decided that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.”

I have the honor to call your attention to the fact that there are in Siberia, besides the Czecho-Slovak troops, considerable numbers of troops of allied nations which have at various times requested their repatriation.

Polish	about . . .	10,700
Jugo-Slavs	” . . .	4,300
Rumanians	” . . .	3,000

These contingents deserve to the same degree as the Czecho-Slovak to be repatriated before the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.

I therefore have the honor to beg you to be good enough to submit the Supreme Council the following modification to the second paragraph of the resolution mentioned above :

“It is also decided that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Jugo-Slav and Rumanian troops in Siberia should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.”

P. O. the Major-General
WEYGAND

Appendix E to HD-65

Proposal To Hand Over the Battleship "Volya" to General Denekin

The British Admiralty has proposed that the Russian Battleship *Volya* which was handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers under Article 29 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, should be transferred to General Denekin.

The Admiralty point out that the *Volya* is held in trust until there is a stable Government in Russia to which she can be returned. The Russian destroyer *Derzki* which is now in the keeping of His Majesty's Government and two Russian destroyers in the possession of the French Government have been transferred to General Denekin, while the Italian and Greek Governments have been asked similarly to transfer the Russian ships which they hold.

The overhauling and repairing of the *Volya* has involved considerable work and expense on the part of His Majesty's Government, and the Admiralty hope that money and trouble will be saved if the *Volya* is sent to Sebastopol to be handed over to General Denekin. The British Delegation has the honor to recommend this proposal to the favorable consideration of the Supreme Council.

Submitted by the British Delegation, September 30, 1919.

Appendix F to HD-65

PARIS, October 1, 1919.

From: The Secretary General of the Commission on International Labor Legislation.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

I have the honor to inform you that I have received from the American Commission to Negotiate Peace a note dated September 29, containing the following remarks, to which I would call attention:

Finland has inquired regarding the possibility of sending delegates to the Conference. Norway and Holland have also inquired whether their delegates will be admitted in case they have not joined the League of Nations by October 29th. In view of the decision of the Supreme Council and of the President regarding the admission of German and Austrian Delegates, the United States Government presumes that no objection will be made to the admission of the Finnish Delegation and of the representatives of other nations who have not yet expressed their adhesion to the League.

The foregoing matters are brought to the attention of the Commission on International Labor Legislation by direction of the United States Government which requests that they may be submitted to the Supreme Council and the United States Government duly informed of any decisions reached.

In transmitting this communication to the Secretariat General of the Conference, the Secretary of the Commission on International Labor Legislation believes it to be his duty to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to the advantage there would be in settling the question raised by Finland, Norway and Holland. In doing this there would be an opportunity for the Supreme Council to specify the meaning of its decision of September 11th,⁷ in indicating that the countries that had not declared their adhesion to the Society of Nations before October 29th, would nevertheless be authorized to send their delegates to Washington; that the question of the admission of these countries would be left to the Conference itself, and that that question would be decided immediately before the discussion of the basic questions appearing on the Conference's order of the day.

Such a solution would have the advantage of quieting certain fears recently manifested by workmen's organizations, fears which would result in prejudicing the success of the Conference.

Appendix G to HD-65

THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES OF
THE AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC

No. 1200

St. GERMAIN-EN-LAYE, September 17, 1919.

From: M. Mayrhauser, Chargé d'Affaires, *pro tem.*

To: M. Clemenceau.

The populations of the regions of western Hungary which, by the Treaty of St. Germain, have been attributed to Austria, have addressed themselves, through the intermediary of several deputations, to the Government of the Austrian Republic formulating the following grievances:

On September 6, 1919, a Hungarian military detachment presented itself to the commune of Gols, situated in the Comitatus of Wieselburg, to take possession of the conscripts of the said commune. The conscripts having fled, the soldiers raged against the peasants who had been but spectators: a number of persons were wounded by shots and by blows from the butt of the guns.

The following day, a more numerous detachment penetrated into the village, arrested the fathers of the conscripts and transported them to the prisons of Deutsch-Altenburg.

At Oedenburg, the Hungarian troops, under the command of Colonel Boze, exercised a regime of terror. More than 600 workmen were arbitrarily arrested; they were abused in the prisons to such

⁷ HD-52, minute 4, p. 185.

an extent that several among them succumbed to the torments to which they were subjected.

This attitude of the Hungarian troops in regions which, by virtue of the decision of the Peace Conference, are to be incorporated with Austria after the going into force of the Peace Treaty, makes us fear that the evacuation of western Hungary by the Hungarian troops will be accompanied by new acts of violence against a peaceful population, which, in spite of its desire to be attached to its nationals, has awaited with exemplary patience the decision of the Allied and Associated Powers giving satisfaction to this desire. The inhabitants of the countries menaced with such a fate notably fear that their cattle and the produce of their harvests [will?] become the object of seizures and sequestrations.

Moved by the grievances and by the apprehensions expressed by the deputations of the populations in despair, my Government addressed itself to the Missions of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers begging them to intercede with the Peace Conference in order that an Interallied Commission of officers be sent to Oedenburg to prevent by its presence the repetition of acts of violence of this kind and to control the attitude of the Hungarian troops when they evacuate the territory in question.

My Government has charged me to call the attention of Your Excellency to the above and beg it, in its name, to be kind enough to take into consideration the proposition above mentioned.

Please accept, etc.

The Chargé d'Affaires, pro tem.,
MAYRHAUSER

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, October 7, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Hon. F. L. Polk	Sir Eyre Crowe	M. Pichon
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>
Mr. L. Harrison	Mr. H. Norman	M. Dutasta M. de St. Quentin
	ITALY	JAPAN
	M. Scialoja	M. Matsui
	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>
	M. Barone Russo	M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . .	Mr. C. Russell
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE	M. Massigli
ITALY	Lieut. de Carlo.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. E. L. Dresel
Colonel Logan
Colonel Browning

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
General Mance
General Groves
Lt. Col. Kisch
Major Money
Mr. Ibbetson-James
Mr. Forbes-Adam
Mr. Herbert-Brown

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
M. Loucheur
General Weygand
M. Laroche

ITALY

General Cavallero
M. Brambilla.

1. (The Council had before it the Note of the German Government of October 3rd (See Appendix "A").)

Reply to the
Note of the
German Govern-
ment Relative to
the Evacuation
of the Baltic
Provinces

MARSHAL FOCH said that he thought the members of the Council had already taken note of the contents of the German Note. The German Government protested its good faith and asked for the appointment of a mixed Commission which should take the necessary steps to effect a speedy evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. He proposed that a reply be made stating that the Allied and Associated Governments were willing to work with Germany, but this must not be interpreted as meaning that they were willing to relieve Germany of her responsibilities. The Allied and Associated Governments agreed to the appointment of a mixed Commission, but maintained the view that this Commission should be particularly charged with seeing that the German Government took the necessary steps to guarantee the evacuation. This method of procedure seemed to him all the more necessary, because the German Government had enumerated a series of steps which it had taken, which were in fact only half steps. The Commission would be charged with seeing that the promises, which had been made to the Allied and Associated Governments, were kept. On the other hand, it was to be understood that, if the results were not forthcoming, these Governments would be obliged to put into effect the means of coercion which had been decided upon.

MR. POLK said that he fully agreed with Marshal Foch. He asked whether the German Government had up to the present paid the troops in question. If this was in fact the case it created a ridiculous situation. He was not surprised that the German Government paid these troops, but he was very much surprised that they confessed to the fact so openly.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the Germans not only continued to pay the troops in question but they also were supplying them constantly with provisions of every kind.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he approved of Marshal Foch's proposals. He desired to add that he thought it necessary to state in the reply to Germany that the Allied and Associated Governments were not satisfied with the explanation which had been made. It was important to point out that the recall of General von der Goltz had been demanded three times and that it was only now that such a step had been decided upon by the German Government. The German reply was drafted to a great extent for public opinion at home and for purposes of propaganda, and for this reason the Allied and Associated Governments were also entitled to state their views fully. He had just received a telegram from the British Mission at Riga, dated the 4th October, and consequently despatched after the German Note had been transmitted. The telegram pointed out that movements of German troops

in the direction of Jacobstadt were continually being reported. There was not a single sign to indicate that evacuation was contemplated. In the neutral zone to the east, the Germans had been replaced by Russians, and finally General von der Goltz had assumed a most threatening attitude towards the Letts.

M. PICHON suggested that Marshal Foch should be requested to draft a reply to the German Government taking note of the remarks made by Mr. Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe. He considered it important to point out to the Germans that the Allied and Associated Governments held them entirely responsible for what had occurred.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the appointment of a Commission did not raise particular difficulties; the Commission existed in fact in the form of the Inter-Allied Mission, at the head of which General Gough had been placed. General Gough, however, was no longer at Riga, and it would therefore be necessary to place an energetic officer at the head of the Commission. He wished to ask from what army the Council desired that the officer in question should be chosen.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Government would have no objection to the appointment of a French General.

M. PICHON suggested that Marshal Foch submit his views to the Council on the following day.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Germans had asked in their Note that the means of economic pressure decided upon by the Allied and Associated Government[s] be abandoned. He desired to express the hope that in the Note which Marshal Foch was about to prepare, it should be pointed out to the German Government that the measures in question would only be suspended when the Commission had submitted satisfactory reports.

It was decided:

that Marshal Foch should present to the Supreme Council at its next meeting the draft of a reply to the Note from the German Government of the 3rd October, respecting the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, in which Marshal Foch should take into consideration the views expressed by Mr. Polk and Sir Eyre Crowe.

2. (The Council had before it a memorandum from the British Delegation of the 30th September, 1919 (See Appendix "B").)

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon this memorandum. He said that there was first the general question of policy to be decided. The Supreme Council in a resolution taken on the 2nd August¹ had said that the German Government should be given full liberty in regard to the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war and that the Allied and Associated Governments would not intervene either

Maintenance and
Repatriation of
Russian Prisoners
of War in
Germany

¹ HD-22, minute 7, vol. VII, p. 486.

in the repatriation or in the maintenance of these prisoners. The resolution in question had not been sufficiently far-reaching. Marshal Foch had pointed out in a number of notes addressed to the Conference, that serious difficulties might arise, if the Allied and Associated Governments abandoned all control and left the field entirely open to German action. He had pointed out that without undertaking the entire control, it would be possible to appoint an International Commission upon which there would be, in addition to representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, German and Russian representatives. This would create a means of dealing with German manoeuvres. It would be a simple matter to organize such a Commission in view of the fact that there were already officers at Berlin, who were dealing with the question. The Germans could easily appoint a representative, but insofar as the Russians were concerned, the question was somewhat delicate, for it might perhaps be difficult to find a man who was not affiliated with a particular faction. If the Council decided to appoint such an International Commission, that Commission could be directed to liquidate the routine matters which required action and which had been mentioned in the memorandum of the British Delegation.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Council should decide as to the questions of principle and leave it to the Commission to insure their application. If the Commission were left too much to itself, its first act would undoubtedly be to address a new report to the Supreme Council. It would therefore be necessary to give full directions.

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed, and said that this matter could be dealt with in the instructions to be prepared for the Commission. In reply to a question asked by Mr. Polk, he stated that the Commission would sit in Berlin.

MR. POLK said that he agreed in principle, but that so far as he was concerned, there was a difficulty in regard to detail. General Harries, who had been the head of the American Mission at Berlin, had left, and the officer who would be appointed would necessarily be without information on the subject.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the questions for the Commission to decide were chiefly of a financial nature, and which financial representatives could study at Paris. It would be sufficient if an officer, who was informed as to the questions, such as Colonel Kisch, could supply the necessary information. There was one question, however, which was somewhat delicate, and that related to the refugees from Kieff. The Germans maintained that the Allies had guaranteed the maintenance in Germany of four hundred Russians who had left Kieff with the German troops in order to escape the Bolsheviks. The German Government added that their action had been taken at the request of the Entente. The amount expended amounted to about two millions.

So far as the French authorities were concerned, they were without information as to the action which the Germans claimed had been taken by the Allies.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Government were equally without information in regard to the matter.

(It was decided :

that Marshal Foch should present to the Council at its next meeting a draft resolution respecting the organization of an International Commission to deal with the maintenance and repatriation of Russian prisoners of war in Germany.)

3. (The Council had before it a note from the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission of the 27th September, 1919. (See Appendix C.)

M. LOUCHEUR read and commented upon the proposals of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission. He said that the proposal was most urgent, particularly in view of the fact that the situation became worse each day. He wished most strongly to urge that the principle of the appointment of the subcommission should be approved upon that day and that the members of the commission should be ready to act at the earliest possible moment.

Organization at
Vienna of a Sub-
commission of
the Organizing
Committee of
the Reparations
Commission

(It was decided :

(1) that a subcommission of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission should be established at Vienna at the earliest possible moment to study the questions relating to the revictualing of Austria ;

(2) that this subcommission should be composed of a delegate from each of the Powers represented on the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission. The presidency of the subcommission should be held at each meeting by each of the delegates in turn ; the secretary should be permanent. There should be added to the subcommission for purposes of consultation and following the nature of the subjects dealt with, representatives of the States bordering upon Austria: Poland, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Hungary ;

(3) that the subcommission should determine the foodstuffs and raw materials needed by Austria and ascertain all the available means of developing the greatest amount of production in Austria itself ;

(4) that the subcommission should examine and propose the means which should appear best to facilitate and to guarantee the delivery and transport from the countries bordering upon Austria of such merchandise as was necessary as well as the payment by Austria to its vendors. The subcommission should see to it that its views were adopted by all the interested states.

It was also decided :

that the subcommission should be established at Vienna by a member of the Organizing Committee of the Reparations Commission, who

should present his credentials from the Supreme Council to Dr. Renner.)

4. (The Council had before it the draft of a telegram prepared by the European Coal Commission (See appendix "D").)

Telegram to the
Czecho-Slovak
and Polish Gov-
ernments Re-
specting the
Supply of Coal
to Austria

M. LOUCHEUR read and commented upon this telegram. He said that he proposed to add at the end of the text an appeal to the good will of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to call the attention of the Council to the last phrase of the penultimate paragraph of the text in which the words, "tout retard nouveau a partir de ce jour devra être rattrapé dans le délai minimum".² This phrase appeared unnecessary on account of the difficulty of execution and he proposed that it be omitted.

It was decided:

(1) to transmit the telegram prepared by the European Coal Commission (See appendix "D") to the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and to the Government of the Polish Republic;

(2) to omit in the telegram the last phrase of the penultimate paragraph.

It was further decided:

that M. Loucheur should add to the text a supplementary paragraph appealing to the good-will of the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments.

5. (The Council had before it a telegram addressed to General Haking by the British Delegation at Paris (See appendix "E").)

Despatch of
Allied Officers to
Upper Silesia To
Insure the
Normal Output
of Coal

M. LOUCHEUR said that he did not agree with the European Coal Commission, which had brought to the attention of the Council with a favorable recommendation, the telegram addressed to General Haking, which had embodied a suggestion made by M. Paderewski.

He thought that the despatch of a large number of officers to Upper Silesia would provoke serious difficulties on the part of the Germans.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with the view expressed by M. Loucheur.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that his experts were not convinced that the despatch of a Commission of Officers would have the practical results which had been anticipated.

MR. POLK said that Colonel Goodyear, who had come from Upper Silesia, thought that it would serve a useful purpose to send a Commission composed of a small number of members. The despatch of

² Translation: "Any new delay henceforth will have to be made up within a minimum time limit."

such a Commission would make it possible to obtain definite information as to the situation in the mines. General Dupont shared this opinion.

M. LOUCHEUR said that if it were possible to send a representative of each of the Powers, the Allied Missions at Berlin could be directed to take the necessary steps, and it would be understood that the Commission would be under the orders of the Missions at Berlin, but it should also keep in close touch with the Coal Commission at Mährisch-Ostrau.

MR. POLK said that the American Delegation would be obliged to send one of its representatives from the Coal Commission at Paris. He wished to mention this fact simply as a matter of detail.

It was decided:

(1) to despatch to Upper Silesia a sub-commission composed of a Representative of the United States of America, British Empire, France and Italy to insure the normal output of coal;

(2) that the members of this Commission, with the exception of the American Representative, should be chosen by the Chiefs of the Entente Missions at Berlin from among the officers attached to these Missions;

(3) that the Commission should be placed under the orders of the Military Representative of the Entente at Berlin.

It was further decided:

that the Commission should keep in touch with the Coal Commission at Mährisch-Ostrau.

6. (The Council had before it a proposal made by Colonel Logan to the European Coal Commission (See Appendix "F").)

M. LOUCHEUR read and commented upon Colonel Logan's proposal. He thought that the distribution of Austro-Hungarian rolling stock ought not to be delayed any longer than necessary. If the transports had been suspended and traffic was practically interrupted, it was not because the material was lacking, but because the distribution of this material had not yet been made. Article 318 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria called for the formation of a special Commission to deal with this redistribution. He proposed that the Commission called for by Article 318 be appointed at the present time and that it should act in a provisional character until the Treaty came into force.

M. PICHON said that he saw a difficulty in view of the fact that the Treaty called for the presence on the Commission of a Representative of the Hungarian State Railways.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the draft resolution prepared by Colonel Logan tended to appoint a new Commission. It would be preferable

Commission
Charged With
the Provisionary
Re-Distribution
of the Rolling
Stock of the
Former Austro-
Hungarian
Monarchy

to appoint a permanent Commission immediately, specifying that it would act at present with only a temporary character.

MR. POLK said that, with reference to M. Pichon's objection, he proposed that the Commission be constituted in accordance with the proposal of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission approved by the Supreme Council on the 29th July,³ and that the Hungarian Representative, who should be chosen from the Hungarian State Railways, be named by the Allied Generals at Budapest.

It was decided:

(1) to appoint in advance a Commission of experts to deal with the re-distribution of the rolling stock as prescribed by Article 318 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria;

(2) that the Hungarian Representative attached should be appointed by the Allied Generals at Budapest from the staff of the Hungarian State Railways;

(3) that upon the appointment of the Commission, instructions should be given to the President in a sense of the resolution prepared by Colonel Logan (See Appendix "F").

7. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation of the 3d October (See appendix "G").)

SIR EYRE CROWE said that when the Council had decided on the 23d September⁴ to fix the amount of the allowances for the President of the Military Commission of Control in Germany as well as for the Presidents of the sub-commissions, they had forgotten to fix the amount of the allowances for the Presidents of the Naval and Air Commissions of Control. He thought that the three Presidents of the Commissions of Control should be placed upon the same footing and be given the same allowances.

MR. POLK said that he had spoken to General Bliss in regard to the matter and that the latter had expressed surprise that the resolution had been adopted in that form. He (Mr. Polk) had just returned to Paris and was not in a position to make a reply at the moment, but he would communicate his answer to the Secretariat-General later on.

The Proposal of the British Delegation was accepted on the understanding that Mr. Polk would communicate his reply as soon as possible.

8. M. LAROCHE said that the decision of the Supreme Council to hold a plebiscite at Teschen⁵ had been communicated to the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Governments. In accordance with the terms of this decision, the plebiscite was to be held within a period of three months after notification. It was therefore most urgent that a Commis-

Allowances for
the Presidents of
the Naval and
Air Commissions
of Control in
Germany

Nomination
of a Teschen
Commission

³ HD-18, minute 5, vol. VII, p. 372.

⁴ HD-59, minute 3, p. 327.

⁵ HD-58, minute 2, p. 300; HD-62, minute 8, p. 412.

sion should be appointed. He wished to add that it was important that the Commissioners should leave at as early a date as possible in order to put an end to the unrest which was showing itself in the Duchy.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had telegraphed his Government but, probably on account of the recent disturbances in England, he had received no reply.

MR. POLK said that he had also received no reply up to the present.

M. SCIALOJA said that the Italian Government, in view of the fact that the resolution of the Supreme Council, did not make it obligatory to change their representative on the Teschen Commission, had thought it advisable to appoint their present representative at Teschen.

M. PICHON said that he was informed that the authorities at Prague were most desirous that the Inter-Allied Commission should be composed of new members. The question was an important one for the Czecho-Slovak Government in view of the demonstrations which had been made against it within the course of the last few weeks. He believed that the wishes of the Czecho-Slovak Government should be met in this matter.

M. LAROCHE said that the French Representative would be M. de Manneville, Minister Plenipotentiary.

M. SCIALOJA said that if the other Powers appointed new representatives the Italian Government would do the same.

M. LAROCHE said that it was further necessary to arrange for the Military occupation of the Duchy; it was an urgent matter, but the Council would have to await the reply of the British Government on the general question of the constitution of the forces which were to undertake Inter-Allied occupations.

(The Council decided to postpone the discussion of the question until the American and British Representatives had received instructions from their Governments.)

9. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated the 2nd October, 1919 (See Appendix "H").)

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented upon the note presented by the British Delegation of the 2nd October. He recalled that General Milne had been asked by the Supreme Council to fix a line which neither the Turks nor the Greeks should pass.⁶ The General had gone to the spot. He thought that the present line could not be held. It was necessary for the Greeks either to advance or retreat. If they advanced they could not avoid a conflict with the

Limitation of
Greek and
Italian Zones
of Military
Occupation in
Asia Minor

⁶ HD-10, minute 4, vol. VII, p. 194.

Turks. The Greeks were aware of this fact. General Milne thought that it would be possible to advance the line, but in this event, it would be necessary to take armed resistance into consideration. General Milne had summarized the situation in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the Note which was before the Council. Before M. Venizelos had left Paris he had been sounded as to whether he was willing to accept a withdrawal of the Greek line under the conditions fixed by General Milne. M. Venizelos appeared to be willing to agree, but upon condition that a withdrawal in the region of Aidin should call for occupation of the territories evacuated by the Greeks by Interallied contingents.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that from a military point of view he had no objection to the proposals of General Milne as a whole. He objected only to these proposals which dealt with the southern part of the line held by the Greeks. General Milne appeared to desire a withdrawal in the region of Aidin. From a military point of view, this proposal was the better one, because the situation of the Greeks at Aidin was precarious, and, if it were to be improved, a conflict with the Turks was inevitable. He wished also to state that the line drawn on the map annexed to the British report⁷ did not entirely correspond to the conclusions of the report. So far as the occupation of the valley of the Meander was concerned, he thought the proposals contained in the fourth paragraph of the British Note did not quite agree with the terms of General Milne's report. There was in this report nothing to show that the actual line of demarcation should continue to form the northern limit of the Italian occupation. If the valley of the Meander was to be occupied by Allied troops it was natural that the occupation should be effected by Italian troops, in view of the fact that they were on the spot, and also as the refugees from the region of Aidin were concentrated in the territories occupied by the Italian troops, it would be easy for the Italians to return them to their homes. The character of the Italian soldier was such as to make incidents impossible. The Italian soldier lived on good terms with the local population and this was a guarantee that the occupation could be made under the best conditions.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the proposals contained in the British Note were based upon General Milne's report. There was no reason for believing that the General had thought of advancing the Italian line. He knew an agreement had been made between the Greeks and the Italians; an agreement approved by the Supreme Council in regard to the limits of the respective zones of occupation.⁸ He wished to state, with all due deference to the Italian Government and its military au-

⁷ Map referred to does not accompany the minutes.

⁸ HD-10, minute 4, vol. VII, p. 194.

thorities, that he did not feel that the idea of replacing Greek troops by Italian troops would meet the situation. If the Greek withdrawal were followed by an Italian advance, he feared that the effect would be disastrous from a Greek point of view. The proposal to which M. Venizelos had finally agreed looked to a Franco-British occupation. Such an occupation seemed possible of realization, but if the Greeks learned that they were to be replaced by Italians the situation would be worse than at present.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that in examining the resolution taken by the Supreme Council on the 18th July, he did not see that it was a question of defining a neutral zone nor that any similar definition was necessary.

M. PICHON said that the reasons given by Sir Eyre Crowe appeared to him most grave. If the Italian proposal were accepted there was great danger that the end which the Council sought, which was the pacification of the region, would not be achieved.

M. SCIALOJA said that so far as the pacification of the region was concerned experience was in the favor of the Italians. There would be no complaint from the Turkish populations in the region of the Italian occupation. He ventured also to remark that the line of the 18th July was a line of demarcation between the Greeks and the Italians. If the Greeks were no longer there, it would be natural, to establish contact, for the line to go farther north. The Greeks would have no reason to complain. It would be possible to hear the Greeks first or to postpone the settlement of the question until an agreement with them had been reached.

MR. POLK asked what would be the result if the line were moved farther east.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked the Council to put themselves in the place of the Greek Government. At M. Clemenceau's request, M. Venizelos had endeavored to reach an agreement with M. Tittoni. If M. Scialoja's proposal were now adopted, the Council would appear to be taking sides with the Italians against the Greeks without having consulted the latter, and would also be failing in their engagements. So far as he was concerned, he could not associate himself with such a course.

MR. POLK said that he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe. The Greeks would be put in a humiliating situation, because a line of agreement had already been fixed with them.

M. SCIALOJA said that if the principle of Interallied occupation of the neutral zone were adopted it would have to be understood that an Italian contingent would form part of the army of occupation. He recalled that the refugees from Aidin had been placed under the protection of Italian troops.

M. PICHON said that he saw no reason to object to this proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in taking this action the Council would be precipitating difficulties which would inevitably provoke trouble between the Italians and the Greeks. The Council had assumed obligations towards the Greeks because they had asked them to go to Smyrna. He asked whether any similar resolution had been made requesting the Italians to go to Asia Minor.

M. SCIALOJA said that there had been a resolution of the 18th July which, by fixing a line between the Italians and Greeks, had recognized the principle of Italian occupation.

MR. POLK said that the Council had testified to an occupation in fact, but he did not believe that they had accepted the principle of Italian occupation.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that General Milne had only been instructed to fix a line of demarcation.

M. SCIALOJA said that all occupation was occupation in Asia Minor and occupation in fact and did not constitute a definite right. For the moment he held that Italian occupation had been recognized.

MR. POLK said that he had heard nothing to the effect that Italian occupation had ever been recognized. The Council, in fixing a line of demarcation, had never sanctioned Italian occupation. It had only been a question of avoiding conflict.

(He then read the resolution of the 18th July (See H. D. 10, Minute 4).)

M. SCIALOJA said that this resolution constituted a virtual recognition, particularly because of the fact that the line of demarcation had been communicated to the Turkish Government in the name of the Conference. The Italian troops were in Asia Minor in the name of the Conference.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if M. Scialoja should insist upon this declaration being inserted in the proces-verbal he would be obliged to make a formal reservation. His Government had undoubtedly never recognized Italian occupation.

M. PICHON said that the Council had to pronounce upon a definite proposition. The question was in what manner the zone between the line drawn in accordance with the resolution of the 18th July and with the new line, which General Milne proposed, should be held by the Greeks. He asked whether the territory was to be occupied by Inter-Allied troops, which should include Italian representatives. It must be understood that the Inter-Allied occupation of the new zone could not have the effect of sanctioning the situation created by the landing of Italian troops in Asia Minor.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to add that General Milne advocated the representation of Greek troops in the army of occupa-

tion of the zone which they were about to evacuate. It was, in effect, the Greeks who were retiring from a territory to which they had gone with the approval of the Conference.

M. PICHON asked whether it would be possible to send Italian troops as well to this zone.

MR. POLK said that he was ready to refer the matter to his military advisers, but he could not consent to this arrangement if it meant that the present position of the Italians in Asia Minor was to be recognized. The situation would then be quite different. The presence of Italian troops had never been recognized as resulting from a mandate given by the Conference.

M. PICHON said that it would be possible to state in the decision that the steps which the Council proposed to take should in no way prejudice the final decision. The question now was to decide if the Inter-Allied Army of occupation should contain Greek troops and no Italian troops, if the occupation should be truly Inter-Allied and if, at the side of the American, British and French troops, Italian and Greek troops would be represented.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought that he should make his point of view more definite. The Greeks were in occupation. They were being asked to retire for military reasons, to stop their advancing in order to avoid conflict with the Turks. M. Venizelos had said, that the Greek troops should be left where they were, but should be joined by British and French units. This would be sufficient to prevent the Turks from attacking. He asked just what the Council desired; whether it was to prevent the Turks from attack and nothing else. If the situation were complicated in allowing the Italians to enter the Inter-Allied Army, new difficulties would be created. The very fact of putting Italian and Greek troops in contact would place them on the verge of an incident.

M. PICHON said that he recognized the weight of the views expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe and that he was in agreement with him.

M. SCIALOJA said that he too would agree.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to take the occasion to express to his Italian colleague his thanks for the conciliatory attitude which he had adopted. There was another matter about which he desired to speak. He did not wish any doubt to exist as to the position of General Milne. General Milne had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in Asia Minor by a decision of the Supreme Council.⁹ It appeared, however, that the French authorities at Constantinople were unwilling to recognize this situation. They stated that they had received no instructions on the subject. It might be possible to inform them of the decisions of the Conference.

⁹ HD-10, minute 4, vol. VII, p. 194.

M. PICHON said that there was no question but that General Milne was in command in Asia Minor. As to the question of the command at Constantinople, that was another matter, and had formed the subject of negotiations between the British and French Governments, and an agreement had been reached in regard to the matter in the month of December last. He asked that Sir Eyre Crowe should permit him to consult with M. Clemenceau, who was Minister of War, in regard to the matter before any actions were taken.

It was decided :

- (1) to accept the proposals made by General Milne in his telegraphic report to the Supreme Council (See Appendix "H") ;
- (2) that in the sector of Aidin the southern limit of the zone of Greek occupation should be changed to a line running to the north-east along the frontier of the sandjak of Smyrna to a point where this line intersects the said frontier ;
- (3) that the zone between the line established by the decision of the Supreme Council of the 18th July and the new line (frontier of the Sandjak) should be occupied by British, French and Greek troops.)

Observations of the Roumanian Delegation Respecting the Ports, Waterways and Railways Clauses in the Treaty of Peace With Hungary

10. (The question was adjourned pending the receipt of a new Roumanian note.)

Committee for the Execution of Colonial Clauses of the Treaty of Peace With Germany

11. (At M. Pichon's request the appointment of a Committee was postponed.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, 7 October, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-66

Translation

Note From the German Government, Under Date of October 3, Relative to the Evacuation of the Baltic Regions by German Troops

In reply to note No. 1755/G dated September 28 [27], 1919,¹⁰ the German Government points out that it attaches the greatest importance to the determination taken regarding the retreat of the troops in the Baltic and in Lithuania, and that it is continually making the most energetic efforts to accomplish this operation.

¹⁰ Appendix E to HD-62, p. 419.

An order was issued, among others, to this end, under date of September 25, 1919, ordering that the soldiers' pay, as well as other advantages accorded to the units who would refuse to conform with the order of retreat, be withheld, and furthermore, in order to prevent reinforcements joining these troops, the German frontier on the Courland side has been closed. Orders were given to fire on the troops who despite this precaution would attempt to cross the line. The furnishing of munition supplies was formally forbidden. General von der Goltz has been recalled from his post. The supreme command is confided, in replacing General von der Goltz, to Major General Von Eberhardt, over all the troops which are at the present time East of the frontier of the Empire until such time as the complete retreat of the troops shall have been effected. Finally, the German Government has addressed a proclamation to these troops pointing out their duty, and indicating the dangers and sufferings of which they seem to be unaware, and which they might cause for the German people if they persist in their disobedience.

All these measures should protect the German Government against the unjustified reproaches which the Allied and Associated Powers have judged necessary to address to Germany (basing the judgment upon the refusal of the German troops to obey orders) accusing them of not trying to fill their obligations relative to the evacuation of the former Russian territory.

The Allied and Associated Governments have a sufficient idea of the position in which the Peace Treaty places Germany to realize that the German Government is unable to have recourse to more energetic military measures.

Referring to the enlistment of German troops in Russian formation, the German Government completely declines any participation in this affair, and adds that it has again clearly expressed its point of view to those concerned. The German Government has never authorized these enlistments and has every desire to do all in its power in the accomplishment of its evacuation obligations.

The German Government must protest energetically against the severe measures contained in Marshal Foch's note, the object of which is the renewal of the blockade of Germany with a view to cutting off supplies. The Allied and Associated Governments cannot have forgotten that this blockade caused not only the death of hundreds of thousands of women, children and patients, but further introduced a weakening in the labor output as a result of insufficient nourishment, which produced a direct influence upon the disorder under which Germany is seriously suffering at this time.

The German Government has every hope that the Allied and Associated Powers, recognizing its good faith, and, in consideration of this,

will forego the application of these inhuman war measures against the German civil population which is in no wise responsible for the actions of the troops now in the East.

But, in order to furnish the Allied and Associated Governments with an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the intensity of its intervention, the German Government requests that they enter into *pour parlers* concerning the measures it would be advisable to adopt.

To this end, the German Government proposes the early constitution of a commission composed of representatives of the German Government and representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments. In the view of the German Government, the duty of this Commission would be, after an examination of the situation, to take the necessary measures to bring about a rapid execution of the evacuation of these territories, and to supervise and force their execution. The German Government respectfully requests an early reply in this matter.

WACKENDORF

DUSSELDORF, October 3, 1919.

Appendix B to HD-66

Note by the British Delegation

RUSSIAN PRISONERS IN GERMANY

On August 2nd the Supreme Council decided to impose on the German Government the obligation (which has always existed) to maintain the Russian prisoners in Germany.¹¹ At the same time, the German Government was to be informed that all restrictions on the repatriation of these prisoners would be removed.

There are a number of matters which have arisen from this decision which need to be settled.

It will be necessary to review the case of these prisoners from July 18th, 1919, at which time their food supply and support was being carried out through the French Government, the American Red Cross and the British Red Cross. On the above date the Supreme Council decided¹² that, pending repatriation (which was to be studied by an Inter-Allied Commission), the feeding of the prisoners should be taken over by the Commissariats of the Allied Armies of Occupation. This arrangement continued until August 2nd, when all responsibility for the prisoners was, by the decision already referred to, transferred to the German Government.

¹¹ HD-22, minute 7, vol. VII, p. 486.

¹² HD-11, minute 6, *ibid.*, p. 208.

The decision involved elaborate arrangements in connection with the transfer of the prisoners' camps from the charge of the Allied Commission of Control to that of the German Government, and it was not found possible to effect this transfer until August 23rd. The Inter-Allied Commission continued to issue food to the prisoners on the same scale as previously until the camps were actually handed over. The Commission considered that it was morally bound to hand over the camps for which it was responsible in good order, and it is submitted that the period of 21 days from the date of the Supreme Council's decision (17 days from that on which the order was received by the Inter-Allied Commission) was the minimum possible.

In order to enable the Inter-Allied Commission as at present constituted to be wound up, definite rulings are required on the following points:

1. *Question of Repayment in Kind to German Government for Flour Supplied by them for Russian Prisoners of War.*

One of the arrangements in force at the date of the Supreme Council's decision of the 2nd was that the German Government should furnish the Russian prisoners with bread on a scale of 600 grs. per day, the flour required to provide the difference between this amount and the ordinary German civilian ration of 300 grs a day being refunded by the Inter-Allied Commission. The amount of flour owing to the German Government by the Inter-Allied Commission on August 23rd under this arrangement was 2,495 tons of wheat flour or 2,745 tons of rye flour. The Commission ask that these quantities should be furnished and handed over to the German Government as early as possible.

2. *The Question of Settling the Accounts of the Inter-Allied Commission.*

The President of the Inter-Allied Commission has reported that the amount of money required to meet the financial liabilities actually incurred by the Commission is 400,000 marks; that all accounts are in order, but that these accounts cannot be closed until the above sum is received.

3. *The Question of the Formation of an International Commission to take the Place of the Former Inter-Allied Commission.*

On being informed of the decision of August 2nd, the German Government at once pointed out that this decision placed them in a most difficult position, and that the Russian prisoners would inevitably suffer considerably as a result of it. These contentions were supported by General Malcolm as President of the Inter-Allied Commission and Marshal Foch in a letter addressed to the Peace Conference dated August 22nd urged that the Inter-Allied Commission should be replaced by the International Commission of Control on which Ger-

many would be represented. General Malcolm urges that it is essential that the Entente should re-assume some sort of control, both for the sake of their own prestige, and to prevent the spread of Bolshevism amongst the Russian prisoners. He reports that in spite of the arrangements which are being made to proceed with the repatriation of the prisoners by sea during the coming winter, there will still remain about 90,000 Russians who cannot at present be repatriated owing to the conditions prevailing in Russia, and for whose care the Entente at one time made themselves responsible.

4. *The Question of the Appointment of a Fully Accredited Russian Mission to Berlin.*

This question is closely connected with 3 above. At present there is at Berlin a Russian Colonel Brandt looking after the interests of Russian prisoners of war. He has, however, no official status, and the Germans do not recognise him. Colonel Malcolm points out that it is essential that some Russian official be appointed to act as a channel of communication between the Russian prisoners of war and the authorities responsible for their care and repatriation. He does not consider Colonel Brandt of sufficient weight and reliability to act in that capacity, and urges the appointment of a Russian representative whose integrity and authority are beyond dispute.

5. *Question of Repayment to German Government of Expenses (2 Million Marks) Incurred in the Care of Kiev Refugees.*

The following is an extract from a report by General Malcolm, dated August 18th, explaining this question:—

“These refugees were brought to Germany by the request of the Entente Representatives at Kiev in January 1919, in order to save them from Bolshevik reprisals. On 18th March, General Nudant notified the Inter-Allied Commission that they were to be responsible for the care of these people, and were to study the means of reimbursement of expenses to the German Government.¹⁴ The German Government was informed of this decision, and denied all responsibility for the care of these refugees. There are at present some 600 of them in camps supervised by the Inter-Allied Commission, and expenses to date amount to about Marks 2,000,000.

It is essential that a definite arrangement should be made with the German Government for the repayment of past and future expenses incurred on behalf of these refugees, or that the German Government should be informed that they are held entirely responsible for their maintenance.”

In reply to above, General Malcolm was informed by Marshal Foch that the Secretariat of the Peace Conference had no knowledge of any decision of the Supreme Council on this subject, and that the German Government who had allowed these Russians to enter Germany, should themselves take any measures which they might think

¹⁴ See subenclosure to enclosure printed *infra*.

necessary in order to recover in the future from the Russian authorities the expenses incurred in this connection.

In a further letter dated September 24th (copy attached marked A) General Malcolm has asked that the matter may be referred to the Supreme Council for decision. General Malcolm contends that the Entente accepted the responsibility for these refugees and are repudiating their responsibility. In his opinion the amount involved is small as compared with the breach of faith with which the Entente can be charged.

BRITISH DELEGATION, 30 September, 1919.

[Enclosure—Appendix A]

INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION FOR THE
REPATRIATION OF RUSSIAN PRISONERS OF WAR
BERLIN

1, MOLTKE STRASSE, 24 September, 1919.

In reply to your letter No. 2244/P. G. 2 of the 16th instant forwarding Foch's ruling on the question of expenses (2,000,000 marks) incurred in the care of Kiev refugees;

1. The fact mentioned therein that the Supreme Council issued no decision on the subject of the transfer of Russian refugees from Kiev is fully appreciated.

2. I wish to draw attention, however, to your letter 657/P. G. 2 of the 18th March (copy attached marked "A") from which it is clear that the Kiev refugees were admitted into Germany by the German Government at the request of Entente Representatives at Kiev, and that they were to be taken on charge of the Inter-Allied Commission, and repatriated with the first convoys of Russian prisoners of war.

3. Accordingly, arrangements were made for their housing and feeding with the German Government on the same lines as the Russian prisoners of war.

4. Much of the early correspondence dealing with the proposed evacuation of the Refugees from Kiev to Germany is not in my possession, and occurred before I arrived in Berlin. I have, however, a memo, dated 4th March, 1919 (No. 1672 SL/11) from "Le Président du Conseil, Ministre de la Guerre" to "Le Général Chef de la Mission Militaire, chargée du rapatriement des Prisonniers de Guerre en Allemagne", forwarding a proposal by Général Berthelot that 1,400 Russian officers refugees from Kiev should be sent to Novorossisk, General Denikin's Army by the Allied Governments.

In my opinion, the fact of such proposal being made, proves that the Entente considered themselves free to dispose of the Kiev refugees as they desired.

5. In view of the above facts I request that the matter be again referred to the Supreme Council, and the full circumstances of the case put before them.

N. MALCOLM
Major-General
President, Inter-Allied Commission

[Subenclosure—Translation ¹⁵]

Note

INTERALLIED PERMANENT
ARMISTICE COMMISSION

SPA, March 18, 1919.

General Dupont, Adlon Hotel, Berlin, for General Ewart.

First. German commission has pointed out to me that more than two thousand Russian officers as well as a certain number of Russian soldiers, women, and children were last January, upon invitation of the representatives of the Entente at Kiev, transported from Kiev to Germany.

Second. German Government requests a settlement with regard to expenses for pay and food. This matter is placed henceforth in the hands of the Interallied Commission on Russian War Prisoners, which is to study the means of reimbursing the advances made and of providing repatriation of the Russians in question ahead of the first convoys repatriating the Russian prisoners.

Third. Inform German Government of this decision.

NUDANT
French Military Mission

Appendix C to HD-66

PEACE CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE OF ORGANIZATION
OF THE
COMMISSION ON REPARATIONS

No. 815

PARIS, September 27, 1919.

NOTE

From the Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations.

To the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers.

In conformity with the instructions of July 17, 1919, of the Council of Five;¹⁶

¹⁵ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹⁶ HD-9, minute 2, vol. VII, p. 173.

In view of the provisions of Article 181 of the Peace Treaty.

By reason of the interest attached by the Commission on Reparations to the resumption of economic activity in Austria as soon as possible, so that she may compensate by her exports into the neighboring countries the importation of goods which they shall furnish her, and later, in a general way, pay her debt to the Allies;

Considering the necessity, on account of the present weakness of Austria's own resources, to incite the neighboring States to send her supplies so as to reduce as much as possible the shipments of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Considering, on the other hand, the advisability of instituting in Vienna a sub-Commission which would be charged by the Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations to study on the spot the conditions of sending supplies to Austria;

The Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations proposes to the Council of Five to take the following resolution:

There shall be established in Vienna, with the least possible delay, a sub-Commission of the Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations, charged with the study of the conditions of Austria's supplying.

It shall be composed of one Delegate of each of the Powers represented in the Committee of Organization of the Commission on Reparations.

The Chairmanship shall be attributed at each meeting to each one of the Delegates in turn; the Secretary shall be permanent.

It can add to itself, in a consultative capacity, and according to the nature of the question dealt with, representatives of the States neighboring Austria: Poland, Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugoslavia and Hungary.

It shall determine the needs of Austria in foodstuffs and raw material and shall try to find all the measures capable of developing to its maximum the production of Austria herself.

It shall examine and propose the means which it shall deem the best to facilitate and insure the delivery and the transportation by the neighboring States of Austria of goods which are necessary to her and the payment by Austria of her purveyors; it shall endeavor to make all the States concerned adopt its views.

That the Sub-Commission shall be installed in Vienna by a member of the Committee of Organization bearer of a letter from the Council of Five to Chancellor Renner.

By order of the Committee,

Appendix D to HD-66

[*Note From the European Commission on Coal*]

Translation

PEACE CONFERENCE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON COAL
SECRETARIAT

PARIS, October 1, 1919.

The Secretariat of the European Commission on Coal has the honor to transmit to the Secretariat of the Peace Conference, the following, to be submitted to the Supreme Council:

1.—The draft of a telegram to be sent to the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments regarding the supplying of coal to the Austrian Republic and especially to the City of Vienna, and in support of that draft a report drawn by a sub-commission appointed by it and which it had approved.

2.—The draft of a resolution presented by Colonel Logan of the American Delegation and approved by the European Commission on Coal, a resolution tending to the immediate nomination of a commission charged with the provisional distribution of the rolling stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. (For original English text, see S. H. Bulletin 989.)¹⁷

[Subenclosure 1]

PEACE CONFERENCE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON COAL
SECRETARIAT

PARIS, October 1, 1919.

Project of Telegram

THE SUPREME COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK
REPUBLIC, TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC

The European Commission on Coal has just examined the question of the supplying of coal to Austria and especially to the City of Vienna. It has come to the conclusion that immediate measures must be taken to remedy the intolerable situation resulting for that country and for its capital, especially from the fact that Poland and Czecho-Slovakia did not fulfill their contracts to furnish coal. The Mission declared itself convinced that nothing in the present state of affairs, opposes the execution of those contracts, and that if it is opportune to look for the means to give to the furnishing states the rolling stock they are asking for, it remains well understood that the execution of the contracts in question could not be subordinated to the improvements to be expected in that respect.

¹⁷ See appendix F, p. 529.

Adopting the conclusion of the European Commission on Coal, the Supreme Council invites you therefore in the most pressing manner to take without delay the necessary measures to execute integrally, from the date of the present communication, the promises to supply coal to Austria; any new delay henceforth will have to be made up within a minimum time limit.

The contract now in force shall be valid until new arrangements have been made, either by an agreement between the Governments concerned, or drawn up by the Commission on Reparations in execution of Article 224 of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

[Subenclosure 2]

Report

B. 111, C. E. C. 109

The sub-commission appointed by decision of September 27, 1919, of the European Commission on Coal to study the question of supplying with coal the Austrian Republic and especially the City of Vienna, states and submits to the approval of the European Commission on Coal the following remarks and conclusions:

I

According to the terms of contracts made, Czecho-Slovakia promised to furnish to Austria, for each work day, the approximative quantities of coal hereafter mentioned:

Gas coal	1, 100 tons
Lignite for the electric industry of Vienna	920 "
Lignite for domestic consumption	2, 500 "
Lignite and coal for railroads and industries	4, 226 "
Total	8, 746 tons
or 218,650 tons per month.	

According to the terms of contracts made, Poland promised to furnish to Austria 2000 tons, 1000 of which was coal and 1000 lignite per working day, or 50,000 tons per month. That supply is independent of that promised by Poland for the transportation called "Polonia".

II

If Czecho-Slovakia and Poland have fulfilled and still continue to fulfill their engagement towards Austria, the latter would have about 50% of her needs. But on account of previous delays, the execution, even complete, from now on, would still leave Austria for a very long time with a very much smaller quota, probably lower than 33%. This remark is increased by the fact that it is a question for the best

part for domestic and urban needs. All the witnesses agree as to the distressing situation of the City of Vienna and to foretell, if immediate measures are not taken, such a state of misery that the Allied and Associated Powers could tolerate neither politically nor humanely.

Now, Czecho-Slovakia, with her present production, can satisfy both her engagements toward Austria and her own needs to the amount of 77% according to the figures of 1913. Poland is in a more difficult situation since Upper Silesia has stopped shipments. But even so, she can fulfill her promises to Austria and cover 35% of her own domestic and industrial needs without any importation, according to figures furnished by the Polish Delegate; the suspension of shipments from Upper Silesia for any length of time is however a very unfavorable hypothesis; finally, it appears, although the Polish Delegate expressed an opinion quite contrary, that it would be rather easy for Poland to increase her production.

The sub-commission considers therefore that, from the point of view of production, there exists no prime motive either for Czecho-Slovakia or for Poland preventing those countries from fulfilling their engagements towards Austria; the amount promised must therefore be delivered.

III

As regards transportation, the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Delegates pointed out the difficulties resulting from the lack of rolling stock. The Polish Delegate raised the general question of the distribution of that material in Central Europe. The Delegate of the United States insisted upon the necessity of acting as quickly as possible in that respect.

The sub-commission considers that the general question thus raised was not within its jurisdiction and that it would have to limit itself to annex it to its report, to be submitted to the European Commission on Coal, together with a note relating to it and furnished by the delegates of the United States and Poland.

As to the problem of the rolling stock necessary for the execution of the engagements in question, it seemed to it, in spite of the contrary remarks of the Polish Delegate, that there could be no real difficulty for the furnishing countries of filling the gaps for the indispensable quantities. According to a telegram from Colonel Nutt, Austria has just stated that she was ready to make a very important effort in that respect, and, for the surplus that might still be necessary, there is no doubt that the concerted action of the Maehrisch-Ostrau Sub-commission and the Interallied organs in Vienna and Budapest could provide for it.

The Sub-commission considers therefore that from the point of view of rolling stock no prime motive can be opposed to the execution of the engagements made.

IV

The Sub-commission is not informed of the last provisions made by the Maehrisch-Ostrau Sub-commission. It appears however from the latest news received, that new agreements between Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Austria have been concluded or are about to be concluded. In order to avoid any action contrary to the Maehrisch-Ostrau Sub-commission, the Sub-commission deemed it its duty to limit itself to the examination of the contracts in force and to their execution, and it concludes:

V

That it is advisable for the European Commission on coal, and if the latter deems it proper to refer the matter to the Supreme Council, to formally invite the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to furnish to Austria the total amount of coal and lignite mentioned in the agreements made with the Government of that country, and to make up, within a minimum time limit, any delay which might take place in the future in the shipments:

Being understood that the contracts made are valid and continue to be valid as long as new agreements have not been made by an accord between the Governments concerned, in anticipated execution of Article 224 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, or drawn up in conformity with the provisions of that article, by the Commission on Reparations.

Appendix E to HD-66

[*Telegram From the British Delegation to General Haking*]

Cypher telegram to General Malcolm, Berlin, from Astoria, D. 17:30,
25 September 1919.

No. 60

M. Paderewski suggests immediate despatch of a considerable number of allied officers to Upper Silesia to safeguard the interests of inhabitants and ensure normal output of coal.

Telegraph your views as to practicability and desirability of above proposal, and state number of allied officers already in Upper Silesia. This suggestion is entirely distinct from question of dispatching plebiscite Commissioners who could not in any case now proceed prior to ratification.

Appendix F to HD-66

[Proposal of the United States Representative on the European Commission on Coal (Logan)]

During the meetings of the Sub-Commission of the European Coal Commission considering the Austrian coal situation it was clearly brought out that the shortage of railway equipment contributes largely to the existing coal shortage in Central Europe. The production at the mines is in general increasing and has now reached a point where the coal actually mined cannot be moved due to shortage of railway equipment.

Roumania has removed to date over 1,000 locomotives and over 20,000 railroad cars of all classes from Hungary. It appears needless to point out that Roumania by these seizures has not only secured the restitution of railway equipment belonging to herself, but in addition has also removed equipment belonging to Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Notwithstanding these Roumanian seizures there still remains in Hungary and in that portion of Hungary just ceded to Austria, railway equipment considerably in excess of local requirements, which should be put into movement as soon as possible. The coal situation as well as the general economic situation in Central Europe does not permit of any of this railway material resting idle any longer.

The European Coal Commission, therefore, recommends the immediate passage of the following resolution by the Supreme Council:

First: That a Special Commission of Experts be established without delay for the purpose of determining and effecting an immediate distribution of surplus railway equipment now in Hungary and Austria as between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and such of the other Allied and Associated Powers as may have interests therein. That this Special Commission in effecting this distribution shall have regard to the amount of material registered on these lines in the last inventory before November 3, 1918, the length of track (sidings included) and the nature and amount of the traffic. That this Special Commission shall also specify the locomotives, carriages and wagons to be handed over in each case, and shall decide upon the conditions of their acceptance, and shall make the provisional arrangements necessary to ensure their repair in Austrian and Hungarian workshops. The provisions of the foregoing shall be applied to lines of former Russian Poland converted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities to the normal gauge, such lines being regarded as detached from the Austrian and Hungarian State systems.

That a full report of the determinations arrived at and the distribution effected by this Special Commission will be reported to the Supreme Council at the earliest practical date. It will be understood that the primary reason for the creation of this Special Commission is to provide the means for placing surplus and idle railway equip-

ment now in this territory into economic activity without delay. The findings of this special commission will in no way prejudice the determination of the Commission of Experts contemplated by Article 318 of the Austrian Peace Treaty, and similar provisions included in other treaties.

Second: That this Special Commission will report to the Supreme Council the quantities by classes of rolling stock taken out of Austria or Hungary by any Power in excess of its proper proportion as determined under the First paragraph of this resolution. This same report will include a detailed statement as to the monetary value of the rolling stock thus removed.

Third: That this Special Commission of Experts will include one representative appointed by each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The Governments of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, may each designate a representative who will represent the interests of the respective governments before this Special Commission.

That a representative to be designated by the Austrian Government and a representative of the Hungarian State Railways to be designated by the Allied Council of Generals at Budapest will represent the interests of Austria and Hungary respectively before this Special Commission.

Appendix G to HD-66

Note From the British Delegation Relative to the Allowances for the Presidents of the Naval and Aerial Missions of Control in Germany

BRITISH DELEGATION
PARIS

OCTOBER 3, 1919.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: Your Excellency will recall that the Supreme Council decided in its session of September 23¹⁸ that General Nolle, President of the Interallied Commission of Control, charged with the supervision of the execution of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty with Germany, would receive 10,000 mks. per month as "frais de représentation", the Council having decided in its meeting of the day before that the superior officers who preside the sub-commissions of the said Commission, would receive 5000 mks. per month in the same conditions.

These provisions seem to have left out the question of the "frais de représentation" of the presidents of the Interallied Naval and Aerial Missions of Control since the decision according to which 10,000 marks are allotted for that purpose to General Nolle, President of the Military Mission and 5000 marks to the presidents of the sub-commissions, applies only to them.

¹⁸ HD-59, minute 3, p. 327.

It would appear according to the report of the military delegates at Versailles,¹⁹ which was adopted at the Supreme Council on July 9, last, that the three commissions of control, military, naval and aerial, must be considered as distinct and independent organs, and I believe that the members of the Aerial Commission are at least as many as those of the Military Commissions.

The presidents of the Naval and Aerial Commissions shall very probably have to go to the same "frais de représentation" as their colleagues of the Military Commission, it would therefore seem just to allow the same sum.

Consequently I have the honor to propose that this question should be submitted to the attention of the Supreme Council at its next session.

Appendix H to HD-66

Limitation of Greek and Italian Troops in Zones of Occupation in Western Asia Minor

1. The Supreme Council decided on July 18th²⁰ to direct the Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic possession of Turkey to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna and Italian and Greek Generals, were to fix the military limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops should be permitted to move.

2. In pursuance of these directions General Milne has telegraphed the following report for communication to the Supreme Council:—

I have arrived at the following conclusions as a result of the report of the Commission who have been visiting the Turco-Greek front at Smyrna:

1. That a state of active warfare exists between the Greek and Turkish forces,

2. That the greater portion of the Turkish forces is composed of organised bands of brigands, reinforced by armed peasants driven from the villages by the Greeks and determined to prevent further advance of the Greeks. These armed forces which are secretly receiving reinforcements from the regular units are in considerable strength,

3. That the Turkish Government has no control over these forces, which are pledged to drive the Greeks out of Asia and hence cannot insist on their withdrawal from any stipulated line,

4. That generally speaking the civil administration is overruled by the military authorities, the latter being secretly in support of the national movement, which is gaining strength, and the Turkish Government are powerless to exercise any restraining influence,

¹⁹ Appendix E to HD-3, vol. VII, p. 76.

²⁰ HD-10, minute 4, *ibid.*, p. 194.

5. That the Greek forces having advanced in many places to a purely Turkish area and an extremely difficult country, are from a tactical point of view badly placed but that any further advance to gain better positions will be resisted to the utmost and can succeed only after severe fighting,

6. That it is of little practical value to define a tactical defensive line, since it would be respected by neither one side nor the other, the Turks because they are determined to drive back the Greeks, the Greeks because no line will satisfy them until they obtain the line asked for by Mr. Venezelos,

7. To concede this line to the Greeks would be to give them territory which is purely Turkish and where a bitter resistance would be offered by the inhabitants. In addition it will precipitate an outbreak elsewhere in Asia Minor.

8. Should the Greeks not be allowed to advance, and should they be driven back by the Turks, they will undoubtedly lay the blame on the Entente,

9. Guerilla warfare will continue so long as Greek troops remain in Sanjak, and any further advance will tend to create greater difficulties.

10. For the present best solution is for Greeks to remain practically in the present position with exception of certain minor rectifications and that mentioned in para. 13,

11. I recommend that the Greek occupation should extend approximately along following line starting from North (ref. 1/250,000 Asia Minor) At point on coast 7 miles north east of Aivalik to watershed at Osmanlar (P. 1558) thence following along summits of Kestene Dagh, Akmaz Dagh to village of Dushme due south along watershed between the Eurkut Dere and Mentesh Dere to junction of Bekir Chai and Jumaali Dere, the summits of Fughlajik and Saritash respectively, along straight line in South South West direction to Urpek Kaya point 1804; through villages Karasigrli, Yenije, Tepejik, Tatarkeui, Munteveli, Yenichiftlik, Papazli; southwest [*southeast*] over point 1804 and Belen Dagh; to village[s] of Kesterli, Yarishlik (3 miles east of Ahmedei)—Sart; south along ridge to Ardiyak-Yaila to villages Kemer, Tabaklar, Semit, Bujak; south to Chaili; south west to Bademma. Question of further boundary will depend on decision given to my proposals in para. 13. All villages mentioned are being taken as inclusive to Greeks.

12. I have considered in suggesting above delimitation Greek point of view and advance to line east of Soma Akhissar railways but, as it included occupation of further country inhabited almost entirely by Turks occupation of which would lead to further fighting and bitterness until reasons produced by Greeks carry sufficient weight this could not always be admitted. Generally I have selected best tactical line in vicinity of line at present occupied.

13. As a whole Greek division is practically employed defending Aidin area on 3 sides in close contact with Turks Greek position in vicinity of Aidin is tactically unsound. An advance will be necessary to secure a good and safe position but this will be stoutly resisted by Turks. If Peace Conference raise no objection to further hostilities and to occupation of further Turkish villages Greeks

might be allowed to advance to line (? Kochak) Chai but in view of fact that Greeks are at Aidin to [*in?*] defiance of orders, and that if they remain there there will be constant fighting, I recommend that they may be restricted to Sanjak area and that allied troops occupy Meander valley as bitterness here is more marked than elsewhere. Advances to Manisa and to Aidin have been carried out contrary to orders and it is in these two places that all the trouble is arising, and so long as Greek troops remain there will continue.

14. It is highly desirable that an early and clear decision from the Peace Conference on above points should be given. Such a decision will carry much weight and should do much to establish tranquillity before the conclusion of harvest when unless some solution be found Turkish forces will be considerably increased.

3. The point in General Milne's telegram which appears to require special consideration and a decision by the Supreme Council is that raised in para. 13 respecting the south eastern portion of the line, the northern and eastern portions of the line being satisfactorily fixed by para. 11 of the telegram.

4. The Supreme Council approved on July 18th an agreement between M. Veniselos and M. Tittoni fixing the line of division between the Greek and Italian occupations from the mouth of the River Meander as far as Keushk on the Smyrna-Aidin Railway. What General Milne proposes is in effect that this line should either remain as the southern limit of the Greek zone of occupation, or be modified so as to follow the boundary of the Smyrna sanjak from the point where it cuts the boundary of the sanjak, but that in either case the line should remain as the Northern boundary of the Italian occupation, the area between the Veniselos-Tittoni line and the boundary of the Sanjak being occupied by Allied troops.

5. Copies of a sketch map of the area in question showing the boundary of the Sanjak in purple and the Tittoni-Veniselos line in red, are attached hereto;²¹

2 OCTOBER [, 1919].

NOTE: Map referred to in Section 5 routed with original papers as follows—S-G; S-D; S-H; I-F.

²¹ The map referred to does not accompany the minutes. It is in the Department's files under Paris Peace Conf. 867.0146/21.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, October 10, 1919, at 10: 30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Secretaries

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de St. Quentin.

ITALY

M. Scialoja

Secretary

M. Barone Russo.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Mr. C. Russell
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE M. Massigli
ITALY M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned :

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. Dresel
Colonel Logan
Mr. Shepardson

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Lt. Colonel Kisch
Sir George Clerk
Mr. Leeper
Mr. Carr
Capt. Fuller

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
M. Loucher
M. Tardieu
General Weygand
M. Laroche

ITALY

M. Brambilla
M. Vannutelli-Rey.

1. **MR. POLK** said that the question of making a communication to the German Government relative to granting permission to German and Austrian representatives to proceed to Washington to attend the International Labor Conference had been referred to the American Delegation,¹ which had been asked to assume the responsibility of providing arrangements to enable the German representatives to proceed to Washington. He had informed Baron von Lersner in accordance with the Supreme Council's instructions and had now received a reply which he wished to place before the Council.

(Mr. Polk then read a note from Baron von Lersner of the 4th October. (See Appendix "A".))

MR. POLK said that he had prepared a draft of a note in reply to Baron von Lersner which, in his opinion, expressed the views of the British, French and American labor representatives. He wished to submit this note to the Council and to ask that, if there should be any objections to its contents, they might be brought up at the next meeting.

2. (The Council had before it a note from the Bulgarian Delegation of the 7th October requesting an extension of ten days to the time limit for the transmission of the reply to the Conditions of Peace. (See Appendix "B".))

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in view of the circumstances he did not feel that the Council could refuse the request of the Bulgarian Delegation.

(It was decided:

to accede to the request of the Bulgarian Delegation for the prolongation by ten days of the time allowed for the presentation of its observations on the Conditions of Peace.)

3. (The Council had before it a note of the 29th September addressed to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission by the American Delegation. (See Appendix "C".))

M. LOUCHEUR briefly commented upon the note in question. He said that, in his opinion, no action could be taken until the Treaty of Peace had come into force. The matter had been discussed by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, which was of the opinion that they had authority under the Treaty of Peace to create a tribunal competent to deal with the question and consider the case in question. He

Admission of German and Austrian Delegates to the International Labor Conference at Washington

Request of the Bulgarian Delegation for the Prolongation by Ten Days of the Time Allowed for the Presentation of Its Observations on the Conditions of Peace

The Question of German and Austro-Hungarian Ships in Spanish Ports

¹ HD-56, minute I, p. 255.

urged that if this view should be accepted, all the Allied and Associated Governments should make the same reply to the Spanish Government in the event of a request being made to these Governments by the Spanish Government.

MR. POLK asked whether it was proposed to take the same course in regard to Norway.

M. LOUCHEUR replied in the negative. He said that the Norwegian claims for reparations from Germany for Norwegian ships lost during the war had been referred by the Conference to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission. The Commission was of the opinion that the matter was one affecting only Norway and Germany, and should consequently, be settled between them, as Norway was not one of the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. POLK said that he agreed, as in the case of Spain it was a question of ships now in Spanish ports.

(It was decided:

(1) to accept the principles contained in the note of the American Delegation (See Appendix "C") to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission as a basis for a reply from the Government of the United States to the Spanish Government in regard to the final disposition of German and Austro-Hungarian ships in Spanish ports;

(2) that each of the Allied and Associated Governments, in communicating a reply to the Spanish Government on the subject, if occasion should arise, should address that Government in the same sense.)

4. (The Council had before it the draft of a note addressed to the German Government relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (See Appendix "D"), prepared by Marshal Foch, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of October 7th, 1919, (H. D. 66).)²

**Draft of a
Reply to the
Note of the
German
Government
Relative to
the Evacuation
of the Baltic
Provinces**

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the draft of the note in question. He added that, in view of the fact that information had just been received to show that German troops were conducting active operations in Latvia, he proposed that a sentence be added to the end of the third paragraph pointing out that information had just been received to show that the German troops had attacked the army of the Letts.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he agreed with the terms of the note prepared by Marshal Foch. There was one point, however, which he wished to raise. The German Government would undoubtedly publish the note and cause public opinion in Germany to feel that the Allied and Associated Governments were acting in a brutal man-

² Minute 1, p. 505.

ner towards Germany. He considered it of equal importance that the note should be published by the Allied and Associated Governments, and that a paragraph should be inserted to make the reasons clear why these Governments considered the German reply³ to be unsatisfactory. He proposed that a paragraph in this sense should be inserted after the second paragraph of Marshal Foch's draft. Sir Eyre Crowe then read the draft of the paragraph in question, (See Appendix "E".)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would have no objection to the insertion of Sir Eyre Crowe's paragraph in the reply to the German Government.

MR. POLK said that he had referred the matter to General Bliss and that he could not express his final opinion at the moment. He would, however, communicate his reply at the first opportunity.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would be also necessary to name a General to act as head of the mixed Commission mentioned in the note.

MARSHAL FOCH said that the General could be named after a reply to the note had been received from the German Government.

(It was decided:

- (1) to accept the draft note prepared by Marshal Foch relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces with the addition to the text proposed by Marshal Foch, and with the addition of the draft paragraph submitted by Sir Eyre Crowe. (See Appendix "E");
- (2) to publish the text of the note.)

5. (The Council had before it the draft of a resolution on the subject of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany (See Appendix "F") prepared by Marshal Foch in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council of the 7th October, 1919, (H. D. 66).)⁴

Draft of a
Resolution
Respecting
Russian
Prisoners of
War in
Germany

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the draft resolution.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he could not help but feel that the Council were going back on their previous decision. In the first instance they had decided to wash their hands of the Russian Prisoners in Germany,⁵ and they had later decided that an International Commission should be appointed upon which there should be both German and Russian Representatives.⁶ If the present draft were accepted, the Council would be going still further, for they would be again assuming responsibility. He pointed out that in the second

³ Appendix A to HD-66, p. 517.

⁴ Minute 2, p. 506.

⁵ HD-22, minute 7, vol. VII, p. 486.

⁶ For previous discussion concerning the establishment of an international commission, see HD-66, minute 2, p. 506.

paragraph of the note, there was a clear expression of the acceptance of responsibility and that in the paragraph numbered 1, the Allied and Associated Governments spoke of re-establishing an Inter-Allied Commission for the control of Russian prisoners. He thought that it was important to avoid the use of the word "re-establishment". Paragraph No. 2, Section B, spoke of regulating the ways and means for the repatriation of Russian Prisoners of War. This paragraph also was a clear expression of the re-establishment of responsibility, and he considered it necessary that the responsibility of the Allied and Associated Governments should not be re-established in regard to Russian Prisoners of war in Germany.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that he thought it possible that the expressions which had been used in the draft resolution went somewhat too far, but the question was one of the intention of the Allied and Associated Governments. The Russian Political Conference at Paris had been informed by General Denikin that it was necessary to avoid at all costs the repatriation to Bolshevist Russia of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany, who came from those parts of Russia, which were under the control of the Soviet Government. He could not help but feel that the Allied and Associated Governments had an important interest in this matter, and he did not believe that they could wash their hands of the affair and leave the matter entirely to the Germans. He felt that the Council should not be willing to consider themselves bound by the resolution in regard to Russian Prisoners of War which was taken on the 2nd August.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, at the present time, the German Government were not in a position to repatriate the Russian Prisoners of War by way of Poland and the Ukraine.

(It was decided:

to request General Weygand and General Sackville-West to modify the draft resolution relative to Russian Prisoners of War in Germany (See Appendix "F"), taking into consideration the views expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe.)

6. GENERAL WEYGAND said that he had just received a telegram from General Dupont according to which the situation in the Baltic Provinces was regarded by the War Office at Berlin as being very grave. General von der Goltz was unable, or rather unwilling, to return. A new Government had been formed at Mitau, at the head of which was Count Palen.

Telegram From
General Dupont
Relative to the
Situation in
the Baltic
Provinces

M. BERTHELOT said that this information was similar to that which he had received, and, according to which, a Russo-German reactionary Government had been established.

7. SIR GEORGE CLERK said that he had little to add to the written report which he had made to the Council. (See Appendix "G".)

He ventured to express the hope that his report would be kept wholly to the Council as he had expressed a number of opinions. He had endeavored to ascertain in Roumania the real meaning for the attitude of the Roumanian Government on the Hungarian question, and the result had been to convince him that M. Bratiano had thought that by playing for time the Allied waters would become sufficiently troubled for him to catch many excellent fish. He therefore considered it essential to make the Roumanian Government understand that the Allied and Associated Governments were both absolutely united and absolutely definite in their decisions in regard to Roumania. He considered it advisable to point out to the Roumanian Government that the decisions taken in regard to Roumania, both as regarded the line of the frontier and the principle of the minorities treaty, were definite. He considered that this would put an end to the Roumanian hopes, which were founded on delay in settling with Turkey, arranging the Adriatic question and other difficult points upon which M. Bratiano was counting. In regard to Hungary, he considered that the first step necessary was a provisional recognition of a Hungarian Government which could maintain order, hold elections and negotiate peace. As soon as such a Government existed, the Roumanian troops could be asked to evacuate, and this alone could definitely put an end to the requisitions about which there had been so much discussion. He proposed that the Hungarians should be told the conditions upon which a Hungarian Government would be satisfactory to the Allied and Associated Governments. He thought that M. Friedrich should be told what he must do, that his present Government no more corresponded to the views of the Allied and Associated Governments than the Government of Archduke Joseph. He thought that M. Friedrich should be invited to broaden the bases of his Government. It was necessary to have some solvent to loosen the crystals concerned in Hungarian affairs. For instance an Allied Commission of a political character, holding direct, and locally supreme authority from the Allies, should negotiate with the various Hungarian political parties. He thought that upon such a condition [*commission?*] Roumania should be represented at least in a consultative character.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Sir George Clerk prepare draft notes to the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments.

MR. POLK asked whether the Supreme Council had received a reply to the message decided upon by the Supreme Council at its meeting of the 22nd August (H. D. 36),⁷ instructing the French Minister at

⁷ Minute 5, vol. VII, p. 791.

Bucharest in the name of the Supreme Council to ask for further information on the intentions of the Roumanian Government with regard to the Banat, and directing him to inform the Roumanian Government that the frontiers laid down by the Council in the Banat and elsewhere were final.

M. BERTHELOT said that no reply had been received from the Roumanian Government.

M. LAROCHE said that, as the first telegram did not appear to have reached its destination, a second telegram in the same sense had been despatched about a month before the present date. The French Minister at Bucharest had acknowledged the receipt of this second telegram and had stated that he had brought it to the attention of the Roumanian Government. Up to the present, however, the Roumanian Government had made no reply.

MR. POLK said that the American Chargé d' Affaires at Bucharest had been unable to discover whether the communication in the sense of the telegram in question had been received at the Roumanian Foreign Office. He thought that M. Bratiano appeared convinced that he could improve his position by waiting.

SIR EYRE CROWE said, with reference to Sir George Clerk's first memorandum, that on the 20th September, M. Bratiano had stated that the Roumanian Government claimed new frontiers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that at the present time the Roumanians and the Serbs were in agreement as to the Banat.

M. BERTHELOT added that the question dealt with the evacuation of the Banat and that both the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments were withdrawing their troops.

MR. POLK asked Sir George Clerk whether he had had a copy of the telegram based upon the resolution of the 22nd of August.

SIR GEORGE CLERK replied that he had not had a copy of this telegram.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that Sir George Clerk and M. Berthelot be directed to draft notes to the Roumanian and Hungarian Governments.

MR. POLK asked for information as to the attitude of the Roumanian Government on the subject of the requisitions which had taken place.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the note to the Hungarian Government should be addressed to M. Friedrich.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought that it should.

MR. POLK said that he felt considerable doubt on the subject.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the relations between the Interallied Generals at Budapest and the Roumanian authorities had become

very strained, and that for this reason he believed there was a great deal to be said for the appointment of a civil Commission, which should be authorized to speak in the name of the Council.

MR. POLK said that he had grave doubts as to the advisability of recalling the Inter-Allied Military Mission at Budapest. The Mission were in a most unenviable position, and there was no question of the fact that the Roumanian authorities at Budapest had lied to them continually.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he agreed with Mr. Polk as to the unenviable position of the Inter-Allied Military Mission. He had not intended to recall that Mission, but considered that to send a Mission of higher rank would have many advantages.

MR. POLK said that he thought this proposal was worthy of serious consideration.

M. BERTHELOT said that it would be necessary to tell M. Friedrich that the Allied and Associated Governments considered that he was acting as a mask for the Archduke Joseph, and that they considered it impossible for him to remain.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought that M. Friedrich might be asked to resign or else to broaden the basis of his Government.

M. BERTHELOT said that he thought it would be preferable to have M. Friedrich retire. The Governments of the States bordering upon Hungary had no confidence in him and he thought that they considered him reactionary and Anti-Semitic and that in occupying his present position it was to act as a mask for the Archduke Joseph. He thought that M. Friedrich should consequently retire as the head of the Government, but this did not mean that he should not occupy a position in the Government.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that he felt that he ought to point out that in the opinion of the Allied Generals at Budapest, M. Friedrich was the best person.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had no objection to M. Friedrich as a man but considered him, however, merely as a symbol. If the Conference adopted the course of treating with him, they would give the appearance of treating with the Archduke Joseph. He thought that M. Heinrich⁹ was a person with whom the Allied and Associated Governments could enter into negotiations. He was undoubtedly a man of the same sort as Friedrich but there was a difference. His Government might be more democratic, and in entering into negotiations with him, the Allied and Associated Governments could not be charged with entering into negotiations with the Archduke as he did not think M. Heinrich represented the Archduke.

⁹ Franz Heinrich, Hungarian Minister of Commerce, August 18 to September 12, 1919.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said he agreed but there was a question of form to be considered. He proposed that the Conference inform M. Friedrich that they were not satisfied with the Government as constituted under him. He suggested that M. Friedrich be asked whether he was prepared to broaden the basis of his Government in such a form as to be satisfactory to the Allied and Associated Governments. If he were not prepared to do this he should be informed that he must go. It would then be a question of a Government under Heinrich or Peidl.¹⁰

M. BERTHELOT said that he felt that there was danger in treating with M. Friedrich in any form whatsoever.

MR. POLK said that he was confident that M. Berthelot and Sir George Clerk could prepare a text which would be satisfactory to the Council. He then asked Sir George Clerk where the difficulty in arming the police of Budapest lay.

SIR GEORGE CLERK replied that the Roumanian Government said that if the police at Budapest were armed, there was danger of a White Terror. M. Diamandi had said that at the time when the Roumanians should evacuate Budapest it would be necessary for them to arm the police.

MR. POLK said that he thought they had no intention of arming the police.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that in his opinion the only means of improving the situation lay in appointing a Commission or in despatching a note. He wished to add, confidentially, that M. Friedrich had informed him, but asked him in no event to let the Roumanians become aware of the fact, that if the Roumanians should leave, he had sufficient police and arms. He thought that M. Friedrich undoubtedly had some scheme in view.

MR. POLK said that Colonel Antonesco, a Roumanian officer, who had recently been in Paris, had assured him in a conversation which had taken place a few days before that the police at Budapest would be armed upon the following day. In point of fact nothing had occurred. He thought that it was most important that the blockade preventing the shipment of arms to Hungary should not be removed. He also wished to say that the conduct of the Roumanians in Bessarabia had called forth strong adverse comment. He was informed that the Roumanian authorities were holding elections and enforcing conscription. He thought that the action of the Roumanian Government in Bessarabia should be considered by the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he agreed and that the matter should be discussed at the next meeting.

¹⁰ Julius H. Peidl, Hungarian Socialist Leader; Prime Minister, August 1 to August 6, 1919.

8. (The Council had before it a memorandum of 23rd September prepared by the American Representatives on the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.) (Appendix "H".)

Proposal of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission for the Despatch of a Sub-Committee To Determine the Reparation Value of Material Removed From Hungary by the Roumanians

M. LOUCHEUR said that the American Delegation proposed that a sub-committee be sent to Budapest to ascertain what material had been requisitioned and what could be placed to the account of the Allies. Sir George Clerk was informed in regard to the matter, and, in his report, he had expressed the opinion that it would be inadvisable to put the Roumanians before a Tribunal. If this were done Roumanian opinion

would be unnecessarily offended and it was important to treat the Roumanians as Allies. He proposed that the Roumanians should be admitted to representation on the sub-committee in a deliberative capacity. He added that in taking this action the Allied and Associated Governments would only be giving to Roumania what was due her, because, according to the regulations of the Treaty of Peace in regard to the Reparations Commission, the Allied States interested, and Roumania was one, were to be admitted to the meetings of the Reparations Commission in the discussion of the questions affecting them. The sub-committee could also study the food question in Hungary, but the immediate question before the Council was that of appointing a sub-committee with a Roumanian member.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that he would suggest that the sub-committee be placed under the orders of the Reparations Commission rather than of the Allied Generals at Budapest.

MR. POLK said that he agreed. He wished to submit an amended proposal which he thought would meet the objections which had been raised. (See Appendix "I".)

M. LOUCHEUR said that he agreed in principle to the proposed resolution submitted by Mr. Polk, but desired time to examine it carefully.

It was decided:

(1) to send to Budapest a Sub-Committee to determine the reparation value of material removed from Hungary by the Roumanians;

(2) that this Sub-Committee should be composed of representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers and to which should be added a Roumanian Representative, who should sit in a deliberative capacity;

(3) that the Sub-Committee should be under the orders of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.

It was further decided:

to refer to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission the proposed resolution (See Appendix "I"), relative to the constitution and functions of the Sub-Committee, submitted by Mr. Polk.

9. MARSHAL FOCH said that it was of urgent importance to decide as to the composition of the Armies of Occupation, which should be furnished by the Allied and Associated Governments in the plebiscite and other areas.

Composition of
Interallied
Forces of
Occupation

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had just sent Sir Eyre Crowe a communication in regard to the matter.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, 10 October, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-67

English Translation of a Note From Baron von Lersner to Mr. Polk

OCTOBER 4, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: I did not fail to communicate to my Government the contents of the letter which you were good enough to send me relative to the participation of German and Austrian Delegates in the Labor Conference which will be held in Washington. My Government has directed me to thank you for this communication, of which it has taken due note. It is needless to say that, should occasion arise, my Government will gratefully avail itself of the offer of the Government of the United States of America, unofficially set forth at the end of the letter, to facilitate the voyage of the German Delegates. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the German labor unions are not free to decide the question of sending a labor delegate, as they feel bound by the resolution of the International Congress of Labor Unions, held in July of this year at Amsterdam, providing for the participation of delegates of the labor unions in the Washington Conference, on the condition that labor delegates from all countries, without exception, be invited and admitted with equal rights. The same question will arise also as regards the other German delegates. Under these circumstances, the German Government considers an explanation of importance as to whether the assumption above indicated of German participation in the Conference at Washington can be looked on as an actuality.

In view of the shortness of the time remaining for the completion of preparation for the voyage, my Government would be especially grateful if this supplementary information could be communicated to it without delay.

Please accept, etc., etc.,

BARON VON LERSNER

To the President of the American Delegation,

The Under Secretary of State, FRANK L. POLK,

Paris

Appendix B to HD-67

Note, No. 363, October 7, 1919, From the Bulgarian Delegation, Requesting an Extension of the Time Allotted for the Preparation of the Observations on the Treaty of Peace

BULGARIAN DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE, October 7, 1919.

From: M. K. Sarafov.

To: M. G. Clemenceau.

I have just received a telegram from the Bulgarian Government charging me to ask Your Excellency for an extension of ten days to the time limit for the sending of the reply to the Peace Conditions.

This prolongation is made necessary owing to the difficulties of a technical order, notably in the work of translation and printing.

I have the honor of calling Your Excellency's attention to the fact that the great distance separating Paris from Sophia is one of the most important reasons for this step of the Bulgarian Government.

I dare hope that the Peace Conference will be kind enough to accede to my request, made in the name of the Council of Bulgarian Ministers, and I beg Your Excellency please to accept, etc., etc.

K. SARAFOV

Appendix C to HD-67

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Note of the American Delegation to the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission

With reference to the disposition of German and Austro-Hungarian ships in Spanish waters, the American Mission is advised by its Government that a note has been received from the Spanish Embassy setting forth the Spanish attitude on the subject. This document refers to Annex 3, Section 1 of Part 8 of the German Treaty, and states that the Spanish Government had consented to the use of these vessels on the basis that their final disposal should not be prejudiced and that with regard to pending claims, Spanish rights in the ships should not be impaired. The note proposed that the final decision as to disposal should be left to an "International Commission or Organization which may be designated at the proper time to work out a juridical and friendly solution of the question." It is further stated in this note that, as the claims consisted of losses suffered through acts of a belligerent power committed in violation of international law, it was logical that neutrals in whose waters the ships

were at the time the injury was done should have the prior claim on indemnification through these ships.

The answer of the United States Government which it is proposed to send refers to Paragraph 20, Annex 2, Section 1 of Part 8 of the German Treaty, and points out that on ratification of the Treaty the Reparation Commission will constitute, under the Paragraph referred to, the suitable tribunal for the hearing of the claims of the Spanish Government in regard to these vessels.

The American Delegation consider it important that the views of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission be obtained on this subject in order that uniform action may be secured. It is obvious that the same question will come up in relation to ships of enemy powers detained in other neutral ports, and in fact it is questioned by the Department of State whether, under Paragraph 20 cited, the future Reparation Commission cannot properly pass on specified claims as to maritime losses suffered by Norway. These claims were briefly discussed at the meeting of the Committee on September 4, 1919.

PARIS, September 29, 1919.

Appendix D to HD-67

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE
ALLIED ARMIES
General Staff G-3

G. H. Q., October 7, 1919.

*Draft of a Note To Be Sent to the German Government Regarding
the Evacuation of the Baltic Countries*

The Allied and Associated Governments note the formally expressed pretensions of the German Government, in its note of October 3,¹¹ to undertake and to pursue in the most energetic manner, the withdrawal of its troops from the Baltic regions and Lithuania.

They also consider as opportune the measures decided upon by the German Government for that purpose.

However, they call attention to the fact that those measures will have value and be efficacious only if they are fully and strictly executed by the German troops. Experience proves indeed that certain agreements already made have not been respected—notably on the subject of stopping reinforcements for the East.

¹¹ Appendix A to HD-66, p. 517.

The Allied and Associated Governments could not therefore admit that the German Government can be considered as having done all that was in its power to fulfill its obligations of evacuation.

As a consequence, they maintain the principle of the full responsibility of that Government in the execution of the evacuation, and they mean to maintain integrally the coercive measures announced by their telegram of September 27th,¹² as long as the evacuation has not been undertaken and pursued with all the desirable celerity.

However, for the purpose of encouraging the execution of that operation and lending assistance to the German Government, the Allied and Associated Governments accept to send Allied representatives whose mission should consist:

in receiving from the German Government information regarding the measures decided upon by it, in view to regulating the conditions of the evacuation, as well as in proposing measures which they themselves may deem advisable.

in exercising on the spot and, with all freedom of action, the effective control of the execution of said measures.

The Chairmanship of the Allied Commission should be in the hands of a superior officer appointed by the Allied and Associated Governments.

Only when that superior officer has informed the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments that the operations of evacuation are progressing normally, can the stopping of the measures provided for by the telegram of September 27th be considered.

The German Government is asked to kindly send its answer as soon as possible.

Appendix E to HD-67

[Draft Paragraphs by Sir Eyre Crowe To Be Inserted After Second Paragraph in Draft of a Note To Be Sent to the German Government, Appendix D, supra]

But when the German government contends that the action they have taken must absolve them from the charge of having neglected to fulfil their honourable obligations under the armistice, it is necessary to point out that the orders of the German government have, notwithstanding the repeated demands and remonstrances on the part of the Allied and Associated governments, been so long delayed that the German government now claim to be practically powerless to enforce them. It is difficult not to believe that their long delay has been deliberate, calculated as it was to lead to the

¹² Appendix E to HD-62, p. 419.

very results which the German government now affect to deplore. It seems indeed impossible otherwise to explain their refusal to recall General von der Goltz who has been their official instrument in creating the present situation in open defiance of the legitimate representations of the Allied and Associated governments. Why was the General's recall thrice demanded, refused? Why was he, after being summoned to Berlin only recently, sent back deliberately to the scene of his activities except to complete under the authority of his official command the organization which now affords to the German government the pretext that the troops hitherto paid, clothed, and transported by them have passed out of their control? Has General von der Goltz acted contrary to their instructions? If so, why has not his insubordination been punished either by formal dismissal or in any other way?

Unless some very much more satisfactory explanations of these matters than those hitherto afforded are given by the German Government the Allied and Associated governments cannot admit the contention that the German government have, as they assert, continually made the most energetic efforts to withdraw the German troops from the Baltic states.

Appendix F to HD-67

Draft of a Resolution on the Subject of the Russian Prisoners of War in Germany [Prepared by Marshal Foch]

By its resolution of August 2nd, 1919,¹³ the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments has charged again the German Government with the supplying and the upkeep of the Russian prisoners of war interned in Germany, and accorded to that Government full liberty of action regarding the ways and means of repatriating those prisoners.

The application of those provisions, creating certain difficulties of such a nature as to aggravate the material and moral situation of the interned Russian prisoners of war, the Allied and Associated Governments, in a spirit of humanity, have decided to adopt all measures guaranteeing to those prisoners decent conditions of life, and to pursue their repatriation within the limit compatible with the internal situation of Russia.

For that purpose, and taking into account the request expressed by the German Government itself, it has been decided:

1st: The interallied Commission for the control of the Russian prisoners of war, created in execution of the Armistice of January 16,

¹³ HD-22, minute 7, vol. VII, p. 486.

1919,¹⁴ shall be reestablished and transformed into an International Commission by the adjunction of a German representative and a Russian representative.

2nd: That International Commission, operating in Berlin under the Chairmanship of one of the Allied representatives, shall have as mission:

a) to control the material situation of the interned Russian prisoners of war (food, clothing, hygienic conditions of installation, sanitary treatment);

b) to regulate, in accord with the German Government, and taking into account the instructions of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, the ways and means for the repatriation of the Russian prisoners of war.

c) to send to the Supreme Council all useful proposals concerning the help which might be granted, in case of urgency, by the German Government [and?] by the Allied and Associated Governments, (improvement of the material situation of the prisoners, facilities for the transportation for their repatriation), being understood that the cost for the upkeep of the prisoners of war falls entirely upon the German Government, and that the cooperation considered above would have to be reimbursed by Germany.

3d: A special Interallied Commission, operating in Paris shall be charged with the final settlement of the questions of a financial nature, of supplies and of transportation which remain unsettled at the time of the dissolution of the Interallied Commission of Control, namely:

Reimbursement for flour to the German Government.

Liquidation of the liabilities of the Interallied Commission (500,000 marks).

Reimbursement to the German Government of its expenditures made for the Kiev refugees.

Utilization of the Russian money which remains in the hands of the German Government (20,000,000 rubles).

That Commission will be qualified to prepare the decision of the Supreme Council regarding those questions and to follow its execution in connection with the Interallied or national organs concerned.

Besides, in the future, it shall have to follow, in the same conditions, the proposals which the International Commission might send to the Supreme Council in conformity with the provisions of Par. 2, Alinea c.

¹⁴ Vol. II, p. 11.

Appendix G to HD-67

[*Report by Sir George Clerk of His Mission to Bucharest and Budapest*]

BRITISH DELEGATION,
PARIS, 7 October, 1919.

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL: I have the honour to submit herewith to Your Excellency and the Supreme Council a report of my Mission to Bucharest and Buda Pesth, from September 24th last, when I sent Mr. Leeper back to Paris with M. Bratiano's latest proposals, to the 4th instant on which day I left Buda-Pesth. Attached to my report is a note by Mr. Leeper dealing with the questions of the minorities treaty and the internal political situation in Roumania.

My mission was, strictly speaking, confined to taking the communication of the Supreme Council¹⁶ to M. Bratiano, with such verbal comments as he might seek from me, and, on subsequent instructions, to comparing the evidence as to Roumanian requisitioning collected by the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals at Buda-Pesth with the assurances given to me on this head by the Roumanian Government. I have therefore throughout considered and declared myself as simply a messenger from the Supreme Council, and if my report seems to go beyond the functions of a messenger, it is because I thought it my duty to give the Supreme Council as clear an appreciation as possible of the Roumanian and Hungarian situation, an appreciation derived from conversations with those most qualified to speak in both countries.

In the same spirit, I have ventured to make certain suggestions, not because I consider myself qualified to put them forward, with any authority, but in the hope that, in a very complicated question, they may at least serve to help the Supreme Council to take their decision.

I venture to observe that, if I have in any way succeeded in faithfully representing the Roumanian situation to the Supreme Council, it is mainly, if not entirely, due to the assistance I received from Mr. A. W. A. Leeper, the Secretary of my Mission. His experience of the Roumanian question in all the forms in which it came before the Peace Conference, his great knowledge of Roumanian men and parties, and his objective and impartial insight into their real aims and intentions, were of the highest value. Moreover, Mr. Leeper was able, while in Bucharest, to correct in many quarters misunderstandings and misrepresentations of the attitude of the Allies, and, if Roumania does once more co-operate loyally with the Allied Powers, the credit will be in no small measure due to him.

¹⁶ Appendix E to HD-47, p. 111.

In conclusion, I should add that the Roumanian Government welcomed and assisted my mission in every way possible. They showed the greatest readiness to help, and they manifestly desired to express their sincere wish to re-establish complete friendship and understanding with the Allies.

I have [etc.]

GEORGE M. CLERK

[Enclosure]

Report

The Supreme Council is already aware of the situation in Roumania up to September 24th last, on which date I sent Mr. Leeper to Paris with M. Bratiano's detailed views, and it is perhaps unnecessary to re-capitulate anything before that date.

But in order to give a clear appreciation of the Hungarian situation, I must travel somewhat outside the actual object of my mission, as political developments in Roumania interact closely upon her attitude in Buda-Pesth.

When Mr. Leeper left, a pro-Bratiano Government had been formed under M. Manolescu but it collapsed that same day owing to the sudden refusal of the Transylvanian Ministers to participate. Bucharest is a small place, and in view of the general political excitement, which made it impossible for me to greet a Roumanian statesman without immediate rumours that the Supreme Council were supporting his party, I judged it best to withdraw to the country while waiting for the instructions which were to be sent to me after the meeting of the Council on September 25th.

On September 28th I received the telegram instructing me to proceed to Buda-Pesth, and I arranged to leave next morning. Meanwhile, after the collapse of the Manolescu Government, the King sent for M. Take Ionescu, who also spoke for General Averescu and M. Maniu, and agreed to their forming a joint Government, whose foreign policy was to be based on complete understanding with the Allies, including, in M. Take Ionescu's intention, acceptance of the Minorities Treaty, but with, if possible, modifications of some of the most obnoxious clauses. The same afternoon M. Bratiano had a long interview with the King, with the result that His Majesty suddenly formed a Government of six Generals on the active list, under General Vaitoianu with M. Misu as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This Government took office next day, and was in being on my return to Bucharest. The King was under the impression that he has happily solved his difficulties by creating a neutral non-political Government that could hold the elections with complete freedom and impartiality, but in fact it is only a form of a Bratiano Government, for the President of the Council, who was Minister of War under M. Bratiano, is bound by many ties to M. Constantinescu, who is the political shadow of M. Bratiano.

Before leaving for Buda Pesth on September 29th, I saw M. Bratiano and General Vaitoianu. Both assured me, as the King had repeatedly done, the [*that?*] Roumania intended to stay in the Alliance and to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Entente. The difficult point was the Minorities Treaty, to yield on which was impossible for Roumanian honour and independence, but the intention was to keep this burning question floating until the Roumanian people had pronounced upon it at a free election. I wondered what would happen if the Allies, who were perhaps less interested in the skilful moves of M. Bratiano's internal policy, could not keep their decision waiting for the Roumanian elections, which have, I think been successively postponed since last January, and should demand a definite answer from Roumania in the near future. Neither M. Bratiano nor General Vaitoianu—who told me he absolutely accepted M. Bratiano's foreign policy—could answer more than that a very serious situation would arise. On the other hand, both gave me the most satisfactory assurances as regards Hungary. All requisitions, beyond those of railway and war material, and food supplies for the army of occupation, had been stopped, and the Roumanian Government were most anxious, in their own interests to establish good relations with Hungary. It was only a question of finding a Hungarian Government with which both the Allies and Roumania could work in accord.

I left Bucharest on the morning of Monday, September 29th but only arrived at Buda Pesth on Wednesday morning, October 1st. I could not see the Allied Generals until the afternoon, so I visited M. Diamandy, the Roumanian High Commissioner, first. He repeated what M. Bratiano had said about the stopping of requisitions, and maintained that care had been exercised to leave the agricultural population supplies sufficient for their needs, and gave me the attached report on the supplying of Buda Pesth,¹⁷ to show what had been done for the inhabitants of the city. As regards the breaking up and removal of machinery, with the consequent loss of work and danger of disorder, he maintained that Roumania was justified in protecting herself against her enemy being able to manufacture masses of war material, and inevitably the Roumanian action was on a large scale, since practically every Hungarian factory turned out war material.

With respect to his relations with the Hungarian Government, he said that M. Friedrich would neither resign himself, nor accept colleagues in his Ministry from other political parties, so that a coalition Government, which alone gave the guarantee necessary for a free electoral choice of the Hungarian people, did not exist. M. Friedrich was, after all, the man who called the Archduke Joseph to take charge of the Government, and stood for a reactionary and anti-Roumanian

¹⁷ Annex 3, p. 566.

policy. M. Diamandy had been much impressed, during a recent visit to Vienna, by the anxiety with which M. Renner and the Austrian Government were watching developments in Hungary. They, and to some extent he too, professedly dread reaction and a White terror.

Lastly, M. Diamandy complained that he got but little help or support from the inter-allied Mission, though he recognised that this was largely due to the fact that they were soldiers, rigidly bound by, and adhering to, certain definitely limited instructions. He could therefore never get from them any wider political consideration, but he felt that while he, whatever differences there might be amongst ourselves, always tried to maintain outwardly the solidarity of the Allies, the Generals tended to look on themselves as the protectors of the Hungarians against the Roumanian oppressor—an attitude of which the Hungarian was not slow to avail himself.

Subsequently I attended a meeting of the Commission of the four (4) Allied Generals, of which a *procès-verbal* is attached.¹⁸ Their instructions from the Supreme Council were:—

1. to see that the conditions of the November armistice were properly carried out;
2. to protect such Hungarian property as would form the common reparation stock of the Allies and to prevent it from being taken out of the country;
3. to organize a Hungarian police and *gendarmérie*.

To these instructions they have rigidly adhered, but say that they have found nothing but obstruction from the Roumanians. They cannot get Roumanian officers detailed to help them in checking requisitions, they get promises, but nothing else, of rifles wherewith to organize the police, and they live in a cloud of polite lies. In view of the Roumanian attitude, it has been impossible for them to carry out their instructions, and their position in Buda Pesth is helpless until there is either an Allied dictator, with force at his back which the Roumanians must respect, or the Roumanians evacuate. The first solution being improbable, the Generals strongly advocate immediate evacuation, the more so as they are confident that, whatever might have been the case 3 or 4 weeks ago, M. Friedrich could now keep order from the moment the Roumanians leave. But they urge strongly that they should have authority from the conference to give the amount of support, which provisional recognition by the Conference would confer, to such a Government as they, with their experience of the situation, consider adequate for a temporary administration and for preparing the elections. Such recognition would both oblige the Roumanians to loosen the bands with which they have tied the Hungarian Government hand and foot, and would enable that Govern-

¹⁸ Annex 2, p. 562.

ment to exercise real authority and so escape having to improvise it at the last moment.

As regards the question of requisitions, the Generals consider that the Roumanians, who were at first gratefully welcomed by the Hungarian people as their saviours from the Bolsheviki, have seriously if not irretrievably, spoilt their position by the persistence, extent and stupidity of their requisitioning, and they have further lost Hungarian sympathy by the way in which they have blocked all attempts of the Hungarian Government to administer the country.

The inter-Allied Mission has accumulated a mass of evidence which it is quite impossible to ignore on the subject of requisitions. I annex to this report some of the instances which the Mission have given to me. It is believed to be true that the Roumanian Government have given official orders to stop all requisitioning of private property and is requisitioning only railway material, war material, and food-stuffs necessary for the army of occupation. Indeed, the Roumanians are actually by way of sending back into Hungary, locomotives in excess of the thousand they have already taken. Now while the Roumanian idea of "war material" is very large, if these orders were rigorously applied, the Hungarians would at least know where they stand and could make a beginning of a fresh industrial and agricultural life. But the facts carefully compiled by the inter-Allied Mission leave little doubt that in practice requisitioning of all sorts is continued. Cases brought to the notice of the Roumanian authorities such as M. Diamandy, the High Commander or General Mardarescu, the Commander-in-Chief, are indeed dealt with at once by them and an order is immediately issued for investigation, reparation, and, if necessary, punishment. But the experience of the Allied Mission is that, with the writing of the order, the matter ends and the members of the Mission have neither time nor personnel to drive the Roumanians into full investigation of the large number of cases that are reported daily. In fact, the Roumanian, who is after all a Balkan and therefore an Oriental, and who has been pillaged and looted by the enemy and by his Russian ally, sees here, in the occupation of Hungary, an opportunity which he will consider himself a lunatic to forego. From the private soldier who "requisitions" the umbrella of a passenger leaving the station, to the officer who "requisitions" a motor car or a carpet to be sold for cash to a Jew and re-sold by the latter at a higher price to its original owner, they intend to leave this country with their pockets full. The Roumanian Government, and those responsible for the conduct of its affairs do realize that Hungary, stripped bare of all necessaries of life, is entirely contrary to the interests of Roumania, and are possibly sincere in their intention to take, with a little interest, only what they consider to be their lawful

property, stolen from them, and to limit their requisitions to the quantities they have laid down. But unfortunately they have neither the authority nor the energy to suppress with a rigorous hand the misdoings of their subordinates.

While it is hard to believe that the Roumanians can really have stripped the country to the extent presumed in the Memorandum of September 23rd, 1919 by the American Representatives on the Organisation Committee of the Reparation Commission¹⁹—after all, the Hungarian peasant is as good as others in hiding his possession from the looter, and the Roumanian has many more accomplished rivals in the art of looting—there is no shadow of doubt that the common property of the Allies has been diminished by Roumanian action, and that owing largely to that action, the Allies have the additional burden of helping Hungary to regain her economic existence.

I also had an interview with M. Friedrich, the head of the Hungarian Government. He is a young man, the son, I believe, of a small doctor, and not, I should say, a man of big political imagination. But he has shown strength and courage in holding on to an office which is neither lucrative nor comfortable, and he has by now probably more or less established himself in the opinion of a great mass of Hungarians. He is frankly against a coalition government, which in reality, according to him, really means giving a wholly disproportionate representation to the 8 or 10 per cent of Socialists among the workers of Buda Pesth. He admits that his strength does not lie in Buda Pesth, but claims that the country outside is wholly with him. In fact one reason why he has not resigned, in face of the impossible position in which he is kept by the Roumanians, is that, were he to do so, the peasants would see in it a Jewish manoeuvre and would start local retaliation, with fatal results. He is frankly anti-Roumanian: in fact, he is—like the leaders in all these countries in regard to their neighbors—pessimistic about the stability of all the new and aggrandized States of Southern and Central Europe, except Hungary, whose geographical position, command of the Danube, and industrial population ensure her recovery and eventual prosperity. But to recover, Hungary needs help, and M. Friedrich looks to the Western Powers to provide it. Hungary entered the war, not because she liked it nor for gain, but because in honour bound to Austria and Germany. She has lost and must pay the price, but now asks for help to win back her rightful place among the nations of Europe. For the moment, M. Friedrich does not ask the Supreme Council to grant him provisional recognition, for fear they should re-

¹⁹ Appendix H, p. 570.

fuse, and thereby undermine such moral authority as he possesses. But he does ask that the Council should allow him to hold the elections, under the control and supervision of Allied officials, so that there may be no accusations of pressure or unfairness. The elections will provide a Government which Roumania cannot completely ignore, and will allow Hungary to make a beginning of her new life.

M. Friedrich further assured me that he could maintain order in Buda Pesth when the Roumanians left.

I also received a visit from M. Garami, a leader of the Social Democrat party.

He said that Hungary had two pressing needs: social quiet and order at home, and an early peace with the Allies. M. Friedrich's Government was unable to secure one or the other. It was unrepresentative, for it included neither the commercial nor the industrial nor the working sections of the community. Its strength was among the peasants, and it represented those who belonged to the three "Christian" parties who were well under 50 per cent of the population and the majority of the territorial magnates, but it did not even include the small landholders, the strongest peasant organisation in Hungary. It was avowedly royalist, and M. Friedrich was merely keeping a place warm for the Archduke Joseph. Such a Government could not bring social quiet, nor did it correspond to the demand of the Peace Conference for a Government representing all parties. But so long as M. Friedrich was there, the way for any other Government was blocked. Therefore M. Friedrich must go.

There were two ways to effect this.

One, by a popular rising in Buda Pesth, but M. Garami, himself an avowed Social Democrat, would deplore this, for it would be a disaster for Hungary and Europe. Who could say where such a rising would end? And what would be the effect on the workers of Western Europe of the Hungarian proletariat, who had rejected Bolshevism, being driven back towards it as the only reply to the reactionary Government by which it was now replaced?

The other way, the only way, was for the Supreme Council to repeat to M. Friedrich the message they had sent to the Archduke.²⁰ It was no longer possible to be rigid about nonintervention in the internal affairs of Hungary. The principle had already been broken in the case of the Archduke, and only intervention could save Hungary now.

All classes, if they knew that the Allies' view, as stated to the Archduke, held good for Friedrich, were ready to form a Government answering to those views. But it would want a week or ten days,

²⁰ Appendix C to HD-32, vol. vii, p. 709.

and, in the absence of any international force, must therefore be done while the Roumanians were still in occupation. Otherwise, Admiral Horthy's force would come, and the incidents of Trans-Danubia would be repeated on a larger scale in Buda Pesth, until the workers, in self-defence, brought out their hidden arms, and revolution and anarchy broke loose.

Unless Hungary got a new Government, which the Allies would accept until the elections, or unless an international *gendarmérie* could be created to replace the Roumanians, Hungary was doomed.

M. Garami said that in such a representative Government the workers, about 20 per cent of the population, would not insist on having their members, and would in no case accept more than two offices, provided always that the basis of the Government was republican and democratic. Moreover, if, when the elections came, and provided they were really free, the result was a majority in favour of a monarchy, the workers would loyally accept the voice of the country, though they would continue to fight the decision with all possible legal and constitutional weapons.

M. Garami's practical proposal was that the "bourgeois" parties should visit the inter-allied Mission with a list of a coalition Government, corresponding to the demands of the Allies, for immediate communication to Paris. If the Supreme Council assented to the formation of such a provisional Government, it would come into being forthwith, provided the Roumanians were still in occupation to maintain order. The important thing was to obtain as soon as possible from the Allies a clear statement of their intentions and of how they viewed these suggestions. Otherwise, everyone in Hungary was working in the dark.

Before seeking to draw any conclusions from these various expressions of opinion and desire, I venture to submit that the general foreign policy of Roumania is also a factor that must be taken in account.

At present, the policy of M. Bratiano holds the field. That centres on refusal to accept the principle of the Minorities Treaty, and it is there that the Allies will have to apply most pressure. Their weapons are not many, and they cannot afford to dissipate them, and M. Bratiano is possibly counting on this. That is, he means to use his positions in Roumania to the utmost to extort the territorial concessions he has demanded. But if the Allies are firm, it is to be hoped that in his turn M. Bratiano will not carry his bluff so far as to break with the Allies over this Hungarian question. It would not pay him in the end.

The two problems in regard to the Hungarian question that have to be solved are:—

1. To stop the requisitions.

2. To find a Hungarian Government with which the Allies and Roumania can alike deal.

The question of requisitions has again two sides to it:—

(a) Cessation.

(b) Restoration to the Allies of their common property or its value, and to Hungary of the means to live.

As regards (a), I fear that orders from the Roumanian Government however sincerely meant, will continue to be evaded, and that evacuation is the only real remedy. But it may be expected that the Roumanians, as their time draws to a close, will increase their activities, and it may be possible to put some check on this.

There are only the two roads from Hungary to Roumania over the Szolnok and Csongrad bridges.

At present, a French and Italian officer, with half a dozen men each, are doing most useful work in checking the trains as they go over, but they have no control over the contents of sealed wagons, of which over 6,000 have been sent across. These officers are there with the consent of the Roumanian authorities, and it would seem desirable to extend the system, in collaboration with the Roumanians. The officers and personnel should be largely increased and Roumanian officers must work with them. They should have a copy of the way-bill of every train, with full authority to verify the loads, and to open and inspect sealed wagons. This would at least check and put on record the deprecations that are being committed; it would facilitate the making up of the bill against the Roumanians; it would be a test of the good faith of the Roumanian Government; and it might even, by exposures and their consequences, deter some of the looters from their proceedings.

It would, of course, be even better if such a commission could unload or detach trucks containing goods that should not have been taken, but I fear that difficulties of storing, and lack of sidings, make this impractical.

I may add that M. Diamandy expressed his personal assent to this suggestion, though he could not commit his Government, but pointed out a practical objection from the delay and blocking that inspection of sealed wagons might cause. It is an objection that would have to be over-ruled.

With respect to (b), the American Representatives on the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission have, in a paper dated September 23rd, last, suggested the establishment of a Special Commission at Buda Pest to make out the bill against Roumania. So far as it goes, the proposal seems to be useful and practical, though more provisions might perhaps have been made for Roumanian collaboration. What the Roumanians feel, and feel very deeply, is that from the outset they have been pre-judged by their Allies as criminals and

put into the dock. They ask for collaboration and co-operation, and, instead, are haled before the tribunal for sentence. This does not make them any more ready to sink their own interests in the common stock, and if they were treated more as Allies, who have fought and suffered, and less as criminals, things would probably go far more easily. They feel bitterly such implications as that their action alone has turned Hungary into a burden on the Allies. They ask that allowance should be made for other factors: Bolshevism, moderate harvest, the peasant's general mistrust of the future, the general dislocation of economic life in Europe; all these are factors in the Allies' disappointment at Hungary proving to be not self-supporting, but the whole sin is visited upon Roumania.

In any case, while the American plan provides a means for restoring common property, or its value, to the Allies, it contains no definite scheme for helping the Hungarians, though presumably it is to be inferred that the suggested Commission will study that aspect of the question, and no doubt make Roumania foot the bill. That would provide a solution, but if the Commission is to work under the Allied Generals, it will possibly be looked on by the Roumanians as absolutely anti-Roumanian, and they will continue their Oriental obstruction. The best chance is for an independent Allied and Roumanian Commission.

Even more difficult is the solution of the second problem, the discovery of a possible Hungarian Government.

I have set down, as faithfully and impartially as I can the views of those most qualified to speak. The Generals, disgusted by their experience of the Roumanians are on the whole for the recognition of M. Friedrich. The Roumanians themselves, and democratic Hungary, look sourly on Friedrich and hold that his recognition in any form by the Supreme Council would be a mortal blow to the moral influence of that body, after their action against the Archduke, for whom Friedrich is but the "Locum tenens".

It is for the Supreme Council to decide, and it is only with the greatest deference that I put forward any suggestions.

The first point seems to me to make clearly known to Roumania what the decision of the Supreme Council is in regard to the territorial adjustments asked for by M. Bratiano. Whether these requests be granted in whole or in part or refused altogether, the Roumanian Government should be informed at once, as it will then have no motive to coquet with various Hungarian parties, in the hope of getting the concessions out of them in return for recognition as a Government, and possibly even a separate Alliance.

It is, I think, the hope of finding a more pliant Hungarian administration that is a main cause of the Roumanian objections to Fried-

rich and one of their principal reasons for not leaving Hungary. If the Roumanians knew that they have nothing to hope for in this respect, they might be more ready to carry out immediate evacuation. The only plea the Roumanian Government could urge for remaining would be the maintenance of order, and that could be met by insisting on the provision of sufficient arms to the Hungarian Police.

The difficulty is, however, to decide what provisional Government is to control that police force, and the choice must precede any steps that may be taken to ensure Roumanian evacuation. Though M. Garami's fears may be exaggerated, there is force in the case he makes against M. Friedrich from the point of view of the Peace Conference. On the other hand, the Generals believe in Friedrich and Horthy, and on the evidence before them have no fear of a white terror or reactionary excesses.

But could not M. Garami's proposal be applied to M. Friedrich first? He is, at present, opposed to widening the basis of his Ministry, but if he realised that only so could he comply with the Allies' conditions and secure recognition, he might accede. Pressure might have to be put on the other parties to come in, but if they are really moved by patriotism, a Coalition Government should not be an impossibility.

If M. Friedrich refuses, then the support of the Supreme Council might, as suggested by M. Garami, be offered to a Coalition Government without him, which would be prepared to meet the Allies' conditions.

There is also another alternative, which it might be worth while to consider. I believe that, technically the Upper and Lower Houses of the Hungarian Parliament have never been abolished and still have a legal existence. The two Houses (or rather these members whose seats are included within the present frontiers of Hungary) might be summoned for the purpose of adding members from other parties to the Hungarian Ministry and of appointing dates for the elections and for a plebiscite as to the form of government which Hungary is to have. The objections seem to be (*a*) that such a Parliament has no real relation to the political feeling of Hungary to-day, and (*b*) that the summons must be through the Hungarian Government and therefore provisional recognition of M. Friedrich is involved, though it would be confined to this one purpose alone.

None of these solutions may commend themselves to the Supreme Council, and other and better ones may be found, but I venture to submit the urgency of imposing some solution from the outside. On that point all parties are agreed: that Hungary can only be saved, if the Allies intervene and by their recognition of some Government, enable that Government to exert the authority necessary to preserve

the country from ruin and anarchy. This is an interest of all Europe.

[Annex 1]

Note by Mr. Leeper

THE MINORITIES TREATY

The burning question in Roumania at the present moment is that of the Minorities Treaty. It is a burning question not because the majority of Roumanians, or even of Roumanian politicians really have any practical objections to the conditions contained in the treaty, but because the Bratiano Government and its agents have misrepresented the issue and so misled and inflamed public opinion that many Roumanians are under the impression that the treaties proposed are quite different from what they really are. After the explanations which we were able to furnish to different Roumanian politicians with whom we talked, many of these misunderstandings were cleared away. The treaties with the different new States themselves have now been published in the Roumanian press, and consequently the atmosphere of ignorance prevailing about them has been to some extent dispelled. Roumanians who have discussed the matter with an open mind are quite willing now to admit the Treaty itself involves no infringement of Roumanian sovereignty or violation of Roumanian interest, and if they still object to certain clauses and articles in the Treaty, fortunately the clauses involved are precisely those which could most easily be altered or omitted without affecting the character and force of the Treaty. It is for consideration whether it would not be good policy if both in any demand addressed to the Roumanian Government relative to the signature of the Treaty, and in any communication made by the Peace Conference thereafter to the Roumanian Government, a cordial invitation were addressed to it to discuss the actual text of the Treaty, provided always that the principle of the Treaty, contained above all in Article 13, was accepted as unconditionally binding.

I went through the text of the Treaty with M. Bratiano, with the Opposition leaders, and with the Transylvanian ministers. M. Bratiano's objections were mostly founded on a curious misunderstanding both of the object and actual text of the Treaty. He particularly protested against the economic clauses to which he ascribed the most sinister intentions but he also found fault with most of the articles of the Treaty except that automatically emancipating the Jews. He refused, in particular, to accept Article XIII, providing for the control of the League of Nations. M. Take Ionescu and General Averescu expressed themselves as perfectly ready to sign the Treaty. M. Take Ionescu declared himself wholeheartedly in favor of the eco-

conomic clauses, he considered the minority clauses as a whole as the logical consequence of the foundation of the League of Nations and as in themselves in no way prejudicial to Roumanian sovereignty and interests, and objected only to two paragraphs in the Preamble and to Articles 10, 11 and 12 which, as I have suggested above, may be quite easily removed from the Treaty without impairing its force. The Transylvanian leaders, M. Maniu and others, were more cautious about the matter and anxious, while not like M. Bratiano refusing absolutely to sign, to obtain a preliminary discussion of the Treaty before accepting the principle.* I have every reason to believe, however, from conversations both with them and with others who know them well, that their opposition to acceptance to the principle is most unlikely to be an obstinate one if the attitude of the Conference towards the discussion of detail is clearly shown to be a friendly and conciliatory one.

It has in our several conversations always been made perfectly clear that there can be no question of a relaxation of the principle of control by the League of Nations in favor of Roumania; that this principle has already been imposed as binding on Poland, Czechoslovakia and various enemy countries, and the Transylvanian leaders can have no possible loop-hole of excuse for hoping that more concessions will be given to them than the Conference is likely to give. In any case I feel no doubt at all that the agitation against signature of the Treaty which has been artificially inspired and kept alive would subside at once were the demand made on Roumania publicly presented in a firm but friendly fashion. The urgent necessity for prompt action on this subject can perhaps hardly be over-emphasized.

Annex 2 to Sir George Clerk's Report of October 7, 1919

Translation

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION
BUDAPEST

BUDAPEST, October 1, 1919.

MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF OCTOBER 1ST (AFTERNOON)

Under the Presidency of General Mombelli

1. The Commission assembled at 4:00 p. m. to hear Sir George Clerk who having returned from Bucarest where he had been sent on a mission by the Peace Conference, was in Paris [*Budapest?*].

*Two days after our conversations with Mr. Maniu an obviously inspired article appeared in the official Transylvanian organ headed "We wish to treat". It obtained considerable prominence in the Roumanian press. [Footnote in the original.]

2. Sir George Clerk exposes to the four Generals the purpose and result of his mission to Bucarest.

3. The purpose may be resumed by the four following questions:

- a) Has Rumania decided to remain with the Entente?
- b) Is Rumania ready to cease requisitions in Hungary?
- c) Will Rumania agree to have an Entente Commission regulate the distribution of the spoils taken from Hungary by the Rumanian troops?
- d) Has Rumania the intention to cooperate in the establishment of a stable Government in Hungary which would be disposed to enter into friendly relations with the Entente?

4. Regarding the first question, Sir George Clerk is convinced that the Crown, the Government, as well as the political circles, are all animated with a desire to have Rumania remain faithful to the Entente.

5. Relative to the requisitions (question *b*) Mr. Bratiano—President of the Rumanian Council—has stated that the requisitions in Hungary would cease immediately, with the exception of those strictly necessary for the needs of the occupation troops.

6. Concerning the third question (*c*) Mr. Bratiano has stated that Rumania agrees that the distribution of the spoils, removed from Hungary by their troops, be settled by an Entente Commission, provided that their rights to the material removed by the enemy during the occupation of Rumania and to the spoils “captured by the Rumanian Army” be safeguarded.

7. Concerning the last question (*d*) Mr. Bratiano declared that Rumania is ready to give her support for the establishment in Hungary of a Government such as the Entente desires; on condition, however, that certain special rights of Rumania—which she judges of great importance—be protected.

A condition which would lend to the establishing and entertaining of friendly relations with Hungary, is that Hungary accept, and that the Entente sanction the frontier boundaries which Rumania esteems as indispensable in the protection of her economic interest and her strategical security.

Rumania requests, consequently, that within her territory be included:

(*a*) the mouth of the Maros, the possession of which represents an economic necessity of the first order for Rumania, as the Maros is the only navigable way leading to the center of Transylvania.

(*b*) The Bekescsaba railway system, which is the outlet for the entire Arad region.

(*c*) A tract of land to the depth of 20 kilometres to the West of the Oradeamare-Szatmar railway line, in order to insure the strategic security of the line.

8. Sir George Clerk reads a memorandum which he had sent to the Peace Conference, and in which the above mentioned questions are exposed in detail.

He afterwards calls attention to a letter which he addressed to Mr. Bratiano, in which—while reserving all decisions regarding the Rumanian provisions for the Supreme Council—the principal objections which the Supreme Council might raise are pointed out, and also the eventuality of a refusal.

9. Sir George Clerk expresses his opinion to the Commission that the Supreme Council will not accept the frontier rectifications proposed by the Rumanians. In this case the relations between Rumania and Hungary might be more difficult, and Sir George Clerk wishes to know if these relations are at the present time friendly or strained.

Following is the reply of the Commission:

The Rumanians, by their requisitions, have compromised the very favorable situation which they had created in Hungary by delivering the country from Bolshevism.

Mr. Diamandy—representing the Rumanian Government at Budapest—many times affirmed the good intentions of Rumania to establish a friendly understanding with Hungary, but this understanding was seriously impeded by the excessive requisitions which developed feelings of bitterness among the Hungarians.

It is said that Hungarian statesmen are now making advances to the Rumanians with a view to establishing an understanding, but the importance of these *pourparlers* is not known.

The Commission is unaware, in particular, if the question of frontier rectification was brought up. On this subject Sir George Clerk remarks that it would not be inopportune to inform the Rumanians that any decision relative to the rectification of the frontiers appertains exclusively to the Peace Conference, and that, for this reason, the responsibility for a refusal of the proposals formulated in this matter by Rumania, would in no wise devolve upon the Hungarian Government.

10. Sir George Clerk wishes to know if the Rumanians would be disposed to recognize—in accord with the Entente—the Friedrich Cabinet and to give it their support.

The Commission replies on this subject:

Under the present circumstances the Friedrich Cabinet is as good as any other. It has remained in power for more than one month and has the confidence of the agricultural masses who form the majority of the Hungarian population; it has undergone many alterations as a result of which it today presents a more liberal base. It is, however, but the continuation of a government which, having come into power

by a *coup d'état* at the same time as the Archduke, has never given satisfaction to the Entente and which—after the abdication of the Archduke—has remained as an emanation of that source.

Furthermore, this government has evidenced reactionary tendencies, which, although exaggerated by its opponents, might nevertheless be dangerous.

Finally, the Government compromised itself with the Rumanians by clandestine organizations of armed forces which the Rumanian military command at Budapest had strictly forbidden. Consequently, the Rumanians proposed its overthrow to the Entente and, not having obtained the necessary consent, they are trying in every way to impede its action and to perhaps cause its overthrow by its political opponents to whom the Rumanian Government has granted—for the last several days—a liberty of reaction which before had been strictly forbidden them.

At the same time they refuse to support a Government which is not accepted by them and consequently continue in every fashion to hinder the formation of the police at Budapest and the reorganization of the Hungarian Army, which is absolutely indispensable to insure order in the country at the time the Rumanian troops shall decide to evacuate.

Under these circumstances the labors of the Commission of Generals becomes daily more difficult and may soon become impossible.

The Commission did not fail to inform the Supreme Council of these circumstances and proposed that it either recognize the Friedrich Cabinet or, if unable to do so, to furnish their precise intentions regarding a new Hungarian Cabinet. But the Supreme Council did not answer.

Therefore, the Commission can only wish for the sending of that answer, confirming that it is indispensable that the formation that [of?] a decent Hungarian Government be made in common agreement between the Entente and the Rumanian Government.

11. Sir George Clerk asks the Commission if, in its opinion, the Rumanians would be willing to accept the Friedrich Cabinet in case the latter declares itself ready to follow them in their intentions.

The Commission is not in a position to express an opinion on that subject.

If the Rumanians do not make the Hungarian Government responsible for a refusal on the subject of the delimitation of the future common boundary, an agreement with the Friedrich Cabinet would perhaps be facilitated.

But there would remain the difficulties represented by the presence of one Head and several members of the Cabinet who are personally compromised by their clandestine actions against the prescriptions of the Rumanian military Command.

It is therefore possible that Mr. Friedrich be accepted for lack of a better person. But even in that case, modifications in the cabinet, with the exclusion of some of the present Ministers is to be foreseen.

12. Sir George Clerk asks if, in case they had a free hand, the Four Generals would be in a position to propose the list of a new cabinet.

The Commission remarks that, according to its instructions, and since it must not intervene in the internal questions of Hungary, it has not until now given its special attention concerning the persons who might form the new cabinet.

Nevertheless, it has already had the opportunity to state to the Supreme Council that a list proposed by Mr. Heinrich would fulfil the conditions of the Entente and that, consequently, in its opinion, the Supreme Council could have given its approval. But the Supreme Council did not answer.

In the present circumstances the Commission thinks that, in agreement with the Rumanians, the composition of a fitting list would not be difficult.

13. Sir George Clerk begs the Commission to kindly deliver to him as soon as possible the minutes of the meeting so that he might draft his telegraphic information to the Supreme Council.

14. The meeting is adjourned at 17:20.

The President for the Day, General Mombelli

E. MOMBELLI

Annex 3 to Sir George Clerk's Report of October 8 [7], 1919

**SUMMARY REPORT RELATIVE TO THE PROVISIONING OF THE CITY OF
BUDAPEST**

1. The Rumanian Command has authorized free circulation throughout all Hungary to all agents officially entrusted by the Hungarian Ministry of Supplies. The number of these agents surpasses 1200.

In spite of these authorizations given on August 12th, the trains which run expressly for provisioning, return to Budapest almost empty.

The reason is that the agents of the Hungarian Ministry spend their time in speculating and in frauds instead of in the purchase and transportation of cereals. One proof of this is shown in the falsification of an authorization given, by hundred copies, authorizing the carrying of foodstuffs for the Hungarian functionaries of the supply Ministry, and with which the respective agents secured great quantities of foods which they did not share among the famished population, but placed in express hidden warehouses for speculation purposes.

We are annexing a copy of one of these falsified authorizations which are now being examined in the Rumanian military courts, as a proof.²²

2. All the Rumanian troop Commanders were ordered to permit and facilitate the transportation of cars and carts, as well as boats, which are being sent with foodstuffs to Budapest, and to give them priority over military transports.

3. The supply warehouses captured from the Bolshevist army have all been placed at the disposition of the Hungarian Supply Ministry.

4. From the commencement, approval was given to have all assistance utilized in procuring foodstuffs for Budapest, with the same purpose the Rumanian Command furnished II pairs of trains daily, named "supply trains" which run in all directions and transport foodstuffs into the city.

A train schedule, such as is published in all the small stations with an aim to facilitate the task of the supply purchasing agents, is annexed hereto.²²

5. The entire region between Tisza and the Danube has been divided into administrative supply departments, under the direction of the Hungarian Department Prefects, who are directed to furnish general statistics of all the foodstuffs which remain available in their department, aside from the needs of the local population, in order that these foodstuffs may be sent to Budapest under the control of the Rumanian Command.

The Departments are further divided into sub-Departments, then into centers and sub-centers, the country people being obliged to thresh the grain with the aid of Bolshevist prisoners so that the surplus may be sent to Budapest. In this way 10-15 carloads of grain, vegetables, and other foodstuffs were sent to Budapest daily by the Rumanian army.

6. The Rumanian Command has formally prohibited all sorts of food requisitions in Budapest for the needs of the Rumanian army and it has placed the central bakery of the Hungarian army at the disposition of the city in order that bread might be obtained for the population.

7. The "Haditelmin" supply society belonging to the Hungarian supply Ministry had hidden the following meats in their local refrigerators:

50,000	kilograms	of frozen meat
20,000	"	of pork and veal
20,000	"	of salted meat

and 10 carloads of fat which was distributed by the Rumanian Command among the population.

²² Does not accompany the minutes.

8. 60,000 hogs in the suburbs of Budapest were placed at the disposition of the Hungarian Supply Minister in order that 300 might be killed per day with a view to filling the needs of the population, but the Supply Ministry suspended this measure, although the hogs in question weigh more than 100 kilograms each.

9. 10,000 carloads of potatoes from the region East of Tisza were placed at the disposition of the Hungarian Supply Ministry by the Rumanian Command, but on account of the negligence of the Ministry nothing has been transported up to the present time, although every facility possible has been offered for the execution of this transportation.—The Hungarians claim that they have not enough locomotives, but in the organization region of the Hungarian army (Szombathely) there are 500 locomotives and in spite of all the guarantees of the Rumanian Government, stating that these machines will not be requisitioned, the Hungarian authorities refuse to have these locomotives used for the transportation of foodstuffs.

10. Because the Hungarian Supply Ministry agents do not pay the farmers for the grain which they buy, they have commenced to hide all the grain in their possession by burying it or depositing it in places hidden from view.

In order to remedy this inconvenience the Rumanian Command has made arrangements to have the mills do the farmers' grinding on condition that they pay in kind.—The wheat which is collected in this fashion, at the mills, is bought by the Rumanian Command and distributed at the same price among the population at Budapest.—Furthermore, the Rumanian Command has arranged for the paid requisition of exposed and hidden wheat by Rumanian Delegates to be later sold to the population at Budapest.

11. The Hungarian Supply Ministry forbids the purchase of wheat by individuals and permits these purchases by the local supply society of the Ministry only, but the retail sale of the wheat flour is untrammelled. This society speculates largely as a result of this privilege, in such a way that the flour is sold in retail in numerous stores of the capital at a price of 25 kronen a kgr.

The Rumanian Command intervened to permit the free sale of grain and flour by anyone, which has certainly helped greatly to prevent speculations.

12. In order to assist the population of Budapest the Rumanian Command requested the Government and Rumanian G. H. Q. to sell the surplus grain in Rumania to the Hungarians.

13. The Rumanian Command has authorized, and has given orders to this effect, the Rumanian troops to facilitate by every possible means the transportation of every sort of combustible [*comestible?*] by railway and in carts. Furthermore, the Rumanian Command has permit-

ted Hungary to export her wine and to receive in exchange any nature of foodstuffs.

14. The Rumanian Command has never refused any request of the Hungarian Supply Ministry. On the contrary, they have tried to facilitate the labors of this Ministry and have given their entire assistance in the provisioning of Budapest. Unfortunately, they are forced to affirm with regret that instead of facilitating the provisioning of the population the Ministry in question tolerated the most flagrant speculation, and that furthermore the excessively precarious situation of the city concerning supplies is the direct result.

15. From the occupation of the city of Budapest by the Rumanian troops, these troops, in their ardent desire to assist the poor population and in order to protect them from certain famine, established 14 canteens for the poor where the children and aged daily receive free nourishment.

The Rumanian Command possess photographs of these canteens taken at the time of the distribution. They also possess a great number of letters of thanks sent by the mayors, city authorities and individuals in Budapest, in which the gratitude of these people is expressed for the large heartedness of the Rumanians in these days of famine.

16. Furthermore, each troop corps nourishes a great number of poor, especially children; each soldier has from one to three guests daily which he nourishes from his own allowance. The Rumanian Command is in possession of photographs confirming this.

17. The Budapest hospital patients were suffering the blackest misery on account of hunger and want at the time of entry of the Rumanian troops.—The Rumanian Command immediately took the necessary measures to abolish this state of affairs. They distributed among the hospitals the foodstuffs captured from the Bolshevist army as well as other supplies brought to the city by the Rumanian troops themselves. A few days after the installation of our troops in Budapest, thanks to the cares above referred to, the situation of the hospitals has become normal.

18. When the Rumanian Command became definitely convinced of the poor faith of the Hungarian official supply organizations, they nominated special delegates from the Rumanian army whose mission was to collect foodstuffs, transport and distribute them among the population. Our delegates received precious aid from the English supply Commission under Colonel Cope.

19. As a result of the lack of foodstuffs in Budapest the Rumanian Command arranged for the reservation of 40 communes, in the surrounding district, for city supplies alone and forbade all army requisitions in the territory of these communes.

20. Despite the repeated and precise orders which the Rumanian Command issued and published, totally forbidding transports from leaving Budapest, persons engaged in contraband with written authorization of the Hungarian Supply Ministry were discovered in the action of clandestinely sending out great quantities of foodstuffs with a view to increasing the heavy task of the Rumanian Command and to favor an extended speculation.

Appendix H to HD-67

AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES
ON THE ORGANIZATION COM-
MITTEE OF THE REPARATIONS
COMMISSION

SEPTEMBER 23, 1919.

Memorandum—The Hungarian Situation and the Effect of Roumania's Appropriation of Values and Property in Hungary on the Other Interested Allied and Associated Powers

Roumania has removed values and property from Hungary far in excess of her individual equity under the reparation and other policies laid down by the Allied and Associated Powers. Roumania has forcibly effected monetary exchanges in Hungary to her own benefit disregarding the reparation equity of her Allies in these same benefits. It results that Roumania has appropriated values and property belonging to Italy, Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and other interested Powers. The latter, therefore, have just claim against Roumania for compensation.

Roumania is reported to have stripped Hungary of all its seed grain, live stock, agricultural machinery, etc., with the result that the supplying of the minimum needs of the Hungarian population will shortly have to be borne by Roumania's Allies at considerable sacrifice and financial cost to their respective Governments and peoples. It would, of course, have been to the joint interest of all the Allies had sufficient seed grain, live stock, agricultural machinery, etc., been left in Hungary to take care of the minimum requirements of these people.

A substantial surplus of foodstuffs existed in Roumania, even before her appropriation of Hungarian foodstuffs. Under the ordinary working of the laws of supply and demand, Roumania is now in that curious position whereby she alone will benefit by supplying foodstuffs to her Allies (particularly Czecho-Slovakia and Poland), from stocks in which her Allies had a joint ownership. A similar situation with corresponding effects occurs in the case of many other classes of property similarly appropriated by Roumania.

A portion of this same surplus foodstuff must go to Austria which is faced with a serious shortage in foodstuff for the coming year. The Supreme Council has decided, and the same intent is written in the Austrian Peace Treaty, that the "first preoccupation" of the Repara-

tions Commission in Austria is to set up finance to meet the minimum needs of the Austrian population during the coming year. The curious analogy is therefore presented of the Reparations Commission setting up finance, at the expense of Roumania's Allies, for the purchase of foodstuffs and other property which they in fact own in common with Roumania but for [*from?*] which Roumania alone will benefit.

The Allied and Associated Powers will shortly have to give the Reparations Commission with reference to Hungary, the similar "first preoccupation", they have already given it with reference to Austria. This would not have been necessary had Roumania awaited the orderly workings of the Reparations Commission in securing her reparations. However, by her systematic stripping of Hungary, without preoccupation as to leaving the minimum necessities for the Hungarian population during the coming year, Roumania has improperly thrown this burden on her Allies. A similar curious analogy occurs in this case as already exposed in the Austrian case. In the Austrian case, however, the minimum necessities of the population did not exist. In the Hungarian case these necessities which actually existed in Hungary and which were appropriated by Roumania must now be replaced by necessities provided at the expense of the latter's Allies.

Roumania has taken values and property out of Hungary without the prior agreement or approval of her Allies and without their representation at the time of removal. Therefore, there exists no basis for determining which if any of these were due Roumania under the adopted policy providing for "restitution of cash, animals, objects of every nature and securities seized and sequestered" "which prove possible of identification". Under these circumstances and for accounting purposes, it is only possible at this time to assume that none of these come within the "restitution" categories and, therefore the full valuation of all must be charged to Roumania on her various reparation accounts. What part or parcel of these values or property now in Roumania as come within the definition of "restitution" consequently rests on Roumania to prove before the Reparations Commission before these charges can be properly cancelled.

As Roumania similarly failed to consider the interests of her Allies when taking over values and property not coming within the "restitution" categories, which she presumably considered to be her reparation equity, its valuation and the determination of the respective allies' reparation equities, including Roumania's can now alone be determined and reported to the Reparations Commission by the other interested allies.

A proposal, today, on the part of Roumania to abide, in the future, by the terms of her engagements with the Allied and Associated

Powers could not be accepted as an equitable solution of this matter. An agreement to any such proposal would be to the sole interest of Roumania with an entire disregard of the other Allied interests, as such agreement could only be construed as a "quitclaim" or approval of all Roumania's appropriations of Hungary's values and property to date. Any agreement entered into today with Roumania should be predicated upon her admission of the right of her allies to make a joint inquiry into what has happened in the past and to fix their own and Roumania's interests in all Hungarian values and property in the manner hereinafter set forth.

It is therefore, suggested that the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission recommend to the Supreme Council the early adoption of the following resolutions:

First: That a Special Commission, including representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers having property and financial interests in Hungary under the Reparation clauses, which interests have been either partially or wholly appropriated by Roumania, be established at once in Budapest for the purpose of listing and valuing the property removed by Roumania in contravention of Roumania's engagements with her allies and in contravention of the direct and specific instructions of the Supreme Council.

Second: That this Special Commission will establish the value of the various Allies' equities in Hungarian values and property appropriated by the Roumanians, in accordance with the reparation policies adopted by the Allied and Associated Governments, and that these values will be at once reported to the Committee on Organization of the Reparations Commission, so that upon the establishment of the Reparations Commission, they may be appropriately entered against the Roumanian accounts, under the various treaties of peace which have or are to be formulated.

Third: That this Special Commission investigate and report to the Supreme Council the fiscal or other effect on Roumania's Allies of Roumania's appropriation of foodstuffs, grain seeds, live stock, agricultural machinery, etc., with reference to its effect on future purchases by them of Roumanian food and other surpluses and the similar direct or indirect effect of Roumania's action so far as it affects benefits accruing to Roumania's Allies from Austrian and Hungarian reparations.

Fourth: That this Special Commission is empowered to give proper credit to Roumania for values and property returned to Hungary up until the time of the closing out of its operations and to make appropriate cancellations on this account on reports submitted to the Supreme Council or to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, as provided for in the preceding paragraphs.

It is recommended that the proposed Special Commission include representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers and representation of Serbia, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland and that these Powers be requested to at once designate their representatives on this Commission and to send them to Budapest accompanied by such

accountants, statisticians, etc., as they may consider necessary, for the first meeting of the Special Commission which should be held at Budapest September 28, 1919.

It is further recommended that Chairmanship of the Commission rotate from day to day as between the Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers represented on it.

In view of the existing political situation in Hungary, it is recommended that for the time being this Special Commission be subordinated to the Allied Commission of Generals now in Budapest.

Appendix I to HD-67

[Despatch of a Sub-Committee to Budapest To Determine the Reparation Value of Material Removed From Hungary by the Rumanians]

PROPOSED RESOLUTION

[Submitted by Mr. Polk]

First: That a Special Commission composed of a Delegate from each of the Powers represented on the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, be established at Budapest without delay. The Presidency of this Special Commission should be held at each meeting by each of the Delegates in turn; the Secretary should be permanent. There should be added to this Special Commission for the purpose of consultation following the nature of the subject dealt with, representatives of the neighboring States who have reparation interests in Hungary, viz:—Roumania, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia.

Second: That this Special Commission should proceed without delay in listing all values and property removed from Hungary by any of the Allied and Associated Powers in contravention of the reparation policies laid down in the various Treaties of Peace.

Third: That this Special Commission will establish the values on the lists provided for in the Second paragraph and will forward the lists so prepared without delay to the Committee on Organization of the Reparations Commission, so that upon the establishment of the Reparations Commission the values so reported may be appropriately entered on the reparation accounts under the various Treaties of Peace which have or are to be formulated.

Fourth: That this Special Commission is empowered to cancel or propose to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission for cancellation, any charges raised in accordance with the provisions of the Second and Third paragraphs of this resolution for

values and property restored to Hungary up until the time of the closing of this Special Commission's operations.

Fifth: That this Special Commission should investigate and report to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission or the Reparations Commission, the direct or indirect financial effect on Allied and Associated Governments, individually or collectively, by individual acts on the part of any of these Governments who have appropriated values or property in Hungary. In making this report the Special Commission will include their recommendation as to the compensatory adjustment of the various reparation accounts that should be made by the Reparations Commission on this account.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, October 11, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de St. Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja
Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Mr. C. Russell
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE M. Massigli
ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. Dresel
Mr. Shepardson
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Sir George Clerk
Mr. Leeper
Mr. Carr

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
General Weygand
M. Laroche

ITALY

M. Brambilla
M. Vannutelli-Rey

1. (The Council had before it a draft of a reply to the letter of Baron von Lersner¹ prepared by Mr. Polk. (See Appendix "A").)

Admission of
German and
Austrian
Representatives
to the Inter-
national Labor
Congress at
Washington

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, if he understood Mr. Polk's proposition correctly, it was a question of saying to the Germans that everyone would have full rights at the Conference.

MR. POLK said that this was not what he meant. The proposal, which he submitted for the approval of the Council, stated that the question would be decided by the Congress itself. His letter contained no promise whatever.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council were in agreement in regard to the matter.

(It was decided :

to accept the draft of a letter prepared by Mr. Polk in reply to the letter of Baron von Lersner of 4th October. (See Appendix "A.")

2. (The Council had before it a draft of a telegram for transmission to the French Minister at Bucharest and for communication to the Roumanian Government (See Appendix "B"),² as well as a draft of a telegram to M. Friedrich (See Appendix "C").)

Notes to the
Roumanian
Government
and to M.
Friedrich

MR. POLK said that he wished to raise a question in regard to the draft telegram to M. Friedrich. He questioned whether it was advisable to send a written communication expressing the views of the Entente. He did not think that the Allied and Associated Governments should dictate to Hungary as to her internal policies. It was true that the Council had taken such action at the time the Archduke Joseph had assumed power, but in that case they were dealing with a Hapsburg. Today the situation was not quite the same; they were dealing with Hungarian political parties. He thought that it would be preferable to send to Budapest a representative who should be charged to communicate with the various parties. He feared that the action proposed would create an unfavorable impression in the United States. He wished to ask whether it would not be possible to send Sir George Clerk to Budapest.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the telegram should be addressed to the Allied Generals at Budapest and that they should be directed to take the necessary action.

MR. POLK pointed out that the Generals would not be in the same position as a special representative. Up to the present time they had played a somewhat different role.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the situation would be the same whether the communication were in writing or were communicated in person

¹ Appendix A to HD-67, p. 544.

² The telegram as it appears in appendix B is to the British Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest rather than to the French Minister at Bucharest.

by a special representative; all the world would know of it just the same.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought all the world should know of it. It was important that the note should be published in all the Hungarian newspapers.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that **M. Friedrich** was the man who had called the Archduke to power. What the Allied and Associated Governments had criticized in his Government was the fact that it was a continuation of the Government of the Archduke. It was that which the Council opposed. There was no desire to interfere with the internal affairs of Hungary.

(It was decided:

to postpone the discussion of this question until the following Monday. **Mr. Polk** reserved the right to propose certain modifications to the draft telegram before the Council.)

MR. POLK said that so far as the note to be transmitted to the Roumanian Government was concerned, he approved of the contents. He wished, however, to make two remarks. He asked what the Council proposed to do in the event of a refusal by the Roumanian Government. It was most important that the Allies should be in entire accord.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the question could not be discussed at the present time, but that he agreed with **Mr. Polk** that it was necessary for the Allies to stand together. He wished to ask **M. Scialoja** if he shared this view.

M. SCIALOJA replied that he was in entire agreement.

MR. POLK said that in the first paragraph of the second page of the draft telegram he thought that it would be better to say instead of, "the Supreme Council regret that they are unable to consent to any change in their original decision" to "the Supreme Council regret that they are unable to modify in favor of Roumania their original decision."

M. BERTHELOT asked whether the note to the Roumanian Government should be published.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought it should not be until it had reached its destination.

MR. POLK asked whether the note should be transmitted to the Roumanian Government by the four Allied Ministers at Bucharest.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was entirely in favor of common action in order that every means should be taken to assure the note reaching its destination.

M. BERTHELOT said that the note could also be transmitted to the Roumanian Delegation at Paris.

(It was decided:

(1) to accept the draft telegram to the French Minister at Bucharest prepared by Sir George Clerk and M. Berthelot (See Appendix "B");

(2) to substitute in the text of the telegram (page 2, paragraph numbered 1) for the words "unable to consent to any change in their original decision", the words "unable to modify in favor of Roumania their original decision";

(3) that the note of the Supreme Council should be transmitted to the Roumanian Prime Minister by the four Allied Ministers at Bucharest.)

(It was further decided:

to publish the text of the note after it had been transmitted to the Roumanian Government.)

3. (The Council had before it a note addressed to the President of the Peace Conference by two Bessarabian Delegates. (See Appendix "B" ["D"]).)

**Roumanian
Action in
Bessarabia**

M. BERTHELOT said the question had been placed on the agenda by the American delegation.

MR. POLK said that M. Misu had informed him on the previous day that the Roumanian Government were about to hold elections in Bessarabia.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Bessarabian question had not yet been settled. He thought that the note of the Bessarabian delegates could be examined at the time that the question of Bessarabia was discussed.

MR. POLK pointed out that the question was somewhat important in view of the fact that according to the information which he had received, the Roumanians were holding elections, applying conscription and confiscating large properties.

M. LAROCHE said that the Bessarabian question was somewhat peculiar. It was at the request of the Russian General Tcherbatcheff that the Roumanians had been asked, at the beginning of the Russian debacle, to occupy the country. In order to stop the development of Bolshevism, it had appeared to be the simplest method to favor the autonomist element in Bessarabia. Soon afterwards Bessarabia had declared herself independent. Later the National Assembly pronounced itself in favor of a union with Roumania. The Council were now faced with the wish expressed by the population. The Conference had not yet decided the Bessarabian question, but it should take account of all that had occurred, for there was no doubt that "the journey which M. de Martonne³ recently made in Bessarabia had brought new proofs" to show that the country was really a

³ Emmanuel de Martonne, French representative, Sub-Commission on Rumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.

Roumanian land. As far as the agrarian question was concerned, the matter was most important. The distribution of landed property was particularly unequal in Bessarabia, and the majority of the population was in favor of a necessary reform. The persons who protested were Russified landowners, whose interests were menaced.

Mr. POLK said that he did not intend to ask the Council to take a decision. He had simply wished to bring to the attention of the Council the fact that the Roumanians were exercising rights of sovereignty in Bessarabia, and that the silence of the Conference in regard to this matter might give the Roumanians grounds for believing that the Council consented to their having assumed this sovereignty. In a conversation which he had had with M. Misu on the preceding day, he had pointed out the possible danger to Roumania, if Roumania tried to make a *fait accompli*. He had asked him what would happen when Russia was reconstituted and when she claimed Bessarabia. Roumania would have to rely upon a position of fact. In order to retain Bessarabia, Roumania depended upon the good will of the League of Nations and of the Conference. Roumania should be discouraged from making any attempt, apart from the decisions of the Conference, to annex Bessarabia definitely. He thought that M. Misu would, in all probability, transmit a communication to the Conference on this subject.

4. (General Weygand presented to the Council the text of the resolution which he had prepared with General Sackville-West in accordance with a resolution taken by the Supreme Council (See Appendix "E").⁴

Russian Prisoners
of War in Germany

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he approved of the text as a whole. He desired, however, to point out that in the second paragraph (Section C) the International Commission at Berlin was to be directed to make all necessary proposals to the Supreme Council. On the other hand, it was said that the Special Interallied Commission sitting at Paris should be charged "with bringing matters to the attention of the Supreme Council". He thought that it was unnecessary to make the Supreme Council intervene throughout. It would be enough to say that the Commission at Berlin should be charged with making "all necessary proposals". The Commission could bring matters to the attention of the Special Commission at Paris and not to the Supreme Council. At the same time, as regarded the Commission at Paris, the text could be modified by saying that the Commission could "request a decision of the Supreme Council when necessary". These changes in the text would give the Commission greater freedom of action.

Mr. POLK asked how the Council proposed to regulate the question of funds.

⁴This appendix does not accompany the minutes in the Department files.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, so far as he knew, there was no question but that the German Government would be obliged to furnish the money.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that there were difficulties as regarded the past arising from the time when the Allied and Associated Governments had assumed charge of the prisoners.

M. SCIALOJA said that he wished to recall that Italy had borne heavy expenses in respect of several thousand Russian Prisoners of War. He wished to ask that this observation be referred for examination to the Financial Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council were in agreement.

MR. POLK said that so far as the Financial question was concerned, he was not in a position to make a definite engagement. He did not know whether his Government had funds to pay for the deficit. Only the American Congress could vote new credits and he could not bind his Government.

It was decided :

(1) to approve the draft resolution prepared by General Weygand and General Sackville-West on the subject of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany, (See Appendix "E") ;

(2) to substitute for the words, "d'adresser au Conseil Suprême" paragraph II, Section C, the words, "de faire" and for the words, "de préparer la décision", paragraph III, last line the words, "de provoquer au besoin la décision".

The American Representative in approving this resolution remarked that so far as a question of a deficit was concerned, he could make no engagement without instructions from his Government.

5. (The Council had before it a report from the Military, Naval and Air Representatives at Versailles of the 6th October, 1919, (See Appendix "F").)

Interallied
Commissions
of Control
in Austria

In view of the fact that the Supreme War Council were unanimous,

It was decided :

to approve the report presented by the Military Naval and Air Representatives at Versailles respecting the organization of Commissions of Control for Austria.

6. (The Council had before it a note transmitted by the Russian Political Conference dated Paris, 6th October, 1919 (See Appendix "G").)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in view of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments were sending war material to Russia, it seemed only logical not to refuse their request for war material which had formerly belonged to them.

Restoration
of Russian
War Material
Taken by
Germany

M. SCIALOJA thought that a difficulty might arise on account of Article 169 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was not one of German war material which the Allies were to divide, but concerned Russian war material taken by the Germans.

M. BERTHELOT said that according to the article 169 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, German war material was to be delivered to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments to be distributed or destroyed. So far as war material coming from a foreign country was concerned, it was to be delivered to these Governments, who should decide as to what was to be done with it. The Russians asked that the war material should not be destroyed, but given to them.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Commissions of Control could be directed to settle this question.

It was decided:

That the Interallied Commissions of Control created by articles 203 to 210 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany should direct, if they found it possible, that Russian arms, munitions and war material retained by Germany should be delivered to the Russian Armies recognized by the Allied and Associated Governments.

7. (The Council had before it a note from the Italian Delegation of the 8th October, 1919, (See Appendix "H").)

M. SCIALOJA read and commented upon the note from the Italian Delegation.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether Hungary was to cede territory to Italy.

M. SCIALOJA replied that this was not the case, but Hungary had had certain claims to Austrian territory. His proposal was intended to regulate the situation of Hungarian citizens residing in the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ceded to Italy, in the same manner as the situation of Austrian citizens residing in these territories had been regulated. So far as cessations [*cessions?*] of territory were concerned, the only question at the moment between Italy and Hungary was the Cession of the Palais de Venise at Rome. The question could be referred to the Drafting Committee.

It was decided:

to refer to the Drafting Committee for report the note from the Italian Delegation, asking for the insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary of articles equivalent to articles 36 to 45 of the Treaty of St. Germain. The Drafting Committee was to be directed to submit to the Supreme Council a draft article in this sense.

8. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation of the 9th October, 1919, (See Appendix "I").)

Insertion in
the Treaty of
Peace With
Hungary of
an Article
Identical With
Article 36 of
the Treaty of
Peace With
Austria

M. LAROCHE said that the question raised here was one of secondary importance, which had been asked by the Legal Advisers, who had pointed out that no arrangement had been made as to the disposal of Western Galicia. The question could be settled at the same time as that of Eastern Galicia. The best method would be to refer the question to the Commission on Polish Affairs.

Disposal
of Western
Galicia

It was decided:

to refer to the Commission on Polish Affairs for examination and report the note from the French Delegation of the 9th October, 1919 concerning the attribution to Poland of Western Galicia (See appendix "I").

9. MR. POLK said that the United States had no Representatives on the Commissions of Control, and, for this reason, he was not voting.

Allowances to
the Presidents
of the Naval
and Air
Commissions
of Control
in Germany

He desired, therefore, to withdraw the reservation which he had made at a former meeting of the Council (H. D. 66).⁵

It was decided:

that the Presidents of the Naval and Air Commissions of Control in Germany, as well as the Presidents of the Sub-Commissions should receive the same allowances as the President of the Military Commission of Control in Germany and the Presidents of the Military Sub-Commissions of Control in Germany.

10. MR. POLK said that M. Misu had informed him on the preceding day that, at the request of the British and French Governments, the Roumanian Government had despatched large quantities of Russian war material, which were in Roumania, to General Denikin.

Question Raised
by Mr. Polk
in Regard to
Alleged Delivery
of War Material
by the Roumanian
Government to
General Denikin

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was without information as to any such action on the part of the British Government, but he would inquire of his Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Marshal Foch should be consulted.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Bratiano had always refused to give arms to General Denikin, because he (M. Bratiano) was supporting the Ukrainians. It was therefore, possible that several months before and through the intermediary of the French Military Mission in Roumania a small part of the Russian war material deposited in Roumania, amounting to about 60,000 rifles, had been sent to Russia. But since that time no action of this kind had been taken, as M. Bratiano had refused to make any deliveries whatsoever.

MR. POLK said that the Roumanians had informed him that the British and French had asked them to send 60,000 rifles to General Denikin, but they had said quite the opposite to the American Minister at

⁵ Minute 7, p. 511.

Bucharest, who was in Paris at the moment. He had raised the question simply to ascertain what had actually occurred.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, October 11, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-68

[*Reply Prepared by Mr. Polk to the Letter of October 4, 1919, From Baron von Lersner*]

DRAFT

SIR: I am directed by the Supreme Council to reply to your letter of October 4,⁶ concerning the membership of the Labor Conference which will shortly be held in Washington at the invitation of the Government of the United States.

Owing to the urgency and importance of the questions to be considered by the Conference, the Supreme Council is of the opinion that the States named in the annex to the Covenant of the League of Nations, whether signatories of the Treaty of Peace or neutral states, should be privileged to participate in the first meeting of the Conference from the outset, in spite of the fact that the League of Nations has technically not yet come into being. By direction of the Council, I am communicating this interpretation to my Government for its guidance.

At the same time, the Council is making a recommendation to the Organizing Committee of the Labor Conference (within whose competence the matter lies) that the question of the admission of German and Austrian delegates to full participation in the Conference shall be considered by the Conference as the first item on its Agenda.

Please accept, etc., etc.

Appendix B to HD-68

Telegram to British Chargé d'Affaires, Bucharest, October 11, 1919

The Supreme Council to-day decided on following joint communication to Roumanian Government. You should concert with your colleagues in presentation to Roumanian Government, whether as identic or collective note.

Text follows:—

“Supreme Council have received with great satisfaction the assurances of the Roumanian Government, reported by Sir George Clerk,

⁶ Appendix A to HD-67, p. 544.

that they have always intended, and still intend, to adhere firmly to the Alliance. The Supreme Council never doubted that such was the real wish of Roumania, and they are happy to think that the Mission of Sir George Clerk has only served to confirm the conviction they already held.

The Supreme Council feel however that recent events have once more demonstrated the necessity of avoiding, so far as possible, all ground for misunderstanding. Such has been the experience of all the Allies during the war, and perfect frankness on even the most difficult and delicate points of difference such as are bound to arise in the complicated relations and conflicting interests of a group of Allies has proved to be the only way to secure harmonious and successful progress.

The Supreme Council therefore desire to put before their Roumanian Allies their decisions on the three questions which form the principal subjects of divergence between Roumania and the Allies to-day. These decisions will be expressed quite definitely and frankly, but the Supreme Council trust that the Roumanian Government will realise that they have been taken, not with any desire to foster other interests at the expense of Roumania nor without the most sympathetic consideration of the Roumanian case, but because the Supreme Council firmly believe that they correspond most nearly to the general interests of peace and well-being.

The three points may be entitled: 1. Territorial Frontiers. 2. The Minorities Treaty. 3. Hungary.

1. After renewing and careful study of the requests made by Monsieur Bratiano for both banks of the river Maros up to its mouth, for Bekes-Csaba, and for a frontier line 20 kilometres outside the Szatmar-Arad railway and of the arguments put forward by Monsieur Bratiano in favour of these modifications, the Supreme Council regret that they are unable to modify in favour of Roumania their original decision taken after the closest examination of all the relevant factors and made known as definite to all the parties interested.

2. The Allied Powers represented on the Supreme Council are absolutely united in their determination to uphold the principle underlying the Minorities Treaty. They feel that this principle is one of the vital elements in removing the causes of further wars and they intend to maintain it intact. It underlies the whole spirit which has led the world to accept a system of a society of Nations and it cannot be abandoned. This principle finds its expression, so far as Roumania is concerned, in Article 71 [60?] of the Treaty with Austria and in Article 13 of the Draft Treaty respecting minorities submitted to the Roumanian Government.

The Supreme Council feel that possibly these two Articles have been misinterpreted in Roumania. In the view of the Supreme Council there is nothing derogatory to the independence of Roumania. She is only asked, in common with other states, which like herself have, as the result of the war, profoundly altered the extent and nature of their dominions, to accept such obligations towards the Society of Nations as arise from membership of that body to which she is already pledged.

But as soon as the Supreme Council learn that the Roumanian Government is prepared to sign the Treaty with Austria without reservation, they, for their part, will be happy to consider in common with Roumania, such modifications of those clauses as affect Roumania individually, as apart from the general principle, in order to see whether it is not possible to meet the views of the Roumanian Government. The Supreme Council had the advantage, while the text of the Minorities Treaty with other Powers was being drafted, of the collaboration of representatives of other Powers, to the great advantage of both parties.

Hitherto this collaboration has been denied to them by the Roumanian Government, but the Supreme Council hope that if the Roumanian Government will now discuss the clauses with them, an equally satisfactory result may be reached.

Lastly the Supreme Council trust that their Roumanian Allies will announce their decision on this point forthwith. It is essential for the establishment of conditions of peace and for the renewal and restoration of economic life in Europe, that the treaties of peace with the enemy powers and the various agreements and arrangements arising out of those treaties, should be brought into force at once.

3. The Hungarian question has two main issues. The first is the question of requisitions by the Roumanian Army of Occupation. The general view of the Supreme Council with regard to the action of the Roumanian requisitioning for herself, without consultation and agreement with her Allies, supplies of material which should, by the agreement to which Roumania herself is a party, form part of the common reparation stock of the Allies has already been expressed to the Roumanian Government.⁷ The Supreme Council have received and considered the Roumanian point of view as expressed by M. Bratiano, and it seems to them there is now no difference of opinion about the general principle. As regards the application of that principle, the Allies propose the following machinery for deciding what material shall be definitely allocated to Roumania and what part, or its value, assigned to the common stock. They are despatching an Inter-Allied Sub-Commission of the Commission on Reparation to Buda-Pesth with authority from the Supreme Council to investigate and examine all the requisitions that have been made and to report on the distribution to be effected between Roumania and the Allies. The Supreme Council trusts that the Roumanian Government will appoint a representative, with full authority to speak for them, to act on this Commission.

There is, however, an aspect of the question, which the Supreme Council feel that they cannot ignore. The Supreme Council recognizes that the Roumanian Government have given orders to confine their requisitions to those of railway materials, materials of war and supplies to the Army of Occupation. Unfortunately, the Supreme Council have in their possession a mass of evidence which leaves no room for doubt that the orders of the Roumanian Government to this effect are deliberately and continuously disobeyed. They do not question the good faith of the Roumanian Government, but on the

⁷ Appendix A to HD-37, vol. VII, p. 819.

other hand, they cannot suffer because the subordinates of that Government do not carry out the orders given to them. The Supreme Council accordingly propose that an Inter-Allied Organization, including Roumanian officials, should be established at once at the bridges of Szolnok and Czongrad to check and verify the way-bills of all trains passing over those two bridges into Roumania. This organization should have full powers to open sealed wagons and to remove all goods that have been improperly despatched to Roumania. At the same time, the Sub-Commission of the Commission on Reparation will have authority to receive all complaints already filed by the Inter-Allied Commission of Generals, or that may subsequently be made as to improper requisitions, and the Supreme Council has no doubt that the Roumanian Government will, in such cases as are definitely established, be prepared to make full reparation.

The other important point in the Hungarian situation is the establishment of a Hungarian Government which can maintain law and order, can hold the elections freely and impartially, and can negotiate peace with the Allies. The Government, of which M. Friedrich, as the titular Minister President of Hungary, is the head, does not, in the opinion of the Supreme Council, fulfill the conditions necessary to ensure these requirements. The Supreme Council consider that M. Friedrich should include in his Government representatives of the various political parties in Hungary, and should he be unwilling or unable to do so, the Hungarian people must realize that the Allies can only recognize and deal with a Government which fulfills these conditions. The Supreme Council are confident that this is also the view of their Roumanian Allies, since it appears that to them that what they desire is as much in the interests of Roumania as of the Allies generally.

Finally, the Supreme Council would be glad to receive assurances that the rifles for the Hungarian police and *gendarmerie* already promised by the Roumanian authorities in B. P. to the Mission of Allied Generals, will be immediately delivered and that the Roumanian forces will at once evacuate the country. They know that Roumania herself wishes to be relieved of this heavy charge upon her resources, and they consider that the burden which it also lays upon the impoverished State of Hungary should, in the interests of the Allies generally, be lifted as soon as possible.[⁷]

Appendix C to HD-68

Draft Telegram to Monsieur Friedrich, Budapest, by Wireless

OCTOBER 1919.

On August 18th last the Allied and Associated Powers informed the Archduke Joseph,⁸ through the Mission of Inter-Allied Generals at Buda-Pest, that they could not recognise nor make terms of peace with a Government which did not represent the country. On receipt of

⁸ Appendix C to HD-32, vol. VII, p. 709.

this intimation the Archduke Joseph resigned his position as head of the Hungarian State. But the Government which represented him and his views remained in Office. The Allies have waited in the hope that that Government, recognising its inability to meet the conditions required by the Allied and Associated Powers, would either arrange itself so as to include representatives of all parties in Hungary, or would withdraw from Office and leave the way open for a Government more in consonance with the requirements of the Allied and Associated Powers.

As there are no signs of such action on your part and as it is vital to the existence of Hungary that she should as soon as possible, have a Government capable, in the view of the Allied and Associated Powers, of maintaining law and order, of holding free and impartial elections within the territorial limits assigned to Hungary by the Peace Conference, and of concluding peace with the Allies, the Allied and Associated Powers are constrained to invite you either to combine with all the other parties in Hungary to form a representative Government, whose constitution will be a guarantee of its ability to satisfy the conditions of the Allied and Associated Powers or to withdraw from Office and to allow some other Statesmen to undertake the task.

The Allied and Associated Powers will be glad to receive your reply within 3 days.

Appendix D to HD-67 [68]

SEPTEMBER 26, 1919.

From: The Delegates of Bessarabia.

To: The President of the Peace Conference.

In the official statement of the organ of the Rumanian Government in Bessarabia, the *Cassa Nostra*, published in the newspapers of Kishinev of August 10, 1919, the Bessarabian land proprietors are informed that a time limit of one month has been fixed to obtain their subjection to Rumania, as well as to name charges d'affaires to replace them to assist in the work of the Commission on the expropriation of their lands.

The Bessarabian Delegation has already once before protested on this subject before the Peace Conference on April 15, 1919.

The Russian Political Conference addressed on April 20, 1919, a memorandum on this subject to the Peace Conference.

At the present moment we are forced to make another plea to the Peace Conference in the hope of obtaining its support in the just cause which we are defending.

It is to be observed that the official statement, a translation of which is attached, clearly indicates that those proprietors who accept Rumanian subjection will be treated differently from those who refuse. The difference will evidently be in favor of those proprietors who bow to the desires of the Rumanian Government.

Speaking in the name of all our mandatories, we consider the exactions of the Rumanian Government as tending to force the proprietors in Bessarabia to swear oath of allegiance to the King of Rumania, as an act profoundly unjust and outraging their dignity of citizens of a country which does not form part of the Kingdom of Rumania. It is also an outrage to international law as well as to the respect due to the decisions of the Peace Conference which has not accorded to Rumania the possession of this Russian province.

The regime established by the Rumanian Government in Bessarabia is truly intolerable for the population, and if the Peace Conference does not raise its voice against the Rumanian abuses of power in the name of justice and with the authority that it alone possesses, bloody uprisings in the Bessarabian population will be inevitable.

In defiance of all justice and rights of peoples, the Rumanian Government forces all the population, under the penalty of heavy fines, to take part in the parliamentary elections of Rumania, that is to say of a country which, until today, was foreign to her.

Through you, M. President, we ask the Peace Conference to condemn the illegal and unjust acts of the Rumanian Government and to declare them as such before the civilized world.

Delegates of Bessarabia

ALEXANDRE N. KRONPENSKY

ALEXANDRE CH. SCHMIDT

[Enclosure]

JOURNAL "BESSARABIA"

AUGUST 10, 1919.

The *Cassa Nostra* informs the landed proprietors abroad that a time limit of one month, dating from the day of the present notice, is accorded them in order to make a request to obtain Rumanian subjection and in order to name chargés d'affaires duly qualified to represent them during the course of the work of the Commission on Land expropriation if they cannot come in person.

In case neither the proprietor nor the chargé d'affaires is present, the expropriation will take place in their absence.

The present notice shall be the last invitation.

Director (Signed)

Secretary (Signed)

N. B. Without speaking of the juridical nullity of this order, it can have no value, not even formal, for the sending of Bessarabian newspapers abroad is prohibited and in order that Bessarabians living abroad be informed, it would be necessary that a like notice be printed in all the large foreign newspapers, as the majority of the landed proprietors of Bessarabia were forced to leave their native country and take refuge abroad.

Appendix E to HD-68

Draft Resolution on Russian Prisoners of War in Germany Prepared by General Weygand and General Sackville-West

[This appendix does not accompany the minutes in the Department files.]

Appendix F to HD-68

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL
MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR REPRESENTATIVES

Annexure A to S. W. C. 471

Copy No. 59

S. W. C. 472

VERSAILLES, 6 October, 1919.

Report With Regard to the Organization of the Commissions of Control for Austria

The Supreme Inter-Allied War Council in its Meeting of 25th September, 1919,¹⁰ passed the following Resolution:—

“It is decided that the Permanent Military Representatives at Versailles be directed to draw up in conjunction with the Naval and Air Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, a detailed Scheme with regard to the Military, Naval and Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, charged with the supervision of the execution by Austria of the Military Naval and Air Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.”

In consequence, the Military, Naval and Air Representatives of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the Joint meeting held at Versailles on October 6th, 1919, after consideration of the question, have agreed to draw up the attached Draft Organisation of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control provided for in Articles 149-158 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

¹⁰ HD-60, minute 5, p. 341.

- | | | |
|--|---|--|
| <p>GAL BELIN K. C. B., K. C. M. G.
 <i>Military Representative,
 French Section, Supreme
 War Council</i></p> <p>LE VAVASSEUR
 <i>Captain,
 French Naval Representative</i></p> <p>DUVAL,
 <i>General,
 French Air Representative</i></p> <p>UGO CAVALLERO
 <i>Military Representative
 Italian Section, Supreme
 War Council</i></p> <p>GRASSI
 <i>Admiral,
 Italian Naval Representative</i></p> <p>ORSINI,
 <i>Admiral,
 Italian Air Representative</i></p> | <p>C. SACKVILLE-WEST
 <i>Major General,
 Military Representative,
 British Section, Supreme War
 Council</i></p> <p>C. T. M. FULLER
 <i>Captain, R. N.,
 British Naval Representative</i></p> <p>P. R. C. GROVES
 <i>Brig-General,
 British Air Representative</i></p> <p>TASKER H. BLISS
 <i>Military Representative,
 American Section, Supreme
 War Council</i></p> <p>MCCULLY
 <i>Rear-Admiral,
 American Naval Representative</i></p> <p>A. LIPPINCOTT
 <i>Colonel,
 American Air Representative</i></p> | <p>SATO
 <i>General,
 Japanese Military
 Representative</i></p> <p>OSMUNI
 <i>Captain,
 Japanese Naval
 Representative</i></p> <p>WATANABI
 <i>General,
 Japanese Air Rep-
 resentative</i></p> |
|--|---|--|

[Enclosure]

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL
 MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR REPRESENTATIVES

S. W. C. 472

VERSAILLES, 6 October, 1919.

*Organisation of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control Provided
 For in Articles 149-158 of the Treaty of Peace With Austria*

GENERAL

Article 1

3 Inter-Allied Commissions of Control shall be established:

- A military Inter-Allied Commission of Control;
- A Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control;
- An Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control.

They shall represent with the Austrian Government the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in everything that concerns the carrying out of the Military, Naval and Aeronautical Clauses (Article 149) respectively.

These Commissions shall enter on their duties on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

Article 2

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be charged with supervising the execution of the Military Clauses (Article 149) and particularly with carrying out the stipulations contained in Article 153.

It will be presided over by an Italian General.*

Article 3

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be charged with the supervision of the execution of the Naval Clauses (article 149) and particularly with carrying out the stipulations contained in Article 154.

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission shall be presided over by an Italian Admiral.

Article 4

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be charged with the supervision of the execution of the Air Clauses (Article 149), and particularly with the carrying out of the stipulations in Article 155.

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be presided over by a French General.

Article 5

The General Officers and the Admiral mentioned in Articles 2, 3 and 4 shall each of them attach to the two others a Permanent Representative (assisted if necessary by other officers), charged with ensuring liaison between them.

*In view of the capital importance of this Commission, the Military Representatives are of opinion that its President should be a General Officer chosen for his Military standing and reputation, as well as his energy and activity. It is advisable that he should be selected from among the General Officers holding at least the rank of Commander of an Army Corps. [Footnote in the original.]

POWERS OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

Article 6

The Powers of each of the Inter-Allied Commissions of control are defined in Articles 149–155 of the Treaty of Peace.

Article 7

The General Clauses (Articles 156–158 of the Treaty of Peace) shall be under the Supervision, in so far as each of them is concerned, of the Presidents of the Military, Naval and Air Inter-Allied Commission[s] of Control.

EXPENSES OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

Article 8

The Maintenance and Expenses of the Commissions of Control and their working expenses are chargeable to Austria in accordance with Article 152 of the Treaty of Peace.

These expenses shall be paid direct through the Presidents of the Commissions to the parties concerned, by the Allied and Associated Governments, who shall obtain repayment of such expenses from the Austrian Government.*

Article 9

The Austrian Government will be notified of the accommodation required for the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, and of the duty incumbent upon it of providing such accommodation in accordance with Article 151 (paragraph 1) of the Treaty of Peace.

Article 10

The Officers and Men forming part of the Military, Naval and Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, shall receive Financial assistance which shall be identical to that fixed for the corresponding Commissions in the case of Germany.

The question of the Transport in Austria of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control (Military, Naval and Aeronautical) as well as that of their accommodation, and of the provision of their supplies

* The American Representatives made the following Reservation with regard to this Article:—

“Before the United States can adopt the proposed procedure, Legislative action by Congress will be necessary”. [Footnote in the original.]

during their stay in this country shall be regulated and co-ordinated by the Staff of General Diaz.

The amount of the allowances to be arranged for in these Conditions ought to be a generous one and ought to be chargeable to the first payment to be made by Austria. It is in the general interest to reduce [the amount of allowances?] as far as possible in [by?] attaching to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control no more than the absolutely indispensable number of officers.

DURATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

Article 11

The Duration of the Activities of each Commission shall be limited to the complete execution of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses under its supervision, in the time limit fixed by the Treaty of Peace.

In case the execution of these clauses be not completed within the period fixed, this fact will be reported by the Commission concerned to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, who will decide on the measures to be adopted.

Until a decision is reached, the Commission will continue to supervise the execution of the particular clause in question.

ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Article 12

The General Officer presiding over the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be assisted by a Staff which shall include officers of each of the armies of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

He shall, moreover, be assisted by the necessary technical personnel (legal, financial, etc.).

The Commission shall sit at Vienna.

Article 13

The Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall include 2 sub-Commissions:—

(a) A Sub-Commission for Munitions, Armament, Material and Fortifications;

(b) A Sub-Commission for Establishments, Recruiting and Military Training.

SUB-COMMISSION FOR MUNITIONS, ARMAMENT MATERIAL AND
FORTIFICATIONS

Article 14

This Sub-Commission shall include in its duties the supervision of the execution of Articles 129–135 and Table V of the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

It shall be presided over by an Italian General, assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies:

It shall sit at Vienna.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission shall be decided by the President.

This Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Grätz, Linz, Innsbruck, and other places which may be considered necessary.

SUB-COMMISSION FOR ESTABLISHMENTS, RECRUITING AND MILITARY
INSTRUCTION

Article 15

This Sub-Commission shall include in its duties the execution of Articles 118–128 and Tables I, II, III and IV of the Military Clauses of the Treaty of Peace. It shall be presided over by a French General assisted by Officers of the various Allied and Associated Armies; it shall sit at Vienna.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission shall be decided by the President.

This Sub-Commission shall be represented by Officers at Grätz, Linz, Innsbruck, and other places which may be considered necessary.

Article 16

The number of Officers who are to form part of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control might be fixed, in principle, on the following proportion:—

The United States of America	4/20.
France	4/20.
Great Britain	4/20.
Italy	6/20.
Japan	2/20.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION OF CONTROL

Article 17

The Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control, which is charged with the supervision of the execution of the Naval Clauses of the Treaty of Peace, will consist of:—

The Main Commission with necessary Staff, with headquarters in Vienna :—

A Sub-Commission to deal with the questions contained in Article 20.

Article 18

The Main Commission shall be presided over by an Italian Admiral, and shall be composed of an Admiral or other Senior Officer of each of the other principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Article 19

The Sub-Commission shall be composed of 4 Senior Naval Officers of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, (with the exception of Japan), and an Italian Interpreter.

It shall be presided over by a French Captain.

The Sub-Commission, moreover, shall be entitled to consult the technical Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers if the presence of the latter is considered necessary by the Commission.

*Article 20*¹¹

The Sub-Commission shall be concerned with :—

- (1) The destruction of ships under construction;
- (2) The surrender of stocks of munitions and Naval War Material, in accordance with Article 142 of the Treaty of Peace.

ORGANIZATION OF THE AERONAUTICAL INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION
OF CONTROL

Article 21

The Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control charged with the supervision of the carrying out of the Air Clauses of the Treaty of Peace shall be composed as follows :—

- A Main Commission with staff which shall sit at Vienna.
- A Sub-Commission for Production.
- A Sub-Commission for Military and Naval Aeronautics.

Article 22

The Main Commission shall be presided over by a French General and shall be composed of a General or Senior Officer of each of the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

¹¹ Articles 18 and 20 have been amended in accordance with a memorandum issued by the Supreme War Council on October 11, 1919.

Article 23

The Sub-Commission for Production shall supervise in particular the execution of the clauses contained in Article 147.

It shall be presided over by a British Colonel, and shall sit at Vienna.

The total number of Officers necessary for this Sub-Commission shall be decided by the President.

Article 24

The Sub-Commission for Military and Naval Aeronautics shall supervise in so far as each of these branches is concerned, the carrying out of the clauses other than those contained in Article 147. It shall be presided over by an Italian Colonel and shall sit at Vienna.

Article 25

The proportion of Officers to sit on the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall be the same as that fixed in Article 16.

Appendix G to HD-68

[Note Transmitted by the Russian Political Conference]

PARIS, October 6, 1919.

(From the Russian Embassy)

In addition to the considerations exposed in its memorandum of August the 20th and September 27th, concerning the supplying of General Youdenitch's Army, the Russian Embassy has the honor to inform the Government of the United States that it appears from the last information that there are actually certain stocks of war material, of Russian origin, at the arsenals of Koenigsberg and Graudentz; these stocks contain several hundred cannons, 400,000 rifles, the correspondent quantity of shells and cartridges, a certain number of military camions and so on.

The Russian Embassy, transmitting this information to the United States Government hopes that these data will be taken into consideration and will contribute to give a satisfactory solution to the request exposed in the above mentioned memorandum.

To the United States Delegation

Appendix H to HD-68

ITALIAN DELEGATION
TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE
HOTEL EDOUARD VII

No. 744

PARIS, October 6, 1919.

From: Scialoja.

To: President Clemenceau.

In the third part of the Treaty concluded at St. Germain on September 10 between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria there is a Section relative to Italy (Articles 36-45).

That section contains:

(a) the renunciation of Austria, as far as she is concerned, to her rights over the territories of the former double Monarchy, recognized as constituting a part of Italy by the said Treaty or by any other Treaties concluded with a view to regulating the present affairs.

(b) the solution of certain particular questions in connection with the state of war which existed between Italy and the double Monarchy.

Considering that from an international point of view the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom constituted a single power, with which the Allied and Associated Powers were at war, it is desirable that a renunciation corresponding to that which was made by Austria, be also made by Hungary as far as she may be interested. This appears especially useful in view of the pretensions which Hungary has never abandoned over certain parts of the Austrian territory in the true sense of the word.

Furthermore, nearly all the particular questions resolved in the section concerning Italy are also applicable in their relations with Hungary. For instance, the declaration that no sum shall be due by Italy by reason of her entry into possession of the palace of Venice at Rome must be valid also as far as Hungary is concerned, as long as this estate was a part of the common dominial property of the double Monarchy.

In the same way the annulment of the judgments rendered against Italian nationals for political offenses by the judiciary authorities of the former Monarchy, ought to be pronounced also in so far as Hungary is concerned.

The plan to have Hungary recognize Italian sovereignty over the territories which Italy requires [*acquires?*], and to apply in the case of Hungary the special clauses of Section I of Part III of the Treaty of

St. Germain, could be easily attained by introducing in the Treaty project with Hungary a provision conceived in the following terms:

"Hungary renounces, in all that concerns her, in favor of Italy, all rights and titles over territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy recognized as being part of Italy by the Peace Treaty concluded on September 10, 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria or by any other Treaties concluded with a view to regulating the present affairs.

"Are applicable, in their relations with Hungary and with Hungarian nationals, the provisions of Section I of Part III of the said Treaty of September 10, 1919, in so far as they may interest her."

Consequently, I have the honor to beg you in this instance, to kindly place on the order of the day of an early session of the Supreme Council, the proposition of having the above clause inserted in the Treaty with Hungary.

SCIALOJA

Appendix I to HD-68

FRENCH DELEGATION

PARIS, October 9, 1919.

Note

ATTRIBUTION OF WESTERN GALICIA TO POLAND

By virtue of Article 91 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, that Power ceded to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers those of her territories which were not specially attributed. Among the territories thus ceded to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers is Galicia.

Until now the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have not yet disposed of that province. As regards Eastern Galicia, the draft of a treaty with Poland is being studied, but its drafting depends on the decision which the Supreme Council shall take on the point of whether Eastern Galicia shall be attributed to Poland provisionally or finally.

Nothing has been done concerning Western Galicia, the attribution of which to Poland is however contested by no one.

There results from it:

1.—That at present Polish sovereignty is recognized over the territories ceded by Germany to Poland; (Treaty of June 29 [28]).

2.—That it is going to be recognized over the former Russian territories, by virtue of the draft of the treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland which is now being prepared by the Drafting Committee in conformity with the decisions of the Supreme Council.

3.—That the sovereignty of Poland over Eastern Galicia shall be the subject of a special treaty;

4.—That nothing has been provided for Western Galicia.

It would be advisable, however, to put an end, as soon as possible, to that state of affairs, as far as this last region is concerned, which is unquestionably the one whose character is the most exclusively Polish.

The French delegation considers that the Supreme Council should come to a decision in that respect as soon as possible.

Several solutions could be considered:

1.—Unite the attribution of Western Galicia with that of Eastern Galicia, that is to say to make it the subject of a single treaty in which it shall be specified that the Western part is ceded in full sovereignty, without any conditions, while the Eastern part is subjected to certain conditions.

2.—To make it the subject of a special treaty.

3.—To take advantage of the separate treaty with Poland for the attribution of the former Russian territories, to add to it an article relative to the attribution of Eastern [*Western?*] Galicia to Poland.

It would seem preferable to adopt this last solution in order to leave its special character to the question of Western [*Eastern?*] Galicia.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, October 13, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Pichon.
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. de St. Quentin

ITALY
M. Scialoja
Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN
M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Mr. C. Russell
BRITISH EMPIRE. Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE. M. Massigli
ITALY M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
Mr. E. L. Dresel
Col. Logan
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE
General Sackville-West
General Groves
Captain Fuller
Commandant Dunne
Mr. Leeper

FRANCE
Marshal Foch
M. Loucheur
General Weygand
M. Laroche
M. Tirard
Captain Roper

ITALY
General Cavallero
M. Vannutelli-Rey

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. M. PICHON said that he had just received a note from the British Delegation asking if there were any objections to the publication of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, as well as the other diplomatic instruments signed at St. Germain. So far as he was concerned, there was no objection.

Publication of
the Diplomatic
Instruments
Signed at
St. Germain

MR. POLK asked what had been decided in regard to the publication of the first draft of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

M. PICHON said that it had been decided that there was no objection to its publication.

(It was decided :

that the Council had no objection to the publication of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, as well as the other diplomatic instruments which were signed at St. Germain.)

2. MR. POLK said he wished to make two remarks in regard to the minutes of the meeting of the 10th October (H. D. 67). According to the text which he had before him, he had said on page 15 (English text),¹ that he thought that it was important that the blockade preventing the shipment of arms to Hungary had been [*should not be?*] removed. He had not spoken of Hungary, but of Roumania, and had not spoken of arms but of supplies of all kinds. He desired that it should be mentioned in the minutes of the meeting that M. Clemenceau had expressed agreement. In the minutes of the same meeting the Council had decided (Page 16, English text)² that the Roumanian representative on the Subcommittee to be sent to Budapest for determining the reparations value of material removed by the Roumanians should sit in a deliberative capacity. He had wished to give them only a consultative capacity.

Correction of
the Minutes of
the Meeting of
the 10th October
(HD-67)

M. LOUCHEUR said that he had insisted on the word "deliberative".

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what was the difference between the two expressions.

M. LOUCHEUR said that if one said "consultative" that excluded the right of vote, whereas the expression "deliberative voice" implied the right of vote. In the beginning he had favored giving the Roumanians a consultative voice, but Sir Eyre Crowe had said that this means of procedure would be offensive to the Roumanians as it seemed to place them before an Allied tribunal. He had recognized the justice of this argument and had then advocated the idea of a consultative [*deliberative?*] voice. The question should be examined again. He, himself, was strongly in favor of the solution which had been adopted at the meeting of the 10th October, as otherwise the

¹ Minute 7, pp. 539, 542.

² Minute 8, p. 543.

Roumanians would be given new grounds for grievance against the Allies. He wished to add that he saw no inconvenience in giving the Roumanians a deliberative voice. They would have one voice against four. If their demands were unjustified they would be in the minority.

MR. POLK asked whether the Hungarians would also have a deliberative voice. He wished to know too what was the position of the Czecho-Slovaks.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the Hungarians would not have a deliberative voice in the Reparation Commission any more than did the Roumanians [*Germans?*] and Austrians. That was specified in the Treaty of Peace. On the other hand, the Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, Poles and Roumanians were given a voice. The Treaty of Peace provided that a representative of these four Nations and of Greece should in turn sit for a year with a deliberative voice.

MR. POLK asked whether Sir George Clerk had discussed the subject before the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had.

M. LOUCHEUR said that Sir George Clerk was present when he had formulated his proposal, which resulted from the very conclusions of Sir George Clerk's report.

MR. POLK asked whether it would not be possible to put the Poles, Jugo-Slavs and the Czecho-Slovaks on the same footing as the Roumanians.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that it would be possible to draft a new text which would put these four Powers on the same footing and give all of them a deliberative voice in the Subcommittee at Budapest for the questions in which they were interested. He could agree with Colonel Logan upon the text of a draft which would define the functions of the Subcommittee.

(It was decided :

to take note of the corrections in the minutes of the meeting of the 10th October, (H. D. 67) in accordance with Mr. Polk's remarks.)

(It was further decided :

(This resolution will be issued at a future date.)³

³ The resolution issued later reads as follows: "It was further decided that M. Loucheur and Colonel Logan should be requested to alter the text of the resolution of the 10th October, respecting the despatch to Budapest of a Subcommittee under the organization committee of the Reparation Commission, in such a manner as to provide that representatives of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on this Sub-Committee, should be placed on an equal footing with the Roumanian representative. The text as altered should be approved by the British and Italian Delegation." (Paris Peace Conf. 180.03502/69.)

3. **M. PICHON** said that he had not been present at the last meeting of the Council. If he had correctly understood the notes of the meeting, the Council had accepted the draft note to **M. Friedrich**,⁴ with the reservation that **Mr. Polk** would suggest modifications.

Draft Note to
M. Friedrich

MR. POLK said that he had had a conversation with **Sir George Clerk** and he could suggest certain changes in the text, but he did not believe that that was essential. The important point was whether the American Delegation were convinced that the Council were not making a mistake in addressing the note to **M. Friedrich**. It was always a delicate matter to intervene in the internal affairs of a country, particularly by transmitting a written document. He would greatly prefer that a special representative of the Supreme Council, authorized to enter into relations with the Hungarian political parties, should be sent to Budapest. The instructions given this representative should be identical with those contained in the draft note to **M. Friedrich**.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he recognized the weight of **Mr. Polk's** argument. He had thought the same thing and had proposed that the Allied Generals at Budapest be charged to take the action proposed. If it was thought that the Generals, on account of their relations with **M. Friedrich**, were not qualified to take this action, it would be possible to send a special representative of the Council. It was of great importance that Hungarian opinion should know of the steps which the Entente were taking. If a means of making the matter public were found other than by transmitting a note by wireless telegraph, he had no objection to the despatch of a special representative of the Supreme Council.

M. SCIALOJA said that he agreed.

M. PICHON said that if the Council should decide to send a representative to Budapest, **Sir George Clerk** would appear to be the person to send.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that **Sir George Clerk** had left on Saturday for London, but he had spoken with him and it would be possible for **Sir George Clerk** to return in two days' time.

M. PICHON said that he thought there would be no inconvenience in awaiting **Sir George Clerk's** return.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if the Council decided to send **Sir George Clerk** it was important that the Allied Generals at Budapest should be notified, in order that they should be aware of the fact that **Sir George Clerk** was charged by the Supreme Council with carrying out a special mission.

⁴ Appendix C to HD-68, p. 586.

(It was decided :

that the Supreme Council, instead of transmitting a Note to M. Friedrich, should send a representative.

It was also decided :

that, upon the appointment of a representative, the Allied Generals at Budapest should be notified of his mission.)

4. SIR EYRE CROWE said that before the Council passed on to another subject, he had a point to raise. He wished to ask what had been decided on the question of the publication of the Note of the Allied and Associated Governments to the Roumanian Government.⁵ The Joint Secretariat had thought that the Council had decided to publish the Note after it had reached the Roumanian Government. He had not understood this to be the case and he thought that M. Clemenceau had been of the opinion that the note should not be published.

Publication of
the Note to the
Roumanian
Government

MR. POLK said he thought that the Council had decided to publish the Note after its receipt by the Roumanian Government.

M. DE ST. QUENTIN said the resolution was worded as follows :

“It was further decided to publish the text of the Note after it had been transmitted to the Roumanian Government.” (H.D. 68, Minute 2, page 4, English Text.)⁶

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he proposed that the Note should not be published until the Supreme Council had taken a new decision on the subject.

(It was decided :

that the Note of the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government should not be published without a special decision of the Supreme Council.)

5. SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council were aware of the fact that the British Government believed that to avoid the inconvenience of an excessive subdivision of military contingents and the resulting difficulties of provisionment, it would appear more convenient that the Interallied zones of occupation, provided for in the Treaty of Peace, should be divided between the Powers in such a way that each zone should be occupied by the troops of a single power. It was objected to on the French side, that it was important to emphasize the Interallied character of the occupation and the collective responsibility of the occupying powers. When the question had last been discussed by the Supreme Council,⁷ he had recalled a suggestion made by Mr. Bal-

Distribution of
Allied Troops
in the Plebiscite
Areas

⁵ Appendix B to HD-68, p. 583.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 578.

⁷ HD-53, minute 2, p. 300.

four to the effect that the preponderance in a particular zone should be given to a particular army, but that small detachments from other armies could be added in order to assure the Inter-Allied character to the occupation. He had conveyed this suggestion to London, but the British Government did not agree with the first suggestion although they were prepared to accept the second. If this system were adopted, it would be necessary for the Council to agree as to the distribution among the various Allied armies before requesting Marshal Foch to regulate the practical details of application.

MARSHAL FOCH said that there was a question of principle to be considered. He was thinking of the question of the occupation of Upper Silesia. The Treaty of Peace provided that the plebiscite in Upper Silesia should take place under the guarantee of occupation by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers. These troops would not be equally divided and one Power would assume command in Upper Silesia. It was necessary for the Governments to inform him, whether they desired an Allied solution, or, what he called, a solution of a single Power. If the spirit of the Treaty of Peace were to be carried out by all the Powers, it was necessary that all participate in its execution; if not, it was not a Treaty of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, but the Treaty of one Power.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the remarks made by Marshal Foch were leading the discussion in another direction. He should remember that the British Government had accepted a compromise which was to leave in one particular zone an army, which should have a preponderance, but that there should also be representation of the other armies. As long as the occupation were Inter-Allied, the principle would be safeguarded. He wished to remark that there would have to be one Commander of the troops of occupation in each zone, and this Commander would be in charge. The argument, that if one recognized the preponderance of one Army, that Army was given the supreme power, did not seem to him exact. The compromise guaranteed a division of responsibility.

MARSHAL FOCH said that before accepting a compromise he would have to know what it was. What the proposition contemplated was he did not know. For the moment he knew nothing but the Treaty of Peace, which had to be applied immediately, if it were not to break down. It had been decided that Upper Silesia should be occupied by two divisions,⁸ one division being sent first. The Versailles Council, on the basis of a decision by the Supreme Council, had drawn up the composition of this division, in determining the minimum which each Allied Army should furnish. To that he agreed. He wished to insist upon the urgency of the matter, and upon the fact,

⁸ HD-36, minute 2, vol. VII, p. 783.

that, at the present time, the only document upon which he had to act was the draft of the Versailles Council. He wished to add, that, if the territories to be occupied and the conditions under which the occupation were to take place, were considered, the charges of occupation were unequal. It had been thought advisable to send two divisions to Upper Silesia for a fixed period; elsewhere occupations could be made with much smaller forces. Was Danzig to be occupied and for how long? He did not know. In any case it was a question of a small force. The same applied to Memel. There was a question of unequal charges for an unequal period of occupation.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he recognized the force of Marshal Foch's arguments. It was a fact that the only text which Marshal Foch had was the Versailles draft. It was to be regretted that Marshal Foch had not been present at the last meeting of the Council where the question had been discussed. At that time he had said that the British Government did not accept the draft prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles. In the course of the same meeting there was a question of a suggestion made by Mr. Balfour on the 8th August.¹⁰ He (Sir Eyre Crowe) thought that the French Representatives agreed in principle with this suggestion. He had informed his Government, which had agreed to the compromise. The entire question could not be brought up again today.

M. PICHON said that this was not quite what had occurred. He had before him the notes of the meeting of the 22nd September (H. D. 58). The Council had admitted the general principle that in a fixed zone one power could have a larger number of troops than the other Powers, but they had not admitted that the units to represent the other Allies could be very small. The whole subject was dominated by the Political question. Inter-Allied occupation proved that the Allies were in agreement as to guaranteeing the execution of the Treaty of Peace. The French Delegation did not desire to see a situation raised, such as had arisen in Bulgaria.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he thought there had been a misunderstanding. M. Pichon had again expressed the French point of view. He knew that point of view. On the other hand he wished to recall that on the 22nd September, when they had alluded to Mr. Balfour's suggestion, a French Representative, he thought that it was General Le Rond, had said that by this means it would be possible to arrive at a solution similar to that which the French Delegation advocated. It was this proposal which he had submitted to London and it was that proposal which he was in a position to accept.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he desired to place the question on its true ground. Upper Silesia was to be occupied at once; that was to say

¹⁰ HD-27, minute 7, vol. VII, p. 625.

in fifteen days after the Treaty of Peace went into force. He asked what was the contingent of each of the Allies in this occupation; as for the rest, he wished to remark, that the Treaty of Peace did not provide for the occupation of Danzig any more than it did for that of Allenstein and Marienwerder. If there were not a firm occupation, the Treaty would become useless. It was a definite question, and there were three questions which arose, if one wished to ask them. He wished to propose that a special meeting, for the regulation of these problems, be called, where the matter should be treated both from a political and from a military point of view.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to state that the Military Experts had asked for one division for Upper Silesia and not for two. In any event, the despatch of the second division remained uncertain. They had thought that the occupation of the other regions where plebiscites were to take place would require a total of one division. It was true that the occupation of Danzig was not provided for by the Treaty, but there was little doubt but that this occupation would be necessary. With regard to Allenstein and Marienwerder, the Treaty provided that the Inter-Allied Commissions, who were charged with presiding over the plebiscites, should have at their disposal a sufficient military force. There was little doubt but that, in view of the information received, it would be necessary to send troops to these districts. There existed there a problem as urgent as that of Upper Silesia.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the Treaty of Peace was very vague upon certain points. It was necessary for the Supreme Council to attend to this. When that had been done, he would know how many effectives were needed. It was further necessary for the Council to inform him what Power would have the preponderance in a particular place. It was only when the Military Experts had this information that they would be in a position to say whether it would be possible to make a distribution of the forces which would impose upon each of the interested Powers an equal expense.

M. PICHON said that it would be necessary to first settle the occupation of Upper Silesia. The Council could direct Marshal Foch to prepare a draft in agreement with the Military Representatives of the other Powers. Then it would be possible to examine the other questions.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council could now decide as to whether or not Danzig and Allenstein should be occupied. He believed, moreover, that this had already been decided.

M. PICHON said that nothing had been decided. The question had been adjourned every time it had come before the Council. The Polish

Commission should be requested to make an urgent report on this subject, but at present a project for the occupation of Upper Silesia was what was wanted.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked why the question of the occupation of Danzig, Allenstein, Marienwerder and Memel could not be decided at once; and why the modalities of the occupation should not be studied by Marshal Foch at the same time as those for Upper Silesia.

M. PICHON agreed that in adopting this course the Council would be taking into consideration the questions raised by Marshal Foch.

MR. POLK said that he thought in any event the Council should hear the report of the Commission on Polish Affairs. He thought that the Commission were not unanimous on the subject of Danzig and Memel.

M. PICHON said that it would be possible to make a provisional reservation on the subject of Danzig and Memel.

GENERAL WEYGAND asked whether a decision had been taken on the question of Klagenfurt. When the Allied Generals had made their report on this question, they had provided for Inter-Allied occupation where the plebiscite was to take place.

M. LAROCHE said that the question was settled in the Treaty of St. Germain. Article 50 provided that the first zone should be occupied by the troops of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and the second by Austrian troops.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that it was therefore necessary to settle only the question of Danzig and Memel. When the Council had reached a decision the General Staffs would need a few hours to prepare a draft.

(It was decided:

(1) that in the portions of East Prussia, where plebiscites were to be held, in accordance with Articles 94 to 98 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, there should be occupation by Inter-Allied troops;

(2) that the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission on Baltic Affairs should inform the Council, at its meeting on the 15th October, whether they considered that Danzig and Memel (Articles 99 to 108 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany) should be occupied by Inter-Allied forces.)

6. (The Council had before it the German notes of the 7th August, 1919, and draft replies to these notes prepared by the Commission, on the left bank of the Rhine (See Appendices "A" and "B").)

Reply to the
Notes of the
German
Government
Respecting the
Occupation of the
Left Bank of
the Rhine

M. TIRARD said that the draft note submitted to the Council was a reproduction of the stenographic text of the declarations made by M. Loucheur to the German Delegates. However, M. Loucheur proposed an alteration to

make the text more clear. On Page 13 ¹¹ (French text) he suggested that for paragraph 13 the following be substituted: "Special Arrangements. Special arrangements shall be made in accordance with the request in the German note for the regulation of the reception by the various railway administrations in consequence of the modification of the frontiers."

(It was decided:

(1) to accept the draft replies to the five German Notes transmitted from Versailles on the 7th August, 1919, respecting the administration of the occupied territory;

(2) that paragraph 13 of the fourth reply (administration of railways in the occupied territory) should be altered as follows: "Paragraph 13. Special Arrangements. Special arrangements shall be made in accordance with the request in the German Note for the regulation of the reception by the various railway administrations in consequence of the modification of the frontiers."

7. (The Council had before it a Note from the British Delegation of the 10th October, 1919, (See appendix "C").)

SIR EYRE CROWE commented briefly upon the Note from the British Delegation. He insisted upon the importance of a decision being taken by the Council in regard to this matter, for otherwise, it might become impossible to obtain the delivery of the vessels in question.

M. SCIALOJA said that he agreed in principle with Sir Eyre Crowe, but he wished to raise a question of competence. It was provided in Section VII of Annex 3 of Part VIII (Reparations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, that Germany agreed to take any measures that might be indicated to her by the Reparation Commission for obtaining the full total for all ships which had during the war been transferred or were in the process of being transferred to neutral flags, without the consent of the Allied and Associated Governments, and to ask Germany to obtain full right of property in these ships. He thought that the question which had been submitted belonged to the Reparation Commission, otherwise there was a danger that Germany might raise objections of a legal nature.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had considered this article in the Note which the Council had before it, but in this case, it was not a question of the definite attribution of these ships; it was simply a question of their being handed over.

M. SCIALOJA agreed, but pointed out that Germany might say that she awaited the decision of the Reparation Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the only matter which concerned the Council at the moment was to prevent the ships passing into the hands of the Dutch.

¹¹ *Post*, p. 626.

M. PICHON said that it was not a question of getting to the root of the matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Germany should be justified in demanding a decision from the Reparation Commission for the settlement of the question of the ownership of the ships. The present question was to force the German Government to make sure of the possession of these ships and to deliver them to the Allies.

MR. POLK proposed that Sir Eyre Crowe prepare a draft note to the German Government which the Council could examine at its next meeting.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this note would demand:

(1) that the five ships in question should be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers at the Firth of Forth;

(2) that the Dutch crews should be removed;

(3) that the Dutch names of the ships and mark of port of origin should be removed;

(4) that the Allied and Associated Governments could, if they desired, make an inspection of the "William Oswald";

(5) that the "Nassau" and the "Branunschweig" should be taken to Bremerhaven by German crews.

M. SCIALOJA asked what part the Reparation Commission would play.

M. PICHON said that its President, M. Loucheur, was in agreement with Sir Eyre Crowe.

(It was decided:

that Sir Eyre Crowe should submit to the Council at its next meeting the draft of a Note to the German Government demanding the delivery to the Allies of the five German merchant ships sold to Dutch firms during the war.

8. (The Council had before it a draft resolution of the 10th October prepared by the American Delegation (See appendix "D").)

Execution of
Articles 100
to 104 of the
Treaty of
Versailles
Respecting
the Free City
of Danzig

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the Council had the right to decide as to measures which should be taken to assure the rapid execution of Articles 100 to 104 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. Article 104 of the Treaty of Peace provided for a Treaty between the free city of Danzig and Poland, but the free city of Danzig did not yet exist.

M. PICHON said that the American Proposal was intended merely to request the Commission on Polish Affairs to study the question and make a report to the Supreme Council. The proposal did not go beyond that.

(It was decided:

that the Commission on Polish Affairs should be requested to examine Articles 100 to 104 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, relative to the creation of the free city of Danzig, and to submit a

report as soon as possible as to the measures to be taken to secure the speedy execution of these articles, upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace.)

Sale of Air Material to Sweden by Germany

9. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated 7th October, 1919, (See Appendix "E").) (In view of the fact that no remarks were made it was decided:

(1) that the German Government should be required to provide the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control with full particulars of all aircraft and aircraft material sold or exported since the Armistice, and that the value of this material should be estimated by the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control, and should be paid to him by the 31st January, 1920;

(2) that Marshal Foch should be instructed to enquire into Mr. Ranft's transactions and the reported gift of two aeroplanes to the Swedish Army and shall also request the German Government to forward a statement with regard to these matters.)

10. (The Council had before it a note from the Secretary-General of the International Labor Commission, dated Paris, 7th October, 1919. (See Appendix "F").)

Admission of Luxembourg to the International Labor Congress at Washington

M. PICHON said that M. Arthur Fontaine had asked the Council to decide whether the Luxembourg delegates to the International Labor Congress should be admitted upon the same conditions as the delegates from Finland. Luxembourg was not one of the States who were contained in the original membership of the League of Nations, nor one of the thirteen States which had been invited to join the League.

(It was decided:

that the question raised in the Note of the Secretary-General of the International Labor Commission respecting the admission of Luxembourg to the forthcoming Congress at Washington should be left to the decision of that Congress.

It was further decided:

that the American Delegation should inform the Secretary-General of the International Labor Commission that the Allied and Associated Governments would interpose no difficulties in regard to passports for Luxembourg delegates desirous of proceeding to Washington in anticipation of a favorable decision.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, 13 October, 1919.

Appendices A and B to HD-69

CONTENTS

Dossier of Correspondence between the Allied and Associated Powers and the German Delegation relative to the Administration of the Occupied Territory of the Rhine

Five Notes from von Lewald, of August 7, 1919, and replies thereto, under the following subjects:

- I. The occupation of the Left Bank of the Rhine
- II. Accommodations for the German Imperial High Commissioners
- III. Questions of Procedure
- IV. Administration of Railroads
- V. Regime of Navigation

Translation

German Notes Relative to the Administration of the Rhenish Territories, Delivered by M. von Lewald, August 7, 1919

FIRST NOTE, RELATIVE TO THE OCCUPATION OF THE LEFT BANK OF THE
RHINE

GENTLEMEN: In the name of the German Government I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the answer¹² to the two German memoranda¹³ concerning the military occupation of the left bank of the Rhine. I note with satisfaction that the Allied and Associated Governments intend to make the military occupation of the left bank of the Rhine as light as possible for the populations.

I take the liberty to make detailed comments on the following paragraphs of the answer:

I interpret the answer concerning paragraph 3 to mean that the laws of the Empire and of the Federative States promulgated for the territories in question, as well as the executive decrees, shall be enforced as long as the High Commission does not make use of its right of veto by a communication to the Commissioner of the Empire, because their application would affect the safety and the needs of the military forces of the Allied and Associated Powers. That right of veto should be expressed in a decree to be issued in conformity with Article 3 of the agreement.^{13a}

In order to make the situation of public right perfectly clear, it would be advisable that the decrees of the High Commission be published in an official paper by the Commissioner of the Empire. Thus the stipulations of article 3-a of the agreement would be fulfilled for the German Government.

¹² Appendix A to HD-11, vol. VII p. 212.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

^{13a} Agreement with regard to the military occupation of the Territories of the Rhine, signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, *Treaties, Conventions, etc.*, 1910-1923, vol. III, p. 3524.

The answer concerning paragraph 4 guaranteed to Germany that the populations shall enjoy the free exercise of its personal and civic rights, religious freedom, freedom of the press, vote, association, and that the political, administrative and economic relations between the occupied territories and between those territories and the non-occupied territories shall not be hindered any more than circulation. A great calm has come over the occupied territory caused by the fact that now the provincial, communal and municipal elections can take place freely and that these assemblies as well as the ecclesiastical assemblies of the provincial synod will be allowed to meet. The special authorization to travel from one part of the occupied territory to another and from the occupied territory to the non-occupied territory of Germany is therefore suppressed. Simultaneously with the guarantee of free circulation, the sale of newspapers from the non-occupied territories of Germany in the occupied territory shall be authorized, as for example the importation of the *Frankfurter-Zeitung* in Rhenish Hesse which was forbidden until now.

Concerning paragraph 5, I take the liberty of making the remark that the Governments of Prussia, Bavaria, Baden, Hesse and Oldenburg have given their consent to the nomination of Herr von Starck as Commissioner of the Empire, with the meaning that the Commissioner of the Empire shall equally represent the rights of those states and of their population at the High Commission.

Concerning paragraph 5a, I remark that the new constitution adopted by the National Constituent Assembly under date of July 31, 1919, contains a considerable increase of the jurisdiction of the Empire as compared with that of the Federative States. I shall take the liberty of sending four copies of the new constitution to the President of the Commission.

I would be grateful if acceptance of M. von Starck's nomination was granted as soon as possible so that he might be in a position to enter into relations with the Interallied High Commission at Coblenz. Numerous administrative measures adopted in the various occupied territories show the necessity of it.

Supposing that the High Commission has its seat in Coblenz, the Commissions [*Commissioner?*] of the Empire must also reside there. For the buildings which must be placed at his disposal and which are at present occupied by the American Military authorities, I take the liberty of delivering the following note.¹⁴

Concerning paragraph 6, I ask again to kindly let me know as soon as possible the effectives of the troops to be maintained in the occupied territory, the number of officers, men and horses, together with the

¹⁴ *Post.* p. 623.

name of places where the troops will have to be stationed; since according to article 8*b* of the agreement, the troops have to be exclusively housed in barracks and not quartered in private houses, the old garrison cities will have to be considered first. It is very important for those cities to be informed as soon as possible of the effectives of the troops which they shall have to house. On that subject, may I be allowed to state that before July 31, 1914, there were only 70,000 men stationed in the occupied territory. Since, according to the Peace Treaty, Germany is authorized to maintain only an army of 100,000 men, distributed all over the territory of the "Reich", the German Government hopes that the effectives of the occupying troops will not exceed a number equivalent to the capacity of the fixed barracks. It will be especially desirable that an order be issued so that the military authorities of the Allied and Associated Powers do not require from cities which are not considered in the future as garrison towns, such things as electric installations, aqueducts or others which would cause great expenses and would not be used later.

To give an example of the serious inconveniences resulting from the extremely high effectives now stationed in the occupied territory, I take the liberty of mentioning that for the present it is impossible for foreigners to find room in Cologne although it is essentially a city of foreigners and it has at its disposal excellent hotels with 5000 beds. The Commission represented here and the members of the parliamentary council of the Commissioner of the Empire who met in Cologne last Sunday could not be housed, or were only able to find absolutely insufficient rooms for one night only, and only upon the request of the Commissioner of the Empire did the military authorities place a few very modest rooms at their disposal.

The repression of the hotel service in the great Rhine towns is incompatible with the development of commerce and industry.

The answer concerning paragraph 7 states that the High Commission is to regulate the organization of the police forces. I take the liberty of remarking that article 1, alinea 2, of the agreement stipulates that it is only the number of the police forces which is to be determined by the Allied and Associated Powers.

Following the troubles caused by the war and the difficult economic situation among the working classes of Germany, and which are well known by the High Commission, the number of police forces will have to be superior to that of Peace time because then, in case of need one could have recourse to the military forces for the maintenance of public order. That is especially important because of the fact that, according to the Peace Treaty, it is forbidden to maintain in the future troops in a zone 50 kms. wide and bordering the occupied territories.

Concerning paragraph 9, I take account of the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers recognize that the privilege of jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon German citizens, so that German citizens, even in a case where they are employed by the troops or are in their service, shall remain subjected to German jurisdiction. In alinea 2 of Paragraph 9, the answer remarks that the Allied and Associated Governments not wishing perturbation to be caused in the occupied territories, could not admit that the competent German authorities begin judicial actions for political or economic facts pertaining to the period of the Armistice, unless those facts have already caused the Allied and Associated Governments to begin judicial actions. I cannot see on what provisions of the agreement that pretention of the Allied and Associated Powers can be based. I interpret the remark to mean, in short, that the creators of the so-called Rhenish Republic, that is to say M. Dorten and his friends, together with the people who are making propaganda in the Palatinate for the creation of the autonomous state "free Palatinate", namely Dr. Haas and acolytes at Lindau [*Landau*], shall therefore be protected, from a point of view of penal law, from any judicial action of any kind on the part of Germany.

Consequently, I feel obliged to remark that for those agitations and machinations of M. Dorten and his friends at Wiesbaden, of Dr. Haas and his friends at Landau, as well as M. Hompa at Kehl, it is only a question of small groups without any importance who are pursuing aims directed against the German Constitution such as no Government can tolerate in time of peace. Without the protection of the military authorities at Wiesbaden and in the Palatinate, as at Kehl, those tendencies would not have had the least success. I have in my hands a rather voluminous dossier concerning M. Dorten's acts and the protection accorded him by the military authorities. As to the Palatinate, I have also at hand documented material. The situation is quite analogous in the Principality of Birkenfeld where the military command attempted to push the small country in a determined political path. All those tendencies do not find the least support in the agreement. I beg you to kindly confirm that as soon as the agreement goes into force, the High Commission, conforming itself to the intentions which have inspired the Allied and Associated Powers in their answer to paragraph 28, see that this interference in the internal affairs of Germany be stopped. The agreement does not give the right to the Germans who thus violated the German law to be immune from legal action. The German Government could not declare itself in accord with that and could only renounce any judicial action in occupied and non-occupied territories in case the Allied and Associated Powers declare themselves ready to grant a complete

amnesty to the persons condemned for having committed infractions to the orders of the occupying powers and in case all the cases pending for such reasons are stopped. I believe that that would correspond to the spirit of conciliation invoked on several occasions in the answer. The same measure would apply to the economic decree enacted either by the occupying authorities or by Germany.

Concerning paragraphs 10, 11, and 12, I take the liberty of delivering a statement of the German Minister of Justice which I beg you to kindly take into consideration.¹⁵

As for paragraph 10, I beg you to kindly enlighten me on a few points. Since the German military legislation does not grant any jurisdiction in civil affairs to the military tribunals, even during the state of war, and since I did not succeed in finding the laws enforced among the Allied and Associated Powers allowing military tribunals to try civil affairs, I would be grateful to receive a copy of the stipulations in question from the various occupying Powers. I am grateful that the answer recognizes the jurisdiction of the German courts to decide differences resulting from contracts made privately either by soldiers, or by their families, with the restriction that the High Commission shall have the right to decide in case of abuses. Since the word "evocation" is used both in the French and in the English text, they seem to have in mind the "jus evocandi" unknown to German legislation for many years and for the explanation of which it is necessary to have recourse to very old German judicial institutions. Consequently, I conclude from the text that to the High Commission shall be reserved the right to take away from German courts cases brought before it and to transfer to the military tribunals of the occupying Powers. That would constitute a serious infringement on the independence of jurisdiction and would be considered by the whole German magistrature as a doubt cast on its absolute impartiality.

Concerning paragraph 14, I had asked if a declaration of the receipts of the Empire and of the Federative States, received in the occupied territory, could also be deposited in the non-occupied territory. The answer to paragraph 14 does not make that very important point clear and that is why I take the liberty of asking for an express confirmation of my interpretation.

Concerning paragraph 16; the Allied and Associated Powers did not accept my proposal to trust the German authorities to determine and pay reimbursements in conformity with German law, however, they have declared themselves ready to study a regulation of application together with the German authorities. I wish to believe that the regulation will neglect neither the interests of the population

¹⁵ This statement does not accompany the minutes in the Department files.

concerned nor those of the German finances. That is why I believe I can limit myself, in that respect, to point out a few wishes, leaving all the rest in the good care of the High Commission. The following points are of a very special importance.

1. The creation of two instances and that in such a way that a second instance shall have the jurisdiction over the whole occupied territory so that the uniformity indispensable to the application and the interpretation of the regulations and in the fixation of the amount of the reimbursement be guaranteed.

2. In both instances the admission as attorney general of a representative of the financial administration of the Empire, to the proposals of whom the Commissions shall grant a hearing before arriving at the decision and who should also be authorized to make an appeal to plaintiff against the decision of the first tribunal.

3. Reimbursement shall be fixed in conformity with the current prices at the place and at the time of the presentation.

On the other hand I take once more the liberty of calling the attention of the Commission of [*to?*] the state of affairs now existing in the various zones of occupation regarding the reimbursement of requisitions and including the burdens caused by the housing of soldiers. I took the liberty of stating in my supplementary memorandum to [*in?*] paragraph 32¹⁶ that the situation had become intolerable. According to the answer, the High Commission will have to take care of the establishment of a uniform order of things by the promulgation of regulations; it is possible that the precautions required to guarantee the future have been taken, that is to say after the going into force of the agreement, against the return of a state of affairs as intolerable as that which existed during the armistice but no solution has yet been found as to how the population shall be indemnified for the requisitions including the housing of soldiers during the armistice period.

The present state of affairs cannot be maintained because of the differences of the stipulations, notably regarding the amount of reimbursements in the various zones of occupation, which have given rise to a marked dissatisfaction among the population and that besides a great many requisitions, among the most expensive ones, have not been paid as I have already had the honor to state with more details. As regards the British zone of occupation where the German authorities were allowed to enforce the law of the German Empire of March 2, 1919,¹⁷ I earnestly beg to maintain the present state of affairs because the financial administration of the German Empire has already paid, in conformity with German law, a sum of more than 100 million marks on account of the claims for indemnities and because a change in the decree and in the procedure during the execution would bring disturbances in the juridical situation as well as in the finances of the

¹⁶ Appendix A to HD-11, vol. VII, p. 227.

¹⁷ *Reichs-Gesetzblatt*, 1919, No. 52, p. 261.

Empire. As to the other zones, one could perhaps guarantee the indispensable homogeneity notably as regards the British zone, by authorizing there also the German authorities to enforce the German law, all the more so that part of the urban and rural circles and the communes have already paid rather large sums on account of the titles to indemnity which have not been paid as yet, neither by the occupying troops nor by the German Empire. However, my Government will be ready to accept also another procedure analogous perhaps to the regulation which the High Commission will promulgate in the future, under the only condition that the population already seriously affected and the communes overwhelmed with taxes be soon reimbursed.

Concerning paragraph 17: the explanations of paragraph 17 seem to take into account especially the second part of my memorandum relative to those points. I am glad that the legitimate needs of the public services at the time of the requisition of public and private establishments shall be satisfied in a conciliating spirit. It will be especially desirable to allow the buildings intended for teaching of all grades to be used for that purpose. I hope that the question to know if a great part of the localities occupied at present shall be again placed at the disposal of the population, will be examined in the same conciliatory spirit.

The question of the housing of officers and their families preoccupies and worries very much the inhabitants of the occupied territory. If it is a fact that during the period of armistice the population felt already as a heavy burden the restrictions inherent to the housing of troops, those feelings will become unbearable if—in view of the long years of occupation to come—a conciliatory solution of that question could not be found. The wealthy families would leave the occupied territory, to the detriment of the communes where they were domiciled, and a spirit of vexation, highly undesirable, would get hold of the middle and lower classes. The housing should be made on the basis of the regulations in force in the various armies, it would therefore be agreeable to me to know those regulations so as to be in a position to take sides regarding the various methods of their application. May I be allowed, however, to express right now the desire that, in general, the housing be regulated so as not to jeopardize the family life of the inhabitants. The complete eviction of the latter or their obligation to use only a few small rooms,—that the exactions of the intensive billeting made often necessary during the period of armistice—should not take place again; in the same way the installation of messes in private houses where they were a great inconvenience to the inhabitants. The billeting of officers' families is a problem particularly difficult to solve. I suppose that it would be a question of placing at their disposal unfurnished rooms since those families have their own furniture. The requisitioning of the whole furniture in-

cluding house linen, table material, kitchen utensils and other household goods seems all the more heavy during the long period of occupation because a great many of those objects are lacking now, especially linen, and that the inhabitants would be unable to replace. I presume that in the future domestic articles shall no longer be required.

For the purpose of avoiding annoyances on both sides, I consider it indispensable to state with precision the objections of the hosts who, up to the present often found themselves in a situation which was not clearly defined. In any case, it would be practicable that the billeting should be made through the municipal authorities.

Finally, I take the liberty of calling your attention to the fact, that, according to the especially difficult situation of the building industry since the war, there exists a great shortage of apartments as well in non-occupied Germany as in occupied territory, and that that situation has been only increased by the billeting of the troops of occupation. May I not also be allowed to express the hope that the requisition of living rooms shall be made within the limits of the absolutely indispensable necessities.

According to my information, the moving of officers' families in the occupied territory has already taken a certain development; allow me to insist on the necessity to authorize those moving only after a solution to the question of billets has been found.

Paragraph 18 recognizes that a control shall be established by the Interallied High Commission as regards the privileges and customs exemptions conferred by Article 19 to the troops of occupation and their personnel both civil and military. The request expressed in my memorandum that no German national and no neutral be granted the privilege of the exemption of taxes by entering in the service of the troops of occupation has received no answer. Consequently I take the liberty of reiterating my request to kindly give me a statement on that subject such as it was given in paragraph 9 of the answer concerning the privileges of jurisdiction.

I ask you to kindly grant a hearing to the Commissioner of the Empire before taking the prescriptions for the measures of control considered by the High Commission concerning the privileges and the customs exemptions. It would be indispensable to give an active part to the competent German authorities at the time of the execution of the control.

19.—The customs frontier of the West show deficiencies. They prevented the installation of German customs officers on German territory at the frontier of Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar Basin. There are customs officers at the frontier of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland, but they cannot act according to the regulations of the German administration regarding the traffic of merchandise and

especially they cannot apply freely the German regulations on importation and exportation. Any German commercial, economic and financial policy, in conformity with the legitimate German interest, becomes impossible so long as the Empire is not master of its customs frontier. The Allied and Associated Powers recognized, at the time of the negotiations of the Finance Commission, that Germany cannot fulfill her economic and financial obligations if she is not allowed to dispose freely of her customs frontier. It is urgent to settle those questions rapidly. If Germany cannot organize as soon as possible the customs service of the Western frontier, not only will enormous amounts of useful and necessary goods enter Germany during the next few weeks, Germany deprived of goods and hungry, but also objects of luxury and other goods, hundreds of millions of marks worth, and which Germany does not need for the present, and which shall enter without paying any duty. It is not doubtful that Germany will not be able to stand such a useless drain in view of the anemic state of her economic body.

In view of the importance and urgency of those questions, it is necessary to begin their study as soon as possible and to find solutions favorable to Germany.

In the answer, paragraph 20 is omitted. I should be grateful to receive an answer and I take the liberty of placing in the hands of the President the desiderata of the railroad administration and those of the navigation on the Rhine.

According to paragraph 21, the liberty to communicate by letter, telegraph and telephone shall be guaranteed. I suppose that the strict observance of the postal secret such as it is provided by the German law shall also be guaranteed, under reservation of an eventual decree of the state of siege, and that consequently any postal censorship such as is now in course will be suppressed.

Concerning paragraph 24, I take the liberty to remark that I interpret it to mean that all the various decrees of the various military authorities issued during the armistice, shall be cancelled and that consequently in the future there will be only two sources of public law in the occupied territory: the legislation of the Empire and of the Federative States and the decrees of the High Commission.

Concerning paragraph 25, I take note of the fact that all the interdictions of sojourn shall be examined in a conciliatory spirit. It would be desirable that the requests of the persons who have been expelled and whose purpose is to return to their country should be submitted to the High Commission through the Commissioner of the Empire.

In order that the amnesty which I proposed in paragraph 9 be complete it would be necessary especially that all the people who were expelled from the occupied territory because they opposed M. Dorten

at Wiesbaden and Haas at London [*Landau*], etc., may be allowed to return to those territories. Public opinion in Germany places a great importance on that question as I was assured very lately by deputies of all parties.

28.—Those explanations rest only on a misunderstanding. It [goes] without saying that nothing was further from the mind of the German Government, supreme and scrupulous guardian of the Constitution of the Empire, than to submit to the Allied and Associated Governments proposals incompatible with international law or with the Constitution of the Empire and the rights of the various Federative States. I do not believe I must insist on the subject, but I note with satisfaction that the Allied and Associated Governments did not mention the Central Governments of the various Federative States in article 3 of the agreement for the simple reason that they concluded peace exclusively with the Central German Government and that it is not their intention to interfere with the internal organization of Germany and that they respect the legal hierarchy. That was the aim of my speech.

Par. 29.—The institution of the administrators and supervisors who, in certain zones, operate with the German administrative authorities forms a particularly painful chapter of the Armistice. It is therefore with pleasure that I learn that after entry into force of the peace Treaty, there shall be no more administrators or supervisors directed to control the German administration. If the High Commission reserves the right to maintain fixed representatives directed to establish a liaison between the local German administrations, the local military authorities and the High Commission itself, it would be expedient to take the necessary measures to have these fixed representatives limited to the facilitation of communication between the authorities and to the transmission of the desires of one to the other. All right of interference of the interior affairs of the German authorities, of the control of incoming correspondence, of the examination of shipments, of authority to give orders, shall be excluded in the future.

It would be desirable if the High Commission would make use of its authority to communicate directly with the local German administration in exceptional cases only because this would greatly facilitate relations between the High Commission and the German administration if the Commission, in principle, operated through the intermediary of the Empire Commissioner who is, in reality, a representative of all the German administrations which enter in the question.

Par. 32.—I am indebted to the Allied and Associated Governments for the declaration that requisitions should be but little practiced, and only operated in particular circumstances.

However, I believe it my duty to call the attention of the Commission to the fact that importance [*sic*] deliveries through requisitions have been ordered for the coming economic period and surpassing the probable duration of the Armistice. For example, the High Commands of the 8th and 10th Army Corps have recently ordered the delivery of 40,000 tons of hay per Army Corps, quantities considerably surpassing the productivity of these districts under their orders. The same districts, last year, only succeeded in delivering for the needs of the German Army a portion of the quantity now demanded, and this under serious pressure on the part of competent authorities. The rural population, suffering under a great shortage of fodder, has been greatly irritated by this hay requisition, as it necessitates a consequent restriction in livestock.

According to reports which I have just received, all the horse owners in the fourth zone have received a circular indicating an intention to operate an important requisition of horses.

I would be grateful if the Commission would kindly assure me that the requisitions would not surpass the means and resources of the occupied countries and that the commune would not be of necessity forced to obtain their supplies in non-occupied territory in order to be able to effect the deliveries demanded or to replace their stocks which, as a result of these requisitions, would be insufficient for their own needs.

In conclusion I take the liberty to especially request that you accord favorable attention to a petition of the Commission assembled here: According to the Peace Treaty a state of peace will not be recognized until the Treaty will have been ratified by three of the Principal Powers. We are unable to say when this time shall arrive. The population believes and supposes that, Germany having signed and ratified the Treaty as well as this arrangement, they would enjoy the facilities elaborated in the reply and that the military regime, of a severe and hard nature, might be replaced by civil organization of the High Commission. I do not wish to mention here the multitude of complaints relative to the oppression of economic and political life, such as exists at the present time, as I hope that we are on the eve of the new era referred to in the reply, which shall put an end to arbitrary procedures and which, without prejudice toward the attributions conferred to the Allied and Associated Powers by the agreement, shall guarantee political liberty, shall reestablish without hindrances free traffic on both sides of the Rhine and which, finally, shall provide an arrangement for the requisition and the billeting of troops, which arrangement shall endeavor to establish a just and equitable compromise between the interest of the occupying military forces and those of the population. Would it not be possible for the High Com-

mission to be authorized at the present time by the occupying Powers interested to commence its work in order that the arrangement and that the method intended for its execution by the occupying Powers, which has been agreed upon here, could enter into application, if possible, on August 15, or at the latest by September 1st? This would correspond with the general point of view developed by the Allied Powers, particularly in their declaration of June 16th,¹⁸ that is, to as soon as possible place Germany in a position to fulfill the obligations which she has assumed by virtue of the Peace Treaty.

LEWALD

VERSAILLES, August 7, 1919.

SECOND NOTE, RELATIVE TO ACCOMMODATIONS FOR THE HIGH
EMPIRE COMMISSIONER

VERSAILLES, August 7, 1919.

MR. MINISTER: As it is assumed that the Interallied High Commission on Rhenish territories shall be installed at Coblenz, it would be advisable to have the German Empire Commissioner locate there also. Now, in that city there are not many buildings suitable for the installation of the Offices of such an important administration, and in this number, there are certainly some which will be requisitioned for the needs of the American military authorities and by the High Commission itself.

There appears, therefore, that there only remains the building of the former General Command which would be suitable for the installation of the offices of the Empire Commissioner. The American troops have no further need of these accommodations and are ready to evacuate them. However, they declare that this evacuation cannot take place without the consent of the General Commanding the Allied and Associated Armies.

I would be deeply grateful, Mr. Minister, if the consent of the General could be obtained in order that the accommodations in question might be prepared for the Empire Commissioner.

Accept, etc.

LEWALD

THIRD NOTE, RELATIVE TO MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE

I

According to article 3c, by tribunals, is understood, aside from the ordinary regular courts, the special courts, such as the Council of

¹⁸ Appendix II to CF-61, vol. VI, p. 330.

Experts and the commercial courts, administrative courts, including civil cases, as well as the arbitration committees destined to regulate workmen and laborers' differences, established on December 23, 1918 (Bulletin of laws of the Empire, p. 1456) on a basis of the decrees of the conventions on tariffs, etc.

II

The prescription of Article 3*d* applies only to nationals of the Allied and Associated countries and shall decide only the question of penal competence.

In civil procedures, the executions concerning the persons referred to in article 3*d* shall be admitted by the administrations of the occupants at the request of competent German tribunals. The execution requests should be addressed to the following administrations:

For Belgium:
 For France:
 For Great Britain:
 For the United States:

III

The prescription of Article 3*e* applies only to acts committed in occupied territory after the entry into force of the conventions of June 28, 1919, in case the accused was domiciled in occupied territory at the time the act was committed. The judgments of similar acts shall be judged according to German jurisdiction.

IV

Cases in litigation in the courts of the Allied and Associated Powers and which are not within the competence of these courts, according to the convention of June 28, 1919, upon the entry into force of the above mentioned Convention, shall be within the competence of German courts, in so far as it is a question of cases not already judged. Details shall be fixed by special convention.

V

According to article 4, only officers in possession of written authorization from one of the authorities cited below may operate concerning extradition demands:

For Belgium:
 For France:
 For Great Britain:
 For the United States:

If at the time of the extradition of a person according to article 4, a penal trial or a penal execution by German courts was being ex-

amined against this person in occupied or non-occupied territory, after the liquidation of the trial by the courts of the occupying forces, the person is to be delivered to the German authorities.

FOURTH NOTE, DESIDERATA OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF RAILROADS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON OCCUPATION

1st. If the economic life in occupied territory is to resume its pacific evolution, it is indispensable that, in principle, the railroads, as in times of peace serve in the first place the economic interests in order that they be able to fulfill their pacific mission. We hope, therefore, that military exigencies may be regulated in such a manner as to permit the railroads to accomplish their true task.

2nd. In the interest of the maintenance of a well ordered service, it would be greatly desirable to create, for each railroad system, a single direction (on the order of the German Linien-Kommandantur) who would assume the transmission of the orders of the High Command of the Allied and Associated troops to the competent organisms of the railroad administrations, in accordance with Article 10, alinea 1, of the Agreement. Transportation of troops, special trains and other service prestations should be announced and taken over after notice corresponding with their importance, in order to assure their execution without interrupting their normal service.

3rd. It is to be presumed that the civil administrations of the railroads will remain in the hands of the German authorities with all the consequences attached thereto.

4th. Under reserve of the requisitions of the High Command of the Allied and Associated Armies within the bounds of military exigencies, the German authorities shall enjoy full independence concerning the management and the exploitation, establishing of time tables and utilization of the stations. The uniform direction of the service shall not suffer any interruption at the frontier of occupied territory. The employment of the rolling stock, etc., shall be entirely subject to the arrangements between the different railroad administrations.

5th. All the orders and regulations concerning the railroads shall become ineffective at the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. The orders and regulations formerly in force shall remain so only on condition of having maintained by order of the High Commission in accordance with Article 3, or by special order of the High Military command, for military needs, in accordance with Article 10.

6th. The regime of the personal subordination of employees and railroad help, as well as the obligations and restrictions resulting,

shall be abolished. The German prescriptions regulating the status of employees and railroad help, their professional representations and committees, shall again be effective.

7th. The German language shall remain official for all service needs, timetables and public schedules, etc.

8th. West-European time shall not be reestablished.

9th. The maintenance of the complete material shall be interpreted to mean that the necessary material shall remain available, without prejudice to the general service resulting from an eventual lack of cars and locomotives on account of the participation of occupied territories. In the same way, the complete maintenance of the civil personnel shall be understood to mean that the number and nature of the personnel necessary at a given time shall be always maintained available.

10th. As to the free transportation of troops, soldiers, officers, and particularly the method of controlling orders of transport, it would be fitting to adopt special dispositions. A desire is emitted that this control right by the personnel of the German trains be recognized. It is considered as agreed that the parents of soldiers and officers shall not have the right to free passage.

11th. The transportation to be effected without charge will not be considered as contracts of transport. For that matter, the transportation of occupation troops shall fall within the application of the German prescriptions. Regarding responsibilities not covered by contract, the German civil laws shall apply to members of the armies of occupation as well. They shall also be responsible for damages which they might cause to the railroad administrations, whether directly or indirectly.

12th. The use of the German telephone and telegraph installations, as well as the mail service, for railroad needs, shall not be subject to any restrictions. It is hoped that the railroad lines requisitioned at the present time will be returned to the German authorities, insofar as they are not required simultaneously for military needs.

In the same way, we desire to see the restitution, insofar as possible, of the installations and premises requisitioned up to the present time for military needs and in view of the fact that these installations and premises are generally indispensable to the service, that no more requisitions be effected.

13th. The regulations of reconciliations between the administrations of neighboring railroads—in view of the frontier changes—especially the Belgian frontier, should be subject to special negotiations. The temporary utilization of the Herbesthal station shall also necessitate a special arrangement in case of the cession of that station.

FIFTH NOTE, RELATIVE TO THE NAVIGATION REGIME IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

As in the case of the railroads, it shall be necessary to clearly define, concerning navigation on the Rhine, the services of a military nature for which this navigation may be employed by the orders of the High Command of the Allied and Associated troops, and to fully designate the authority which may issue orders of this nature in the name of the High Command, in order that the exercise of this right may interrupt as little as possible the regular navigation traffic. In the interest of the regular functioning of fluvial traffic it would also be advisable to have the orders of the High Command addressed to the Directors of the Navigation Companies, and not individually to their many subordinate functionaries. I also believe I may presume that, as is the case regarding freedom of circulation provided for by paragraph 4, the control of the navigation personnel shall be suppressed after the entry into force of the agreement regarding Rhenish territories, that is to say that the passports, control of merchandise traffic, as well as the restrictions issued concerning the circulation of merchandise between the right and left banks of the Rhine, shall be abolished. It would appear to me that upon the establishment of this free traffic, the Interallied Navigation Commission could be dissolved or that, at least, this Commission limit the field to its activities to purely military transportation, having for purpose the assurance of supplies for the Allied troops in occupied territory and that the Commission discontinue the intervention which it has exercised up to this time regarding the economic and technical conditions of Rhine navigation and over the ports on this river. The re-establishment of free communication by telegraph and telephone consented to in Par. 21 would logically entail the right of the Rhine navigation service to use the telephone and telegraphs for the needs of their organisms.

*Reply to the Five German Notes Delivered by
Mr. von Lewald,
August 7, at Versailles,
Relative
to the Administration of the Occupied Territories*

Translation

I.—REPLY TO THE MEMORANDUM RELATIVE TO THE OCCUPATION OF THE
LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE

Paragraphs 1 and 2. Preliminary remarks,—In a general manner the Allied and Associated Governments refer to their memorandum

of July 29, 1919, replying to the two memorandum delivered by the German Government dated July 11 and 12, 1919, on the same question, and to the reservations formulated in the last paragraph of the reply memorandum.

Paragraph 3.—Application of German legislation.—It is understood that the High Commission shall exercise its veto right by ordinances with the least delay possible. To this end, German laws and regulations should be communicated to the Commission prior to their promulgation. The High Commission reserves at all times the right to suspend the application of a law if circumstances demand it. The High Commission shall itself assure the publication of these laws and regulations in which they should be assisted by the German authorities.

Paragraph 4.—Public liberties and circulation.—Public Liberties; the freedom of the press shall be assured in conformity with German legislation. If a publication infringes on the public order or the security of the troops, administrative and judiciary punishments shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Circulation: Circulation shall be free between the occupied and non-occupied territories, but an identification card should be carried by the interested, which they shall be obliged to present when requested according to conditions fixed by the High Commission. The High Commission, furthermore, reserves the right to order expulsions justified by the maintenance of public order or the security of the troops of occupation.

Paragraph 5.—Institution of an Empire civil Commissaryship.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply. The Empire Commissioner cannot be officially accepted until after the ratification of the Treaty by three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Paragraph 6.—Effectives of the troops of occupation.—The effectives of the troops of occupation shall be communicated to the German Government as soon as possible. The German Government can attenuate the burden of the occupation for the Rhineland population by calling on the resources in material and supplies from the rest of the Empire.

Paragraph 7.—Strength of the police force.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply.

Paragraph 9.—Jurisdiction privileges.—The Allied and Associated Governments insist on the terms of their previous reply. They do not admit the principle of reciprocal amnesty which would favor one or another case of the German nationals. They mean to oppose judiciary actions of a nature to disturb the public order, in accordance with the terms of the convention and of their above-cited reply.

On the other hand, they shall examine with favor and in each case the remission of sentences pronounced in the course of the Armistice by military jurisdiction.

Paragraphs 10, 11, and 12.—Legal questions.—The memorandum of the German Minister of Justice shall receive a special reply. The High Commission shall decide by ordinance regarding the questions introduced.

Paragraph 14.—Finances.—No objections.

Paragraph 16.—Payment of requisitions.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply. It is mentioned that the requisitions effected by the German troops in France and Belgium have not been settled.

Paragraph 17.—Billeting of troops.—The High Commission shall make efforts to obtain friendly arrangements with the local authorities for the billeting of officers and men. It is pointed out that the German authorities may facilitate these arrangements both by evacuating the population which emigrated to the occupied territories in the course of the war, and by calling upon the general resources of the Empire.

Paragraph 18.—Tax exemptions.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply.

Paragraph 19.—Duty questions.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply. Concerning the Lorraine-Palatinate frontier the German authorities have already been invited to establish customs posts on that frontier, although it has not yet been officially recognized.

Paragraph 20.—Railroads.—The note remitted by the German Delegation calls for a special reply.

Paragraph 21.—Telegraph and Mail Service.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply.

Paragraph 24.—Orders for military authorities.—The High Commission has full and exclusive competence in the regulation of this question.

Paragraph 25.—Persons expelled.

Paragraph 28.—Authorities of the Governments of the federated States.

Paragraph 29.—Functionaries.

Paragraph 32.—Requisitions.—The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their previous reply and to paragraph 4 of the present reply.

The occupied territories must aid in the feeding and other needs of the troops of occupation. The German Government should, in order to prevent the requisitioning of supplies and fodder, examine the participation of the resources of the entire Empire with a view to satisfying the needs of the troops of occupation.

SPECIAL QUESTIONS

1st. Preparatory labors of the High Commission.—The Commission on Rhineland territories, operating at the present time, is preparing the labors of the High Commission which shall commence operation only on the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. It may enter into unofficial relations with the Empire Commissioner.

2nd. Distribution of Coal.—A special reply has been addressed to the German Government on this question.

II.—REPLY TO THE LETTER OF THE GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION RELATIVE TO THE INSTALLATION OF THE GERMAN IMPERIAL HIGH COMMISSIONER

The Interallied Commission on Rhineland territories has constituted a Committee directed, in accord with the American Command, to proceed to a complete revision of the cantonments in Coblenz. The Burgomaster of Coblenz represents German authority.

A personal lodging and office accommodations shall be provided for the German Imperial Commissioner, when those of the High Allied Commissioners shall have been determined. The consent of the Marshal of France, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies, is not necessary.

III.—REPLY TO THE NOTE OF THE GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION, A. D. H. J. H. No. 13561, RELATIVE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE RHENISH TERRITORIES

1. As regards paragraph 1 of the German note:

“The Allied and Associated Governments agree with the German Government for the interpretation which it proposes. Article 3c of the agreement concerns all the tribunals.”

2. As regards the first alinea of paragraph 2a, there is nothing to add to the text of the memorandum already transmitted.

As regards the second alinea, it is a question of a regulation of detail which shall be the subject of an ulterior examination of the High Commission.

3. Paragraph 3, as well as paragraph 4, cannot be favorably received.

4. As regards paragraph 5:

a) The officers mentioned in article 4 of the agreements are the officers whose juridical competence is defined by the regulations of the various armies of occupation.

b) The Allied and Associated Governments have no objections to the trying by the tribunals of the non-occupied parts of Germany of the delinquents already on trial before those tribunals, after the closing of the procedure before the tribunals of the armies of occupation. However, the guilty party must serve his term in the occupied territories if the heaviest condemnation has been pronounced by the Allied or German judiciary tribunals of said territories.

IV. ANSWER TO THE GERMAN NOTE RELATIVE TO THE CONTROL OF THE RAILROADS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

1. General use of the Railroads.—It is understood that the Allied and Associated authorities shall take all measures so that the railroads be, as the German note asks, in a position to satisfy the economic interests of the occupied territories, in a measure compatible with military exigencies.

2. Organs of transmission of the orders of the High Command.—As it is proposed in the German note, the orders of the Allied High Command shall be transmitted to the railroad administration by a single special Organ.

The Interallied Commission on Field Railroads is competent to fill that function. Subcommissions of the system and the military organs empowered by it to that effect shall facilitate the accomplishment of that task.

The Commission has with it a German delegate to whom instructions are transmitted.

That Organization corresponds to the organization of the Allied railroads in time of peace.

The Interallied subcommissions on field railroads act as the *Linien Kommandantur* considered by the German note.

3. Civil administration of railroads.—It is understood that the civil administration of railroads shall be exercised by the German authorities with the reservations provided for by Article 10 of the agreement of June 28.

4. Exploitation.—With the same reservation, it is understood that the German authorities shall have full liberty as far as the exploitation of the systems is concerned. However, in execution of alinea 2 of article 10, the Commission of Interallied Railroads shall be in a position to control at any time that the necessary personnel and matériel for the upkeep and the exploitation of all lines of communication are maintained in full in the occupied territories.

5. Orders and regulations.—It is understood, as the German note requests, that the orders and regulations concerning the railroads and emanating from the Command shall be maintained by decree of the

High Commission, in conformity with article 3 of the agreement, or by express order of the High Military Command for the military needs, in conformity with article 10.

6. Subordination of the personnel to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.—The German regulations concerning the situation of the employees and workmen of the railroads, as well as their professional representation and the committees, shall be made valid under the reservation of the right of previous examination by the Interallied High Commission, as it was provided for all the laws and regulations in occupied territories. However, the Interallied Commission on field railroads, in application of alinea 1 of article 10, and to insure the execution of the orders of the High Command can pronounce or cause on the part of the German authorities any useful sanctions. It pertains, however, to the High Commission, in execution of Article 5 of the agreement, to pronounce the revocations and expulsions which are recognized as necessary.

It shall notably be necessary to report without delay to the Interallied Commission on Field Railways all incidents of a nature to disturb the exploitation such as: agitation among the personnel, attempts to strike, etc.

7. German language.—It is understood that the German language shall remain the official language for the needs of the German civil services. For military orders, the rules now in force shall be followed.

The documents informing the public of the schedules for passenger trains and the conditions for the transportation of merchandise shall be drawn up in three languages: French, English and German.

8. Western Europe Time.—That question shall be regulated later by the High Commission after examination of the High Command's proposals by reason of the eventual necessities of troop movements concerning the ensemble of the systems in Allied and in occupied countries.

9. Full Maintenance of the personnel and material.—Article 10 provides formally that by reason of military needs and the necessity of eventual troop movements, the material and the personnel must be maintained in full for the upkeep and the exploitation of all the lines of communication in the occupied territories.

The request contained in the German notes and tending to make use of the material to remedy the shortage of cars and locomotives in the non-occupied territories cannot be accepted.

Changes in personnel are subordinated to the observation of the general rules edicted [*sic*] on the subject by the High Commission for the other administrative personnel of the other occupied territories.

10. Free transportation of troops.—That question shall be the subject of the regulations by the High Commission upon proposals of the High Command.

The exemption shall apply to transportation with a regular order of transportation, including the transportation of the families of the soldiers and officers and that of the men on leave belonging to the corps of occupation, in conformity with the regulations of the various Allied Armies.

11. Responsibility of the railroad administration as regards transportation.—The responsibility of the German administrations as regards transportation cannot be affected by the fact that the transportation is made free of charge, since the agreement of June 28, 1918 (June 25, 1916?), is in itself a contract.

That rule, however, is that observed in similar cases on the Allied systems in spite of the reductions and special tariffs of military transportation.

12. Use of the telephone and telegraph installation and requisitioned buildings.—The High Command shall examine, according to the request contained in the German note, how the utilization of the lines and buildings now requisitioned can be regulated for the best of the interests of the civil service and the needs of the armies of occupation.

13. Rectification of frontiers.—Special agreements shall be made as requested in the German note.

V—ANSWER TO THE GERMAN NOTE RELATIVE TO THE NAVIGATION SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

The Allied and Associated Governments refer to their answer to the German note relative to railroads.

1. Use of waterways.—It is understood that the military authorities shall take the necessary measures so that the use of the waterways of military needs disturb as little as possible the economic traffic.

2. Transmission of the orders of the High Command.—As the German note requests, a single organ shall be charged with the transmission of the orders of the High Command. The Interallied Commission on Navigation shall be charged with that function. Its functioning and its organs are similar to those provided for the Interallied Commission on field railroads.

3. Navigation personnel.—Same remarks as for the railroad personnel.

4. Restrictions enacted concerning the circulation of merchandise between the left and the right banks of the Rhine.—It is understood that these restrictions are abolished.

5. Function of the Navigation Commission.—It is understood that the Navigation Commission shall not have to intervene in the economic

traffic. However, it shall have to supervise the execution of the provisions of article 10 of the agreement.

6. Use of telegraph and telephone line.—Same remarks as for the lines affected to [*set apart for*] the railroad service.

Appendix C to HD-69

Memorandum Submitted by the British Delegation

Amended Version*

By the terms of the Armistice Convention signed at Treves in January, 1919,¹⁹ Germany agreed to place the whole German Merchant Fleet under the control and under the flags of the Allied Powers.

The *Johann-Burchard*, *William Oswald*, *Braunschweig*, *Denderah* and *Nassau* have not been delivered. All except the *Oswald* are ready for sea. Continued demands have been made by the Allied Naval Armistice Commission to the President of the German Armistice Commission to surrender these vessels. These demands were simply ignored and remained unanswered until quite recently when Admiral Goette stated that, the ships having been sold in 1915-1916 by the Hamburg Amerika line and Kosmos Line to Dutch Shipping Companies were consequently not German but Dutch ships.

In fact, these ships were without question, originally built for German companies and were German property. Their transfer admittedly did not take place until considerably after the outbreak of hostilities. The Germans as well as the Dutch were already well aware that this transfer was invalid, as the ships have not in fact dared to put out to sea in view of the certainty of their capture by the Allies.

The impression gained by the naval officer who inspected the vessels on behalf of the Interallied Armistice Commission is that the Germans fully realised that the ships would have to be surrendered under the Peace Treaty. They hoped to be able to evade their obligation by supporting the Dutch claim and handing over the ships to the Dutch before the ratification of the Treaty of Peace.

The German contention, if accepted, would amount to the recognition of the right to transfer the property in these belligerent vessels to a neutral after the outbreak of hostilities. It is a contention which is not accepted by the Allied Powers.

* The last paragraph of the original version has been altered. [Footnote in the original.]

¹⁹ Vol. II, p. 11.

The substance of the Allied view was brought to the attention of the Neutral Governments by a circular dated November 7th, 1918, issued by the British Government, in which it was recalled that no transfer of enemy tonnage during or after the War to neutral flags or ownership would, except by special consent be recognised before the final conclusion of Peace.

This view has been finally endorsed and confirmed by all the Allied and Associated Powers in virtue of the express stipulation of the Treaty of Peace. Under the head of Reparations, Annex 3, Section 7, it is provided that:—

“Germany agrees to take any measures that may be indicated to her by the Reparations Commission for obtaining full title to the property in all ships which have during the war been transferred, or are in process of transfer to neutral flags without the consent of the Allied and Associated Powers.”

It is thus definitely established by common agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany that German vessels transferred to a neutral flag during the war without Allied consent must be regarded as German vessels. The obligation on the part of the German Government to deliver them up under the terms of the Armistice cannot therefore be called in question. The Germans are perfectly well aware of this and they are only having recourse to a transparent subterfuge in order to escape the obligations imposed upon them by the Armistice and by the Peace Treaty to hand over the vessels.

In these circumstances it is suggested that instructions be given to the Armistice Commission to require the German Government to hand over the ships without further delay.

OCTOBER 10, 1919.

Appendix D to HD-69

Resolution

[Draft Prepared by the American Delegation]

“It is agreed that the Commission on Polish Affairs should be instructed to consider Articles 100 to 104 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany regarding the establishment of the Free City of Dantzig, and to report at the earliest possible moment as to the measures which should be taken to assure the prompt execution of these clauses when the Treaty comes into force.”

OCTOBER 10, 1919.

Appendix E to HD-69

Note by the British Delegation

SALE BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO SWEDEN OF AERIAL MATERIAL

On August 22nd [23rd] Marshal Foch, acting under the instructions of the Supreme Council, sent a telegram²⁰ to General Nudant for transmission to the German Government, forbidding the sale or export of German aircraft and aircraft material.

On September 30th [29th] as a result of further infringements of the Air Clauses of the Peace Treaty, the Supreme Council instructed Marshal Foch to send a further telegram to the same effect, adding that the German Government would be required to hand over to the Allies the proceeds of all sales already made.²¹ This telegram was despatched on the same date.

Information has now been received to the effect that early in September a Swede by the name of Mr. Ranft was arranging to purchase 30 aeroplanes in Germany and was placing other orders for aircraft in Germany, also that the Autogesellschaft in Berlin had offered the Swedish Army two German aeroplanes as a gift and had requested permission for aeroplanes to be flown from Germany to Stockholm.

In order to put a stop to these transactions and to prevent further infringements of the Air Clauses the following resolution is proposed.

1. "That the German Government shall be required to provide the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control with full particulars of all aircraft and aircraft material sold or exported since the Armistice, and that the value of this material shall be estimated by the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control, and shall be paid to him by January 31st, 1920."

2. "That Marshal Foch shall be instructed to enquire into Mr. Ranft's transactions and the reported gift of two aeroplanes to the Swedish Army and shall also request the German Government to forward a statement with regard to these matters".

7 OCTOBER, 1919.

 Appendix F to HD-69

PEACE CONFERENCE COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL LABOR LEGISLATION

PARIS, October 7, 1919.

From: General Secretary of the Commission on International Labor
Legislation.

²⁰ Appendix C to HD-37, vol. VII, p. 823.

²¹ HD-63, minute 2, p. 430.

To: The Ambassador of France, General Secretary of the Peace Conference.

The representatives of the French labor organizations insist that Luxembourg be invited to take part in the International Labor Conference at Washington.

Luxembourg is not one of the 32 States who are original members of the League of Nations, nor one of the thirteen who have been invited to agree with the pact.

As regards the International organization of labor, Luxembourg is therefore in the same situation as Finland regarding which the Supreme Council took a decision on October 2nd,²² a decision similar to that already adopted for Germany and Austria and which seems applicable to all the neutrals not included in the list of the 13 nations invited to agree to the pact.

I therefore think that the Government of the United States, in conformity with that decision, will not refuse to give the visa on the passports of the eventual delegates from Luxembourg, and that, should they go, the Washington Conference will decide on their admission at the same time as that of Germany, Austria and Finland.

I am not in a position to inform the Government of Luxembourg of the general decision of the Supreme Council, above mentioned, and I can only ask you to inform that Government, if it has not already been done.

ARTHUR FONTAINE

²² HD-65, minute 6, p. 489.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, October 15, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	BRITISH EMPIRE	FRANCE
Mr. F. L. Polk	Sir Eyre Crowe.	M. Pichon.
<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Secretaries</i>
Mr. A. W. Dulles.	Mr. H. Norman.	M. Dutasta.
		M. de St. Quentin.
ITALY		JAPAN
M. Scialoja		M. Matsui.
<i>Secretary</i>		<i>Secretary</i>
M. Barone Russo.		M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Mr. C. Russell
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE	M. Massigli
ITALY	M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned :

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

General Bliss
Mr. E. L. Dresel
Major Tyler
Captain Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Lt. Col. Kisch
Mr. Carr
Captain Fuller
Commandant Dunne
Mr. Shearman

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
M. Loucheur
General Weygand
M. Laroche
General LeRond
M. Fromageot
M. Escoffier

ITALY

General Cavallero
M. Brambilla
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Pilotti

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu
M. Nagaoka

1. (The Council had before it a draft note addressed to the German Government to be communicated by the Allied Naval Armistice Commission (See Appendix "A"). This note was prepared by the British Delegation.)

Note to the German Government Relative to German Ships Transferred During the War to Dutch Navigation Companies

SIR EYRE CROWE said that pursuant to his instructions from the Supreme Council in the preceding meeting the British Delegation had prepared a draft note to be sent to the President of the German Naval Armistice Commission.¹ The principles enunciated in this note had already been approved by the Council at its preceding meeting.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the French Delegation did not agree to our demand being based on the terms of the Armistice, as the Armistice would cease to be operative in a few days. The Reparation Commission, and not the Armistice Commission, would have to take possession of these vessels. He therefore thought that it would not be well to act on the basis of the Armistice.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that we were still subject to the terms of the Armistice; the only proper procedure therefore was that proposed by him.

M. LOUCHEUR said that, assuming that on the day when our note would reach Germany the Peace Treaty should already have become operative, the Reparation Commission alone would then be qualified to take possession of the vessels. He proposed to add a paragraph to the effect that if when our demands should be met the Peace Treaty had become operative the Reparations Commission would take possession of the vessels.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the matter had dragged on long enough and that it was important to settle our difference with the Dutch Government as soon as possible. He feared that the draft proposed by M. Loucheur would be apt to result in the Germans doing nothing. We should inform them of the reasons upon which our claim is based and that it is formulated by virtue of the terms of the Armistice. Moreover, he found no difficulty in admitting that if our note should not arrive until such time as the Armistice would cease to be operative, the Reparations Commission would take the matter in hand.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he could accept the terms of Sir Eyre Crowe's note as far as the Germans were concerned, but as regards relations between Allies he could not admit that it should be specified that the vessels should be delivered to the Armistice Commission. At least he could only admit this on one condition; to-wit, that it should be clearly understood that if, at the time of the delivery of

¹ HD-69, minute 7, p. 609.

the vessels, the Peace Treaty should be operative the Reparation Commission would take possession thereof.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

MR. POLK also agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that a question of form still remained to be settled. It seemed to him desirable that the note should be published and a copy thereof be delivered to Baron von Lersner.

(It was decided:

(1) to accept the draft Note to be transmitted to the German Government through the intermediary of the Naval Armistice Commission, prepared by the British Delegation;

(2) that in the event of the Treaty of Peace coming into force before the delivery of the ships in question, the Reparation Commission should be charged with taking possession of them.

It was further decided:

to publish the Note and transmit a copy to Baron von Lersner.)

2. SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the British Naval Representative had received a telegram from the Commander of the Naval Forces in the Gulf of Riga. According to this telegram the Commander of the Naval forces had ordered the Germans to evacuate the Dvina front before noon of October 15th, failing which he would open fire on them. The Council was evidently face to face with a *fait accompli* in view of the fact that this ultimatum had actually been sent. The British Admiralty wished to know the views of the Supreme Council in this respect. The situation was evidently abnormal inasmuch as there was no definite information as to what had taken place and as to what the Germans had done. According to the latest British information the Letts were still holding out in Riga, but no one knew how long they could resist.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he knew the situation of the Letts and Esthonians as well as one could know it from Paris, but that it was difficult to tell from here what should be done.

M. PICHON stated that it seemed to him that the Council should confine itself to taking note of this communication; it should consider that the officers on the spot had taken the necessary measures.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that he desired to call the attention of the Council to the great importance of the Allied and Associated Powers being represented at Berlin or at Riga by a General Officer, whom it had already been proposed to the German Government to send. The departure of this officer should be hastened.

M. PICHON stated that according to the telegram which he had received that morning the National Assembly would that day take action on the reply to be made to our note. As soon as this answer was received measures would have to be taken and our representative would have to be sent.

Situation in
the Baltic
Provinces

MARSHAL FOCH stated that this representative should have instructions from the Council defining the attitude which he should adopt toward the German Government.

3. (The Council had before it a note from the Committees on Polish and on Baltic Affairs, drafted at a joint meeting, relative to the military occupation of Dantzic and Memel. (See Appendix "B.")

Occupation of
Dantzic and
Memel

M. LAROCHE read and commented on the note of these Committees and directed the attention of the Council to the last paragraph of this note respecting Memel. It seemed to the Committees, sitting in joint session, that it was not proper to interfere with local administrative functions in view of the uncertainty of the future fate of Memel. Therefore it had seemed advisable to specify that the Commanding Officer of the forces of Occupation should only have such powers as would be conferred upon him by International Law with a view to the maintenance of order. When the Commission had settled upon a battalion and a half of infantry, a squadron of cavalry and a machine gun section—a total of about 1700 men—as the strength of the forces for the occupation of Memel, it had taken a strictly local point of view. It had not thought itself qualified to consider the question raised by virtue of the presence of German forces in the Baltic provinces. The Allied High Command would be competent to reinforce the troops of occupation if it should deem it necessary in view of the actual situation existing in the neighboring territory.

With respect to Dantzic, the situation was different. There was no question in that case of a plebiscite region, and forces of occupation had not been provided for by the Peace Treaty. The Allied Powers were only to send a delimitation commission there at first; the League of Nations was to appoint the High Commissioner. In view of this situation the Supreme Council some time ago, on the motion of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty, decided to send an administrative commissioner to Dantzic,² but in the actual state of affairs no one was able to say whether it was necessary to send troops there.

In order to solve the difficulty therefore, the Council had adopted the following expedient: in its last session it decided to send troops to Allenstein and Marienwerder.³ A base at Dantzic was necessary for the supply of these troops and this base would have to be strong enough to insure its own safety. It was only in this manner and on such grounds that troops could be sent to Dantzic at once, but the troops at this base were not to interfere to maintain public order in the free city itself unless commanded to do so by the High Com-

² HD-8, minute 3 (c), vol. VII, pp. 160, 161.

³ HD-69, minute 5, p. 604.

missioner of the League of Nations. However, if trouble should break out before the High Commissioner's arrival, the Administrative Commissioner could bring to the attention of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the necessity of occupying Dantzig with Interallied forces. In such a contingency the base troops could be used for police duties in the city.

(It was decided :

to accept the proposal made by the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission on Baltic Affairs in regard to the occupation of Dantzig and Memel.)

4. **MARSHAL FOCH** observed that as the Council now had a more or less solid base on which to work, he wished to revert to his suggestion made the previous session; to-wit, that a commission composed of military and diplomatic representatives must be formed for determining the composition of forces of occupation.

M. PICHON said that he did not see the necessity for appointing diplomatic representatives; he thought it would suffice if Marshal Foch should assemble the Military Representatives.

MARSHAL FOCH dissented and said that the point which he always found troublesome was above all the question of Upper Silesia. He wished to know to what extent the British Government was disposed to take part in the occupation of this region.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did not minimize the importance of the question of Upper Silesia, but it seemed to him that the question of Allenstein, for instance, was of equal importance and that all similar problems should be considered together.

GENERAL WEYGAND wished to insist on the appointment of Diplomatic representatives. He felt that if the Allied and Associated Powers were to let themselves be guided by purely military considerations they would, for instance, be tempted to have the same corps occupy Upper Silesia and the Duchy of Teschen; if this were done, however, he thought it would contravene the spirit of the Treaty. Similarly, they might think of grouping under the same command the forces of occupation of Allenstein and Marienwerder; whereas, politically, the situation of these regions was entirely different.

M. PICHON agreed with this opinion and thought that each of the Allied Powers could designate a diplomatic representative to be attached to the military representatives. He designated **M. Laroche**.

(It was decided :

that Marshal Foch, together with the Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, with whom diplomatic representatives of these Powers might collaborate, should study the question

Composition of
Interallied
Forces of
Occupation

of the Interallied forces which should occupy the districts which, under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, were to be or might be occupied by Interallied forces, and that these representatives should submit their proposals to the Supreme Council at the earliest possible opportunity.)

5. (The Council had before it a note addressed to it with respect to the composition of the Commissions of Delimitation of the German and Austrian frontiers (See Appendix "C") and a draft set of instructions relative to the Commissions of Delimitation. (See Appendix "D".))

Organization of
Commissions of
Delimitation

GENERAL LE ROND stated that the instructions now before the Council had been unanimously adopted, with the exception that a difference of opinion had been developed relative to the salaries of the members of these commissions. The British Delegation had not yet indicated whether it had changed its point of view (See Appendix "D", Article III, A, Note I).

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the British Government was still of the opinion that according to the terms of the Peace Treaty, all charges arising out of delimitations should be borne by the interested parties and not by Allied countries. This was a question of principle and the payment of these salaries was one of these charges. If this point of view were not admitted, the matter would have to be taken to Parliament, as a fiscal measure was involved.

GENERAL LE ROND said that the four other delegations did not agree with the British delegation with respect to this interpretation of the Treaty. The Treaty provided that the expenses of the Delimitation Commissions should be borne by the interested countries, but do these expenses include the salaries of officers? He was not inclined to think so. If an officer belonging to a Delimitation Commission were on duty in his own country his Government would have to pay his salary. Furthermore, a question of morale is involved which should not be overlooked; he did not believe it possible to charge the salaries of officers to Powers interested in this work of delimitation, especially if they should happen to be our Allies. He insisted that a distinction should be drawn between the salaries of officers and allowances. The salaries of officers should only be charged to their respective Governments. The allowances should be charged to the countries interested in the work of delimitation and it is they who should bear the heaviest part of the burden. He wished, moreover, to repeat that several delegations were unwilling to compromise on this point of morale.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the difficulty was that the British officers who were sent to these Commissions would otherwise be demobilized; therefore, as he had already remarked, a Parliamentary grant would have to be obtained.

M. PICHON observed that the French delegation had to take account of the fact that all additional expenses imposed upon Germany diminished by so much the amount remaining available for reparations. France, being the country most interested in this question, since she had suffered the most in the war, felt that Germany should be charged with as few expenses of this kind as possible. If Sir Eyre Crowe were right in using the Parliamentary argument, the French were also justified in doing so.

GENERAL LE ROND stated that two delegations had declared that they would never agree to the salaries of their officers being paid by a foreign Power.

M. PICHON asked Sir Eyre Crowe to impress upon his Government the argument of the majority of the Commission.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that the draft set of instructions relative to the Commissions of Delimitation mentioned the creation of a central body.

GENERAL LE ROND observed that the creation of such a body was not under discussion.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that it was at least mentioned and added that there was already a central body, to wit, the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty and its special sub-committee.

GENERAL LE ROND stated that his Committee had intentionally employed the expression "central body" to designate the body, whatever it might be, charged with the constitution and organization of the Delimitation Commissions and the supervision of their activities. At present that body was the Sub-committee of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty.

MR. POLK stated that the American Government had already declared that it seemed very desirable that the Delimitation Commissions should not be able to make separate communications to the interested Governments and that one single central body should be competent to make these communications and to coordinate the work of the Commissions.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that this was not in contradiction with what he had said.

(It was decided:

to approve the draft Note relative to the Composition of the Commissions of Delimitation of the frontiers of Germany and Austria (Delegations of Powers not interested) as well as the draft instructions relative to Commissions of Delimitation, dated the 6th October, 1919, (See Appendices "C" and "D"), with the reservation that Sir Eyre Crowe should request the agreement of the British Government to the opinion, expressed by the four other Delegations, that the members of the Commissions of Delimitation should be paid by their respective Governments.)

6. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation dated the 13th October, 1919. (See Appendix "E".))

Putting Into Force of the Versailles Treaty
 M. LAROCHE desired to call the attention of the Council to the importance of not proceeding to the deposit of ratifications before being assured that the coming into force of the Treaty would find the Allied and Associated Powers prepared. The Committee on the Execution of the Treaty could be instructed to immediately draw up a list of the measures which have to be taken during the first weeks following the taking effect of the Treaty, as well as the Commissions to be appointed, and to ask each Government if it had prepared the nominations which it had to make under the Treaty.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he agreed fully to what M. Laroche had suggested, and added that he desired to take advantage of the presence of Marshal Foch to submit an even more general question. He wished to ask if the Allied and Associated Powers were inclined to substitute the means of action given by the Treaty of Peace for those obtaining under the Armistice. He thought that they should particularly ask themselves in view of the situation now existent in the Baltic Provinces, whether it would be to the interest of the Allied and Associated Powers to ratify the Treaty. There was no doubt that this ratification would deprive them of weapons which the Armistice gave them. At the present moment German ships could be stopped in the Baltic; this could no longer be done were the Treaty in effect. If more energetic action in the Baltic Provinces became necessary, were they better armed by virtue of the Treaty or of the Armistice? He recognized that the question had two sides; thus the use of Polish troops in the Baltic Provinces had formerly been opposed for fear that their use might have unfortunate results with respect to Upper Silesia and might cause new disturbances in the coal districts. The Allied occupation of Upper Silesia prescribed by the Treaty would obviate that difficulty. A problem was here presented which should be carefully studied.

MARSHAL FOCH stated that he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe.

(It was decided:

that the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty should be requested

(1) to submit to the Council at the earliest possible opportunity a list of the measures to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers in the first weeks following the entry of the Treaty into force, together with a list of the Commissions to be appointed in these first weeks;

(2) to notify the Supreme Council as soon as possible of the steps taken by the Allied and Associated Governments and those which remain to be taken, in view of the entry of the Treaty into

force, pointing out those measures which these Governments were not in a position to take immediately;

(3) to compare the value under present conditions of the means of action placed at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers by the Treaty of Versailles with those now available to them by virtue of the terms of the Armistice.)

7. (The Council had before it a note from the General Secretariat of the Peace Conference (See Appendix "F").)

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the General Secretariat. The question of adhering to the Covenant of the League of Nations was especially important with respect to Spain, inasmuch as she was a member of the Council of the League of Nations and the latter had immediately to make a large number of decisions. If Spain were given two months to signify her adhesion to the Covenant she would not be able to take part in the meetings of the Council, or at least she could not take part in the deliberations which would have to take place immediately.

M. PICHON remarked that Spain had already indicated that she would adhere to the Covenant.

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that she had only done so unofficially; in order to avoid all difficulty it was necessary that as soon as Spain had received the official invitation addressed to her she should immediately signify her adhesion. With respect to the other neutral Powers, it was equally urgent that their adhesion should be obtained as soon as possible. Two methods of procedure might be used: first, either the Minister of Foreign Affairs should deliver to the heads of the diplomatic missions of the interested Governments in Paris a certified copy of the Treaty of Versailles, notifying them of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty; the neutral states would have a two months period within which to signify their adhesion to the Covenant by a declaration addressed to the General Secretary of the League of Nations. Or, secondly, the President of the Peace Conference should telegraph the heads of the various neutral Governments in question, while at the same time a certified copy of the Treaty of Versailles should be delivered to the heads of their diplomatic missions in Paris. The second procedure seemed to him less practical.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that both methods might be employed at the same time.

M. FROMAGEOT agreed. He desired to insist upon the fact that a certified copy of the whole Treaty of Versailles, and not only a copy of the Covenant of the League, should be transmitted. Indeed, the Treaty in its different parts contained a series of measures to be taken by the Council of the League of Nations. In accepting mem-

Adhesion of
Neutral States
to the Covenant
of the League
of Nations

bership in the League the Governments in question would have to take note of and must accept all obligations arising out of the Treaty.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

(It was decided :

(1) that the neutral States which, under the terms of the Annex to the Covenant of the League of Nations were to be invited to agree to the Covenant, should be informed officially of the contents of the Covenant and the obligations of the League of Nations relative to the execution of the Treaty of Peace;

(2) that these States should be notified of the entry of the Treaty into force, as soon after such entry as possible.)

(It was also decided :

that these two notifications should be made at the same time by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, acting under the authority of the Supreme Council, to the Chiefs of the diplomatic missions in Paris of the Governments interested, and by a telegram from the President of the Conference to the Heads of the neutral Governments interested. A certified copy of the Treaty should be transmitted to the Representatives of the neutral Governments at Paris.)

8. SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council of the League of Nations must immediately after the coming into force of the Treaty formulate a complete series of measures to be taken. The President of the United States must call this Council. Could he do it before the Treaty had been ratified by the American Senate?

MR. POLK stated that the question had already been settled at the meeting of the Supreme Council of the 15th September (H. D. 53).⁴ It had been agreed that he should suggest to President Wilson the calling of the Council of the League for a meeting which would be devoted entirely to the consideration of questions demanding the action of the Council a short time after the coming into force of the Treaty. He thought that he could obtain a formal assurance to this effect. He added that he would welcome any suggestions which the Drafting Committee might deem opportune.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that before the coming into force of the Treaty there should be no doubt on the point of President Wilson's calling the Council. Otherwise, everything would remain unsettled.

MR. POLK said that he would immediately communicate with Washington.

M. FROMAGEOT called the attention of the Council to the very delicate situation which the coming into force of the Treaty would create at Dantzig, Memel and in the Sarre Basin. The day the Treaty would come into force Germany would lose all authority in these districts.

⁴ Minute 9, p. 213.

If trouble should arise the Allied and Associated Powers would be entirely responsible.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the League of Nations should begin to operate and formulate decisions the very day of the coming into force of the Treaty. He would almost say that the minutes of the first meeting of the Council should be drawn up beforehand. He suggested that the Secretary General of the League of Nations should now be notified of the questions on which the Council would immediately have to take decisions.

M. ESCOFFIER said that the Secretariat of the League of Nations had itself to be confirmed by the Supreme Council.

M. MANTOUX observed that this was not true of the Secretary General, who was designated by the Treaty.

(It was decided:

(1) that Mr. Polk should obtain an assurance from Washington, that, without awaiting the ratification of the Treaty of Peace by the United States Senate, President Wilson would convoke the Council of the League of Nations for a meeting, which should be held in Europe;

(2) that the Secretary General of the League of Nations should, at the present time, be notified unofficially by the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference of the questions which, upon the entry of the Treaty of Peace into force, would require immediate action by the Council of the League of Nations.)

9. (The Council had before it a note from the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference, dated 14th October, 1919. (See Appendix "G".))

**Wearing of
Uniform by the
Members of the
Interallied Mis-
sions of Control
in Germany**

M. PICHON commented briefly on this note of the Secretariat General. He remarked that in the opinion of the French Delegation there was no possible analogy between the position of members of the Commissions of Control and Military Attachés. Moreover, Military Attachés wear the uniform when on duty and officers of Commissions of Control are always on duty. The French Government was entirely opposed to the personnel of these Commissions of Control being obliged to wear civilian clothing. Moreover, among this military personnel there were noncommissioned officers and men. If they were obliged to wear civilian clothing difficulties would arise. There was no intention of riding rough shod over German prejudices or of abusing our victory; nevertheless, Germany must accustom herself to the idea that she was beaten. Allied officers in Germany have a definite military mission to fulfil. They cannot be expected to wear civilian dress in the execution of their duties.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed entirely with M. Pichon. He added that in his mind there was no doubt that the German demand was not

aimed at preventing possible friction alone. It was a question of something more. Whoever knew Germany knew that a man in uniform is far more respected than a civilian. The idea of the Germans was to diminish the prestige of Allied officers.

(It was decided:

not to grant the wish expressed by the German Government that, upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace, the members of the Interallied Missions of Control should wear civilian clothing.)

10. (The Council had before it a draft note addressed to the German Delegation, prepared by the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty (See Appendix "H"), in reply to the note of the German Delegation prepared at Versailles 22nd September, 1919.)

Reply to the
Note of the Ger-
man Government
Respecting the
District of
Memel

GENERAL LE ROND read and commented briefly upon the note of the Committee on the Execution of

the Treaty.

(It was decided:

to accept the draft reply to the Note of the German Delegation respecting the District of Memel, prepared by the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty. (See Appendix "H".))

(The Meeting then adjourned)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, 15 October, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-70

Draft Note From the Supreme Council to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission for Communication to the President of the German Armistice Commission

PARIS, 15 October, 1919.

You are requested to transmit the following note to the German Government on behalf of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, with as little delay as possible.

By the terms of the Armistice Convention signed at Treves in January, 1919, Germany agreed to place the whole of the German merchant fleet under the control and under the flag of the Allied and Associated Powers.

In particular five vessels, namely the

*Johann Heinrich Burchard,
William Oswald,
Braunschweig,
Denderah and
Nassau*

have not been delivered on the pretext that these ships, having been sold in 1915-1916 by the Hamburg-Amerika Line and Kosmos Line to Dutch Shipping Companies, were consequently not German but Dutch ships.

The German Government have been repeatedly informed, through the President of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission, that the Allied and Associated Powers do not recognise any transfer of enemy tonnage to neutral flags or ownership during the war, except by special consent.

Under the head of Reparation, Annex 3, Section 7, in the Treaty of Peace, it is provided that:—

Germany agrees to take any measures that may be indicated to her by the Reparation Commission for obtaining the full title to the property in all ships which have during the war been transferred, or are in process of transfer, to neutral flags, without the consent of the Allied and Associated Governments.

It is thus definitely established by common agreement between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany that German vessels transferred to a neutral flag during the war without Allied consent must be regarded as German vessels. The obligation on the part of the German Government to deliver them up cannot, therefore, be called in question. In consequence the German Government is required:—

(1) to send without further delay the five vessels above named to the Firth and [of] Forth for delivery to the Allied and Associated Powers.

(2) to remove the nucleus Dutch crews now on board and to substitute for them German crews.

(3) to have removed forthwith the Dutch name and Dutch port of registry at present temporarily painted on each vessel.

(4) to permit a free inspection of the *William Oswald* by officers representing the Allied and Associated Powers whenever desired by them.

(5) to have the *Nassau* and *Braunschweig* brought down the river Weser from Bremen to Bremerhaven by German crews, and berthed wherever directed by the Allied Senior Naval Officer in German waters.

The German Government is requested to acknowledge this communication immediately on its receipt and to reply to it.

BRITISH DELEGATION, October 14, 1919.

Appendix B to HD-70

Report of the Committees on Polish and Baltic Affairs Relative to the Military Occupation of Dantzig and Memel

The Commissions on Polish and Baltic Affairs, at a joint meeting, understanding that the Constitution of the Free City of Dantzig has

for principle the nomination of a High Commissioner by the League of Nations, consider that it will be the duty of this High Commissioner to request, should occasion arise, the despatch of a corps of occupation for facilitating the organization of the Free City of Dantzig.

Moreover, it would appear necessary to establish at Dantzig a base for the revictualing of troops charged with the occupation of the territories of Allenstein and Marienwerder. This base should immediately permit of sufficient effectives to assure, in case of need, the maintenance of order necessary for its functioning.

Finally, the Commissions consider that the occupation, properly called, of the territory of the Free City of Dantzig by Interallied troops could be decided by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in case of necessity indicated by the official for the administration of order temporarily designated by them as their representative until the designation of the High Commissioner named by the League of Nations.

The local administration would continue, in any event until the establishment of the Constitution.

As regards Memel, the Commission considers that the territory should be occupied by Interallied troops until such time as its final disposition shall be definitely fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The troops of occupation, being placed there for the sole purpose of maintaining public order, should consist of a battalion and a half of infantry, a squadron of cavalry and a section of mitrailleuses, totalling 1700 men.

The local administration will continue to function, subject to powers conferred upon the commander of the forces of occupation, under international law, for the maintenance of order.

Appendices C and D to HD-70

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[Appendix C]

Note to the Supreme Council on the Subject of the Composition of the Commissions on Delimitation of the Frontiers Between [of] Germany and [of] Austria

(Delegations of the non-concerned Powers)

[OCTOBER 6, 1919.]

I.—PRELIMINARY MEASURES

The Committee of Execution asks that a decision be immediately arrived at by the Supreme Council on the following points:

1st. Designation by the Council of the League of Nations of the three Powers, outside of France and Germany, charged with the appointment of the members of the Commission on the delimitation of the Saar Basin frontiers.

(Article 48, Part III) of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

2nd. Designation of the three Principal Allied and Associated Powers charged with the nomination of the High Commissioner and of the two members of the Commission on the Delimitation of the frontiers of the Dantzig territory.*

(Article 101, Part III) of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

3rd. Designation of the three Principal Allied and Associated Powers, outside of Italy, charged with the appointment of the members of the Commission on the delimitation of the frontier between Italy and Austria.

(Article 36, Part III) of the Peace Treaty with Austria.

4th. The Committee calls the attention of the Supreme Council to the advisability of having the Commissioners of the various Commissions on the Delimitations of the frontiers of Germany and Austria, those of the Powers concerned included, meet very soon in Paris. The first meeting could have only an unofficial character if certain Powers consider that it will be better to postpone the official nominations of their Commissioners; in any case, it would allow the latter to study together the material preparation of their commissions and to study in particular the organization of their means of transportation.

II.—COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSIONS

The Committee on the Execution proposes that the Delegations of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers be composed as follows, the Commissioners being chosen as far as possible among the technical officers:

*See Page 3, Par. 5. NOTE—Frontiers of Germany. [Footnote in the original.]

A.—PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY

1st. Commission on the Delimitation of the frontiers between Belgium and Germany. (Article 35, Part III.)

One American Commissioner	
One British	“
One French	“
One Italian	“
One Japanese	“

Eventually a technician shall be added * upon the request of the President of the Commission.

(Commission to be constituted within a fortnight following the going into force of the Peace Treaty.)

2nd. Commission on the delimitation of the frontier of the Saar Basin. (Article 48, Part III.)

The three powers, besides France and Germany, who shall be designated to appoint the Commissioners of the Commission shall appoint each one:

One Commissioner.

Eventually a technician shall be appointed * upon the request of the President of the Commission.

(Commission to be constituted within a fortnight following the going into force of the Peace Treaty.)

3rd. Commission on the delimitation of the Czecho-Slovak frontiers, Ratibor Section.

(Article 83, Part III.)

One American Commissioner	
One British	“
One French	“
One Italian	“
One Japanese	“

Eventually a technician shall be appointed upon the request of the President.*

(Commission to be constituted within a fortnight of the going into force of the Peace Treaty.)

4th. Commission on the delimitation of the frontier between Germany and Poland.

(Article 87, Part III.)

America: 1 Commissioner, 1 Assistant Commissioner, 2 technical officers.

England: 1 Commissioner, 1 Assistant Commissioner, 2 technical officers.

* Intended to act as Secretary of the Commission. [Footnote in the original.]

France: 1 Commissioner, 1 Assistant Commissioner, 2 technical officers.

Italy: 1 Commissioner, 1 Assistant Commissioner, 2 technical officers.

Japan: 1 Commissioner, 1 Assistant Commissioner.

That Commission shall be on the spot as soon as the Treaty goes into force.

5th. Commission on the delimitation of the frontier of the Dantzig territory.

The Commission is composed of three members, including one High Commissioner, President, appointed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, one member appointed by Germany and one by Poland.

Eventually a technician shall be appointed* upon the request of the President.

That Commission shall be on the spot as soon as the Treaty goes into force.

The Committee proposes that the members of the Commission on the Delimitation of the frontiers of the Dantzig territory be chosen from among the members of the Commission on the Delimitation of the frontier between Germany and Poland, since this last Commission has a very large personnel. Under these conditions the President of the Commission on the Delimitation of the frontier between Germany and Poland should also be the President of the Commission on the delimitation of the frontier of the Dantzig territory.

6th. Commission on the delimitation of the frontier between Germany and Denmark. (Article III [111] Part III.)

One American Commissioner	
One British	"
One French	"
One Italian	"
One Japanese	"

Eventually a technician shall be appointed upon the request of the President of the Commission.

Those Commissioners can be chosen from among the members of other Commissions having finished their work.

Commission to be constituted within the fortnight following the vote of the plebiscite.

B.—PEACE TREATY WITH AUSTRIA

1st. Commission on the Delimitation of the frontier between Italy and Austria.

(Article 27, Part III.)

*Intended to act as Secretary of the Commission. [Footnote in the original.]

The three Principal Allied and Associated Powers, besides Italy, who shall be designated to furnish the Commissioners to the Commission shall appoint each one:

One Commissioner.

Eventually a technician shall be appointed* upon the request of the President of the Commission.

(Commission to be constituted within the fortnight following the going into force of the Treaty.)

2nd. Commission on the delimitation of the frontier between Austria and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

(Article 48, Part III.)

One American Commissioner	
One British	"
One French	"
One Italian	"
One Japanese	"

Eventually a technician shall be appointed * upon the request of the President of the Commission.

(Commission to be constituted within the fortnight following the going into force of the treaty.)

3rd. Commission on the delimitation of the frontier between Austria and the Czecho-Slovak State.

(Article 55, part II [III].)

One American Commissioner
One British Commissioner
One French Commissioner
One Italian Commissioner
One Japanese Commissioner

Eventually a technician shall be appointed * upon the request of the President of the Commission.

(Commission to be constituted within the fortnight following the going into force of the Treaty.)

[Appendix D]

Instructions Relative to Commissions of Delimitation

I.—GENERALITIES

1. The Delimitation Commissions have as a mission to determine on the ground:

- a) Primarily the frontiers described in the Peace Treaty;
- b) Ulteriorly the frontiers which shall be determined after the execution of the several plebiscites provided for by the said Treaties.

*Intended to act as Secretary of the Commission. [Footnote in the original.]

They shall have full powers not only in the determination of the fraction defined under the heading of "line to be determined on the ground", but, further, if one of the States concerned makes such request, and if the Commission approves the opportunity, for the revision of the fraction defined by the administrative boundaries, except concerning the international frontiers existing in August 1914, where the role of the Commissions shall be limited to a verification of the stakes on boundary markers.

They will make every effort, in both cases, to closely follow the definitions given in the Treaties by taking into account, insofar as possible, the administrative boundaries and the local economic interests.

A central agency, instituted by the Peace Conference, shall proceed with the constitution and organization of the Delimitation Commissions and shall follow their operations.

II.—ORGANIZATION

A.—COMPOSITION

For the fixing of each frontier, the Peace Treaties establish in principle the composition of a Commission and the number of the Commissioners.

In cases of frontiers of great extent or of difficult delimitation, assistant Commissioners may be named with a view to sub-dividing the Commission into sub-commissions.

A technical personnel (technical assistants) is attached to each Commission with a view to determining on the ground the survey labors which may be judged necessary, to supervise the erection of the frontier markers in accordance with the rules established and to assure their correct placing.

An auxiliary personnel is also attached to the Commission (topographical assistants, secretaries, interpreters, draftsmen, etc.).

The combined personnel furnished by each State constitutes the delegations from that State.

The Delegations of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Commissions to be created for the fixing of the frontiers in Europe are limited, in principle, to the following composition:

1 Commissioner; 1 interpreter; 1 topographer, and one secretary, and, in exceptional cases, an assistant Commissioner.

The Delegations of the Powers concerned (on whom shall be incumbent in principle the duty of operating the technical labors) may have a surplus Commissioner and shall include the technical assistants (officers) and the personnel for the labors on the ground. If the countries concerned cannot furnish the technical assistants they shall be furnished by the non-interested Powers.

With a view to general economy these same commissioners may operate on several commissions. To this end, the central agency shall study the organization and the plan of action of the several commissions and shall make all useful proposals to the Supreme Council.

In each commission the commissioners of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall elect a President from among the commissioners of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which are not directly interested. The President shall have the right to attach, as assistant, a technical expert of his choice, from among the technical assistants of the commission. The personnel of the Delimitation Commission must be military; the commissioners and, insofar as possible, the assistant commissioners should be superior or acting officers; the technical assistants should be subaltern or acting officers; the secretaries, topographical assistants, etc., shall be, in principle, acting non-commissioned officers or soldiers. The personnel of the commissions shall be in uniform and may, in principle, be supplied with a revolver.

B.—NOMINATION OF THE PERSONNEL

In conformity with what is established by the Peace Treaties, the Commissions should be in a position to operate at a date fixed by the said treaties or following a decision of the Supreme Council.

The central agency shall conduct the nominations in due time and it shall take due dispositions to insure the first convocation of each commission.

By the competency of this same central agency, each commissioner shall be accredited to the different States concerned.

All replacements of personnel, for whatever cause, shall be proposed by the President to the central agency, in the name of the commission, except concerning the technical assistants and any enlisted personnel, whose replacement shall be demanded directly from the power to which they belong.

The central agency shall have full authority to decide if a commission can or not operate in the absence of one or more delegations of the non-interested Powers, and it shall decree the procedures governing the operation of the commission under these conditions.

C.—CONSTITUTION

During their first meeting, the commissioners should proceed to the constitution of the commission by nominating the President, and, if need be, the sub-commissions.

The commission, thus constituted, shall establish a preliminary plan of the labors to be executed, and shall determine the number of technical assistants and settle the question of instruments. It shall examine the question of large scale maps and documentation in general, shall

determine the place and date for a first meeting on the ground in proximity to a center of frontier in common to a same series of members.

D.—OPERATIONS

The Commissions have full authority to establish their own operations. They must, however, operate on the following basis of a general order:

Each Commission shall provide for the creation of a courier service every 15 days to insure liaison with the central agency and for the transmission for all necessary information.

Each Commission or sub-commission before proceeding to the ground, and after having assembled and taken cognizance of the documentation placed at its disposition, should draw up a plan of action and specify:

1st. If it is advisable to divide the frontier into several sections or sub-sections, into clearly determined parts, into parts to be determined locally, configuration of the ground, etc.;

2d. The nature of the labors to be conducted in each section or sub-section. Concerning the "lines to be determined on the ground" they shall make every effort and in particular by the use of the large scale maps and from information obtained from the interested Commissioners, to specify an outline beforehand;

3d. The best order to adopt for the execution of the labors;

4th. A uniform type of frontier posts (*bornes*) to be adopted for each section or sub-section, and the numbering of these posts;

5th. Directives for the technical labors to be operated.

Practically it seems advantageous to proceed as follows: after the preliminary conferences, the commission shall confide to the assistant commissioners interested or technical assistants interested the task of proceeding to the delimitation.

In principle, they shall leave litigious questions aside, in cases where they cannot reach a solution by agreement in common; the commission shall settle the difference.

Only in cases of bitter conflict between the commissioners of interested nationalities should members of noninterested nationalities be designated by the commission for the preliminary labors.

Concerning territory of which no maps have been made, the sketch executed by the technical assistants shall be submitted to the commission which shall determine the outline on the map; the delimitation shall be made by the commissioners or assistant commissioners of the States concerned.

If there are members who belong to several commissions, they shall thus have time to accomplish their duties in connection with the different groups to which they belong.

The delimitation established, the commission shall verify the outline as adopted, decide at the same time the text of the general description and the rough draft of the map and shall assemble the documents furnished in connection with the establishing of the land marks. In the course of this general examination the commission may be accompanied by local authorities, to whom they shall furnish the indications which might be useful to them regarding the outline of the frontier.

The decisions of the commissions shall be adopted on a majority of votes and shall be obligatory for the parties concerned.

The final delimitation reports, maps and documents annexed, shall be drawn up in triplicate, two of which shall be submitted to the Governments of each of the bordering States and the third shall be transmitted to the central agency which shall deliver an authentic copy of it to the Powers signatory to the Treaty.

III.—ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

A.—INDEMNITIES

In addition to the salary or allowances received normally by each member from his own government,* the commissioners and the personnel of each commission shall receive the following indemnities:

Officers

Clothing indemnity (paid at their departure)	80. 00 lbs. Sterling.
Extra duty indemnity (monthly)	75. 00
Monthly) President of the Commission	40. 00
Operation) per Commissioner	30. 00
Indemnity) per Asst. Commissioner	10. 00

non-Commissioned officers and Soldiers:
(topographers, chauffeurs, secretaries, etc.)

Non-Commissioned topographers	40. 00 lbs. Sterling.
-----	35. 00
Soldiers	30. 00

Each Government should advance to its own Delegation, in addition to the indemnities above mentioned, a sum sufficient to cover travelling expenses.

Before leaving for duty the officers shall be paid a sum corresponding to the clothing indemnity and also a month's pay and a month's extra duty indemnity; the non-commissioned officers and soldiers shall receive 15 days indemnity in advance.

* Four delegations esteem that the members of the delimitation commissions should receive the salary and the allowances which are due them from their Governments. The British delegation withholds its opinion until after consultation with its Government. [Footnote in the original.]

B.—EXPENSES, MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION AND BILLETING

1. *Expenses.* In accordance with what was established by the Supreme Council in its session of August 18th,⁹ all the expenses of the delimitation commissions shall be distributed equally between the two States concerned. There shall be, consequently, charged to the countries concerned :

- a) The indemnities of the personnel of the delegation ;
- b) all transportation expenses ;
- c) the billeting expenses of the entire personnel of the commissions in the renting of all necessary buildings (meeting hall, garage, offices, etc.)
- d) office expenses and miscellaneous expenses incurred in the operations of the Commission.

The several states interested agree to furnish to the delimitation commissions, either directly, or through the intermediary of the local authorities the means of transportation, billeting, manual labor, material (posts, markers) necessary in the accomplishment of the mission.

Each power represented in the delimitation commissions shall place at the disposition of its commissioners the necessary funds for the payment of all the expenses falling on its delegation and every three months shall submit a statement to the central agency on whom shall be incumbent the duty of effecting the reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with the Powers interested. If, on account of local circumstances, a commission deems it advisable to furnish means of transportation, the expenses pertaining thereto shall be charged to the account of the Powers concerned.

During its first meeting, each Commission shall arrange the category and the extent of these means which should be at the disposition of each delegation, by taking the nature and the extent of their territories where it is to operate into account.

The Delegations (personnel, material, vehicles, etc.) shall be transported without charge on all the rail and waterways of the powers interested.

The personal baggage as well as the courier of all the members of the Allied Delegations shall be exempt of all duty rights and of all other similar taxes. The couriers between the central agency and the commissions shall enjoy full diplomatic franchise.

The escort over all materials transported for the commissions shall be insured by the power over whose territory the transportation shall be effected.

2. *Billeting.* The various buildings necessary for the billeting of the personnel and of the material of the delegations (rooms for officers and soldiers, offices, storehouses, garages, etc.) shall be placed at the

⁹ HD-32, minute 10, vol. VII, p. 706.

disposition of the commissions by the Power concerned upon the territory of which these commissions shall sojourn.

The custody of these buildings shall be assured by the said Power.

IV.—TECHNICAL OPERATIONS

A.—ELEMENTS SERVING AS A BASE FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE LABORS

The frontiers described in the various Treaties are outlined, in their definite parts, on 1/1,000,000 scale maps annexed to the Treaties. In cases of differences between the text and the maps, the text shall supersede.

In each Commission, the Delegations shall receive, for the execution of the labors, from their respective Governments:

1st. True copies of the Articles of the Peace Treaty referring thereto, with their translations.

2nd. True copies of the original maps attached to the Treaties.

3rd. Copies of the maps which were used in the elaboration of the frontier outline.

4th. Copies of the reports made by the Territorial Commissions, or of the extracts of these reports.

The various States interested agree to furnish the Commissions with all documents necessary in their labors, in particular, authentic copies of the minutes of the delimitation of present or former frontiers, all the large scale maps existing, geodetic data, sketches made and not published, information on the deviations of the frontier water courses.

They agree, furthermore, to order the local authorities to communicate to the Commissions all documents, notably plans, land surveys and registrations, and to furnish them, at their request, with all information concerning the property, economic tendencies and any other information necessary.

In case of differences found in the maps, the Commission shall execute rectifications by referring to the geodetic data at its disposition.

It shall decide in each case the solution to be taken by following as nearly as possible the line determined by the text of the Treaty.

The various States interested agree to respect the trigonometrical land marks, signs, posts or frontier markers set up by the commission.

B.—DEMARKATION OF FRONTIERS

1. *On Land*

The frontier shall be marked by landmarks of durable materials, clearly visible and of a uniform type in a same section or sub-section.

They shall be constructed in such a way as to indicate:

1. The serial number and the distinctive letter of the section or sub-section;

2. The direction of the adjacent landmarks;
3. The two countries which they separate.

The landmarks common to three countries and those which terminate a section or sub-section shall be of a special model and shall bear the date of the Treaties.

The placing of each landmark shall be noted in such a way that in case it should disappear, it could be replaced without difficulty.

The Commission shall decide the method of laying to be chosen among the means hereafter enumerated :

- a) By junction with natural objects;
- b) By geographical coordination (Latitude and longitude and eventually altitude);
- c) By rectangular coordination (X and Y for a known projection);
- d) By relation to neighboring landmarks;
- e) By simple reference to the map;
- f) By photographs taken in the known directions.

The landmarks shall be placed within sight of each other, closer if the trace be winding and, as much as possible, at each change in direction.

A landmark shall indicate the point of passage over ways of communication (routes, important trails, railroads, rivers, canals).

For the former frontiers, the verification of landmarks shall be effected and the inscriptions on the existing landmarks shall be changed in conformity with the above indications.

The emplacement and the number of the landmarks shall be carried on a cartographic document.

2. *On Water*

Concerning the frontiers determined by a water course, the terms "course" or "channel" employed in the descriptions of the Treaties mean: on the one hand for unnavigable rivers, the median line of the watercourse or of its principal arm or branch, and on the other, for the navigable rivers, the median line of the channel of principal navigation. However, it shall devolve upon the Commissions on delimitation, provided for by the Treaties, to specify if the frontier line shall follow in its eventual changes the course or the channel thus defined, or if it shall be determined in a definitive way by the position of the course or channel, at the moment of the putting into force of the Treaty.

Ordinarily it shall not be possible to lay landmarks along frontiers which follow water courses; but in certain cases it shall be possible and desirable to demark the frontier with the aid of alignments realized by landmarks placed on the banks or by the aid of floating buoys or stationary beacons.

Such cases may present themselves in lakes, at confluents or on the shores.

The Commission shall examine and decide upon the spot the solution to be employed to rejoin on sea the limits of the territorial waters, either in following the prolongation of the last part of the frontiers, or in following one normal to the coast.

Navigable and unnavigable water courses.

In the case of navigable water courses, the frontier is formed by the axis of the channel of navigation; in the case of unnavigable water courses, the Commission shall have to decide on the spot the interpretation to give to the term "course" or "principal course" adopted in the Treaty.

For the water courses, the Commission on delimitation should examine:

1. If there does not exist on a bank enclaves coming from former rectified meanders which might be reclaimed by one of the bordering countries. It would settle the question on the spot;

2. In the case where the course of the river is not stabilized, if new changes are to be anticipated, it will call these points to the attention of those interested and propose a solution basing itself on the history of the river and of its deviations, and on the possible result of new derogations as to the interests of the riparian inhabitants;

3. In case of several navigable channels, it shall decide which should be considered as the principal channel;

4. If there is reason to adopt a method of demarkation at least in certain places (very large parts, confluents, points common to three frontiers, etc.) it shall decide the method of staking out (floating and stationary beacons, alignments, resections) by inspiring itself on the principles admitted for the establishment of markers on land, pools, lakes, lagoons, etc.,

The Commission should decide on the spot and according to the large scale maps on the interpretation to be given to the term "median line" adopted in the Treaty.

It shall not lose sight of the attribution of the islands.

It shall have to decide in the case of a gulf or a lagoon on the method of marking the frontier and its necessity.

3. Lines to be determined on the terrain

a) In the case where a regular sketch exists,—The Commission should try beforehand to determine the line with the aid of large scale maps guiding themselves:

1. by the existing administrative limits;
2. by the limits established by survey;
3. by the natural lines of the soil or straight alignments.

In the undetermined parts, it shall decide on the spot being inspired as much as possible by the proposals made by the Commissioners of the interested countries.

b) In the case where no regular sketch exists.—The Commission will then have to see that the sketches are made by the technical experts; they will be given for that purpose instructions under the form of directions.

The aim of this work shall be to obtain on a topographical scale to be fixed by the Commission a strip of territory where the frontier could be traced. It could be defined as follows: a strip having for axis the trace such as it exists on the map 1/1.000.000 attached to the Treaty, and sufficiently large to show the details cited for the definition of this frontier in the Treaty, villages, crests, rivers, railways, lines, roads.) The minimum breadth could also be defined.

This map should comprise: the planimetry, the configuration of the land contours.

It shall also contain in a special manner the natural or artificial landmarks which might facilitate the laying out of landmarks (high peaks, steeples, minarets, etc.).

The method of sketching should evidently be influenced by the terrain. However, in cases where it shall be possible, one should have recourse to a rapid triangulation with numerous intercalar points and numerous resections, marked on the terrain by permanent signals made of the materials at hand (wooden buoys, stone pyramids, etc.). The points shall be figured by latitude, longitude and altitude. The verifications shall be done by measures of bases, latitudes and azimuths. The sketch of the details shall be executed with a place table according to the desired scale. In a wooded country one must proceed by polygons, theodolite, tachometer, completed by itineraries supported by numerous points of latitude and azimuths.

The landmarks shall be bound to these permanent signals.

C.—DOCUMENTS TO BE FURNISHED BY THE COMMISSION FOR THE WORK ON DELIMITATION

1. An ensemble map of a large scale bearing in a fine and continuous line the trace of the frontier and the emplacements of the international landmarks with their numbers and letters, accompanied by a complete description of the frontier, from landmark to landmark.

2. The documents assuring the locating of the landmark emplacements.

3. The protocols established by the Commission for all the decisions taken by common accord to complete or determine the terms of the Treaty;

4. Eventually a general report on the subject of the progress of the work and the various points on which the Commission would like to call attention.

These documents shall be made in triplicate. (see II.D)

Appendix E to HD-70

Note From the French Delegation Regarding the Putting Into Force of the Treaty of Versailles

OCTOBER 13, 1919.

PUTTING INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The official report on the ratification by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers involves the entry into force of the Treaty, and from then will be dated all the delays in the execution, which are to be guarded against.

Before drafting this report, it would therefore be necessary to determine whether the interested Powers are ready to execute the provisions which should enter into force immediately after the going into force of the Treaty, or with the shortest possible delay.

It is advisable to ascertain whether the International Commissions provided for are nominated and ready to operate, whether the troops of occupation are ready to accomplish their task, whether all the measures have been taken to effect the execution of all other provisions, especially of the obligations imposed on Germany.

Appendix F to HD-70*[Note From the Secretariat General]*PEACE CONFERENCE
SECRETARIAT GENERAL

NOTE

Article 1 of the Treaty with Germany and the Annex to Part I of this Treaty provide that certain neutral States, not signers and enumerated in the said Annex, are invited to accede to the Covenant of the League of Nations within the two months from the going into force of the Covenant, that is to say of the Treaty.

The date of the going into force being near, it would seem necessary for the Supreme Council to take preparatory and necessary decisions that:

1. The States invited to accede to the Covenant be officially informed of the tenor of the Covenant and of the obligations of the League of Nations relative to the execution of the Treaty:

2. The said States receive notification of the putting into force of the Treaty with Germany, at as early a date as possible.

The two notifications (tenor of the Covenant and of its obligations and date of the going into force) can be made:

Either by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, by delegation of the Supreme Council, to the chiefs of diplomatic Missions of the states interested at Paris,

Or directly by telegram from the President of the Conference to the chiefs of the different Governments.

In either case, the double notification could be made only on the day of the signing of the authentic minutes of the filing of the ratifications, and a certified copy conformable to the Peace Treaty with Germany should be addressed to the neutral Governments invited to accede to the Covenant.

The double notification by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic to the Chiefs of diplomatic Missions at Paris could be made in the form of a letter, a draft of which is appended.

If the procedure of notification by the President of the Conference were adopted, it would be advisable to mention, in the telegram to the Chiefs of Neutral States interested that certified copy conformable to the Peace Treaty with Germany has been handed to their respective representatives at Paris.

Annex

Project of a Letter From the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions in Paris

PARIS, (Date of signing of minutes
on file of the ratifications).

MR. MINISTER: By delegation of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, I have the honor of enclosing herewith a certified copy, conformable to the Peace Treaty signed at Versailles June 28, 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, and beg you to be kind enough to bring it to the attention of the Government of

I have also been charged with calling your attention to certain clauses of this Treaty.

Article 1 of the Treaty and the Annex to Part I provide that the (State) is invited to accede to the Covenant of the League of Nations within two months after the going into force of the Covenant, that is to say of the Treaty.

In conformity with the final clauses of the said Treaty, I have the honor of informing you that the Treaty having been ratified by Germany on the one hand, by the British Empire, France and Italy on

the other, a first official report of the filing of these ratifications has been drawn up under date of and that all delays provided for by the Treaty will be counted beginning from this date, among the High Contracting Parties.

Please accept, etc.

The Minister of the Argentine Republic
 Republic of Chile
 Republic of Colombia
 Kingdom of Denmark
 Kingdom of Spain
 Kingdom of Norway
 Republic of Paraguay
 Kingdom of the Netherlands
 Kingdom of Persia
 Republic of Salvador
 Kingdom of Sweden
 Swiss Republic
 Republic of Venezuela

Appendix G to HD-70

Request Made by the German Delegation That Officers of Control in Germany Wear Civilian Clothes After the Coming Into Force of the Treaty

PEACE CONFERENCE
 SECRETARIAT GENERAL

PARIS, October 14, 1919.

Baron von Lersner on October 13 visited the Secretary General of the Peace Conference. He expressed to him in the name of the German Government the desire, that beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace, Allied officers belonging to Missions of Control in Germany should adopt the wearing of civilian clothes which is customary for officers exercising their functions in foreign countries, for example, for Military Attaches. In this manner incidents would be avoided which the German Government states it is powerless to prevent in view of the present state of feeling among the people.

M. Dutasta replied to the President of the German Delegation that the request of the German Government would be submitted to the Supreme Council at an early meeting.

Appendix H to HD-70

*Draft Reply to Note of German Delegation of September 22,
Regarding Memel*

OCTOBER 14, 1919.

PROJECT

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor of acknowledging receipt of the note which you addressed to me September 22 regarding the territory of Memel.

In reply to this communication, I have the honor to inform you that Article 99 of the Peace Treaty having allowed no bond to exist between this region and Germany, the Allied and Associated Powers could not enter into discussion with the German Delegation on the future fate of the territory of Memel.

Please accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER,

*President of the German Delegation,
Versailles.*

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, October 16, 1919, at 10: 30 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. de St. Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja
Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. Gordon
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
FRANCE M. Massigli
ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned.

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. C. Russell
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Sir George Clerk
Mr. Leeper
Mr. Forbes-Adam
Capt. G. Lothian Small

ITALY

M. Vannutelli-Rey

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

1. MR. POLK said that a telegram had just been received from the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest dated the 14th October.

He desired that the telegram (see Appendix "A") should be placed before the Council and be considered before the question of Sir George Clerk's mission was discussed.

Telegram From
the Interallied
Military Mission
at Budapest

M. MANTOUX then read the text of the telegram.

MR. POLK said that he wished to call attention to the fact that the telegram expressed the opinion of the four Generals at Budapest. He thought that the question of the reply should be considered at once. The telegram was addressed, not to the American delegation, but to the Supreme Council. If the telegram required an answer, as he thought it did, the question was to decide as to the nature of the answer.

M. PICHON agreed that the telegram could not be left unanswered. It was important that the demand of the Interallied Military Mission should be fulfilled. He considered that the Generals should be given entire satisfaction.

MR. POLK said that at the same time that the telegram had been received his attention had been called to a press despatch from Budapest, which stated that it was rumored in both Austria and Hungary, that the members of the Interallied Military Mission were on the point of resigning, because they felt that they had not received adequate support from the Supreme Council.

M. PICHON said he did not see how this demand could be made. In any event, it was important to beware of rumors. In point of fact, the Supreme Council had replied to the previous telegrams of the Interallied Military Mission and had taken the views of the Mission into full consideration. Up to the present time the Interallied Military Mission had never transmitted to the Council a telegram so precise in its statements and so far reaching in its consequences. He considered it essential to accede to the wishes of the Interallied Military Mission, namely, that the Roumanian Government should be asked to evacuate Hungary forthwith. He wished to point out, however, the grave situation which would be almost certain to result in Hungary following the retirement of the Roumanian army of occupation. The question of arming a police force of sufficient size to enforce order was not mentioned in the telegram, and the Military Mission had made no suggestions in regard to this matter. He asked whether the Military Mission had made any proposals relative to the organizing of a police force before the evacuation should take place.

MR. POLK pointed out that the Military Mission had already asked for 10,000 rifles for the purpose of organizing a police force.

M. PICHON said that he had not been present at the last meeting of the Council where the subject had been discussed.¹ He understood, however, that Sir George Clerk had already proposed the immediate evacuation of Hungary by the Roumanian forces.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that Sir George Clerk had proposed the evacuation of Hungary by the Roumanians, but that he had also in-

¹ HD-67, minute 7, p. 539.

sisted upon the necessity of the establishment of a Government which could maintain order and be recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers. (See H.D. 67.)

MR. POLK said that he did not understand that the report advocated that the Roumanians should remain in Hungary until a stable Government was established.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Allied and Associated Governments had already addressed the Roumanian Government on the subject of the evacuation of Hungary.²

MR. POLK said that he thought that the Council had already insisted that the Roumanian military authorities form the police of Hungary and then withdraw. It was most important that the Roumanians should not await the establishment of a suitable Government.

M. PICHON asked who should give orders to the police.

MR. POLK said that the Interallied Military Mission had already reported that the Government of M. Friedrich were prepared to organize a police force.

M. PICHON pointed out that the Council had already considered the draft of a telegram to M. Friedrich telling him that he should withdraw and permit someone else to form a government.³

MR. POLK said that he thought it was important not to mix the two questions. So far as he was concerned, he was not in a position to accept a form of action which would enable the Roumanian forces to remain until a satisfactory Government had been established.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Allied and Associated Governments had already told the Roumanian Government that they must withdraw their military forces from Hungary.

(He then read an extract from the Note to the Roumanian Government, (See Appendix "B" to H.D. 68) in which a definite demand upon the Roumanians to withdraw their military forces from Hungary was made.)

He said that he considered that it was most important to inform the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest that this demand had been made of the Roumanian Government.

M. PICHON said that it was of equal importance to see that the Roumanian Government carried out the measures in question.

MR. POLK said that he hoped that the matter could be cleared up. He wished to ask whether the rifles were to be delivered to the Hungarian police at the present time, and whether the Roumanian forces were to withdraw at the present time, whatever the Government in Hungary might be.

M. PICHON replied in the affirmative.

² Appendix B to HD-68, p. 533.

³ Appendix C to HD-68, p. 536.

M. SCIALOJA asked whether the Interallied Military Mission had been informed of the telegram sent to Bucharest.

M. PICHON replied that they had not been informed, but that they ought to be informed immediately.

MR. POLK said that he understood that a decision had been taken at the meeting of the Council on the 11th October to inform the Interallied Military Mission of the Note to the Roumanian Government.

M. PICHON said that the resolution had not been drafted in this sense, but that the decision should be communicated to the Interallied Military Mission, as it would be the best reply to their telegram.

MR. POLK said that he wished to express the hope that the Supreme Council would not forget that possibly six weeks ago, certainly four, the Roumanian military authorities had been told to deliver the necessary rifles to the police. The Council were aware that the Roumanians had never done this. M. Misu had informed him that the Hungarians had plenty of rifles from Field Marshal Mackensen's supply. In point of fact this was not the case. The Roumanians were unwilling to carry out the wishes of the Supreme Council.

M. PICHON said that Marshal Foch had been informed on the 10th October by Colonel Dimitrescu that the Roumanian High Command had some time before placed at the disposal of Colonel Yates for the Hungarian *gendarmérie* 10,000 rifles and 40 machine guns. 1,000 rifles had already been delivered and the rest was guarded by Roumanian troops until such time as they should be delivered. Colonel Dimitrescu added that Colonel Yates, the United States Military Attaché at Bucharest, had been charged by the Interallied Military Mission with the creation of a Hungarian *gendarmérie*. The Roumanian troops had begun their withdrawal from Hungary.

MR. POLK said that in his opinion it was delightfully typical of the Roumanians that of 10,000 rifles, 9,000 had not been delivered.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that on the 20th September M. Diamandi and General Mardarescu had promised to turn over the rifles and machine guns for the use of the Hungarian *gendarmérie*. As far as he was aware they had not delivered a single rifle or machine gun.

MR. POLK said that they had delivered 1,000 rifles which might be useful for parade purposes, but which could not shoot.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that substantially there was no additional information in the telegram now before the Supreme Council. The point was that the Supreme Council had not communicated to the Generals the Note to the Roumanian Government; that the Generals therefore were unaware when they sent this telegram of the steps that the Supreme Council had already taken. He had no desire to doubt the evidence of the Interallied Mission, but the evidence was largely

collected from Hungarian sources. For this reason he did not consider that their report was altogether satisfactory since the Roumanians might have some explanation to make. In their telegram the Interallied Military Mission had mentioned the names of several towns as lying in territory which was to be ceded to Roumania under the terms of the Treaty of Peace. As a matter of fact some of the towns in question would remain in Hungarian territory. He did not think that the report should be accepted as gospel.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that he wished to add that on the night before he had left for Bucharest M. Misu had come to see him. He had pointed out to M. Misu how impossible the conduct of the Roumanian authorities had been, as for example, in the case of the Museum at Budapest. Mr. Misu then turned to M. Vaida and asked him for the official explanation. M. Vaida had then produced a telegram from his Government stating that the Roumanian Government had only wished to recover archives belonging to them which had been carried off from [to?] Budapest. He did not vouch for the truth of this explanation, which had not been investigated: it simply went to show that such incidents might have satisfactory explanations.

MR. POLK said that the explanation which the Roumanians had made to the Interallied Military Mission was that the material in question was Transylvanian property, and they wished to take it as they expected to acquire Transylvania. He wished to emphasize the point, however, that as the four Powers had sent four representatives to Budapest, there was no reason why the Roumanians should not make their explanations to them. He felt that the Council should either accept the statements of the Generals or else recall them. Personally he had great faith in General Bandholtz. The fact that the Roumanian Officials made their explanations outside of Budapest was decidedly unjust to the Interallied Military Mission and placed them in an impossible position.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he agreed. He said further that the Council should insist that the explanation of the Roumanian authorities should be made to the Interallied Military Mission. The point which he had wished to raise was this: a note had been despatched to the Roumanian Government and the Council had not yet heard their side. He wished to emphasize the necessity of waiting until a reply from the Roumanian Government had been received, as he did not believe that conditions were any worse than the Council already knew them to be.

M. PICHON said that the Council agreed as to the necessity of informing the Interallied Military Mission of the note to the Roumanian Government.

(It was decided:

to communicate to the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest the text of the note from the Principal Allied and Associated Governments to the Roumanian Government approved by the Supreme Council on the 11th October (H. D. 68).)

2. M. PICHON said that Mr. Polk had not considered it advisable to transmit a telegram to M. Friedrich but to send a representative of the Council to Budapest. The instructions to be given to Sir George Clerk were contained in the draft telegram to M. Friedrich which had been previously discussed by the Council (See Appendix "C", H. D. 68).

Mission of Sir
George Clerk to
Budapest

MR. POLK said that he wished to suggest two changes in the text. In the first paragraph it was stated that the Allies had waited in the hope that the Government of M. Friedrich, recognizing its inability to meet the conditions required by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, would either include representatives of all parties in Hungary or withdraw from office. He thought that instead of speaking of "all parties" it would be better to substitute the words, "the several parties". In the second paragraph he wished to suggest that the words "in the view of the Allied and Associated Powers" be omitted.

M. PICHON said that it had been agreed to inform the Interallied Military Mission in regard to Sir George Clerk's departure for Budapest.⁴ He thought that Sir George Clerk should be charged to inform the Generals as to the discussion which had taken place in the Council on that day and to inform them that the Council were resolved to do all that was necessary to make the Rumanian Government follow the line of action which had been decided upon.

(At this point Sir George Clerk left the meeting.)

MR. POLK said that he wished to raise a question which he had hesitated to mention in Sir George Clerk's presence. He understood that as Sir George Clerk was proceeding to Budapest as a representative of the principal Allied and Associated Powers the necessary expenses in connection with his mission, amounting to whatever sum Sir George Clerk in his discretion might consider necessary and proper, would be paid by the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. PICHON said that he thought that the British Government should pay the necessary expenses and that the amount in question should then be divided between the Powers interested.

MR. POLK said that Sir George Clerk was going to Budapest as the representative of the Supreme Council and it would be unfortunate

⁴ HD-69, minute 3, p. 603.

if the impression should obtain in Rumania or Hungary that the Council were dissatisfied with the Interallied Military Mission. He thought that a formal statement should be made to the four Generals which should contain the reasons why Sir George Clerk was going to Budapest.

M. PICHON said that the Council had already decided to notify the four Generals at Budapest of Sir George Clerk's mission (see H. D. 69, minute 3).

Mr. POLK pointed out that Sir George Clerk's mission would be known to the press.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Sir George Clerk was being sent to Budapest because it had been thought inadvisable by sending a telegram to give the appearance of mixing in the internal affairs of Hungary.

M. PICHON said that he did not approve of giving any statement to the press. In any mention of Sir George Clerk's mission, he would only be referred to as being charged with a special mission to Budapest on behalf of the Supreme Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked that Sir George Clerk's date of departure might be fixed for the following Saturday.

(It was decided :

(1) that Sir George Clerk should proceed to Budapest as the special representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. (See H. D. 69, minute 3) ;

(2) that Sir George Clerk should be directed to communicate with the several Hungarian political parties and that in his mission he should be guided by the spirit of the views of the Allied and Associated Powers as expressed in the draft telegram to M. Friedrich (See Appendix "C" to H. D. 68), with the following alterations in the text: for the words "all parties" (Line 12) the words "the several parties" should be substituted, and in lines 17 and 18 "in the view of the Allied and Associated Powers" should be omitted ;

(3) that Sir George Clerk should inform the four Generals at Budapest of the Discussion which had taken place in the Supreme Council on that day and that the Council were resolved to do all that was necessary to make the Rumanian Government follow the line of action required of them ;

(4) that such funds as Sir George Clerk might, in his discretion, consider necessary and proper for the expenses of the mission should be paid by the British Government and subsequently shared by the Principal Allied and Associated Governments ;

(5) that the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest should be notified by telegraph of Sir George Clerk's mission ;

(6) that the only statement which should be made with regard to Sir George Clerk's mission was that he had been despatched to fulfil a special mission at Budapest on behalf of the Supreme Council.)

3. (The Council had before it a Note of the 10th October from M. Politis to M. Clemenceau, (See Appendix "B".))

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN read and commented upon the note in question.

Protest of the Greek Delegation Against the Failure of the Inter-Allied Mission of Inquiry at Smyrna To Communicate Information to the Greek Representative

M. PICHON said that he thought it was a difficult matter for the Council to give instructions from Paris. If witnesses had given testimony under a promise of secrecy, he did not see how the Council could absolve the commission from the promises which they might have made.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Council had made an engagement to M. Venizelos.⁵

M. SCIALOJA said that when the Council had given the undertaking to M. Venizelos they were not aware that the Commission had promised certain witnesses that their testimony would be held as secret.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had just received a telegram from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople on the subject. The telegram confirmed the fact that the Commission had decided to take certain evidence *in camera* for the purpose of obtaining reliable information and avoiding reprisals. A definite promise had been made to certain witnesses. On the other hand, the Council had given an undertaking to the Greek Government.

M. PICHON said that the Council were not to blame for what had occurred. He thought the only possible compromise was to inform the Greek Delegation that the testimony taken after the instructions of the Supreme Council had been received would be placed at the disposal of the Greek Government. The Supreme Council were not in a position to give an undertaking as to previous promises made by the Commission of Inquiry.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed that this compromise would seem the best means of solving the difficulty.

Mr. POLK asked as to the nature of the promise made by the Supreme Council.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that the undertaking in question was contained in a resolution of the Supreme Council. (See H. D. 64, Minute 6.)

(It was decided: that, owing to pledges of secrecy given by the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna to certain witnesses, the Commission be not obliged to communicate to the representative of the Greek Government, in its entirety, the evidence given by these witnesses before the receipt of the terms of the resolution of the 30th September (See H. D. 64).)

4. (The Council had before it a Note from the British Delegation of the 15th October (See appendix "C").)

⁵ HD-64, minute 6, p. 463.

Repatriation of
Austrian and
Hungarian
Prisoners in
Great Britain
and Japan

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was not one of great importance. The Austrian Delegation had asked that the Austrian Prisoners of war held in Great Britain should be repatriated. There were only 36 officers and 135 others in Great Britain and the British Government saw no reason for refusing the request of the Austrian Delegation. It would probably be possible to repatriate the prisons in question with German prisoners. There was also a small number of Hungarian prisoners in Great Britain and the British Military Authorities were anxious that these should be repatriated at the present time.

M. MATSUI asked whether the Council had any objections to the Japanese Government repatriating the small number of Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in their hands.

(It was decided:

that there was no objection to the immediate repatriation of the Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war in Great Britain and Japan.)

5. SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council had just addressed a stiff note to the Rumanian Government which asked them, in effect, whether or not they were prepared to accept the guidance of the Supreme Council.⁶ He desired to call attention to the fact that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had not signed the Treaty of Peace with Austria or the Minorities Treaty. At the present time there was a ministerial crisis at Belgrade. He had hoped that the moderate element would come into power, but at the moment it looked as if the *intransigent* element were about to come into power. If the matter were brought to a head at the present time the effect would be to strengthen the hands of the elements in Yugo-Slavia who were most anxious to cooperate with the Allied and Associated Powers. He suggested that at an early date a communication be addressed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government inquiring whether or not they were prepared to sign the Treaties.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with the opinion of Sir Eyre Crowe and thought that action should be taken at once.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had prepared a rough draft of a note to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government.⁷ He did not mean that the draft should be accepted as final but he simply wished to refer it to his colleagues for their consideration as a possible basis of discussion.

⁶ Appendix B to HD-68, p. 583.

⁷ Appendix A to HD-73, p. 718.

Relations With
Serb-Croat-
Slovene
Government

6. MR. POLK said that at the meeting of the Council of the 11th October Marshal Foch had raised the question of two Commissions to deal with subjects relating to Russian prisoners of war in Germany. With reference to the resolution in the Minutes of the meeting in question (H.D. 68, Minute #4),^s he desired to make it quite clear that the United States could not be committed to incur any expense. No American representative on the Commissions in question, or on any other Commission, could commit his Government to a financial obligation. The matter would first have to be brought before the Council and receive his approval.

The Council took note of Mr. Polk's remarks with reference to Resolution No. 4, H.D. 68, to the effect that the American representative on the Commissions dealing with questions relating to Russian prisoners of war, and American representatives on all Commissions, could not bind their Government to financial obligations unless the subjects in question had been brought before the Supreme Council and received Mr. Polk's approval.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, 16 October, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-71

[*The Interallied Mission at Budapest to the Supreme Council*]

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

PARIS, FRANCE

TELEGRAM

Send via Check Date
22 VN Z 1139

From Budapest October 13-14-1919
To Supreme Council Peace Conference.
Paris.

Cold weather setting in, days delay now more serious than would have been weeks delay two months ago. Inter-Allied military mission therefore desires present Supreme Council following statement facts concerning conduct Roumanians with request for prompt action. They have so thoroughly cleaned out country of rolling-stock that there are not enough for transportation local food and fuel requirements. Their Administration reduced food reserve Budapest to one third what it was September. According report from Hungarian Food Minister

^s *Ante*, p. 579.

they have by unnecessary and cruel restriction prevented food from going out Budapest to neighboring suburbs, population which estimated six hundred thousand. Reported during evacuation trans Dunabia [*Danubia?*] they released Bolsheviks who been detained and in city Budapest have repeatedly by force without written order taken Bolsheviks prisoners out of jail. At Szolnok where committee this mission obtaining information about Roumanian exportations have arrested several Hungarian railway men who were aiding our efforts. Have prevented University students from reporting for continuation their courses. September 26th their commander in Chief sent letter to mission stating that to cover needs feeding Hungary, zone between Danube and Thies Rivers been placed at disposition Hungarian Government, no requisitions would take place that zone except those necessary for actual feeding troops, especially for city Budapest above zone be extended to East Thies to Boundary line fixed by Commander, despite which October 5th Roumanian Colonel Rujinschi seized thirty aeroplane motors Budapest which cannot classified as food. October 10th in Budapest from firm Schmitt and Tarsai they seized removed machinery which put two thousand laborers out work. Large number of similar cases with proof on hand. In reply to letter from mission that desired that objects National Museum be not disturbed until acted upon by committee they sent reply that intended take those and that signers letters Mardarescu and Diamandi assumed responsibility for action, this being in effect insult to nations represented on interallied military mission. That they did not take objects due fact doors sealed signed by President [of] Day at time and they afraid go to extreme breaking seal. Between five and six o'clock this morning they attempted arrest Prime Minister Friedrich and did arrest two Government officials result which President of Day in Person delivered General Mardarescu memorandum from mission copy which telegraphed Supreme Council this date. They kept their commander in chief General Mardarescu and High Commissioner Diamandi absent in Bucharest week during which no representative present with whom business could be transferred [*transacted?*]. Although they in August acknowledged InterAllied Military Mission as representing their superiors the Supreme Council, they have with negligible exceptions carried out none of instructions this mission and have always insisted acting as though Roumania equal or superior to nations represented on mission. They sent misleading reports Paris placing themselves attitude saviours of Hungary and have censored press in Hungary to extent that Hungarians could not refute false statement. On 19th September General Mardarescu wrote mission he taken all necessary measures make treatment of prisoners satisfactory, stating especially from sanitary viewpoint according report his surgeon general conditions very good. October 11th

Mission receives communication from International Red Cross representatives stating his investigations at Arad resulted discover[y] conditions so opposed to conventions covering treatment prisoners war that he felt this mission should take action. This [*His?*] conclusions which follow concur with all reports concerning same except Roumanian reports "I find that these prisoners were not captured on field battle but many days after cessation hostilities; that lodgings of prisoners are unsanitary; that army which captured them take no care of them whatever, furnishes them neither food, clothing, medicine, covering or anything; that from date their captivity prisoners had no funds and that majority cannot purchase anything for even insufficient nourishment. That prisoners treated contrary Article Nine General [*Geneva*] Convention 1906;⁹ that all these men are exposed to serious diseases if not properly aided; that orders given Red Cross at Arad to take care prisoners' needs entirely illegal and cannot be based upon any law or international convention." Dr. Munro British Food Commission and Swiss Captain Burnier International Red Cross just returned from visiting following towns: Hatvan, Gyonsgyons, Miskolcz, Satoralja Ujhely, Nyiregyháza, Dedreczen, Szolnok, Magycarad [*Nagykörrös?*], Békes, Gyula, Arad, Temesvar, and Szeged all in permanent portion Hungary but now occupied by Roumanians and have submitted statement from which following is extract "In all towns occupied by Roumanians we found oppression so great as to make life unbearable. Murder is common. Youths and women flogged. Imprisoned without trial, arrested without reason, theft of personal property under name of requisition. Condition of affairs prevails difficult for Western European realize who not seen and heard evidence. People forced take oath allegiance to Roumanian King; if refuse they persecuted. Experienced Hungarian doctors of hospitals been replaced by inexperienced Roumanian doctors. Roumanian Military authorities demand petition for every passport. Request for coal or food. Petitions must be written Roumanian language. Roumanian lawyer just been employed and charges enormous fees. Stationmaster Weber of Brad and Stationmaster Kétegyháza been fearfully flogged. Last Good Friday Roumanians advanced suddenly to Boros-Sebés and two hundred fifty Hungarian soldiers taken prisoners. These killed in most barbarous manner. Stripped naked and stabbed with bayonets in way to prolong life long as possible. Roumanians established custom house every village. Delivery permits only be obtained by payment ridiculously large sum. Commerce is impossible. People will soon starve. Deliberately for no military or political reasons apparent hospitals not allowed transport for coal and wood which already (Wire went out of commission here) paid for. Very life of hospital hangs on coal. Hospitals

⁹ Malloy, *Treaties, 1776-1909*, vol. II, p. 2183.

have [to be?] closed down entirely unless relieved immediately. Results be disastrous. Will be outbreaks all sorts contagious epidemic disease such [as?] typhus, typhoid, etc." An American officer and an Italian doctor if Roumanians permit will accompany International Red Cross representative on thorough investigation prisoners war camps. In general Roumanian conduct been such that this Mission been almost wholly unable carry out its instructions and there apparently no prospect immediate improvement. It is unanimous opinion of Mission that unless Roumanians immediately evacuate Hungary and make at least partial restitution in particular of rolling stock, machinery and much other property seized here there will result in short time extreme suffering from lack food and fuel and recrudescence of Bolshevism. This Mission therefore of unanimous opinion that either Roumanians should be forced evacuate Hungary at once and make restitution outlined or this Mission should be relieved.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION

7: 53 P. M., OCTOBER 14, 1919.

Appendix B to HD-71

GREEK DELEGATION
TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, October 10, 1919.

From: Mr. Politis,
To: M. Clemenceau.

You were kind enough to inform Mr. Venizelos, by your letter dated September 20th [30th?], that the Supreme Council had recognized that the Commission of Inquiry on the affairs of Smyrna could not with equity formulate its conclusions without having given full information to the Representative of the Greek Government and that, in consequence, it had decided "that the minutes of the Commission, including *depositions of the witnesses*, would be communicated to Colonel Mazarakis".¹⁰

You added that instructions to that effect had been sent by you to the Commission of Inquiry.

I regret exceedingly to have to inform your Excellency that the Commission on Inquiry did not conform with those instructions. Indeed, it limited itself to sending to Colonel Mazarakis a statement of the facts established by it without communicating to him the depositions of the witnesses regarding which it informed him by a letter dated October 7th that those depositions "had been made under the

¹⁰ HD-64, minute 6, p. 463.

promise of absolute secrecy and that it would be impossible for it to communicate them without breaking its promise."

Colonel Mazarakis replied, in conformity with the instructions of the Greek Government, that it was indispensable for him to see the whole dossier as the Supreme Council had decided.

I am informed that the promise referred to by the Commission was not taken with all the witnesses: to the Greek witnesses the Commission only recommended discretion without promising anything to them. However it may be, after having deprived the Representatives of the Greek Government of the right of legitimate defense prescribed by justice, the Commission of Inquiry, in spite of the instructions of the Supreme Council, has gone as far as to surround its procedure with an absolute secrecy, even as regards Colonel Mazarakis.

In the name of the Greek Government, I feel obliged to protest against that unjust and arbitrary decision and I appeal to the equity of the Supreme Council, so that, in conformity with its decision of December [*September*] 30th, the Commission of Inquiry be formally invited to communicate to Colonel Mazarakis the depositions of the witnesses, even if strictly confidential.

Please accept, etc.

POLITIS

Appendix C to HD-71

Note by the British Delegation

The Austrian Delegation has addressed an unofficial appeal to the British Delegation with a view to obtain the release of the Austrian prisoners of war in Great Britain.

The Austrian Delegation admits that Austria has no right to claim the release of these prisoners before the Treaty of Peace comes into force but justifies this appeal on the ground that prisoners belonging to other races of the former Austrian Empire, as well as German prisoners, are actually being released.

The Delegation suggests that, if this request is granted, the Austrian Government, being unable to provide the necessary means of transport for the repatriation of the prisoners, would, with the consent of the British authorities, endeavour to arrange with the German Government that these prisoners should be sent home together with the Germans.

The number of Austrian prisoners in England appears to be no more than thirty-six officers and one hundred and twenty-five non-commissioned officers and men.

15 OCTOBER, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, October 18, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Secretaries

M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de St. Quentin

ITALY

M. Tittoni

Secretaries

M. Paterno
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF..... Capt. G. A. Gordon.
BRITISH EMPIRE..... Capt. G. Lothian Small.
FRANCE..... M. Massigli.
ITALY..... M. Zanchi.

Interpreter.—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. E. L. Dresel
Dr. J. B. Scott
Capt. B. Winthrop.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Gen. Sackville-West
Mr. A. Leeper
Mr. Shearman
Mr. C. Tufton

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
M. Tardieu
Gen. Weygand
M. Laroche
M. Fromageot
M. Aubert
M. Escoffier

ITALY

Gen. Cavallero
M. Ricci-Busatti
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Pilotti

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a report presented by the Special Commission charged with determining the Composition of Interallied Forces of Occupation (See appendix "A").)

Composition of
the Interallied
Forces of
Occupation
Provided for
by the Treaty
With Germany

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the report. He called the attention of the Council to the reservations formulated by the Italian Military Representative and by the British Delegation. The Italian Military Representative felt that he ought to affirm again that his Government had only authorized the participation of three battalions destined for Upper Silesia. In the table prepared by the Commission the provision had been made for the employment of seven Italian battalions. He felt that he should add that in former Conferences the Italian Military Delegate had always expressed the same opinion on this point.

M. TITTONI pointed out that in fact he had always stated that his Government could only send three battalions.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that this decision meant imposing a heavy burden on the French. He took the liberty of insisting that M. Tittoni should reconsider the matter. It seemed to him that Italy, not being threatened on any frontier, could do at least something more. If she should persist in her refusal she would put the French in a most unfair situation.

M. TITTONI reserved the right to reconsider the question.

GENERAL WEYGAND added that the British Delegation had made two reservations: it had first been decided that Memel should be occupied by a British battalion and an American battalion; according to the revised table which the Council had before it the American battalion was to be sent to Upper Silesia to reinforce the United States forces there and was replaced at Memel by a French battalion. The British Delegate accepted this change on condition that the command should be held by a British officer.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this request was based on the same reasons which the British had always advanced. It was purely a question of organization and administration.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had no objection to the command at Memel being held by a British Officer.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the British Delegation also asked that all British troops forming part of the forces of occupation at

Dantzig, Marienwerder, Allenstein and Memel, should be treated as a single unit from an administrative point of view, although they were placed under different commands.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not see anything unreasonable in this request.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that no formal reservation had been made with respect to the American troops: but according to his conversations with General Bliss it seemed to him that one point still remained to be settled, namely, would the American Government authorize to the use of its troops before the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate?

MR. POLK observed that a cable had been sent on this subject and a reply was expected. All he could say for the moment was that the troops were on the way and were first to be sent to Coblenz. He wished to draw the Council's attention to another point. The Commission expressed the desire that in each zone of occupation the Presidency of the Interallied Commission and the command of the troops of occupation should be invested in individuals of the same nationality. Would it not be preferable with respect to the Interallied Commission that the Presidency would not be permanent but should rather be held in rotation by each nation represented.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that this was scarcely practicable.

GENERAL WEYGAND observed that some Commissions, such as the one in Upper Silesia, would have a rather long life—perhaps from eight to twenty months—while others would only exist for from three to six months. Under these conditions he did not think a system of alternation was feasible.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as far as he was concerned he attached so much importance to good feeling between Allies that he was quite willing to accede to Mr. Polk's suggestion.

MR. POLK said that he in no way insisted upon this, he was merely making a suggestion.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that each Interallied Commission might be left free to elect its own President.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that this question was distinct from that of the command of the military forces, which would be determined before the departure of the troops in conformity with the Commission's recommendations. He wished finally to call the Council's attention to a desire expressed by the Commission: It wished the departure of the Interallied Commissions and of the forces of occupation to be determined in such a way, and the date of the coming into force of the Treaty to be settled in such a fashion, that the Commissions and forces of occupation would arrive at their appointed destinations at the moment of the coming into force of the Treaty. The

Commission also wished the German Government to be advised beforehand of the date determined for the entry into force of the Treaty and its coincidence with the arrival of the Commissions and troops of occupation so that the German Government might take the necessary measures.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that the Allied General Staffs should therefore agree on the date when the troops could arrive at their appointed destinations: that would be date upon which, as far as military questions were concerned, the Treaty could come into force. He would inform the Council of this date.

It was decided:

(1) to accept the recommendations of the special Commission relative to the composition of Interallied forces of occupation (See Appendix "A"), with the reservation that the definite approval of the Italian Government should be obtained;

(2) that the command of the various forces of occupation should be exercised according to the recommendations of the Commission, and that, at Memel, a British officer should be in command;

(3) that although the British troops forming part of the forces of occupation at Dantzig, Marienwerder, Allenstein and Memel would be placed under different commands, they should, from an administrative point of view, be treated as a single unit;

(4) that the departure of the Commissions and of the forces of occupation should be regulated in such a way, and that the date of the entrance into force of the Treaty should be fixed in such a manner, that both the Commissions and the forces of occupation should arrive at their appointed destinations at the moment of the entrance into force of the treaty of Peace;

(5) that Marshal Foch, after agreeing with the Allied General Staffs, should inform the Supreme Council of the date from which they consider it possible for the Treaty to enter into force;

(6) that the German Government should be notified in advance of the date fixed for the entry into force of the Treaty and of its coincidence with the arrival of the Commissions and the forces of occupation, so that it might take all necessary measures within the proper time, and, especially to fix the date of evacuation of the districts in question by its own forces;

(7) That the Interallied Commissions sent into the zones of occupation should choose their own presidents, without it being necessary for them to be of the same nationality as the Commanding Officers in the corresponding zones of occupation.

Draft Note to
the Serb-Croat-
Slovene
Government

Sir George
Clerk's Mission
to Budapest

2. (The examination of this draft note was adjourned to the following session.)

3. M. BERTHELOT said that a telegram had just been received from the Interallied Mission at Budapest (See appendix "B"), stating that the Mission had learned by a private telegram of the sending of

Sir George Clerk to Budapest. The Mission asked that it receive official confirmation thereof and that Sir George Clerk's Mission might be defined. He submitted a draft telegram (See appendix "C") which would officially notify the Generals of Sir George Clerk's arrival and would define the Mission with which he was entrusted.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that in order to make the matter even more definite there should be added at the end of the first paragraph a sentence specifying that Sir George Clerk represented the Supreme Council in all political questions.

M. TITTONI said that he had no objection to this draft on the condition that it was well understood that the Generals were in no way superseded; it should be clear that Sir George Clerk had a special mission and the Generals should retain jurisdiction over all military questions.

M. BERTHELOT proposed that the following sentence should be added at the end of the first paragraph, "He will represent the Supreme Council in all political questions, the Generals retaining jurisdiction over military questions."

It was decided:

(1) to approve the draft telegram (See Appendix "C") to be sent to the Allied Generals at Budapest;

(2) to add to the end of the first paragraph of this draft telegram the following sentence;

"He will represent the Supreme Council in all political questions, the Military Mission retaining jurisdiction over military questions."

4. (The Council had before it a note from the drafting Committee dated October 16th, 1919, (See Appendix "D").)

**Italian Proposal
To Insert Certain
Articles in the
Treaty of Peace
With Hungary**

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented on the note of the Drafting Committee. With respect to page 3, Section C in this report:

MR. POLK raised the following questions: he asked if the question of restoration to Italy of rolling stock belonging to Italian Railroads was not within the jurisdiction of the Reparation Commission.

M. FROMAGEOT said this was not a question of reparations for war damages: it concerned in fact rolling stock which was on Austro-Hungarian territory at the outbreak of war and had been seized there.

MR. POLK, as a matter of information, asked if any disposition of this nature was provided for in the Treaty with respect to Austrian or Hungarian rolling stock which at the outbreak of war might have been on Italian territory.

M. FROMAGEOT stated that there was not.

It was decided :

In conformity with the recommendations of the Drafting Committee (See Appendix "D") to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary the following articles :

Article A.—Hungary renounces, in all that concerns her, in favor of Italy, all rights and titles to which she might lay claim over territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy recognized as forming part of Italy according to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Peace concluded September 10th, 1919 between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria.

Article B.—No payment is due on the part of Italy by reason of her taking possession of the Palazzo Venezia at Rome.

Article C.—Hungary will restore to Italy, within three months, all the rolling stock belonging to Italian railroads which, prior to the outbreak of war, has been transported into Austria and are at present in Hungary.

Article D.—In derogation of Article 269, Part X, (Economic Clauses), persons having their customary residence in the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy now transferred to Italy pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, and who, during the war, were without the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or had been imprisoned, interned or evacuated, will benefit fully by the provisions of Articles 252 and 253, Part X, (Economic Clauses).

Article E.—Judgments rendered in civil and commercial causes since August 4th, 1914, by courts of territories transferred to Italy, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, between inhabitants of the said territories and nationals of the former kingdom of Hungary, will only become executory after an exequatur rendered by the new corresponding court of the territories in question.

All judgments rendered since August 4th, 1914, by the judicial authorities of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy against Italian nationals or against those who shall acquire Italian nationality, pursuant to the Treaty of Peace with Austria, for political crimes or misdemeanors, will be deemed null and void."

5. (The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee dated October 17th, 1919 (See Appendix "E").)

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented on the note of the Drafting Committee. With respect to the eventual convocation of the Council of the League of Nations the following questions were raised :

MR. POLK asked if all the Powers which, when they should have ratified the Treaty of Peace would be represented in the Council of the League of Nations, would have to be represented at the first meeting of the Council? President Wilson had made it known that he was prepared to call a meeting of the Council for the three Powers which had ratified the Treaty, and he wished to know if the other powers had now to designate their representatives.

Putting Into
Force of the
Treaty With
Germany

M. FROMAGEOT explained that they did not have to, but that they could do so. This obligation would only arise for those Powers after they had ratified the Treaty. Nothing in the Treaty made the coming into force or the ratification thereof a condition precedent to these designations.

MR. POLK wished to know if this applied, for instance to Spain.

M. FROMAGEOT answered that Spain could designate its representative; that it was known, moreover, that she was ready to do so.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to know if the Treaty specified any quorum necessary to validate the meetings of the League of Nations. Would the absence of one of the members invalidate the Council's decision?

MR. POLK said that he did not think so.

M. TARDIEU said that there was no such provision in the Treaty.

MR. POLK asked if the Drafting Committee could prepare for Monday's meeting a draft form of convocation to be sent out by President Wilson to call the meeting of the Council.

M. FROMAGEOT resumed his commentaries on the note of the Drafting Committee.

M. TARDIEU explained that the second part of the Drafting Committee's note had to some extent duplicated the work of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty. This latter Committee, pursuant to the instructions it had received from the Supreme Council,¹ had drawn up a list of the Commission[s] to be formed, and had indicated what Powers had designated their representatives on these Commissions and what Powers had not yet done so.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that this latter report should be distributed and examined prior to the meeting of Thursday, October 23d: at this time each Power should designate the Commissioners which it had not yet named.

It was decided:

that the Drafting Committee should submit to the Supreme Council at its next meeting:

(1) the draft of a letter by which President Wilson should convoke the Council of the League of Nations for the day of the entry into force of the Treaty;

(2) the draft of a letter from the Supreme Council to each of the Powers represented in the Council of the League of Nations inviting them to designate forthwith their representatives on this Council, as France and Italy had already done.

6. (The Council had before it two draft protocols prepared by the Drafting Committee concerning, first, the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace signed between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, of the Protocols signed on the same day by the said Powers, and of the

¹ HD-70, minute 6, p. 645.

arrangement of the same date between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany relative to the occupation of the Rhineland (See Appendix "F"); secondly, the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty signed June 28th, 1919, between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland (See Appendix "G").

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that it was necessary to make a separate procès-verbal for each group of ratifications. It had likewise seemed important to the Committee that the hour of the signature should appear on the Procès-Verbaux. Indeed, that was an important point for the agents who would then be on the spot and who should be informed in advance or, at least, by telegram, of the hour the Treaty would come into force. In these protocols Germany for the last time signed in the last place: once this act had been accomplished she would sign in her alphabetical order. He drew the Council's attention to the great importance of having Czecho-Slovakia ratify the Treaty of Versailles before it should come into force. Czecho-Slovakia would be the only non-ratifying country having a common frontier with Germany. A situation might thus arise which might create difficulties with respect to the operation of the Delimitation Commission provided for by Article 83 of the Treaty.

It was decided:

to approve the draft procès-verbaux of Deposits of Ratifications prepared by the Drafting Committee with respect, first, to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, as well as of the Protocol signed on the same day by the said Powers, and of the Arrangement of the same date between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany, concerning the Rhineland (See Appendix "F"); secondly, to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty with Poland (See Appendix "G").

7. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation (See appendix "H") and a note of the Drafting Committee dated October 16th, 1919 (See Appendix "I").)

Operation of the
Plebiscite and
Delimitation
Commissions in
the Absence of
American
Representatives

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee. He explained that the question raised by M. Von Lersner only concerned the Delimitation and Plebiscite Commissions, but it was insidious, because the same argument might apply to far more important Commissions such as the Reparation Commission. If Germany might maintain that the Reparation Commission could only operate if a given power were represented thereon, a very dangerous situation would arise. Consequently the Drafting Committee recommended that all Commissions should be considered regularly constituted as soon as the Powers which had ratified the Treaty—and which consequently would then be obliged to be represented on these Commissions—and

the Powers which had agreed to send representatives before having ratified, should be represented. The latter Powers would be in a situation analogous to that of the Powers which were not parties to the Treaty but which, nevertheless, were by the Treaty accorded the right of designating representatives on different Commissions, such, for instance, as Holland and the Scandinavian States.

MR. POLK said that he had no objection to make to this solution but he wondered if the Germans could raise any.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that they would have no valid ground for contesting the vote of a member of a Commission designated by a Power which had not yet ratified the Treaty; when once the Treaty had come into force, the Commissions were composed of the representatives of the Powers specified in the Treaty. The Treaty nowhere provided that the representatives on the Commissions should be the representatives of Powers which had ratified.

M. TITTONI inquired if ratification and the right of being represented on Commissions should be considered in law as two distinct matters? He wished to know if the right of representation existed even in the absence of ratification, or was the foregoing only a provisional solution?

M. FROMAGEOT replied that the Drafting Committee considered the right of representation to be in law independent of ratification: the right of representation existed irrespective of ratification, whereas, on the other hand, the duty of being represented arose from ratification. But there was a second delicate point: what would happen if the Powers which had not ratified did not designate representatives? It seemed to the Drafting Committee that even in this case the decisions of the Commissions would be valid; if, in that event, the votes should be equal, the vote of the President of the Commission would be controlling as provided for in article 437 of the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the question had not been raised and wondered if the Germans would seek to raise trouble on this point.

M. TITTONI thought that if M. Fromageot's argument were legally sound, the reply to his question was impliedly contained therein: with regard to the Powers which had ratified, and which thereby came under the obligation of naming representatives on the Commissions, there was no doubt that they must send representatives in order to validate the decisions of these Commissions; on the other hand, if the Powers which merely had the option of naming representatives did not make use thereof, that fact would in no wise affect the validity of the decisions of the Commissions, and the latter could operate legally.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired whether Germany should be informed of the foregoing point of view before she had raised any question with respect thereto.

M. FROMAGEOT saw no necessity of replying and thought that there was nothing to be gained by divulging these arguments.

M. TITTONI expressed the desire that M. Fromageot should give the Council a confidential report containing the legal development of this argument.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that this would be a purely academic document, but he had no objection to M. Fromageot giving it to M. Tittoni.

M. FROMAGEOT inquired whether his Committee should reply on the first point to M. Von Lersner?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it should send a note to M. Dutasta.

M. DUTASTA remarked that M. Von Lersner made no secret of the fact that public opinion in Germany would be greatly disturbed if America were not represented on the different Commissions until the Senate had ratified the Treaty.

Mr. POLK doubted whether, under M. Fromageot's plan, America would be represented.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he recalled distinctly that President Wilson, after some hesitation, had agreed that the United States would be represented on the Reparation Commission.²

Mr. POLK pointed out that this was only unofficial. Prior to ratification the United States was not authorized to be officially represented; he very much doubted whether, in view of the political situation, the United States would insist as a matter of right on having official representation on these Commissions prior to ratification. If Mr. Wilson spoke of American representation on the Reparation Commission he only meant representation after ratification.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

(It was decided:

A—(1) to approve the principles contained in the note of the Drafting Committee relative to the question put by Baron von Lersner (See Appendix "I");

(2) that the Drafting Committee should send to the Secretary General of the Conference a note refuting the argument presented by Baron von Lersner in the course of his interview with M. Dutasta.)

8. M. TARDIEU read the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on October 15th (See H. D. 70).³ The reply to the first two paragraphs of this resolution was contained in M. Fromageot's report; there remained the last question: what was the value of the means of action placed at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers by the Treaty of Peace compared with those available by virtue of the Armistice? Under the Armistice the available means were:

Measures To Be Taken Immediately Upon the Coming Into Force of the Treaty

² IC-170Q, minute 2, vol. v, p. 72.

³ Minute 6, p. 645.

- (1) the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and the bridge-heads;
- (2) the right of occupying that portion of the neutral zone from north of Cologne to the Dutch frontier;
- (3) the occupation of the bridgehead at Kehl (measures to that effect had been taken);
- (4) resumption of hostilities after forty-eight hours notice;
- (5) the maintenance of the blockade;
- (6) the retention of prisoners of war.

The coming into force of the Treaty would deprive us of the possibility of resuming hostilities; it deprived us of the weapon of blockade insofar as general measures were concerned, since the American Government did not seem disposed to admit the principle of a pacific blockade; finally, we lost the right of occupying the neutral zone to the north of Cologne. With the Treaty in force, if Germany committed hostile acts, the Covenant of the League of Nations would come into play. If, on the other hand, Germany limited itself to acts of passive resistance, Articles 12 to 18 of the Covenant would come into operation and the Council of the League of Nations would take such measures as it deemed fit. Finally, the occupation of the bridgeheads gave us another means of action. The Treaty of Peace likewise allowed us, which was not true of the Armistice, to disarm Germany and to stop the manufactures and the recruiting which she was carrying on at the present moment. He added that whatever judgment might be passed on the reply of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty, its value was only relative, for the period of decision was necessarily a very short one.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to know what the attitude would be with respect to the clauses of the Armistice which had not been fulfilled. Could their fulfilment be exacted?

M. TARDIEU replied that the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty had not considered this question. He, personally, was of the opinion that if the Treaty should be put into force without previously demanding the fulfilment of these clauses there would be no ground for such a demand after the Treaty's coming into force. If it were desired that certain clauses should be fulfilled by Germany a demand to that effect should be made before the Treaty came into force.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired what causes Sir Eyre Crowe had in mind.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that he was thinking of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.

M. TARDIEU said that if the fulfilment of the Armistice clauses which had not been carried out was desired, the only efficacious means of action should be used, namely, an advance into Germany.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that this would be rather difficult after the Treaty had been ratified.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked the Drafting Committee to submit at the next meeting of the Council a report on this question, having especially in mind the situation in the Baltic Provinces.

(It was decided :

(1) that the Drafting Committee should present to the Supreme Council at its next meeting a report as to whether, after the coming into force of the Treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers would have the right to demand the fulfilment of Clauses of the Armistice which had not been executed, in particular, the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces;

(2) that the Drafting Committee should point out in its report the affirmative means of action of which the Allied and Associated Governments might avail themselves in order to insure the fulfilment of these clauses after the coming into force of the Treaty.)

9. M. TARDIEU said that at its meeting of July 28th ⁴ the Council had approved a recommendation of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty and had decided to create a Committee to coordinate questions relative to the interpretation and the execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany. Up to the present moment the British Empire and Japan had alone designated their representatives on this Committee. It would be well for the United States, France and Italy to designate their representatives on this Committee.

M. TRITONI proposed that the Powers should have the right to designate an alternate delegate in case their principal delegate should not be able to sit.

(It was decided :

(1) that the United States, France and Italy should as soon as possible designate their representatives on the Committee for the coordination of questions concerning the interpretation and execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany;

(2) that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers might designate alternate delegates who, if necessary, should replace their delegates on this Committee.)

10. SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the allowance for members of the Commissions of Control and of Delimitation had been fixed, but that nothing had been decided for the members of the Plebiscite Commissions. He suggested that the question should be referred to a special Committee.

Allowances for
Members of the
Plebiscite
Commissions

⁴ HD-17, minute 1, vol. VII, p. 356.

(It was decided :

that a subcommittee of the Committee on the execution of the Treaty should determine the allowances to be granted to the personnel of the Plebiscite Commissions, after having consulted representatives of these Commissions.)

11. MARSHAL FOCH stated that the reply of the German Government to the last Note of the Allied and Associated Powers relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces⁵ had just reached him, and that it would be sent that day to the various delegations. The German Government accepted the sending of an Allied General Officer as had been proposed in the Note of the Allied and Associated Powers. In view of the great importance of hastening in every way the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, he recommended that the Council should at once designate this General Officer, and he proposed the name of General Mangin.

Evacuation of
the Baltic
Provinces

(It was decided :

that General Mangin should be charged by the Allied and Associated Powers with the duty,

(1) of ascertaining from the German Government the measures taken by it with a view to regulating the conditions of evacuation, and of proposing to that Government the measures which he himself should deem proper;

(2) of exercising on the spot an effective control over the execution of these measures.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, October 18, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-72

[Report by the Special Commission Charged With Determining the Composition of Interallied Forces of Occupation]

In accordance with the resolution of October 15,⁶ Marshal Foch has the honor to address the following proposals to the Supreme Council, concerning the composition of the Interallied occupation contingent in the territories which, by the terms of the Peace Treaty, may or must be occupied by Interallied contingents. These proposals were studied :

⁵ Appendices D and E to HD-67, pp. 546 and 547.

⁶ HD-70, minute 4, p. 642.

For:	UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN	FRANCE	ITALY
By:	General Bliss	Sir Eyre Crowe Gen. Sackville- West.	Mr. Laroche Gen. Wey- gand	Count Vannutelli Gen. Cavallero

The principles of distribution proposed for the Allied contingents are as follows

- equality of expenses and responsibilities among the Powers, account being taken of their totality;
- predominance in each zone of the contingents belonging to the Power which insures the Command in that zone, the other Powers being represented by a smaller contingent.
- no contingent shall be less than one battalion; consequently in certain zones, two powers only will participate in the occupation.

The table hereto annexed gives the composition of the occupation contingents and their distribution among the Allied and Associated Powers.

It is desirable that, in each zone, the Presidency of the Commission and the Command of occupation forces be exercised by personalities belonging to the same nation, without making this condition compulsory in every instance.

We have the honor to submit to the Supreme Council the opinion that it would be advisable, in order to insure the execution of the Treaty under the most favorable circumstances:

1st) on one hand, to arrange for the departure of the Commissions and the occupation troops.

on the other hand, to fix the date of the entry into force of the Treaty, in order that the Commissions and occupation troops may reach their destinations at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty.

2nd) to advise the German Government, prior to the date fixed for the entry into force and of the coinciding with that entry into force and the arrival of the Commissions and the occupation troops in order that the German Government be in a position to take all the necessary dispositions, and in particular to fix the date for the evacuation of the territories by its own forces.

NOTE.—The Italian Military Delegates, although having participated in the study of the distribution provided for in the present plan, deems it expedient to affirm that the Italian Government has authorized the participation of only three battalions destined for Upper Silesia.

[Annex]

COMPOSITION OF THE INTERALLIED OCCUPATION CONTINGENTS

	Strength Necessary *	Distribution between the Allied and Associated Powers				Command	Observations
		Great Britain	United States	France	Italy		
Upper Silesia.....	18	3	3	7	5	French..... American.....	In case of troubles, the first reinforcement battalion to be sent to Teschen will be taken from the British troops in Upper Silesia
Teschen.....	3		1	1	1		
Dantzig.....	4	2	1	1		British..... Italian.....	No proposal is made on account of the special character of the exclusively military occupation of Memel.
Marienwerder.....	2	1			1		
Allenstein.....	4	3	1			British..... Undetermined.....	
Memel.....	2	1	1				
Schleswig.....	3	1	1	1		British.....	
Total.....	36	11	8	10	7		

*The strength of the contingents is indicated in battalions, it being understood that the strength of one battalion is to be maintained at from 600 to 800 men.

Artillery—In the zones where artillery is necessary (Upper Silesia, Dantzig) the proportion of artillery will be 1 battery for each regiment.

Machine guns—Shall be included in the organization of the battalions, or shall be formed into separate companies according to the army organizations. [Footnote in the original.]

Memorandum

**MODIFICATION PROPOSED CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
CONTINGENTS**

The French Representatives propose to the American, British and Italian Representatives that in modification of what was decreed on October 16, one French battalion be located in Memel in place of the American battalion provided for, this latter to proceed to Upper Silesia to replace the French battalion retired.

If this proposal is approved, the annexed table should be substituted for the table annexed to the report.

[Annex]

COMPOSITION OF THE INTERALLIED OCCUPATION CONTINGENTS

	Strength Necessary*	Distribution between the Allied and Associated Powers				Command	Observations
		Great Britain	United States	France	Italy		
Upper Silesia.....	18	3	4	6	5	French..... American.....	In case of troubles, the first reinforcement battalion to be sent to Teschen will be taken from the British troops in Upper Silesia.
Teschen.....	3		1	1	1		
Danzig.....	4	2	1	1		British..... Italian.....	No proposal is made on account of the special character of the exclusively military occupation of Memel.
Marienwerder.....	2	1			1		
Allenstein.....	4	3	1			British..... Undetermined.....	
Memel.....	2	1		1			
Schleswig.....	3	1	1	1		British.....	
Total.....	36	11	8	10	7		

*The strength of the contingents is indicated in battalions, it being understood that the strength of one battalion is to be maintained at from 600 to 800 men.

Artillery—In the zones where artillery is necessary (Upper Silesia, Danzig) the proportion of artillery will be 1 battery for each infantry regiment.

Machine guns—Shall be included in the organization of the battalions, or shall be formed into separate companies according to the army organizations. [Footnote in the original.]

Appendix B to HD-72

Telegram

From: Interallied Military Commission.

To: Supreme Council, Peace Conference, Paris.

No. 841

BUDAPEST, October 17, 1919.

The Commission has just learned, through a telegram addressed to one of its members, of the early arrival at Budapest of Sir George Clerk, supplied with full powers. It requests that this designation be officially confirmed by the Supreme Council and to clearly specify just what shall be the respective attributions of the Commission on one hand, and of Sir George Clerk on the other.

Appendix C to HD-72

Telegram From the Supreme Council to the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest

OCTOBER 18, 1919.

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has decided to send Sir George Clerk to Budapest as its special representative. Sir George Clerk is directed to establish relations with the

various Hungarian political parties and to inform M. Friedrich of the views of the Supreme Council concerning the conditions which must be fulfilled by a Hungarian government capable of maintaining order, of instituting elections and of concluding peace with the Allies. He will represent the Supreme Council in all political questions, the Interallied Military Mission retaining jurisdiction of military questions.

The special political mission of Sir George Clerk in no wise modifies the general mission of a military nature with which the Allied Generals were entrusted by the confidence of the Supreme Council. Sir George Clerk will inform the Generals of the deliberations taken by the Supreme Council pursuant to their last communications, and, in particular, their telegrams under date of October 13th and 14th.⁷ He will inform them that the Council has decided to take all the measures necessary to force the Roumanian Government to follow the line of conduct which it was requested to adopt.

POLK
Am[erican] Mission

Appendix D to HD-72⁸

*Drafting Committee Note on the Italian Proposal Concerning the
Peace Conditions With Hungary*

OCTOBER 16, 1919.

The extent of the Italian proposition, such as this proposition is presented, appears to be the following:

1st—To assure the renunciation of Hungary, in favor of Italy, to all rights and titles, to which Hungary might have pretensions on the Austrian territories or on the Austro-Hungarian territories (that is, the territories placed up to this time under the undivided sovereignty of Austria and of Hungary) attributed to Italy in accordance with the Austrian Treaty and supplementary treaties.

If, as explained by the Italian Delegation, Hungary has never abandoned her pretensions over certain parts of the Austrian territories, properly speaking, attributed to Italy, it is important to end the matter. Furthermore, if among the territories attributed to Italy according to the Austrian Treaty, there are Austro-Hungarian territories, it is necessary to provide for a renunciation on the part of Hungary as well as on the part of Austria.

On the first point, the Italian proposal appears, therefore, justified. It is none the less so concerning the other States born of the dismem-

⁷ Appendix A to HD-71, p. 678.

⁸ Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 185.3131/4.

berment of the former Monarchy or grantees of the Austrian or Austro-Hungarian territories. The provisions already adopted provide for this (see Articles 37, 40 and 45 of the Peace Conditions with Hungary).

The Drafting Committee proposes therefore to further provide, as far as Italy is concerned, by the following provisions:

“That Hungary renounces, in so far as she is concerned, in favor of Italy, all rights and titles to which she might have pretensions on the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, now recognized as being a part of Italy, in accordance with Article 36, alinea 1st, of the Peace Treaty, concluded the 10th of September, 1919 between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria.”

2nd—That a renunciation on the part of Hungary be stipulated at this time over all rights and titles on Hungarian territories which are not yet, but which will perhaps subsequently be, attributed to Italy.

Concerning the second point, the proposal appears premature. It will be justified only in the event of a decision of the Supreme Council attributing these Hungarian territories to Italy.

3rd—To stipulate that concerning Hungary, even in case no Hungarian territory would be attributed to Italy, Italy will enjoy the same right which she now enjoys in relation to Austria by virtue of the special Section concerning Italy (Articles 36 to 45 of the Austrian Treaty).

This third point gives rise to the following remarks:

a) It is perfectly natural to have a provision inserted in the Hungarian Treaty in favor of Italy corresponding to that of Article 40 of the Austrian Treaty, and stipulating that no sum shall be due from Italy by virtue of her entry into possession of the “Palazzo Venezia” in Rome. As long as the acquisition under gratuitous title was admitted, and that in fact the structure was Austro-Hungarian property, it is important to stipulate a similar clause with Hungary as with Austria, that is:

“No sum shall be due from Italy by virtue of her entry into possession of the ‘Palazzo Venezia’ in Rome.”

b) Articles 38, 39, 41, 43 and 44 of the Italian section of the Austrian Treaty refer exclusively to the territories attributed to Italy and to the state of affairs created by the transfer of sovereignty. The Drafting Committee was unanimous in deciding that these provisions were not applicable as concerns Hungary.

c) Article 42 of the said section of the Austrian Treaty stipulates that Austria is obligated to restore to Italy the Italian cars which had entered Austria prior to the war and not yet returned to Italy.

The Italian Delegation points out that among these cars which entered Austria a considerable number at the present time are in

Hungary and that, in consequence, their restoration should be stipulated concerning Hungary, as was done with Austria.

The Drafting Committee therefore proposes a provision as follows:

“Hungary shall restore to Italy within a period of three months, all the cars belonging to the Italian railroads, which, prior to the war, had entered Austria and are at the present time in Hungary.”

d) Articles 37 to 45 of the Italian section of the Austrian treaty deal with the methods of procedure or analogous questions.

Article 37 protects the inhabitants of the territories attributed to Italy, in accordance with the Treaty of St. Germain, against certain foreclosures or limitations, which, without such provision, might be found applicable, in cases where these persons were, during the war, absent, evacuated, interned or imprisoned.

As was pointed out by the Italian Delegation, there would be, if not a direct contradiction, at least a peculiarity difficult to explain, if the same person, having been the object of measures of coercion, obtained protection against the consequences of this measure as concerns Austria, and not as concerns Hungary, especially if it is considered that very often during the war orders were given which were common both to Austria and to Hungary.

Consequently, the Drafting Committee proposes to reproduce as follows, in the Hungarian Treaty, Article 37 of the Austrian Treaty, by specifying clearly that the question concerns the territories attributed to Italy in accordance with Art. 36, alinea 1 of the Treaty of St. Germain.

“By derogation of Article 269, Part X (Economic Clauses), persons having their habitual residence within the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, transferred to Italy in conformity with Article 36, alinea 1, of the Peace Treaty with Austria, and who, during the war were outside of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, or had been interned, imprisoned, or evacuated, shall integrally enjoy the advantages of the dispositions provided for in Articles 252, and 253, Part X, (Economic Clauses). [”]

Article 45, in its first alinea, provides that the judgments rendered in civil and commercial affairs subsequent to August 4, 1914, (date of the declaration of Italian neutrality) between the inhabitants of the territories attributed to Italy and the Austrians, or between these inhabitants and the Germans, Bulgarians and Turks, by the courts of the said territories shall be executory only after exequatur by Italian tribunals replacing the tribunals in which the judgments were rendered.

It could not be understood why the same measures be not taken, concerning similar cases, when the judgments were rendered between the said inhabitants and Hungarians. In other words, the Hungarian

nationals should be treated, on the ceded territories as are the Austrians, Germans and Bulgarians and Turks.

Alinea 2 of the same Article annuls the judgments rendered, in political affairs against the Italians, by the Austro-Hungarian judiciary authorities, including those persons becoming Italian by virtue of the Treaty with Austria.

When it is considered that very often, as was mentioned above, the trials and condemnations took place by virtue of orders, common to the two parties to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, it is difficult to explain why a similar provision be not taken mutually concerning each one of the two parties of the former Monarchy, that is to say toward Hungary as toward Austria.

Referring to alineas 3, 4, and 5 of the said Article 45 of the Austrian Treaty, their provisions have a special bearing concerning Austria, and the relations between the Austrian and Italian judiciary authorities, as a result of the transfer of sovereignty. They do not appear, therefore, to apply in the Treaty with Hungary.

The Drafting Committee proposes, therefore, to insert in the Hungarian Treaty an article corresponding with the first two alineas of Article 45 of the Austrian Treaty, as follows:

“1st—The judgments rendered in civil and commercial affairs, subsequent to August 4, 1914, by the tribunals of the territories transferred to Italy, in accordance with Article 36, alinea 1, of the Peace Treaty with Austria, between the inhabitants of the said territories, and nationals of the former kingdom of Hungary, shall be executory only after exequatur pronounced by the new corresponding tribunal in the territories in question.”

“2nd—All judgments rendered subsequent to August 4, 1914, by the judiciary authorities of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy against Italian nationals, including those to whom Italian nationality shall be acquired in conformity with the Treaty of Peace with Austria, for crimes or political misdemeanors, shall be considered null and void.”

For the Drafting Committee,
HENRI FROMAGEOT

Appendix E to HD-72

[Note From the Drafting Committee]

As the Treaty provides that, without delay, German sovereignty over certain territories be transferred either to the League of Nations or to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and as certain measures must be taken either by the Council of the League of Nations or by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, it is necessary that on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty the necessary organisms be ready to exercise the functions for which the League of

Nations, or the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, will be, from that time, responsible.

1st—Concerning the League of Nations, nothing can be regularly done except by the Council. However, the Council itself cannot exist legally and act regularly until after the entry into force of the Treaty.

In order to obviate the difficulties which could result from that situation, the following procedure could be used as a base :

1st—by the terms of Article 5 of the Convention, the President of the United States is to convoke the first meeting of the Council. Nothing in the text opposes the convocation before the entry into force of the Treaty or before ratification by the United States. On this latter point, in fact, if, in default of ratification by the United States, the President is not obliged to make this convocation, it is none the less true, in any case, that he has received the authority from the contracting powers to do so.

The President of the United States, therefore, should be requested, at once, to convoke the Council of the League of Nations for the day of the entry into force of the Treaty, that is to say, for the day of the first deposit of the ratifications, in adding that the date shall be later specified.

The convocation should be made for the same place as the depositing of the ratifications, that is, in Paris, and should be addressed to each one of the Powers represented in the Council, that is, to the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and to Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece.

2nd—At the present time each one of the said Powers represented on the Council should be invited by the Supreme Council to designate its representative without delay, as has already been done by France and Italy.

Here also, nothing in the Treaty subordinates these designations to the entry into force or to the preliminary ratifications of the Treaty.

3rd—To meet as soon as possible, in a non-official meeting in the presence of the General Secretary of the Council, Sir Eric Drummond, in which should be represented the members of the Council of the League of Nations designated by the Powers. During this meeting unofficial decisions should be made concerning all the measures tending to insure, as soon as the entry into force of the Treaty, the execution of the obligations immediately incumbent upon the League of Nations, i. e. :

a) Provide for the government and the fixing of the boundaries of the Saar Basin, that is, designation of the Commission and formulating of instructions to be given it—designation of the delimitation commission;

b) Designation of the High Commissioner to Dantzig, and instructions to be given him;

c) Sending, immediately and unofficially, of these agents to their posts, in order that they may be ready to take up their duties officially upon the day and hour of the entry into force of the Treaty.

4th—Upon the day and hour fixed for the filing of the ratifications and consequently, for the entry into force of the Treaty: Official meeting of the Council of the League of Nations which, from that time, shall exist legally—legalization of the measures taken unofficially—issuance of orders to agents previously sent to their posts, to immediately assume their duties.

On this same day, invitations to adhere to the League of Nations, as has already been decided, should be sent to the third Powers enumerated in the Convention.

5th—Concerning the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, from the present moment it appertains to the Supreme Council to take, if such has not already been done, all measures necessary to insure the execution of the obligations which are incumbent on it by the entry into force of the Treaty, or at least in the few days following; that is, notably:

a) Provide for the Government of Memel-Dantzig and the German Colonies.

b) Civil High Commission to the occupied Rhenish countries.

c) Plebiscite Commission: Upper Silesia-Eastern Prussia (Allenstein)—Western Prussia (Marienwerder)—Schleswig;

d) Delimitation Commissions: Belgium—Czecho-Slovakia (Ratibor)—Poland—Dantzig—including the High Commissioner;

e) Supervision Commissions: military, naval and Aeronautic;

f) Commission on the demolition of Heligoland;

g) Prisoners of war Commission;

h) Reparations Commission;

i) River Commissions: Rhine, Danube, Elbe, and Oder;

j) List of those accused of crimes and misdemeanors against the rights of people.

k) Where necessary, the sending, immediately and unofficially, of these agents to their posts, in order that they may be ready to take up their duties officially upon the day and hour of the entry into force of the Treaty.

For the Drafting Committee,
HENRI FROMAGEOT

OCTOBER 17, 1919.

Appendix F to HD-72

Procès-Verbal

of the deposit of ratifications of the Peace Treaty signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala,

Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Serb, Croat, Slovene State, Siam, Czecho-Slovak State, and Uruguay, on the one hand,—and Germany on the other; as well as of the following acts: the Protocol, signed the same day by the said Powers, the Arrangement of the same date by the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany concerning the occupation of Rhenish territories.

In execution of the final clauses of the Peace Treaty signed at Versailles, on June 28, 1919, the undersigned assembled at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Paris, to proceed with the deposit of the ratifications and to deliver them to the French Republic.

The instruments of the ratifications or notifications of their sending by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, i. e.:

of the British Empire, for the Peace Treaty, the Protocol and the Arrangement;

of France, for the Peace Treaty, the Protocol and the Arrangement;

of Italy, for the Peace Treaty and the Protocol;

and of the Allied and Associated Powers, following, i. e.:

of Belgium, for the Peace Treaty, the Protocol and the Arrangement;

of Poland, for the Peace Treaty and the Protocol;

of Siam for the Peace Treaty and the Protocol (the Instrument to be delivered later)

as well as of Germany, for the Peace Treaty, the Protocol and the arrangement,

were produced and having been, after examination, found to be in good and due form, are confided to the Government of the French Republic, to remain deposited in its archives.

In accordance with the provisions of the final clauses above cited, the French Government will notify the contracting Powers of the depositing of the instruments of subsequent ratifications by the States which are signatories of the said Treaty, Protocol and Arrangement, and which are not in position at this time to conform with this formality.

In witness whereof, the undersigned have drawn up the present Procès-Verbal, and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Paris, the day of 1919

at o'clock.

Signed: GREAT BRITAIN

“ FRANCE

“ ITALY

“ BELGIUM

“ POLAND

“ SIAM

“ GERMANY

Appendix G to HD-72

Procès-Verbal

of the deposit of the Ratifications of the Treaty signed at Versailles, on June 28, 1919, between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Poland.

In execution of the final clauses of the Treaty signed at Versailles, on June 28, 1919, between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Poland, the undersigned assembled at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris to proceed with the deposit of the Ratifications and their delivery to the Government of the French Republic.

The Instruments of Ratification :

Of the British Empire,
Of France,
Of Italy, and
Of Poland

were submitted and having been, after examination, found to be in good and due form, are confided to the Government of the French Republic to remain deposited in its archives.

In accordance with the provisions of the final clauses above cited, the French Government will notify the contracting Powers of the deposit of the ratifications.

In witness whereof, the undersigned have drawn up the present *procès-verbal* and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Paris, this . . . day of 1919
at . . . o'clock.

Signed: GREAT BRITAIN,
FRANCE,
ITALY,
POLAND.

 Appendix H to HD-72

PEACE CONFERENCE

Note From the French Delegation

In the course of a call made on October 13th, by Baron von Lersner to Mr. Dutasta, Baron von Lersner called Mr. Dutasta's attention to the fact that the Treaty of Versailles provided for the designation of American Commissioners to take part in the Delimitation and Plebiscite Commissions. He intimated that, in case the American Commissioners might not be designated before the ratification of the Treaty by the United States of America, the Allied

and Associated Governments should come to an understanding at the present time with the German Government with a view to the examination of the consequences which might result from this situation and avoid the possibility that the Commissions might be unable to be formed within the time specified.

The questions shall be submitted to the Supreme Council during the next session.

In view of this deliberation, the Secretary General of the Peace Conference has requested the Drafting Committee to kindly give their views on the point of law introduced by the President of the German Delegation.

Appendix I to HD-72

Note From the Drafting Committee on the Question Introduced by Baron von Lersner Regarding the Functioning of Plebiscite and Delimitation Commissions Pending the Appointment of American Representatives

All Commissions to be constituted by the Allied and Associated Powers shall be duly composed and shall function regularly with the representatives designated by the Powers having ratified the Treaty or who, without having ratified, have agreed to proceed with the designation of a representative to the Commission.

If all the Powers, whose representation is provided for in the Treaty, have not designated their representatives at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty, the decisions taken by the Commission shall be none the less valid. And if, in like cases, there is an equality of votes, the procedure should be as is provided for in Article 437 of the Treaty.

For the Drafting Committee,
HENRI FROMAGEOT

OCTOBER 16, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, October 20, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Percin

ITALY
M. Tittoni
Secretaries
M. Paterno
Don Ascanio Colonna

JAPAN
M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Capt. G. A. Gordon
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. G. Lothian Small
FRANCE	M. Massigli
ITALY	M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF
General Bliss
Dr. J. B. Scott
Capt. B. Winthrop

BRITISH EMPIRE
Gen. Sackville-West
Mr. Groves
Mr. Fuller
Mr. A. Leeper
Mr. Malkin

FRANCE
General Belin
General Le Rond
M. Tirard
Colonel Roye
M. Fromageot
M. Escoffier

ITALY
M. Ricci-Busatti
Gen. Cavallero

JAPAN
M. Shigemitsu

1. M. PICHON desired to refer to the minutes of the meeting of the Council of October 16th (See H. D. 71, Minute 1),¹ and read the following question of Mr. Polk (English Text, page 5) :

Reference to
HD-71, Minute 1,
October 16, 1919

"MR. POLK said that he hoped that the matter could be cleared up. He wished to ask whether the rifles were to be delivered to the Hungarian police at the present time and whether the Roumanian forces were to withdraw at the present time, whatever the Government in Hungary might be.

M. PICHON replied in the affirmative."

He stated that he wished to make his position clear in this respect. He meant that he agreed that the rifles in question were to be delivered to the Hungarian *gendarmerie* at the present time, but with reference to the withdrawal of the Roumanians he felt that this matter should wait upon the receipt of a reply to the Council's note to the Roumanian Government² and upon the report to be made by Sir George Clerk. He felt that this was the sense of the whole discussion.

MR. POLK said that he understood that the Council and the Allied Generals had already directed the Roumanians to withdraw and that, therefore, there was no reason to have their withdrawal wait upon the receipt of a reply to the Council's note to the Roumanian Government, or upon a report from Sir George Clerk.

M. PICHON said that he only wanted to make his own opinion clear.

MR. POLK desired to ascertain the Council's opinion. The Allied Generals had directed the Roumanians to withdraw and they had been supported in this action by the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that a demand for withdrawal was contained in the note sent to the Roumanian Government and that the Council were awaiting an answer thereto.

M. PICHON replied that this was so, but thought that it was important to receive the reply of the Roumanian Government in order to know what it would be most practical to do.

MR. POLK pointed out that the Roumanians had been directed to withdraw prior to the sending of the note. He read from the minutes of the meeting the question asked by him, above referred to, and explained that what he meant was that it was the duty of the Roumanians to withdraw at once without waiting for any conference with Sir George Clerk.

2. (The Council had before it a draft communication of the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government relative to the

¹ Ante, p. 668

² Appendix B to HD-68, p. 583

signature of Peace with Austria (See Appendix "A").)

Communication
to the Serb-
Croat-Slovene
Government
Relative to the
Signature of
Peace With
Austria

MR. POLK stated that he wished to read the draft note to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government in order to satisfy himself as to questions of form only, and that he would communicate his conclusions thereupon to Sir Eyre Crowe later in the day.

It was decided:

to approve the draft communication from the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government relative to the signature of peace with Austria (See Appendix "A"), subject to the reservation that Mr. Polk would examine this draft further with reference to questions of form and would communicate his conclusions to Sir Eyre Crowe.

3. SIR EYRE CROWE said that it had been reported to him that as a result of the situation at Riga the Allied Naval Armistice Commission had decided temporarily to stop the movement of all German ships in the Baltic. Formerly it was necessary to obtain the Commission's permission for German ships to navigate but the Commission now proposed to suspend the granting of all such permissions. He wished to know if the Supreme Council agreed to this action.

Action of
Allied Naval
Armistice Com-
mission Result-
ing From the
Situation at
Riga

M. PICHON said that the Council would take note of it.

MR. POLK inquired whether this would apply to all German ships in the Baltic regardless of where they might be.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that this was the case, the reason being that if ships were allowed to go out of the harbors where they now were there was no telling what their destination might be.

MR. POLK felt that if the Armistice Commission had taken such action it was quite all right.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that a British ship had been fired on by the Germans and twice hit.

(The council noted with approval the action of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.)

4. (The Council had before it a report from the Supreme War Council relative to supplies to be furnished the Polish Army (See Appendix "B").)

GENERAL BELIN stated that the Council had agreed on all the points embraced in this report, with the reservation by the American Representative to the effect that his Government could at the present moment not participate in any way in furnishing supplies to Poland.

M. TITTONI observed that a Polish Committee for the purchase of war material had been in contact with his Government and he hoped that the participation by Italy in the furnishing of supplies recom-

Report From
the Supreme
War Council
Relative to Aid
To Be Given to
Polish Army

mended under the terms of the War Council's report would not interrupt the activities of this Polish Purchasing Committee in Italy.

GENERAL BELIN observed that the same situation existed in France. General Le Rond called attention to the deficiency which would exist even if the recommendations contained in the report of the Supreme War Council were fully carried out. Marshal Foch had made it clear that 600,000 sets of warm clothing were urgently necessary for the Polish Army. The Marshal had shown that it was a political as well as a military necessity to furnish this clothing immediately to the Polish Army but it now appeared that only 200,000 sets of warm clothing could possibly be sent to the Polish Army; likewise, it was evident that no Power could supply sufficient rolling stock to Poland in accordance with the recommendations of the report. Anything that any Power might be able to do over and above the contribution allotted to it by this report would be of the greatest possible benefit. The gravest problem necessarily was that of clothing; if the Polish Army did not receive partially adequate clothing before the setting in of a rigorous winter it was extremely liable to become imbued with the dangerous revolutionary doctrines by which they were surrounded.

MR. POLK desired to ask the officers present if they thought that an army of the present size was a necessity to Poland.

GENERAL LE ROND agreed with Mr. Polk's underlying idea that the Polish army should be reduced to such a size as would be consistent with military necessity, but a question of fact was presented in that the Polish Government was obliged to clothe even those men who were now under arms and who might later be demobilized.

M. TITTONI felt that a reduction in the size of the Polish army was inevitable. He recalled that when M. Paderewski was last heard before the Council he had made it very clear that it would be impossible for Poland to continue to pay an army of that size.³ The Council felt that no Power or Powers could undertake the financial burden necessary for the maintenance of the Polish army, and the examination of the question had been postponed. His immediate concern, however, was not Bolshevism, for he felt that this was rapidly tending to become less dangerous.

GENERAL LE ROND thought that it was somewhat premature to dismiss the question of the danger of Bolshevism thus lightly.

M. TITTONI reiterated that the size of the Polish army must be reduced as there was no way of paying it.

MR. POLK called attention to the fact that according to a prior report on this question 100,000 new men were being called to the colors in November and 75,000 additional men would be called up in January and March.

³ HD-54, minute 1, p. 218.

GENERAL LE ROND inquired whether the number of men demobilized was also shown in this report. It was a fact that the Poles had released a considerable number of the older classes.

M. PICHON pointed out that in a recent debate in the Polish Diet the Minister of War had promised that a substantial number of men would shortly be demobilized: this, however, was dependent upon the situation in Russia, and according to latest advices, the end of the Soviet regime could hardly be predicted as likely to occur prior to the month of March. It would be highly imprudent therefore to cease taking serious precautions. Certainly every effort must be made to clothe the Polish army at once.

MR. POLK said there was no doubt of that.

GENERAL BELIN pointed out that the report of the Supreme War Council had taken account of the fact that an additional effort relative to the supply of the Polish army might have to be made; it was for this reason that the report had specified that the general basis of its recommendations was a momentary one.

SIR EYRE CROWE desired to point out that if the British were to be asked to make a further effort with respect to supplying the Polish army it should be remembered what had already been done by them; for instance, the British practically alone had undertaken the complete supply of the forces in southern Russia.

It was decided:

to accept the report submitted by the Supreme War Council relative to aid to be given to the Polish army and to transmit this report to Marshal Foch for execution.

5. (The Council had before it a draft proclamation of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission. (See Appendix "C").)

M. TIRARD explained that this proclamation would be published on the day the Treaty entered into force. He pointed out that in the first and second paragraphs of this proclamation mention was made only of the Allied Powers; if the United States should decide to designate a representative on this Commission the words "and Associated" could be added to the words "the Allied Powers" at the last moment.

MR. POLK said that the point could not be answered on that day. He would immediately transmit the draft of this document to his Government for its approval.

(It was decided:

to adopt the draft proclamation of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, with the reservations that Mr. Polk would submit this document to his Government for approval, and that in case the United States Government should communicate a decision to designate a representative on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commis-

Proclamation of
the Inter-Allied
Rhineland
High Commission

sion, the words "and Associated" should be added in the first and second paragraphs to the words "The Allied Powers".)

6. (The Council had before it a draft form of letter to be signed by the President of the United States calling the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (See Appendix "D"), a draft letter from the President of the Conference to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris (See Appendix "E"), and a draft letter from the President of the Conference to the chief delegate of the United States of America, the British Empire, Japan, Belgium, Brazil and Greece. (See Appendix "F").)

Summoning of
the First Meeting
of the Council
of the League of
Nations

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented on these three draft letters and pointed out that it was most important to have the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations take place at the very hour when the Treaty came into effect and in the same place. Taking up the question of the Sarre territory, as an example, he showed that there was no obligation under the Treaty to appoint a Sarre Commission within any given time, but that if this were not done this district would be without any Government whatsoever, inasmuch as all German authority ceased the moment the Treaty came into force.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that the same thing applied to Dantzig.

M. FROMAGEOT said that this was not quite so in form, although substantially it was so.

MR. POLK stated that he had already cabled the draft of the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations to Washington.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed to the necessity of having the first meeting take place at the moment the Treaty came into effect, but he was not so convinced of the necessity of having the first meeting in Paris. The essential machinery actually existed and was in London.

M. TITTONI stated that he had just received from the Secretary General at London the agenda for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. There were two alternative agenda possible: if the United States were not represented at the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations this meeting should take place in Paris and could only concern itself with the nomination of members of the Commission of Delimitation of the Sarre Territory; whereas, if the United States should be represented at this meeting it should take place in London and the agenda would then comprise numerous questions which would necessitate protracted action.

M. PICHON pointed out that the agenda received by M. Tittoni could only be a draft. The question of the place where the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations should take place could only be decided here by the Supreme Council because Sir Eric Drummond

could not act officially as General Secretary of the League of Nations before the Treaty came into force. Up to the present time all official meetings with reference to the organization of the League of Nations had taken place in Paris. M. Clemenceau and Colonel House had agreed that the first meeting should be in Paris.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he was not aware of any such agreement.

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that it would be most unfortunate to have nothing but the question of the Sarre Delimitation Commission on the agenda of the first meeting.

M. PICHON said that President Wilson had agreed to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Paris.

MR. POLK said that he was not objecting, but that he had never known that there was such an agreement. He thought, in fact, that it was better to have the first meeting here in Paris, but that he was quite unaware that there had been an agreement to that effect. He could recall nothing further than that at a meeting between MM. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Tittoni and the Japanese Ambassador the matter had been discussed. He had never seen the letter in question from Colonel House to M. Clemenceau, except insofar as he had seen press reports thereof, and he did not think that President Wilson was committed by this letter.

M. PICHON remarked that if Mr. Polk had already cabled to Washington, there was nothing to do but to await a reply.

It was decided:

(1) to adopt the draft form of letter, to be signed by President Wilson, convoking the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations;

(2) to adjourn the consideration of the question of an unofficial meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

7. MR. POLK summarized a letter from the Commanding General of the American Forces in Germany recommending that the cost of transportation to and maintenance in the United States of German subjects convicted of serious offences, entailing a sentence of confinement of five years or more, against members of the American Forces or against the property or authority of the American Forces in Germany, be deemed a proper charge against the German Government as an item in the cost of maintenance of troops of occupation.

Cost of Transportation and Maintenance in the United States of German Subjects Convicted of Serious Offences Against Members of the American Forces or Against the Property or Authority of American Forces in Germany

It was decided:

to refer this question to the Drafting Committee.

8. (The Council had before it a report from the Drafting Committee relative to the enforcement of unfulfilled armistice clauses after the

Report of the
Drafting Com-
mittee Relative to
Enforcement of
Unfulfilled
Armistice Clauses
After the En-
trance Into Force
of the Treaty,
and To Affirma-
tive Means of
Action Available
to the Allied and
Associated
Powers

entrance into force of the Treaty and to affirmative means of action available to the Allied and Associated Powers (See appendix "G").)

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon this report.

MR. POLK asked whether a pacific blockade could be imposed by any other body than the League of Nations.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the Covenant does provide means of pressure but his Committee was considering the question independently of the provisions with respect to the League of Nations and rather from the point of view of action to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. POLK queried whether economic pressure could not be exerted by the Reparation Commission? What he chiefly desired to ascertain was what was the quickest means of bringing pressure to bear on Germany?

M. FROMAGEOT said that apart from a blockade there could be effective interdiction of commerce as well as financial measures. Furthermore there were additional means of bringing pressure to bear, for instance, it might be provided that German goods and German freights should be subjected to a severe surtax which could go towards the payment of Germany's debt for reparations. He added that if certain Powers had objections to a pacific blockade these objections could only be valid in so far as they emanated from Powers that had ratified the Treaty. Powers who had not ratified could declare a blockade and could take measures amounting to interdiction of commerce while requesting that the Powers which had ratified the Treaty should coordinate with them.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that Mr. Polk's question was not as to what measures might be taken but as to who might take them.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that the principal Allied and Associated Powers could do so. He added that an additional means of exerting pressure was the occupation of German territory, for which there were clear precedents, for instance, the occupation of the Duchy of Schleswig and of Mitylene. Finally there remained the possibility of retaining prisoners until the Germans should fulfill all of their obligations arising out of the armistice.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that there were a good many practical questions remaining to be settled. Certainly the various Commissions charged with the supervision of the execution of the terms of the armistice should report on the terms of the Armistice which still remained unfulfilled and submit these reports to the Council. He said

that he knew offhand several unfulfilled clauses, for instance, the naval clauses.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that each Committee charged with the supervision of execution of the Armistice clauses should be asked to report within four days on any unfulfilled clauses coming within their jurisdiction.

It was decided:

(1) that Marshal Foch and the competent Commissions (The Allied Armistice Commission at Cologne, the Allied Naval Armistice Commission at London, the Financial Commission) should report to the Council within four days all clauses of the Armistice still remaining unfulfilled;

(2) that Sir Eyre Crowe should take the necessary measures to secure this report from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

9. (The Council had before it a letter from General Nollet to President Clemenceau, dated Berlin, October 9th, 1919 (See Appendix "H").)

Monthly Allowances To Be Assigned To Be Assigned to General Officers, Members of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Germany Who Are Chairmen Neither of Commissions Nor Sub-Commissions

COLONEL ROYE stated the substance of this letter to the Council.

M. PICHON asked if there were any objections to the recommendations contained in this letter.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council already had certain officers fulfilling certain functions, and that according to these functions their allowances had been regulated. Now another principle was being introduced; that of payment according to military rank.

COLONEL ROYE stated that General Nollet recommended these allowances because he intended to use these two Generals on special missions.

M. PICHON thought that it was not a question of rank, as Sir Eyre Crowe had indicated. These two officers were to be given these allowances not because they were Generals but because they were heads of delegations.

MR. POLK said that the whole theory of allowances was being brought up in this question and that the Council was not really competent now to decide this question. It should be referred to Versailles.

M. TRITTONI asked if there were any other officers in this situation.

M. PICHON said that there probably were not.

M. TRITTONI thought that in that case no precedent would be created.

MR. POLK pointed out that anything done now would surely constitute a precedent with respect to Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

M. PICHON thought that under the circumstances the best thing to do was to refer the matter back to General Nollet asking him for further information and recommendations, having in mind all the consequences that might result from the granting of allowances in these particular cases.

(It was decided :

to refer the question of monthly allowances to be assigned to General Officers, members of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Germany, who were Chairmen of neither Commissions nor Sub-Commissions to General Nollet for further information and recommendations.)

10. (The Council had before it a note of protest from the Greek Delegation against the decision taken by the British Command to transport to Constantinople Turkish heavy artillery and munitions left in the Greek zone of occupation in Asia Minor. (See Appendix "I".)

Protest of the Greek Delegation Against the Decision Taken by the British Command To Transport to Constantinople Turkish Heavy Artillery and Munitions Left in the Greek Zone of Occupation in Asia Minor

M. BERTHELOT in commenting on the Greek protest, pointed out that the Greeks had no right to the matériel in question; they had only obtained the same by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Council which allowed them to occupy the Smyrna district to maintain order there.⁴ On the other hand, as the Turks were being disarmed, they should not have this matériel either. It belonged to the reparation fund. He thought it might be best to approve the decision of the British Command, with the understanding that this matériel should be received and held in the name of the Allied Powers.

(It was decided :

to approve the decision of the British Command to transport to Constantinople Turkish heavy artillery and munitions left in the Greek zone of occupation in Asia Minor, on the understanding that this matériel be received and held in the name of the Allied Powers.)

11. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation on the repatriation of troops from Siberia (See Appendix "J"). The substance of the note was stated to the Council.)

Reparation [Repatriation] of Troops From Siberia

MR. POLK asked if it was settled as to who should pay the expenses of repatriation [*repatriation*].

M. TITTONI observed that that was a different question; the only thing now to be decided was the order in which the troops were to be repatriated.

MR. POLK thought he had no objection as to the order in which the troops were to be repatriated, but he did not wish the question to be decided on that day. He recalled that he had heard that local conditions in Siberia made it inadvisable, for instance, to repatriate all the Czecho-Slovak troops first.

M. BERTHELOT wished to add, for the information of the Council, that it was understood that the French would bear the expenses of

⁴ IC-181C, vol. v, minute 17, p. 484.

repatriation arising in Siberia, and that the British would bear the expense of sea transportation; afterwards a division of expenses would be made. He added that after considerable discussion M. Benes had promised him that the Czecho-Slovak Government would pay at least half of the expenses of the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops, and, if possible, would do even better. There remained still unsettled the question of whether the United States would pay a part of the expenses.

MR. POLK said that the difficulty now was that his Government was prepared to pay a lump sum, but there was a question whether France and England could contribute.

(It was decided:

to adjourn the discussion and decision of this question.)

(The meeting then adjourned)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, October 20, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-73

[Draft Note to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government]

15 OCTOBER, 1919.

The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference have the honour to address to the Royal Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State an urgent reminder that the Royal Government have not yet signed and adhered to the Treaty of Peace with the Republic of Austria concluded at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 10th September last, together with the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on the other which was signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the same date.

The Supreme Council, anxious to accord to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State every opportunity for consideration of the many important questions at present before them, have hitherto refrained from addressing to the Royal Government any demand which might be felt to embarrass their position. The Supreme Council, however, cannot accord an indefinite delay to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government for the decision which must be taken as to whether these two Treaties already signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall also be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. The Supreme Council have always been animated by the warmest feelings of friendship for and sympathy with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State which they have been proud to consider a full ally and associate alike in the work of the Peace Conference and in the organiza-

tion and future activities of the League of Nations. It is therefore the more surprising to the Supreme Council that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State has hitherto refrained from adhering to the Treaty of Peace with Austria in which fullest and most sympathetic account has been taken of the aspirations and needs of the Yugo-Slav people. It is true that the difficulty made by the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to the signature of the Treaty was based on the fact that an integral part of the Treaty was Article 51. This Article expanded into the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State engages the Serb-Croat-Slovene State in the same way as all other Powers concerned or involved to the solemn acceptance of certain provisions for the protection of minorities and freedom of transit in conformity with the essential principles and under the high control of the League of Nations to which the Serb-Croat-Slovene State has already adhered.

The Supreme Council, however, are loth to believe that the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government intend to persist in objections which could only be regarded as expressing intentions and foreshadowing a policy totally contrary to that on the basis of which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have accorded to the Yugo-Slav people as a whole their warm sympathy and support in their efforts towards the constitution and full international recognition of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.

Such a complete contradiction of the fundamental principles of the League of Nations it would be impossible for the Supreme Council to approve or to tolerate. The Supreme Council, however, are certain that the Allied Serb-Croat-Slovene Government can have no intention of persisting in such a point of view.

The Supreme Council, therefore, wish to remind the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government that it is impossible any further to prolong the delay to full acceptance of the Treaty. Confident in a friendly feeling and good intentions of the Allied Serb-Croat-Slovene nation, the Supreme Council venture to express the hope that the Royal Government will be good enough to notify them forthwith that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State engages to sign the two Treaties without reservation. Failing receipt of this promise the Supreme Council will be forced to conclude that the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have decided to abandon the alliance and pursue an independent policy, hostile to the Peace Conference and the League of Nations. The Supreme Council feel that there is no need to dwell on the serious situation in which the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would thereby be placed, forced without any co-operation and support from the Powers comprising the League of Nations, to pursue an entirely isolated

policy without any international recognition of its new territorial frontiers and political status.

At a moment when similar stipulations have already been accepted in treaty form by other states concerned, the Supreme Council are unwilling to believe that the Royal Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State have the intention of pursuing a policy at variance with all the principles on the basis of which the Peace Conference have supported the constitution of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. Convinced that the Royal Government, conscious of the Serb-Croat-Slovene people's wholehearted desire to co-operate with their Allies, will not fail to take into account these serious considerations, the Supreme Council have the honour to ask from the Royal Government a positive and explicit reply within fifteen days from the present date.

Appendix B to HD-73

SUPERIOR WAR COUNCIL
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

VERSAILLES, October 15, 1919.

Report on Furnishing Material to the Polish Army

By a resolution under date of October 2, 1919,⁵ the Supreme Council decided:

1st—to submit the demands for material, received from the Polish Ministry of War, and approved by Marshal Foch, for examination by the military representatives of the Superior War Council at Versailles;

2nd—to invite the military representatives at Versailles to examine the question, and to present a report thereon as soon as possible.

It has been further decided that the execution of the measures, recommended by the military representatives at Versailles, after approval by the Supreme Council, shall be confided to the Staff of Marshal Foch.

The Military Representatives **CONSIDERING:**

1st—that Poland has been, from the beginning of the war, the theatre of active operations; and that from this fact, she has been deprived of a great part of existence necessities, foodstuffs, clothing, railroad material and factories, and that it appears that she has nothing in reserve at the present time;

2nd—that by utilizing all her resources, Poland was able to organize and keep up, with the aid of the allies, an army of 500,000 men, which forced the Russian Red Armies into a rapid and extensive retreat.

3rd—that the Polish army appears at the present time to be in complete destitution from every point of view (a great number of the

⁵ HD-65, minute 2, p. 485.

men being clothed in denim (*toile*) ; linen, mantles, and blankets are completely lacking) ; that this destitution has already had a depressing influence on the health and morale of the troops, and that it might develop much more serious repercussions during the first cold weather in those regions where winter is early and terribly severe ;

4th—that, by considering only the requests of the Polish Government touching their needs of immediate urgency, the Polish army in order to continue its existence, should receive :

—about 600,000 outfits, particularly warm clothing and overcoats, one-half immediately and the other half before the middle of December ;

—Infantry and machine gun ammunition, shells and caissons ;
—100 locomotives and 1,500 cars for special army service ;

5th—that the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers concerning furnishing of material to Poland was favorably considered by the Supreme Council on June 27th 1919 ;⁶

ESTEEM :

1st—that, as they had already recommended in their report of July 11, 1919,⁷ relative to the material to be furnished to Poland, it would be advisable that the Allied and Associated Powers adopt :

“all measures necessary to hasten the sending to Poland of the material asked for in the numerous requests of the Polish army.”

2nd—that it would be well, as a consequence, to confide to Marshal Foch the mission :

a)—of arranging with the Allied Staffs, the participation of each one of the Allied and Associated Powers in the furnishing of material to the Polish army, according to the general basis temporarily established by the Annex I hereto attached ;

b)—to arrange for the transportation and delivery of this material to Poland, by utilizing insofar as possible :

—the Italian and Austrian lines, the Swiss and Austrian lines and the Czecho-Slovakia roads ;

—or by sea route, with debarkation at Dantzig as soon as debarkation shall have become possible, and if sea transportation presents greater advantage than railroad transportation.

The Military Representatives wish to respectfully call the attention of the Supreme Council to the great urgency there is to take a decision in this matter, in order that the Polish army may receive warm clothing before the commencement of winter.

Nota.—In accordance with the terms of a letter to his Colleagues, date of October 13, 1919, and attached hereto, as Annex 11, the Amer-

⁶ CF-96, minute 5, vol. VI, p. 726.

⁷ Appendix F to HD-7, vol. VII, p. 149.

ican Military Representative makes a general reservation concerning the entire participation possible of the United States, now or later, in the furnishing of supplies of every kind destined for the Polish army.

GEN. BELIN <i>French Mil. Representative</i>	SACKVILLE-WEST <i>British Mil. Representative</i>
CAVALLERO <i>Italian Mil. Representative</i>	BLISS <i>American Mil. Representative</i>

Annex No. I

SUPERIOR WAR COUNCIL
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

VERSAILLES, October 15, 1919.

Nature of the Supplies Which Can Be Disposed of at the Present Time by the Allied and Associated Powers, for the Provisioning of Poland

I.—GREAT BRITAIN

10,000 rifles
1,400 machine guns
18 million cartridges.

II.—ITALY

500,000 flannel vest belts
500,000 pairs of woolen gloves
Several hundred thousand 75 mm. shells
10,000 shells of 155 mm.

III.—UNITED STATES

Has no material available, at the present time, for the provisioning of Poland.

IV.—FRANCE

Important number of complete outfits and several hundreds of thousands of metres of German cloth available from the stocks recently ceded the French Government by the United States.

Miscellaneous winter effects to be deducted from the war supplies.

 Annex No. II

SUPERIOR WAR COUNCIL
AMERICAN SECTION

VERSAILLES, October 13, 1919.

From: The American Military Representative.

To: The French, British, and Italian Military Representatives.

Referring to the minutes of the Session of the Military Representatives held in Versailles on October 26th, during which the Military

Representatives examined Marshal Foch's recommendation relative to the furnishing of material to the Polish army, I have the honor to communicate the following to you.

On October 7th, I telegraphed, to the Minister of War and to the Chief of Staff, the recommendation submitted by Marshal Foch to Mr. Clemenceau in a letter dated September 29th, concerning the shipping of supplies of all kinds to the Polish army. In the same telegram I informed the Washington Government of the extent of the needs of the Polish army, extent submitted by the Polish Minister of War and approved by Marshal Foch. In the telegram I posed the following questions:

1st—Will the United States participate in the furnishing of funds or material, or both, destined for the Polish army?

2nd—If the Government of the United States decides to participate, will it determine its own contribution or will it agree to furnish the same contribution as each one of the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers which would also participate?

In reply to this telegram, the War Department at Washington directed me to communicate the following decision to my Colleagues:

1st—The Government of the United States has no authority, under the present legislation, to take part in the aid proposed, even by furnishing supplementary assistance;

2nd—The supplementary supplies of the United States in Europe have been extensively drawn from, and new sales to Poland on credit, outside of the supplementary supplies in the United States, cannot be approved;

3rd—As an act of Congress in the United States should precede all definite action, the Government and the War Department are not disposed to recommend such a measure, considering their present views on the interests of the United States.

TASKER H. BLISS

*General, American Army
American Military Representative*

Appendix C to HD-73

Proclamation of the Interallied High Commission to the Rhineland

In execution of the Peace Treaty, the Interallied High Commission of the Rhineland assumes, from this date, the supreme representation of the Allied Governments in occupied territory.

Guided by the instructions of the Allied Governments, the Commission desires to make as light as possible, for the Rhenish population, the burden of occupation, under the single condition that the German Government fulfills its duties concerning the reparations due to the victims of the war.

The High Commission guarantees to the Rhenish populations the full execution, both in word and spirit, of the occupation statutes, the especially generous regime of which is unprecedented in history.

The Commission will see, moreover, in accord with the High Command of the Allied troops, that no prejudice is introduced concerning the safety of the troops. It will suppress, without needless severity but with firmness, any enterprise against the security of these troops, which in 1918 crossed the frontiers under the emotion of the spectacle of their devastated homes, the memory of the horror of the treatment inflicted on their wives, parents and children, and which, by their self control, winning the most noble of victories, have for ten months, furnished the Rhenish populations with the benefits of order, assistance from their own supplies, and their example of discipline.

The High Commission counts upon the collaboration of the German functionaries and magistrates, in order to assure, by complete harmony in this collaboration, a regime of order, labor and peace for the populations of the occupied territory, responsible for public order, the burden of which finally falls on the troops of occupation, the Commission intends to guarantee justice, the exercise of public and private liberty, the development of the legitimate aspirations and the prosperity of the Rhenish populations.

The High Commission hopes that the contact between the troops of the Allied and Associated Nations and the Rhenish population will be, not a cause of friction, but a means to establish better acquaintance and to develop a closer relationship between labor, order, and the future peace of a better humanity.

Appendix D to HD-73

DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Plan of Convocation

of the First Council of the League of Nations in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention.

(To be addressed to the Governments of the

United States of America
 British Empire
 French Republic
 Italy
 Japan
 Belgium
 Brazil
 Spain
 Greece)

In compliance with Article 5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the President of the United States of America has the honor to inform the Government of that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations will be held at the place, day and hour of the signature of the first procès-verbal of the deposit of the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles, of June 28, 1919.

The date upon which this act will take place will be definitely determined later by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The President of the United States ventures to hope that the representative of the Government of will not fail to attend this meeting.

Appendix E to HD-73

DRAFTING COMMITTEE

Draft of Letter From the President of the Conference to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris

A.S. of the Council
of the League of Nations

MR. AMBASSADOR: You were kind enough to communicate to the General Secretariat of the Conference, unofficially, the letter which you will address, at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty with Germany, to the President of the Conference, advising him of the adhesion of the Spanish Government to the League of Nations.

The near entry into force of the Treaty with Germany . . .

(the rest as in the collective letter addressed to the first Delegates.)⁸

Appendix F to HD-73

DRAFTING COMMITTEE

A.S. of the Council of
the League of Nations

Draft of a Letter from the President of the Conference

To: the First Delegate of

(the United States of America
British Empire
Japan
Belgium
Brazil
Greece

⁸ *Infra.*

MR. DELEGATE: The early entry into force of the Treaty with Germany involves, for the League of Nations, the obligation of certain immediate decisions.

These decisions should be taken by the Council of the League of Nations. Now, this Council will exist, legally, only upon the entry into force of the Treaty, according to the terms of the final clauses, and it is precisely at that time that the decisions in question should go into force as well.

It would be opportune, therefore, to consider the preparation of these decisions at the present time in a non-official meeting of the Council of the League.

The decisions in question would be subsequently recorded by the Council in an official meeting held in Paris simultaneously with the deposit of the Ratifications.

In order to have these meetings take place in due time, I would be grateful if you would kindly invite the Governments of

the United States of America
British Empire
Japan
Belgium
Brazil
Greece,

to designate their Delegate to the Council of the League of Nations, upon which the Representatives of France and Italy have already been nominated. The presence of this delegate in Paris is desirable with the least practicable delay.

Accept, etc.

Appendix G to HD-73

Note to the Supreme Council Relative to the Execution of the Obligations Imposed by the Armistice

1st—In principle, the stipulations of the Armistice are replaced by those of the Peace Treaty; but, the obligations imposed by the Armistice may remain in force, whether by virtue of their permanent character, or as a result of their remaining in force, as expressly or implicitly provided for by the Treaty itself. This applies in particular concerning the obligations of Germany referred to in Article 212, (Protection of Territories), 248 and 251 (Financial Obligations). It is under these conditions that the accomplishment of the non-executed clauses of the Armistice may be demanded by the Allied and Associated Powers.

2nd—Until the entry into force of the Treaty, the Powers have as a means of action the right to renounce the Armistice and resume hostilities (Rules of the Hague, Article 40; ⁹ Armistice of November 11, 1918, Article 34).¹⁰ After the entry into force of the Treaty, the Powers will have no other means of action to insure the execution of the obligations incumbent on Germany than the guarantees stipulated in the Treaty itself, or resulting from the general principles of the rights of peoples.

The guarantees provided for by the Treaty are, it is known, particularly those contained in Article[s] 213, 428 to 432 of [*and?*] Par. 18 of Annex II of Article 244 (Reparations). Especially relative to the Baltic provinces, the Treaty contains as a guarantee for their execution, the provisions of Article 433.

As a means of coercion, according to the general principles of the rights of peoples, apart from war means, can be cited: economic pressure in default of the blockade called pacific, which raises objections on the part of certain Powers—reprisals, such as an occupation of territory, a seizure of German merchant vessels of less than 1,600 tons, a detention of prisoners of war.

Furthermore, Germany might be warned that the Treaty would not enter into force until such time as she had previously executed in their entirety the obligations assumed by her in the Armistice—or to further stipulate on the part of Germany, at the time of the entry into force, of an express renewal of certain of her Armistice obligations, by henceforth submitting their execution to the supervision of an Interallied Commission or to any other control deemed necessary.

However, it is important to remember that by the terms of the final clauses of the Treaty, the procès-verbal of deposit must be drawn up “as soon as the Treaty shall have been ratified by Germany, on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other.” Now, it is publicly known that, in fact, Germany and three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have actually ratified. Germany might thus take advantage of the said final clauses and demand the accomplishment of the formality of the procès-verbal of deposit without further delay. But, in such an event, an adjournment of the completion of the procès-verbal by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be justified as a measure of reprisal.

⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, pp. 1204, 1214.

¹⁰ Vol. II, pp. 1, 7.

Appendix H to HD-73

DELEGATION OF THE INTERALLIED
MILITARY COMMISSION ON CONTROL
PRESIDENCY

No. 86

BERLIN, October 9, 1919.

From: General Nollet,
To: President Clemenceau.

The resolution taken by the Supreme Council in its meeting of September 23, 1919,¹¹ provides for the attribution of a monthly allowance to the Presidents of the Military Commission and Sub-Commissions.

On the other hand, the resolution taken by the Supreme Council in its meeting of September 22, 1919,¹² provides for the attribution of a monthly allowance to the Heads of Service and of district from the grade of colonel down.

Now, the Military Commission has two heads of Delegation, General Calcagno of the Italian Army and General De Guffroy of the Belgium Army who are not provided for in either one of the above mentioned resolutions.

Owing to the position occupied in the Military Commission by these two Superior Officers, it seems that they should, from a point of view of allowances, be assimilated to rank with the President of the Sub-Commissions.

I am of the opinion that the same measure could be taken concerning the General assisting the President of the Commission.

I would ask you to be kind enough to have the Supreme Council come to a decision on the proposals which I have had the honor of making above.

NOLLET

 Appendix I to HD-73

GREEK DELEGATION

Note From the Greek Delegation Protesting Against the Transporting to Constantinople of Turkish War Material in the Greek Zone of Occupation in Asia Minor

PARIS, October 14, 1919.

The British Military Command has requested the Greek military authorities in Asia Minor to transport the Turkish heavy artillery material and Turkish munitions now in the territory of Asia Minor occupied by the Greek Army, to Constantinople.

¹¹ HD-59, minute 3, p. 327.

¹² HD-58, minute 3, p. 305.

Now, at a time when the Greek army in Asia Minor is actually in a state of war with the Ottoman forces, they cannot understand being deprived of the necessary enemy war material now in their hands.

The Greek Delegation, therefore, has the honor to request the Supreme Council to revoke the order in question issued by the British Military Command, at least until the signing of Peace with Turkey, and to not insist upon the immediate transportation of this material to Constantinople.

His Excellency, Mr. GEORGE CLEMENCEAU

President of the Peace Conference, etc., etc., etc.,

Quai D'Orsay.

Appendix J to HD-73

Note Relative to the Repatriation of the Foreign Contingents in Siberia

FRENCH DELEGATION

PARIS, October 18, 1919.

According to indications furnished by General Janin²³ to the French Ministry of War, the strength of the foreign troops to be repatriated from Siberia is as follows:

Czecho-Slovak	54,000
Poles.....	12,000
Rumanians	2,700
Letts in Krasnojarsk.....	800
“ in Vladivostok.....	1,000

Serbo-Croats:

a) Serbian Regiments.....	1,400
b) Yugoslav Regiments.....	1,600
c) In Vladivostok	1,000

Furthermore, the important transportation of the families must be considered. For the Polish division, in particular, there are about 2,500 persons.

It is necessary that the repatriation of these different classes be operated according to a methodical plan. General Janin has established a plan which is based upon the services rendered by the different contingents and on their state of morale. Any other procedure might entail serious consequences, and give rise to claims and provoke disorders in the increments in question.

Moreover, the removal should be effected methodically in order to permit the Russians to organize the relief of the foreign contingents on the trans-Siberian. The weak resources of Admiral Koltchak in

²³ Gen. Maurice Janin, of the French Army; supreme commander of the Czecho-Slovak Army in Siberia.

men, the inefficiency of the railroads, would, in fact, prevent the Siberian Government from coping with any unforeseen situation. Now, this is just what would happen if individual misunderstandings interfered with the established order of evacuation. The most serious consequences would be the result, concerning the operation of the railroad, which would produce an immediate influence on the military and political situation in Siberia.

For these reasons it is indispensable that the Supreme Council establish decisions in this matter and determine a logical and impartial plan of evacuation which would have to be rigorously carried out.

The proposals of General Janin, who is particularly competent to formulate an estimation in this matter, are consequently submitted to the Supreme Council.

These propositions stipulate that the evacuation should be conducted in the following order:

- 1st) Czecho-Slovaks,
- 2nd) Poles,
- 3rd) Rumanians,
- 4th) Letts (Detachment of Krasnojarsk)
- 5th) Serbo-Croats (Serbian regiments of Krasnojarsk and then the so-called Yugoslav regiments of Krasnojarsk.*).
- 6th) Letts of Vladivostok.

*with the exception of a few invalids, the Serbians of Vladivostok, as well as several other detachments of the same origin scattered throughout Siberia, do not deserve to be removed before the prisoners. They are deserters and elements unworthy of interest. [Footnote in the original.]

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, October 22, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF
Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE
Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE
M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Percin

ITALY
M. Tittoni
Secretaries
M. Paterno
M. Barone RUSSO

JAPAN
M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Capt. B. Winthrop
BRITISH EMPIRE	Capt. G. Lothian Small
FRANCE	M. Massigli
ITALY	M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Mr. E. L. Dresel
Dr. I. Bowman
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Mr. A. Leeper
Commandant Lucas

FRANCE

Commandant Levavasseur
Commandant Aron
M. Cheysson

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

1. SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to bring to the attention of the Council a telegram which had just been received, according to which a German aeroplane had made a forced landing in the neighborhood of Kovno. This aeroplane carried two German civilian pilots and three passengers,

Landing of a
German Aero-
plane at Kovno

one of whom was Russian and the other two Turkish; this aeroplane was travelling from Berlin to Moscow and was being held until further orders.

2. **SIR EYRE CROWE** wished to bring to the notice of the Council the fact that the British Government, called upon by a number of Delegates, was making every effort to secure berths for Delegates who wanted to proceed to Washington in connection with the Labor Congress, but was not absolutely sure of securing same. He would make every effort for this purpose; perhaps the Council could give direct orders to the Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

Journey of the Delegates to the Labor Congress at Washington

MR. POLK said that he felt the same way, and had already cabled to Washington asking whether it would be possible to take care of these Delegates on transports which were sailing from Brest within the next few days; he doubted, however, whether this could be done, considering that every available berth had been taken. An answer was expected the following day.

M. PICHON said that it would be wise to settle the question at the meeting of the Council to be held on the following day, and meanwhile to instruct the Allied Maritime Transport Executive in the way suggested by Sir Eyre Crowe.

MR. POLK feared that the Allied Maritime Transport Executive would reply that all available tonnage which it controlled had been allotted to commerce.

3. **M. TITTONI** wished to announce that Italy had appointed Count **Bonin-Langare**, Italian Ambassador in Paris, as its Delegate on the permanent Committee charged with the execution of the Treaty, and Professor **Pagliano** as second Delegate.

The Committee on Questions Relating to the Interpretation and Execution of the Treaty of Peace

M. PICHON said that France would be represented on the Committee by himself, and by **M. Berthelot** as second Delegate.

4. (The Council had before it a note from the Finance Commission dated October 15th, 1919, relative to a telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople dated September 23rd, 1919, and a draft telegram to be sent by the Government of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople (See Appendix "A").)

German and Austro-Hungarian Banks in Turkey

M. CHEYSSON read and commented upon the note from the Finance Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he had consulted the Legal Advisors of the British Delegation on the subject, and that the latter felt that two points had to be distinguished, liquidation and control. With regard to liquidation, the Legal Advisors approved of the proposals of the Finance Commission. With regard to control, they had remarked that two questions were to be considered, not only the Treaty with Germany

but also the Armistice conditions with Turkey; the Armistice conditions prohibited the Turks from allowing Germans to resume their position in Turkey. He thought the question had better be referred back to the Drafting Committee which would be able to furnish a report in short time.

M. TITTONI thought that the question should certainly be submitted to the Legal Advisors. The question was important: were the Armistice conditions with Turkey, or rather, as he thought, the provisions in the Treaty of Peace with Germany to govern the situation of German and Austrian banks in Turkey.

(It was decided:

to refer to the Drafting Committee for examination and report the note of October 15th, 1919 from the Finance Commission, relative to the situation of German and Austrian banks in Turkey, as well as the draft telegram to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople prepared by this Commission (See Appendix "A").)

5. (The Council had before it a note from the Greek Delegation to the Peace Conference dated October 15th, 1919 (See Appendix "B").)

Sequestration of
Property Belong-
ing to the Greek
Orthodox Com-
munity of
Budapest

M. TITTONI said that the Economic Commission was competent to examine this note. The Draft Treaty with Hungary contained, in Section 4, Part 10, clauses which were pertinent to the above case in the protest of the Greek Delegation.

(It was decided:

to refer to the Economic Commission for examination and report the protest of the Greek Delegation relative to the sequestration of property belonging to the Greek Orthodox Community of Budapest. (See Appendix "B").)

6. (The Council had before it a telegram from the High Commissioner of the French Republic in the Near East, transmitting a telegram from the Grand Vizier to the Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey at Vienna (See Appendix "C").)

Repatriation of
Staff of Turkish
Embassy at
Vienna

After a short discussion it was decided:

To authorize the repatriation of the Turkish Embassy Staff at Vienna in accordance with the request made by the Grand Vizier to the French High Commissioner, also to authorize the transmission to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna of the telegram prepared by the Turkish Government (See Appendix "C").

7. (The Council had before it a note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, dated Paris, October 7th, 1919, requesting that authority be given by the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to exploit the coal mines situated in the basin of Pecs (Petchoui) for a period of five years beginning with the coming into force of the

Permission To
Work the Pecs
Coal Mines

Treaty (See Appendix "D").)

COMMANDANT ARON said that M. Loucheur wished to have this question postponed.

M. TITTONI did not think that a postponement was necessary: the Reparation Commission had examined this question and was unanimous in proposing that the Serbian request be rejected.

COMMANDANT ARON then said that the Reparation Commission had decided that the question was not one which came within its province.

MR. POLK wished to ask whether this application had been referred to the Coal Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that he did not know. He considered the question a local one because the competent local Commission had already refused to accede to the Serbian request that the mine district of Pecs should be included within the frontiers of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. On account of this refusal, the Serbs had formulated their new demand.

M. TITTONI said that if the mines of Pecs were taken away from Hungary, that country would have no coal at all. The Coal Commission was not competent, and in his opinion, it was only the Economic Commission which was qualified to deal with this question.

M. PICHON remarked that M. Loucheur wished to be heard by this Commission.

(It was decided:

to refer to the Economic Commission for examination and report the note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation dated October 7th, 1919 (See Appendix "D"), requesting for the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government the exclusive right of exploitation of the coal mines situated in the Petchoui (Pecs) Basin for a period of five years after the entrance into force of the Treaty of Peace.)

8. (The Council had before it a revised draft of a note addressed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government dated October 20th, 1919, which had been prepared by the American delegation (See appendix "E").)

MR. POLK said that he had asked for certain modifications of form in the draft¹ which the Council had examined at last Monday's meeting; the text which he had prepared had been distributed to the various Delegations.

M. BERTHELOT said that the Serbian delegation had refused to sign the Treaty of Peace with Austria on account of the Minorities Treaty: this had not been done without hesitation on its part. The only reason that the Serbs gave for not signing immediately was that they were without a cabinet at the time. Now, however, after a long crisis, a cabinet had been formed. Mr. Trumbić had left Bel-

¹ Appendix A to HD-73, p. 718.

grade and he and Mr. Patchitch had instructions to sign. Under these circumstances it was a question whether the proposed step was a necessary one. In a conversation which he had had with Mr. Vesnitch, the latter had insisted upon his demand that if the Minorities Treaty be modified to give satisfaction to the Greeks or Roumanians, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government should also benefit by these modifications.

MR. POLK said he had received a telegram from the United States Minister at Belgrade announcing the departure of Mr. Trumbić who had received instructions to sign the Treaty: under these conditions it was perhaps not necessary to send a note.

M. PICHON was of the same opinion.

M. TITTONI inquired whether the Serbs meant to sign the Treaty only after it had been modified.

M. BERTHELOT stated that no modifications had been made to the Treaty since the Council had last heard Mr. Vesnitch, at which meeting M. Tittoni was present.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the situation was not the same for the Treaty with Serbia as regards Minorities as for Treaties with Greece and Roumania. The Principal Allied Powers had already signed the Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government.

M. BERTHELOT said that the question had already been brought up in connection with Poland: Poland had asked that if on any important point a more favorable situation was granted to the Roumanians, concerning the Jewish question for instance, the same advantages should be granted to Poland.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that it was important that no promise should be given.

M. BERTHELOT said there was no question of giving a promise, for should it be given, such a promise would not amount to very much. The modifications requested by the Roumanians, as a matter of fact, either concerned the very essence of the Treaty, and therefore could not be accepted, or questions such as the Jewish question did not concern the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. Under these conditions the Serbs would have difficulty in availing themselves of the Treaty with Roumania in order to ask for a more favorable regime. Should it be necessary to introduce certain modifications in the Serbian Treaty, the fact that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had already signed would not be an obstacle thereto.

M. PICHON said that for the moment it was only a question of finding out whether we could tell the Serbs that if the other Treaties concerning Minorities were modified, they should benefit by the same modifications. As far as he was concerned he thought it advisable

to ask the Serbs to sign purely and simply. Mr. Trumbić had left Belgrade with instructions to sign the Treaty of Peace with Austria, therefore, it would be better to await his arrival.

SIR EYRE CROWE was of the same opinion.

It was decided:

to adjourn until a further meeting of the Council the sending of a note inviting the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to sign the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty. (See Appendix "E".)

9. (The Council had before it a note from the German Delegation dated, Paris, October 17th, 1919, (See Appendix "F").)

SIR EYRE CROWE said that a certain latitude had always been given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces in the Baltic, and the Council had always avoided giving a decision on the measures taken by him. We were bound to recognize the decisions by virtue of which the German shipping in the Baltic had been stopped. Perhaps these decisions had been executed too strictly; in fact, he was informed that their execution sometimes entailed unnecessary inconvenience not only for the Germans but also for Neutrals, and for this reason sailings of German ships which were carrying food-stuffs from Denmark to the plebiscite zone of Schleswig had been held up. It was therefore necessary to direct the Naval Commanders to act with great discretion and to carry out their measures in such a way as not to affect without good cause navigation in the Baltic; we should instruct the Admirals to interfere as little as possible with traffic between neutral ports, and even, in certain cases, to authorize traffic between German ports.

M. TITTONI remarked that it was the intention of the Council to prevent in an effective way commerce with ports of Bolshevik Russia: its object was not to interfere with traffic in the Baltic.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it was not only a question of the blockade of Russia; he also had in mind the situation brought about by the action of the Germans in Courland. The Naval experts should be requested to prepare the draft of an answer to the German note.

MR. POLK asked that the draft of this answer be submitted to the Council.

It was decided:

(1) that the Allied Naval Armistice Commission should be asked to execute the measures prescribed by it with regard to the situation in the Baltic Provinces in such a way as to take into account the legitimate interests of neutral commerce and certain urgent needs with respect to supplies for German ports;

(2) that the Naval Experts should present to the Council as soon as possible a draft answer to the German note of October 17th, 1919. (See Appendix "F".)

Seizure of German Shipping in the Baltic

10. (The Council had before it a note from the Roumanian Delegation dated October 18th, 1919, requesting representation on the Commissions charged with the recovery of material, which were functioning in Germany in the interests of France and Belgium in execution of the Armistice Clauses (See Appendix "G").)

Representation of Roumania on the Armistice Commissions Charged With Recovery of Material in Germany

M. BERTHELOT said that it was difficult to accept the Roumanian demand. As a matter of fact the right which the Roumanian Delegation was demanding had been recognized by the Armistice in favor of France and Belgium alone; on the other hand, the Roumanians had not hesitated to go ahead and recover alone material in Hungary. It was therefore difficult to grant them this favor. He therefore proposed that this note should be referred back to the Reparation Commission with a request that it should examine and advise in what measure it was possible to grant it.

M. TRITTONI did not think that this was a question of application of the Treaty. The Armistice only stipulated a recovery of material taken away by German troops in favor of France and Belgium. Once the Treaty came into force, the situation would be different, and recovery of this kind would be made in favor of all the Allies. He thought, however, that the Reparation Commission was best qualified to examine the Roumanian request.

It was decided:

to refer to the Committee on the Organization of the Reparation Commission for examination and report the note of the Roumanian Delegation dated October 19th, 1919, (See Appendix "G"), requesting representation on the Commissions charged with the recovery of stolen material which are operating in Germany under the clauses of the Armistice.

11. M. PICHON said that Mr. Henry Simon² asked whether the Council would adjourn the examination of this question.

MR. POLK said that he had only received instructions to submit the document³ in question to the Council but that he had not been asked to press with any special force its conclusions: the opinion of the Council was only asked for.

Offer of the National Lutheran Council of the United States With Regard to the Execution of Article 438 of the Treaty of Peace With Germany

(The examination of this question was therefore adjourned.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL CRILLON, PARIS, October 22, 1919.

² French Representative, Commission on Colonial Mandates.

³ The document referred to is a letter containing the proposal of the National Lutheran Council of the United States to take over the German Lutheran Missions in different parts of the world. (Paris Peace Conf. 185.18/35, 38.)

Appendix A to HD-74

[*Note From the Financial Commission*]

FINANCIAL COMMISSION

OCTOBER 15, 1919.

The Financial Commission is in receipt of a telegram in which the French High Commissioner at Constantinople requests specific and identical instructions for all delegations as to the attitude to be adopted in regard to German banks in Turkey from the date of the coming into force of the Treaty with Germany.

The Commission wished, in this connection, to examine the questions brought up by the attitude adopted by the High Commissioners since the Armistice in regard to the German and Austrian banks and the claims which have been brought in this connection by the parties concerned, particularly a letter sent August 11th, 1919, by the Wiener Bank Verein to the Financial Control at Constantinople.

The Commission is of the opinion that the decisions of the High Commissioners were wisely taken. They should be regarded as due to political rather than economic causes. German and Austrian banks in Turkey were founded under the patronage of, and were favored by, the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments and by their action they helped to consolidate Germany's and Austria-Hungary's hold on Turkey, and they may justly be considered as agents of German and Austro-Hungarian propaganda. The measures taken in regard to them are therefore primarily protective measures that come strictly within the jurisdiction of administrators whose duty it is to ensure the policing of occupied territory.

The Economic Commission considered that the decisions of the High Commissioners may be regarded as "exceptional measures" according to Article 297*d* and paragraphs 1 and 3 of the annex to this article of the Treaty with Germany and the corresponding articles in the Treaty of Saint Germain.

The Financial Commission is of the opinion that at least one article should be inserted in the Treaty with Turkey to specify clearly that no such measure can give rise to the payment of any indemnity nor claim by Germany, Austria-Hungary or Turkey. This article would be applicable to Germany, Austria and Hungary in accordance with article 434 of the Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding articles of the Treaties concluded or to be concluded with Austria and Hungary, agreeing to "recognize the full force of Treaties . . . which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with the Powers who fought on the side of Germany."

As to the future, the Financial Commission considers that "exceptional measures" cannot be maintained in regard to German and Austrian banks when the Treaty of Peace with these Powers comes into force. The German and Austrian banks should, from the date of the going into effect of the treaty, be placed on the same footing as neutral banks and not subject, in the future, to other than general measures taken or to be taken by the High Commissioners to ensure the policing of occupied Ottoman territory. Consequently, it seems to the Financial Commission that in reply to telegram No. 1792 of September 23d sent by the French High Commissioner, the Governments of the Principal Powers should send the High Commissioners identical telegrams of which the main lines are indicated in the draft telegram attached hereto.

[Enclosure]

FINANCIAL COMMISSION

OCTOBER 16, 1919.

Draft Telegram To Be Sent by the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople

After having reexamined the questions brought up by your telegram No. 1792 of September 23d, regarding the attitude to be taken with respect to German and Austrian banks in Turkey, the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in accordance with the opinion expressed by the Financial Commission, consider that the decisions of the High Commissioners have been wisely taken and that they are, from all points of view, protective measures designed to ensure the policing of occupied territory.

As for the future, the above mentioned Governments consider that no exceptional measure can be maintained in regard to German and Austrian banks after the coming into force of the respective Treaties with Germany and Austria.

These banks will then be free either [to] resume their operations or to proceed with their liquidations. They will, however, remain subject to the police measures which the high Commissioners may find necessary to take in view of maintaining order in regard to all neutral banks.

Appendix B to HD-74

*Note From the Greek Delegation Relative to the Sequestration of Property Belonging to the Greek Orthodox Community of Budapest*GREEK DELEGATION TO
THE PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, October 15, 1919.

To the Secretary General of the Peace Conference:

There were at Budapest, and in other cities of Hungary, Greek orthodox communities which had property, the ownership of which in the case of the dissolution of these communities, was to have been returned to the Greek State.

The Soviet Government of Hungary proceeded July last to sequester property belonging to the Greek orthodox community of Budapest, recognized as having belonged to the community since the 18th Century, by the law of 1868.

This measure, taken by a revolutionary government, being contrary to the rights acquired and to prerogatives assured by the Treaties to all ethnic minorities, the Greek Delegation has the honor of begging the Peace Conference to be kind enough to insert in the Peace Treaty with Hungary a clause by virtue of which she would pledge herself to restore to their legitimate owners the property constituting the patrimony of the Greek Orthodox Communities in its territory.

Appendix C to HD-74

*Letter From M. Defrance, Relative to the Repatriation of the Staff of the Turkish Embassy in Vienna*HIGH COMMISSARIAT
OF THE
FRENCH REPUBLIC
POLITICAL SERVICE
DIRECTION OF POLITICAL
AND COMMERCIAL AFFAIRS.

Asia Oceania No. 545

CONSTANTINOPLE, September 27, 1919.

From: M. Defrance, High Commissioner of the French Republic in the East.

To: M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In re: Sending of telegram
From Damad Ferid Pacha.

The Grand Vizier having begged me to insure the transmission of a telegram to the Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey at Vienna, relative to the return to Constantinople of the personnel of the Ottoman Embassy and the maintenance of Ottoman Consuls in the Austro-Hun-

garian ex-Empire, I deemed it my duty to submit this request for the consideration of my colleagues of Great Britain and Italy.

In their meeting of the 18th instant, the Allied High Commissioners were of the opinion that the decision requested by the Ottoman Government depended on the assent of the Allied Governments.

Consequently, I have the honor of transmitting herewith to your Excellency, a copy of this telegram,⁵ leaving to your Excellency the care of forwarding it to the proper party, if an agreement is reached on this subject with the British and Italian Governments.

Appendix D to HD-74

DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, October 7, 1919.

To the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, Paris.

The total production of the coal mines located on the territory of the present kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, including the mines of Petchoui which are still in the territory occupied by our troops, amounted in 1913 to 292,720 tons monthly. The monthly consumption of coal in these territories amounted at the same time to 322,230 tons. The difference of 29,510 tons was to be covered by the importations from Germany, Austria and Great Britain.

It is well known that during the war the enemy has destroyed not only all the means of communication but has as well, especially during his retreat and by criminal action, rendered unexploitable and flooded almost all the coal mines in Serbia. The coal production has been thus completely annihilated and represents only at present, in spite of all the hard works of reconstruction, only one-tenth (1.10) of what it was before the war; it will only become normal again after several years.

The total production of the mines in the Kingdom of the S. C. S. has amounted in the month of July 1919, but only thanks to the help furnished by the mines of Petchoui, to 208,100 tons, a quantity which hardly suffices to assure the traffic of our roads of communication, which are only partly reestablished. The difference between the coal production before the war, for that matter insufficient at that time, and the present production amounts consequently to 300 carloads or 3,000 tons daily, which gives a deficit of 90,000 monthly, and that fact has a fatal repercussion upon the normal exploitation of the means of communication. If we take into account the necessities of industry which is at present, on account of the lack of coal, absolutely stopped, and also the needs in coal for heating in our country where winter lasts

⁵ The document referred to does not accompany the minutes.

six months (nine-tenths of the territory being under continental climate), we can only foresee profound distress for our populations in a short time. The lack of coal necessary for the heating cannot be made up by wood because the coal deficit in the railways renders impossible the exploitation of the forests. There results for our country a pressing want of coal which can only be satisfied by the cession of the exploitation of the Petchoui mines under our administration.

The Petchoui mines are also indispensable to us for other reasons.

All the mines of our Kingdom produce presently nearly 800 carloads a day of which 300 carloads are extracted from the only mines of Trifail, in Slovenia. But the coal of Trifail cannot be used alone for the heating of the machines on account of its inferior quality (insufficiency of calories); in order to be used it must be mixed up, as it has constantly been done so far, with coal of Petchoui. To deprive us of the latter would be equivalent to put us in the impossibility to use the coal of Trifail which would bring about a veritable catastrophe in our railroad communications which are considerably limited.

As we have just mentioned, our coal deficit before the war was covered by importations from Austria, Germany and Great Britain. We cannot rely upon the importations from Austria any more, the latter being also in want of coal. It is the same with Germany on account of her obligations of reparations, towards other Allied countries. On our side, we have addressed several requests to the Supreme Council in order to obtain the introduction into the Peace Treaty, as well with Germany as with Austria, of clauses according us, as reparations, the indispensable quantities of coal necessary to our consumption. Neither in the Treaty with Germany nor in the Treaty with Austria have our demands been taken into consideration, so that we shall receive nothing at all from those two countries.

As to the importation of coal from Great Britain, it is out of the question for a long period after the war, because the wants of Great Britain itself, as well as those of France and Italy who also are supplied by English mines, are very important. Moreover, the neighboring countries of our Kingdom, such as Italy, Rumania and Greece, either are deprived of mines, or have a small production.

In the Treaty with Bulgaria, it is true, a quantity has been granted to us but being only 50,000 tons a month, it is quite insufficient. We must, besides, add that the Treaty with Bulgaria contains restrictive conditions which render our right, even concerning that small quantity, illusory, the Interallied Commission being in reality, authorized to impose its veto if it deems that that coal is necessary for Bulgaria.

Finally, we should like to mention that the maintenance of the communications in our country depends exclusively upon the indispensable quantity and upon the necessary quantity of coal we shall dispose of; that maintenance has not only a vital importance for us, but has also

a great international importance as it insures the liaison between the Orient and the Occident. Moreover, we produce great quantities of agricultural and forest products which would remain unutilized for lack of means of transportation; that is what happened to the harvest of last year which, after the armistice and for lack of means of transportation, has been wasted in greater part, despite the want which was felt for it in Western Europe and even in the different parts of our country. The same would happen to the present harvest if the present state continues.

All these facts are very well known to our Allies, who have verified them by their different missions sent to our country for that purpose. We hope that our State will succeed by working with great activity to reconstitute the destroyed mines and to improve the productions of the others, to produce in a few years a quantity of coal which, added to that which we shall receive, thanks to the facilities of the importation will satisfy our needs.

That is why we request that the exploitation of the Petchoui mines be, by the Treaty with Hungary, given to us for a short period of five years after which we think we shall be able to produce sufficiently for our consumption.

Consequently, the Delegation of the Kingdom of the S. C. S. has the honor to ask the Supreme Council to insert in the Treaty with Hungary, in the Chapter of Reparations, the following text:

“In compensation of the destruction of the coal mines in Serbia, and to be deducted from the amount of reparations of war damages owed by Hungary, the latter cedes to the Kingdom of the S. C. S. the exclusive right of exploitation of the coal mines located in the Petchoui basin (Pecs), for a period of five years after the going into force of the present treaty.

“In order to insure to the Kingdom of the S. C. S. the full liberty of exploitation of the said mines, Hungary promises henceforth to respect all the regulations made by the Government of the Kingdom of the S. C. S. concerning the exploitation of the said mines, as well as all other provisions relating thereto.”

DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS
AND SLOVENES TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Appendix E to HD-74

*Revised Draft of Communication From the Supreme Council to the
Serb-Croat-Slovene Government Relative to the Signature of Peace
With Austria*

15 OCTOBER, 1919.

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers have the honour to address to the Royal Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene

State an urgent reminder that they have not yet signed the Treaty of Peace with the Republic of Austria concluded at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 10th of September last, and the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State which was signed by the former on the same date.

Anxious to accord to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State every opportunity for consideration of the many important questions now before them, the Supreme Council have hitherto refrained from presenting to the Royal Government any request which might embarrass their position during a period of internal stress for the Council have always been animated by the warmest feelings of friendship and sympathy for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, which they have been proud to consider an ally and associate alike in the conduct of the war, in the work of the Peace Conference and in the organization of the League of Nations.

They feel confident, therefore that the Royal Government will not persist in objections which could only be regarded as foreshadowing a policy tending to separate that country from the Allied and Associated Powers, who have heartily cooperated in the creation and in the full international recognition of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

It has, however, become impossible further to prolong the delay, and the Supreme Council must earnestly request that the Royal Government be good enough to notify them promptly that they are prepared to sign the Treaties without reservation.

Appendix F to HD-74

Note From German Delegation Dated October 17, 1919, on the Subject of Blockade Measures Enforced in the Baltic Sea

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

OCTOBER 17, 1919.

The German Government urgently requests that the blockade measures taken concerning the Baltic Sea be limited to those which are militarily necessary and that the fishing rights, navigation between German ports, ferry navigation, the maintenance of light ships (*Seesichendampfer*) be unmolested.

Furthermore, the German Government requests the liberation of the German vessels captured because of unfamiliarity with orders issued, as is particularly the case concerning the coal tenders plying to Königsberg.

Appendix G to HD-74

Translation

RUMANIAN DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

PARIS, October 18, 1919.

From: M. Alex Vaida Voevod.

To: M. Clemenceau.

The Rumanian Delegation has the honor of calling the kind attention of the Supreme Council of the Conference to the following facts:

By the Peace Treaty with Germany it was decided (Article 258 [238]) that Germany was obliged to restore the machines taken away, seized or sequestrated, as well as animals or objects of all kinds and securities taken away, seized or sequestrated; it is added that these restorations are to be made in conformity with the procedure established by the Reparations Commission.

We are informed that Members working on the execution of the Armistice Convention with Germany, in the commissions entrusted with effecting the said recoveries, have often found during the course of their researches objects of all kinds belonging to Rumania. In the same way, we are informed that in Germany endeavors have been made to return objects, machines, etc., taken away from Rumania, impossible of identification when the Commission, working in conformity with the procedure of the Reparations Commission, shall come to identify them.

This is why the Rumanian Delegation begs the Supreme Council of the Conference to kindly permit the attachment of Rumanian Delegates to the Commissions now operating in Germany for France and for Belgium, in execution of the Armistice Convention, with a view to effecting the recoveries. These delegates will indicate to the Commission, on every occasion, the property which belonged to Rumania so that proceedings may be drawn up, establishing the nature of the object, the place where it was found, etc.

In the same way, we beg the Supreme Council of the Conference to allow Rumanian Delegates to make researches in this respect, even in the localities where the Commissions have already finished their work.

Owing to the importance of the interests at stake, and that Rumania is not in a position—as is shown above—to recover her property, which in this way would remain to the profit of the Germans, I dare hope, Mr. President, that thanks to the kind support which your excellency will be good enough to give our demand, it will find in the midst of the Supreme Council a speedy solution.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, October 23, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon

Secretaries

M. Dutasta

M. Berthelot

M. de Percin

ITALY

M. Scialoja

Secretary

Don Ascanio Colonna

JAPAN

M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. G. A. Gordon
 BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. Hinchley-Cooke
 FRANCE M. Massigli
 ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Dr. J. B. Scott

Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Tufton

Mr. A. Leeper

Commander Macdonald, R. N.

FRANCE

Marshal Foch

General Weygand

General Le Rond

M. Fromageot

M. Aubert

ITALY

M. Ricci-Busatti

M. Vannutelli-Rey

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu.

1. (The Council had before it a communication from the President of the German Peace Delegation, dated Paris, October 22, 1919, addressed to Mr. Polk (See Appendix "A").)

Communication
From the
German Peace
Delegation
Relative to
the Sending of
German and
Austrian
Delegates to
the Interna-
tional Labor
Congress at
Washington

MR. POLK called the attention of the Council to the second paragraph of the communication from the President of the German Peace Delegation, which stated that,

"The Austrian Government will probably likewise appoint delegates who will travel together with the Germans, and whose number and names will likewise be communicated at a very early date."

He thought that it was most surprising that the German Peace Delegation should undertake to answer with respect to the attendance of Austrian Delegates to the International Labor Congress. He stated that a liaison officer of the American Delegation had been instructed to call Baron von Lersner's attention to this matter and that Baron Eichhoff would likewise be asked by what authority the German Delegation assumed to speak for the Austrian Government in this matter. These inquiries would be made orally and he would communicate the result thereof.

M. PICHON said that the Council approved of the action of the United States Delegation; it could not be admitted that the German Peace Delegation should assume this authority.

2. (The Council had before it a report of the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany, dated October 21, 1919 (See Appendix "B").)

Report of the
Sub-Committee
on the Execu-
tion of the
Treaty With
Germany
Relative to
the Organiza-
tion of
Plebiscite
Commissions
in Silesia,
Allenstein and
Marienwerder

GENERAL LE ROND read and commented upon this report. He pointed out that the British maintained their exception with respect to members of Plebiscite Commissions being paid by their respective Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that, pursuant to a resolution of the Council adopted October 15, 1919 (H. D. 70 Minute 4 [5]),¹ he had referred the question of payment of members of Commissions of Delimitation by their respective Governments to his Government, which had replied that it accepted the principle that "ordinary army pay" of these members should be defrayed by their respective Governments.

GENERAL LE ROND observed that these words were the English equivalent of the "solde" mentioned in the Committee's report.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was not sure of the exact definition of "ordinary army pay", inasmuch as officers in the British Army

¹ *Ante*, p. 643.

were entitled, over and above such pay, to ordinary and special allowances. He would refer the question to his Government for an exact definition, but he felt confident that his Government would admit the same principle relative to the payment of members of Plebiscite Commissions. He wished, however, to now raise a somewhat more important question: strictly speaking, the cases of Dantzig and Memel were not exactly similar: the Treaty had not provided specifically for troops of occupation in these two districts, and therefore there was no provision that the payment of such troops as might be used as troops of occupation should be a charge on local revenues. The Council, however, had decided that troops of occupation might be used in these two districts;² it was therefore necessary to decide in principle as to the method of payment of such troops, should they be used as troops of occupation. He thought that on the principle laid down in the Treaty with respect to other troops of occupation the payment of such troops should be a charge upon local revenues.

M. PICHON saw no objection to this.

MR. POLK suggested that, although no formal occupation of Dantzig had been decided upon, it had, nevertheless, been designated as a base. Should not the payment of these base troops, therefore, be deemed part of the expenses of the occupation of Upper Silesia?

GENERAL LE ROND added that, in accordance with this suggestion, the payment of these troops should rather be deemed part of the expenses of the occupation of Allenstein and Marienwerder, inasmuch as Dantzig was to serve as a base for these two districts.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the base troops, however, might be used as troops of occupation of the city of Dantzig upon the demand of the High Commissioner, in which case Dantzig should bear the expense of the maintenance of such troops.

GENERAL LE ROND desired to point out to the Council the situation which his Committee had considered. In determining whether or not troops of occupation should at once be sent to Dantzig, it had thought that inasmuch as the present situation in Dantzig was a provisional one there was no basis in right, at the present time, for sending troops of occupation to Dantzig. The troops which would be sent there could at present only be used as base troops, but could not be used as troops of occupation before the appointment of the High Commissioner; thereafter they could only be so used upon the demand of the High Commissioner.

(It was decided:

(1) to approve the recommendations of the report of the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany relative to the organization of Plebiscite Commissions in Silesia, Allenstein and Marienwerder (See Appendix "B"), with the reservation that Sir

² HD-70, minute 3, p. 641.

Eyre Crowe should request the agreement of the British Government to the opinion, expressed by the other Delegations, that the members of such Commissions should be paid by their respective Governments;

(2) that the principle that the payment of troops of occupation should be a charge upon the local revenues of the territories occupied should apply to such troops as might be used as troops of occupation in Dantzic and Memel.)

3. (The Council had before it a report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany on the Commissions to be named during the first weeks following the entry into force of the Treaty. (See Appendix "C".))

Report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty With Germany on the Commissions To Be Named During the First Weeks Following the Entry into Force of the Treaty

The report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty was read, and in the course of its reading the following remarks were made:

MR. POLK reminded the Council that the United States could not be represented on any Commissions prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that although he had a complete list of British appointments to the Commissions in question, he thought it inadvisable to present these piece-meal during the reading of this report and suggested that each Delegation present to the Secretary-General of the Conference its nominations for the Commissions mentioned in the Committee's report. This suggestion was approved.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that with respect to the Delimitation Commission for Dantzic, the Treaty provided that three Nations should be represented on this Commission, but it had not yet been decided which three nations were to be so represented.

GENERAL LE ROND pointed out that the Council had already approved the recommendations of a prior report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty that the members of the Delimitation Commission for Dantzic should be drawn from the Germano-Polish Delimitation Commission and that the presidency of these two Commissions should be held by the same person, in this case General Dupont.³ Therefore, only two members of this Commission still remained to be named.

M. PICHON thought it would be well that one of these members should be British.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

M. PICHON added that since the United States could not be represented the choice lay between Italy and Japan.

GENERAL LE ROND thought it was more suitable for Italy to be represented, since Japan had fewer representatives on the Germano-Polish Delimitation Commission.

³ HD-70, minute 5, and appendices C and D thereto, pp. 643, 651, and 655.

M. SCIALOJA said that although Italy did not ask to be represented it did not object to being represented.

GENERAL LE ROND pointed out that the Treaty provided that Germano-Polish Delimitation Commission should be constituted 15 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, but that the Supreme Council on July 16th⁴ had decided that this Commission should be on the spot and enter into operation on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty. The same was true of the Dantzig Delimitation Commission by virtue of the Supreme Council's decision of October 15, (H. D. 70, Minute 4 [5]).⁵

M. BERTHELOT observed that this brought up again the whole question of what was the proper day for putting the Treaty into force: he remarked that it had also been decided that the troops of occupation were to be on the spot on the day in question.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that there were three questions to be considered; first, the Delimitation Commissions, second, the Plebiscite Commissions, third, the troops of occupation. Did the Council fully intend to have the troops ready to be at their appointed destinations on the day the Treaty came into force?

M. PICHON said that this was the Council's opinion and he wished to know what date the troops would be ready to start.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the French troops could entrain on November 5th, and he thought the British troops were now ready. The question of the number of battalions to be furnished by Italy was still unsettled: the three battalions that Italy had agreed to furnish for service in Upper Silesia were now ready to start, but the question of whether Italy would furnish the remaining four battalions designated as her share in the report of the Special Commission (See Appendix 1 [A], H. D. 72),⁶ was still undetermined. He had been informed by General Bliss that, although American troops could not be used as troops of occupation prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate, troops were now on their way to Coblenz and would be held there until such time as this ratification might take place. They would then at once be ordered to proceed to zones of occupation. He pointed out that the question of transportation still remained to be solved. This question was most serious with respect to troops destined to occupy Upper Silesia. It was extremely difficult to ask the Germans for more transportation than they had been asked for upon the occasion of the passage of General Haller's troops. Having in mind the transport of sup-

⁴ HD-8, minute 3 (c), vol. VII, p. 160.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 643.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 695.

plies, as well as of troops, at the rate of six trains per day, the movement would require fifteen days.

M. BERTHELOT calculated that on this basis the 11th of November might be a suitable date for putting the Treaty into operation.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that this date was satisfactory as far as the troops were concerned but it should be remembered that very little time was left in which to take various other necessary measures. The various Commissions had to arrive at their destinations prior to the entry into force of the Treaty and likewise the Germans should be informed of that date as far ahead as possible in order that they might take all necessary measures of evacuation.

MR. POLK asked, for information, whether the troops of occupation were to be at their appointed destination on the day of ratification or within fifteen days thereafter.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the troops were to be in place within fifteen days after ratification but that in order to effect this result it would be necessary for the troops of occupation to begin to arrive in their respective zones on the day the Treaty came into force: clearly these zones could not be occupied prior to the ratification of the Treaty.

M. PICHON asked again if the Council desired to decide on the 11th November as the day of putting the Treaty into operation.

GENERAL WEYGAND repeated that this would be satisfactory from a military point of view, except that the question of the contingent to be furnished by the Italians must be settled before a definite decision could be arrived at. He wished to add that the Italian Military Representative had always maintained a reservation on this point.

M. PICHON said that the distribution of forces decided upon by the Supreme Council must be followed out, and he desired to insist most pressing upon Italy furnishing the full contingent demanded of her by the Special Commission's report, especially since, prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate, the four American battalions destined for Upper Silesia would not be sent there.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired if the absence of American troops of occupation prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate would not adversely affect the distribution of troops of occupation provided for by the report of the Special Commission.

M. PICHON said that the eventual use of United States troops was to be considered, and added that he did not wish an attitude to be adopted which would appear to exclude United States troops from eventually participating in occupation.

MR. POLK remarked that everything depended upon the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate. He wished to repeat that United States troops were en route and would be held at Coblenz ready to be sent to zones of occupation.

M. PICHON asked Marshal Foch whether, in the present absence of United States troops destined eventually for participation in the occupation of Upper Silesia, he had enough troops to maintain order there.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he must first know if he was going to have at his disposal the remaining fourteen battalions, all ready to move on November 5th.

M. SCIALOJA said he would try to obtain a satisfactory reply from his Government immediately.

GENERAL LE ROND pointed out that the Plebiscite Commissions, for instance in Silesia, being essentially Government Commissions, they should arrive at their destination in plenty of time to confer with the outgoing German officials, so as to be able on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty to take up the Government of these districts without any hitch.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that as soon as the date of the entry into force of the Treaty was definitely determined upon, someone should be designated to settle all such matters with the German Government.

M. PICHON said that Marshal Foch was the best person to do this.

M. SCIALOJA objected that plebiscite Commissions were not of a military nature.

M. BERTHELOT replied that they were closely concerned with military affairs. Until the Armistice came to an end Marshal Foch was the properly qualified person to treat with the German Government on all such matters.

MR. POLK asked with reference to the Committee's report respecting "Persons to be delivered by Germany", when the demand for such individuals would be made.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that, for many reasons which had already been discussed, the day of the entrance into force of the Treaty would be the appropriate date for making such a demand.

M. BERTHELOT, in pointing out the provision in the Committee's report with reference to the Government of Memel, said that in view of the small size of the Memel district there was no objection to the British Commander exercising both civil and military functions.

M. PICHON suggested that the whole question could be settled by agreeing to take all necessary measures for putting the Treaty into force on November 11th, 1919. M. Dutasta had informed him that he was going to see Baron von Lersner on that night, and he wished to inquire whether M. Dutasta should tell Baron von Lersner that the Treaty would be put into force on November 11th.

MR. POLK observed that if Baron von Lersner were told this he would undoubtedly publish it immediately.

MARSHAL FOCH said that it would be better to simply inform Baron von Lersner that his Government would be notified of the date of entrance into force of the Treaty in sufficient time for it to take all measures necessary to be taken by it prior to that date.

(It was decided:

(1) that the Delegations of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should immediately submit to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference the list of the representatives they desired to name upon the Commissions which, under the terms of the Treaty with Germany, must begin to operate during the first weeks following the entry into force of said Treaty;

(2) that the 11th day of November, 1919, should provisionally be considered the date of the entry into force of the Treaty with Germany;

(3) that everything should be done to insure the completion prior to that date of all measures constituting conditions precedent to the proper and effective entry into force of said Treaty, and to effectually dispose of all reservations hindering or preventing such entry into force;

(4) that the German Peace Delegation should not yet be informed of the tentative date of the entry into force of the Treaty, but that in reply to this Delegation's inquiry as to such date it should be informed that the German Government would be informed of the date of the entry into force of the Treaty in ample time to enable it to take all measures necessary to be taken by it prior to such date.)

4. (The Council had before it a report of the Drafting Committee on the cost of transportation to and maintenance in foreign countries of German subjects convicted of serious offenses against members of the forces of occupation or against the property or authority of forces of occupation in Germany. (See Appendix "D".)

MR. POLK stated that he was entirely satisfied with the report of the Drafting Committee. He wished to add that he had already recommended to the military authorities that the procedure in question should only be followed in very serious cases and he hoped there would be very few more of these.

(It was decided:

to adopt the report of the Drafting Committee on cost of transportation to and maintenance in foreign countries of German subjects convicted of serious offenses against members of the forces of occupation or against the property or authority of forces of occupation in Germany. (See Appendix "D").)

Report of the
Drafting
Committee on
Cost of Trans-
portation to
and Mainte-
nance in
Foreign
Countries of
German Sub-
jects Convicted
of Serious
Offences
Against Mem-
bers of Forces
of Occupation
or Against
the Property
or Authority
of Such
Forces in
Germany

5. (The Council had before it a note from the Bulgarian Delegation dated Neuilly-sur-Seine, October 12th, 1919, (See Appendix "E"), and another note from the Bulgarian Delegation dated Neuilly-sur-Seine, October 21st, 1919, (See Appendix "F").)

Protest of
the Bulgarian
Delegation
Against the
Evacuation of
Western Thrace

M. BERTHELOT read the two notes of protest. He pointed out that a *fait accompli* now existed and that the question raised by the Bulgarian Delegation had become purely academic. He added that the occupation of the district in question by the Greek troops had taken place without any disturbance, and he thought that as the Bulgarians would deliver their answer to the Peace terms on the following day there was nothing further to be done until this answer had been received.

MR. POLK submitted a draft of the following questions to be addressed to General Franchet D'Esperey and requested that General D'Esperey should be asked to report immediately by telegraph on the following points:

- (a) whether the Bulgarians were actually evacuating Thrace.
- (b) what troops were proceeding to the evacuated territory.
- (c) whether other Allied troops than Greek were taking part in the preliminary occupation.
- (d) whether satisfactory precautions were being taken to prevent a possible Greek occupation of territory outside of their zone of occupation.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that Marshal Foch was in possession of the information requested and that he would reply to all these questions.

MR. POLK stated that if all the information was here he would merely ask Marshal Foch to give him the answers to these questions.

(It was decided:

- (1) that there was no necessity at the present time of replying to the Bulgarian protest against the evacuation of Thrace;
- (2) that Marshal Foch should supply the Council with all pertinent information relative to the conditions of the evacuation of Thrace and its occupation by Allied troops.

5 [6]. M. BERTHELOT referred to the decision of the Supreme Council (H. D. 72, Minute 1, (7), October 18th, 1919)⁷ "that the Inter-Allied Commissions sent into the zones of occupation should choose their own Presidents, without it being necessary for them to be of the same nationality as the Commanding Officers in the corresponding zones of occupation." He stated that M. Clemenceau thought it better for the Council to designate the Presidents of these Commissions after the lists of appointees to these various Commissions had been transmitted

Presidency of
Commissions in
Zones of
Occupation

⁷ *Ante*, p. 684.

to the Secretary General of the Conference by the various Delegations.

M. PICHON said that when the lists were submitted to the Secretary General, this question could be taken up again.

(The meeting then adjourned)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, October 23, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-75

[*The President of the German Peace Delegation (Von Lersner) to Mr. Frank L. Polk*]

PRESIDENT OF THE
GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

PARIS, October 22, 1919.

MR. UNDER-SECRETARY FOR STATE: In reply to your esteemed letter of October 13,⁸ I have the honor to state that, in accordance with the constitution of the German Labor Organization, The German Government is prepared to send delegates to the Conference at Washington. Provisionally, their number will be eleven; I must still reserve, most respectfully, the communication of the names of the gentlemen.

The Austrian Government will probably likewise appoint delegates who will travel together with the Germans, and whose number and names will likewise be communicated at a very early date.

I should be grateful to Your Excellency for the kind provision of places on a steamer, and for information of the time and place of its sailing.

Please accept [etc.]

BARON VON LERSNER

To His Excellency,

Mr. Under-Secretary for State, FRANK L. POLK,
*Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the
United States of North America,
Paris, Hotel Crillon.*

Appendix B to HD-75

PEACE CONFERENCE
SUB-COMMITTEE ON EXECUTION
OF THE CLAUSES OF THE
PEACE TREATY

OCTOBER 21, 1919.

Note to the Supreme Council

In compliance with the resolution taken by the Supreme Council in its session of October 18,⁹ the Sub-Committee on Execution as-

⁸ For draft of letter, see appendix A to HD-68, p. 583.

⁹ HD-72, minute 10, p. 694.

sembled to determine the basis upon which it must establish "the rate of indemnities of the plebiscite Commissions, after having consulted the representatives of these Commissions."

The study of the question brought up the following points which the Sub-Committee on Execution has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council:

a) By the very terms of the Treaty, the said Commissions are directed, at a fixed date, to assume, in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers the government of the territory submitted to their authority, in lieu of the German Government, and to exercise this government until the delivery of this territory to the State or States to which it may be attributed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers after the execution of the plebiscite.

These various Commissions, although, at times, they have been designated as Plebiscite Commissions, are, therefore, Government Commissions both in fact and in deed.

b) By the terms of Articles 88, 95 and 97, which define the duties, the authorities, and the responsibilities of these various Commissions, as in the spirit which guided the drafting of these Articles, these Commissions should govern, by maintaining in function in so far as possible to be judged by them according to circumstances—the functionaries of administrative order.

Their composition therefore will allow them:

on one hand, to insure the governing of the territory,

and on the other, to direct, supervise and control thoroughly the execution of the various administrative services by the existing functionaries.

From the date on which the powers of government will be transferred from the German authorities to the Commission, the responsibility of the government and of the administration devolves, in fact, entirely upon the Commission, mandatory of the P. A. A. P.;¹⁰ it is probable, furthermore, to expect ill will and inertia, and perhaps certain more serious forms of resistance, on the part of the German administrative personnel, at the disposition of the Commission.

It is important therefore to place in each commission, at the disposition of the representatives of the P. A. A. P., the necessary means for the effective accomplishment of their difficult mission, and, in particular, a personnel of technical and administrative order, destined for the supervision and control of the various branches of the administration of the territory.

c) Aside from these general characteristics in common, the Commissions of Government to Upper Silesia, Allenstein and

¹⁰ Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Marienwerder will vary according to the extent of the territory, the population, the political and economic importance of the country, as well as for the duration of their mission, to be provided for, and its responsibilities.

d) The composition of these various commissions will, naturally, be consistent both in the general characteristics which are common to them, as with the conditions of operation which differentiate them.

The Treaty made provision, in the Articles relative to each one of these commissions, only for the representatives of the P. A. A. P., in a word, the directing committee of the Commission. It authorized the P. A. A. P. to provide for the detailed constitution of each one of these commissions with a view to responding to its particular functions.

It seems that, concerning each particular commission, it appertains to the representatives of the P. A. A. P., which constitute the directing committee to proceed with the detailed study relative to the composition of the commission.

e) Although the sub-Committee on Execution must await the results of this preliminary study, it esteems that, at the present time, it is expedient to determine certain principles for the establishment of the rates of indemnity:

The above cited articles of the Treaty stipulate that "the expenses of the Commission, both concerning its operation and for the administration of the zone, shall be deducted from the local revenues."

The various indemnities to be allotted to the personnel of the commission by virtue of its functions in the commission are incontestably comprised in this definition.

There remains for decision whether the salaries or the normal indemnities of the officers and functionaries are to be included therein, or if they shall be paid to the officer or to the functionary by his own Government.

On this point, the Sub-Committee on Execution proposes, with the exception of the British Delegation, which reserves its acceptance, that the normal salaries of the officers or functionaries be paid them out of the budget of the State to which they belong.

As to the operating expenses, the sub-Committee on Execution esteems it fitting to establish the following classes of indemnities, variable, for that matter, according to the importance and the duties of each commission:

1st—Representatives of the P. A. A. P. in the Commission; the representative* who shall exercise the Presidency of the commission, shall

*The mission of governing which devolves on the Commission, carries a permanent Presidency during the entire duration of the Commission. [Footnote in the original.]

receive a supplementary indemnity corresponding with his expenses as President.

2nd—First class functionaries, civil or military.	} classification to be established according to the importance of the function exercised.
3rd— do. Second Class	
4th— do. Third Class	

Appendix C to HD-75

List of the Commissions Which Should Be Nominated During the First Weeks Following the Entry Into Force of the Treaty, and Measures Already Adopted and To Be Adopted

Time limit	Article or page	Commissions	Countries having designated members	Countries having organized the personnel
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(A) BY THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS

I.—Delimitation Commissions

15 days after entry into force	Art. 35, p. 24	Germano-Belgian	G. B.—F. I.—J. } yes	J. G. B. } en F. } route I. J. } yes
15 days	Art. 87, p. 50	Germano-Polish	yes	yes
15 days	Art. 101, p. 60	Dantzig	yes	yes
15 days	Art. 83, p. 48	Polono-Czecho-Slovak	in preparation	in preparation
15 days after plebiscite	Art. 3 [111] p. 64	Schleswig	in preparation	in preparation

II.—Plebiscite and Government Commissions

Upon the entry in force of the Treaty	Art. 88, annex p. 52	Upper Silesia	G. B. } yes I. } Fr. } no	G. B. } yes I. } no F. } no
15 days	Art. 95, p. 56	Allenstein	G. B. } yes J. } F. } I. } no	G. B. } incomplete J. } yes F. } I. } no
15 days	Art. 97, p. 57	Marionwerder	G. B. } F. } no I. } J. } yes	G. B. } F. } no I. } J. } yes
Upon the entry in force	Art. 109, p. 63	Schleswig	in action	in action

III.—Miscellaneous

No time specified	Arrangement Art. 2, p. 2.	Rhine territories	in action	in action
	Art. 203 and following arts. p. 93 & following	Military Control Naval Aerial	in action	in action
To be specified	Art. 115, p. 66	Destruction of Heligoland fortifications	To be drawn from Naval Supervision Commission	
As soon as possible after entry into force	Art. 215, p. 97	Prisoners of War	G. B. } I. } yes F. } J. }	yes
Upon entry into force	Art. 233, p. 102 and annex 2, p. 107	Reparations	G. B. } J. } yes I. } F. } no	Progressively by the organization Commission.
Upon the entry in force	Art. 354, p. 180	Rhine	G. B. } no F. }	no.
Upon entry into force	Art. 346, p. 178	Danube	Nothing	Nothing

Time limit	Article or page	Commissions	Countries having designated members	Countries having organized the personnel
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III.—Miscellaneous—Continued

3 months	Art. 340 & 343, p. 177	Elbe	Nothing	Nothing
3 months	Art. 341 & 343, p. 177	Oder	Nothing	Nothing
		Persons to be delivered by Germany	F. } G. B. } yes I. } J. }	
Upon entry into force	Art. 99, p. 58	Government of Memel	Military Occupation provided Govern't no.	
Upon entry into force	Art. 102, p. 60	Temporary administration of Dantzig.	English member designated to be replaced.	
Upon entry into force.	Art. 119, p. 68	German Colonies	Prolongation of present regime	
3 months	Art. 300 & 304 pp. 153 & 160	Mixed arbitral Tribunal	Nothing	
	Art. 296, p. 140	Verification and compensation offices.	Nothing	
No time specified	Art. 227, p. 100	International Tribunal to Judge Wm. II	Nothing	
No time specified	Art. 364, p. 185	Delimitation of neutral zones for Czecho-Slovaks in ports of Hamburg & Stettin.	(3 delegates to be named: 1 German, 1 Czecho-Slovak) nothing done.	
do.	Art. 371, 3 ^o p. 188	Distribution of Railroad material.	Nothing (concerns Reparations Commission)	
1 month	Art. 259 3 ^o p. 126	Reception of gold of Ottoman public debt deposited in Reichsbank.	Nothing (concerns Reparations Commission)	

B.—BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Upon convocation by Prest. of U. S.	Art. 4 & 5, p. 10	Council	Yes (under reservation of telegram sent by Mr. Folk).
15 days	Art. 48, p. 28	Delimitation of Saar Basin	
No time specified	Art. 50 Annex Par. 17, p. 32	Government of Saar Basin	
do	Art. 103, p. 60	High Commissioner Dantzig.	

Appendix D to HD-75*Note for the Supreme Council*

(Expenses of penitentiary services in the occupied territories)

OCTOBER 21, 1919.

By the terms of Article IV of the Armistice, the upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (not including Alsace-Lorraine) will be at the expense of the German Government.

The expenses for the maintenance of order and of the police, and consequently for the repression of crime and misdemeanors committed against the troops of occupation, are expenses necessitated by the maintenance of the said troops and must therefore be paid by Germany.

The question to regulate is, whether, in the case of serious crimes and misdemeanors, the presence of the sentenced party presents dangers for the troops of occupation and justifies removal outside of occupied territory, this is a question of fact, capable of being judged only by the military authority.

Consequently, the Allied and Associated Power, responsible for the occupying military authorities, is justified in charging Germany on the occupation expense account with the expenses above referred to. Thus it is with expenses of transport to and upkeep in the United States of parties sentenced for serious crimes to more than 5 years imprisonment by the American military authorities of occupation.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

Appendix E to HD-75

BULGARIAN DELEGATION TO
THE PEACE CONFERENCE

No. 387

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE, October 12, 1919.

From: M. K. Sarafov,

To: M. Clemenceau.

The Royal Government has just informed me by telegram, dated October 9, which arrived today, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies of the East, basing himself on Article 27 of the Peace Conditions, has asked the Bulgarian Government to proceed to the evacuation of Thrace, stipulating that this operation must be terminated on the 14th of this month, at noon.

On this subject, the Bulgarian Delegation has the honor of presenting the following remarks:

From a legal point of view, the present obligations of Bulgaria concerning its frontiers with regard to the Allied and Associated Powers are explicitly regulated by the Armistice Convention of September 29, 1918,¹¹ which in one of its clauses provides for the evacuation of Thrace.

On the other hand, the evacuation of Thrace cannot be based on Article 27 of the project of the Treaty, because it has not legal force, owing to the fact that Bulgaria up to the present time has not given her adhesion to it, and consequently one cannot impose upon Bulgaria such an obligation.

The very fact of demanding this evacuation, it being based on this project, has caused a painful surprise to the entire people. The Bulgarian Delegation has just been informed by Your Excellency that

¹¹ Vol. II, p. 241.

the Supreme Council, granting its request, has decided that the delay for the handing over of the answer by Bulgaria to the Peace Conditions is extended for 10 days. The execution of the demand of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies would be equivalent therefore to the application of a project on the subject of which Bulgaria has not yet even presented her remarks.

Besides, no consideration of fact whatsoever justifies at the present time the demand formulated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies of the East and its premature execution would be of a nature to raise serious difficulties in the country.

The question of the previous evacuation of Thrace at a time when the Bulgarian people is yet under the impress of the great territorial sacrifices which are required by the Treaty, and at a moment when Bulgaria is going through a political crisis of an exceptional importance, would submit the country to the most painful trials. Under these conditions, the maintenance of order and calm would constitute an overwhelming task for any government.

The delay fixed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies of the East expiring October 14, the Bulgarian Delegation by order of its Government has the honor to beg the Supreme Council not to refuse to take the necessary measures before this delay expires.

With the hope that Your Excellency will be good enough to take a kind interest in this matter, please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix F to HD-75

BULGARIAN DELEGATION TO
THE PEACE CONFERENCE

No. 424

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE, October 21, 1919.

From: M. Th. Theodoroff,

To: M. Clemenceau.

In its note of October 12th,¹² the Bulgarian Delegation, by order of its Government, had the honor of setting forth the reasons of right and of fact for which it begged that the unjustified demand of the General, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East, relative to the evacuation of Western Thrace by the Bulgarian authorities, be revoked.

Even before being honored by a reply from the Conference the Bulgarian Delegation has just learned that the order, forming the subject of the note in question above, has begun to be executed.

¹² *Supra.*

A telegram, sent from Sofia the 13th instant, and received the 19th, informs us "that the IX Greek Division intends to enter Xanthi on October 16th. The local population, despite the advice given it, despite encouragements tending to reassure it, has begun to leave their homes. The state in which these unfortunates are is indescribable."

On the other hand, this morning's papers announce that the IX Greek Division, received, on October 19th, at the Xanthi railroad station by the Commander of the Allied troops in Thrace, General Charpy, entered the city and General Charpy entered Gümürdjina on the same day.

From this information it may be seen that not only the occupation of a part of Western Thrace is already an accomplished fact, but that it has been carried out by Greek troops.

Now, on October 8th again the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Madjaroff, following the declarations of the Commander of the Danube Army, General Claudel, concerning the eventual occupation of Thrace by Greek troops, categorically objected inasmuch as these facts are in absolute contradiction with Article II of the Armistice Convention, concluded on September 29th, 1918, at Salonika. The Article referred to prescribes only the occupation of certain strategic points in Bulgaria, and only by troops of the Great Allied Powers and not by Greek troops.

The Bulgarian Delegation deems it its duty to observe once more that these facts constitute a most flagrant violation of the Armistice Convention of Salonika and of the regulations known as the Rights of People. The matter concerned in this case is only a previous and compulsory execution of Article XXVII of the Peace Scheme, before the Conference received the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation which are to be submitted to the Conference in writing on October 24, before this scheme be approved and signed by the interested parties, before its being put into effect and becoming obligatory.

The Bulgarian Delegation is all the more surprised by the events which happened in Western Thrace because it has not received, so far, any information of the decision of the Conference concerning that subject. If really such a decision has been taken, the Delegation was first entitled to receive notification of it.

In regard to the foregoing, the Bulgarian Delegation, following the instructions received by its Government, is obliged to make all necessary reserves on the subject of the arbitrary dispositions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East, concerning Western Thrace, as well as on the subject of the consequences which might result from them.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, October 25, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Percin

ITALY

M. Tittoni
Secretaries
M. Paterno
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Capt. B. Winthrop
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian Small
FRANCE M. Massigli
ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Dr. J. B. Scott
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Commander Fuller
Mr. Palairat
Mr. Carr
Mr. Malkin

FRANCE

M. Laroche
General Le Rond
M. Cheysson
M. Fromageot

ITALY

M. Ricci-Busatti

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

1. M. PICHON stated that the Bulgarian counter-propositions had arrived; they had been distributed both to the delegations and to the Commissions concerned. He thought it advisable to specify to the Commissions the time they would have to prepare their answers; he considered eight days adequate.

Answer to the
Bulgarian
Counter-
Propositions

MR. POLK asked whether such a long time was necessary. It was only the Bulgarian answer dealing with reparations that was difficult.

M. TITTONI supported Mr. Polk's remarks, especially as the Commissions, as well as the Council itself, were familiar with the question concerned.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that on previous occasions time had been lost; the several Commissions had made partial answers which an *ad hoc* Commission had been appointed to collect and coordinate. He wished to know whether M. Tardieu's Central Territorial Committee could not at once be asked to collate the answers of the Commissions and, without waiting any longer, prepare a final comprehensive answer.

MR. POLK agreed with this suggestion: the sooner the answer would be ready, the better.

M. PICHON said that the Council might decide that the reply ought to be ready on Saturday next. He thought an earlier date would be difficult.

M. LAROCHE said that even now M. Tardieu's Committee might get in touch with the several commissions. So far as affected points on which he did not consider himself qualified to submit a reply, he would ask the Commissions to do so.

It was decided:

(1) that the Central Territorial Committee should collect and coordinate the answers of the Commissions concerned to the observations presented by the Bulgarian Delegation;

(2) that the said Committee should present to the Supreme Council a draft of a final comprehensive answer to these observations by November 1st, 1919, at the latest.

2. SIR EYRE CROWE submitted to the Council two telegrams which he had just received from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission

Violation of
Naval Clauses
of the Armistice
by the Germans

(See Appendices "A" and "B"). The second telegram partly rectified the first. He considered it might be suitable to discuss them when the general question of the violation of clauses of the Armistice by the Germans was being considered.

3. (The Council had before it the draft answer to the German Note of October 17th,¹ concerning the measures taken by the Allied Naval Authorities in the Baltic. (See Appendix "C").)

Situation in the
Baltic Provinces.
Measures Taken
by the Naval
Authorities
Concerning Navigation in the
Baltic

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the Council had asked the Naval Experts to prepare a draft answer to the German Note of October 17th, concerning measures taken by the Allied Naval Authorities in the Baltic. He wished to know whether the Council would approve this draft reply.

M. PICHON said that, no comment having been made, the Council took the text as read.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that according to a telegram received from the British representative at Riga, the situation there was very grave; the attacks against Riga were still violent, to such a degree that the British Representative suggested the occupation of Memel, and if possible, of Tilsitt. The Representative had maintained that General Eberhardt was even worse than his predecessor, General von der Goltz. The Council had decided to send an Interallied Commission to the spot.² So far nothing had been done and the Commission had not departed. He wished to know how far preparations had advanced.

M. PICHON said that General Mangin, whose name had been suggested by Marshal Foch, had preferred not to be charged with this mission. Another General had been appointed and the publication of his name would not be delayed. He considered that to occupy Memel, without waiting for the Treaty to come into force, was a serious undertaking and he would like to know if the British Government completely adopted the opinion of its Representative at Riga.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he was only repeating the opinion of the Chief of the British Mission to indicate how serious he considered the situation, but he was not asking the Council to decide immediately upon the occupation of Memel.

M. PICHON proposed that the suggestion of the British Representative at Riga be referred to the Military Experts for examination.

It was decided:

(1) to adopt the draft answer to the German note of October 17th prepared by the Naval Representatives (See appendix "C");

(2) to refer to the Military Representatives for examination and report the question of whether the situation in the Baltic Provinces was such as to necessitate occupying Memel before the prescribed date.

¹ Appendix F to HD-74, p. 744.

² HD-67, minute 4, and appendices D and E thereto, pp. 536, 546, and 547.

4. **M. TITTONI** desired to draw the Council's attention to the situation in Southern Russia. General Denikin, to whom the Council had in the past afforded moral and material support against the Bolshevists, appeared to be neglecting them and to be turning against the Ukrainians. Under the circumstances ought the Council to continue its support?

Relations Between General Denikin and the Ukrainian Army of General Petlioura

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the information at his disposal did not quite accord with that of M. Tittoni.

M. PICHON felt in the same position: Denikin was fighting very vigorously against the Bolshevists, but to hope for an end to all difficulties between Russians and Ukrainians was asking too much. France had, for that matter, just sent a military mission to General Denikin with instructions to help him in organizing the fight against the Bolshevists and at the same time to work for the prevention of conflict with the Ukrainians.

M. TITTONI added that Italy likewise had sent a mission and for that very reason he considered it necessary to coordinate their activities.

MR. POLK stated that General Jadwin³ who had just been investigating the situation with Denikin's Army, as well as Petlioura's, reported that it was Petlioura who was attacking Denikin: the Ukraine-Russian difficulties involved two fundamental questions, namely: the Jewish question and the question of the independence of Ukraine. General Jadwin had even brought forward one case at least in which Petlioura had facilitated Bolshevik action against Denikin. At any rate, should the Council wish to hear General Jadwin, he could give them a résumé of the situation.

M. PICHON thought that the Council might very well hear him.

M. TITTONI considered it might be well to instruct their representatives to prevent friction between Denikin and Petlioura.

M. PICHON stated that the representatives of France as well as those of Great Britain had already received such instructions: but there was no use hiding the fact that the situation was extremely difficult.

MR. POLK added that General Jadwin had been informed by Petlioura that his best troops were Galician.

M. TITTONI stated that the Georgian representatives who had visited him represented General Denikin as making no secret of his intention to put an end to the Georgian Republic as soon as he had done with the Bolshevists.

³ Brig. Gen. Edgar Jadwin, U. S. A., observer in the Ukraine, September 1919.

It was decided:

to hear General Jadwin at a future meeting of the Council on the situation in Southern Russia.⁴

5. (The Council had before it a note of the British Delegation dated October 24, 1919 (See Appendix "D").)

Diplomatic
Representation
of the Allied
and Associated
Powers in
Germany

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the British Government believed it to be very important that the Allies should agree among themselves in fixing the conditions under which diplomatic relations with Germany should be resumed. He proposed that a special Legal Com-

mittee be entrusted with this question.

MR. POLK inquired whether it was essentially a question of protocols?

M. TITTONI considered that a political question must first be decided: namely; would the Allies be represented by Ambassadors or by Chargés d'Affaires?

M. PICHON said that that question had already been decided. It had been agreed to send first, Chargés d'Affaires and some months later, Ambassadors.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the Council could not fix a date by which at the latest Ambassadors should be accredited; and again, what were the intentions of the Powers as regards sending diplomatic representatives to Munich and Dresden. Certainly the British Government proposed to send them.

M. TITTONI wished to know whether special representatives would be sent to Munich and Dresden as before the war, and also what would be their title.

MR. POLK stated that the United States had never had representatives in those two capitals.

M. LAROCHE said that as far as Munich and Dresden were concerned the question was as follows: Did they wish to be represented there, and what title would be given to their representatives? Might not the person who was actually Ambassador at Berlin be also the diplomatic representative in those places? In point of fact, before the war the French Ambassador at Berlin was also Chargé d'Affaires at the Court of Saxony.

M. PICHON stated that the Council was agreed to send to Berlin at present only Chargés d'Affaires, and he considered it difficult at this time to fix the date on which Ambassadors would be designated. That would depend on the situation in Germany and on the attitude of the German Government. On the other hand, they could decide at once not to send Ambassadors before having agreed on this subject.

M. MATSUI asked what would be the rank of Chargés d'Affaires.

⁴ General Jadwin never appeared before the Council.

M. PICHON thought that this was not so important. It was the title of Chargé d'Affaires that mattered. The French representative would be a Consul-General, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

M. MATSUI thought that Japan might have difficulty in sending first a Chargé d'Affaires and then an Ambassador, but he was perfectly willing to recommend such procedure to his Government.

M. PICHON stated that the French Government intended to have a representative at Munich under the same circumstances as formerly, and also to be represented at Dresden.

MR. POLK asked whether there would be at Munich and Dresden autonomous Governments independent of Berlin.

SIR EYRE CROWE answered that he had read the German Constitution; that possibly the Central German Government might find arguments therein on which to oppose the sending of diplomatic representatives to State capitals; nevertheless there was nothing in the Constitution which explicitly said that such representatives could not be sent outside Berlin.

MR. POLK asked whether the present German Government was not much more centralized than the former Imperial Government.

M. LAROCHE stated that the German Constitution had denied to particular States the right of accrediting representatives, but not of receiving diplomatic representatives.

M. TITTONI thought there might be opposition and that the Powers might, if they were to designate representatives without being assured in advance of their being accepted by Bavaria and Saxony, run the risk of not finding anyone with whom the representatives might deal.

M. LAROCHE thought that the Council might settle the question of principle and leave to the Commission that was to be appointed the task of deciding what procedure should be followed.

M. TITTONI agreed, on the condition that they keep to strictly legal grounds.

M. LAROCHE inquired whether they had agreed to recognize Germany as a more compact unit than it was in the past.

MR. POLK was of the opinion that the Treaty did not prevent Germany from deciding this internal question whichever way she wished: the question of the unity of Germany was not under discussion.

M. BERTHELOT said that the unity of Germany was indeed not under discussion; what was certain was that Bavaria and Saxony had no longer the positive right of representation but had retained a negative right. The intention of the French Government was to be represented in each of these states by a Consul-General—a diplomatic agent.

M. TITTONI suggested that such arrangement would be similar to what obtained at Budapest before the war, but that the title of diplomatic agent could not be accorded to these Representatives without the consent of the Saxon and Bavarian Governments.

M. BERTHELOT maintained, however, that they had the right of being thus represented, which was the pre-war situation. The Treaty, however, had made no change in this respect, and Germany had not notified the Powers that she would forbid the exercise of the same prerogatives as they had before the war. They were taking into account the changes which had occurred in Germany by diminishing their representations at Munich and Dresden. It was certain that their representations would not be imposed, but at the same time would not be a matter of negotiation; he had in mind rather a courteous notification.

M. PICHON stated that as they were agreed upon the principles, they could entrust a special commission with drawing up the questions of procedure.

It was decided:

(1) that the Allied and Associated powers upon resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany, should be represented at Berlin by Chargés d'Affaires and that they should fix later a suitable date for sending Ambassadors;

(2) that such Allied and Associated Powers as before the war had had diplomatic representatives at Dresden and Munich, be qualified to continue their representation;

(3) that a special Committee should be charged with the study of the proper procedure to be followed in the resumption of diplomatic relations. This Committee would be composed of members as follows:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF	Mr. Grew
BRITISH EMPIRE	Hon. C. Tufton
FRANCE	M. Berthelot
ITALY	M. DeMartino
JAPAN	M. Shigemitsu

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions containing the draft instructions of the Supreme Council to the Plebiscite Commission of Teschen, Spisz and Orava (See Appendix "E").)

Plebiscite Procedure in the Duchy of Teschen and the Territories of Spisz and Orava

After a short discussion, the Commission being unanimous,

It was decided:

to approve the draft instructions to the Plebiscite Commission in the Duchy of Teschen and in the territories of Spisz and Orava prepared by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions, (See Appendix "E").

7. (The Council had before it a letter from the chairman of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference dated October 21st, 1919 (See Appendix "F").)

Proposed Municipal Elections in Upper Silesia

M. LAROCHE thought it would be wise for the Polish Commission to verify without delay the information

transmitted by Mr. Dmowski. If the information were exact it would be well that the Commission prepare a draft note to the German Delegation demanding whether the alleged facts were true and stating that, if so, the Allies could not permit any such manoeuvre. The note would also state that the Municipal elections would take place after the Inter-Allied occupation and when the Plebiscite Commission should have assumed its functions.

SIR EYRE CROWE was in agreement provided it were not stated that the elections were to take place immediately after the Commission had taken up its duties.

M. LAROCHE thought they might say, "as soon as possible", namely, when things had become quiet and those persons who had fled before the German repression had returned.

GENERAL LE ROND said the question had already been examined by the Commission which dealt with the Eastern Frontiers of Germany. It had been considered then that the German Government would be unable to hold any election before the Inter-Allied occupation and that it would be for the Plebiscite Commission to fix the date of the Municipal election. It would obviously be very grave to let the Germans proceed to elections at that time.

It was decided :

(1) to refer at once to the Polish Commission for examination and report the letter of Mr. Dmowski to the President of the Peace Conference showing the intention of the German Government to hold without delay municipal elections in Upper Silesia ;

(2) to ask the Commission, should these facts be found exact, to prepare immediately a draft note to the German Government in which it would be pointed out that the Allied and Associated Powers would not tolerate such a manoeuvre and that the municipal elections should be held after the occupation of Upper Silesia by the Allied troops and at such a time as the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission should deem it possible. (See Appendix "F".)

8. (The Council had before it a telegram from the Chairman of the Schleswig Commission, dated October 22nd, 1919 (See Appendix "G"), and a note transmitted by Baron von Lersner on October 23rd, 1919 (See Appendix "H").

Mr. LAROCHE said that Sir Charles Marling's telegram brought up a delicate question. In the note addressed to the German Delegation on July 29th, the Allied and Associated Powers had called the attention of the German authorities to arrests which had taken place shortly before, for political reasons, in the region adjoining the plebiscite zone. To this note the Germans replied on August 10th that they desired to avoid any action of a kind that might stir national passions and that

Schleswig
Situation

they had released the publicist Wall,⁷ but Mr. Wall had been kept under observation. Did the Council still wish to go further and demand the setting at liberty of this person. It would, at any rate, be necessary that the German Government should be warned that, if arrests had been made in the plebiscite zone, the arrested persons must be released. As for the particular case of Wall, it had to be recognized that he resided in the zone not subject to plebiscite.

M. TITTONI said that the German authorities imputed to Wall an action tending to detach from Germany a country belonging to it under the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

M. LAROCHE agreed, but stated that at the time Wall came to Paris,—and this was the action for which he was reproached,—the intention of the Allies had been to extend the plebiscite to a third zone, namely, the one which Denmark had refused. Obviously, they could not do much from a legal point of view, but it was to be feared that the German agents would make capital of the Wall incident with half-hearted people in the second zone, and convince them that if the result of the plebiscite left this second zone to Germany, those who had voted for attachment to Denmark would be treated as the publicist in question had been.

SIR EYRE CROWE referred to a further point in Sir Charles Marling's telegram: the French representative on the Schleswig Commission believed that the German Government had been notified that it would be called upon to evacuate immediately the third zone if arrests of a political nature should occur there. As a matter of fact, it was not so, and the Council had modified on July 16th (H. D. 8),⁸ the proposal which had been submitted to it by the relevant Commission. He suggested therefore that the Schleswig Commission be informed accurately on this point, and was prepared, if the Council approved, to telegraph to Sir Charles to that effect.

M. LAROCHE told the Council that according to a telegram of the French representative at Copenhagen, as well as to the note from Baron von Lersner, the Germans had sent troops to Flensburg on the pretext of preventing incidents arising out of unemployment. It was clear that there was therein an attempt at bringing pressure to bear on the eve of the plebiscite. They could not oblige the Germans to withdraw their troops, but could they not send to the spot warships charged with watching what was taking place.

M. PICHON thought that it would be wrong to let this action of Germany pass without protest.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed, but at the same time, thought that, up to the time, when the Treaty came into force the German Government

⁷ W. Wall, from Obdrup (Angel), representative at Paris of the Danes of the Third Zone.

⁸ Minute 3(b), vol. VII, p. 160.

had both the right and the duty to maintain order in these regions; and they were not in a position to say *a priori* that any such manoeuvre was intended.

M. LAROCHE drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the Germans had deemed it their duty to advise it of this despatch of troops; doubtless their conscience was not perfectly at ease. The Council could reply recognizing the Germans' right, but adding that they, on their side, were going to send ships to demonstrate the fact that when the moment arrived they were equally interested in the maintenance of order.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether they were in a position to send ships.

M. LAROCHE answered that a French ship must be on the eve of arriving at Copenhagen.

SIR EYRE CROWE also asked whether they had the right to send ships into German ports.

MR. POLK thought that they were no more justified in that than in sending troops into Upper Silesia before the Treaty came into force.

M. LAROCHE thought it was exactly because that right was debatable that he proposed the formula he had just indicated.

GENERAL LE ROND reminded the Council that since the Armistice the cruiser *Marseillaise* had already been at Flensburg and Sonderburg.

M. LAROCHE remarked that certainly the Germans had objected, but on the grounds of a particular incident which had arisen. The note might say that, in order to avoid any misinterpretation resulting from the despatch of warships to Flensburg, the Allies on their part would send ships into the harbor without disembarking.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that it would be well to make sure that they had ships available.

M. PICHON concluded that the naval representatives would come to an agreement.

It was decided:

(1) that Sir Eyre Crowe should make known to the Chairman of the Schleswig Commission in the name of the Supreme Council, the exact sense of the decisions taken by the Council at its meeting of July 8th [16th], 1919, with regard to Schleswig;

(2) that on account of recent events at Flensburg, and with the reservation that the naval representatives should deem it possible to send warships, a note should be sent to the German Delegation to inform it that the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to send warships to Flensburg.

9. (The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee dated October 23rd, 1919 (See Appendix "T").)

M. CHEYSSON said that in the draft telegram which the Financial Commission had already prepared it had been indicated to the High Commissioners at Con-

stantinople that the Council supported them in such measures as they had taken.⁹ This indication did not appear in the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee. It would perhaps be wise to communicate to the High Commissioners the note of the Drafting Committee.

MR. POLK asked what the Drafting Committee thought about it.

M. FROMAGEOT said he could only reply for himself. It seemed to him preferable to send the telegram as it had been prepared by the Drafting Committee and to address also to the High Commissioners a copy of their note. They would thus have complete security for the past as well as for the future. The considerations developed in their report would give the High Commissioners all the arguments tending to justify, if that should be necessary, the attitude they had taken in the past. The Drafting Committee would further suggest to the Council the advantage of inserting in the Treaty with Turkey a clause which should give to the High Commissioners final discharge in respect of all operations carried out by them, and which should fix the allocation of sums accruing from liquidations carried out up to the time of the coming into force of the Treaty with Germany.

It was decided :

(1) to approve the note of the Drafting Committee dated October 23rd, 1919, relative to German and Austrian banks in Turkey;

(2) to send to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople the draft telegram enclosed in the above note and at the same time to send a copy of this note to the Allied High Commissioners (See Appendix "I").

10. M. PICHON proposed at the next meeting, which at Mr. Tittoni's request would be on Tuesday, to discuss the violations of the Armistice as well as the nominations for Chairmen of the different Government Commissions.

Determination
of Agenda
for the Next
Meeting

Boundaries
of Albania

11. MR. POLK asked whether the question of the boundaries of Albania could not be referred forthwith to the appropriate Commission for examination and report.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether this question could be detached from the whole Adriatic question.

M. TITTONI did not think one could separate from the Adriatic question that of the mandate claimed by Italy for Albania, but the specific question of boundaries might quite well be considered separately.

MR. POLK thought that the boundary question was indeed a question apart. The line of the Albano-Greek frontier would be fixed shortly; elsewhere the problem of the Albanian frontiers involved Serbian and Montenegrin questions, but nevertheless if the question were studied

⁹ Appendix A to HD-74, p. 738.

now, time would be saved. When the proper time arrived the Council would have a report before it.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed but thought on the whole that in such a country as Albania the limitation of boundaries was largely a matter of political compromise: the solutions arrived at in neighboring regions should be known. He would like the matter discussed provided the problem was discussed in all its bearings.

M. TITTONI said that the Council was already in possession of a report on the subject of the line of boundary between Albania and Greece; why not prepare a report on the Albano-Serbian frontier? When the Council came to discuss the question there would be nothing to hinder its examining the matter as a whole. Then would be the time to introduce considerations of a political nature. For the moment let the Commission investigate the line guided by ethnographical considerations.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if he might remark that the Territorial Commissions charged with the determination of frontiers were not guided in the work simply by ethnographical considerations.

M. BERTHELOT thought that so far as concerned Albanian frontiers, Treaties prior to this war supplied already a general basis. If they were to modify the frontiers which had then been traced it would be in virtue of essentially political considerations and these considerations were bound up with decisions still to be arrived at affecting the Adriatic.

M. TITTONI added that this bond existed particularly for Italians who had associated the question of the mandate in Albania with the concessions that they made in Dalmatia, the two problems being inseparable.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked why not then tackle the problem as a whole at once?

M. PICHON remarked that as Mr. Polk and M. Tittoni were to meet that day they might await the result of their conversation.

MR. POLK then withdrew his proposal.

It was decided:

to adjourn the discussion of this question until a future meeting.

(The meeting then adjourned)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, October 25, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-76

Memorandum From the British Delegation

The following telegram, addressed to the Supreme Council, has been received from the President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission:

“Considering that Admiral Goette persists in paying no attention to the orders emanating from the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, it is proposed to send Admiral Goette the following telegram tomorrow night :

(Beginning of the telegram) :

Considering that you persist in paying no attention to the orders which are given you by the President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, particularly as relates to :

- I.—The delivery of tank vessels ;
- II.—The sending to the Firth of Forth of five ships, in execution of the order of the Supreme Council, which was the object of my telegram No. 1840 of October 16th ;
- III.—The sending of the ships *Estonia* or *Estland* (see my telegrams 1300 of October 17th, 1930 of October 17th and 1100 of October 18th) ;
- IV.—The answer to my telegram No. 1200 of October 7th, asking for a statement on the measures taken on the occasion of the Claymore incident ;
- V.—The case of several merchant ships which have not been delivered ;

You are informed by the present, that as long as the orders given by the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, are not executed, no German ship will be given freedom of the seas either Baltic waters, or elsewhere. (Here ends the telegram.)

The approval of the Supreme Council is requested.—1329.

Pending the arrival of instructions from London, the British Delegation is not able to discuss this question.

OCTOBER 24, 1919.

Appendix B to HD-76

Memorandum From the British Delegation

The following telegram, addressed to the Supreme Council has been received from the President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission :

I refer to telegram 319 from the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, dated October 22nd. On account of the decision of the Supreme Council¹⁰ on the subject of the German note,¹¹ asking that the embargo put on navigation in the Baltic be only applied when military reasons make it necessary, the telegram which it was proposed to send to Admiral Goette, has not been sent.

Since October 22nd requests Numbers 3 and 4 have been complied with, but the important points numbers 1, 2 and 5, have not yet begun to be executed.

OCTOBER 25, 1919.

¹⁰ HD-74, minute 9, p. 736.

¹¹ Appendix F to HD-74, p. 744.

Appendix C to HD-76

(EMBARGO ON GERMAN SHIPPING IN THE BALTIC)

*Proposed Draft Reply to the German Delegation Note of 17 October,
Prepared by the Allied Naval Advisers*

The Allied and Associated Governments have examined the request contained in the Note of 17 October from the German Government,¹² concerning the restrictions placed on the sailings of German fishing vessels and other small craft in the Baltic, and have instructed A.N.A.C.¹³ to take whatever steps are possible to meet the requests of the German Government, in so far as these steps do not interfere with any military measures that are considered necessary.

24 OCTOBER, 1919.

Appendix D to HD-76

Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council

The Governments of the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan have agreed on a uniform course of actions as regards the resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany and propose to be represented at Berlin at first by Chargés d'Affaires.

The British Government would be glad to know the views of the Supreme Council on the following points:—

1. How should the names of the representatives chosen and the dates of their arrival be notified to the German Government? Should this be done through the neutral Governments which now represent the five Powers at Berlin—in the case of Great Britain, the Netherland Government?
2. Should the credentials of the five representatives be in the usual form?
3. Should the five representatives follow the procedure customary in the case of a newly arrived Head of a Mission as regards official calls, etc., while of course abstaining from any relations with the Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish Missions till the Treaties of Peace with their respective Governments have been ratified?
4. Should the procedure agreed on, whatever it may be, be also followed at Munich and Dresden?
5. When should the five representatives proceed to their posts?

OCTOBER 24, 1919.

¹² Appendix F to HD-74, p. 744.

¹³ Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

Appendix E to HD-76

Joint Note of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions Relative to the Plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen and the Territories of Spisz and Orava

NOTE PRESENTED TO THE SUPREME COUNCIL BY THE JOINT POLISH AND CZECHO-SLOVAK COMMISSIONS

PLEBISCITE IN THE DUCHY OF TESCHEN AND THE TERRITORIES OF SPISZ AND ORAVA

A decision taken by the Supreme Council under date of September 27th last,¹⁴ established the method of carrying out the plebiscite to be instituted in the territories of Teschen, Spisz and Orava, and determined the powers of the Interallied Commission charged with the task of organizing the plebiscite and of supervising its execution.

The Commissions which elaborated the plebiscite plan consider it necessary that the instructions given to the Interallied Commission by virtue of the above cited decision be made clear on certain points, and that at the same time more latitude in interpretation be accorded the Commission in order that it may more easily cope with the difficulties which might be encountered locally on account of the difference of views of the Poles and of the Czecho-Slovaks.

To this end the Commissions have the honor to submit herewith, for the approval of the Council, the following resolution which, if it is adopted, should be communicated in the form of instructions to the members of the Plebiscite Commission.

The Supreme Council judges it desirable to define as follows the provisions of the resolution of September 27th, as well as the powers confided to the International Plebiscite Commission by this resolution.

As stated by the decision of September 27th, the Commission alone shall have authority to interpret this decision, to decide just what are the administration and police powers which it appears to it necessary to exercise to insure the maintenance of order and the normal existence of the country. It may hear the Polish and Czecho-Slovak representatives, but merely in a consultative capacity.

Also, in its decisions, the Commission should not consider itself as bound by the various indications contained in the minutes of the sessions of the Paris Commissions, or in the other documents placed at its disposition. It should only consider them as indications facilitating the study of the problem: it shall be solely guided by the decision of September 27th and by the present instructions.

Competence
of the
Commission

¹⁴ HD-62, minute 8, p. 412; see also HD-58, minute 2, p. 300.

Conditions
Governing
the Right
of Suffrage

The Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations have requested that modifications be introduced in the conditions governing the right of suffrage as fixed in article 5 of the resolution of September 27th.

The Poles consider that domicile ought to be taken as the sole basis of a right to vote, in order that this right may be refused to persons who have, for some time, ceased to inhabit the country. They consider, further, that domicile ought to entail a right to vote if it is prior to November 3rd, 1918.

The Czechs, on the contrary, desire that "indigénat" (*heimatsrecht*) alone be taken into consideration.

It is impossible to accede wholly to either one or the other of these propositions.

The Czecho-Slovak proposal refuses the right to vote to a number of inhabitants who, although not possessing "indigénat", have none the less been located in the region for some time.

The modification of date proposed by the Poles tends to accord voting rights to elements too recently arrived in the country, and to the participation in the plebiscite of that part of the population whose floating character is difficult to contest and whose admission to voting rights could only be justified on political grounds and not by durable bonds of attachment to this region.

In establishing the list of voters, the Commission should not only conform to the letter of the provisions of Article 5, paragraph c, but be guided also by their spirit, in order fully to respond to the clear intention of the Supreme Council. The right to take part in the plebiscite should only be accorded to those who may be considered in good faith as meeting the conditions fixed by the Supreme Council, that is:

1. To those who possessed "indigénat" prior to August 1st, 1914.
2. To those who, without having fulfilled that formality, had their habitual residence in the region from a date which could not be subsequent to August 1st, 1914.

Thus, one could only accord the vote to persons who possessed "indigénat" previous to the 1st of August, 1914, if their behavior showed that they had not disinterested themselves from the region or allowed their connections with the region to be severed. On the other hand, the right to vote could only be based upon residence previous to the 1st of August, 1914, if that residence had been habitual, actual, residence prolonged until the date of the plebiscite. Persons could not be admitted to the vote who, after having resided outside of the region during this period, only returned to participate in the plebiscite. *Force majeure* (military service, etc) could only be invoked if the person in question has shown his attachment to

the country by the fact that he had been there for a considerable period previous to 1914, or by other evidence of a nature to leave no doubt as to his intention of making that region the place of his habitual residence (property holding and the maintenance of his family in the country, etc.).

Within these limits, the Commission has full power without appeal to decide the conditions of the vote.

Appendix F to HD-76

**POLISH DELEGATION
TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE**

PARIS, October 21, 1919.

**From: Roman Dmowski,
To: President Clemenceau.**

The German Government has decided to take advantage of the short period remaining before the occupation of Upper-Silesia by Allied troops, to conduct communal elections in that province. Electoral lists have already been prepared and exposed to the public. The electoral colleges will be convoked in the very near future.

The purpose of this measure, put into operation in great haste, is clearly evident. Following the insurrection of the Polish population in Upper Silesia, provoked intentionally by the Germans, thousands of Poles were arrested and deported to German provinces; more numerous still are those who were obliged to take refuge in Polish territory already liberated. The amnesty recently discussed between the Polish and German Governments has not yet been realized. Under these conditions, an important number of electors are unable to take part in the election, thus the result of these preliminary elections must in no sense be considered as the true expression of opinion in the country. All electors subject to the exceptional regime still in force in Upper-Silesia, will be deprived of an opportunity to express their opinions. But this is exactly the reason why the German Government hastens to conduct the elections, it wishes to prove to the Inter-allied occupation authorities, and to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers that the universal suffrage as applied to the Communal elections gives Germany full justification and confirms her assertions regarding the German character of Upper-Silesia. Moreover, the communal authorities, elected under similar circumstances, will be docile instruments in the hands of the German Government, with which she intends to influence the result of the plebiscite. It is also certain that the German Government will do everything in its power to insure the election of persons who, by remaining in the country, would serve as supporters of her policy.

The Polish Delegation, in a note dated July 5th last, indicated that it is important to proceed with the communal elections, but under a regime of occupation by Allied troops, because this occupation alone could furnish sufficient impartiality guarantees concerning the organization and conduct of these elections.

Considering that the communal elections decreed for Upper Silesia are to be regarded as a manoeuvre on the part of the German Government tending [to influence?] the result of the plebiscite, the Polish Delegation has the honor to request the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to kindly take any measures it may deem necessary to cause a revocation of the communal elections in Upper-Silesia by the German Government, and to have these elections operated under the control of the Inter-Allied occupation authorities after a reasonable electoral period, and upon a basis of the lists which are to be prepared after the evacuation of the province by the German Authorities.

Accept, etc.

ROMAN DMOWSKI

Appendix G to HD-76

Telegram to the Supreme Council From Sir C. Marling, Chairman of the Slesvig Commission, Relative to Political Arrests in Slesvig

COPENHAGEN, October 22, 1919.

About July 20th the Slesvig Commission at Paris suggested to the Supreme Council that a request should be addressed to the German Government to give strict instructions to the German officials in the Third Zone to abstain from political arrests, on the understanding that the evacuation of that zone would be immediately required in case any instances of such arrests, which could not but vitiate the results of the plebiscite, were reported by the International Commission.

The Commission was never authoritatively informed whether the Supreme Council approved this proposal and addressed the necessary communication to the German Government on the subject, but my French colleague believes this to be the case.

A concrete instance has now occurred in the case of the publicist Wall. This man was arrested last July and released at the instance of the late French Minister, yet the German authorities have since confined him to his own house, and the Commission hereby requests authority to demand of the German Delegate that Mr. Wall shall be restored to complete liberty, and to quote in so doing, the above mentioned resolution of the Supreme Council.

Appendix H to HD-76

Note Delivered by Baron von Lersner, October 23, 1919

For several weeks Flensburg has been suffering from gross excesses committed by strikers and members of the seamen's league. Crews who wish to work are threatened; provisioning is jeopardized. On the 16th instant the Hotel de Ville was taken by assault and impossible demands made on the magistrates. Consequently, we were obliged to comply with the urgent request of the authorities and of the citizens of Flensburg to take measures for military protection.

Appendix I to HD-76

Note for the Supreme Council Concerning German and Austrian Banks in Turkey

1st—The measures taken since the Turkish Armistice and until the entry into force of the German Treaty (and afterwards the Austrian Treaty) are protected from German or Austrian Claims:

1st—By virtue of Articles 19 and 23 of the Turkish Armistice¹⁵ which forbids the presence of Austrian or German subjects in Turkey or of any relations between Turkey and Germany (and Austria); and (2nd) by virtue of Article 439 of the German Treaty (Article 377 of the Austrian Treaty) by virtue of which Germany (and Austria) renounced any claims concerning measures taken by the Powers prior to the entry into force of the Treaty.

2nd. After the entry into force of the German Treaty (and afterwards the Austrian Treaty) the control measures taken or to be taken by the Powers are covered; 1st, by the articles of the Turkish Armistice above referred to; 2nd, by the right vested in Powers occupying a territory to supervise, for reasons of military security, any enterprise whatsoever situated in occupied country.

The Drafting Committee has no knowledge as to whether the Principal Allied and Associated Powers intend to operate liquidations after the entry into force of the German Treaty (and of the Austrian Treaty), but if such liquidations are to be operated it would be advantageous to have these measures covered later in the Turkish Treaty.

In fact, the Allied and Associated Powers have, in relation to Germany, Article 155 of the German Treaty (and in relation to Austria, Article 86 of the Austrian Treaty) entire authority to fix the fate of the said German and Austrian Banks in the Turkish Treaty, and Germany and Austria agree at the present time to all stipulations of this nature between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey.

¹⁵ See undated telegram No. 32 from the Special Representative (House), *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 441.

If these considerations are fully founded, it would be opportune to instruct the High Commissioners at Constantinople as follows:

DRAFT OF TELEGRAM TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS AT CONSTANTINOPLE

Replying to your telegram 1.792 of September 23rd with regard to the attitude to be adopted concerning the German and Austrian banks in Turkey, the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agree to not proceed, after the entry into force of the German Treaty, and afterwards of the Austrian Treaty, with the operation of any liquidation measures, but they reserve the right to take, even after the entry into force of these Treaties, all supervision measures deemed necessary concerning the said banks. These measures will be justified: 1st, by Articles 19 and 23 of the Turkish Armistice; and 2nd, by the right vested in Powers occupying the territory to supervise, for reasons of military security, any enterprise whatsoever situated in said occupied territory.

It will be expedient to fix the fate of the said banks in the stipulations of the arrangements with Turkey, as Germany (Article 153 [155] of the German Treaty) and Austria (Article 86 of the Austrian Treaty), have already agreed to any stipulations of this nature between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

OCTOBER 23, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, October 28, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk.

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe.

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.

Secretaries

M. Berthelot.
M. de Saint-Quentin.

ITALY

M. Tittoni.

Secretary

M. Barone Russo.

JAPAN

M. Matsui.

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Capt. G. A. Gordon.
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian Small.
FRANCE M. Massigli.
ITALY M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

General Tasker H. Bliss
Brig. Gen. Cheney.
Rear-Admiral McCully, U. S. N.

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Commandant Lucas
General Groves
Colonel Kisch
Captain Fuller

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
General Weygand
General Niessel
M. Laroche
M. Kammerer
Commandant Le Vasseur
Captain de corvette Fabre
Captain Roper

ITALY

General Cavallero
C. Amiral Grassi
Lieut-Col. Scelzo
Capt. de corvette Ruspoli

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu.

1. (The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch, dated October 15th, 1919, to M. Clemenceau, with annexed note (See Appendix "A").)

**Constitution
of Inter-Allied
Military Organi-
zation for the
Execution of the
Clauses of
the Treaty With
Germany**

MR. POLK observed that he only received the letter and note in question late the night before.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if he desired to adjourn the consideration of this question?

MR. POLK thought that it would be useful to discuss the questions involved although he did not think that any conclusions could be reached at that meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if Sir Eyre Crowe was in the same situation, and briefly summarized the letter and note, adding that he intended to appoint Marshal Foch as the French Representative on the Inter-Allied Military Organization which it was intended to constitute and he thought that he should have the presidency thereof.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had hurriedly read the letter and note in question but he had not been aware that this point was on the agenda for that day. He was not clear as to the exact machinery which it was proposed to set up. There were already in existence Commissions of Control which would supervise in Germany the execution of the Treaty, and on these Commissions representation of all the Allied and Associated Powers was provided for.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the proposed Military Organization was not an ordinary Commission. It was rather a question of creating an Inter-Allied Military Organization with executive functions. After the Treaty came into force Marshal Foch, as Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces, would no longer have any command to exercise. He proposed to transfer those powers to the Council existing at Versailles and to endow it with executive functions.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if it was not desired to retain an Inter-Allied command.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it was, but that it would be in a different form.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that there was already in existence a Council sitting at Versailles which, however, had no executive powers but purely advisory ones. He felt that he would have to refer the question of the organization now proposed to his Government. Command of the troops of occupation on the Rhine was already settled, the command being vested in the Commanding Officer of the French troops of occupation on the Rhine, and he thought it was unnecessary to create another intermediate body exercising functions of command.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the troops of occupation on the Rhine were not the only ones concerned. He was now asking to be relieved as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces. It was however

necessary to ensure the execution of the clauses of the Treaty. It was true that in large part this was already confided to the Commissions of Control in Germany, but for various reasons a central organization like that at Versailles was necessary, with an Inter-Allied staff: First, it was necessary to have a central organization in order to give directions to the various Commissions of Control which otherwise would deal with their respective Governments, so that confusion and disorder would necessarily ensue. For the same reasons a central organization was necessary in view of the different conditions applying to the Inter-Allied troops of occupation, inasmuch as they were to be stationed in different localities, were of different composition and were subject to different conditions of administration. If it became necessary to proceed to affirmative measures on the Rhine, for instance, it would be necessary to have a medium for reaching an agreement with Belgium with respect to the cooperation of her troops. In like manner if it were also desired to take similar measures on the eastern frontier the same necessity existed for coming to an understanding with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. For the foregoing reasons it was necessary to have an Inter-Allied staff. The Council at Versailles did not at present have executive powers, but in February and March, 1918, with Mr. Lloyd-George's consent, the Executive War Board sitting at Versailles had been invested with executive as well as consultative powers. He proposed the retention of the present Council of Versailles with the added attribution of extensive executive powers, otherwise the proper execution of the various military measures would become impossible.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that his delegation had already discussed this matter and that, although differing on certain points, it had come to a similar conclusion. The necessity for a centralized organization with executive powers was fully realized. He thought that the Council already existing at Versailles was sufficient but that it should remain under the orders of the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that of course this would be so.

MR. POLK suggested that the Conference might no longer be in session at the time referred to.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that this was true but that the necessity of consulting the respective Governments would still exist and that, therefore, a central body with executive power became more necessary than ever. If the various decisions of the Allied and Associated Powers were to be communicated to their respective military commanders much confusion would inevitably result: it would be preferable to have these orders transmitted by a central body sitting at Versailles which would include representatives of the Governments concerned.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that a Committee for the coordination of questions concerning the interpretation and execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany had already been decided upon.¹

MR. POLK thought that the idea was that such a Committee would have no other powers than the winding up of the work of the Conference: it had not been contemplated that this Committee of Coordination should resolve itself into a continuation of the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that for whoever knew the Germans it was unquestionably true that if we did not see to the proper execution of the clauses of the Treaty they would never be executed.

MR. POLK inquired whether it would be equally necessary to have some central body of Naval control.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that he did not see why not; that he should like that to come about.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought that the Committee of Coordination which had been decided upon was essential: moreover, that as it could transmit orders from the various Governments concerned to their Naval and Military Representatives it, in his opinion, was sufficient.

M. TITTONI in summarizing what Sir Eyre Crowe had said, took it that he meant that the existing Council at Versailles should be maintained and that it should have the same relations towards the proposed Committee of Coordination as it now occupied with respect to the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the Versailles Council had no executive powers at all.

MARSHAL FOCH added that he himself now had all executive power.

M. TITTONI thought that the Council of Versailles should exist under the presidency of Marshal Foch with executive powers, receiving its orders from the Committee of Coordination in the same manner as it now received such orders from the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that the Supreme Council or the Committee of Coordination was always to retain the power of decision; that the military organization proposed was to be endowed with full executive powers for carrying out the orders of the Supreme Council or of the Committee of Coordination. He thought it was necessary to have Marshal Foch at the head of this proposed military organization at Versailles inasmuch as in view of his great prestige, as well as his ability, it would never do for the Germans to think that they were finally rid of him.

MR. POLK inquired if it was Marshal Foch's idea that the Interallied troops of occupation in Dantzic, Silesia, and other regions would all be under the supreme command of the organization at Versailles with its Interallied General Staff.

¹ HD-17, minute 1, vol. VII, p. 356.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that this was the case. He thought that the questions involved were now clearly understood by everyone and he suggested that their decision be postponed to a future meeting.

(This was agreed to.)

2. (The Council had before it telegrams from Sir Edward Grey to Lord Curzon and from Lord Curzon to Sir Eyre Crowe, both dated October 25th, 1919 (See appendix "B").)

Communication
From the British
Delegates to the
International
Labor Conference
at Washington
Urging the
Ratification of
the Treaty With
Germany

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented on the telegrams in question.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that a great many other important questions were awaiting upon the possibility of setting a definite date for the coming into force of the Treaty, which, needless to say, would be done as soon as possible.

3. (The Council had before it draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (See appendix "C").)

Draft Instructions
to the Inter-Allied
Commission
Charged With
Examining Into
the Evacuation of
the Baltic Provinces

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that in the place of General Mangin, General Niessel had been appointed to the Presidency of this Commission: the General had lived for a long while in Russia and was familiar with

the Russian tongue.

MR. POLK suggested that the representatives named on this Commission meet and discuss the draft instructions to General Niessel and report back to the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they could meet immediately in another room.

GENERAL NIESEL remarked that as he had had a conversation with the British Representative, General Turner, the day before, he could speak for him at this meeting.

(At this point the military representatives on this Commission left the room.)

M. TITTONI observed that the draft instructions brought up a great many political questions also.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that these be discussed immediately.

M. BERTHELOT then began to read Section 5 of the draft instructions.

M. TITTONI, with respect to the last paragraph of Section 5, suggested that the wording used implied that the Commission would be superior and in fact replace the local *de facto* governments, thus assuming responsibilities which properly attached to them. He thought that this clause should be so altered that it would be clear that these *de facto* governments were to be consulted by the Commission. He suggested that the clause be made to read: "The local governments, in agreement with the Commission, will take, etc."

M. BERTHELOT observed that this change could easily be made: it was clear that the Commission could not replace these *de facto* governments.

MR. POLK, with respect to the first paragraph of Section 5, inquired whether the recognition of the Governments of Latvia, Esthonia and Lithuania was implied.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was not, that it was only a question of dealing with these *de facto* governments.

MR. POLK observed that he had asked the question because the United States had not yet recognized these Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE, with respect to the last paragraph of Section 6, inquired whether it was contemplated that the President of this Commission would surely be the representative of the Allied and Associated Powers at Petrograd.

M. BERTHELOT said that this was not exactly the meaning: what was meant was that the President of this Commission might eventually be designated by the Conference as representative in Petrograd of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. TITTONI thought it would be better to provide that this Commission might eventually represent the Allied and Associated Powers at Petrograd, rather than that the President thereof should be such representative.

MR. POLK wished to raise the point whether there was not great danger of this Commission doing much more than it had been meant to do. The primary intention was to constitute a commission which should see to it that the Germans were driven out of the Baltic Provinces. Under the instructions now presented the Commission was apt to engage the Allied and Associated Powers in a large number of delicate questions.

M. BERTHELOT replied that it was difficult to separate the questions. The Germans were in those regions in all conditions and guises and for that reason it was necessary to provide for a great number of contingencies and to enable the Commission to treat with all the local authorities. It had been attempted to formulate a clear and continuous policy with respect to the Baltic Provinces; this was a thing which heretofore had been lacking and had frequently been a cause of reproach.

MR. POLK agreed that a clear and continuous policy was certainly necessary, but queried whether this was the time to begin to formulate one. He found this difficulty: if this Commission was to extend its activities beyond driving the Germans out of the Baltic Provinces he would have to refer the matter to his Government, inasmuch as many questions would be involved which he had always maintained must be settled directly by the Government of the United States and not here

in Paris by the Council. Especially with reference to Russian questions had he always maintained this point of view.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed with Mr. Polk. He added that the Allies had had a representative in these regions, namely General Gough. He felt that this present Commission was being vested with powers which were formerly held by General Gough. It was a new question for him and he would have to refer the matter to his Government.

M. BERTHELOT had not thought that this was a new question to the British Delegation because General March, who had succeeded General Gough, had told the French Military Representative at Riga that he understood that his mission was being terminated on account of the organization of the present Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that his Government had appointed General Hicking with detailed instructions.

M. BERTHELOT thought that this was a different matter, inasmuch as General Hicking's purely British mission was only to operate in case of the eventual taking of Petrograd.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that however that might be, he felt that the scope of this Commission was being unduly extended. He did not wish to be in the position of supporting a Commission whose powers might conflict with the instructions already given to General Hicking's mission.

M. TITTONI said that to his mind the only way of settling the conditions of anarchy existing in these regions was to send a Commission with powers substantially similar to those embodied in the draft instructions. He was in favor of sending this Commission now.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that inasmuch as no troops were assigned to this Commission it must be given other means of making its decisions and authority respected. Unless it clearly represented the Council it would only obtain vague promises at Berlin, and on the spot it would, as had happened before, merely be laughed at by the Germans.

M. CLEMENCEAU hoped that the American and British representatives would consult their Governments as soon as possible.

MR. POLK replied that he would of course do so, but he thought he should point out that he did not believe that his Government would be disposed to have a military Commission handle matters of this kind, which were, rather, diplomatic in their scope and nature.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in such a delicate question all Governments should take their share of the responsibility. If this Commission did not have a very great moral authority it would be able to accomplish nothing. It was also very necessary not to engage in any undertaking of this kind with such inadequate means, or under such conditions, that it could not be carried to a successful conclusion. He was in favor of granting to this Commission powers substantially

as laid down in the draft instructions. But, at any rate, even if some modifications were to be made, the instructions finally given to General Niessel must be absolutely clear.

MR. POLK agreed that the instructions to the Commission should be absolutely clear and added that in Russian and Baltic Provinces questions the Allied and Associated Powers had heretofore not been in sufficient agreement and had hesitated unduly. For instance, it would be very advantageous to settle at once, if possible, the questions of the recognition of Admiral Kolchak's government and of the provisional governments of the Baltic Provinces. He wished again, however, to reiterate that he did not feel that these questions should be raised in connection with the instructions to this present Commission.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the draft instructions did not involve recognition. He again recalled that the Council had already sent various ultimata in vain. If this Mission were despatched with no other power than to order the Germans to evacuate the Baltic Provinces failure was bound to result. Another alternative was presented: the Germans could be told that if they did not evacuate, the Allied and Associated Powers would refuse to ratify the Treaty, but this was entirely a different question.

MR. POLK agreed but felt that there was some confusion as to the matters being discussed. The Germans asked that a Commission should be sent to the Baltic Provinces to assist in the evacuation of their troops, and this had been accepted. He agreed entirely that the Commission should have ample power, but he did not see that that had any connection with giving instructions as to what would happen after the capture of Petrograd. It might be advisable to contemplate such a contingency but he doubted if his Government would consent to the matter being handled by the sending of this Commission.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that Bermond² had announced that he intended to enter Petrograd at the same time as General Yudenitch; it was for this reason that he had first wished to occupy Riga. Moreover, Bermond² had certain relations with elements of Yudenitch's army. Therefore it was difficult to separate these questions. Even if there were to be modifications with respect to details he hoped that the main principle could be agreed upon.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Delegations should consult with their Governments at once.

MR. POLK thought that perhaps after studying the draft instructions it might not be necessary for him to consult his Government

² Colonel Prince Avalov-Bermond², commander of the Russian Western Army of Volunteers.

on certain points, but he doubted whether points such as the relations to be established with Esthonia could be settled in this manner.

GENERAL WEYGAND called the attention of the Council to a telegram received from General Dupont desiring that the Commission be sent as soon as possible, for two reasons: first, the question was raised as to whether the evacuation should take place via the ports of Memel and Königsberg, and this necessarily involved many complicated questions of detail which could only be settled on the spot: secondly, Noske³ had made it known that if the blockade continued until the completion of evacuation the supply of iron ore for the Silesian mines would be cut off and some 200,000 men would be thrown out of work. The conclusion necessarily was that this Commission should be sent at the very earliest moment possible. (At this point the Military Representatives on this Commission re-entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if the Military representatives were unanimous in their conclusions?

GENERAL NIESSEL said that two or three points still remained to be cleared up. It was proposed to add to Section 3, paragraph C. the following clause: "The German Government will give to the Commission and its Agents complete authorization to circulate in all the territory occupied by German troops". (This was agreed to.)

GENERAL NIESSEL desired to add to the first paragraph of Section 4 the following clause: "German diplomatic and civil officials shall leave the Baltic Provinces at the same time as the troops".

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether there was any basis of right for this action. He maintained that under the terms of the Armistice there existed a perfect right to compel the evacuation of the troops but he doubted whether there were any legal grounds for compelling the withdrawal of diplomatic and civil officials.

GENERAL NIESSEL said that this additional clause was suggested by reason of the request of the British Representative at Riga, who felt that these diplomatic and civil officials should be compelled to leave at once.

M. TITTONI pointed out that this was equivalent to forbidding Germany to have any diplomatic relations with the *de facto* governments of the Baltic Provinces and he inquired whether the Council wished to go that far.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that the British Representative at Riga had made the request in question on account of the excessive number of German diplomatic and civil officials now in those regions. However, that might be, the question remained whether there were any legal grounds for this action and he wished to ask what would happen if

³ Gustav Noske, German Minister of Defense.

the Germans would simply refuse to recognize the right to demand the withdrawal of these diplomatic and civil officials.

MARSHAL FOCH suggested that to the clause proposed by General Niessel there be added the following words: "with the exception of those recognized by the *de facto* governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania". (This was agreed to.)

GENERAL NIESSLER also desired to add the following clause at the end of Section 9: "The Allied Navies will supply the Commission with all transportation necessary and will ensure transmission of the Commission's telegrams".

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that he would have to refer this to the British Naval Advisers. As a general observation he inquired whether an agreement could not be reached on military matters leaving the political questions for further consideration.

GENERAL NIESSLER explained that unless adequate naval transportation were assured the Commission could not reach the necessary localities nor function properly. If the Commission had to travel through regions in revolt it would surely fail at the very outset.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired if this transportation in any wise referred to troop transportation.

GENERAL NIESSLER explained that it did not.

(It was agreed to accept the clause proposed by General Niessel to be added to Section 9.)

GENERAL NIESSLER commenting upon Section 10 of the draft instructions, thought it should be made clear that the Commission was to be superior to all military missions in the regions in question, including a British military mission under Colonel Tallents.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that Colonel Tallents, a retired Colonel, represented the civil power; it would obviously be impossible to subordinate a civil mission to a military mission.

GENERAL NIESSLER observed that he did not desire such subordination if the scope of Colonel Tallents' mission was clearly indicated.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that this mission was accredited to the *de facto* government of Lithuania and was a diplomatic mission.

GENERAL NIESSLER said that this was satisfactory to him and that he therefore would not suggest adding anything to Section 10.

SIR EYRE CROWE, referring to the same Section 10, inquired where General Niessel intended to establish his headquarters.

GENERAL NIESSLER explained that he could not determine that point until he reached Berlin. His headquarters would have to be established at the spot where he could obtain the best local assistance against the Germans.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the provision as to the location of headquarters was so indefinite that he feared that it might possibly

be situated at Dantzig, which of course, would lead to fatal complications.

GENERAL NIESSEL replied that there was no danger of that. He wished to know what provision had been made relative to money to be furnished the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the Council would settle that question.

GENERAL NIESSEL said that the Commission would need some money immediately. For instance part of its duty was to bring about the dissolution of Bermondts's Germano-Russian Corps. If it succeeded in this it doubtless would have to incur large expenditures by way of payments relative to present members of that corps. If the *de facto* governments of the Baltic Provinces should be asked to incur extra expenditures on this account it was important that they should be assured of reimbursement by the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. POLK thought that this matter could be discussed later.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

GENERAL NIESSEL pointed out that Bermondts had close relations with the Germans, and at the same time was corresponding with Yudenitch. He wished to know whether he should utterly refuse to deal with Bermondts, or whether he should act towards him in such a manner that it might later be possible to make use of him.

M. TITTONI thought that the Commission should be authorized to use its entire discretion.

GENERAL NIESSEL then brought up the question of the supply of war matériel. He pointed out that it was most essential for the organization of any strong local force in the Baltic Provinces to have an ample and regular supply of matériel. The lack thereof had already proved most embarrassing to General Gough, and he felt that he could not succeed any better unless he were assured of adequate supplies.

MR. POLK wished again to revert to the difficulty he had formerly felt. It might perhaps be advisable to broaden the powers of the Commission, but it had not been contemplated that a mission with the powers now contained in the draft instructions should be organized; for instance, powers to deal with questions of supplies, representation in the future, etc.

GENERAL NIESSEL again pointed out that the Germans could understand nothing but force, and the only available forces were the local ones in the Baltic Provinces. If these forces were properly armed and equipped the Germans, if necessary, could be thrown out of the Baltic Provinces by force.

MR. POLK observed that what he had in mind in his preceding remarks was the relations with Bermondts which had been discussed.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this question should be reserved for future discussion.

GENERAL NIESSEL observed that a most important point was the attitude to be taken with respect to the German Government. He wished to know the Supreme Council's views with respect to the attitude to be taken if the evacuation were not properly carried out.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Niessel should always insist with the utmost firmness on the proper execution of the measures for evacuation, but that he should avoid going into any further detail. He suggested that the proposals relative to military action contained in the draft instructions be adopted and that the discussion of all political questions involved in the said draft instructions should be adjourned until such time as the various delegations could refer these questions to their respective Governments and receive answers which could be agreed upon. The instructions could then be sent on to the Commission.

GENERAL NIESSEL remarked that the Commission could not leave before the end of the week.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that possibly the Commission could then get its instructions before it left.

(It was agreed to accept M. Clemenceau's suggestion.)

(It was decided :

to adopt the following Sections of the Draft instructions to the Interallied Commission charged with the examination of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces,—Sections I to IV inclusive, Section IX, and Section X, with the following corrections :

(1) at the end of Section III, paragraph C, the following words should be added: "The German Government will give to the Commission and its Agents complete authorization to circulate in all the territory occupied by German troops."

(2) at the end of the first paragraph, Section IV, the following words should be added: "German diplomatic and civil officials shall leave the Baltic Provinces at the same time as the troops, with the exception of those recognized by the *de facto* governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania."

(3) at the end of Section IX the following words should be added: "The Allied Navies will supply the Commission with all transportation necessary and will assure the transmission of the Commission's telegrams."

It was further decided :

that the Commission should leave as soon as possible and perform the duties entrusted to it without awaiting the instructions as to political questions which would be forwarded to the Commission after discussion and decision thereupon by the Council at a future date.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, October 28, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-77

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF
THE ALLIED ARMIES
GENERAL STAFF
1ST SECTION

No. 4960

G. H. Q. October 15, 1919.

From : Marshal Foch

To : President of the Peace Conference.

The state of war with Germany will cease upon the entry into force of the Treaty of June 28, 1919.

The occupation troops have been reduced to definite proportions and their command is assured in conformity with the decisions of the Peace Conference. Under these conditions the command of the armies, which was confided in me through the confidence of the Allied and Associated Governments, is no longer necessary.

Consequently, I have the honor to request that you kindly solicit the French, American, British and Italian Governments that I be relieved of the duties attributed to me during the conferences of Doullens, Beauvais and Abbeville under date of March 26, April 3, and May 2, 1918.

F. FOCH

P. S. I enclose herewith a note concerning the constitution of an interallied organ which appears to me necessary to insure the execution of the treaty, and the solution of the interallied military questions yet pending.

F. F.

(Enclosure)

Note

The military execution of a Treaty signed by the Allied and Associated Governments can only be carried out, and satisfactorily terminated, by the constitution of an Interallied Military organ operating under a single head, in the interest of these Governments.

This organ should have:

—supreme command of the Control Commissions, entrusted with insuring the execution of the military clauses of the Peace Treaties with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey.

—supreme command of the Allied occupation forces established in the Rhineland and in the plebiscite zones.

—the settlement of questions of a military order which might result from any unsatisfactorily regulated European situation, in particular concerning the military aid to be supplied to the armies struggling for order.

This organ should be constituted in the general form of the Executive Committee, created at Versailles in February 1918 for the coor-

dination of military operations, which would include the assembly of the military representatives of the Superior War Council under the Presidency of General Foch.

Appendix B to HD-77

Telegram From Sir E. Grey to Lord Curzon, Washington, 25 October 1919

Over 30 states have announced their intention of being represented at the International Labour Conference, which has been convened by the United States Government under the Treaty of Peace and opens on Wednesday next, October 29th. Their delegates are now arriving at Washington. The Conference, however, has no status until the Treaty of Peace has become operative and delay may necessitate an adjournment. This will cause great inconvenience and have an unfortunate effect on the labour situation in many countries. Can you ensure that the Supreme Council at Paris, which, it is understood, is now considering the date of the formal exchange of ratifications on which the coming into force of the Treaty depends will bear in mind the great importance for the Labour Conference of bringing it into force at the earliest possible date? I am sending this telegram after consultation with Barnes, and Delevingne, who attach great importance to it and it is obvious that a most embarrassing situation must arise for the delegates here unless by the exchange of ratifications at Paris the Labour Conference is regularised by Wednesday next, October 29th.

Telegram From Lord Curzon to Sir E. Crowe, October 25, 1919

Please bring the matter immediately to the notice of the Supreme Council and urge that everything possible may be done to ensure that the Conference shall be able to begin at the earliest possible moment although we fear, in view of your reports that it will be impossible to fix the date of ratification before November 11th.

Appendix C to HD-77

Draft

Instructions for General Niessel

I—DECISION OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL

The persistent violation, on the part of the German Government and the German Generals operating in the Baltic Provinces, of the

prescriptions of Article 12 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918 (confirmed by Article 433 of the Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919 with Germany) has caused numerous protests from the Supreme Council, and a resolution under date of October 10th⁴ deciding upon the constitution of an Inter-Allied Commission to supervise the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by German troops.

2—COMPOSITION OF THE INTER-ALLIED COMMISSION

General Niessel is selected to exercise the Presidency of this Commission, which shall comprise the following members:

British Representative:	General
American “	Brigadier General S. A. Chenay
Italian “	Brigadier General Marietti
Japanese “	Major G. Takeda, Infantry.

3—EVACUATION SUPERVISION

The German Government alone is held responsible for the execution of the evacuation.

The Inter-Allied Commission is authorized to exercise, with full liberty of action, wherever it may judge necessary, control of the execution of the evacuation measures ordered by the German Government.

To this end, the Commission:

a) shall acquire full knowledge, through the German Government at Berlin, of the measures taken by Germany with a view to establishing the conditions of the evacuation.

b) shall receive communication of the instructions, given by the German Command of the Baltic regions, concerning the application of these measures.

c) shall, should it judge necessary after a local examination of the situation, address any proposal to the German Government of a nature to facilitate, insure and hasten the execution of the evacuation.

4—CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE EVACUATION

The execution of the provisions of Article 12 of the Armistice, implies not only the retreat of the constituent German unities now located in the Baltic provinces with their staffs and full service, but also the recall of all German military who, after demobilization, individually or in groups, entered the service of the Russian corps organized in the said provinces.

The supervision shall cover, not only the execution of the evacuation movements, but as well the verification of the material accom-

⁴ HD-67, minute 4, p. 536.

panying the German troops, in order to prevent the removal of any material or supplies that does not belong to these troops.

5—RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The Commission shall establish a liaison with the *de facto* governments in Latvia, Esthonia and Lithuania, which have been recognized as such by the Allied Governments, and with whom they entertain unofficial relations.

The Commission shall see that the authority and prerogatives of these Governments are respected by the German or Germano-Russian troops and shall stop all interference of these troops in the internal affairs of the said states.

The Commission shall attempt to develop relations of military solidarity between the Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian Governments with a view to a union of effort, in the struggle which they have undertaken, to liberate their countries of German occupation, and in their common defense against the Bolsheviks.

The Commission shall take, in concert with these Governments, all measures necessary for the maintenance of order in the evacuated territories proportionate with the retreat of the German troops, and the dissolution of the Germano-Russian troops.

6—RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS AND THE RUSSIAN ARMIES OPERATING IN THE BALTIC PROVINCES

a)—Russian Government.

The Inter-Allied Commission is not to assert itself, as for or against the Russian Government, called Northwest, presided over by Mr. Lianosof, concerning which the Government of Admiral Koltchak has made no definite decision, and which has not yet been recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers, even as a local, or *de facto*, Government.

The Commission shall refuse to recognize the doubtful, Pseudo-Russian Government, recently created at Mitau by Count Phalen, with the assistance of important German bankers and Russian reactionaries.

b)—Russian armies.

The Inter-Allied Commission will make every effort to bring about the dissolution of the Bermondts Germano-Russian corps which, with German assistance, is attacking the Lettish troops under pretext of contributing to the defeat of the Bolsheviks.

The Commission shall keep in constant contact with the Russian army, commanded by General Youdenitch, operating against the Bolsheviks with a view to delivering Petrograd from their tyrannical

anarchy. The Commission shall serve as an intermediary between the Russian General and the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the event that the Russian Capital be occupied, the President of the Commission shall be authorized to eventually represent the Allied and Associated Powers therein, to insure the protection of their interests, and prevent the execution of massacres or reprisals.

7—RELATIONS WITH FINLAND

The Inter-Allied Commission shall keep in constant contact with the Allied Military missions located in Finland. It will inform the Supreme Council concerning the negotiations which might be established between the Russian and the Balkan [*Baltic?*] provinces, and the Finnish Government, and would eventually communicate the views of the Allied and Associated Powers to them.

8—RELATIONS WITH POLAND

The Commission shall keep in constant contact with the Allied Military Missions operating with the Polish Government. It will make every effort to insure an understanding between the Lithuanians and the Poles concerning the decisions of the Conference, and shall inform the Supreme Council to that effect.

9—ACTION OF THE ALLIED NAVY IN THE BALTIC

The Commission shall establish relations with the Interallied Maritime Command in the Baltic, which shall furnish information relative to the naval operations undertaken, either to support the liberation of Petrograd, or to block the provisioning of the Bolshevists by sea, in conformity with the decisions of the Conference. The Commission will serve as an intermediary between the Supreme Council and the Allied Navy.

10—POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

In order to accomplish its mission, the Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the British and French Allied Missions now operating in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania with a view to prevent any isolated initiative or divergence of action.

The Commission may appeal to the personnel of the French Military Mission in Poland, if need be, and in accord with General Henrys.

The Commission, in accord with the Baltic Governments at Reval, Riga and Kowno, shall be assured of the cooperation of the local authorities if such assistance is deemed necessary.

The General, President of the Commission, shall determine the location of his headquarters in the Baltic provinces. He shall have free use of the telegraphic and radio-telegraphic lines and stations for his communications.

11—GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

The primordial and essential purpose of the Commission is based on the necessity of liberating the Baltic States of all German occupation and enterprise of every kind, and keeping in mind the fact that Germany alternatively aids the Soviet authorities and the autocratic Russian organizations, as she has repeatedly done since the commencement of the Russian revolution.

The Commission will also make every effort to preserve the Baltic province from tyranny and Maximilian (Maximalistest) [*Maximalists*] anarchy.

The Allied and Associated Governments desire to favor the legitimate aspirations of the populations of Esthonia, Lithuania and Latvia who wish to definitely organize their internal life on stable basis.

Although the Allied and Associated Governments are opposed to the dismemberment of Russia, and favorable to a reconstitution of its unity they deem it equitable to insure the interior independence, acquired at the price of great sacrifice, of the Baltic countries, and essential to the free development of their individual personality. The declaration made by the Allies to Admiral Koltchak on May 27, 1919,⁵ provided for, on one hand, the autonomy of the Baltic States and the free constitution of the Government, and, on the other, the guarantees due to Russia concerning her access to the sea and the liberty of her economic exchange.

It will be within the province of the League of Nations to intervene for the definite establishment of relations in the Baltic States and of the future Government of Russia, if a direct agreement is not consummated.

⁵ Appendix I to CF-37, vol. VI, p. 73.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, October 29, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

M. Pichon

Secretaries

M. Berthelot

M. de St. Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja

Secretary

M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop
 BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian Small
 FRANCE M. Massigli
 ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

General Tasker H. Bliss

Mr. E. L. Dresel

Colonel J. A. Logan

Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Groves

Air Commander Smith

Captain Fuller

Lieut. Commander Dunne

Lieut. Colonel Kisch

FRANCE

Marshal Foch

General Weygand

M. Henry Berenger

M. Laroche

Commandant Levavasseur

M. de Celle

Capitaine de Corvette Fabre

M. Kammerer

Capitaine Roper

General Niessel

ITALY

M. Stranieri

Lieut. Col. Piccio

Capt. de Corvette Ruspoli

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a report from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies dated October 23, 1919 (See Appendix "A"), a note in three parts from the British Delegation dated October 23, 24 and 25, 1919¹ (See Appendix "B") and a letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (See Appendix "C").

Violations by
the Germans of
the Armistice
Clauses

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the report dealing with the violations of the clauses of the Armistice, the preparation of which had been entrusted to the Armistice Commission at Cologne.

CAPTAIN FULLER read and commented upon the notes from the British Delegation dealing with violations of the Naval Clauses of the Armistice.

M. DE CELLE read and commented upon the letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, and added thereto the following observations:

The Germans were to have supplied a complete list of the plunder and thefts committed by them; there were numerous omissions in the lists supplied. It had been indicated clearly to the Germans that in matters of specie and personal property omission might occur only in exceptional cases and that they should be made known within twenty-four hours of their discovery. The despatch of a new truckload of property had just been made known to them. They had to acknowledge that the German delegates in Paris were actually doing their best to give satisfaction.

Similarly, the documents which Clause 13 of the Protocol of Spa, dated December 1st, 1918,^{1a} had in mind, concerning notes issued by towns during the German occupation (list of printed notes, lists of notes whose issue had been authorized, list of notes actually issued, list of water-marked paper stocks, etc.,) had not so far been supplied, notwithstanding the formal promise made by Germany to send them before December 10th, 1918. Those lists were of extreme importance in order to discover and suppress possible forgery.

Lastly, as for the recovery of *objets d'art*, if those that belonged to public museums had been restored this was not the case with *objets d'art* or furniture taken from private houses. The Germans

¹ Only two parts, dated October 23 and 25, appear in the Department files.

^{1a} Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 3 sér., tome xi, p. 185.

professed that there had been no official storage of these objects: they knew, however, that the experts who had superintended their collection had worked publicly and that furniture and pictures had been carefully packed for transport. It was impossible to admit, as the Germans pretended, that the vanished furniture had been used merely for furnishing posts of command or dugouts.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether a member of the Council wished to make any remark.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished for the moment to leave aside the two most serious violations of the Armistice, namely, the question of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident, to which he intended to return. As for the other violations it was important to adhere to this: that obligations incurred by the terms of the Armistice be retained when the Treaty came into force. Guarantees to this effect were necessary. If their legal advisors were of the opinion that the stipulations of the Armistice would no longer subsist with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, it was absolutely necessary to oblige the Germans to sign a special Protocol assuring to the Powers every possible guarantee corresponding to the guarantees of the Armistice.

MR. POLK agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that the legal advisers should be consulted.

M. SCIALOJA found the difficulty to arise out of the fact that the conventions of the Armistice, while constituting a veritable treaty, had been imposed in military form. He thought there were grounds for preparing a Protocol enumerating all the obligations still to be fulfilled, but what sanctions would the Council still wield since the coming into force of the Treaty would deprive it of the sanctions which the Armistice afforded? It was necessary that the Protocol itself incorporate sanctions.

SIR EYRE CROWE maintained that for the very reason adduced by M. Scialoja, he had drawn the distinction between the more important and the less important violations of the Armistice: was not such sanction necessary for the less important violations?

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they did not wish to commit themselves to a perfectly futile manifestation; a definite date had to be fixed. As a matter of form it would be well to say that unless the obligations undertaken were fulfilled they would have to demand sanctions which, as it seemed to him, ought to be of a military nature for in reality there were no others. Therefore, in the Protocol a list of all the so-called secondary violations of the Armistice had to be prepared. He thought it hardly possible to say to the Germans that they would not have the Treaty come into force until after the execution of those clauses: it would be sufficient to say that if the clauses were not fulfilled, sanctions of military nature would be imposed. The questions of Scapa Flow

and of the Baltic Provinces remained. In the former matter they had done nothing; on the latter they had decided upon a course of action the preceding day. Would it not be necessary to know what sanctions they would employ if the mission of General Niessel arrived at no success.

MR. POLK asked whether it was intended to tell the Germans what sanctions would ultimately be applied.

M. CLEMENCEAU said there certainly was no such intention. It would be sufficient to say that there would be some sanction: but of course the Germans would have to sign the Protocol before the Treaty would come into force.

MR. POLK remarked that the Protocol should be submitted first to the Council, which would then have to discuss the question of sanctions.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. POLK inquired whether the Council had communicated to the Dutch Government the note² sent to Germany relative to the delivery of ships she had sold to Holland.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Dutch Government had been informed of such a note having been sent and told that if it claimed property rights in the ships in question, it would have to justify its claims before the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE reverted to the violation of the Armistice committed in the Scapa Flow incident. The Council had been apprised some time ago of a British proposal on the subject. The sinking of the ships could be considered either the individual act of the officers and crews, or an act for which the German government was responsible. The British Delegation believed that there were grounds for holding the government responsible. In the latter case reparation was due for the value of the sunken ships, cost of salvage of the ships, cost of surveying the anchorage, buoying the wrecks and any subsequent expenses incurred, e. g., in clearing the anchorage of wrecks, etc. It was proposed further that reparation should be in kind, for example in the surrender of the five light cruisers that Germany still possessed and of floating docks, cranes, harbor craft, etc.; that the Germans should be asked further to supply to the Armistice Commission a complete list of this material, delivery of which the Armistice Commission would be authorized to accept.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they were agreed in considering the German Government responsible.

MR. POLK stated that he did not yet have the report of his naval experts on the question and asked that it be adjourned.

SIR EYRE CROWE maintained that if they held the German Government responsible, they could, as the British Delegation believed,

² Appendix A to HD-70, p. 649.

repatriate the German officers and seamen of the crews which had been taken prisoner on the destruction of the fleet.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed to discuss that question on the following day.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to remark further that in the matter of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces the terms of the Armistice were repeated in the body of the Treaty. In that respect, therefore, they did have guarantees.

It was decided:

(1) to ask the Drafting Committee to prepare a Protocol to be signed by the Representative of the German government before the Treaty came into force and to contain, along with the list of the unfulfilled clauses of the Armistice, an undertaking by Germany to fulfil those clauses within a prescribed time under penalty of such measures which the Allied and Associated Powers would reserve to themselves in the event of noncompliance;

(2) that the question whether the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident were to be explicitly mentioned in this Protocol be provisionally reserved. (See appendices "A", "B" and "C").

2. GENERAL NIESSEL wished to point out to the Council that it would be difficult for his Mission to leave the Monday or Wednesday following; his Italian colleague had not yet arrived and General Turner's officers would not be in Paris before the end of the week. Lastly there would be difficulties from the point of view of railroad transportation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Niessel would leave on Wednesday at the latest.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they might agree provisionally that the expenses of the Mission would be divided between the Allies.

M. BERTHELOT explained that for the moment it was only a question of the immediate expenses of maintenance and voyage.

MR. POLK said that it would be best that each Power supply the expenses of its own representatives.

It was decided:

that, subject to later examination of the question by the Supreme Council, each Power should pay the expenses of its representatives on the Inter-Allied Baltic Provinces Military Commission.

3. (The Council had before it a note from the New States Commission asking the Supreme Council for instructions (See appendix "D").)

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the first part of the note.

M. SCIALOJA thought it preferable to insert in the Bulgarian Treaty a clause by which Serbia and Roumania would incur the same obligations as those of

article 46 of the Treaty with Greece.

Inter-Allied
Baltic Provinces
Military
Commission

Request for
Instructions
From the New
States Commis-
sion Relative
to the Bulgarian
Counter-
propositions

M. KAMMERER suggested that if, in the Treaty with Bulgaria, the same terms were inserted which had prevented Serbia from signing the Treaty with Austria, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would not sign the Bulgarian Treaty; the result would correspond to the second procedure suggested by the Commission.

MR. POLK wondered, whether, if they made it possible to sign the Bulgarian Treaty without inserting therein the same terms as in the Austrian Treaty, they might not leave it optional to certain powers to sign one Treaty and not the other. It was most important, he thought, to tell the Roumanians and the Serbs that if they did not sign the Austrian Treaty neither would they sign the Bulgarian Treaty.

M. KAMMERER agreed that the insertion of a new article might be possible; he thought, however, that it would be disagreeable to the states concerned for the Council to tell them that they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty before signing the Austrian Treaty.

MR. POLK did not see that they had to modify a treaty so as to satisfy a power that refused to sign.

M. PICHON considered the second method preferable; they would inform the Roumanians and Serbs that they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty unless they signed the Austrian Treaty. The Council would thus be in possession of a further means of bringing pressure to bear upon them.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered that there should be on the agenda of an early sitting of the Council, the question of the signature of the Austrian Treaty by the Roumanians and Serbs.

M. PICHON said Mr. Trumbic had arrived and that General Coanda had left Bucarest the previous day. According to a telegram he had received that morning, he thought the signature probable.

SIR EYRE CROWE'S information did not give him the same impression.

MR. POLK was in a similar situation. He had the feeling that the Roumanians wished simply to gain time.

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the second part of the report of the New States Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what right Bulgaria had to set up as champion of the Turkish cause.

M. KAMMERER explained that it was not Turks properly speaking, but Turkish subjects who had taken refuge in Bulgarian territory. The Italian Delegation was afraid that Serbia was preventing their exercising that right of option which the 1913 treaty³ gave them, but which the outbreak of war had made impossible. There was no doubt that the insertion of special clauses in the Treaty would be unpleasant enough for Serbia.

³ Treaty of peace between Bulgaria and Turkey, September 16 (29), 1913, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 706.

SIR EYRE CROWE maintained that it was always dangerous to modify a treaty once it had been signed, and that the Allied and Associated Powers had already signed the Minorities Treaty.

M. KAMMERER explained that it was the Italian Delegation that insisted upon that solution.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if there were any evidence to show the Turks intended returning into Serbian territory?

MR. POLK explained that it was a question of Macedonian refugees.

M. PICHON asked whether, instead of changing the text of the Treaty, a procedure which as Sir Eyre Crowe had pointed out, presented serious disadvantages, they could not demand of Serbia written declarations on the point?

M. KAMMERER was of the opinion that Serbia would prefer that solution.

M. SCIALOJA pointed out that in the Bulgarian Treaty a clause could be inserted analogous to that in which Greece was placed by Article IV of the proposed Greek Treaty.⁴

M. KAMMERER said that the Commission had judged that this involved difficulties and that there was no point in concealing the fact that the insertion of a clause of such nature in the Bulgarian Treaty would be extremely disagreeable to the Serbs.

M. SCIALOJA maintained that Serbia would have to restore to its refugees the right of option which the outbreak of war had prevented them from exercising in the prescribed time.

M. PICHON believed that Serbia should make the declaration in a letter.

(It was decided :

(1) that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should make known to the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations that these latter countries would not be allowed to sign the Treaty with Bulgaria before having signed the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty;

(2) that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government be asked to make known by written declaration that it would authorize its Ottoman subjects who, owing to the war, had not been able to avail themselves in the prescribed time of the right of option envisaged by the Treaty of 1913, to take advantage of that right. (See Appendix "D".)

4. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 27th (See Appendix "E").)

(After a short discussion

It was decided :

Request for
Instructions
From the
Chairman of
the Inter-Allied
Aeronautical
Commission of
Control in
Germany

to refer to the military representatives at Versailles, for examination and report, the request for instructions addressed to the Supreme Council by the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of

Control in Germany. (See Appendix "E".)

⁴ Appendix F to HD-82, p. 922.

5. (The Council had before it a draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Polish Commission (See Appendix "F").)

(It was decided:

**Note to the
German
Government on
the Municipal
Elections in
Upper Silesia**

to approve the draft note to the German Government on the question of municipal elections in Upper Silesia as prepared by the Polish Commission. (See Appendix "F").)

6. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 27th (See Appendix "G").)

**Salaries and
Allowances for
the Administrator
of Dantzig
and His Staff
and for the
Administrative
Staff of Memel**

M. PICHON considered it logical to adopt the proposal, which conformed to previous decisions of the Supreme Council.

MR. POLK asked who would fix the salaries.

M. PICHON said it would be a matter for deciding as in analogous cases.

(It was decided:

(1) that the salaries and allowances of the temporary Administrator of the Free City of Dantzig and his staff, and of the Administrative Staff of Memel should be a charge upon local revenues (See Appendix "G");

(2) that the rate of these salaries and allowances should be fixed by the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany.)

7. (The Council had before it a report of the Commission entrusted with examining the question of the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from Siberia (See Appendix "H").)

**Repatriation of
Allied
Contingents
and Enemy
Prisoners From
Siberia**

CAPTAIN DE CORVETTE FABRE read and commented upon the report of the Commission.

MR. POLK thought that the order of repatriation could be modified by financial considerations. As regarded the Czechs, an agreement had been arrived at, which placed the immediate expenses of repatriation on Great Britain, the United States and France. No account had been taken so far of the Poles, the Roumanians and the Serbs. Perhaps the United States would be led to assume responsibility for this repatriation. In any case, he was obliged to remark that the financial rulings of the United States Treasury Department forbade his government from participating in expenses of a provisional nature that might be subject to a later readjustment among the Powers; the United States could only make direct advances to the small nations concerned.

M. PICHON held that the thing to do at the moment was for each Power to appoint a financial expert and a political representative to be attached to the Commission actually existing.

CAPTAIN DE CORVETTE FABRE remarked that the Commission was qualified to deal only with prisoners. It was therefore asking the

Council to decide whether it would be competent to deal likewise with the volunteers of friendly nationalities who ought to be repatriated.

M. KAMMERER insisted on the necessity of the Commission being empowered to deal with volunteers as well as prisoners. The two questions were bound together from the point of view both of transport and of finance.

SIR EYRE CROWE did not think his Government inclined to participate in the expenses of repatriating 250,000 German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners; they had the repatriation of their Allies to consider.

M. BERTHELOT held that distinction must be made between repatriation of their Allies and of prisoners belonging to one of the enemy powers: from the humane point of view these were alike; politically, there were raised questions of quite different kinds. The Council had already decided that the repatriation of enemy prisoners should wait until after that of Allied volunteers.⁵ They were informed that the Germans had already been trying to conclude private contracts with Japanese ship owners. If they were to let Japanese shipping companies repatriate enemies who were ready to pay a very high price, the effect would be disastrous, and it was important that M. Matsui should draw the attention of his government to the question.

M. MATSUI stated that his government had informed him that the statement that ships had been chartered on behalf of Germany was incorrect. The Japanese government had no ships at its disposal; and private ship owners had concluded agreements to charter ships for the purpose of repatriating Czechs. Once the Treaty came into force it would be for each government to get into direct touch with the ship owners. He had already acquainted Tokio with that decision of the Supreme Council, which had in mind giving priority to the repatriation of the Allies.

M. KAMMERER held that they could and, indeed, ought to leave to the Germans the care of arranging the repatriation of their prisoners. It was for the Commission only to make sure that that repatriation should not precede the repatriation of volunteers of friendly nationalities.

CAPTAIN DE CORVETTE FABRE pointed out that it was exactly for that reason that the Commission had asked enlargement of its powers. It had been formed originally to organize the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners of war, but had found itself confronted by a resolution of the Supreme Council which specified that the repatriation of those prisoners should not take place until after the repatriation of volunteers of friendly nationalities. So long as the repatriation

⁵ HD-62, minute 7, p. 411.

of those volunteers had not been begun, the Commission could not work to any purpose.

MR. POLK thought that the Commission could confine itself to examining the repatriation of prisoners without taking any executive steps.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked why the Commission should have to concern itself with German and Austrian prisoners of war at all. Article 215 of the German Treaty envisaged the setting up of a special commission, for the repatriation of prisoners. This question was its peculiar concern, and he understood that it was forming a Sub-Commission to take care of this particular case.

CAPTAIN DE CORVETTE FABRE stated that the Commission referred to in article 215 had to deal exclusively with enemy prisoners taken by the Allied and Associated Powers; the repatriation of prisoners from Siberia taken by the Russians did not concern it. Indeed practically all the prisoners in Siberia had been taken by the Russians, and it would be impossible to repatriate them without authorization of the Government of Omsk which might wish to retain them as hostages.

M. PICHON acknowledged that they had no legal obligation towards enemy prisoners who had been retained in Siberia.

It was decided :

(1) that the Commission entrusted by the Supreme Council with studying the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from Siberia should examine at the same time the question of repatriating the volunteers of friendly nationalities;

(2) that, in view of the consequent extension of their powers and because of the complexity of the problems raised by the question of repatriation, each of the Allied and Associated Powers should nominate to the Commission representatives for political and financial questions. (See Appendix "H".)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, October 29, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-78

Translation

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE
ALLIED ARMIES
GENERAL STAFF
1ST SECTION

5080

G. H. Q., October 23, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference.
(Secretariat General)

In compliance with the prescriptions of a resolution of the Supreme Council, under date of October 20th,⁶ I have the honor to enclose herewith the list of the Armistice clauses * which have not yet been executed by Germany.

WEYGAND
Major-General

[Enclosure]

ARMISTICE CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 11 ⁷*Delivery of Railroad Material*

CLAUSE VII

This clause imposed on Germany the delivery of 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars.

At the present time there are still 42 locomotives and 4,460 cars to be received.

But it cannot be said that at the present time the Germans have not executed or are not executing the obligations imposed on them by that clause, as certain obligations necessitate delays concerning which the Germans advance explanations or excuses, and, furthermore, certain delays are caused by the very nature of the operations and differences of interpretation arising from the narrowness with which the Germans wish to apply the Protocol.

⁶ HD-73, minute 8, p. 714.

* Initial convention of November 11, 1919 [1918], renewal of conventions and protocols. [Footnote in the original.]

⁷ For text, see vol. II, p. 1.

ARMISTICE CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 11

Provisions Relative to the Eastern Frontiers of Germany
(CLAUSES XII AND XIV)*Clause XII:*

Clause XII stipulates that the German troops in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must withdraw to Germany at such time as the Allies judged proper, consistent with the interior situation of these territories.

On June 18th the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers ordered the German Government to evacuate Libau and Windau and to expedite the evacuation of all territories which, before the war, formed a part of the former Russian Empire.

In view of the procrastinations of Germany, the Supreme Council successively renewed these injunctions on August 1st, Aug. 24th, September 27th,⁸ and October 10th.⁹

In fact, the German Government continues to contend that it is powerless to enforce its orders on the troops in the Baltic. The orders for withdrawal supposed to have been given by the Government, were not executed. On the other hand, the local German Command favored the transfer of a large part of it[s] effectives into the Germano-Russian corps constituted under its protection. Reinforcements in men and material assistance continued to arrive from Germany.

Clause XIV.

Furthermore, and in violation of Clause XIV, the German troops have continued to exercise abusive requisitions in the Baltic countries; to paralyze the economic life and the organization efforts of these countries, disarming their contingents, mixing in their internal affairs and even having recourse to abuse of authority (*coup d'état*) by enforcing a government in Latvia, instrument to its cause (April 1919).

ARMISTICE CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 11

Financial Clauses

CLAUSE XIX

Clause XIX provides, in particular, for “. . . the immediate delivery of all documents, specie, values, (of property and finance with all issuing apparatus) concerning public or private interests in the invaded countries”.

⁸ Appendix E to HD-62, p. 419.

⁹ Appendices D and E to HD-67, pp. 546 and 547.

It has been impossible to obtain complete statements of the specie and securities (bank values, property confiscated belonging to persons repatriated, removal of specie qualified as fines, bail funds, etc. . . .) removed, collected or confiscated by the Germans, whether in the invaded territories or in the prison camps. These lists are indispensable to the Restitution Service.

The Beaux Arts Protocol of December 17, 1918

The Beaux Arts Protocol of December 17, 1918, annexed to the Armistice Convention, enjoins Germany to restore all objects of art and documents of an artistic character removed from France and Belgium.

The restoration of the objects of art abandoned by the Germans in France, in Belgium, or in the territories of the left bank of the Rhine, at the time of their retreat, was effected without difficulty.

The restoration of the objects of art which had been transported into non-occupied Germany, on the contrary, is being operated with slowness on account of the difficulties of such operation, and also from lack of complacency [*sic*] on the part of the Germans, who surrender such objects reluctantly.

It cannot be said, however, that they are not executing this clause: its execution is being operated.

CONVENTION OF JANUARY 16, 1919¹⁰

(2nd renewal of the Armistice)

CLAUSE III

*Delivery by Germany of Agricultural Implements to
France and Belgium*

This clause imposed on Germany the delivery of agricultural implements in lieu of the supplementary railroad material imposed by virtue of the first Armistice renewal as a penalty for delay in delivery.

The deficit of the material which Germany was to have delivered to France by October 1, 1919, is actually as follows:

40 "Heucke" ploughing outfits.

The personnel necessary to operate the apparatuses.

¹⁰ For text, see vol. II, p. 11.

All the tools which the German Government agreed to furnish before October 1st, by virtue of *additif* 3 of the Protocol 392/T, of July 25, 1919:

1,500 Spades
 1,130 Plows T.M. 23/26
 1,765 Plows T.F. 18/21
 1,512 Plows T.F. 23/26
 1,629 Belgian Plows, T.F. 0 m. 20
 1,205 Belgian Plows, T.F. 0 m. 26
 4,282 Harrows of 2 k. 500
 2,157 Cultivators, 11 teeth
 946 Steel Rollers
 966 Fertilizer Spreaders, 2 m. 50
 1,608 Fertilizer Spreaders, 3 m. 50.

CONVENTION OF JANUARY 16, 1919

(2nd Renewal of the Armistice)

CLAUSE VI

Restoration of the Industrial Material Removed From Belgian and French Territory

It cannot be said that the Germans have not executed this clause; but the restoration of the industrial material is being carried out very slowly, due partially to the difficulties introduced by this operation and partially to the numerous discussions to which an interpretation of the text (the French word is "taxes") of this clause gave rise and still gives rise between the Allied Commissions on one hand and Germany on the other.

BRUSSELS CONFERENCES OF MARCH 13 AND 14

ANNEX V/c

List of Objects Which Germany Was Forbidden to Export

The "Black list" of objects which Germany was forbidden to export during the Armistice period was drawn up in the course of the Conferences held in Brussels on March 13 and 14, 1919.

This black list was headed as follows:

"War material of every nature, including the naval fleet"

In violation of this provision, the Germans have exported aerial apparatus (whole airplanes, or detached parts) to neutral countries (Sweden, Holland and Denmark).

On four occasions* the Supreme Council reminded the German Government "that it was forbidden to export aeronautical material . . . that all such material should be stored . . . that the German Government would have to reimburse the Allies the value of all aeronautical material sold or exported since the Armistice."

The German Government has not complied with these decisions. It simply replied concerning them by the two notes hereto annexed in which reservations are cited concerning the interpretation of the ruling made by the Supreme Council and requests that the questions relative to aeronautic material be submitted to the Aerial Supervision Commissions which are to operate in Germany upon the entry into force of the Peace Treaty.

At the same time, the Government continued to authorize the exportation or at least the utilization of its aeronautical material. For example: on October 7th, that is to say, subsequent to the notification of the resolution of the Supreme Council forbidding the utilization of German aeronautical material and ordering that it be stored,¹¹ the German dirigible *Bodensee* commenced a regular dirigible service between Berlin and Stockholm, and on the same day German planes took part in the offensive against Riga.

Wako No. 641

DUSSELDORF, September 8, 1919.

Telegram

From: German Armistice Commission.

To: Interallied Permanent Armistice Commission.

Representative of the German Government's Note No. 8401 dated Sept. 8, 1919.

I have the honor to reply as follows to your notes No. 1494/G, 1525/G† and 1622‡ of August 2 [, August 8,]¹² and August 27th:¹³

"The German Government has, relative to the matters referred to in the notes indicated, instituted the necessary investigations. The Government, however, remarks that, in principle, it cannot agree on all points with the interpretation of law as expressed in the notes indicated, and that an opportunity to engage in verbal *pourparlers* con-

* Telegrams to the Permanent Armistice Commission on August 7, August 26, September 30, and October 18th. [Footnote in the original.]

¹¹ HD-63, minute 2, p. 430.

† Addressed to Marshal Foch as a report. [Footnote in the original.]

‡ Transmission of Telegrams Nos. 3765 of August 7th and 4111 of August 27th [26th?]. [Footnote in the original.]

¹² This note (Paris Peace Conf. 185.001/121) transmitted the text of the proposals accepted by the Supreme Council on August 6, HD-25, minute 14, vol. VII, p. 563.

¹³ For text, see appendix C to HD-37, *ibid.*, p. 823.

cerning the execution of Part V of the Peace Treaty will be presented in the near future with the Commissions of the Allied and Associated Powers which are daily expected in Berlin. The German Government deems it its duty to propose, for this reason, that the final settlement of the questions in suspense be reserved until after negotiations with these Commissions."

WACKENDORF

I.P.A.C.

9/9/19

No. 2, 294

Transmitted to Marshal Foch.

GENERAL NUDANT

President of the I. P. A. C.

Assistant Chief of Staff of the I. P. A. C.

Urgent Telegram

DUSSELDORF, Wako No. 3639.12.10.

*Note From the Representative of the German Government A. A. I.
6061 roem, October 12, 1919*

Replying to your note of October 1st, No. 1764/G (1), I have the honor to communicate the following:

1st—The point of view exposed, by the Supreme Council of the Allies in the note above indicated, is expressed as "final decision". The German Government must protest against a like declaration expressed in this sense. It must be determined concerning the matters in question: whether, at this time, they are actual obligations imposed on Germany by the Peace Treaty. It cannot be admitted, that on account of this, the Allied and Associated Powers have the exclusive right to adopt a final decision.

2nd—As long as the Peace Treaty shall not have been ratified by the Allied and Associated Powers, and for this reason, cannot be considered as in force, the formal obligations imposed on Germany by the Treaty cannot be exacted.

For this very reason, the point of view expressed by Marshal Foch in his note No. 4111 dated August 27 [26?], 1919, according to which all German war material in excess of that accorded to Germany by this Treaty, is already the property of the Allies, cannot be admitted; even after the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, a similar demand on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers, concerning the delivery of war material which would be in excess, would become useless, if according to Article 169 of the Peace Treaty it is provided that such material be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers

to be destroyed or rendered useless, this article would therefore mean that the employment of such material for military ends should be excluded without reservation. A like delivery of material to the Allied and Associated Governments is in no sense necessary to them for such service, and is in no wise justified by the text of the Convention.

3rd—Furthermore, the point of view of the Allied and Associated Governments, according to which all aviation material in Germany must be considered as military material without exception, without even taking into consideration apparatus of certain type, could not be admitted.

Among the aviation material now in Germany there exist machines whose character leaves no doubt as to their civil construction, and which from this fact, are not included under the conventions of Article 198. That there exists, beyond doubt, such civil material has been already recognized by the verification of contracts concerning the civil aerial circulation which emanate from a civil firm in Germany. It is completely inconsistent to consider such aviation material as military material at this time. On the contrary, Germany may legally dispose, without hindrance, of such material, in so far as such material shall not be considered, after the entry into force of the Treaty, as material of aerial circulation by the rulings of the Supervision Commission.

4th—The German Government, under every reservation and in consideration of its point of view herein exposed, and guided by this base is ready to commence at this time, and in so far as possible, the execution of the military provisions of the Treaty which it has ratified. It was upon this same basis that the German Government proposes, in its note A. A. I. 5401, under date of September 8 (2), to definitely settle the questions herein referred to, by means of *pour-parlers* with the Commission now sitting in Berlin. Up to the present time no discussions have taken place, but it seems desirable to reach a solution in this way.

Appendix B to HD-78

Memo Submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation

23 OCTOBER 1919.

ARMISTICE CONDITIONS OUTSTANDING

German Mercantile Marine

The following Armistice requirements in connection with the surrender of the German Mercantile Marine have not yet been complied with by the German Government:—

1. 14 Tank Steamers, total tonnage 63,143 at Hamburg which had been temporarily exempted from the surrender which was agreed to in the Armistice terms, were directed, by the decision of the Supreme Council of the 27th September,¹⁴ to proceed to the Firth of Forth for delivery to the Allied and Associated Governments' representatives. These vessels have been detained in Hamburg on the pretence of a sympathetic strike in that port and have not yet sailed.

2. 5 steamers, total tonnage 62,456 lying at Bremerhaven, Geestemünde and Bremen have not been handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers, the German Government alleging that these 5 vessels were sold to Dutch Shipping Companies in 1915-16. On 15th October, 1919,¹⁵ the Supreme Council ordered these vessels to be delivered, as the Allied and Associated Governments have consistently refused to recognize the validity of any transfers of enemy shipping to neutral flags during hostilities. The German Government has disregarded the orders of the Supreme Council for the despatch of these 5 vessels to the Firth of Forth.

3. A certain number of merchant vessels which should have been delivered under the Terms of the Armistice to the Allied and Associated Powers have not yet been handed over. These vessels are dealt with in detail as follows:—

(a) The German Government has alleged that the following ships have not been handed over owing to the difficulty of obtaining labour and materials for repairs or completion of construction:—

<i>Rugen</i>	<i>J. L. Lassen</i>
<i>Kaiser</i>	<i>Rickmer Rickmers</i>
<i>Kehrwider</i>	<i>Ibbercury</i>
<i>Columbus</i>	<i>Ittajahy</i>
<i>Tirpitz</i>	<i>Hermionthes</i>
<i>Berlin</i>	<i>Bosnia</i>
<i>Wigbert</i>	<i>Estland.</i>
<i>Pungo (ex Moewe)</i>	

(b) A large number of sailing vessels in German Waters and also in Neutral Ports, mainly South American, are still undelivered.

(c) A certain number of German steamers in Dutch East Indies and other Neutral Ports still remain to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Governments' representatives in spite of repeated demands for their surrender.

4. The Romanian Tank Steamer *Arthur Von Gwinner* was ordered to be sent to the Firth of Forth but has not yet been despatched.

¹⁴ HD-62, minute 1, p. 403.

¹⁵ HD-70, minute 1, and appendix A thereto, pp. 639 and 649.

5. S. S. *Verus* lying at Dordrecht, which is one of the vessels to be surrendered under the Armistice, has not yet been delivered to the Belgians although repeated demands have been made to the German authorities by the Sub-Commission of the A. N. A. C.

N. 19814

25. 10. 19.

Memorandum Submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation

NAVAL QUESTIONS AFFECTED BY THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY

Submarine engines to be surrendered as reparation for submarine U. C. 48.

The German submarine U. C. 48 was interned in Spain at the date of the armistice; under the terms of the armistice she was surrendered to the allies. She escaped from custody at Ferrol and, on being chased by a Spanish torpedo boat, she was sunk by her crew. Admiral Goette has acknowledged that the sinking of the boat was the act of her commanding officer. A. N. A. C. has demanded as reparation the complete engines and motors of the submarines U. 137, U. 138 and U. 158, but in spite of repeated demands they have not been delivered.

In addition to the above there are three motors exsubmarine U. 146 which remain to be delivered.

Reparation for the Scapa Flow Sinkings.

In the opinion of the Admiralty the sinking of the German warships interned at Scapa Flow constituted a direct violation of the terms of the armistice, and it should be regarded in every way as a term of the armistice which Germany has failed to fulfill. Reparation as penalty for the breach of the armistice should be obtained.

Appendix C to HD-78

From: Mr. Klotz.

To: Marshal Foch.

By despatch No. 5034 of the 20th inst., you asked me to indicate those of the financial clauses, imposed on Germany [by?] the Armistice Convention or the Protocols annexed, which have not yet been entirely executed.

I have the honor to inform you that the execution of the Armistice Convention, from a financial point of view, raises the following two questions:

1. The German Government refuses at the present time to continue making payments, in Reichsbank bank bills, towards the upkeep expenses of the Armies of Occupation, an obligation imposed by virtue of clause IX of the Armistice Convention of November 11th, 1918. The German Government bases its refusal on the fact that the marks previously remitted were used, not to apply towards occupation expenses, but for the expenses of various civil administrations. Now, the upkeep expenses of the Armies of Occupation, except in cases of local purchases or requisitions, which constitute the smallest share, are payable, not in marks, but in francs, or any other legal tender consistent with the origin of the products destined as army supplies; consequently, it is evident that the marks to be paid by Germany could not be considered as a reimbursement unless they be freely placed at the disposition of the French Government to be used for the various needs for which they were intended. It appears, therefore, indispensable, to have the claim of the German Government, pretending to obtain justification of use, repulsed purely and simply, and to insist on the immediate resumption of the payments to be applied on the upkeep expenses of the Armies of Occupation.

2. It has been impossible to obtain complete statements of the specie and securities (bank values, property confiscated belonging to persons repatriated, removal of specie qualified as fines, bail funds, etc.) removed, collected or confiscated by the Germans, whether in the invaded territories or in the prison camps. These lists are indispensable to the Restitution Service.

The documents provided for by Clause XIII of the Protocol of Spa, under date of December 1st, 1918, (city bonds) have not reached me either; however, according to the statements of the Germans, they were enclosed with the bonds themselves which were restored and deposited in the Bank of France in sacks. Until a verification of these sacks, which will take a long time, it appears to me unnecessary to insist further on this question.

Concerning the restitutions themselves, it is to be noted that the cash of the Bank of France, and of the Credit du Nord Bank especially, has not yet been restored; but owing to the present state of the negotiations, I do not think it advisable to take these delays into account.

I add that my remarks only refer to the strictly financial clauses and relate neither to the industrial restitutions, agricultural and railway materials, nor to archives or works of art.

KLOTZ

Appendix D to HD-78

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Request for instructions from the Supreme Council by the Commission on New States with regard to the response to the Bulgarian observations on the Conditions of Peace.

Reply to the Bulgarian Observations. Request for Instructions From the Supreme Council by the Commission on the New States

The Commission on the new States has examined that part of the Bulgarian reply concerning the protection of minorities (Part 3, Section 4).

The Bulgarian Delegation accepts the provisions in Articles 49 to 57. However, the Delegation calls attention to the following points:

1. Considering the principles of reciprocity between the different Balkan States as necessary from the point of view of protection of minorities, the Delegation points out:

a) that the special provisions concerning the protection of minorities in the Balkan States, other than Bulgaria, are not included in the text of the Treaty;

b) but while there is an Article (46) stipulating with regard to Greece the acceptance of the principle of the protection of minorities, no analogous clause was inserted with regard to Serbia and Rumania.

2. The Delegation calls attention to the situation of persons formerly residing in Macedonia, Dobrudja or Thrace and who, before or during, or since the war, have taken refuge in Bulgaria, and requests that these persons be given the right to opt for the nationality of the State in which is now located the territory where they were formerly domiciled.

The Commission on the new States considers:

1st—*a*) that it would not be opportune to insert in the Treaty with Bulgaria provisions concerning the protection of minorities in the other Balkan States;

b) The observation made by the Bulgarian Delegation that no clause had been provided for in the Treaty which obliges the Serb-Croat-Slovene State or Rumania to accept such provisions, is founded.

There are two methods of complying with this request:

a) To insert in the text of the Treaty with Bulgaria a provision obligating Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State; a provision analogous with that taken concerning Greece in Article 46.

b) To insert no new Article in the Treaty with Bulgaria, but to inform the Rumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations that they will not be permitted to sign the Treaty with Bulgaria before having signed the Treaty with Austria and the Treaty on Minorities.

Although the case of Rumania is different from that of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, as, by the Treaty with Bulgaria, Rumania does not acquire any territory, yet, considering the existence of an important Bulgarian minority in the Dobrudja, it has occurred to the Commission that an analogous solution could be applied in both cases.

The Commission thinks that the Supreme Council should decide which of these two methods should be adopted.

3. The Commission recognizes that the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation are, in part, justified concerning the Ottoman subjects who were unable to exercise the right of option provided for by the Treaty of 1913, and took refuge in Bulgaria before or since the war. It is true that among these refugees there is, according to indications which have been received, an important proportion of Bulgarian agitators whose return to Macedonia, Thrace or Dobrudja might present serious dangers with regard to the pacification of these territories.

By Article 4 of the Draft of Treaty with Greece, Ottoman subjects, born on territory ceded to Greece, of parents actually domiciled there, acquire Greek nationality. The corresponding article in the Treaty with the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes makes no mention of Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian nationals.

With a view to harmonizing the provisions of these two treaties, the Commission esteems that the words "or Ottoman" should be inserted in Article 4 of the S. C. S. Treaty.

The Drafting Committee will have to study in what manner it will be possible to carry out this modification. Perhaps it would be advisable to establish a special protocol, which does not appear to present serious difficulties, especially in case, as is probable, further modifications may be judged necessary.

The Commission does not consider it possible to insert a provision concerning this subject in the Treaty with Bulgaria.

Appendix E to HD-78

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Note from the British Delegation requesting decisions of the Supreme Council with regard to

- (a) distribution of airship sheds in occupied areas.
- (b) interpretation of phrase "no dirigibles shall be kept" (Art. 198 German Treaty).
- (c) interpretation of Art. 200 of German Treaty.

(19781)

BRITISH DELEGATION,
PARIS, 27 October, 1919.*Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council*

The Chairman of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany has asked for decisions of the Supreme Council with regard to the following points:—

1. The distribution of the airship sheds in the occupied areas.

Some members of the Commission have claimed that these sheds belong to the Powers in occupation.

With regard to this claim, the British Delegation would observe that, in its report on the distribution of the aeronautical material in Germany,¹⁶ the Supreme War Council recommended that the material should be distributed in the following proportion:

England and France, each 30%
Italy and the United States each 15%
Belgium and Japan each 5%

It was also agreed, as regards airship sheds that, for reasons of geographical proximity and convenience, France should be permitted to have the first choice from among the airship sheds in the area occupied by her troops and in Belgium. This report was agreed to by the Supreme Council. Throughout the discussions on this subject, both at the Aeronautical Advisory Commission and at the Supreme War Council, there has never been any question of the sheds in an occupied area being the property of the Power in occupation.

2. The interpretation of the phrase occurring in Article 198 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany,—“No dirigibles shall be kept.”

Does this mean no dirigibles whatever, or no dirigibles for military or naval purposes?

It appears that when this Article was prepared by the Aeronautical Commission, no clear decision was arrived at on this point. The Commission put up a strong recommendation to the Supreme Council to the effect that Germany should not be permitted to engage in civil aviation for a period of years, but this recommendation was not agreed to and the Supreme Council, by refusing to accept it, permitted Germany to possess civil aircraft.¹⁷ Presumably, therefore, she is permitted to possess airships for commercial work.

As a matter of fact, the airship is far less dangerous than the aeroplane for war purposes, while its immediate commercial value is probably far greater.

In view of these considerations, the British Delegation does not think it possible to uphold the view that the phrase “No dirigibles shall be kept” applies to civil airships.

¹⁶ Appendix B to HD-63, p. 443.

¹⁷ BC-52, minute 1, vol. IV, pp. 355, 370.

As regards the method of deciding whether any particular aircraft is to be considered to belong to the military or the civil type, the Supreme Council at its meeting on August 6th, 1919,¹⁸ passed the following resolution:

“That the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types of aircraft are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise.”

3. The question whether Article 200 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany gives to the Allied and Associated Powers the right to send military machines into unoccupied German territory, pending the complete evacuation of German territory by the Allies.

The British Delegation is of opinion that this right, which is disputed by the Germans is clearly established by the provisions of the Article in question and that it should be maintained. The Drafting Committee, moreover, have expressed the unanimous opinion that this right is not confined to occupied German territory.

Appendix F to HD-78

POLISH AFFAIRS COMMISSION

Note to the Supreme Council

1st) an overture made by Mr. Dmowsky,
2nd) a telegram issued by General Dupont,
represent the German Government as preparing to conduct municipal elections in Upper Silesia very shortly.

For these reasons, the Polish Affairs Commission has the honor to propose that the Supreme Council communicate the letter hereto annexed to the German Delegation.

PARIS, October 27, 1919.

[Annex]

OCTOBER 27, 1919.

Draft of Letter for the German Delegation

MR. PRESIDENT: According to information brought to the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments, the German Government is preparing to conduct municipal elections in Upper Silesia before the entry into force of the Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Powers request information as to whether this news has any foundation.

The Allied and Associated Powers could not admit, in fact, that elections be held in Upper Silesia before the Commission, which, ac-

¹⁸ HD-25, minute 14, vol. VII, p. 563.

ording to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, is directed to organize a plebiscite in this region, has commenced its operations. This Commission alone, should it judge necessary, will be authorized to conduct elections during the period prior to the plebiscite. These elections would take place under its supervision and under the proper conditions requisite to the liberty of votes.

Appendix G to HD-78

BRITISH DELEGATION,
PARIS, 27 October, 1919.

Note by the British Delegation for the Supreme Council

At its meeting of Thursday, October 23rd,¹⁹ the Supreme Council passed the following resolution:—

“that the principle that the payment of troops of occupation should be a charge upon the local revenues of the territories occupied should apply to such troops as might be used as troops of occupation in Danzig and Memel.”

In this connection a further question arises, namely, that of the source from which shall be provided the salary and allowances of the Administrator of the Free City of Danzig and his staff, and of the persons who will be engaged in the administration of Memel during the occupation of that place.

This question requires settlement because the British Treasury insists that in no case shall the expenses incurred under these heads become a charge on British revenues alone, and it is therefore necessary to decide whether those expenses shall be borne by the territories concerned or by the Allied and Associated Powers in equal shares.

The British Delegation recommends to the favourable consideration of the Supreme Council the former solution, which would appear the more natural and proper one.

Appendix H to HD-78

CONFERENCE ON PEACE PRELIMINARIES

COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REPATRIATION OF THE GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN PRISONERS IN SIBERIA

In the course of a meeting held September 27, 1919,²⁰ the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers enacted the following resolution:

Constitution of
the Commission

It is decided that a Commission comprising an American, French, British, Italian and Japanese Officer shall be constituted to take charge

¹⁹ HD-75, minute 2, p. 747.

²⁰ HD-62, minute 7, p. 411.

of the repatriation of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia.

It is further decided that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops now in Siberia shall be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.

By a resolution under date of October 2, 1919,²¹ the above text was modified in the following manner:

It is decided to modify the second paragraph of the resolution of September 27th, in the following manner:

It is further decided that the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Yugoslav and Rumanian troops now in Siberia shall be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners.

The Commission was composed as follows:

Composition of the Commission	United States of America:	Col. J. A. Logan
	British Empire:	Lt. Col. C. H. G. Black
	France:	Naval Captain Fabre
	Italy:	Major Scanagatta
	Japan:	Major Katsuki, or, as replacement, Col. Nagai.

*Report Presented to the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers*

The Commission constituted by the Supreme Council to study the repatriation of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in Siberia learned through a telegram from Gen. Janin on October 11th* that the personnel to be repatriated from Siberia amounts to a minimum of 250,000 men and comprises the following different categories:

A) Contingents of volunteer friends, called allogene contingents, recruited from among the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Rumanian, Serbian and Jugo-Slav prisoners, and who, under the orders of General Janin, fought against the Germano-Bolshevists in Siberia, or participated in the maintenance of order: about 75,000 men, to whom will have to be added, several thousand persons constituting the families of these soldiers.

B) Prisoners of war who belonged to the German or Austro-Hungarian armies, but who, by their place of origin, now belong to Allied Governments, Poland, Rumania and Serbia.

These men are to be distinguished from the preceding in that they did not agree to accept service in the above cited contingents; they are dispersed throughout various prison camps, and their number is yet to be determined.†

²¹ HD-65, minute 4, p. 488.

* résumé hereto annexed. [Footnote in the original.]

† this category does not include any Czecho-Slovaks, all having been mobilized. [Footnote in the original.]

- C) Deported civilians belonging to the same Allied nationalities.
- D) German, Austrian and Magyar prisoners (belonging to German[y], Austria and Hungary, according to their new boundaries).
- E) Deported civilians belonging to the same enemy nationalities under the same conditions.

The opinion of the Commission concerning the repatriation of these different personnel categories may be resumed as follows:

Category A.—Contingents of volunteer friends (called allogene contingents).

The Commission esteemed that it was not in its competency to examine measures relative to the repatriation of these contingents; these measures are studied by qualified authorities representing the different Allied and Associated countries concerned.

However, the repatriation of the allogene contingents which, by the terms of the resolutions of the Supreme Council of September 27 and October 2, should be effected before that of the German, Austrian and Hungarian prisoners, is a question which interests the Commission.

According to information which the Commission has been able to obtain, instructions have been sent to General Janin to concentrate and maintain volunteer contingents of sufficient strength in the Kharbin and Vladivostock region to justify the commencement and continuance of operations from the present time.

It would be advisable to have the question of sea transportation regulated as soon as possible.

Categories B. C. D. E.—Non-incorporated prisoners and deported civilians as indicated by General Janin, it is necessary:

1st—that Poland, Rumania and Serbia immediately send authorized representatives to Siberia to distinguish between the prisoners or deported civilians to be repatriated as friends (categories B and C) and those destined for Germany, Austria and Hungary, according to their new frontiers (Categories D and E).

2nd—that an immediate order be issued covering the repatriation of these various categories in relation to each other, as well as within each category with relation to the various nationalities.

General Janin states that he is not qualified to issue this immediate order, the determining of which concerns questions of general policy which are not within his competence; he proposes that the order be issued by the Commission in Paris now studying the repatriation of the Siberian prisoners.

3rd—it is necessary to establish relations with the Omsk Government, where the greater part of the prisoners are in detention and which, considering that it is in a state of war with Germany, Austria and Hungary, might estimate that it was not obliged to hand over these prisoners.

The question of evacuating the different personnel, friend[s] or enemies, which shall still remain in Siberia after the departure of the

volunteer contingents, is not merely a technical problem of transportation, but, on the contrary, closely linked with numerous political questions and could furthermore involve a study of financial questions.

The Commission, constituted by the resolutions of September 27 and October 2, is composed exclusively of officers, and esteems that it is not qualified to treat these questions. It asks that each Power represented nominate to the Commission an expert in political and financial matters.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, October 30, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon

Secretaries

M. Berthelot

M. de Saint-Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja

Secretary

M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Capt. G. A. Gordon
 BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian Small
 FRANCE M. Massigli
 ITALY M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Rear-Admiral N. A. McCully, U. S. N.

Captain Madison, U. S. N.

Lieut.-Commander H. W. Koeller, U. S. N.

Dr. J. B. Scott

Dr. I. Bowman

Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

Commander MacNamara

Captain Fuller

Mr. A. Leeper

Mr. H. W. Malkin

FRANCE

Marshal Foch

General Weygand

General Le Rond

M. Laroche

Commandant Le Vavasseur

M. Fromageot

ITALY

C. Amiral Grassi

M. Ricci-Busatti

M. Vannutelli-Rey

M. Stranieri

Capt. de Corvette Ruspoli

JAPAN

Commandant Ohsumi

M. Nagaoka

M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a draft note of the Drafting Committee on the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty. (See Appendix "A".)

Note of the
Drafting
Committee
on the
Notification to
the German
Government of
the Coming
Into Force of
the Treaty

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon this note.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to raise a point of mere form relative to the second paragraph of this draft note. He desired that this paragraph be changed to read as follows:

"The President of the Peace Conference has the honor to inform the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire, France and Italy, have ratified the Treaty, and Germany, on the other hand, having likewise ratified it, the above mentioned condition is fulfilled."

This change was merely designed to prevent the note being drafted in such form as to notify the German Government that it had ratified the Treaty.

M. PICHON said that the question of the date to be fixed for the coming into force of the Treaty should not be discussed at the present time.

M. FROMAGEOT concluded his commentaries on the draft note by saying that, as a result of the decision taken the preceding day by the Council¹ relative to the unexecuted Armistice clauses and to the drafting of a Protocol, he thought that a paragraph should be added at the end of the draft note to the effect that the German Government should send a representative to Paris prior to the ratification of the Treaty, with power to sign a Protocol relative to the unexecuted Armistice clauses. (This was agreed to.) The Drafting Committee thought that a large majority of the unexecuted Armistice Clauses were covered by provisions in the Treaty itself: in most cases the Treaty in terms imposed upon the German Government the same obligations as did the Armistice, and a large number of these Treaty provisions likewise specified the penalty for nonfulfilment of these obligations.

M. PICHON observed that for such violations of the Armistice clauses as the Scapa Flow incident no penalties were provided.

M. FROMAGEOT said that this was true, and that likewise no penalties were provided for the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, although in this case the Treaty did take care of this obligation (Article 433). With respect to most of the remaining unexecuted clauses of the Armistice the Treaty provided penalties. He thought it

¹ HD-78, minute 1, p. 802.

might be well to give a brief summary of the unexecuted clauses. There was nothing in the Treaty with respect to the delivery by the German Government of rolling stock. With respect to the Financial Clauses, the Treaty in Article 238 not only reiterated the obligations incumbent upon the German Government, but explicitly provided penalties. This was likewise true with respect to the handing over of agricultural and industrial implements. The Penalties provided for Germany's non-fulfilment of her obligations in general were laid down in Article 430 and paragraphs 17 and 18 of the second annex to Part VIII (Reparations). The question of works of art was likewise fully covered. The question of aeronautic material was not so well covered. Articles 170, 202 and 210 of the Treaty prohibited the exportation of such material but no penalties were provided. The Committee did not feel that it quite understood the argument of the Minister for Finance relative to the payment by the German Government of maintenance expenses of the troops of occupation (See H. D. 78, Appendix "C").² The question of the German mercantile marine, which at present resolved itself into a matter of the tank steamers, the five vessels alleged to be sold to Holland and some undelivered vessels in neutral ports, was also fully covered by the Treaty. The foregoing summary seemed to indicate that in general the Treaty took into account the probability of the German Government not having fulfilled all its obligations under the Armistice prior to the entry into force of the Treaty.

M. PICHON asked if there were any remarks.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to know if this note were to be sent to the German Government without at the same time informing it what it was proposed to include in the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses. He thought that if the German Government were directed to send a representative to sign such Protocol without knowing what it was to contain, further delay would ensue.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that there was no need at the present time to arrive at a decision as to the date of deposit of ratifications. The Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses would be ready on the following Saturday; the point was to agree upon the form of the note which should be sent at the proper time.

M. PICHON said it was only necessary to agree on the principle of this note.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he agreed in principle with the foregoing remarks, but he felt that it was important to let the German Government know what had to be done. He thought that the following arrangement would be most advisable: without letting the German Government know the exact date of the deposit of ratifications it

² *Ante*, p. 819.

should be informed that the Treaty would be put into force at an early but undetermined date which could be designated as "D" day. The German Government could be informed at once that on "D" minus 8 day for instance, it would be notified of the date of deposits of ratifications and that on "D" minus 6 day, for instance, its representative must be in Paris. He thought that an arrangement of the note on such a basis would solve all difficulties.

M. BERTHELOT inquired if it was intended that the representatives of the German Government should all be in Paris and not in the various regions where Allied Commissions and troops of occupation were to arrive.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the German representatives must be here and come to an agreement before the Treaty could be put into force.

M. BERTHELOT brought up the example of Silesia. Should it be decided here in Paris what German officials would remain there in order to effectuate a transfer of authority in that territory without a hitch?

GENERAL LE ROND replied that German representatives should be here in Paris to settle the general principles involved, and that officials should likewise remain in Silesia and other territories where the same situation was presented in order to effect the necessary arrangements with the incoming Allied Commissions and troops of occupation. The procedure to be adopted consisted of two phases.

GENERAL WEYGAND thought it would be better not to put these details in the draft note, as confusion would certainly be caused thereby. It was most important that the summoning to Paris of the German representatives should not be bound up with the question of settling the date of deposits of ratifications.

M. PICHON agreed that *pourparlers* should certainly start in Paris before the date of deposit of ratifications was necessarily fixed.

M. POLK, referring to Marshal Foch's idea as to rearrangement of the draft note on a time-table basis, inquired whether this was to include the unfulfilled Armistice clauses. He supposed that it was only meant to refer to movement of troops, evacuation, and similar points.

M. PICHON said that this was so.

M. SCIALOJA thought that the draft note should be modified so that the invitation to the German Government to participate in the deposit of ratifications should be eliminated so long as that date remained unsettled. It would be enough to merely inform the German Government that as the time for deposit was approaching, it became necessary for it to fulfill the conditions precedent thereto.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the German Government should be informed why the deposit of ratifications had not yet taken place.

M. SCIALOJA thought that representatives of the German Government should be summoned to Paris immediately to discuss the matters still remaining unsettled prior to the fixing of a date for the deposit of ratifications.

M. FROMAGEOT still thought it would be better to retain the framework of the draft note to the extent of acquainting the German Government with the proposed procedure, this in order to avoid any argument on their part that the Treaty should now automatically be put into force.

M. PICHON summed up by suggesting that the draft note should be changed so as to accord with the views above expressed by Marshal Foch, M. Scialoja, Sir Eyre Crowe and M. Fromageot, and that as so modified, it should be submitted to the Council on the following Saturday, together with the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses. (This was agreed to.)

(It was decided :

(1) to accept in principle the note of the Drafting Committee on the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty (See Appendix "A"), with the following modifications:

(a) in the first part of said draft the German Government should be invited to participate in the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty at a date specified as not yet being determined.

(b) that the German Government, at the same time, should be informed that the date of the coming into force of the Treaty would later be communicated to it in ample time but that without awaiting the notification of said date it should immediately send representatives to Paris to discuss the settlement of the matters constituting conditions precedent to the putting into force of the Treaty.

(c) to add at the end of said draft a paragraph to the effect that the German Government, prior to the date of deposit of ratifications, should send representatives to Paris with power to sign a Protocol dealing with the unexecuted clauses of the Armistice.

It was further decided :

(1) to change the form of the second paragraph of said draft so that it should read as follows: "The president of the Peace Conference has the honor to inform the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely: the British Empire, France and Italy, have ratified the Treaty, and Germany, on the other hand, having likewise ratified it, the above mentioned condition has been fulfilled."

(2) that the draft note of the Drafting Committee should be modified as above indicated and submitted to the Council on the following Saturday, together with the Protocol relative to the unexecuted Armistice Clauses.)

2. CAPTAIN FULLER R. N. explained to the Council that the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had met on the preceding day; no report had been made by them to the Council, but the report which he was now going to read had been agreed to by the British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives, and in great part had been agreed to by the United States representative, who, however, wished to submit a minority report. He then read the majority report (See Appendix "B"). He added that it was understood that in the event of the surface vessels being broken up and sunk, the same procedure should not be adopted in the case of floating docks.

MR. POLK asked if Rear Admiral McCully might read his minority report.

REAR ADMIRAL MCCULLY then read his minority report (See Appendix "C").

MR. POLK said that the point of view of the minority report was this: although it had already been decided that the German Government should give up certain ships, their disposition had never been definitely determined. At one time there had been some question of sinking them. Now the ships in question had actually been sunk. The majority report proposed to take mercantile material, which of course could not be destroyed, in reparation for the vessels sunk. This mercantile material would be useful to the Reparation Commission. It seemed to him better, by way of reparation for the vessels sunk, to take from the German Government naval material which could be destroyed if so desired. The point he wished to emphasize was that he thought that the proposal to take over mercantile material, raised a question which distinctly affected the Reparation Commission.

M. PICHON remarked that the French Government had never agreed to the sinking of these ships.

MR. POLK replied that such was not his contention. That was not the point now at issue. His question was whether it were not better to leave this mercantile material to be devoted to such purposes that it would become useful to the operations of the Reparation Commission, rather than, by taking it away, to diminish Germany's power of making adequate reparation.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that several questions were now being confused. He pointed out that the British Government had been willing to make a big concession; it was willing to bear all the loss resulting from the Scapa Flow incident, therefore, it seemed to him that the opinion of his Government should now bear some weight. To him it seemed pointless to take over from the German Government ships which were useless to them and were equally useless

Sinking of
the German
Fleet at
Scapa Flow

to the Allied and Associated Powers. He thought that such an action might indeed be pleasing to the German Government. Likewise the docks which it was proposed to take over were so large that they were only useful for large sized ships of which the Germans now had none, and certainly it was not desired to encourage them to build any.

M. BERTHELOT thought that Mr. Polk's observations had shown that the argument of the United States was entirely based upon the sinking of the ships. The question had now, however, reached a further stage. Neither the French nor the Italian Governments had ever agreed to the sinking of the ships and they had demanded their distribution. Certainly there was no point in distributing the ships if they were thereafter to be sunk. He recognized the force of Sir Eyre Crowe's argument and he wished to point out that the British Government had even made another concession: although the British Government was prepared to have the ships sunk and thought that the American Government would agree, nevertheless, it was ready to admit the right of France and Italy to dispose of their share of the ships as they saw fit. He thought it was important to settle now the question whether or not the ships were to be sunk.

MR. POLK inquired if M. Berthelot meant to say that naval material ought not to be replaced by naval material. However the Council was not then discussing the disposition of ships; he merely wished to repeat that he thought the question now under discussion was one that interested the Reparation Commission. The action proposed by the majority was, to give a priority, on account of reparation, for the ships sunk. To his mind three points were involved: there was no question at the present time of the disposition of the ships; he understood and appreciated the attitude of the British Government; he thought that this was a question for the Reparation Commission. He pointed out that his position was purely a matter of principle inasmuch as the United States would not get any ships.

M. PICHON thought that this presented a new phase of the question.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that this would make it impossible to settle the Scapa Flow incident prior to the drafting of the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses and would indefinitely postpone the entry into force of the Treaty.

M. PICHON agreed, and observed that Marshal Foch had pointed out to him that as this was a question of a violation of the Armistice the Reparation Commission could not yet be interested therein. The American argument could equally be applied to all material to be handed over by virtue of the Armistice clauses.

MR. POLK asked if the Financial experts had not been consulted with respect to the delivery of locomotives and similar questions?

MARSHAL FOCH said that they had not, for the reason that the Reparation Commission had not yet existed and did not yet exist.

MR. POLK thought that on that basis it would be easy for the Armistice Commissions to seriously embarrass the Reparation Commission.

M. PICHON remarked that all matters heretofore adjusted had been controlled by the Supreme Council.

M. SCIALOJA added that the conception of reparation only existed by virtue of the coming into force of the Treaty.

MR. POLK said that he was surprised to learn that the Financial experts had not been consulted. He thought that the American Financial experts had at least given an opinion on these matters.

M. PICHON said that the French Government could not yield on this point.

MR. POLK remarked that if the docks and similar material now proposed to be demanded were received, the United States would get something, otherwise they would not.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the principle of demanding floating docks and similar material should be maintained, at the same time giving instructions that only the large ones and those belonging to the German Government or in which it had a predominating interest should be taken.

MR. POLK thought that the Naval Representatives could easily agree on that basis.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Naval representatives should immediately meet and settle this question.

M. PICHON remarked that the question was a very urgent one inasmuch as it had to be settled before the Protocol, which was to be submitted the following Saturday, could be drafted. The Naval representatives should come to a conclusion by the following day at the latest and communicate the same to M. Berthelot and M. Fromageot.

CAPTAIN FULLER, R. N. said he understood then that the Committee of Naval Experts might call upon the German Government to make over by way of reparation: (1) Government docks; (2) docks, cranes, etc., in which the German Government had a predominating interest; and, (3) docks, cranes, etc., the removal of which would not affect the working of ports in which they were situated either from the Allied or from the German point of view.

(It was decided:

(1) to accept the principle of the responsibility of the German Government for the sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow.

(2) that the Committee of Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should meet immediately and agree as to the reparation to be exacted from the German Government for the

sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, being guided by the principle that docks and similar material belonging to the German Government or in which it had a predominating interest, or too large to be suitable for present German maritime uses, should be taken by way of reparation.)

3. (The Council had before it a report of the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers relative to the dispatch of naval vessels to Flensburg (See Appendix "D").)

Dispatch
of Naval
Vessels to
Flensburg

M. PICHON suggested that the recommendations contained in this report be adopted.

(This was agreed to)

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he only wished to recall the fact that although it had been intended to send three battalions to Schleswig, only two battalions would go there. It was worth considering, in view of the adoption of the Naval Representatives' recommendation not to send Allied warships to Flensburg, whether this force was sufficient.

(It was decided:

to accept the report of the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers relative to despatching naval vessels to Flensburg (See Appendix "D").)

4. M. PICHON thought that, as the Central Territorial Committee was not unanimous, the best procedure was for it to submit majority and minority reports which would be discussed and settled by the Council at its meeting on the following Saturday.

Request of
the Central
Territorial
Committee for
Instructions on
the Questions of
Dobrudja and
of the Serbo-
Bulgarian
Frontier, in
Connection
With the Reply
to the Bulgarian
Counter-
Proposals

M. LAROCHE observed that certain delegations had stated that the opinion held by them relative to the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier might be influenced by the Council's solution of the Dobrudja question; certain other delegations had stated that their opinion would not be changed by such a solution.

MR. POLK inquired if the question of Dobrudja were not a short one susceptible of being settled immediately.

M. PICHON remarked that he could only say that the opinion of the French Government was that Dobrudja, a province belonging to an Allied Government, should not be taken away from it and given over to Bulgaria, an enemy.

MR. POLK pointed out that he was not insisting on that matter being settled now. The only point before the Council was what kind of an answer should be sent to Bulgaria? He quite understood that in this answer there would be nothing relative to transferring Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

M. LAROCHE said that the settlement of the Dobrudja question was intimately connected with that of Bessarabia.

MR. POLK replied that in his opinion the question of Bessarabia should not be discussed at the present moment particularly on account of the situation in Russia.

M. PICHON agreed.

M. LAROCHE said that if the question of Bessarabia were not to be raised he thought the question of Dobrudja should likewise not be raised.

MR. POLK thought that at some other time or in some other form, by the medium of another Treaty or action on the part of the League of Nations, the question of Dobrudja could be brought up.

M. PICHON said the French Government absolutely did not agree to any solution contemplating the transfer of Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

M. LAROCHE thought that if the matter were left for future action in the manner intimated, with the implication that Dobrudja would eventually be transferred to Bulgaria, it was equivalent to certainly depriving Roumania of this province.

MR. POLK remarked that the chief trouble was that Roumania had been given everything she wanted in a territorial way without any equivalent being demanded. The time to bargain would have been when Roumania's territorial requests had been freely granted.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that it would be sufficient to say in the answer to the Bulgarian counter-proposals that in a Treaty with Bulgaria the question of Dobrudja could not be raised.

M. BERTHELOT agreed. He thought that it would be inadvisable to mention anything further, particularly in regard to the League of Nations.

(The suggestion of Sir Eyre Crowe met with approval and the discussion of the questions of Dobrudja and the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier were fixed for the meeting of Saturday, November 1st, 1919.)

5. M. BERTHELOT, referring to the draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, called attention to Section X thereof (H. D. 77, Appendix "C").³

In the first paragraph of that Section it was provided that: "In order to accomplish its mission, the Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the British and French Allied Missions now operating in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action." He observed that no mention had been made of Italian and American Commissions. He thought that the paragraph should be redrafted so as to include

Instructions
to Inter-Allied
Commission
Charged With
Examining
Into the
Evacuation of
the Baltic
Provinces

³ *Ante*, p. 796.

the personnel of the Military Mission of all the Allied and Associated Powers. He understood that there was no Italian Military Mission in that region but that there was an American one.

MR. POLK stated that there was no American Military Mission in that region, but that he had no objection to the change proposed.

(It was decided:

to modify Section X of the draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with the examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (H. D. 77, Appendix "C"), so that the first paragraph thereof should read as follows: "In order to accomplish its mission, the Inter-Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the Military Missions of all the Allied and Associated Powers now operating in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action".)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, October 30, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-79

Project of a Note to the German Government

By the terms of the final provisions of the Treaty signed at Versailles June 28, 1919, it has been stipulated that:

"A first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand."

The President of the Peace Conference has the honor of calling to the attention of the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire, France and Italy on the one hand, and Germany on the other, have ratified the Treaty and that the condition above referred to has been fulfilled.

The other Allied and Associated Powers who have, up to the present day made known their ratification, are Belgium, Poland and Siam.

In execution of the said provisions, and if the various acts necessary to the coming into force of the Treaty be fulfilled in time, there will take place in Paris on November 1919, at o'clock, the Procès-verbal of the deposit of these ratifications. The German Government is requested to be kind enough to participate.

The final provision[s] of the Treaty add:

"From the date of this first procès-verbal, the Treaty will come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it. For

the determination of all periods of time provided for in the present Treaty, this date will be the date of the coming into force of the Treaty."

This entry into force of the Treaty entails certain consequences which should be considered :

1. The beginning of operations by the Inter-Allied High Commission of the Rhineland. (Arrangement, Article 2) ;

2. The beginning of operations by military, naval and air delegations, at the present time in Germany, as military, naval and air commissions of control (Treaty, article 203) ;

3. The beginning of operations by the Reparations Commission; (Treaty, article 233 and Annex II paragraph 5) ;

4. Transfer of sovereignty for Memel (Treaty, article 99) and for Danzig (Treaty, Article 100), resulting in the evacuation of the troops, and German authorities, and the taking possession of these territories by the Interallied troops ;

5. Transfer of Government in the Saar Basin (Treaty, article 49 and annex, paragraph 16) ;

6. Transfer of temporary Government in the territory of Upper-Silesia, submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty, article 88 and annex, paragraphs 1 and 2) ; resulting in the evacuation of German troops, and authorities to be designated by the Commission, and the occupation by the Inter-Allied troops as well as the beginning of operations by the Commission of Government and of Plebiscite on this territory ;

7. Transfer of temporary administration in the territory of Schleswig submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty, article 109) resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and occupation by the Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commission of Administration and of Plebiscite on this territory ;

8. Beginning of the 15 day period, in which must be effected the evacuation and the transfer of temporary administrations, in the territories submitted to a plebiscite: Eastern Prussia, Allenstein (Treaty, article 95) and Eastern Prussia, Marienwerder (Treaty, article 97), resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and occupation by the Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commissions of Administration and of Plebiscite on these territories.

9. Beginning of the 15 day period, in which the Commissions of Delimitation must begin their operations.

The German Government is invited to send to Paris for the duly accredited representatives to :

1. agree with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers as to the conditions of establishment of the Commissions of Government and of administration and plebiscite, the handing over of powers, the transfer of services, the entry of Inter-Allied troops, the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and all other measures above provided for.

Attention is now called to the fact that the German authorities must leave on the spot all installations of service or dwelling as well as the documents which are to be used upon the immediate entry into

action of the Inter-Allied authorities; that the German troops must also leave on the spot all installations occupied by them.

2. agree with the Staff of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies as to conditions of transport of Inter-Allied troops.

Appendix B to HD-79

Conclusions Arrived at by the British, French, Italian and Japanese Naval Advisers to the Peace Delegation on the Subject of Reparation for the Sinking of the German Warships at Scapa at Meeting Held at Ministry of Marine at 3 p. m. on 29 October, 1919

NOTE: The U. S. Naval Adviser has a minority report.

In view of the reparation claims that Germany had already incurred under the terms of the Peace Treaty, it was not considered feasible to make any further financial or material demands other than the following, which, however, cannot be regarded as complete compensation to the Allied and Associated Powers for the losses incurred through the sinking of the modern German men-of-war at Scapa.

2. The further claims which it was considered should be put forward are as follows:

(a) For the capital ships sunk.

A number of floating docks now in German ports, whose total lifting capacity is equivalent to that of the capital ships sunk, should be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers. The aggregate tonnage is 370,740 tons.

(b) For the five light-cruisers sunk.

The following light-cruisers, left to Germany under the Peace Treaty, should be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers;—

Königsberg
Pillau
Graudenz
Regensburg
Strassburg

(c) For the fifty T. B. D.'s sunk.

A number of small floating docks, floating cranes, tugs, dredges, and other floating port material of an equivalent displacement to the fifty destroyers should be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers. The aggregate displacement is 41,800 tons.

NOTE: A certain number of these ships have since been salvaged and are in a bad condition. The raising of these vessels has incurred a considerable expenditure, and consequently it is not considered that these vessels can be placed to the credit of the German Government in the above demands.

3. With a view to carrying out the above conditions the German Government shall undertake to supply to the Allied Naval Commis-

sion of Control within ten days of the deposit of the ratifications of the Peace Treaty, a complete list of all floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, etc., now in German possession, and to surrender such floating docks and additional material as may be notified to them by the Allied Naval Commission of Control.

4. The distribution of docks, cranes, tugs, and dredges, etc., surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers, under the above conditions, should be considered in conjunction with the disposal of the enemy surface vessels.

5. That on the understanding that the Supreme Council have decided to hold the German Government solely responsible for the sinking of these ships at Scapa, it is desirable that all the German officers and men belonging to these ships should be repatriated as early as possible, with the exception of any whose surrender is required under Article 228 of the Treaty of Peace. The German Government should, however, agree to the reparation demanded, before it is effected.

6. With regard to the moneys salvaged from the German warships at Scapa, it was considered that such moneys should be placed to the credit of the Reparation Fund. Individual claims can be made good by the German Government.

7. It was not considered that the torpedo boat destroyer *B-98* could be retained as compensation for one of the destroyers sunk at Scapa, but that she should be claimed as one of the forty-two torpedo boat destroyers to be surrendered under the Peace Treaty.

Appendix C to HD-79

OFFICE OF NAVAL ADVISER

HOTEL CRILLON, PARIS, FRANCE, October 30, 1919.

From: U. S. Naval Adviser.

To: Supreme Council.

Subject: Minority Report on Memorandum submitted to Supreme Council by the British Delegation regarding Responsibility for sinking of German warships at Scapa Flow, and other questions connected therewith.

Reference: (a) Report Board of Admirals, June 23, 1919.
 (b) Letter of M. Clemenceau to German Delegation of June 25, 1919.⁴
 (c) S. H. Bulletin 756 of October 22, 1919.
 (d) S. H. Bulletin 148 [1148] of October 25, 1919.
 (e) Report Board of Admirals, October 29, 1919.

⁴ Appendix XI to CF-92, vol. VI, p. 695.

1. The German Government was responsible for failing to take preventive measures against sinking of the interned German vessels. In consequence the Armistice was violated, and this justifies a demand for Reparations.

2. The German Naval Officials in command at Scapa Flow were responsible as active agents in sinking the vessels. This justifies a demand for the trial and punishment, if convicted, of such officers.

3. The Reparations demanded should in principle be confined to further delivery of Naval Material. German Naval Material available for Reparations, according to Reference (a) consists of:—

(a) *Of Military Value.*

(1) Five (5) Light Cruisers (*Graudenz, Koenigsberg, Pillau, Regensburg, and Strassburg*).

(2) Fourteen (14) Destroyers (1908-09 program).

(3) Eight (8) Torpedo Boats.

(b) *Of Small Military Value.*

(1) Fourteen (14) Pre-Dreadnaughts (1900-1906 types) (about 182,000 tons in all).

(2) Nine Light Cruisers (*Gazelle* and *Hamburg* classes).

(3) One (1) Cruiser (*Roon*).

(4) Twenty-three (23) Destroyers (1906-07 Program and later).

(c) *Of Little or No Military Value.*

(1) Seven (7) Battleships (*Kaiser Friedrich* and *Brandenburg* classes).

(2) Eight (8) Coast Defense ships (*Hagen* Class).

(3) Two (2) Cruisers (*Prinz Heinrich* and *Furst Bismarck*).

(4) Six (6) Light Cruisers (5 of *Hertha* class and *Kaiserin Augusta*).

(5) Thirty-six (36) Destroyers.

(6) Sixty-four (64) Torpedo Boats.

(d) *Naval Docks (At Wilhelmshaven).*

(1) Three (3) Large Docks, one of 40,000 tons

(2) One (1) Pontoon Dock 1,500 tons

(3) Four (4) Torpedo Boat Docks 4,000 tons

The entire Reparations could be taken from classes (a), (b) and (d) mentioned above, reckoning either on tonnage basis, or based on value for scrap. In Class (c) would still remain sufficient Naval Forces for Germany's needs to assist in maintaining internal order.

NOTE: At time of sinking of German vessels in Scapa Flow, there were in port 50 German Destroyers, of which fifteen (15) were not sunk, four were salved later, another is being salved. Majority Report, Reference (c), demands Reparations for fifty (50) Destroyers.

4. In regard to the sum of 34,642 marks, 20 pfennings, the Germans have claimed some of this money as personal property of

Officers and Men. Such of this money as can be proved by them to be personal property, should be paid to German Officers and Men entitled to it, as personal property of war prisoners is not subject to confiscation. The remainder should be placed in Reparation Fund.

5. The German Destroyer *B-98* was engaged in bringing mails to German vessels interned at Scapa Flow, was provided with proper authority to make the trip, and was flying the white flag. It is not alleged to have had any part in the sinking of the German vessels, or to have been guilty of any warlike act. However justifiable her seizure may have been at the moment, her indefinite retention is not justified by International Law, and she should be released and restored to Germany pending further dispositions.

N. A. McCULLY

Appendix D to HD-79

Report of Allied Representatives on Dispatch of Naval Vessels to Flensburg

According to the decision taken on October 25 by the Supreme Council,⁷ the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers met on Monday, October 27, at 15 o'clock, in the Ministry of Marine, in order to determine whether, on account of the recent events at Flensburg, they deem it possible to send battleships to that port.

The Naval Representatives express the following opinion :

First: From a maritime point of view, the sending of light ships (light cruisers, destroyers or gun boats) is possible, but it is unnecessary for them to enter the port and stay there.

Second: Great Britain, the United States and France are the only great powers which have ships available to fulfill this mission.

Third: They think that, in case one or several battleships were sent immediately, the Commander-in-Chief would be placed in a difficult situation, if, as is probable, the Danes would ask him for assistance which he would be unable to give; and, as he would be in a German port, the Germans might assume a hostile attitude towards him, which would necessitate immediate action on the spot, and an ulterior action of the Supreme Council.

Fourth: In case the Supreme Council should decide to send ships, it is indispensable for it to determine in a precise manner what line of conduct the Commander-in-Chief must observe.

Fifth: The Naval Representatives think that it is not judicious to send Allied battleships for "demonstration" purposes only, before the day under which the Allied Naval Forces are to arrive, with troops, for the plebiscite of Schleswig, according to the stipulations of the Peace Treaty.

⁷ HD-76, minute 8, p. 770.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 1, 1919, at 10 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

M. Pichon

Secretaries

M. Berthelot

M. de Saint Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja

Secretary

M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Mr. B. Winthrop.
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian Small.
FRANCE M. Massigli.
ITALY M. Zanchi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Dr. J. B. Scott
Rear Admiral McCully
Mr. A. W. Dulles
Dr. I. Bowman
Colonel J. A. Logan
Commander Koehler
Captain Gordon

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Admiral Groves, R. N.
Hon. C. H. Tufton
Mr. A. W. Malkin
Mr. A. Leeper
Commander Smith, R. N.
Commander Dunne, R. N.
Captain Fuller, R. N.
Commander Macnamara, R. N.

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
General Weygand
General Desticker
General Le Rond
M. H. Berenger
M. Laroche
Commandant Le Vavas seur
M. Fromageot
Capitaine Roper

ITALY

General Cavallero
 Contre-Amiral Grassi
 M. Ricci-Busatti
 M. Vannutelli-Rey
 M. Galli
 M. Pilotti
 Capitaine de Corvette Ruspoli
 Prince Boncompagni

JAPAN

M. Adatci
 Commandant Ohsumi
 M. Nagaoka
 M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 28, 1919 (See Appendix "A").)

SIR EYRE CROWE stated the question was a very simple one, and was summarized in the note from the British Delegation which had been circulated among the members of the Council. The Council had appointed, at some prior time, General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in Asia Minor: It seemed that neither the French nor the Italian authorities had been informed of the decision of the Council.¹

M. PICHON thought indeed that the question could not raise any difficulty so long as the beginning of the note, as submitted to the Council, was altered slightly: The British Delegation had said that the General Officer commanding the British troops at Constantinople and in Asia Minor (Syria excepted) had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in those regions. This assertion was correct, as far as Turkey in Asia was concerned, but the question of the command at Constantinople was the object of negotiations between the British and French Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed with this remark, but asked, above all, that the French and Italian military authorities be informed of the decisions of the Supreme Council, which had recognized the authority of General Milne.

M. BERTHELOT thought that there could be no doubt whatsoever on this question, and added he could not understand the misunderstanding which had taken place, for the necessary information had been given at the same time to M. de France and to General Franchet d'Esperey.

M. SCIALOJA asked that the same instructions be repeated to the Italian military authorities.

M. PICHON agreed that this information should be reiterated.

(It was decided:

that the French and Italian Delegations take the necessary steps to inform their representatives in Turkey that the Supreme Council had

¹ HD-10, minute 4, vol. VII, p. 194.

appointed General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Asia Minor, Syria excepted. (See Appendix "A".)

2. (The Council had before it a draft note prepared by the Drafting Committee (See Appendix "B").)²

Draft Note
to the German
Government
Relative to
Putting the
Treaty
Into Force

M. FROMAGEOT commented upon this draft note and remarked that the Drafting Committee had taken account of the observations made at the preceding meeting of the Supreme Council,³ and also that the new draft was presented by all the members of the Committee.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the draft, as prepared by the Drafting Committee, invited the German Government to send representatives to Paris on November 6th. He would like to know whether on the 6th of November they could profitably discuss with the German delegates: would the Commissions be ready on that date?

M. BERTHELOT said that he had proposed November 6th to take into account the wish expressed by General Weygand himself that the conference should take place as soon as possible, but could easily be put off for a few days.

GENERAL WEYGAND thought that from a military standpoint they would certainly be ready on November 6th, but that perhaps that date might be a little early for the Commissions.

M. PICHON proposed the 10th instead of the 6th.

(This proposal was adopted)

(It was decided:

that the draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Drafting Committee, relative to putting the Treaty into force, be approved, and that the German Government be asked to send representatives to be in Paris on the 10th, and not on the 6th, of November, 1919. (See Appendix "B").)

3. (The Council had before it a draft Protocol, prepared by the Drafting Committee (See Appendix "C").)⁴

Draft Protocol
Between the
Allied and
Associated
Powers and
Germany
Relative to
Confirming the
Obligations
Imposed Upon
the German
Government by
the Armistice

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee, and remarked that there was occasion to modify the draft on the following points:

(1) Page 1, point 3: Eliminate in the second line the word "immediately" and add after the words, "in Russian Territory" the words, "as soon as the Allies judge opportune."

² Appendix B is not the draft but the final text of the note.

³ HD-79, minute 1, p. 830.

⁴ Appendix C is the final text of the protocol. The English text of the draft protocol cannot be found in the Department files. A translation, by the editors, of

(2) Page 1, point 4: Substitute the word, "coercive" for the word, "consecutive."

(3) Page 1, point 5: Substitute the word "fiduciary" for the word, "judicial."

(4) Page 2, point 6: Add to the end of the paragraph, "destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over."

(5) Page 3, point 11: Add to the end of the paragraph, "and various other merchant vessels."

the French text (Paris Peace Conf. 185.182/153) reads as follows (the page numbers of the original are given in brackets):

[1]

Draft Protocol

At the very time of proceeding to the first deposit of ratifications of the Peace Treaty, it was ascertained that the following obligations which Germany had agreed to execute, in the Armistice Conventions and the complementary agreements, have not received full satisfaction, viz:

1st. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause VII: Obligation of delivering within a period of thirty-one days ending on December 11, 1918, 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars. Forty-two locomotives and 4,460 cars are still to be delivered.

2d. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause IX: Obligation of the cost of the troops of occupation. The reimbursements have not been made.

3d. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XII: Obligation of withdrawing immediately within the frontiers of Germany, the German troops which are in Russian territory.

This withdrawal of troops has not been as yet executed, in spite of the reiterated injunctions of August 27, September 27, and October 10, 1919.

4th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XIV: Obligation to discontinue immediately all requisitions, seizures or consecutive measures in Russian territory. The German troops continue to use these measures.

5th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XIX: Obligation of immediately delivering all documents, specie, securities (transferable and judicial, together with plant for issue thereof) concerning public

[2]

or private interests in the invaded countries. The complete statements of the specie and securities removed, collected, or confiscated by the Germans in the invaded countries, have not been delivered.

6th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XXII: Obligation of delivering all German submarines. Destruction of the German submarine UC-48, off Ferrol, by order of her German Commander.

7th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XXIII: Obligation of maintaining in the Allied ports the German battleships designated by the Allied and Associated Powers, these ships being destined to be subsequently delivered; Clause XXXI: Obligation of not destroying any ships before delivery—on June 21, 1919, destruction at Scapa Flow of the said ships.

8th. Protocol of December 17, 1918, annexed to the Clauses of the Armistice of December 13, 1919: Obligation of restoring all works of art and artistic documents removed from France and Belgium. All works of art which were transported into unoccupied Germany have not been restored.

9th. Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause III and Protocol 392/I, additional Clause III, of July 25, 1919: Obligation of delivering agricultural implements in lieu of the supplementary railroad material provided for in tables 1 and 2 annexed to the Protocol of Spa, of December 17, 1918. The following were not delivered on the date fixed (October 1, 1919): 40 "Heucke" plowing outfits; all the personnel necessary to

(6) Page 4: Add to the end of the second paragraph, "and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over."

(7) Page 4, point 2: Add to the end of the paragraph "also the three submarine engines of *U-146*, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for submarines destroyed in the North Sea."

operate the apparati, all the spades; 1,500 shovels, 1,130 plows T. M. 23/26; 1,765 plows T. F. 18/21; 1,512 plows T. F. 23/26; 629 Belgian plows T. F. Om 20; 1,205 Belgian plows T. F. Om 26; 4,282 harrows of 2k.500; 2,157

[3]

steel cultivators; 966 fertilizer spreaders 2m 50; 1,608 fertilizer spreaders 3m 50.

10th. Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VI: Obligation of restoring the industrial material removed from French and Belgian territories. All this material has not been restored.

11th. Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VIII: Obligation of placing the entire German Merchant Fleet at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. The following have not been delivered: 14 tankers, total tonnage of 63,143, lying at Hamburg; five steamers, total tonnage of 62,456, lying at Bremerhaven, Geestemünde, and Bremen; all of which were to be surrendered in the Firth of Forth.

12th. Protocols of the Brussels Conference of March 13th and 14th, 1919: Obligation of not exporting any war material of any nature. Exportation of aerial material to Sweden, Holland, Denmark.

A certain number of the above unexecuted stipulations were renewed by the Treaty of June 28, 1919, the going into force of which will of right render applicable the sanctions provided for. This applies, in particular, to the various payments in kind stipulated as reparation.

On the other hand, the question of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces was the object of an exchange of notes and decisions, which are in course of execution. The Allied and Associated Powers expressly confirm the contents

[4]

of their notes, the execution of which Germany, by the present Protocol, agrees to carry out loyally and strictly.

Lastly, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot overlook, without sanction, the other infractions committed against the Armistice Conventions, and violations as serious as the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow and the destruction of the submarine *UC-48* off Ferrol.

Consequently, Germany agrees:

1st) To deliver within a period of ten days, from the date of the present protocol as reparation for the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow.

2d) To deliver within the same period, the machinery and engines of the submarines *U-137*, *UT-46* [*sic*], and *U-150*, as reparation for the destruction of the submarine *UC-48*.

3d) To pay to the Allied and Associated Governments, the value of the exported aerial material, according to the estimate that will be made by the President of the Aerial Control Commission as provided for in Article 210 of the Treaty of Peace, and within five days following the notification of this estimate.

4th) To make within a period of 10 days from the date of the present protocol, reimbursement with 10 percent interest for the cost of the troops of occupation.

5th) To effect, within the same period, the delivery of the 42 locomotives and 4,460 cars in accordance with clause VII of the Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918.

[5]

In case Germany should not fulfill these obligations within the time above specified, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to have recourse to any coercive measures, military or other, which they may deem appropriate.

Done in Paris 1919.

He explained that in point 1 of Page 1 they had mentioned an interval of thirty-one days expiring December 11th, 1918. Was this exact?

MARSHAL FOCH said it was not quite right; the time limit had been exceeded by mutual consent and in consequence of various agreements. There was no need to mention it. On the other hand, he considered that as regarded handing over of rolling stock, the Germans had not, properly speaking, committed any real violation of the Armistice. There had been certain slowness of execution. It would be a mistake therefore to treat as equally serious the nonfulfilment of that clause and specific violations of the Armistice like the Scapa Flow incident and the nonevacuation of the Baltic Provinces. It would perhaps be better to mention in the beginning of the note the more important questions, and to consider secondary violations in a final paragraph.

M. FROMAGEOT said that they had followed the order of the clauses of the Armistice conventions; obviously that might be modified. From a legal point of view, on the other hand, he felt obliged to remark that the fact of an obligation being in course of fulfilment did not prevent their considering it unexecuted.

MARSHAL FOCH thought that it would be sufficient to say that, on that point, the Allied and Associated Powers had not received full satisfaction. He wished to repeat, in that case, that there was no formal violation of the Armistice, and that it would be well not to confuse in the same category formal violations and incomplete execution.

M. BERTHELOT said it had seemed advantageous to make a complete enumeration, but he wished to remark that, in the last part, they had to take into account the arguments the Marshal had in mind, and that, doubtless, it would be sufficient to omit in that last part, paragraphs Nos. 4 and 5 of page 4.

M. PICHON summed up that they were agreed to modify the first paragraph of page 1 in the following manner: "The obligations, etc., have not been carried out, or have not received full satisfaction."

(This suggestion was adopted)

MARSHAL FOCH wished to remark that as for point 2, they could not reproach the Germans with not having made the reimbursement of the upkeep expenses of the troops of occupation, for the simple reason that they had not yet told them the total amount of these expenses. It would therefore be better to omit the paragraph.

M. BERTHELOT thought it was all the easier, as the obligation was covered by the Treaty.

M. PICHON concluded that the Council decided to omit this paragraph.

M. FROMAGEOT stated that with regard to Germany's obligation to deliver documents, specie, valuables carried away by her troops, they

had not felt in a position to mention the valuables removed from the prisoners' camps, as the Minister of Finance had demanded, because the Armistice did not speak of it.

MR. POLK thought that, although he did not suppose that his Naval Experts would raise objections on the point, he wished to make a reservation on point 6 of the Committee's draft. Similarly, he felt he must make a reservation on point 11 of the draft, concerning the handing over of the fourteen tank vessels which had been demanded. He believed, further, that on this point it might be possible to find a text which would satisfy at once the American Delegation on the one hand, and the British and the French on the other.

M. BERTHELOT stated they had already taken care to avoid a text which appeared to imply a decision by the American Government on property in these vessels.

MR. POLK added that the American Government did not consider that the demand for the handing over of those tank vessels could be maintained.

M. BERTHELOT wished to remark that the Supreme Council had taken a decision on the subject,⁵ namely that a German obligation existed although, as between the Allies, the question might be examined anew.

MR. POLK did not wish to raise, at that time, the question in its entirety, but could not help remarking that if the decision which M. Berthelot recalled, had not been taken, there would not have been a violation of the Armistice, in that case, on the part of the Germans. He was hoping that the Drafting Committee would prepare a text which would permit of an agreement.

M. HENRY BERENGER stated that they did not at that time have to examine the question of real property in the tank ships, nor what was the legal position of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. That was a question which belonged to the Reparations Commission; for the moment the question was: why had the ships which had been demanded in virtue of certain clauses of the Armistice, not been delivered, especially at a time when tonnage and fuel were everywhere the universal need. He thought the British Delegation believed, as he did, that there was there a real obstruction on the part of Germany.

MR. POLK thought that the question before this meeting was to revise the protocol and not to discuss in its entirety the question of the tank ships which, however, he was ready to discuss. He simply wished to make a reservation, and he was convinced that the Drafting Committee would manage to agree on a text which would not bring up the whole question.

MR. BERTHELOT said that a distinction should be made between the two points: 1st, the attitude of the Allies towards the Germans: the

⁵ HD-62, minute 1, p. 403.

Germans had been asked to deliver the ships, they ought to do it. 2nd, if the Supreme Council had several times decided that the tank ships were to be sent to the Firth of Forth it was no longer a matter of settling the question in substance; and discussion remained possible as between the Allies and America. But it was important to introduce in the protocol a clause! If they were not to do so they would unintentionally be deciding the question in substance and to the advantage of Germany.

MR. POLK thought that the remarks of M. Berthelot were probably true, but as time was short, he would for the moment confine himself to making a reservation.

M. CLEMENCEAU concluded that it was understood, then, that the protocol would contain a clause on that subject, but for the moment the Council decided to reserve the text.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked with regard to point No. 12 of the Committee's draft whether it would not be advisable to examine it at the same time as the draft reply to the German note of October 10th [12th]⁶ on the sale of Aeronautical matériel which figured on the agenda of that morning.

M. FROMAGEOT thought that the question would present itself more profitably a little later. He would have some observations to make which would satisfy the technical experts; and at that time could also be examined the draft reply which Sir Eyre Crowe mentioned. He added that, following point No. 12, it would be right to alter the text of the paragraph beginning with the words, "A certain number of stipulations, etc"; it should read: "Unexecuted or incompletely executed stipulations" so as to take into account the observations offered some time before by Marshal Foch.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they then had to decide what reparations they were going to exact for the Scapa Flow incident.

CAPTAIN FULLER pointed out that the Naval Experts had not been able to come to an agreement. The Representative of the United States had made a reservation on the subject of floating docks that ought to be exacted.

COMMANDANT LE VAVASSEUR stated that he for his part had submitted—and his British, Italian and Japanese colleagues were of the same opinion—that it was inadvisable to specify the percentage of large and small docks that ought to be demanded for the tonnage that was to be replaced. They had thought it sufficient to fix only the total, leaving it to the Commission of Naval Control to make the choice. The American Delegate alone had been of a different opinion.

⁶ Appendix A to HD-78, pp. 811, 816.

COMMANDANT LE VAVASSEUR repeated that they had all been agreed upon the principle that the handing over of Naval matériel ought to be demanded and agreed also upon the amount of tonnage that should be claimed as reparation. Their difference existed in the proportion as between large and small docks.

CAPTAIN FULLER agreed that was the situation.

MR. POLK wished to ask for what reason they could not specify at this time the proportion of great docks and small docks to be delivered.

CAPTAIN FULLER replied that it was because this raised the question of the docks at Dantzig, for it was at Dantzig that two of the biggest docks Germany possessed were situated.

MR. POLK said that, in the absence of his naval experts, it was difficult for him to take a decision. He felt, however, as he had already stated to the Council, that this question brought up the problem of the extent of Germany's ability to make reparation, and for that reason came within the province of the Reparations Commission; he confined himself to making a reservation and proposed that the discussion be resumed that afternoon. (This proposal was adopted.)

M. FROMAGEOT wished to draw the attention of the Council to the third obligation which the protocol imposed on Germany, to take into account the remarks which had been presented to the Committee by technical experts. They, therefore, proposed to alter the text which the Council had before it in the following manner:

“third—to make over to the Allied and Associated Governments the value of the Aeronautical matériel which had been exported, according to the decision that would be given, and the estimate made or notified by the President of the Commission on Aeronautical Control, as provided in article 210 of the Treaty of Peace, before the 31st January, 1920”.

It was the President of the Commission who would decide whether the exported matériel were civil or military, and who as a result of that decision, would determine the sum that Germany ought to pay.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that the notification to Germany would be made by the President, but that the decision would have to be taken by the Commission itself.

M. FROMAGEOT explained that the technical experts had agreed that the President be trusted with the power of deciding whether the matériel in question were civil or military.

CAPTAIN ROPER stated that the Supreme Council had had to make a decision on this point on the 29th September (H. D. 63),⁷ on the point being raised by the British Delegation. In the text prepared by the British Delegation the President had been mentioned, but in their

⁷ Minute 2, p. 430.

minds it was clear that the President was merely the interpreter of the Commission.

M. BERTHELOT added that this meant the decision of the Commission as notified by the President.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that of course the Commission could always delegate its powers to the President.

M. FROMAGEOT made the comment that the two following paragraphs, Nos. 4 and 5 on page 4, ought to be omitted in the light of the explanations just offered by Marshal Foch, but that the Drafting Committee thought that there was still ground for adding to the final paragraph the following phrase which was dictated by the analogous terms of paragraph 18 of the annex to part VIII of the Treaty; "Germany pledges itself not to consider these measures as acts of war."

M. CLEMENCEAU did not think this a very happy addition. What were they going to do if Germany should refuse to sign that phrase.

MARSHAL FOCH announced himself quite hostile to that phrase.

M. SCIALOJA wished to raise another question. In his opinion it would be well to ask the Germans to come armed with full powers to sign the Protocol, but expressly on the understanding that that Protocol would not be still subject to ratification by the National Assembly. Were they not to take this precaution they would expose themselves to the anomaly that the Treaty would have come into force while the protocol was in the air; for certain articles of the German Constitution left it an open question whether the document that they wished to have the German representative sign would be valid without ratification by the legislative authorities.

M. FROMAGEOT wished to point out that in their draft note it was stated on Page 2^s that the German representative who was to sign the protocol must be armed with full powers.

M. SCIALOJA explained that this meant full powers to sign, but it was necessary that this signature should hold Germany without ratification.

M. FROMAGEOT thought it would be sufficient to modify the first paragraph on Page 2 of the draft note in the following manner:

"The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives, authorized to sign the procès-verbal for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement."

(It was decided:

to approve the draft Protocol prepared by the Drafting Committee (See Appendix "C") to be signed by a representative of the German Government upon the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace, with the following modifications:

^s See final text of note, appendix B, p. 863.

(1) Page 1, paragraph 1: "The obligations have not been executed or have not been entirely fulfilled."

(2) Page 1, paragraph 2: Eliminate the words, "within a period of thirty[-one] days ending on December 11, 1919 [1918]."

(3) Page 1, paragraph 3: This paragraph to be entirely eliminated.

(4) Page 1, paragraph 4: Eliminate in the second line the word, "immediately" and add to the fourth line the words, "as soon as the Allies judge opportune."

(5) Page 1, paragraph 6: In the third line substitute the word, "coercive" for "consecutive".

(6) Page 1, paragraph 7: In the third line substitute the word, "fiduciary" for the word, "judicial".

(7) Page 2, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph the words, "and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over".

(8) Page 2, paragraph 3: This clause is provisionally reserved.

(9) Page 2, paragraph 4: line 1, substitute for, "Clauses of the Armistice", "Armistice Convention".

(10) Page 3, paragraph 3: The first part of this paragraph is reserved, and at the end thereof are to be added the words, "and various other merchant vessels".

(11) Page 3, paragraph 5: Between the words, "unexecuted" and "stipulations" insert the words, "or incompletely executed".

(12) Page 4, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph, "and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over".

(13) The next paragraph was reserved provisionally.

(14) Page 4, paragraph 4: This paragraph to be modified so as to read: "To deliver within a period of ten days, from the date of the signature of the present Protocol, the machinery and engines of submarines *U-137*, *U-138*, and *U-150* by way of reparation for the destruction of submarine *UC-48*, as well as of the three engines of submarine *U-46*, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for the submarines destroyed in the North Sea."

(15) Change paragraph 5 on Page 4, to read: ". . . according to the decision that will be taken, the estimate made and modified [*notified*] by the Aeronautic Control Commission as provided for in Article 210 of the Treaty of Peace and before January 31, 1920."

(16) To omit the two last paragraphs of the same page.

It was further decided:

that on account of the changes made in the Protocol, the first paragraph on page 2 of the draft note to the German Government should be modified in the following manner:

"The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives authorized to sign the procès-verbal for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the Protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement."

4. (The Council had before it a draft reply prepared by the French Delegation (See Appendix "D").)

**Draft Reply
to the German
Note Upon the
Sale of
Aeronautical
Matériel**

SIR EYRE CROWE proposed to refer this draft back to the Drafting Committee for examination, and also to state whether the text thereof agreed with the resolutions which had just been taken.

(This proposition was adopted)

(It was decided:

(1) to refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the German Government dated October 12th.⁹ (See Appendix "D".)

(2) that the Drafting Committee would decide whether the note and the protocol which the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to send, did not render superfluous the sending of that specific reply.)

5. (The Council had before it the report from the Central Territorial Committee concerning the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier (See Appendix "E"), and a draft reply from the same Committee to the Bulgarian note concerning Thrace (See Appendix "F").)

**Reply to the
Bulgarian
Counter-
Propositions.
(Questions
of the Dobrudja
and of the
Serbo-Bulgarian
Frontier)**

M. LAROCHE explained that the Committee had not been able to agree. Although it was unanimous, as far as Thrace was concerned, in refusing the Bulgarian

claims, on the contrary, a disagreement existed on two other points. Two delegations, the American and the Italian, were of the opinion that there should be a modification of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier line as it was defined in the conditions of Peace, in two places, namely in the region of Tsaribrod and in the region of Bossiligrad. On the contrary, the three other Delegations were of the opinion that the original conditions should remain. With regard to the Dobrudja, the Committee was equally divided. On September 5,¹⁰ the Supreme Council had decided to examine the question of the Dobrudja when it would reply to the Bulgarian propositions. At the preceding meeting,¹¹ Sir Eyre Crowe had proposed that they should confine themselves to answering the Bulgarians that the question should not come up in a Treaty between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers, but the American and Italian Delegations insisted that the question should be examined anew: As far as they were concerned, the question was bound up with that of the Serbian frontier. That was the opinion of the majority of the Commission. In justification of the changes which they proposed to make in the conditions of Peace, the American and Italian Delegations laid stress on arguments which were already known, and they also emphasized the feeling which was being shown in Bulgaria, they were afraid that the decision of the Conference would leave behind them lasting marks of resentment.

⁹ Appendix A to HD-78, pp. 811, 816.

¹⁰ HD-48, minute 2, p. 116.

¹¹ HD-79, minute 4, p. 837.

These arguments were not of sufficient value for the majority. The Majority as a matter of fact, pointed out that the Serbian Delegation was familiar with the Peace conditions: Should the Council change them at the last minute, the Serbian Allies would be the ones to experience that feeling referred to by the minority Delegations. The majority was of the opinion that the reasons which had modified the line of the former Serbo-Bulgarian frontier were still good: they had wished to protect in the Vranje region the Belgrade-Salonika railroad from a Bulgarian aggression; indeed, it should not be forgotten that it was in that region, and by reason of the proximity of the railroad to the former frontier, the Bulgarian attack had begun in 1915.

MR. POLK wished to remark that as far as the Dobrudja was concerned, he thought it might be sufficient to insert a phrase on the subject in the covering letter; that the Allied and Associated Powers would declare, for instance, that the time had not come to discuss the question. Should the majority insist, he would not oppose himself to that decision, but he wished to state that he would have to make a formal reservation in the name of the American Government. The Dobrudja might become a cause of future war in the Balkans, and America would have some difficulty in interfering in a conflict which might be brought about by that question. He therefore wished to ask that this reservation be set forth upon the record: that the American Delegation would prefer the insertion in the covering letter of a line stating that the matter would be taken up with Roumania. Was the Supreme Council hostile to this solution? He did not wish to hide the fact that it seemed to him a great pity, at a time when they were guaranteeing the protection of Minorities, to go against the rights of these Minorities in the Dobrudja.

M. PICHON remarked that the Treaty of 1913¹² which had decided the future of the Dobrudja was prior to the war; there was no reason why they should change it as far as Roumania was concerned.

M. SCIALOJA did not wish to insist that the question of the Dobrudja should be taken up, but he, however, thought that it could very well be said that it did not concern the Treaty with Bulgaria.

MR. POLK reiterated the fact that he did not ask for the insertion of a disposition to that effect in the Treaty itself, nor even for the addition of a phrase in their reply to the Bulgarian counter-propositions; he was only asking that some words to that effect might be put in the covering letter.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this amounted to the same thing; such a phrase would be offering a pretext for war.

¹²Treaty of peace between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Roumania, and Serbia, July 28 (August 10), 1913, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CVII, p. 658.

M. LAROCHE continued his comment, and said that in the region of Tsaribrod, the Serbians had asked for a rectification of frontiers as far as the Dragoman Pass which protected Sofia. The Conference did not wish to go so far, but they had to point out that there was a series of mountain railways which in that region converged on Pirot and which consequently were the roads leading to Nisch; that was the traditional road of the Bulgarian invasions. It had appeared to them that there was reason for giving to the Serbians the strategic key of that road: indeed Serbia did not have any more claims to set up against Bulgaria, and therefore it was right to believe that there would be no further ambition to satisfy in that direction. On the contrary, Bulgaria would not cease to claim Serbian territories and on that side, the reasons for aggression subsisted. As a matter of fact the rectification of frontiers in question would only have the effect of passing approximately 20,000 inhabitants under Serbian authority.

M. LAROCHE stated that the report of the Minority had been distributed and that he was ready to read it.

MR. POLK wished to bring out certain points: first, should they consider the text of their first Peace conditions as intangible? Secondly, when the question had come up for the first time, M. Tardieu had told them that it was only a matter of 7,000 Bulgarians being turned over to Serbian authority. On verifying these figures, it was found that as a matter of fact, it was a total of nearly 42,000 Bulgarians being turned over as against 93 Serbian inhabitants. The only possible justification for this proposed change was to give the Serbians the means to attack Sofia without being stopped by any intermediary obstacles. He, therefore urged the Supreme Council to think over the consequences entailed in a decision which meant the handing over of 40,000 Bulgarians to the Serbians, so as to facilitate a Serbian attack upon Sofia. Even in Serbia the wisest people had seen that this would be a mistake which would make more difficult their mission of conciliation. He did not wish, however, to retard in any way the hour of Peace, but he felt it was his duty to express a very definite protest on this question.

M. LAROCHE wished to answer Mr. Polk's arguments by stating briefly that 40,000 Bulgarians in a total population of 4,000,000 inhabitants did not represent a very large figure. They had not left Sofia without protection since they had let the Bulgarians keep the Dragoman Pass which formed a defensive strategic position of the greatest value; and should it be found correct that they had ensured advantages to the Serbians, the reason was that they were convinced it was the Bulgarians who would attack. A concession at Tsaribrod would not make the Bulgarians forget either Stroumitza or Monastir.

M. SCIALOJA agreed with the American thesis. The arguments of the majority, as a matter of fact, did not seem convincing in the least.

The ethnographic question was a clear one: This was a question of a population purely Bulgarian, of a territory which was Bulgarian by its nature and history. The only argument which had been invoked was that of the railway; on this point, he wished to bring their attention to the fact that there were other points on which the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier came nearer thereto than in the Bossiligrad region. Why then base upon the existence of a railroad the determination of a frontier? From the military standpoint, they could no more give Serbia the means of invading Bulgaria than give Bulgaria the means of invading Serbia. If Serbia had legitimate fears, one might, to allay these impose on Bulgaria the disarmament of the entrenched camp of Slivnitza. The truth was that Serbia wished to have an open door on Sofia. They ought to be working to insure equilibrium; they should not admit the violation of those very principles of peace which they were striving to establish. There would always be causes for war, it was not for them to try and bring them about. It was clear that Bulgaria would never admit that the Serbs get an open road to Sofia. Lastly, he wished to remark that the text which they had communicated to the Serbs was only a draft, and that they had a perfect right to change it.

M. LAROCHE stated that at the present time, from a strategic point of view, the Serbs were in a position of clear inferiority. It was the line of the present frontier which had allowed in 1915 the Bulgarian invasion. The Peace conditions which they had handed to Bulgaria, at the same time as to all their Allies, were more than a simple draft. They would be taking a very serious responsibility should they modify these conditions. As for the disarmament of Slivnitza, which M. Scialoja proposed, this would appear to the Bulgarians as much more serious than the loss of Tsaribrod.

MR. BOWMAN resumed the arguments of the minority as follows: First, he thought it was useless to reinforce the feelings of reciprocal hostility between the Bulgarians and the Serbs; secondly, the minority did not consider that reasons existed to foresee an invasion of Serbia by the Bulgarians. Bulgaria was vanquished, and the Treaty disarmed her as well on land as on sea. Precautions had been taken to prevent her reorganizing an army; under these conditions she could not think of starting a new war for a long time. It was correct that in the Bossiligrad region, the railroad was at a distance of about ten miles from the frontier. It was proposed to withdraw this frontier to twice this distance, although the population was entirely Bulgarian; the minority would consent to accept this modification, but the case of Tsaribrod was entirely different. The frontier on that point formed a salient which protected the railroad, and on the other hand, in the southwest, on a point where

they had been asked to rectify the line, the frontier came much nearer to the railroad. The American and Italian Delegations were aware of the fact that if one wished to modify the frontier line, the new line as proposed was a good one, but the question was whether such modification was necessary. They still thought that no sufficient reasons were adduced to justify such a change; and when, on the other hand, they pointed out that this was the question of greatest interest to Bulgarian opinion, that it would likewise in itself be sufficient to prevent a *rapprochement* between Serbia and Bulgaria; that further the draft proposed to them was even opposed by influential men in Serbia, they deemed it their duty to maintain their conclusions.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that Mr. Polk was perfectly right in saying that the Peace conditions which they had handed to the Bulgarians were not inalterable. Any modification was difficult when it bore upon a question which had been discussed for many months and which had been the result of compromise. As a matter of fact the only new point brought up at this meeting was more complete statistical information. All the other arguments had already been discussed, and he admitted that in the first Commission, all the military experts had agreed that the proposed frontier did not give the Serbians offensive military advantages, but only defensive. They were now told that the idea of protecting a railroad had no sense, and that a strategical argument could never be adduced as against an ethnical one; he would point out that the Yugo-Slavs had said the same thing about the line proposed for the new Italo-Slav frontier. In preparing the treaties, they had had to make compromises on all points. Why maintain that in this question particularly principles were sacred? Would it not be wiser to stand by the clauses on which they had agreed? They were as a matter of fact assured that the Bulgarian Delegation would sign the Treaty in any event: on the contrary the conversations he had had with the Serbs had convinced him that if they were to make concessions to Bulgaria so as to facilitate in Sofia a signature which appeared certain, they were running the risk of having the whole treaty jeopardised at Belgrade. The Serbian Delegation which had arrived in Paris was in a difficult situation: it was ready to sign the Treaty with Austria. If this new sacrifice were imposed on Serbia, would the delegation still be able to sign? Their common desire was to sign Peace as soon as possible. They were sure to have the Bulgarian signature; ought they to jeopardise the Serbian signature?

M. PICHON wished only to add one word to Sir Eyre Crowe's statement. The Serbian Delegates had told him that a concession would mean for certain political men a decisive argument in favor of the refusal of Serbia's signature. On the other hand, the inten-

tions of Mr. Trumbic were conciliatory. Had the Bulgarians deserved that the Allies should bully the Serbs? He did not think so.

Mr. POLK wished to rectify on one point the statements of Sir Eyre Crowe: the American and Italian experts had never accepted the new line of frontier, they had always pointed out its dangers. The new line was not the work of the Commission, the Supreme Council alone had decided in its favor.¹³ He did not wish to complicate a difficult situation and he accepted that the Council should maintain its former decision, but in that case he felt it his duty to protest, to point out once more the dangers of such a decision, and to repeat that this decision was made against the advice of the American Delegation. The American Delegation did not wish to assume any responsibility whatsoever in the event of future conflicts which this decision might bring about.

M. SCIALOJA wished to associate himself with Mr. Polk's declaration. (The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 1, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-80

Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council

On July 18th the Council of Five passed certain resolutions.¹⁴ (Attached Appendix A.) From these resolutions it will be seen that the General Officer Commanding the British troops in Constantinople and Asia Minor, other than Syria, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in those parts. As Commander-in-Chief, he was given the specific duty of demarcating a line beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops were to be permitted to move. It would appear that the fact of this officer's appointment as Commander-in-Chief was not communicated to the Allied troops, as will be seen from the following telegrams:—

1. The British Commander-in-Chief, Constantinople, reported to the War Office on September 23rd that the Chief of the French Staff had informed his British liaison officer that no intimation had been received from the French Government that General Milne had been appointed to the command of the Allied troops in Asia Minor.
2. On the 26th October General Milne reported that for the last two months he had been endeavouring to obtain from the General commanding the Italian troops in Asia Minor a line of demarcation between the Italian and Turkish troops as directed in the instructions referred to above. In a letter to General Milne, dated Sep-

¹³ FM-16, minute 1 (d), vol. iv, pp. 716, 720.

¹⁴ HD-10, minute 4, vol. vii, p. 194.

tember 30th, the Italian General definitely states that he has no knowledge of instructions in the above quoted telegram regarding a line of demarcation between the Italian and Turkish Forces.

General Milne therefore states that so long as the Italian General declines to acknowledge his authority, he is unable to take any action in conformity with the orders of the Supreme Council, and that he cannot accept the responsibility put upon him.

The British Government, therefore, requests that General Milne's status may be communicated by the respective Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to their subordinates in Constantinople and Asia Minor.

28/10/19

Appendix A

Following resolutions were passed by Council of Five on July 18th, 1919.

1. Resolved that the Conference shall communicate to the Turkish Government their intention of immediately marking out the limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops will be permitted to move, all rights secured to the Allies under the Armistice being of course reserved. The Turkish Government is required to withdraw its troops to a position which will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief.

The Turkish Government shall be at the same time informed that the limiting lines above referred to, have no relation to the ultimate territorial arrangements which will be imposed by the Peace Conference.

2. The Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Asiatic possessions of Turkey shall be directed to send officers who, after communicating with the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna and the Italian and Greek Generals, shall fix the military lines above referred to.

3. Any future movement of the Allied forces shall be under the supreme direction of the Commander-in-Chief who is responsible to the Conference for military operations in the Asiatic portion of the Turkish Empire.

The Council also approved on July 18th the following agreement between Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Venizelos which had been reached as a result of discussions between them authorised by Council of Five:—

The line of division between the Greek and Italian occupations in Asia Minor begins from the mouth of the river K. Menderez: thence it will follow the course of the river up to the Ayassuluk-Scala-Nova road: thence it will follow the line of the Greek occupation of Ayassuluk and old Ephesus.

From old Ephesus it will follow a line at an average distance of 600 meters from the railway Smyrna-Aidin to the west, then to the south of the said railway, the line to be fixed on the spot by the Greek

and Italian Governments in order to allow the Greek troops to protect the railway from sudden attacks from *Comitagus*.

The line will then reach the river Muschluk-Deresi which will be followed to its junction with the Menderez.

Thence it will follow the bed of the Menderez to the east as far as Keuehk.

The two Governments agree not to pass beyond the line above established. Moreover this occupation has only a provisional character corresponding to the actual state of affairs, the consideration of the definite regime for these regions being reserved to the Conference.

Each of the two Governments agrees to afford in the territory which it occupies full and complete protection to the co-nationals of the other.

Instructions will be given to the commands in order that the officers of the two armies may maintain towards each other most friendly relations.

Appendix B to HD-80

Note to German Government

NOVEMBER 1, 1919.

By the terms of the final provisions of the Treaty signed at Versailles June 28, 1919, it has been stipulated that:

“A first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand.”

The President of the Peace Conference has the honor of calling to the attention of the Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire, France and Italy have ratified, and Germany on the other hand, having also ratified the Treaty, the condition referred to above has been fulfilled.

The other Allied and Associated Powers who have up to the present time made known their ratification are Belgium, Poland and Siam.

In compliance with the said provisions, and if the various acts necessary to the coming into force of the Treaty be fulfilled in time, there will take place in Paris, at a date which will be announced later and notification of which will be given five days in advance, a procès-verbal, of the deposit of these ratifications, at which the German Government is requested to participate.

The final provisions of the Treaty add:

“From the date of this first procès-verbal the Treaty will come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it. For the determination of all periods of time provided for in the present Treaty this date will be the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.”

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers have decided that the Treaty shall not go into force until the execution of the obligations which Germany had by the Armistice Convention and the additional agreements undertaken to fulfill and which have not received satisfaction, shall have been fully carried out.

The German Government is, therefore, asked to give to the German representative, authorized to sign the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications, also full powers to sign at the same time the Protocol, of which a copy is hereto annexed,¹⁵ and which provides without further delay for this settlement.

Furthermore, the entry into force of the Treaty involves certain consequences which, at the present time, it is important to consider:

1. The beginning of operations by the Inter-Allied High Commission of the Rhineland (Arrangement, Article 2) ;
2. The beginning of operations by military, naval and air delegations, at the present time in Germany, as military, naval and air commissions of control (Treaty, Article 203) ;
3. The beginning of operations by the Reparations Commission; (Treaty, Article 233 and Annex 11, Paragraph 5) ;
4. Transfer of sovereignty for Memel (Treaty, Article 99) and for Dantzig (Treaty, Article 100), resulting in the evacuation of the troops and German authorities and the taking possession of these territories by the Inter-Allied troops ;
5. Transfer of Government in the Saar Basin (Treaty, Article 49 and Annex, Paragraph 16) ;
6. Transfer of temporary Government in the territory of Upper Silesia, submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty, Article 88 and Annex, Paragraphs 1 and 2) ; resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities to be designated by the Commission, and the occupation by Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commission, of Government and of Plebiscite in this territory ;
7. Transfer of temporary administration in the territory of Schleswig submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty, Article 109), resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and the occupation by Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commission of Administration and of Plebiscite in this territory ;
8. Beginning of the 15-day period in which must be effected the evacuation and the transfer of temporary administrations in the territories submitted to a plebiscite; Eastern Prussia, Allenstein (Treaty, Article 95) and Eastern Prussia, Marienwerder (Treaty, Article 97), resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and the occupation by Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commissions of Administration and of Plebiscite in these territories ;
9. Beginning of the 15-day period in which the Delimitation Commissions must begin their operations.

¹⁵ Appendix C, *infra*.

The German Government therefore is now invited to send to Paris, for November 10th, 1919, duly qualified representatives for this purpose, to:

1. Arrange in agreement with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers the conditions for the setting up of the Commissions of Government, of Administration and of Plebiscite, the handing over of powers, the transfer of services, the entry of Inter-Allied troops, the evacuation of German troops, the replacement of the said German authorities and all other measures above provided for.

Attention is now called to the fact that the German authorities must leave intact, all service organizations and offices, as well as the documents required by the Inter-Allied authorities for the immediate entry on their duties; and that the German troops must also leave intact all the establishments which they occupy.

2. Agree with the Staff of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Powers, as to the conditions of transport of Inter-Allied troops.

Appendix C to HD-80

Protocol

At the very time of proceeding to the first deposit of ratifications of the Peace Treaty, it was ascertained that the following obligations which Germany had agreed to execute, in the Armistice Conventions and the complementary agreements, have not been executed or have not received full satisfaction, viz:

1st.—Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918,¹⁶ Clause VII: Obligation of delivering 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars. Forty-two locomotives and 4,460 cars are still to be delivered.

2d.—Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XII: Obligation of withdrawing within the frontiers of Germany, the German troops which are in Russian territory, as soon as the Allies judge the time proper. This withdrawal of troops has not been as yet executed, in spite of the reiterated injunctions of August 27,¹⁷ September 27¹⁸ and October 10, 1919.¹⁹

3d.—Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XIV: Obligation to discontinue immediately all requisitions, seizures or coercive measures in Russian territory. The German troops continue to use these methods.

4th.—Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XIX: Obligation of immediately delivering all documents, specie, values (of property and finance, with all issuing apparatus),²⁰ concerning

¹⁶ Vol. II, p. 1.

¹⁷ Not found in Department files.

¹⁸ Appendix E to HD-62, p. 419.

¹⁹ HD-67, minute 4, and appendices D and E thereto, pp. 536, 546, and 547.

²⁰ The English text of the Armistice reads: "documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof;" vol. II, p. 5.

public or private interests in the invaded countries. The complete statement[s] of the specie and securities removed, collected or confiscated by the Germans in the invaded countries, have not been delivered.

5th.—Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XXII: Obligation of delivering all German submarines. Destruction of the German submarine *U. C. 48*, off Ferrol, by order of her German Commander, and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines proceeding to England for delivery.

6th.—Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XXIII: Obligation of maintaining in the Allied ports the German battleships designated by the Allied and Associated Powers, these ships being destined to be ulteriorly [*subsequently?*] delivered; Clause XXXI: Obligation of not destroying any ships before delivery—on June 21, 1919, destruction at Scapa Flow of the said ships.

7th.—Protocol of December 17, 1918, annexed to the Armistice Convention of December 13, 1918: Obligation of restoring all works of art and artistic documents removed from France and Belgium. All works of art which were transported into unoccupied Germany have not been restored.

8th.—Armistice Convention of January 15 [16], 1919, Clause III and Protocol 392/I, additional Clause III, of July 25, 1919: Obligation of delivering agricultural implements in lieu of the supplementary railroad material provided for in Tables 1 and 2 annexed to the Protocol of Spa, of December 17, 1918—The following were not delivered on the date fixed (October 1, 1919): 40 "Heucke" plowing outfits; all the personnel necessary to operate the apparatus, all the spades; 1,500 shovels, 1,130 Plows T. M. 23/26; 1,765 plows T. F. 18/21; 1,512 plows T. F. 23/26; 629 Belgian plows T. F. 0,m20; 1,205 Belgian plows T. F. 0 m.26; 4,282 harrows of 2 k.500; 2,157 steel cultivators; 966 fertilizer spreaders 2m.50; 1,608 fertilizer spreaders 3m.50.

9th.—Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VI; Obligation of restoring the industrial material removed from French and Belgian territories. All this material has not been restored.

10th.—Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VIII; Obligation of placing the entire German Merchant Fleet at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. A certain number of ships, of which delivery had been requested by virtue of this clause, have not yet been delivered.

11th.—Protocols of the Brussels Conferences of March 13th and 14th, 1919: Obligation of not exporting any war material of any nature. Exportation of aerial material to Sweden, Holland and Denmark.

A certain number of the above unexecuted, or incompletely executed stipulations, were renewed by the Treaty of June 28, 1919, the going into force of which will of right render applicable the sanctions provided for. This applies in particular, to the various payments in kind stipulated as reparation.

On the other hand, the question of the evacuation of the Baltic provinces was the object of an exchange of notes and decisions, which are in course of execution. The Allied and Associated Powers expressly confirm the contents of their notes, the execution of which

Germany, by the present protocol, agrees to carry out loyally and strictly.

Lastly, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot overlook, without sanction, the other infractions committed against the Armistice Conventions, and violations as serious as the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, the destruction of the submarine *U. C. 48* off Ferrol, and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines proceeding to England for delivery.

Consequently, Germany agrees:

1st.—A) to deliver as reparation for the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow:

ent protocol and under the conditions provided for by paragraph

a) Within a period of sixty days from the signing of the present protocol, of Article 185, of the Treaty of Peace, the following five light cruisers:

Königsberg
Pillau
Graudenz
Regensburg
Strassburg

b) Within a period of ninety days from the signing of the present protocol, and in all respects in good condition and ready to function, such a number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs, and dredgers, equivalent to a total displacement of 400,000 tons, as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers may demand.

As regards the docks, the lifting power will be considered as displacement. In the number of docks above provided for, there should be about seventy-five per cent of docks of over 10,000 tons. The totality of this material must be delivered *in situ*.

B) To be delivered within a period of ten days from the signing of the present protocol:

A complete list of all the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers which are German property. This list, which will be delivered to the Inter-Allied Naval Control Commission, provided for by Article 209 of the Peace Treaty, will include the material which on the 11th of November, 1918, belonged to the German Government, or in which the German Government had an important interest at that date.

C) The officers and men who formed the crews of the battleships sunk at Scapa Flow, and who are actually detained by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, with the exception of those who [whose?] surrender is provided for by Article 228 of the Peace Treaty, will be repatriated at the latest when Germany will have complied with the above, paragraphs A and B.

D) The destroyer *B-98* will be considered as one of the 42 destroyers, the delivery of which is provided for by Article 185 of the Peace Treaty.

2nd.—To deliver within a period of ten days from the signing of the present protocol: The machinery and engines of the submarines

U-137, *U-138*, and *U-150*, to offset the destruction of the submarine *UC-48*, as well as the three engines of the submarine *U-146*, which is still to be delivered, to offset the destruction of submarines in the North Sea.

3rd.—To pay to the Allied and Associated Governments: The value of the exported aerial material, according to the decision and the estimation which will be made and notified by the Aerial Control Commission, provided for by Article 210 of the Peace Treaty, and before the 31st of January, 1920.

In case Germany should not fulfill these obligations within the time above specified, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to have recourse to any coercive measures, military or other which they may deem appropriate.

Done in Paris 1919.

Appendix D to HD-80

THE FRENCH DELEGATION

*Draft of Reply to a Note of the German Government of the 12th of October*²²

(Wako No. 3639)

1. The refusal, expressed in paragraph one, to admit that the Allied and Associated Powers have the right to spontaneously make definite decisions, is in contradiction with the Terms of Article 204, paragraph 2, of the Peace Treaty, drawn up as follows:

“They (Inter-Allied Commissions of Control) will communicate to the German authorities the decisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (therefore the Supreme Council) have reserved the right to take, or which the execution of the military, naval and air clauses may necessitate.”

2. The objection raised by the first alinea of paragraph 2 of the German note, has been considered by the Supreme Council in its meeting of the 23rd of August, 1919.²³ After having examined the text of the convention of Brussels and of the telegram from the Economic Supreme Council under date of the 25th of March, account being taken of the lifting of the blockade, the Supreme Council, considering that, the agreement made by Germany to execute the terms of Article 202 confers on the Allied and Associated Powers property rights over the material to be delivered, has decided that:

“The Allied and Associated Powers will inform Germany that they insist upon the principle established that Germany must not alienate

²² Appendix A to HD-78, pp. 811, 816.

²³ HD-37, minute 5, and appendix C thereto, vol. VII, pp. 816 and 823.

her aeronautical material. However, the Allied and Associated Powers, making use of their property rights, upon this material, reserve . . .”

3. The assertion contained in the second alinea of paragraph 2, according to which “Article 169 of the Treaty provides for the delivery of the material, in order to be destroyed or rendered unserviceable”, is inaccurate in the particular case of the aeronautical material, because Article 159, chapter 2 of Section 1, “Military Clauses” only relates to the munitions and the war material referred to in this section of the Military Clauses “and does not provide at all for the fate of the aeronautical material, which is the object of Section 3 ‘clauses concerning the military and naval air service’”.

The fate of this material is decided by Article 202, which does not provide for any destruction, but “for the delivery, in a period of two months, to the places which will be indicated” with interdiction “to shift this material without special authorization of the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.”

4. According to Paragraph 3 of the German note, the Allied and Associated Powers refused to admit that there exists any German civilian aircraft. This assertion is not mentioned in any of the notes sent to the German Government but on the other hand this Government has been informed by telegram, communicating the decision taken by the Supreme Council on the 6th of August,²⁴ that:

“The Allies are aware that military aeroplanes are transformed into commercial aeroplanes. The President of the Inter-Allied Aerial Control Commission will be the only judge to declare whether an aeroplane is military or not.”

The reason for this is that the Supreme Council has admitted that “aircraft constructed since the Armistice according to entirely new plans, might be considered as civilian aircraft”. Therefore, there could only be in Germany a limited number of aircraft. Consequently, until the Inter-Allied Aerial Control Commission has given its opinion on the subject of this aircraft, which the German Government claims to be of a civilian nature, it has been decided (29th of September, 1919)²⁵ that:

“All aeronautical material existing in Germany must be considered as war material, and for this reason, can be neither exported nor alienated, nor loaned, nor utilized, nor destroyed, but must be stored until the Inter-Allied Aerial Commission of Control has decided upon its nature.”

5. It is true that concerning the execution of the aeronautical clauses of the Peace Treaty, a great number of details were settled by

²⁴ HD-25, minute 14, *ibid.*, p. 563.

²⁵ HD-63, minute 2, p. 430.

direct negotiations between the German Government and the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission, "especially appointed to supervise the execution of these clauses" (Article 203) and "Especially directed with the supervision of the execution of the deliveries provided by the obligations of the German Government (Article 204—Paragraph 1)".

But this Commission cannot, in any case, definitely "settle the questions at stake" (German Note,—paragraph 4) but will often have to call for orders from the Supreme Council, and "to inform the German authorities of the decisions which the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take, or which the execution of the aeronautical clauses might necessitate." (Article 204—paragraph 2.)

Appendix E to HD-80

CENTRAL TERRITORIAL COMMITTEE

Report to the Supreme Council on the Bulgarian Demands Concerning the Serbo-Bulgarian Frontier

On the question of the frontiers between Serbia and Bulgaria, the Central Territorial Committee has not succeeded in reaching a unanimous decision.

The British and French and Japanese Delegations are of the opinion that the line of the frontiers as described in the peace conditions with Bulgaria should be maintained.

This line was in fact adopted by the Supreme Council²⁷ after having been unanimously proposed by the Commission on Jugo-Slav Affairs, which took its decision only after having considered all the elements of the problem. None of the arguments stated by the Bulgarians has appeared of a nature to justify any changes in the line adopted.

In these circumstances, the British, French and Japanese Delegations do not believe that the only hope of facilitating for Bulgaria the accomplishment of the treaty which is imposed upon her can counterbalance the grave inconvenience which there would be in modifying a decision made with full knowledge of the facts and which has been notified not only to Bulgaria, but to the Allied Serb-Croat-Slovene Government.

REPORT OF AMERICAN AND ITALIAN DELEGATIONS

The American and Italian Delegations propose that in the regions of Tzaribrod and Bossilegrad the rectifications in favor of Serbia be

²⁷ FM-16, minute 1 (d), vol. iv, pp. 716, 720.

withdrawn and that the boundary in these districts be maintained at the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier of 1914.

In support of this proposition the two Delegations submit the following:—

1. The population concerned, numbering more than 40,000, is almost 100% Bulgarian—

(Tzaribrod district—Bulgarians 20,384; Serbs 79)
(Bossilegrad “ — “ 21,839; “ 12)
(Bulgarian statistics—1910.)

2. The natural economic outlets of the districts are towards Sofia.

3. The proposed frontier would bring the Serbian frontier 10 kilometres nearer Sofia, leaving it only 54 kilometres from the Bulgarian capital.

4. The new frontier possesses no natural advantages over the former frontier, in general it follows lower ridges, and in the Bossilegrad district cuts two valley heads, which are apparently inaccessible by road from the Serbian side.

5. By the present Treaty the Allies have already made concessions to Serbia at the expense of Bulgaria in granting the districts of Strumitza and Koula (Vidin), where the population is over-whelmingly Bulgarian.

6. By accepting the new strategic frontiers the Allies may well expose themselves to the charge brought against Austria-Hungary, when in the second Treaty of Bucharest, 1918,²⁸ the latter advanced the Hungarian frontier in Transylvania, on purely strategic grounds, to include the valley heads of the Roumanian streams.

7. The cession of Tzaribrod and Bossilegrad will result in augmenting the large number of refugees already in Bulgaria (now some 400,000), who are a danger to the public security of the country and form centres of propaganda against Bulgaria's neighbors.

In case the Serbians consider that the entrenched camp at Slivnitza is a danger for their own frontier, the Allied Powers can make provisions for its destruction.

In supporting the frontier proposed in the draft of the Bulgarian Treaty for the districts of Tzaribrod and Bossilegrad, the British and French Delegations emphasize strategic considerations and the inconvenience of modifying a frontier already notified.

In reply the American and Italian Delegations assert that strategic considerations should not outweigh clear ethnic considerations and the wishes of the people concerned. As regards the modification of a previous decision, in the cases of neither the German nor the Austrian Treaty, have the Allies hesitated to make rectifications where such appeared justified.

The American and Italian Delegations are firmly convinced that the maintenance of the proposed frontier, by its flagrant violation of ethnic considerations in favor of strategic frontiers, by its perpetual

²⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 771.

threat and humiliation to the Bulgarian capital, can only render more difficult the maintenance of peace in the Balkans.

The American and Italian Delegations contend that Bulgarian public and official opinion is more strongly opposed to the changes on the western frontier than to any other boundary alterations. We believe that so unexpected a blow, one which is peculiarly painful because it strikes at the security and pride of the national capital, will serve as the basis of protracted propaganda and eventually of war. That the blow was unexpected gives no assurance that its effects will soon pass. The deciding question is this: Does the act fall within the general rules or principles of the Conference? We assert that it does not.

Appendix F to HD-80

CENTRAL TERRITORIAL COMMITTEE

Draft of Reply to the Bulgarian Note Relative to Thrace

The Allied and Associated Powers have examined the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation relative to the frontier of Thrace with most scrupulous attention. Before determining this frontier line, such as it is indicated in the Peace Conditions with Bulgaria, the Allied and Associated Powers did not fail to fully consider all reasons of an ethnical, geographical and even historic order having any influence on their decision. The same care has been exercised in studying all arguments presented by the Bulgarian Delegation. For these reasons, the Allied and Associated Powers see no reason to introduce modifications in the outline of the frontier.

The Allied and Associated Powers were, furthermore, particularly attentive to protect the economic interests of Bulgaria by guaranteeing, in particular, this country an outlet to the Aegean Sea. In numerous cases, the Powers were obliged to have recourse to the same procedure in order to reconcile the interests under debate, and they do not doubt, that if Bulgaria loyally accepts this solution, the future will show that the guarantees which have been given her will be in no manner illusory.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 1, 1919, at 3:30 p. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk

Secretary

Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe

Secretary

Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon

Secretaries

M. Berthelot

M. de Saint Quentin.

ITALY

M. Scialoja

Secretary

M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui

Secretary

M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. Gordon
 BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian Small
 FRANCE M. Massigli
 ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

General Bliss

Rear Admiral McCully

Lt. Commander Koehler

Dr. I. Bowman

Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

Hon. C. H. Tufton

Lt. Col. Kisch

Captain Fuller, R. N.

Commander Dunne, R. N.

Commander McNamara, R. N.

Mr. A. Leeper.

FRANCE

General Weygand

General Desticker

M. Sergent

M. Henri Berenger

M. Laroche

M. Larnaude

Commandant Le Vasseur

Commandant La Combe

M. de Montille

ITALY

General Cavallero
 M. Vannutelli-Rey
 M. Manciola
 Capt. de cor. Ruspoli
 Prince Boncampagni

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu
 M. Nagaoka
 M. Adatei
 Commandant Ohsumi

1. SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he had reached an agreement with Mr. Polk and M. Henri Berenger with respect to paragraph 3, page 3, of the Drafting Committee's draft Protocol,¹ concerning which a reservation had been made at the preceding meeting of the Council. That paragraph now read[s] as follows:

Protocol
 Relative to
 Unexecuted
 Clauses of
 the Armistice

"10—Convention of January 16th, 1919, Clause VIII: Obligation to put the entire German Mercantile Marine at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. A certain number of vessels, whose delivery had been demanded by virtue of this clause, have not yet been handed over."

The question of the final distribution of tank ships remained undecided as between the Allies.

(It was decided:

that the third paragraph of page 3 of the draft Protocol should read as follows:

"10—Convention of January 16th, 1919.—Clause VIII: Obligation to put the entire German Mercantile Marine at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. A certain number of vessels, whose delivery had been demanded by virtue of this clause, have not yet been handed over.")

2. (The Council had before it the draft reply prepared by the Central Territorial Committee (See Appendix "A").)

M. LAROCHE stated that, as a result of the decision taken by the Council at its morning meeting,² this Committee had prepared a draft reply relative to the frontiers of Bulgaria (See Appendix "B").

(He then read the text of this draft reply, which was approved.)
 (The draft replies concerning Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), Part III, Section IV (Protection of Minorities), Part IV, Section II (Naval Clauses), and Part IV, Section III (Clauses concerning Military and Naval Aviation), were approved, with the exception that the third paragraph of this last draft reply (Part IV, Section III) was eliminated.)

Reply to the
 Bulgarian
 Counter-
 Proposals

¹ Footnote 4, p. 847.

² HD-80, minute 5, p. 856.

M. LAROCHE said that the Military Representatives were in favor of suppressing Secret Articles I, II and III of the Military Convention. The Naval Commission, which had met that morning, was likewise in favor of suppressing Secret Article IV. Thus, all the Secret Articles were suppressed, and the answer could be made to Bulgaria that she would not have to concern herself with expenses of occupation after the coming into force of the Treaty, inasmuch as after that time there would be no occupation. The Military Representatives were disagreed on two points of the Military Clauses. Three Delegations thought that Bulgaria's demands concerning the reintroduction of obligatory military service could not be accepted at the present time, but that the question should later be examined anew. This was the opinion of the American, French and Italian Delegations. The Japanese Delegation was not represented. The British Delegation was opposed to this concession. Likewise, the British Delegation could not agree to the recommendation of the majority of the Military Representatives that Bulgaria should be authorized to form a corps of frontier guards consisting of 3,000 men.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the first question was one on which the British Government could not change its position. If the head of his Government were there, he was sure that he would not yield; for a principle was at stake on which there could be no compromise. If a concession were made to Bulgaria on this point she would be granted an advantage which no other enemy had obtained. Moreover, having in mind the principle of eventual disarmament, the abolition of conscription was an unquestioned step in advance. The British Empire had introduced this principle and he thought the United States would likewise do so. On the other hand, with respect to the second point, the British Delegation might accept a compromise; it would accept the view of the majority if it were distinctly understood that the corps of frontier guards should only be recruited by voluntary enlistment.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with the British argument. This principle had been applied with respect to other enemy Powers, and there was no reason to make an exception here.

GENERAL DESTICKER explained that all the Military Representatives had realized that it was a serious matter to modify an accepted principle, but that Bulgaria had adduced concrete arguments which appeared to be of considerable weight; he pointed out that, for a population of 65,000,000 inhabitants in Germany, the Council had allowed an Army of 100,000 men. Being an agricultural country, Bulgaria, with 5,000,000 inhabitants could never recruit 20,000 men. If the proportion was to be maintained, either the Bulgarian Army should

be reduced to 7,000 or 8,000 men, or the German Army should be increased to 260,000 men.

M. PICHON pointed out that the same reasoning could have been applied to Austria. Nevertheless the army of Austria, with a population of 6,000,000 had been fixed at 30,000. To violate a principle is more serious than to be illogical in a matter of proportion.

GENERAL CAVALLERO observed that the Military Representatives had not failed to bear in mind the question of Austria; they had thought, however, that Austria, a country with a large urban population and comprising in its territory the remnants of a large army, would only encounter difficulties of a financial nature in recruiting a volunteer army. On the other hand, Bulgaria was an agricultural country whose population showed no taste for military service. They had thought that an army of 20,000 men was necessary to Bulgaria. She should be able to recruit such an army, or else the contrary to what was necessary for the maintenance of order would be arrived at. Finally it should not be forgotten that there were in Bulgaria extreme elements, *comitadjis* and others. It was almost certain that these elements would constitute the bulk of the army, and they were elements of disorder.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the arguments advanced by General Cavallero proved that the Council had been right in adopting the principle of voluntary recruiting. The difficulties which the Balkan States would encounter in the formation of volunteer armies would deter them from adopting a war-like policy.

M. PICHON thought that the most reasonable course was to maintain the principle which had been adopted.

MR. POLK agreed.

M. MATSUI likewise agreed.

M. SCIALOJA suggested that it could be said that the Council of the League of Nations would be competent to modify the Peace conditions on this point.

M. LAROCHE thought it would not be well to put this in writing.

M. PICHON pointed out that it was a reply that could be delivered orally to the Bulgarians if the question were raised.

The draft replies concerning Part V, Section I, (Prisoners of War and Graves), Part VI (Penalties), Part VII (Reparations), Part VIII (Financial Clauses), Part IX (Economic Clauses) and Part XI (Ports, Waterways and Railways), were approved.

The draft reply concerning Part XII (Labor), was adopted after suppressing the second paragraph thereof.

It was understood that if the Bulgarian Delegation asked that Bulgarian Representatives should attend the International Labor Conference at Washington a favorable reply should be given them orally.

M. LAROCHE pointed out that in the draft covering-letter the Bulgarian Delegation was accorded 10 days within which to submit its reply. This delay had seemed necessary on account of the distance and of the fact that there were no daily trains to Sofia.

MR. POLK asked if such a long delay was absolutely necessary.

M. PICHON observed that the reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals would be delivered on November 3rd and that the time for the Bulgarian final reply would run until November 13th. He proposed to grant the Bulgarians 10 days but not to consent to any prolongation.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that when the reply was delivered the Bulgarian Delegation could be orally informed that it would be useless for it to ask for a further delay.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished especially to thank the Commissions entrusted with preparing the replies to Bulgaria and the draft protocol, for the energy and ability they had shown: Thanks to their untiring efforts two very important questions had been settled in an exceedingly short time.

MR. POLK wished to join in this expression of thanks.

M. PICHON said that the Council was glad to extend its hearty congratulations to these Commissions.

It was decided:

(1) to accept the draft reply prepared by the Central Territorial Committee to the three letters of the Bulgarian Delegation dated October 24th (See Appendix "A"), with the following modifications:

(a) Military Clauses.—In the reply to the Bulgarian Delegation it should not be stated that the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to examine anew article 65 of the Treaty of Peace, at such time as the Commissions of Control which will be sent to Bulgaria shall have given them exact information as to the possibilities for recruiting the Bulgarian Army.

(b) Military Clauses.—It should be stipulated that the special corps of frontier guards whose creation is authorized and whose strength may not exceed 3,000 men, cannot be recruited in any other way than by voluntary enlistment.

(c) Clauses concerning Military and Naval Aviation.—The third paragraph of the draft reply on this point should be eliminated.

(d) Part XII, (Labor)—The second paragraph of the draft reply on this point should be eliminated.

(2) that the draft covering letter should likewise be approved.

It was further decided:

to approve the reply prepared by the Central Territorial Committee, relative to the frontiers of Bulgaria, in conformity with the

decisions taken by the Council at its preceding meeting. (Appendix "B".)

3. M. BERTHELOT communicated to the Council a memorandum from Marshal Foch concerning a request for assistance made by the Latvian Government and a draft reply to this request (See appendix "C").

Assistance
to the
Latvian
Government

It was decided:

(1) to approve the recommendations of Marshal Foch with respect to the reply to be made to the Latvian Government's request for assistance;

(2) that Marshal Foch should communicate this reply to the Latvian Government. (See Appendix "C".)

4. CAPTAIN FULLER read a report of the Naval Representatives dated November 1st, 1919, (See Appendix "D").

Reparation
for the
Sinking of the
German Fleet at
Scapa Flow

SIR EYRE CROWE asked how much of this report should be inserted in the protocol to be signed by the representative of the German Government. Part of the report only concerned the Allied and Associated Governments and could only be discussed between them.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 1 and all of Section 2 should be inserted in the protocol.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether Section 3 should likewise be inserted.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that it was not necessary.

MR. POLK felt sure that during the coming week it would not be difficult for an agreement to be reached as to the details of this Section but he thought it better to insert in the protocol only the provisions essential thereto.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that with respect to delivery of the light cruisers it should be specified that their delivery should take place within two months, that is to say, within the period which had elsewhere in the Treaty of Peace been provided for the delivery of vessels. On the other hand, the list of material to be delivered should be transmitted to the Allied Naval Commission of Control within 10 days as provided in the report. The majority of the Naval representatives thought that the Allied Naval Commission of Control should itself draw up the list of material whose delivery was demanded in accordance with certain principles indicated in the report. The American representative had asked that the powers of this Commission of Control should be limited to determining the percentage of the different classes of maritime material demanded. In order to arrive at an agreement with the American Representative the majority had been prepared to ask as much as 80%

of the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers which belonged to the German Government on November 11th, 1918, and 80% of the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers in which the German Government had a predominant interest on November 11th, 1918, but it had not been possible to arrive at an agreement.

MR. POLK said he had no objection to make with respect to light cruisers but that his Naval Advisers had made reservations with respect to floating docks of over 10,000 tons whose delivery was provided for.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that it was, nevertheless, necessary that the protocol indicate the total tonnage demanded from the Germans.

MR. POLK inquired if it would not suffice to state in the protocol that the Germans should deliver a number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers equivalent to the displacement of 400,000 tons.

CAPTAIN FULLER thought not; he thought it important that the Germans should have definite information as to what they would be asked to deliver.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the question was complicated by the fact that two of the most important floating docks owned by Germany were at Dantzig. If they were taken there was a risk of incurring protests on the part of the Free City of Dantzig and of the Polish Government. Therefore, it was important to specify the percentage of docks of over 10,000 tons displacement which were to be demanded.

MR. POLK asked if Paragraph (b) of Section 1 of the report could not be drafted as follows:

“Such number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, up to a total displacement of 400,000 tons, as the Allied and Associated Powers may demand.”

CAPTAIN FULLER thought that it was better to say: “equivalent to the displacement,” otherwise the Germans might think that the 400,000 tons constituted a maximum, and the Allied and Associated Powers would run the risk of not obtaining the full amount.

MR. POLK said that he did not wish to make the Allies lose a single ton to which they were entitled, but if a wording was insisted upon which might involve stripping the German ports of all their maritime matériel he would have to ask for instructions from his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the information at his disposal showed that there was no question of stripping the German ports.

MR. POLK said that he could not unreservedly accept the figures given by the majority because they had not yet been verified. However, he was ready to accept the wording proposed by the majority, if it was clearly understood that the German ports would not be stripped of all their matériel and that the composition of the reparation to be

demanding would only be decided by the Council after he had received instructions from Washington on that point.

CAPTAIN FULLER pointed out that Sections 4 and 6 should equally be inserted in the protocol.

(This recommendation was adopted.) (It was decided:

(1) that paragraph 1-(b) of the report of the Naval Representatives concerning the compensation to be demanded of the German Government for the sinking of its warships at Scapa Flow (See Appendix "D") be modified to read: "Such number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, equivalent to the displacement of 400,000 tons, as the Allied and Associated Powers may demand. The lifting power of a dock to be taken as displacement, and approximately 75% of the docks over 10,000 tons are to be included"; and that as thus modified, the said report should be approved; provided that the composition of the compensation to be taken from the German Government should only be decided by the Supreme Council after Mr. Polk had received the instructions of his Government on that point.

(2) that paragraph 1, modified as above, paragraph 2, paragraph 4 and paragraph 6, of the said report be incorporated in the Protocol relative to unexecuted clauses of the Armistice.)

5. M. BERTHELOT stated that the Drafting Committee had found, after examination, that it would be superfluous to send the draft reply submitted to it by the Council, in view of the stipulations contained in the Protocol to be signed by Germany (See H. D. 80, Minute 4).⁴
(The meeting then adjourned)

Draft Reply to
the German
Note of
October 12th,
Relative to the
Sale of
Aeronautical
Matériel

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 1, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-81

Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the Bulgarian Delegation on the Conditions of Peace

PEACE CONFERENCE
THE CHAIRMAN

PARIS, November 3, 1919.

To: His Excellency Mr. Theodoroff, Chairman of the Bulgarian Delegation, Neuilly.

SIR: The Allied and Associated Powers have considered, with the greatest care, the observations submitted to them by the Bulgarian Delegation, in its three letters dated October 24.

They have taken cognizance with satisfaction of the Bulgarian Government's favourable reception of those clauses in the conditions

⁴ *Ante*, p. 855.

of peace which relate to the League of Nations, the Protection of Minorities, and to Labour. They are pleased to observe in this adherence by Bulgaria to the various conditions of Parts I, III and XII of the Treaty, that country's desire henceforward to conduct her policy in accordance with the broadly humanitarian principles and ideas of international solidarity which have inspired the Allied and Associated Powers.

In a second document, the Bulgarian Delegation further asked that alterations should be made in some of the provisions of the Treaty, and more especially those relating to the military, financial and economic clauses, etc.

Finally, in another letter relating to territorial questions, the Bulgarian Delegation, discussing the responsibilities incurred by its country through having entered the war against the Entente Powers, attempted to mitigate the same by urging that Bulgaria was forced into the war by a party Government, the large majority of the population being in favour of the Entente. In this connection the Bulgarian Delegation alleges that the German alliance was merely an accident as far as Bulgaria was concerned, whilst representing for other Balkan States the permanent basis on which they conducted their policy. It also denied the charge that Bulgaria ever entertained ideas of hegemony calculated to imperil the peace of the Balkans. On the other hand it denounced the ambitions of neighboring countries, to whom it ascribed the responsibility for the war.

The Allied and Associated Powers do not wish to follow the Bulgarian Delegation in this discussion. The eloquence of facts is sufficient for them.

If it were true that Bulgarian public opinion was not unanimously favorable to the idea of an alliance with the Central Powers, the support of the country was nevertheless given to a Government which satisfied its territorial cravings by undertaking a policy of conquest.

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot forget that the Bulgarian troops, sustained by popular sentiment, did not hesitate to attack the Serbian army from the rear and without provocation, thus paralyzing the heroic resistance which that army was opposing on another front to invaders who menaced the independence of Serbia.

When the Bulgarian troops were led against Roumania, not only did they seize the territories on the right bank of the Danube claimed by Bulgaria, but they also crossed the river, acting as the vanguard of the German armies. Everywhere they showed by their attitude that they wished to slake their hatred of the occupied country.

There, as in Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria waged a war of conquest and pillage and public opinion applauded the success of her armies.

The Bulgarian Delegation alleges that its country did not believe that in the war which it had declared it would be opposed by the Powers of the Entente. How could the Bulgarian people believe for an instant that the Serbian Army would be left without help from its Allies, when the terrible struggle in which that Army was engaged with the Central Empires had for its origin the aggression of Austria-Hungary against Serbia? If the slightest doubt could have existed in this respect amongst the Bulgarian troops, how can it be explained that, when they found themselves in contact with the troops of the Entente, their country showed no disposition to withdraw and renounce a combat against the Powers who had contributed most towards Bulgarian independence? It was not until the Bulgarian Army was conquered in the field and forced to lay down its arms that Bulgaria asked for peace. She waited until that moment to disavow the Government which had dragged her into a fatal adventure.

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot lose sight of the fact that, by ranging herself on the side of the Central Empires and by remaining in that alliance until the moment when their defeat appeared certain, Bulgaria broke the principal line of communication between Russia and her Allies, opened to Germany the road to the east, and thus rendered inevitable the prolongation of the war. She is, therefore, responsible for the terrible evils which resulted therefrom.

Nevertheless, it is no idea of vengeance which has animated the Allied and Associated Powers in preparing the conditions of peace handed to the Bulgarian Delegation on September 19.

These Powers do not dream of making Bulgaria expiate all her faults of the past. They wish merely to establish a peace which shall be just and consequently durable and fertile. They feel that the conditions of peace, drawn up in no heat of passion, are calculated to ensure the peaceful development of Bulgaria and to allow her to reestablish her normal economic existence within a short period. In this connection, they would remind her of the fact that she is guaranteed a free economic outlet on the Aegean.

The Allied and Associated Powers have, none the less, examined the observations formulated by the Bulgarian Delegation with the most scrupulous attention. The appended Notes answer the various requests contained in the letters of October 24, but must not be considered an authorized interpretation of the Treaty.

If the Allied and Associated Powers do not answer all the questions raised by the Bulgarian Delegation it is because, after examin-

ing them they did not feel able to settle them as requested. Non-receipt of a reply must not therefore, be held to mean consent.

The Allied and Associated Powers have acceded to the wishes expressed by the Bulgarian Delegation in a certain number of points. The alterations thus made in the draft Treaty are final.

On all other points the text presented to the Bulgarian Delegation remains unchanged, as appears from the document appended to the present letter. This text can now only be accepted or rejected as it stands.

The Bulgarian Delegation will be so good as to inform the Allied and Associated Powers, within a period of ten days from the date of the present communication, whether it is prepared to sign the Treaty in its present form.

After that period, the Armistice concluded on September 29, 1918, will be considered at an end and the Allied and Associated Powers will take any steps they may think fit.

I remain, etc.

G. CLEMENCEAU

[Enclosure]

PART I

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(Articles 1 to 26)

In expressing her wish to be received into the League of Nations as soon as possible, Bulgaria declares herself especially anxious to prove her good faith before an august legal Association capable of judging her according to her real deserts and her zeal to acquit herself of her international obligations.

The Allied and Associated Powers note this statement, which conforms to their ideas, with satisfaction. The future attitude of Bulgaria, if agreeing with the intentions above set forth, will no doubt be such as to facilitate and hasten her admission to the League of Nations.

PART II

FRONTIERS OF BULGARIA

(Articles 27 to 35)

The Bulgarian Delegation has asked for certain alterations in the frontiers assigned to Bulgaria in the conditions of Peace in Thrace or in the direction of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State. The said Delegation has also stated Bulgaria's claims to the Dobrudja, and re-

requested that the "final status" of that region be settled by the Allied and Associated Governments.

As regards the latter point the Allied and Associated Governments consider that, in view of the purpose of the present Treaty, the question of the Dobrudja cannot be dealt with therein.

As to the line of the other frontiers commented on by the Bulgarian Delegation, it was adopted only after careful consideration, when every aspect of the problem was taken into account. The Allied and Associated Powers nevertheless examined with care the various arguments put forward. Although not denying the value of these arguments, the said Powers do not consider that they offer sufficient reason for revoking decisions which are the outcome of lengthy deliberation. They are of opinion, therefore, that it will be impossible to allow Bulgaria the desired alterations.

The Allied and Associated Powers have moreover taken special care to protect Bulgaria's economic interests, in particular by granting to that country an outlet to the Aegean. In many cases these Powers have been obliged to have recourse to the same procedure in order to reconcile conflicting interests, and they have no doubt that if Bulgaria accepts this settlement in good faith, the future will prove that the guarantees thus granted to her are in no way illusory.

PART III

POLITICAL CLAUSES

SECTION IV

PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

(Articles 49 to 57)

The Allied and Associated Powers have noted the Bulgarian Delegation's acceptance of the principle of the protection of minorities guaranteed by the League of Nations. Bulgaria's co-operation in this matter will undoubtedly contribute to the establishment of friendly relations between the Balkan peoples.

The Bulgarian Delegation considers it desirable that the same regime concerning the protection of minorities be established in all the Balkan States. With regard thereto the Allied and Associated Powers wish to point out that, in the Treaties of Peace with Germany and Austria and in the present Treaty, all provisions have been made for this purpose; the control of the League of Nations has been established, which ensures a guarantee for impartial treatment.

The Bulgarian Delegation has also drawn the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments to the position of Ottoman nationals

formerly resident in the Dobrudja, Thrace and Macedonia and at present refugees in Bulgaria.

The Allied and Associated Powers have noted this remark and will take all necessary steps with a view to remedying the position in question.

PART IV

MILITARY, NAVAL & AIR CLAUSES

SECTION I

MILITARY CLAUSES

(Articles 64-82)

After consideration of the Counter-proposals formulated by the Bulgarian Delegation, the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers have the honour to communicate below their decision with regard to the Military Clauses.

MILITARY CLAUSES

1. The modification proposed to Article 65 would result in allowing the Bulgarian State to incorporate each year more than half of the annual class, and thus to give a military training to the majority of the able-bodied population.

However strong the social and economic arguments, put forward by the Bulgarian Delegation, may be, the institution of a military regime based on compulsory service is absolutely contrary to the principle of the reduction of armaments that the Allied & Associated Powers have agreed to impose on their former enemies, as alone being able to ensure the peace of the world in the future.

This modification cannot be accepted.

2. The modification proposed to Article 66 would result in raising the strength of the Bulgarian Army from 20,000 to 25,000 men. This addition would be contrary to the principle of the reduction of armaments mentioned above; it is also in no way justified by any argument contained in the Bulgarian Counter-proposals.

This modification cannot be accepted.

3. The modification proposed to Article 69 and which would result in the creation of a "Special corps of Frontier Guards" would appear to facilitate the maintenance of order on the Bulgarian frontiers, without forming any appreciable danger for the Powers neighbouring on Bulgaria.

This modification can therefore be accepted on condition that the corps in question shall be recruited by voluntary enlistment and shall not exceed 3,000 men.

4. The modification proposed to Article 66 and intended to raise the proportion of Officers from one-twentieth to one-fifteenth, would allow the Bulgarian Army to form supplementary cadres.

And also there is no reason to allow the demobilization of Officers by echelons within a two years' time limit, this method not having been authorised for any of the former enemies of the Allied and Associated Powers.

It should furthermore be observed that the argument based on the impossibility of paying pensions to the large number of officers who are to be discharged immediately, appears to have but little value, since the Bulgarian Government, if it maintained these Officers on the Active List, would have to bear a much greater financial burden.

This modification cannot be accepted.

5. The modification proposed to Article 73 has for its object the creation of a school for Non-Commissioned Officers. It is incumbent on the Bulgarian State to organise the training of its Non-Commissioned Officers in their corps, and there is no need for instituting a special school.

This modification cannot be accepted.

GENERAL CLAUSES

The request for the suppression of Article 102, in its entirety, cannot be accepted since the Allied and Associated Powers must ensure, through the organs of control at their disposal, that the conditions of the Armistice have been completely carried out.

However, the part relative to the military convention (Secret Articles, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4) will cease to be applicable at the moment of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

Furthermore, in order to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, the Allied and Associated Powers agree that only those dispositions of the Armistice Convention, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace shall remain in force.

They agree, therefore, that Article 102 of the Treaty of Peace shall be replaced by the following Article :

Article 102

"The following dispositions of the Armistice of September 29th, 1918, namely, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 6, remain in force in so far as they are not inconsistent with the stipulations of the present Treaty."

SECTION II

NAVAL CLAUSES

Though of opinion that they cannot accept in its entirety the request made by the Bulgarian Delegation concerning Naval Clauses, the Allied and Associated Powers authorize Bulgaria to retain a small number of lightly-armed vessels for police and fishery duties.

In these circumstances, the following addition will be made to Article 83 of the Treaty :

“Bulgaria will, however, have the right to maintain on the Danube and along her coast, for police and fishery duties, not more than four torpedo-boats and six motor-boats, all without torpedoes and torpedo apparatus, to be selected by the Commission referred to in Article 99.

“The personnel of the above vessels shall be organized on a purely civilian basis.

“The vessels allowed to Bulgaria must only be replaced by lightly-armed patrol craft, not exceeding 100 tons displacement and of non-military character.”

The Allied and Associated Powers further agree that the scientific material claimed by Bulgaria for use in her Aquarium may, at the direction of the Commission referred to in Article 99, be allotted to her after the losses sustained by the Allies have been made good.

SECTION III

MILITARY AND NAVAL AIR CLAUSES

(Articles 89 to 93)

The Allied and Associated Powers consider that no change is admissible in the clauses concerning military and naval aviation.

Article 89, which gave rise to the claims contained in Section III of (C) from the Bulgarian Delegation, was drafted with full knowledge of the matter in hand and with the firm intention of refusing to Bulgaria the right to possess any air squadrons or airships for any purpose whatsoever.

The Allied and Associated Powers see no reason for granting to Bulgaria a privilege which has been refused to Germany and Austria.

PART V

PRISONERS OF WAR AND GRAVES

SECTION I

PRISONERS OF WAR

(Articles 105 to 115)

In reply to the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation concerning Article 109 of the Treaty of Peace, the Allied and Associated Powers agree to substitute the words "October 15, 1919" in the second paragraph of Article 109, for the words "June 1, 1919".

On the other hand, they see no reason for the insertion in the Treaty of a special clause, authorizing the repatriation of prisoners of war as from the day of signature, without waiting for ratification. The interested Powers shall moreover be free to advance the date of repatriation of the prisoners in question, should they consider this desirable.

PART VI

PENALTIES

PENALTIES

(Articles 118 to 120)

Articles 118 to 120, concerning penalties, cannot be altered in accordance with the Bulgarian request without endangering the very principle of justice on which they are based.

In claiming the right to bring the authors of acts in violation of the laws and customs of war before military tribunals of countries against whose nationals Bulgarian troops have committed such crimes, the Allied and Associated Powers are only conforming to the usual legal principles concerning competence. If, despite criticism based on the relations between the Balkan nations, the Allied and Associated Powers considered this jurisdiction preferable to a tribunal of which their own representatives were members, still less would they agree to establish jurisdiction from which belligerent Powers would be excluded whose competence was greatest (Greece, Roumania, Serbo-Croat-Slovene State).

Finally, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot agree that any weight be attached to legal proceedings, prosecutions or sentences instituted or pronounced by Bulgarian tribunals since Article 118 is

only a necessary result of the system of legal proceedings which they desire to organise, failing which such proceedings would be absolutely without effect.

PART VII

REPARATIONS

REPARATIONS

(Articles 121 to 131)

1. The Bulgarian Delegation asks for a reduction of the sum mentioned in Article 121 of the Conditions of Peace as representing the obligations imposed on Bulgaria by way of reparation; having calculated the various charges assumed by the country after Peace is signed—in which are included moreover her normal fiscal expenditure, the service of her public debt, and her war pensions and the upkeep of the army—the Delegation complains the Treaty will leave Bulgaria plunged in debt, and unable to bear the liabilities imposed on her.

Bulgaria will undoubtedly have heavy liabilities to bear. These will not, however, be the result of the Conditions of Peace, but of the war of aggression in which she voluntarily took part, into which she entered of her own free will, in a spirit of domination and conquest. Bulgaria has failed in a scheme undertaken contrary to the law of nations and of liberty, in the hope of illicit territorial and material gains. It is right and just that she should now atone. Are there not certain nations among the Allied and Associated Powers who, without sharing Bulgaria's guilt, have merely defended their life and independence, but who will be obliged for generations to toil and endure hard sacrifices in order to regain their past strength and prosperity?

The Conditions of Peace are just and even lenient; the obligations imposed on Bulgaria have been limited to a sum which is decidedly lower than the amount of damage sustained by the Allied and Associated Powers by reason of her entry into the war. If the latter acted in this manner, it was precisely because they wished to take into account Bulgaria's capacity for payment, which they made every effort to estimate with absolute impartiality. The second paragraph of Article 124 of the Conditions of Peace—which provides for Germany's renunciation of a debt of Bulgaria's transferred to the Reparation Commission for the benefit of the Allied and Associated Powers by the Treaty of Versailles—is proof positive of this desire not to demand from Bulgaria anything which may

exceed her resources. There can therefore be no question of cancelling the figure of 2 milliard 250 million gold francs. But if, against all probability, it should in future become evident that, Bulgaria's position not being as now estimated, she is at any particular time unable to pay the instalment corresponding to her contribution towards reparation, Article 122 of the Conditions of Peace is amply sufficient to permit of any justifiable modification being granted to her.

II. In connection herewith, the Bulgarian Delegation asks, in the first place, that a total sum be fixed representing the entire amount of liabilities devolving on its country under the various provisions of the Treaty, and secondly that the yearly payments mentioned in the fifth paragraph of Article 121 of the Conditions of Peace shall not be higher during the first few years, when the resources of the State will be most restricted, than during subsequent years.

As regards the first point, the Allied and Associated Powers are unable to give satisfaction to Bulgaria. The reasons for refusal are obvious when it is remembered that Bulgaria wishes to see her own military expenditure included in the total to be limited in advance. It would thus be very easy for Bulgaria to reduce to a minimum her obligation to share in the reparation for damage.

With regard to the second point, on the contrary, the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation did not appear unfounded. The Allied and Associated Powers agree therefore to insert an alteration in the fifth paragraph of Article 121, the second clause of which shall henceforth read as follows:—

“Therefore, each half-yearly payment shall include, over and above the payment of interest at the rate of 5% (five per centum) per annum, the provision of a sinking fund sufficient to extinguish the total amount due by Bulgaria in 37 years from January 1, 1921.”

In this manner, the yearly payments to be made by Bulgaria would not necessarily become less as time goes on, and instructions could be given to the Interallied Commission to arrange for these payments in accordance with practical possibilities.

III. It goes without saying that the Allied and Associated Powers cannot consider the possibility of fixing the reparation debt in levas, as requested by the Bulgarian Delegation; it is obvious that in that case Bulgaria would have no further interest in maintaining the international value of her currency, and could indeed reduce the actual value of her payments indefinitely.

It does not seem impossible under this head, however, to grant to Bulgaria certain facilities for payment by permitting the Interallied

Commission, if necessary, to accept payment in levas—at their current value, which the Commission itself would fix—or various payments in kind.

The Allied and Associated Powers therefore consent to the insertion in the Treaty of a clause similar to Par. 19 of Annex II of the Chapter on Reparations of the Treaty of Versailles. This clause, which would be a fresh paragraph of Article 121 (inserted between the former paragraphs 6 and 7) should read as follows:

“Payments required to be made in specie in virtue of the above provisions may at any time be accepted by the Reparation Commission in the form of chattels, properties, commodities, businesses, rights and concessions, within or without Bulgarian territory, ships, bonds, shares, or securities of any kind, or currencies of Bulgarian or other States, the value of such substitutes for gold being fixed at a fair and just amount by the Reparation Commission itself.”

IV. It would be superfluous to dwell on the fact that it is impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to contemplate the deduction of interest from the sums due from Bulgaria as reparation. Strictly speaking, the payment of reparation for damage already committed could be demanded immediately. It is merely out of consideration for *de facto* impossibilities that this payment has been deferred. The obligation to pay interest exists from the first day when a debt is acknowledged; it cannot be avoided.

The Bulgarian Delegation also requests that a delay of 50 years from 1st April 1925 (in reality, a delay of 54 years) be substituted for the delay of 37 years provided for in Article 121 of the Conditions of Peace; it is sufficient to remark that such a measure is at any rate unnecessary, seeing that Article 122 gives the Interallied Commission the power to grant any delays in payment which it shall consider necessary.

V. The Allied and Associated Powers are also unable to reconsider Articles 127 and 128 of the Conditions of Peace. These Articles have limited, by means of a special arrangement, the right of certain of the said Powers whose territories have been violated and looted by Bulgarian troops, to receive entire restitution. This arrangement risks indeed being unduly favourable to Bulgaria, nevertheless the last paragraph of Article 127 and that of Article 128 both illustrate the moderation and scrupulousness with which this undeniable right will be applied.

VI. Finally, the suggestion by the Bulgarian Delegation that some of the Allied and Associated Powers might pay for the works of military importance which Bulgaria carried out on their territory for the purpose of fighting against them, is not worthy of discussion.

PART VIII

FINANCIAL CLAUSES

FINANCIAL CLAUSES

(Articles 132 to 146)

The Allied and Associated Powers have most carefully considered the observations submitted by the Bulgarian Delegation concerning the clauses inserted in Part VIII of the Conditions of Peace.

The present reply will not discuss each of the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation, but confine itself to indicating the points on which it seemed necessary to supply further details, either for the purpose of removing a misunderstanding on the part of the Bulgarian Delegation or of proving the slight foundation of some of its observations.

Article 133. The observations of the Bulgarian Delegation on the obligation to pay for the upkeep of armies of occupation refer:—

- (1) to occupation before the coming into force of the Treaty;
- (2) to occupation after the coming into force of the Treaty.

As regards the first point, the Allied and Associated Powers see no valid reason for renouncing provisions inserted in the Treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain, according to which Germany and Austria undertook to pay the total cost of the armies of occupation. The Allied and Associated Powers cannot, furthermore, enter into any discussion with the Bulgarian Government as to the strategic use of the military units sent to Bulgaria.

As regards the second point, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed in stating that they have no intention of continuing military occupation after the coming into force of the Treaty.

Consequently, and in order clearly to indicate this intention as well as to avoid any ambiguity which may have misled the Bulgarian Delegation, the wording of the first phrase of Article 133 will be altered as follows:—

Instead of: "There shall be paid by Bulgaria the total cost of all armies occupying territory within her boundaries, as defined in accordance with the present Treaty, from the date of signature of the Armistice of September 29, 1918", read: "There shall be paid by Bulgaria the total cost of all armies . . . occupying territory within her boundaries, as these are defined in the present Treaty, from the signature of the Armistice of September 29, 1918, and until the coming into force of the present Treaty."

Article 136. The Allied and Associated Powers have agreed that only the value of material of a non-military character surrendered in execution of the Armistice or of the Treaty shall be credited to the

State surrendering the same, and that the value of war material shall not be credited to the general Reparation account. The Bulgarian Delegation brings forward no arguments against this principle; and the Allied and Associated Powers agree that the text of Article 136 should be retained.

Nevertheless, to ensure unity of opinion in decisions establishing the non-military character of material surrendered by Germany, Austria and Bulgaria, the penultimate line of the second paragraph of Article 136 shall be altered as follows:—

Instead of: "There shall be credited to Bulgaria . . . the value . . . of material . . . for which, as having non-military value, credit should, in the judgment of the Reparation Commission acting through the Inter-Allied Commission, be allowed", read: "There shall be credited to Bulgaria . . . the value . . . of material for which, as having non-military value, credit should, in the judgment of the Reparation Commission, be allowed."

Articles 134-141. The Bulgarian Delegation asks that Powers to whom Bulgarian territory is ceded may assume responsibility for part of the Bulgarian public debt as it shall stand at the date of signature of the Treaty, and not as it stood on August 1, 1914.

Were such a claim allowed, the Powers to whom Bulgarian territory is ceded would have to bear the burden of part of the debt which Bulgaria contracted in order to wage an unjust war against those Powers. The Allied and Associated Powers cannot consider such a possibility. They agree, however, that part of the Bulgarian Debt contracted between August 1, 1914, and October 11, 1915, (at which date Bulgaria entered the war against Serbia) was used for the benefit of territory surrendered by Bulgaria in virtue of the Treaty, and they consider that the date of October 11, 1915, may be substituted for that of August 1, 1914 in Article 141.

They nevertheless consider that such part of the Bulgarian public debt as was contracted between August 1, 1914, and October 11, 1915 and directly used to prepare for war, cannot be divided among the Powers to whom Bulgarian territory is surrendered, and they leave it to the Reparation Commission to determine that part of the debt.

Consequently, the wording of Article 141 has been altered as follows:—

Instead of: "Any Power to which Bulgarian territory is ceded . . . undertakes to pay . . . such contribution towards the charge for the Bulgarian Public Debt as it stood on August 1, 1914 . . .", read: "Any Power to which Bulgarian territory is ceded . . . undertakes to pay such contribution towards the charge for the Bulgarian Public Debt as it stood on October 11, 1915 (including . . . laid down in Article 134). The Reparation Commission, acting through the Inter-Allied Commission, shall determine the amount of the Bulgarian Public Debt on October 11, 1915, taking into account, in the case of

the debt contracted after August 1, 1914, only that part of the debt which was not used by Bulgaria to prepare a war of aggression. The part of the Bulgarian Public Debt to be paid by each Power to which territory is surrendered shall be that which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers . . . etc.”

Article 139. This Article settles the question of the Loan contracted by Bulgaria in July 1914 with German Banks.

The Bulgarian Delegation claims that as the Loan Agreement was not carried out by the German creditors, it is now null and void, and asks for the omission of Article 139 as useless. According to certain information received, however, the German banks which signed the Loan Agreement consider the same to be perfectly valid and intend to stand by it.

To avoid all discussion, the Allied and Associated Powers therefore feel it necessary to retain Article 139. They prefer to run the risk of inserting a supererogatory provision in the Treaty, rather than expose themselves to future controversies.

Moreover, they wish to point out that the obligation imposed on the Bulgarian Government of transferring to the Reparation Commission all rights, interests and securities of every kind retained by Bulgarian nationals under loan agreements and conventions does not exceed the conditions imposed on Germany by Article 235 of the Treaty of Versailles and that this obligation has not been improperly imposed, as stated by the Bulgarian Delegation. In reality the value of all these rights, interests and securities will be credited to Bulgaria by the Reparation Commission, to be deducted from sums due as reparation.

Articles 129 and 145. The Allied and Associated Powers intend to credit Bulgaria (on account of the total amount fixed in Article 121 of the Treaty of Peace and owed by Bulgaria as reparation) with all sums and shares which the Reparation Commission may recover from sums owed to Bulgaria under the financial and economic clauses of the Treaty and the clauses concerning Ports, Waterways and Railways.

In order completely to reconcile the wording of Articles 129 and 145, Article 129 is altered as follows:—

“the following shall be placed to the credit of Bulgaria in respect to her reparation obligations:—Any amounts which the Reparation Commission may consider due to Bulgaria under Part VIII (Financial Clauses), Part IX (Economic Clauses), and Part XI (Ports, Waterways and Railways) of the present Treaty.”

Article 146. The Allied and Associated Powers have no desire to claim from Bulgaria payment in gold currency of sums owed by her under the Treaty.

The Bulgarian Government may procure as it thinks best the necessary foreign bills and cheques to meet the payments required of it.

PART IX

ECONOMIC CLAUSES

SECTION I

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

Article 151. With the object of safeguarding as far as possible the fiscal revenues of Bulgaria, the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to alter the text of Article 151 in such a way as to make it clear that customs duties upon their imports shall be payable in gold in all cases where, in virtue of Bulgarian law, such payment in gold could be demanded on 28th July, 1914, on condition that the rate of exchange of gold for notes shall be periodically fixed by the Reparation Commission.

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot, however, consider any alteration of Article 151 as regards the rates of duty applicable to their imports into Bulgaria within the period of one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty. Only the most favourable duties in force on July 28, 1914, may be applied to these imports.

Nor can the proposal to reduce the period of application of Article 151 to six months be accepted. In Treaties previously concluded with Allies of Bulgaria provisions were introduced which, in the case of the products of certain adjacent countries, provided for free import or the benefit of conventional tariffs during a specified period sometimes extending to five years. Bulgaria has been spared similar provisions in the present Treaty.

The stable and uniform regime provided by Article 151 for the period of one year is necessary to allow of the resumption of international trade with Bulgaria, especially in view of economic conditions caused by the war, which the Bulgarian Delegation does not fail to recognize.

SECTION II

TREATIES

Article 162. The Bulgarian Delegation suggests that all multilateral Treaties existing before the war should be revived. It mentions, however, no omission as regards the list given in Article 162 and offers no definite suggestions.

The Allied and Associated Powers have provided for revival of all multilateral Treaties which they thought compatible with fresh conditions resulting from the war. They therefore see no reason to alter the Article in question.

The requests of the Bulgarian Delegation either arise from an insufficient comprehension of the text under discussion or are not founded upon specific instances, and cannot be granted.

Article 168. The Bulgarian Delegation states that it cannot agree to the revival of bilateral Treaties under the conditions laid down in that Article, since Bulgaria will not enjoy the same rights as the Allied and Associated Powers.

Germany and Austria have accepted a text identical with that of Article 168, and Bulgaria must do likewise.

The Bulgarian Delegation, however, commits a double error in the interpretation of this Article.

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot arbitrarily set aside certain provisions of a bilateral Treaty which they desire to revive. They can and should only omit from such a Treaty any provisions which do not agree with the general dispositions or specific provisions of the Treaty of Peace. The third paragraph of Article 168 is very clear on this point.

On the other hand, while the Article provides that the League of Nations shall be called upon to decide, this is only in case of a divergence of opinion between the Allied and Associated Powers.

Article 164. Article 164 gives Bulgaria the opportunity of participating in the drawing up of the proposed new radio-telegraphic Convention. It does not imply that the text of that Convention will be dictated to her and that she must accept it *ne varietur*; but merely provides against a systematic refusal to conclude the Convention or claims rendering its conclusion impossible in practice.

Article 165. The Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to substitute the following text for the text of this Article, viz:—

“Until the conclusion of a new Convention concerning fishing in the waters of the Danube to replace the Convention of November 29, 1901,⁶ the transitory regime to be established will be settled by an arbitrator appointed by the European Commission of the Danube.”

Articles 166 and 167. The period fixed by these Articles was considered sufficient by the Powers allied to Bulgaria; it cannot be prolonged, in view of the necessity for establishing as soon as possible the guarantees indispensable for economic relations between the nations concerned.

Articles 169, 171 and 172. It is not for the Allied and Associated Powers to free Bulgaria from charges and indemnities caused by her

⁶ Martens, *Nouveau recueil général de traités*, 2 sér., tome xxxiii, p. 277.

own fault; but it is to be recalled that Germany and Austria have undertaken in advance to accept the clauses of the present Treaty affecting them.

Article 175. This Article does not imply the perpetual maintenance of the Capitulations, since it expressly envisages the possibility of abolishing that regime by means of special conventions.

It is not for Bulgaria to revive the agreements she had concluded or prepared with certain Allied and Associated Powers, but for the Allied and Associated Powers to lay down, in conformity with the general principles of the present Treaty, the manner in which equitable treatment may be secured for foreigners in Bulgaria.

SECTION III

DEBTS

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot consider relinquishing the system of Clearing-Offices.

Should certain Allied and Associated Powers opt for this system, even if they apply it only in their relations with Bulgaria, the result would not be, as the Bulgarian Delegation imagine, a more considerable depreciation of the Bulgarian leva than by application of the system of direct recovery; whether it is a question of settlement by the Bulgarian State or direct settlement by Bulgarian nationals, payment may always be claimed in the currency of the Allied or Associated State concerned.

Nevertheless, to allow Bulgaria to procure means of payment with less haste, the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to substitute the following text for the first paragraph of all of the Annex to Section III:—

“The balance between the Clearing Offices shall be struck every three months and the credit balance paid in cash by the debtor State within a month”.

SECTION IV

PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

Article 177. If, as the Bulgarian Delegation acknowledge, there is reason to regret the measures of seizure and liquidation taken by the Bulgarian Government, even against the property, rights and interests of Allied and Associated Powers who, far from resorting to the disposal of Bulgarian property, rights and interests, have not even applied measures of sequestration or any other war measures, it is none the less the obvious duty of Bulgaria to fulfil her obligations as completely and promptly as possible and with this object to use all

means at her disposal and in particular the capital of her nationals invested abroad.

The treatment reserved for Bulgarian property, rights and interests may be different in certain countries. This may be the case in the United States, who are not at war with Bulgaria but who have taken part in the preparation of the Treaty with that Power, guided as they are by their interest in the general peace and consequently in the settlement of certain questions due to the war, which settlement must be such as to contribute to the maintenance of peace. Seeing that this is the reason for the participation of the United States in the Treaty with Bulgaria and also that no steps have been taken against Bulgarian property in the United States, it seems unnecessary to raise the question of the application of the Treaty to that property, at least if Bulgaria herself has respected American property within her territory during the war.

The question whether Bulgaria should be credited under Article 129 with the total proceeds of liquidations effected in virtue of Article 177, or only with the balance remaining after payment of compensation under paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the latter Article, will be decided by the Reparation Commission in accordance with Article 122.

Article 177 (b). The fears expressed by the Bulgarian Delegation seem groundless, in view of the guarantees offered by the third part of that paragraph and the fourth part of Articles 40 and 45.

Article 177 (e). The limitation proposed by the Bulgarian Delegation in the application of this paragraph cannot be considered. Nationals of all the Allied and Associated Powers who are signatories of the present Treaty are entitled to compensation, if injured by the measures of transfer or exceptional war measures referred to in pars. 1 and 3 of the Annex to Section IV.

Article 177 (k). The taxes and imposts in question are not simply those levied on the property, rights and interests of the nationals of Allied and Associated Powers to which the property, rights and interests of Bulgarian nationals were not subjected, but of all imposts or taxes on capital.

Article 177 (Annex). To meet the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation, the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to insert the following text at the end of the first sentence of paragraph (d) of the present Article, viz:—

“If however in the States referred to in paragraph (i) of this Article measures prejudicial to the property, rights and interests of Bulgarian nationals and not in accordance with the local law have been taken, the Bulgarian proprietor shall be entitled to compensation for the damage caused to him. This compensation shall be fixed by the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal provided for by Section VI.”

Articles 177 and 178. With regard to territories taken from Bulgaria to form independent States, the Treaty creating the independent State would determine the regime in regard to property, rights and interests.

SECTION V

CONTRACTS, PRESCRIPTIONS, JUDGMENTS

Article 180. The Bulgarian Delegation think that the maintenance of contracts is dependent upon the pleasure of the Allied States or their nationals. But, in the first place, the exception contained in paragraph (b) of Article 180 is limited to cases in which the execution of the contract is required in the general interest, and in the second place its execution can only be demanded by the Government of the Allied and Associated State concerned and not by a national of that State.

It must also be pointed out that it is not the case that this Government can, in virtue of paragraph (b), demand that one part only of the contract be upheld. The contract remains valid in its entirety and the exception provided for in paragraph 3 of the Annex only refers to the case of contracts one part of which is annulled by virtue of Article 180 and one part upheld by virtue of the general exception contained in paragraph 2 of the annex.

Article 182. The exceptional provisions of this Article are justified by the measures of spoliation applied by Bulgaria to Allied concessionaires.

Nevertheless, the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to alter the text of the Article as follows:—

“Concessions . . . may in case of abnormal conditions of working or of dispossession resulting from conditions or measures of war be extended on the application of the interested party, which must be presented within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty.”

Annex, paragraph 12. The Allied and Associated Powers agree to omit this paragraph.

SECTION VII

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

Reciprocity has been granted in this Section in all cases in which it can be effectively accorded. Bulgarian legislation concerning industrial property has not hitherto been of a kind to justify the Allied and Associated Powers in exempting Bulgaria from provisions accepted by her Allies.

SECTION VIII

SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO TRANSFERRED TERRITORY

Article 197. The Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to substitute the following text for the second paragraph, viz:—

“The amount of taxes and imposts on capital which have been levied or increased on the property, rights and interests of former Bulgarian nationals since September 29, 1918, or which shall be levied or increased until restitution in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, or, in the case of property, rights and interests which have not been subjected to exceptional measures of war, until three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the owners.

The property, rights and interests restored shall not be subject to any tax levied in respect of any other property or any other business owned by the same person after such property had been removed from Bulgaria, or such business had ceased to be carried on therein.

If taxes of any kind have been paid in anticipation in respect of property, rights and interests removed from Bulgaria, the proportion of such taxes paid for any period subsequent to the removal of the property, rights and interests in question shall be returned to the owners.”

RESUMPTION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

The Bulgarian Delegation ask for reciprocity as regards the right reserved by the Allied and Associated Powers, in virtue of Article 159, of appointing consuls in Bulgarian towns and ports.

The Allied and Associated Powers are not prepared to grant Bulgaria this right; it should, however, be noted that nothing in that Article is opposed either to the revival under the terms of Article 168 of Consular Conventions between individual Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, or to the conclusion of fresh agreements between Bulgaria and these Powers concerning the admission of Bulgarian consular officers to their territory.

PART XI

PORTS, WATERWAYS & RAILWAYS

(Articles 212–248)

As regards the questions affecting Ports, Waterways and Railways, the Allied and Associated Powers have noted with satisfaction that the sentiments expressed by the Bulgarian Delegation were similar to those which had always inspired its deliberations.

With regard to the Articles to which the objections of the Bulgarian Delegation refer, on the other hand, the Commission do not, after

careful examination, feel able to alter the text. Similar clauses have been inserted in the Treaties with Germany and Austria.

With regard to the question of railway communications between Paris and Constantinople, it does not come within the scope of the Peace Treaty and must form the subject of subsequent negotiations between the Governments concerned.

PART XII

LABOUR

(Articles 249 to 289)

While appreciating Bulgaria's intentions, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot alter the provision of the Treaty of Peace which only admits the original members of the League of Nations as original members of the Labour Conference.

Appendix B to HD-81

[Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the Bulgarian Delegation on the Conditions of Peace (Continued)]

PART II

FRONTIERS

(Articles 27 to 35)

The Bulgarian Delegation has asked that modifications be made concerning the frontiers as assigned to her in the Peace Conditions, both in Thrace, and on the Serb-Croat and Slovene side. The Delegation furthermore exposed Bulgaria's claims to Dobrudja, and asked that the "Final statutes" of that region be regulated by the Allied and Associated Governments.

On this last point, the Allied and Associated Governments esteem that, in view of the object of the present Treaty, the Dobrudja question is out of place.

As to the outline of the other frontiers referred to in the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation, it was adopted only after an attentive study taking into account all the elements of the problem. However, the Allied and Associated Powers have examined the arguments invoked with care, but, without disregarding their value, they were unable to recognize any motive of a nature to justify a change in these

carefully studied decisions. The Allied and Associated Powers, therefore, are unable to accord Bulgaria the modifications solicited.

The Allied and Associated Powers were, furthermore, particularly attentive to protect the economic interests of Bulgaria by guaranteeing, in particular, this country an outlet to the Aegean Sea. In numerous cases, the Powers were obliged to have recourse to the same procedure in order to reconcile the interests under debate, and they do not doubt, that if Bulgaria loyally accepts this solution, the future will show that the guarantees which have been given her will be in no manner illusory.

Appendix C to HD-81

[*Memorandum From Marshal Foch*]

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
GENERAL STAFF

No. 5226

OCTOBER 31, 1919.

MEMORANDUM

In an interview with the Chiefs of the Military Missions of the Entente, which took place at Riga on October 27, the Lettish Government has renewed its request for assistance, and made precise the conditions of the support to be given to it by the Allies, with a view to enable it to continue the fight against the Germans and the Bolsheviks.

Following are the conditions:

1st.—Active assistance against Germany, and reinforcement of the direct help given by the fleet.

2nd.—Cession of army and war material, to be sent immediately.

3rd.—Advance in the form of a loan of two millions pounds sterling.

4th.—New shipments of food supplies.

5th.—Interdiction to the Germans to send to Germany any Lettish provisions, absolute closing of the German frontier—surrender of the German material in Latvia.

6th.—Transfer to the Lettish authorities of the Riga-Libau railway, actually in the hands of the Germans, as this town (Riga) will, in six weeks, be blockaded by ice.

The Lettish Government asked for a reply by the 3rd of November in order to be able to determine its line of conduct.

It seems that, on account of the difficult situation in which this Government is placed, consequent to the fight engaged in on two fronts and the demands of the Esthonian Government, its neighbor, there is every advantage in answering its request within the proper time, in order to deprive it of any pretext to negotiate with its enemies.

1st.—Active assistance against Germany:

a) By its resolution of the 10th of October,⁷ the Supreme Council had decided to send to the Baltic provinces an Inter-Allied Mission for the purpose of assuring the control of the evacuation of the German troops, and to provoke all measures which may facilitate and accelerate this evacuation. This Mission is about to leave.

b) All supplies of food and raw materials, and all financial facilities are refused to Germany as long as the latter will not have obeyed the order of evacuation (decision of the Supreme Council of the 17th [27th] of September).⁸

c) Finally, the German navigation has been stopped in the Baltic, with the reserve of taking into consideration the trade necessities of neutrals (order of the Inter-Allied Naval Armistice Commission of October 10, confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Council of October 22nd.).⁹

Thus, the Allied and Associated Governments give to the Baltic provinces an active assistance, by imposing upon Germany an effective military control and serious economic penalties, the effect of which will be deeply felt by her.

These Governments, on the other hand, reserve the right to take, if necessary, all new measures which they may deem necessary, in order to obtain from Germany the executions of her agreements.

2nd.—Cession of Arms and War Material:

The Allied and Associated Governments have already granted to the Lettish Government important cessions of war material and supplies.

During the first days of November a ship transporting armament and equipment for 10,000 men will leave the port of Boulogne, for Latvia.*

Study is being made at the present time as to what extent it will be possible to satisfy a new request for material for 40,000 men.

*3rd. Advance under the form of loans
to the amount of 2,000,000 lbs.
sterling*

*4th. New shipments of supplies in food-
stuffs.*

The question will be submitted to an examination by the Governments.

5th. a) Interdiction that Lettish provisions be sent into Germany by the Germans.

⁷ HD-67, minute 4, and appendices D and E thereto, pp. 536, 546, and 547.

⁸ HD-62, minute 3, and appendix E thereto, pp. 406 and 419.

⁹ HD-74, minute 9, p. 736.

* There remains about 40 cars, in course of transport, and which will not reach Boulogne before November 4th, to be shipped. [Footnote in the original.]

Any requisition, seizure, or coercive measure with a view to obtaining resources destined for Germany is forbidden to the German troops. (Article 14 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.)

In execution of this provision, the Interallied Commission to the Baltic Regions has received an order: "to prevent the removal of any matériel or provisions which does not properly belong to the German troops".

b) The surrender of German material in Latvia:

This surrender cannot be exacted by law. It may, however, be the object of transactions with the German Government.

However, the Supreme Council decided,¹⁰ that after October 11th, the Interallied Control Commission at Berlin would be authorized to order the delivery of munitions and Russian war material, deposited in Germany, to the Russian armies recognized by the Allied and Associated Governments. This provision shall be applicable to the Lettish army.

c) Closing of the frontier:

In notes dated October 3rd¹¹ and 16th, the German Government itself, specified that it had ordered the closing of the frontier, the discontinuance of supplies and munitions, and that it had organized, to this end, frontier surveillance posts, which were ordered to fire on German troops attempting to enter Courland.

The Inter-Allied Mission shall be especially entrusted with the strict execution of these prescriptions.

The occupation of the territory of Memel, which shall be effected upon the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, will facilitate the execution of this supervision, by permitting the greater part of the ways of entry to Latvia to be barred by Allied troops.

6th—Transfer of the Riga-Libau Railway line administration to Lettish authorities, now controlled by Germans.

This question is within the competence of the Inter-Allied Control Mission, the departure of which is announced above. The attention of the Head of this Mission shall be called to the necessity of solving this question as soon as possible.

F. FOCH

¹⁰ HD-68, minute 6, p. 580.

¹¹ Appendix A to HD-66, p. 517.

Appendix D to HD-81

Report of Meeting of the Naval Advisors Concerning the Compensation To Be Demanded of the German Government for the Sinking of Their Men-of-War at Scapa Flow on 21 June, 1919

1 NOVEMBER, 1919.

1. In view of the reparation claims that Germany had already incurred under the terms of the Peace Treaty, it is not considered feasible to make any further financial or material demands other than the following, which however cannot be regarded as complete compensation to the Allied and Associated Powers for the losses incurred through the sinking of the modern German men-of-war at Scapa:—

(a) The five Light Cruisers

Königsberg
Pillau
Graudenz
Regensburg
Strassburg

(b) Such number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers equivalent to the displacement of 400,000 tons as the Allied and Associated Powers may demand. The lifting power of a dock to be taken as displacement, and approximately 75% of the docks to be included.

2. In order to put the above conditions into effect, the German Government shall undertake to supply to the Allied Naval Commission of Control within 10 days of the deposit of the ratification of the Peace Treaty, a complete list of all floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers in German possession. This list is to notify the material which was in the possession of the German Government on 11th November, 1918, or in which the German Government had considerable interests on that date.

3. The Allied Naval Commission of Control will select the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers in accordance with the following provisions:—

The priority of selection will be:—

(i) Government docks, cranes, tugs and dredgers which were Government property on 11th November 1918.

(ii) Floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers in which the German Government had large interests on 11 November 1918.

(iii) Floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, the removal of which will have the least effect on the working of the port in which they are situated.

4. The German officers and men belonging to the men-of-war which were sunk at Scapa and which are at present retained by the Allied and Associated Powers will, with the exception of any whose surrender is required by Articles 228 of the Treaty of Peace, be repatriated on the German Government giving their guarantee to the conditions contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 above being carried out.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers are placing any monies salvaged from the German men-of-war at Scapa which cannot be traced to any particular individual to the credit of the Reparation Fund. The amount of monies salvaged is 42,086 Marks 20 Pfennigs.

6. The Torpedo Boat Destroyer *B. 98* can be considered as one of the 42 T. B. D.'s to be surrendered under Article 185 of the Peace Treaty.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
GREAT BRITAIN
FRANCE
ITALY
JAPAN

N. A. McCULLY

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 3, 1919, at 10 a. m.

PRESENT

**AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF**

Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint-Quentin

ITALY

M. Scialoja
Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Capt. B. Winthrop
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian Small
FRANCE M. Massigli
ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

General Bliss
Dr. James Brown Scott
Mr. A. W. Dulles

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Lieut-Col. Kisch
Commander Dunne
Captain Fuller, R. N.
Mr. H. W. Malkin
Mr. A. Leeper

FRANCE

General Weygand
General Desticker
M. Kammerer
Commandant Lacombe
M. Fromageot

ITALY

General Cavallero
M. Ricci-Busatti
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Stranieri
Prince Boncompagni

1. (The Council had before it a report from the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the occupation of Memel prior to the ratification of the Treaty (See Appendix "A").)

Report of the
Military
Representatives
at Versailles
Relative to the
Occupation of
Memel Prior
to the
Ratification
of the Treaty

GENERAL DESTICKER read and commented upon the report.

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

to approve the report as prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles, and that no troops should be sent to Memel before the entry into force of the Treaty.)

2. (The Council had before it the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the suppression of the Inter-Allied Transport Commission (See Appendix "B").)

Report of the
Military
Representatives
at Versailles
Suggesting the
Suppression of
the Interallied
Transport
Commission

GENERAL DESTICKER read and commented upon the report.

(It was decided:

to suppress the Inter-Allied Transport Commission, as proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles in their report.)

3. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation on the Hungarian situation (See Appendix "C").)

Roumanian and
Hungarian
Questions

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the note prepared by the French Delegation. He wished to bring to the attention of the Council that in paragraph 2, of Page 4,¹ the phrase relative to the Inter-Allied force under discussion should be understood in the sense that the force include only Serbian, Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak troops, under an Inter-Allied command.

MR. POLK stated that he had not yet seen a final report from Sir George Clerk and he thought it might be advisable to await this information before discussing the question. He should, however, inquire how the Council intended to treat the Inter-Allied Commission of Generals; if this Inter-Allied Commission had not succeeded, it was because the Supreme Council had not backed it up sufficiently.

M. BERTHELOT thought that they had not carried out with sufficient authority the instructions given them by the Supreme Council, and on the other hand, they had not shown initiative, and did not seem to have had a consistent policy. As for Sir George Clerk, he did not seem to have succeeded in his mission with M. Friedrich. The affair seemed to be dragging along; M. Friedrich had not yet retired and the Democratic Government had not been formed as was expected by the Council. He added that the French proposition was not to be

¹ *Post*, p. 920.

little the mission of Sir George Clerk in any fashion, but it was important to clear up the situation and settle this vexatious question.

M. PICHON thought it was extremely important to solve this question as soon as possible.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Roumanian and Hungarian questions of course involved each other. Sir George Clerk had insisted on the importance of getting the Roumanians out of the country, and a stable government could not be formed until this had been settled. The information from Sir George Clerk said there might be disadvantages, but the balance of advantage was that the Roumanians should be gotten out. The Roumanians were defying the Council. M. Bratiano was dragging on negotiations with no intention of following the instructions of the Council. He certainly thought that they should insist on getting an answer from Roumania and he thought that the Council should publish the note² which has been sent to Roumania. M. Bratiano was spreading false versions of the note, sent in the course of the electioneering campaign which was going on in Roumania, and was pretending that there was no disagreement as between the Allies and Roumania.

M. BERTHELOT stated it was quite evident that the Roumanian troops should first get out but there was great danger if the Roumanian troops were to leave the country before other troops were sent to replace them. In that case, the Allies would find before them at Budapest only a Friedrich Government which had in its hands a force of police; outside of Budapest was Admiral Horthy with an army of 20,000 men or so; at any rate he was reactionary and was a symbol of the Hapsburgs. In conclusion, first: the Roumanians should get out; secondly, the Roumanian troops should be replaced in such a way that the Allies would be in a position to impose their policy at Budapest; but the departure of the Roumanians would be dangerous if the Allies did not have other means of controlling the situation. As far as the Roumanians were concerned, there was no doubt whatever they should be obliged to answer the note which had been sent them, and it might become advisable to publish this note, although this might not be of very great practical value, as elections were being held at this time. M. Bratiano was pretending that this note had never been delivered to the Roumanian Government by the Conference. According to his theory, only three out of the four Principal Allied and Associated Powers had presented the note, and the Italian representative had not associated himself with this step. General Coanda, who had just arrived in Paris, claimed that there was no need to reply to a note which had not been received.

² Appendix B to HD-68, p. 583.

MR. POLK had noticed in the French note a reference to the American General which he did not approve. He thought the American General had been doing his best to follow his instructions. His only contention was that Roumania was not on trial, but that the Supreme Council should be obeyed. The impression was going abroad in Roumania that the orders which were being executed by the Commission did not correspond to the real orders of the Supreme Council and also that if the text of the note did not sound quite French, it was because it stood for an Anglo-American translation. On the whole the impression there was that America was against Roumania; that was not so, it was only a question, as he had said before, of the orders of the Supreme Council being followed. If there were so little coordination of action between the Allies in this case, it argued [*augured?*] badly for the future.

M. PICHON said they were all agreed that the Inter-Allied cohesion should be maintained.

MR. POLK asked how it was possible after they had ordered the Roumanians to leave Hungary, to think of leaving them in the Inter-Allied forces referred to in the latter part of the French note.

SIR EYRE CROWE said M. Berthelot's remark—that the Supreme Council's note had not been received,—was a surprise. If that were so, then they could not insist upon its being carried out. That lack of cooperation in Bucharest was very serious.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that he had no information on the non-presentation of the note by the Italian representative; he would, however, get more information on the subject.

M. PICHON stated that according to a telegram from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest there had been delay in presentation of the note to the Roumanian Government for the reason that the Italian representative had not received his instructions. A second telegram had informed him that the note had been delivered by three out of four representatives of the Allies without awaiting any longer the instructions of the Italian representative. He did not know whether the Italian representative had now received these instructions, but he wished to point out that the Roumanians were still maintaining that they had not received the note.

SIR EYRE CROWE mentioned that M. Bratiano was spreading the report that this was an Anglo-American intrigue.

M. PICHON was of the opinion that the note should be published so as to put a stop to these rumors, and also a further note, should the Council so decide.

MR. POLK wished to point out that the Council could only repeat the conclusions it had adopted at its meeting of August 5th or thereabouts.

M. BERTHELOT wished to point out that one could not reproach the French Government with having opposed itself to any of the orders sent to Bucharest. The French representative had always delivered the notes either in the name of the Allies or in the name of the French Government. Should M. Bratiano wish to try and cause disagreement between the Allies this should carefully be avoided. He repeated that two points were to be distinguished; on the Roumanian question there was no discussion possible as to the attitude to be taken, but the Hungarian question remained. The departure of the Roumanians from Budapest ran the risk of bringing about a state of anarchy or the reappearance of the Hapsburg monarchy.

MR. POLK thought that early in September the Council had ordered the Roumanians to turn over 10,000 rifles to the Hungarian police which was to be organized, and he understood that only 1,000 rifles had been delivered up to this time without bayonets, without sufficient ammunition, and that the machine guns had been delivered without tripods. He thought there would be no use sending another Mission to Budapest if there was to be no compliance with the orders already sent out by the Council. If the present Mission had not done its work, it would then be advisable to recall it.

M. PICHON agreed that this might be exact, but there remained the danger of an armed force under the orders of Admiral Horthy, with the shadow of a Hapsburg reaction. The Roumanians might be lying, but they again affirmed that they had given up these arms; it would be easy to verify this through the Mission and the orders should then be carried out. He again pointed out how dangerous it would be to recall Roumanian troops without being able to oppose an Inter-Allied force to the Horthy force. It was important to organize a democratic Government at Budapest or it would be impossible to sign peace with Hungary.

MR. POLK wished to remark that four of the Powers had sent representatives to report on conditions in Hungary—he personally had great confidence in General Bandholtz,—and if the Council did not have confidence in these representatives it was for it to recall them. Later the Council had sent Sir George Clerk, in whom also he had the greatest confidence. He thought the Council should have confidence in the men they sent on these Missions, and he considered it had been well represented so far.

M. BERTHELOT said that if the police force at Budapest was armed, that did not inspire great confidence, for it was in the hands of the Friedrich government. It was quite clear that the Council got its information from representatives wherever sent; it had also the advantage of a general view of all the problems. The important question was that there should not remain a dangerous and ridiculous cen-

ter of disorganization in central Europe; a negative policy was not sufficient. They should have a positive policy.

M. PICHON asked what was to be done about Hungary. Were they going to deliver it to the Friedrich government or to the Archduke? As the Allies would not have forces available to send there, it seemed that the best solution would be to have the occupation force composed of Serbian, Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak troops under an Inter-Allied command. If the Council had in mind a better solution, this was the time to put it forward.

MR. POLK asked whether the question should not also be examined by the Financial experts.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that Sir George Clerk should be informed by telegram of the discussion, and asked for an opinion on the possibility of employing Roumanian, Serbian and Czecho-Slovak troops.

Mr. POLK agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe, that the Council should not think of acting without Sir George Clerk's opinion.

M. PICHON remarked that Sir George Clerk could also consult the Generals.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether, in the existence of the disturbed state of the country, it would be expedient to use Roumanian troops, and whether a force containing Roumanian and Serbian troops would work well.

M. BERTHELOT thought that this was simply a question of command. He thought, however, that the Roumanians might be excluded, especially if this exclusion might be used to show them how little confidence was put in them by the Supreme Council. But it was most important that they should have the symbol of an Inter-Allied force, so as to disarm Horthy. Telegrams would not be sufficient to do this. This occupation would not be very long, and with an efficient high command it would be easy to await the formation of a democratic Government.

M. PICHON summed up, stating that the Council was agreed to send immediately a telegram to Bucharest, insisting that the Roumanian Government should answer the last note sent by the Council. M. Berthelot would now prepare the text of this telegram.

M. BERTHELOT submitted to the Council a draft telegram which was approved (See Appendix "D"). He thought it advisable to give the text of this telegram to the Roumanian Delegation that same afternoon, and to publish the new and the former note the next day.

SIR EYRE CROWE informed the Council he had at that moment received a telegram from Sir George Clerk, which he proceeded to read to the Council.

(The Council unanimously agreed to adjourn the examination of the draft telegram to be sent until the next meeting of the Council)

(It was decided:

(1) to send a note to the Roumanian Government insisting on a prompt answer to the note which had already been sent by the Council on October 12th;

(2) that this note should be immediately delivered to the Roumanian Government at Bucharest by the four representatives of the Powers without waiting for further instructions from their respective Governments;

(3) to give the Roumanian Delegation at Paris a copy of this note that same afternoon;

(4) that the present note, and also the original note, should be published the following day.)

4. The Council had before it a report from the New States Commission (See Appendix "E"), and a draft Treaty with Greece (See Appendix "F").)

Greek
Minorities
Treaty

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the report of the New States Commission and the draft Treaty with Greece. He added that the proposed Treaty concerned European territory only and should any Asiatic territory be attributed to Greece at a later time, a new treaty would be necessary. Greece should also be informed that the Treaty would be communicated to her at this time, but that the signature would only follow upon the final attribution to her of certain territories.

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

(1) to approve the draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece, prepared by the New States Commission;

(2) that in communicating the text of this treaty to the Greek Delegation the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should inform the Delegation that it only applied to territories situated in Europe, and that Greece would not be asked to sign the Treaty before the territories to be attributed to her had been determined.)

5. M. FROMAGEOT wished to inquire which Powers should figure in the preamble of the Treaty with Bulgaria, and also which Powers were to sign. America and Japan were not at war with Bulgaria, but it seemed anomalous that they should not sign, taking into account the different dispositions of the Treaty.

Treaty With
Bulgaria

MR. POLK understood that the question had already been settled and that it was agreed that all the Principal Powers sign.

M. FROMAGEOT said that, as for the other Allied and Associated Powers, a certain number had not declared war against Bulgaria, but their full powers had already been presented to the Bulgarian Delegation; under those circumstances they had a right to sign. He proposed that a circular letter should be sent them asking whether they intended to sign, and he thought this would not delay the delivery of the reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals.

It was decided :

(1) that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the Treaty with Bulgaria;

(2) that a circular letter should be addressed to the other Allied Powers which had not declared war against Bulgaria, to inquire whether it was their intention to sign the Treaty.)

6. (The Council had before it the note from the Dutch Government (See Appendix "G") and the draft reply prepared by the Drafting Committee to this note (See Appendix "H").)

**Draft Reply
to the Note
From the Dutch
Government
Regarding
German Ships
Sold to Dutch
Navigation
Companies**

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon both documents. He wished to add that the note sent by the Supreme Council on October 15th to Germany³ conformed to the declarations made in March at the Conference in Brussels concerning the question of ships in course of construction. He wished to point out that the decision was formerly that all ships in

course of construction were to be delivered to the Allies.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that, in the reply to the Dutch Government, paragraph 7, Annex 3, to Part VIII of the Treaty with Germany should be had in mind. A possible objection from the Dutch Government should be foreseen: the Treaty stated that Germany agreed to take any measures that might be necessary for obtaining the full title to the property in all ships which might have been transferred during the war to neutral flags. It therefore followed that Holland might very well tell the Allies that they should address their demands to Germany and not to her. He would like the Drafting Committee to take into consideration the possibility of that objection in the note to be sent to Holland.

MR. POLK stated that apparently the said paragraph tied the hands of the Supreme Council; but as a matter of principle, this would not be in accord with the American view of International Law. Should not this note be sent back to the Drafting Committee to prepare a text which would satisfy all the members of the Council?

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to remark that if an argument were begun with the Dutch Government, it would be difficult to foresee how long this discussion might last.

(It was decided :

to refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the Dutch Government for further examination.)

³ Appendix A to HD-70, p. 649.

7. (The Council had before it a report from the Allied Railways Commission in Poland relative to the opening for commercial traffic of the three railroads crossing the German-Polish frontier north of Warsaw (See Appendix "I").)

Proposal of the Allied Railways Commission in Poland To Open for Commercial Traffic the Three Railroads Crossing the German-Polish Frontier North of Warsaw

COLONEL KISCH read and commented upon this report. He brought up the personal suggestion that the Armistice Commission was not the proper authority, but that the question should be referred to the Allied Representatives in Berlin.

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

to approve the conclusions of the report as presented by the Allied Railways Commission in Poland, with this modification: that the Allied Military Representatives charged with the Polish-German Affairs acquaint the German Government with the agreements if any, concluded at Warsaw.)

8. (The Council had before it a request of the European Danube Commission on the International Conference to establish the regime of the Danube, as provided for in Article 349 of the German Treaty (See Appendix "J").)

Request of the European Danube Commission on the International Conference To Establish the Regime of the Danube, as Provided for in Article 349 of the German Treaty

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

to refer this request to the Drafting Committee for examination and report as to points of law.)

9. (The Council had before it the request of the European Danube Commission for the attribution of two tugs to that Commission (See Appendix "K").)

Request of the European Danube Commission for the Attribution of Two Tugs to That Commission

(It was decided:

to attribute two tugs belonging to the Enemy Powers to the European Danube Commission for an indemnity to be fixed by the arbitrators.)

10. (The Council had before it the note from the German Delegation to the Reparations Commission regarding the transport by sea of potatoes purchased by Germany in Denmark (See Appendix "L").)

Note From the German Delegation to the Reparations Commission Regarding the Transport by Sea of Potatoes Purchased by Germany in Denmark

(It was decided:

to refer back to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission this question for examination and report.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 3, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-82

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

VERSAILLES, 30 October, 1919.

S. W. C. 477
(89th M. R.)

Report on the Occupation of Memel

By a resolution dated October 25th, 1919,⁴ the Supreme Council decided:

“to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles for examination and report the question of whether the situation in the Baltic Provinces was such as to necessitate occupying Memel before the prescribed date”.

The Military Representatives

TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION :

(1) That Germany maintains her sovereignty over the Memel district until the moment when the Treaty shall have come into force.

(2) That the occupation of Memel before the Treaty shall have come into force would expose the troops of occupation to possible attack by German troops from East Prussia on the West, or from Lithuania on the East, or from both these directions, and that as long as the allied force intended for the occupation of the Plebiscite areas (Danzig, East Prussia, &c) are not in position (which will not be the case until after the coming into force of the Treaty) the allied forces in the Territory of Memel would be left without any reserves.

(3) That the combatant strength of the German forces in East Prussia and Lithuania appear to be approximately 20,000 and 40,000 respectively.

(4) That it would be impracticable to occupy Memel in sufficient force to make the troops of occupation safe against such an attack.

(5) That the Supreme Council has already decided (on October 14th [15th], 1919)⁵ to occupy Memel after that region shall have passed to the hands of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

ARE OF THE OPINION

That the occupation of Memel before the prescribed date would offer certain advantages in providing the Inter-Allied Commission proceeding to the Baltic Provinces with an efficient means of action, but that in view of the considerations reviewed above, this occupation should not be effected before the coming into force of the Treaty.

⁴ HD-76, minute 3, p. 765.

⁵ HD-70, minute 3, and appendix B thereto, pp. 641 and 650.

DESTICKER	SACKVILLE-WEST	CAVALLERO	EMBICK
<i>Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council</i>	<i>Major-General, Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council</i>	<i>Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council</i>	<i>Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council</i>

Appendix B to HD-82

Copy No. 26

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

S. W. C. 476
(89th M. R.)

Joint Note No. 46

JOINT NOTE TO THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL BY ITS MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES

SUBJECT—SUPPRESSION OF THE INTER-ALLIED TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE

To the Supreme War Council.

By its decision dated February 1st, 1918, (3rd Session), the Supreme War Council approved Joint Note No. 8 of the Military Representatives in which they proposed "The Constitution of an Inter-Allied Transportation Committee . . . , to report to the Supreme War Council."

This committee was charged "To draw up a statement of the existing position of affairs as regards Inter-Allied Transportation, the projects now under way, the present state of, and future possibilities in, construction . . . and to make definite recommendations as to their co-ordination on the most efficient lines . . . to advise as to execution, and to report as to progress."

The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council

HAVING TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION

1. That the principal reasons for the formation of the Inter-Allied Transportation Committee have ceased with the State of War,
2. That all the questions which have been sent for examination and report to the said Committee, by the Supreme War Council, or, all preliminary technical examination having been completed, have at present been submitted to the decision of the interested Governments or of the Supreme Council,

3. That though, at the present moment, there may still exist numerous questions interesting any two Governments, there no longer exist from the point of view of transportation any questions common to all, beyond those dealt with by the Supreme Economic Council,

ARE OF OPINION

That the maintenance of the Inter-Allied Transportation Committee is no longer necessary, and that it would be advisable in consequence to decide on its suppression.

DESTICKER	SACKVILLE-WEST	CAVALLERO	EMBICK
<i>Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council</i>	<i>Major-General, Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council</i>	<i>Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council</i>	<i>Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council</i>

Given at Versailles, 30th October, 1919.

Appendix C to HD-82

Note From the French Delegation

THE SITUATION IN HUNGARY

The Supreme Council has, on many occasions, studied the situation in Hungary. Recently, it directed Sir George Clerk to proceed to Budapest, bearer of a decision made by the Allies in which the Friedrich Ministry was notified; that it was invited to modify its Government and include democratic elements without delay.⁶

Since the arrival of the emissary of the Conference, the Ministerial situation in Hungary has undergone no modification. If decisive measures are not adopted and put into execution by the Supreme Council, the situation in Hungary is very liable to become decisively more aggravated.

The position of the three powers now co-existing in Budapest may be presented in the following manner:

1st—Mr. Friedrich continues to elude the wishes of the Allies and to refuse to constitute a democratic Ministry, representative of all the elements of the country, the only Ministry which would be capable of conducting equitable elections and concluding a peace with the Allies in the name of the entire country.

On the other hand, Admiral Horthy, who is an energetic, ultra-reactionary personality, susceptible of intriguing for his own mili-

⁶ HD-69, minute 3, p. 603.

tary dictatorship, has constituted a force comprising about 20,000 men who are fully armed and devoted to him.

These two elements (Mr. Friedrich and Admiral Horthy) represent, each on his side, a mask of the former absolutism and in particular the Archduke Joseph. If the Allies do not intervene, they will probably witness, immediately after the departure of the Rumanian troops, and even if a small police force has been constituted in the Capital, the re-appearance, under one form or another, of the Hapsburg dynasty. The democratic policy, which is the policy of our Allies in Rumania, Bohemia, Jugoslavia, France, England, the United States and Italy, will be justified in reproaching the Conference for allowing the establishment of a clerical and reactionary government which would finally reestablish fatal ties with Vienna and Berlin.

It must be added that Admiral Horthy, whose clique seems to favor a military dictatorship, in no wise dissimulates his intention to take advantage of the momentary difficulties existing in Slovakia to resume on the very first pretext, the struggle against the Czechs and to commence by taking possession of Presbourg: the vital danger of that situation was pointed out by Mr. Benes.

2nd—The Rumanian army, despite the reproaches made toward it concerning requisitions and the evident abuses of force committed by it, represents, however, the only material force which is capable of preventing the reconstruction of the Royalist Government at Budapest. The Allies esteem, however, that the Rumanian army must evacuate the Capital as soon as possible in order to permit a regular Government to be constituted and operate freely. The Rumanians declare that they are ready to withdraw their troops to the rear, in view of the present situation, but point out that if such decisions are taken, the situation will become still more embarrassing for the Allies. They, have, moreover, furnished the armies necessary for the organization of the city police force.

3rd—The Commission of Generals, it must be admitted, has not succeeded, despite all efforts, to satisfactorily accomplish its general mission, nor the special missions with which it was entrusted by the Supreme Council on several occasions. The French General has taken no action. His English colleague appears to be acting in accordance with the original views which, however, do not conform with the decisions and instructions of the Conference. The American General and his Italian colleague, despite their efforts of loyal documentation, do not appear to have been clearly conscious of the views of the Allies. Under these circumstances, it does not appear that the Commission of Generals is capable of resolving, in itself, no matter what instructions may be sent them, the difficulties of the Hungarian problem.

To find a practical solution of the difficulties of the Hungarian Situation, and to place the country in a position to sign peace with the Allies, a primary condition to the re-establishment of order and for the functioning of a regular government, the following provisions may be considered:

1st—Mr. Friedrich having shown that he could not or would not constitute a Government in which all the democratic elements of the

population would be represented, should be obliged to retire and make place for a democratic government, the elements of which exist in Budapest.

2nd—An Inter-Allied force of two divisions, placed under the orders of an Allied Staff, in command of a General selected by the Conference, and comprising Rumanian, Czech and Serbian contingents, could replace the Rumanian troops which are to fall back to the Theiss.

This small occupation corps would supervise the organization of a local police, disarm Admiral Horthy's army of adventurers, and would guarantee freedom in the elections and the operations of the new Hungarian Government. As soon as the situation would have been regulated, and the return of the fallen dynasty averted, the Allies would withdraw their troops. The signing of the peace would finally be made possible and the country would resume its normal situation.

If the Allies allow the situation at Budapest to continue, and if they do not adopt a complete and precise plan of action, the Hungarian situation is liable to compromise the entire condition in Central Europe.

Appendix D to HD-82

Telegram

Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the French Minister—Bucarest.

The Supreme Council has decided to request the Allied Ministers at Bucarest to notify, jointly, without delay, the Roumanian Government of the fact that it was unfavorably impressed upon learning that General Coanda, sent as special envoy to Paris by the Roumanian Ministry, arrived without the Roumanian reply to the last note from the Powers,⁷ under the pretext that the Italian Minister had not taken this step at the same time as France, England and United States. The Supreme Council expresses the formal desire to obtain, within the shortest time, a brief and clear reply from the Roumanian Government on all the points discussed. As the situation in Hungary demands an early decision in order to ensure the re-establishment of normal conditions which is absolutely essential for the security of Central Europe, the principal Allied and Associated Powers cannot allow to [*sic*] Roumania to prolong dilatory negotiations on the three questions stated October 12th last.

Please communicate this in the name of the Conference, collectively with your colleagues, who need not wait for special instructions from their Governments, owing to the urgency of the situation.

PICHON

⁷ Appendix B to HD-68, p. 583.

Appendix E to HD-82

CONFERENCE ON
PEACE PRELIMINARIES

COMMISSION ON NEW STATES

*Report to the Supreme Council Relative to the New Treaty With
Greece*

The Commission on New States has the honor to submit to the Supreme Council the draft of Treaty which is to be presented for the signature of the Greek Delegation.

During the elaboration of this draft, the Commission duly noted the observations of Mr. Venizelos and the original text has been modified on many points in order to comply with several of his requests. In the preamble, for instance, he indicated, as is true, that the Greek Delegation had always evidenced broad views.

Concerning this point, to which Mr. Venizelos attached great importance, the Commission, however, did not deem it possible to accord satisfaction. Article 9 imposes on Greece, concerning the provinces which were ceded to her subsequent to January 1, 1913, which are peopled with an important proportion of non-Greek inhabitants, the obligation to insure instruction in the State Schools in a language other than Greek. Thus the Greek Government is expected, in certain regions, to insure to the Greek citizens of Bulgarian language, instruction in their own tongue. Mr. Venizelos indicated that the Greek Government would vigorously oppose this decision.

In this matter, the Commission feels obliged to point out that the general object of these Treaties is to guarantee that the foreign populations which are united to Greece, or to any other State, have full liberty to use their own language. This principle was established and maintained in corresponding Treaties. It might also be indicated that if Bulgarian schools are provided for by the Greek Government, there would be considerably less danger that they would be used for political propaganda and intrigue, for the Bulgarian children, than in the private schools which would not be under State control.

That question being considered as a matter of principle, the Commission did not consider it necessary to make any concession to Mr. Venizelos on this point.

The attention of the Supreme Council is called to another important point. The Treaties of 1832⁸ and 1863,⁹ establishing the independence of Greece, obligated that nation, in conformity with the views of France, Great Britain and Russia, protective powers, to remain a constitutional monarchy. The Committee has esteemed that a clause re-

⁸ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XIX, p. 33.

⁹ *Ibid.*, vol. LIII, p. 28.

stricting the sovereignty of the Greek people, with respect to the basis of their own Constitution, should no longer be maintained, and that it is fitting to liberate Greece from a situation which places her in a state of inferiority in relation with the other States. For this reason, the Commission proposes that the English and French Governments release the Greek Government from the obligations imposed on it by the Treaties of 1832 and 1863, in the present Treaty. The Commission further proposes, that, in view of the obligations borne by Greece, in conformity with the present Treaty, on account of the engagements assumed by her, and assured under the protection of the League of Nations, France and Great Britain release Greece from the special obligations which she accepted toward these two Governments in 1830 and which had reference to the maintenance of religious liberty.¹⁰

The clauses of the present Treaty are, for the greater part, analogous with those of the other Treaties. There are, however, certain special articles concerning the protection of the Valaques of Pindus, the non-Greek monastic communities of Mount Athos, and of the Mussulmans. The stipulations in the article relative to the protection of the Jews are much less strict than those which were deemed necessary in the Treaty with Poland. The liberalism manifested by the Greek Government in its relations with the Jews has appeared of a nature to render more detailed restrictions as needless.

The Commission adds that this Treaty was drafted without taking into account any territories of Asia which might be ceded to Greece. If cessions of that nature are accorded, protection for the non-Greek populations of these territories should be the object of further stipulations.

Appendix F to HD-82¹¹

Draft of a Treaty

Between
The United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, and
Japan.

Described as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,

On the one hand;

And Greece

On the other hand;

Whereas since the 1st January 1913 large accessions of territory have been made to the Kingdom of Greece, and

Whereas the Kingdom of Greece which has given to the populations included in its territories, without distinction of origin, language or

¹⁰ Protocol No. 3 of the Conference of London of February 3, 1830; *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xvii, p. 202.

¹¹ Filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 186.1/38.

religion, equality of rights, is desirous of confirming these rights and of extending them to the populations of the territories which might be added to the Kingdom so that they shall have full and complete guarantee that they shall be governed in conformity with the principles of liberty and justice, and

Whereas it is desired to free Greece from certain obligations which she has undertaken towards certain Powers and to substitute for them obligations to the League of Nations, and

Whereas it is desired also to free Greece from certain other obligations which she has undertaken to certain Powers and which constitute a restriction upon her full internal sovereignty.

For this purpose the following Representatives of the High Contracting Parties:

The President of the United States of America,

.....
His Majesty The King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

.....
The President of the French Republic,

.....
His Majesty the King of Italy,

.....
H. M. The Emperor of Japan,

.....
His Majesty the King of the Hellenes.

.....
After having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

France and Great Britain hereby renounce for their part to the special rights of supervision and control devolving upon them under the Treaty of London of May 7, 1832,¹² under the Treaty of London of November 14, 1863,¹³ and, as regard the Ionian Island, by the Treaty of 29 March 1864.¹⁴

France and Great Britain, recognising that under the present Treaty Greece has undertaken obligations for the maintenance of religious liberty which are placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations, hereby renounce for their part the rights conferred upon them by the Protocol No. 3 of the Conference held in London on the 3rd February 1830, to ensure the protection of the principle of religious equality.¹⁵

¹² *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XIX, p. 33.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. LIII, p. 19.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. LIV, p. 11.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. XVII, p. 202.

Chapter I

ARTICLE 1

Greece undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 2 to 8 of this chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no laws, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

ARTICLE 2

Greece undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Greece without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Greece shall be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals.

ARTICLE 3

Greece admits and declares to be Greek nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality Bulgarian or Turkish (or Albanian) nationals habitually resident at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty in territories transferred to Greece since January 1st 1918 [1913?].

Nevertheless, the persons referred to above who are over eighteen years of age will be entitled under the conditions contained in the said Treaties to opt for any other nationality which may be open to them. Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

Persons who have exercised the above right to opt must, except where it is otherwise provided in the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria and Turkey transfer within the succeeding twelve months, their place of residence to the State for which they have opted. They will be entitled to retain their immovable property in Greek territory. They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

ARTICLE 4

Greece admits and declares to be Greek nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality persons of Bulgarian or Turkish nationality who were born in the said territories of parents habitually resident there, even if at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty they are not themselves habitually resident there.

Nevertheless, within two years after the coming into force of the present Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Greek authorities in the country in which they are resident, stating that they, abandon Greek nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as Greek nationals. In this connection a declaration by a husband will cover his wife, and a declaration by parents will cover their children under eighteen years of age.

ARTICLE 5

Greece undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have, under the Treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with Bulgaria or Turkey, to choose whether or not they will acquire Greek nationality.

ARTICLE 6

All persons born in Greek territory who are not born nationals of another State shall *ipso facto* become Greek nationals.

ARTICLE 7

All Greek nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice and [any] Greek national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Greek national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Greek Government of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Greek nationals of non-Greek speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

ARTICLE 8

Greek nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Greek nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish manage and control at their own expense charitable religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

ARTICLE 9

Greece will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Greek nationals of other than Greek speech are resident adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Greek nationals, through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Greek Government from making the teaching of the Greek language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Greek nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

The provisions of the present article apply only to territory transferred to Greece since the first of January 1913.

ARTICLE 10

In towns and districts where there is resident a considerable proportion of Greek subjects of the Jewish religious [*religion*], the Greek Government agrees that these Jews shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their Sabbath, and that they shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath. This provision however shall not exempt Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Greek citizens for the necessary purposes of military service national defence or the preservation of public order.

ARTICLE 11

Greece agrees to accord to the community of the Valachs of Pindus, local autonomy in regard to religious charitable or scholastic matters under the control of the Greek State.

ARTICLE 12

Greece undertakes to recognise and maintain the traditional rights and liberties enjoyed by the non Greek monastic communities of Mount-Athos under clause 62 of the Treaty of Berlin.^{15a}

^{15a} *Foreign Relations*, 1878, p. 895.

ARTICLE 13

Greece agrees to grant to the Musulmans in the matter of family law and personal status provisions suitable for regulating these matters in accordance with Musulman usage.

The Greek government shall take measures to assure the nomination of a Reiss ul Ulema.

Greece undertakes to insure protection to the mosques cemeteries and other Musulman religious establishments. Full recognition and facilities shall be assured to pious foundations (*vakoufs*), Musulman religious and charitable establishments now existing and Greece shall not refuse to the creation of new religious and charitable establishments any of the necessary facilities guaranteed to other private establishments of this nature.

ARTICLE 14

Greece agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guaranty of the League of Nations. They shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Greece agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Greece further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Greek Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Greek Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

Chapter II

ARTICLE 15

Greece undertakes to make no Treaty, Convention or arrangement and to take no other action which will prevent her from joining in any general Convention for the equitable treatment of the commerce of other States that may be concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations within five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Greece also undertakes to extend to all the Allied and Associated Powers any favours or privileges in Customs matters, which it may grant during the same period of five years to any state with which since August 1914 the Allied and Associated Powers have been at war or to any State which in virtue of Article 6 of Part X of the Treaty with Austria has special Customs arrangements with such States.

ARTICLE 16

Pending the conclusion of the general convention referred to above, Greece undertakes to treat on the same footing as national vessels or vessels of the most favoured nation the vessels of all the Allied and Associated Powers [which?] accord similar treatment to Greek vessels. As an exception from this provision, the right of Greece or of any other Allied or Associated Power to confine her maritime coasting trade to national vessels is expressly reserved.

ARTICLE 17

Pending the conclusion under the auspices of the League of Nations of a general convention to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit, Greece undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit to or from any Allied or Associated State over Greek territory, including territorial waters, and to treat them at least as favourably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails respectively of Greece or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation or ownership, as regards facilities, charges, restrictions, and all other matters.

All charges imposed in Greece on such traffic in transit shall be reasonable having regard to the conditions of the traffic. Goods in transit shall be exempt from all customs or other duties.

Tariffs for transit across Greece and tariffs between Greece and any Allied or Associated Power involving through tickets or waybills shall be established at the request of the Allied or Associated Power concerned.

Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.

Provided that no Allied or Associated Power can claim the benefit of these provisions on behalf of any part of its territory in which reciprocal treatment is not accorded in respect of the same subject matter.

If within a period of five years from the coming into force of this Treaty no general convention as aforesaid shall have been concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations, Greece shall be at liberty at any time thereafter to give twelve months notice to the Secretary General of the League of Nations to terminate the obligations of the present Article.

ARTICLE 18

All rights and privileges accorded by the foregoing articles to the Allied and Associated Powers shall be accorded equally to all States members of the League of Nations.

The Present Treaty, in French in English and in Italian of which in case of divergence the French text shall prevail, shall be ratified. It shall come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria.

The deposit of ratifications shall be made at Paris.

Powers of which the seat of the Government is outside Europe will be entitled merely to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative at Paris that their ratification has been given; in that case they must transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.

The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified copy of the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Paris, the 1919, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French Republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.

Appendix G to HD-82

PARIS, October 28, 1919.

From: Roosmale Nepveu

To: Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Dutch Government has noted the text, as published in the papers, of a note addressed to the German Government by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers.¹⁸ It is shown

¹⁸ Appendix A to HD-70, p. 649.

in this note that the Supreme Council has requested the delivery of the following five ships to the Allied Governments:

*Johan Heinrich Burchard,
William Oswald,
Braunschweig,
Denderah,
Nassau.*

The "Koninklijke Hollandsche Lloyd" Dutch Navigation Company purchased the *William Oswald* and the *Johan Heinrich Burchard* on the 15th of June 1916. The other three ships were purchased by the "Holland-Amerika Lijn" Dutch Navigation Company on July 29, 1915 and August 7, 1915.

These ships, the purchase price of which was paid by the two Companies in question, were in course of construction at the time of the transaction. With reference to these ships, they were never at any time, properly speaking, German property and were never carried on the register of German ships. They were provided for the first time with Dutch clearances.

As a consequence, the ships in question are incontestably Dutch property, the more so in that at the time of the transaction there existed no prescription prohibiting the sale of German ships, in course of construction, or the purchase of German ships, by neutrals.

The Dutch Government has indicated the rights of the Dutch Companies to the German Government.

The Government of the Queen thought it advisable to bring the preceding to the knowledge of the Supreme Council. The Government entertains the hope that the Supreme Council will recognize the rights of the Dutch Companies, and that measures will [not?] be taken which would thwart the delivery of the ships in question to their legitimate owners.

By order of my Government, I have the honor to apply to your Excellency to act as intermediary in presenting this communication to the Supreme Council.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

Appendix H to HD-82

A. S.

German Ships Ceded to Holland

OCTOBER 31, 1919.

Note From the Drafting Committee

The Drafting Committee is of the opinion that the letter from the Dutch Minister, dated October 28th,¹⁷ calls for the following response:

¹⁷ *Supra.*

A ship of enemy origin cannot, during the war, escape the practice of the rights of belligerents, that is to say the liability of capture during hostilities, by sale or cession, nor upon the reestablishment of Peace, escape the Peace Conditions covering enemy ships.

The letter from the Dutch Minister contends that upon the dates when the purchase of these ships took place, there existed no prescription prohibiting the purchase of German ships by neutrals.

The Minister of the Netherlands appears to forget that by international law, the purchase of enemy ships in the course of war cannot in principle, be opposed to the belligerents.

HENRI FROMAGEOT

Appendix I to HD-82

WARSAW, October 4, 1919.

Copy

From: The Minister of France to Poland.

To: The Minister of Foreign Affairs.

RESUMPTION OF COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC ON RAILROADS CROSSING THE
GERMANO-POLISH FRONTIERS

I have the honor of addressing herewith to Your Excellency a copy of a note from the Allied Mission on Railroads proposing to ask the Polish Government for the opening to commercial traffic of the three railroads crossing the present Germano-Polish frontiers north of Warsaw:

Bialystok-Lyck
Warsaw-Mlawa-Danzig
Lowicz-Thorn.

I would be thankful to Your Excellency to be kind enough to inform me if this proposition is agreeable. The Minister of the United States has already informed the representative of his country at the Peace Congress in Paris of the question and is expecting instructions directly.

I am of the opinion, in accord with my English and American colleagues, that in case of affirmative we could open negotiations with Poland by identical verbal notes.

It would also be advisable, evidently, to ask Marshal Foch to start similar negotiations at Berlin.

The Allied missions on railroads and supplies deem that it is now time to take measures to open the railroad lines between Poland and Germany (northern frontier) to traffic of travellers and merchandise. The three lines considered are: the direct line between Lowicz and Thorn; the line Warsaw-Mlawa-Ilowo-Danzig; and the line Bialv-

stok-Lyck. The most important would seem to be the second. The only traffic existing at the present time for merchandise is that which is exploited by the Allied Commissions on Supplies, and the movement of travellers consists only in a bi-weekly courier that only persons accredited to the various missions are authorized to make use of.

The Missions on Railroads and Supplies think that it is of prime importance to begin the exploitation of this line at as early a date as possible, under reserve of maintaining the passports and authorizations to the necessary extent.

They would like to remark that as the lines are now exploited to the frontiers of Posnania, there are no good reasons to keep the frontiers of the north closed.

Therefore, the Mission proposes to the Ministers of France, the United States and Great Britain to ask the Polish Government if it has any objections, and if it has, at what date shall it decide to open the frontiers.

Moreover, as soon as the date shall have been fixed, these missions would propose to their respective Ministers that they inform the German Government requesting it at the same time to send a representative to Warsaw to come to an understanding on the measures of detail.

The operation of Frontier Commissions of Allied Officers and more especially at Mlawa and Illowo would not appear necessary.

DELALAIN

*French Delegate to the Allied
Mission on Railroads*

HAMMOND

*Brigadier General, Chief of the
Allied Mission on Railroads
in Poland*

JOYCE

*Lieutenant: for the American
Commission of Supplies*

CREDWSON

*Captain in the "Irish Guards",
Chief of the British Mission
of Supplies*

Appendix J to HD-82

[*The European Danube Commission to the Supreme Council*]

The European Danube Commission:

Whereas Article 349 of the Peace Treaty with Germany provides for the early meeting of an International Conference to establish the regime which is to apply to the Danube throughout its entire internationalized course; whereas it is indispensable that the European Danube Commission be represented in this Conference to indicate the

interests it represents and to furnish the benefits of its experience in Danubian affairs;

Decides;

to request the Supreme Council of the Allies to kindly assure the representation of the European Danube Commission in the said Conference.

Appendix K to HD-82

Copy

PARIS, October 24, 1919.

From: Minister Plenipotentiary, President of the European Danube Commission.

To: President Clemenceau.

The Peace Treaty with Germany provides, in Article 339, that Germany shall cede, within a maximum period of three months after she shall have received notification, a portion of the tugs and ships which will remain registered in the ports of the fluvial systems declared as international, after the deductions which will be operated as restitutions or reparations, to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned. The establishment of the number and of the distribution of these tugs and ships shall be determined by one or several arbitrators designated by the United States of America, with full consideration for the legitimate needs of the parties concerned. This cession is to be operated for considerations as stipulated in Article 339. Similar provisions figure in Article 300 of the Peace Treaty with Article [*Austria*], and in Article 328 of the Peace Conditions presented to Bulgaria on September 19, 1919.

The European Danube Commission, entrusted by the Treaties with the execution of important operations in the Lower Danube, is urgently in need of several high-powered tugs which it is unable to obtain through commercial channels without great delay, even if orders were immediately placed with naval shipyards; the present encumbrance existing in the maritime construction yards of the entire world would render the filling of orders impossible within a period of several years.

The European Danube Commission esteems, that in view of the public interests represented by it, an organization which represents four of the Allied and Associated Powers is entitled to the benefits of Article 339 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, as well as to analogous provisions in the Treaties concluded, or to be concluded, with the former allies of that Power. For this reason, during its recent plenary session, held in Paris a few days ago, the European Danube

Commission, during a meeting held October 17, 1919 (in the morning) took the following decision :

“The French Delegate shall present a request to the Supreme Council of the Allies, for the attribution of two high-powered tugs, which are necessary in the services of the European Danube Commission, in compliance with the Conditions fixed by Article 339 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, 300 of the Peace Treaty with Austria, 228 of the Peace Conditions presented to Bulgaria on September 19, 1919, and of the analogous Article which shall be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Hungary; these ships to be selected from among the tugs ceded by Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria to the Allied and Associated Powers concerned, and to be attributed by the arbitrators who are to be designated by the United States of America, by virtue of the aforementioned Articles”.

In bringing the preceding decision to your attention, I have the honor to indicate to the Supreme Council the advantage there would be, considering the operations necessitated on the Lower Danube to facilitate navigation, to attribute the tugs in question to the European Danube Commission, for an indemnity to be fixed by the arbitrators.

The price of these tugs would be, moreover, deducted from the indemnities which are due the European Danube Commission by Germany, in compliance with Article 352 of the Peace Treaty with that Power.

Appendix L to HD-82

Note Handed to Mr. Loucheur, by the President of the German Peace Delegation

PARIS, October 27, 1919.

On account of the threatening nature of the food situation in Germany, a contract has been concluded with Denmark for the delivery of 50,000 tons of potatoes.

It is absolutely necessary that these potatoes be transported before the commencement of the frosts.

It is impossible, however, to make the shipments in time without having recourse to German tonnage and to cross the Baltic sea. The transportation should be made by steamers and German lighters of about 500 to 750 tons.

For this reason petitions have already been addressed to the Allied and Associated Governments by Denmark on this subject.

Notes of Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 4, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de St. Quentin

ITALY

M. de Martino
Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF . . . Capt. G. A. Gordon
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian Small
FRANCE M. Massigli
ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for the items in which they were interested:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Dr. J. B. Scott

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Captain Fuller, R. N.
Mr. A. Leeper
Commander Dunne
M. Malkin

FRANCE

Marshal Foch
General Weygand
General Desticker
General Le Rond
M. Fromageot

ITALY

General Cavallero
M. Vannutelli-Rey
M. Dell'Abbadessa
M. Pilotti
Prince Boncompagni

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu
M. Nagaoka

1. MARSHAL FOCH stated that the President of the Armistice Commission had informed him that at a meeting at Treves of the Railways Commission the German delegates informed the Allied representatives that the German Government had decided to stop all passenger train service from the 5th to the 15th of November, both in the occupied and unoccupied parts of Germany. After the 15th of November passenger traffic would be restored but all express trains would be suppressed. He wished to be authorized by the Council to reply that the suspension of railway service in the occupied territories could not be admitted and that if a reduction of railway service in these territories were consented to, it would only be on condition that rapid communication with the large centers of unoccupied Germany, with respect both to passenger traffic and postal service, should continue to exist.

Curtailment of Service on German Railroads

(It was decided:

to approve the communication to be sent by Marshal Foch to the German Government notifying it that the Allied and Associated Powers could not permit a substantial curtailment of service on railroads in the occupied territories (See Appendix "A").)

2. (The Council had before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council dated November 1st, 1919 (See Appendix "B").)

Hungarian Question M. BERTHELOT said that it was evident from reading Sir George Clerk's telegram that everyone in Hungary desired the departure of the Roumanian troops; they were an embarrassment both to the Friedrich Government and to the Allied Generals, whose authority was compromised by their presence. But, in spite of this fact, it remained necessary to have an Inter-Allied force on the spot. This seemed to him all the more essential as he noted that the only Allied representative having a real influence in Hungary was Admiral Troubridge, and he supposed that this was because of the vessels under the Admiral's command. So the Roumanians should leave, but on the other hand, it was necessary to have an Inter-Allied force which would be more than a moral force. Sir George Clerk's telegram also indicated that the Friedrich Government would retire as soon as the Roumanian troops had left. Under these conditions it seemed to him that the order of events should be as follows: (1) formation of an Inter-Allied force, if it were decided to form one;—(2) departure of the Roumanian troops, as soon as this Inter-Allied force could reach its destination;—(3) withdrawal of the Friedrich cabinet; and,—(4) formation of a Democratic government which would take charge of elections. Sir George Clerk, as a perfect gentleman, seemed to feel confidence in Admiral Horthy, in whom he

had found a pleasing personality. As far as he was concerned, it seemed to him that the word of an Hungarian Admiral, however likeable he might be, and whose intentions moreover were known, was not sufficient.

M. DE MARTINO said that the Italian Delegation was of the opinion that the occupation of Hungary by an Inter-Allied force composed of Jugo-Slavs and Czechs would result in trouble; these troops, particularly the Jugo-Slav troops, had shown in the past that they were not averse to pillaging. Moreover, there existed a profound hatred between Hungarians and Serbs. The Italian Delegation therefore thought that the troops which it was proposed to send to Hungary would only increase disorder. The Italian representative at Budapest had proposed an alternative plan of charging the Inter-Allied Military Mission with supervising the organization of the Hungarian army and of ensuring that it did not fall into the hands of the reactionaries. Such a mission for the Generals could be considered as falling within the terms of the Armistice and would not constitute an illegal interference in the Internal affairs of Hungary. In any case it would be well to know what kind of government it was desired to establish in Hungary. Sir George Clerk's report seemed to place confidence in Friedrich and Horthy, while, on the other hand, the French Delegation had characterized them as tools of Archduke Joseph; a definite policy should be adopted.

M. BERTHELOT replied that if the Serbs and Czechs were to be commanded by Serb and Czech officers it would evidently be impossible to use them, but it was proposed to place these troops under Allied command. Moreover, whatever bitterness might exist in Hungary against the Serbs, he thought that Hungarian public opinion was resigned to the loss of certain territories. In the next place, it seemed scarcely possible that Admiral Horthy's army could be controlled by a Commission which had no material force at its disposition: to follow any such line of action would be tantamount to insisting on a policy of impotence. Finally, as to the question of knowing what government should be supported, he thought that there was no difference of opinion, and that M. De Martino himself had no doubts concerning the true aims of Friedrich. This point of paramount importance remained: as long as the Roumanians were there, the Hungarian Government had been able to do nothing. The day the Roumanians left and nothing remained but the moral force of the Allied Generals, the country would be delivered over to reaction and monarchical restoration. It was vital to have a real force in Hungary; the question was to know what this force should be.

MR. POLK asked who would pay the Czecho-Slovak and Serbian troops placed under Allied Command. It was evident that it would not be their governments.

M. BERTHELOT observed that the financial question would have to be examined but that it was less important than the question of principle which should be decided first.

M. PICHON pointed out that it was necessary to know if it was agreed to organize an Inter-Allied force. For his part he thought it indispensable. As long as Friedrich was there the establishment of a democratic form of government could not be counted upon. Friedrich had proved that he was either unable or unwilling to establish one.

MR. POLK said that his difficulty was that the plan now proposed had not been suggested either by Sir George Clerk or by the Allied Generals; it was being discussed at long range. Moreover, he thought that there would be difficulties in obtaining the necessary cooperation of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs; it would also be difficult to persuade the Roumanians to withdraw completely, and the Council would find it hard to maintain control of the situation. Finally, he doubted if an Allied command would suffice to prevent the pillaging and disorders that M. De Martino mentioned.

M. PICHON said that evidently no decision could now be taken and that Sir George Clerk and the Allied Generals should be consulted.

M. BERTHELOT observed that it would certainly be preferable to send Allied troops into Hungary, but that none were available. It was also clear that it would be difficult to eliminate the Roumanians, and that if the three countries bordering on Hungary participated in that operation the difficulties would be less. On both sides there were adverse considerations between which a choice would have to be made.

M. DE MARTINO requested that his proposal be submitted also to Sir George Clerk. He was, moreover, greatly impressed by the fact that Sir George Clerk thought that Horthy could be persuaded to keep his promises.

M. PICHON thought it was extraordinary that Admiral Horthy, who had raised an army with certain well known intentions, should suddenly renounce his designs.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that Sir George Clerk had also indicated the possibility of trusting Friedrich and had spoken of private negotiations relative to the formation of a Ministry, whereas M. Berthelot had said that the Council had already pronounced against Friedrich.

M. BERTHELOT said that it should be recalled that after Sir George Clerk's first trip, the Council had agreed that Friedrich must be eliminated.¹ A draft telegram² to this effect had been prepared. In order not to seem to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary this telegram had not been sent and it had been decided to entrust Sir George Clerk with a new mission, but Sir George Clerk's instructions

¹ HD-67, minute 7, p. 539.

² Appendix C to HD-68, p. 586.

were contained in the draft telegram.³ This draft had been prepared by Sir George Clerk and himself. Sir George had pointed out to him that it would be best not to give Friedrich an order to withdraw and to only tell him that for the last time he was asked to form a democratic government—a thing which they judged it impossible for him to do. He recalled also that the Council had thought of publishing the telegram in order to strengthen the hands of the Hungarian Democratic elements. It was clear that if Friedrich had been able to form a democratic government he would long since have done so. Sir George Clerk, moreover, did not seem to have any doubt of his withdrawal. It seemed to him that the Friedrich Government, like any monarchical Government which attempted to establish itself in Hungary, should withdraw.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he entirely agreed that Sir George Clerk should be consulted; he himself had suggested it at the preceding meeting of the Council.⁴ There was first of all a point which had to be clarified, namely: what was being asked of Hungary? It was to have a stable Government which would preside over the elections and with which Peace could be concluded. The occupation which M. Berthelot thought would be a short one, was therefore bound up with the question of elections, and might well be prolonged. Furthermore, Sir George Clerk thought that Friedrich would withdraw after the departure of the Roumanians and he manifested a great deal of confidence in Admiral Horthy's assurance that he would recognize a Government resulting from the elections. Sir George must have had serious reasons for this opinion and he, himself, attached great weight to it. Moreover, it was well known that the majority of the Hungarian population favored the establishment of a conservative form of Government; if the elections took place without mismanagement it was almost certain that the resulting Government would not be democratic. However, there existed no right to prevent the Hungarian people from forming a Government corresponding to its own tendencies, provided there were no question of restoring the Hapsburgs. He thought indeed, that Admiral Horthy was counting on the elections to bring about in Hungary a Government satisfactory to himself and that doubtless explained his attitude and the assurance he had given to Sir George Clerk. Ought military intervention to be resorted to, in order to prevent such elections? The whole question lay there. In the meantime, elections were impossible in Hungary until the Roumanians had retired beyond the Theiss. The intervention of the Czechs and Serbs might likewise create difficulties. He doubted whether that inter-

³ HD-69, minute 3, and HD-71, minute 2, pp. 603 and 674.

⁴ HD-82, minute 3, p. 908.

vention could be obtained since the Czechs were probably not inclined to favor the formation of a Government whose tendencies would cause them anxiety. Moreover, if the intervention of the Jugo-Slavs were requested they might ask to be guaranteed against an Italian attack; what would be done then? He thought, for his part, that Sir George Clerk ought first of all to be asked if he thought it expedient to form the Inter-Allied force which had been suggested. Why not be satisfied with the departure of Friedrich and the formation of another Government? That was what had been desired by the Council. There had been no thought of military occupation and no new fact had occurred to justify that occupation.

M. BERTHELOT thought that there was a new fact, namely; the organization of Horthy's army. He was very nearly in agreement with the essential part of Sir Eyre Crowe's statements. It was indeed probable that the elections would be favorable to politicians of the same shade of opinion as Friedrich, but the principle should be agreed to that the return of the Hapsburgs could not be tolerated. It was impossible to intervene in opposition to the opinion of the country, nevertheless this opinion could not be allowed to do what it pleased. Moreover, he did not think that the Czechs would create any difficulty over giving the assistance which would be asked of them, for Mr. Benes had been the first to point out the danger. There was no doubt that the police of Friedrich and the army of Horthy would, at the time of the elections, act favorably to the reactionary elements.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that Sir George Clerk should be asked if he was sure of the good faith of Friedrich and Horthy.

M. DE MARTINO said that Sir Eyre Crowe had alluded to a question which the Jugo-Slavs would doubtless raise if they were asked to send troops into Hungary. He could not better reply than by reiterating the opposition of the Italian Delegation to the sending of Serbian troops into Hungary.

M. BERTHELOT asked the reasons for this opposition?

M. DE MARTINO said the reasons were those that he had already pointed out; he was willing, however, for Sir George Clerk to be consulted on this point provided that his (M. De Martino's) suggestions were also submitted to him.

M. PICHON pointed out that Sir George Clerk had made another recommendation, namely sending an Inter-Allied Mission to Transylvania. For his part he approved of this recommendation.

M. POLK asked if the members of this proposed Mission could not be taken from the Allied officers at Budapest.

SIR EYRE CROWE recalled that Transylvania was to be given to Roumania, and inquired whether such a Mission could be sent without previous negotiations with Roumania.

MR. POLK suggested that Sir George Clerk be asked what part of Transylvania was referred to in his telegram.

M. PICHON added that he might also be asked to specify the accusations made against the Roumanians.

M. BERTHELOT read a draft telegram which he had prepared in conformity with the views expressed in the course of the discussion.

MR. POLK asked if the sense of the Council was that the Roumanians should eventually be represented in the Inter-Allied force?

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he, just as did the American Delegation, saw difficulties in such a course.

M. PICHON said that he was not desirous to have the Roumanians included in this force but he thought that their exclusion would create additional difficulties.

MR. POLK remarked that he had only said that it seemed to him difficult for the Roumanians to accept exclusion from the Inter-Allied force.

SIR EYRE CROWE called attention to the fact that Sir George Clerk had asked if he was authorized to state that the Allies would recognize a Government, acceptable to him, which did not include Friedrich. A reply on this point should be sent to him.

MR. POLK said he took it as understood that the telegram would be submitted to the Council before being despatched.

It was decided:

that at its next meeting the Council would examine a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk to be prepared by M. Berthelot in conformity with the discussion of this question at the meeting of November 4th.

3. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation dated November 3, 1919 (See Appendix "C").)

GENERAL LE ROND said that there had already been preliminary conferences between the British and French delegates on the various Plebiscite Commissions. It would be very advisable for the Italian delegates to participate as soon as possible in these conferences. The Council should not forget that these Commissions were important bodies, that each country had to organize a numerous personnel and that such organization would necessarily entail a long delay. In these preliminary conferences it would be necessary to agree on the personnel to be furnished by each Allied country and to prepare the negotiations with the Germans.

M. DE MARTINO thought that November 7th was somewhat early. The 8th or 9th would be better.

GENERAL LE ROND observed that there was no obligation to commence negotiations with the Germans exactly on the 10th.

Conference
Preparatory
To Putting
Into Force
the Treaty
With Germany

M. PICHON wished to draw the attention of the Italian Delegation to the question of the contingent to be supplied by Italy for the forces of occupation; the Council did not yet know if Italy had withdrawn her reservation.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that the instructions he had just received authorized him to withdraw that reservation. The Italian contingent would consist of five battalions and two batteries of Field Artillery, that is to say, three battalions and two batteries of Field Artillery would be sent to Upper Silesia, one battalion to Marienwerder and one to Teschen. He would come to an agreement with Marshal Foch's Staff to have the strength of the three battalions destined for Upper Silesia sufficiently reinforced to equal approximately the five battalions demanded.

MARSHAL FOCH said that this plan ought to be examined more closely but in principle it seemed admissible.

M. PICHON said that the Presidents of the Commissions should be named. The Council had decided on the 18th October⁵ that the Presidents should be elected by the Commissions themselves, but it later seemed preferable to have the Council appoint them directly.⁶ Ought it to wait until the Commissions had been formed?

GENERAL LE ROND thought that it was important to make these appointments as soon as possible. Indeed the Presidency carried with it certain obligations; the nations furnishing the Presidents would also have to furnish a larger personnel. They, therefore, should be settled upon as soon as possible. If it were decided that the Presidency of each Commission should be given to the Nation to which had been entrusted the command of the troops in the same zone, he wished to recall that at Allenstein the military command would be British, at Marienwerder Italian, in Upper Silesia French, and at Teschen American; but as for Teschen the American participation was awaiting the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate, and the question was all the more urgent inasmuch as only two months were left in which to hold the plebiscite.

M. PICHON said that the Council felt that it was fitting that the military command in each territory to be occupied, and the Presidency of the plebiscite Commission in the same territory, should pertain to the same Nation.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that while waiting for America to assume the Presidency of the Teschen Commission it should be held

⁵ HD-72, minute 1, p. 684.

⁶ HD-75, minute 6, p. 754.

by France, which already administered the neighboring territory of Upper Silesia.

MR. POLK agreed.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that a telegram had just been received from General Henrys containing information of the agreements concluded between the Germans and Poles with respect to regulating the taking over by Poland of territories to be immediately ceded to it by virtue of the Treaty of Peace. The application of these agreements, moreover, raised certain difficulties; for instance, it involved the passage over part of the territory of the free city of Danzig of German troops. Under these circumstances he thought it important to notify the Poles to send here representatives qualified to continue their negotiations with the Germans under the auspices of the Conference. (This recommendation was approved.)

It was decided:

(1) that the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on Plebiscite or Administrative Commissions, to the extent of at least one Delegate from each Power on each Commission, should assemble at the Quai d'Orsay as soon as practicable—November 7th if possible;

(2) that the Polish Government should be invited to send to Paris representatives empowered to conduct with the German Government—under the auspices of the Conference—the negotiations rendered necessary by the cession to Poland of German territory, at the same time as the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers discussed with the German Delegates questions raised by the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace.

It was further decided:

(1) that the Presidency of the Plebiscite Commissions should at Allenstein be held by the British Representative, at Marienwerder by the Italian, in Upper Silesia by the French, and at Teschen by the Americans; although provisionally it should be held at Teschen by the French Representative;

(2) that the question of the strength of the Italian troops of occupation should be settled by Marshal Foch and the Italian Military Representative.

4. (The Council had before it a note from the Belgian Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference dated October 25th, 1919 (See Appendix "D").)

Transportation
on the Baltic of
Wood Destined
for Belgium

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the question was decided by the former decisions of the Council.⁷ The best course would be to transmit this note to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission stating that the Council was of the opinion that the instructions previously given by it to this Commission involved the granting of the Belgian Delegation's request.

⁷ HD-74, minute 9, p. 736.

It was decided :

to transmit to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission the note from the Belgian Delegation relative to German vessels laden with wood destined for Belgium, and to inform that Commission that the Supreme Council was of the opinion that the instructions previously given by it involved the granting of the Belgian request.

5. GENERAL WEYGAND stated that with respect to their railway system the Baltic Provinces were in a peculiar situation. During the war the Germans changed the tracks to normal gauge with the result that at present only German material and transformed Russian material could circulate on the Baltic system. It was evident that in order to assure the continuance of the economic life of the country part of the German material should be retained on the spot. Neither the Armistice nor the treaty accorded the right to demand this. He proposed that the German Government be informed that, by reason of Germany's deliberate transformation of the railways of the Baltic Provinces, General Niessel should be empowered to determine the amount of German material to be retained in those territories.

**Railway System
of the Baltic
Provinces**

It was decided :

that the German Government should be informed by Marshal Foch that, in consequence of the transformation of the railways of the Baltic Provinces effected by the Germans during the war, General Niessel would be empowered to determine the amount of German rolling stock which should be left in those regions.

6. (The Council had before it the draft letter to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Dutch Government relative to the vessels sold by Germany during the war to Dutch Navigation Companies. (Appendix "E").)

**Note to the
Chargé d'
Affaires of
the Dutch
Government**

It was decided :

to approve the text of the note to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Dutch Government relative to German ships sold during the war to Dutch Navigation Companies.

7. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 3rd, 1919 (See Appendix "F").)

**Representation
of the European
Danube Commission in the
Conference
Provided for
by Article 349
of the Treaty
of Versailles**

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the only thing to do was to approve the recommendations of the note. The Council at that moment agreed that the Secretary-General of the European Danube Commission, that is to say, Colonel Rey, should be Secretary-General of the Conference provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(It was decided :

(1) to approve the recommendations of the note prepared by the Drafting Committee (See Appendix "F") relative to representation

of the European-Danube Commission in the Conference provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles;

(2) that the Secretary-General of the European-Danube Commission should act as Secretary-General of the said Conference.)

8. M. FROMAGEOT said that the Drafting Committee wondered whether it would not be expedient to have Bulgaria sign a Protocol similar to those signed by the German and Austrian Delegations at Versailles and at St. Germain. It was difficult to take the Versailles Protocol as a guide for the Protocol in question. On the other hand, the St. Germain Protocol contained provisions which it would be advantageous to have Bulgaria sign. For instance, it provided, in Section 1, that the list of persons to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Governments by Austria pursuant to Article 173, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, should be sent to the Austrian Government within a month of the coming into force of the Treaty. A similar clause could be inserted in the Bulgarian Protocol. The provisions contained in Section 2 seemed inapplicable to Bulgaria. The same was not true of the provisions of Section 3; but as the Bulgarian Treaty, with respect to reparations, differed greatly from the Austrian Treaty, he thought that the opinion of the Reparation Commission should be asked on that point. Finally, Section 4 could be advantageously reproduced. Austria had also signed at St. Germain a declaration by which it undertook to communicate to the Allied and Associated Governments all the information at its disposal relative to vessels sunk or damaged by Austrian naval forces during the war. It might not be very beneficial to have Bulgaria sign a corresponding declaration, but at least it could not be prejudicial.

(It was decided :

(1) that the Drafting Committee should prepare, to be signed at the same time as the Bulgarian Treaty, a draft protocol similar to the protocol signed September 10, 1919, at Saint Germain, by the Austrian Delegation, subject to the decision of the Reparation Commission as to the expediency of repeating in the said protocol the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the protocol of Saint Germain;

(2) that the Drafting Committee should prepare, to be signed by the Bulgarian Delegation at the same time as the Treaty of Peace, a declaration similar to the one signed on September 10, 1919, by the Austrian Delegation.)

9. M. MATSUI stated that he had been telegraphically informed that the Emperor of Japan, on October 30th, had ratified the Treaty of Versailles. Under the final clauses of the Treaty of Peace it became his duty to make a formal notification of this ratification. Should he do so at once or await the signature of the procès-verbal relative to the deposit of ratifications? It seemed to him that he might await this latter date.

Ratification
of the Treaty
of Versailles
by Japan

M. PICHON said that the Conference would approve the procedure prescribed by the Drafting Committee.

M. FROMAGEOT said that that Committee had provided for this contingency in the draft procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications which had been approved by the Council. This draft had spoken of "deposit of ratifications or of notifications of ratifications."

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 4, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-83

NOVEMBER 4, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch,
To: General Nudant.

The German Delegate to the C. I. C. F. C.^s at Treves communicates the following decision of the Minister of the Empire, actuated by the coal shortage:

"The Ministry of the Empire has decided: 'From November 5 to 15 inclusive, on all the principal and secondary lines, all passenger train traffic will be suspended with the exception of workmen trains which are absolutely indispensable, and the suburban train service of the large cities. Beginning with November 15, and until further orders, passenger traffic will be limited to the trains which are absolutely indispensable to the maintenance of economic life. Take the necessary measures at once to insure that all express and passenger trains which are not necessary to workmen traffic be stopped after their arrival at destination on and after November 5'".

The German Delegate to the C. I. C. F. C. requests authorization to apply these measures in the occupied countries.

Please communicate the following to the German Government: I do not grant the authorization requested. I demand that postal and passenger train service between the Allied Countries and the occupied territories on one hand, and between the occupied territories and the great centers of non-occupied Germany on the other hand, be maintained as they are. These relations are indispensable to the existence of the Army of Occupation, to the execution of the Armistice Convention and that of the Peace Treaty. The approval of any program changing traffic in the occupied territories must be subordinate to the maintenance of the above mentioned relations.

The C. I. C. F. C. of Treves is further invited to immediately formulate proposals with this in view.

FOCH

^s Commission Interalliée des Chemins de Fer de Campagne (Inter-Allied Campaign Railway Commission).

Appendix B to HD-83

*Telegram From Sir George Clerk, Budapest, to Sir Eyre Crowe,
Astoria*

No. 3

D. November 1, 1919.

R. November 2, 1919.

Following for Supreme Council No. 2.

Situation here is extraordinarily complicated and difficult. Three or two months ago provisional coalition government could have been made comparatively easily. Since then anti-Semitic crusade has grown to a great height and though really genuine has been to some extent fostered for political purposes. Result is that it is impossible to ignore popular sentiment which unless handled with great care will break out in violence and unrest throughout country.

I have seen important representatives of every shade of opinion and my general conclusions are as follows:

1. Immediate evacuation of Roumanian forces is essential. Whatever risks I have not found one Hungarian apart from extreme Jewish and social democrats who are not agreed upon this. Until Roumanians go nothing serious can be done here and it is only this tangible proof of betterment that will enable me to handle problem of Christian National party which is name of this mass of excited popular feeling which looks on Friedrich as the standard bearer. M. Diamandi assures me that immediately on my arrival he telegraphed urgently to Bucharest pressing for withdrawal but so far has had no reply. Possibly Roumanian elections which I understand are at present taking place in Bucharest may account for this but I beg Supreme Council will exercise all possible pressure on Roumanian Government to secure earliest possible withdrawal. I trust Roumania will be required to evacuate all occupied territory that is to say that they will not be allowed to remain on (1 group undecypherable). A further reason for early evacuation is that there are signs of an early and very hard winter and this means that with a frozen Danube vessels of inter-allied Danube Commission will be immobile and only force we possess to assist in maintaining order will be powerless.

2. Once I have this definite assurance of Roumanian evacuation I can approach Friedrich and I hope obtain from him a definite assurance that he will make way for a government which corresponds with wishes of Supreme Council.

3. Private negotiations are in train for formation of such a Government. In view of great weight and excited feeling of Christian National Party they must be fully represented and care taken not to give them occasion to think they are being swamped by Jews and Socialists. If however all goes well there will be a government which

will fully meet requirements of Supreme Council. I shall of course satisfy myself main Hungarian parties (1 group undecypherable) Christian National Party are content with their representatives in this government. As it may be of great importance before they settle transfer of government from Friedrich to his successor at short notice I venture to ask that I may if necessary assure new government of provisional recognition of Supreme Council. Time necessary only to exchange telegrams after formal new government may upset whole scheme.

4. I have seen Admiral Horthy. He inspires confidence. He will give me a formal assurance that he will accept new government and keep his troops in hand. In order to quiet en bloc apprehension of Jewish and Socialist convention here I have told Admiral Horthy that on the strength of his assurance I shall give my personal assurance to these people that order will be maintained. Otherwise there may be something like panic.

6. It would be practically impossible to include a Jew in the new Provisional government. Nor do Jews themselves wish it. I shall however see that they are satisfied with composition of government.

7. Reports reach me here as to Roumanian action in Transylvania which leaves little doubt Roumanians are acting there not only with great harshness but in flagrant violation of conditions of peace treaty. If it were possible for an inter-Allied commission to visit Transylvania to report on situation confidence and trust of this people in justice of Allies would be firmly established. I am sending by despatch report on conditions in Transylvania.

Appendix C to HD-83

[The French Delegation to the Supreme Council]

PARIS, November 3, 1919.

In a note dated November 1st,⁹ the Allied and Associated Powers invited Germany "to send to Paris, for November 10, 1919, duly qualified representatives to regulate, in accord with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, the installation arrangement for the Government, Administration, and Plebiscite Commissions, the investiture ceremonies, etc., etc."

⁹ Appendix B to HD-80, p. 863.

It is indispensable that the representatives of the Powers designated to meet the German representatives on November 10th assemble prior to that date and establish an agreement between Allies before any discussion with the Germans is entered into.

The French Delegation has the honor to propose that :

1st—the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, designated at the rate of at least one Delegate for each Power and for each Commission, assemble on November 7th at the Quay d'Orsay ;

2nd—Sessions of the Commissions which are to commence operations on November 10th, in participation with the Germans, be held [*sic*]

In view of these early conferences, the French Delegation calls the attention of the Supreme Council to the necessity of regulating the two following questions as promptly as possible.

1st—Strength of Occupation Forces :

American troops will not participate in the occupation before the ratification of the Treaty by the United States. However, the emplacement of their battalions is reserved, in accord with the American Government.

The Italian Delegation has not yet indicated whether its Government is disposed to furnish the entire contingent of seven battalions as requested, and if it can, in any event, furnish Upper Silesia with the five battalions especially necessitated as a result of the delay in the arrival of the American battalions.

2nd—Presidency of the Inter-Allied Commissioners in the Zones of Occupation.

On October 18th,¹⁰ the Supreme Council decided that the Inter-Allied Commissions sent to the zones of occupation would select their President, without it being obligatory that these Presidents be of the same nationality as the Officer, in each zone, commanding the forces of occupation.

But, after a new examination,¹¹ at the suggestion of M. Clemenceau, the Conference agreed to reconsider the question on November 24th [*4th?*].

In fact, it appears preferable that the Supreme Council itself select the Presidents of the Commissions, by taking into account the importance of the effectives, unity of command and the equilibrium of the Powers.

¹⁰ HD-72, minute 1, p. 684.

¹¹ HD-75, minute 6, p. 754.

Appendix D to HD-83

BELGIAN DELEGATION

Order No. 1 Annex

PARIS, OCTOBER 25, 1919.

From: Baron Capelle,

To: President Clemenceau.

Several ships loaded with wood in Finland and ultimately destined for Belgium have been stopped in Baltic ports as a result of the blockade proclaimed by the Supreme Council.

As Belgium is in extreme need of wood on account of the numerous reconstruction labors in the country, I am taking the liberty to ask that you intervene, and that instructions be given, as soon as possible, authorizing the clearance of these ships. These ships are immobilized in their cargo ports through fear of developments or blocked at different ports of their course, from which they dare not clear.

This question is of extreme importance; navigation in the Baltic will be, in fact, suspended very shortly on account of the ice, and if these boats are not authorized to continue their voyage at the present time, they will risk being blocked until next spring.

Furthermore, it would be imminently dangerous to leave property belonging to Belgium for a period of several months, in a country, where conditions are as uncertain as in Finland at the present time.

I have the honor to enclose herewith an original list of the ships in question loaded for Holland. I am awaiting a supplementary list and as soon as I shall have received same, I will take the liberty of sending it on.

I entertain the hope, Mr. President, that a decision may be taken by the Supreme Council, on principle, concerning this question, to which extreme importance is attached by the Government of the King.

Please accept, etc.

[No signature on file copy]

[Enclosure]

Partial List of German Steamers Loaded for Holland, the Cargo (Wood) of Which Is To Be Ultimately Transferred to Belgium

Admiral—Chartered by M. M. L. Brabandt and Co., Brussels, and Mme. Van Canegem, Ghent, through the intermediary of Barde-maecker of Ghent.

To be loaded with wood at Rafso (Finland) by the Reposaaeren Hoyrysaaha Osakeyhntio, Helsingfors, now blockaded at Kiel.

Weser—Chartered by Jussiant and Company, Antwerp, through the intermediary of ?

To be loaded with wood at Trangsund (Finland) by Sarklsalni Angsag, Nyslott, probably now at Stettin and blockaded there.

Jupiter—Chartered by Jussiant and Company, Antwerp, through the intermediary of Zeyen and Co., Antwerp.

To be loaded with wood at Koivusaari and Trang Sund (Finland) by Salvesen and Sarkisalni, Angsag, Nyslott, at the present time at Trang Sund.

Gerwin—Chartered by M. A. Gobbaert at Antwerp, by the intermediary of Zeyen and Co., Antwerp.

To be loaded with wood at Ra-fso (Finland) by Reposaaen Hoy-rysaha Osaheyhtio, Helsingfors, at the present time blockaded at Stettin.

Ariane—Chartered by the M. A. Gobbaert at Antwerp, by the intermediary of Zeyen and Company, Antwerp.

To be loaded with wood at Trang Sund (Finland) by Salvesen and Sarkisalni Angsag, Nyslott, at the present time at Trang Sund.

Fiducia—Chartered by M. H. Deweert at Ostend, through the intermediary of John P. Best at Ghent.

To be loaded with wood at Walkome (Finland) by Mr. Ferd Frigen, Lahti, at the present time blockaded at Stettin.

Wilhelm Oelsner—Chartered by the Widow Dapsens Soyer at Tournai, through the intermediary of John P. Best at Ghent.

To be loaded with wood at Trang Sund by Juselius Aktiebolag, Bjerneborg, at the present time ?

Yens—Chartered by Messrs Devriendt Brothers at Ghent through the intermediary of Vyane at Ghent.

To be loaded with wood at Walkome (Finland) by John Parviainen Osaheyhtio, Jyväskylä, at present ?

Concerning the tonnage, full registration can be found by consulting the Lloyd registers. Information concerning several other ships may be had through Maritime Courier.

Appendix E to HD-83

Proposed Letter to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Netherlands

PARIS, November 4, 1919.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 28 last,¹² in which you kindly requested me to communicate to the Supreme Council the views of the Netherlands Government relative to German ships, claimed by Holland as having been sold during the war by the Hamburg-Amerika-Line and the Kosmos-Line to the profit of the Netherlands companies Lloyd Royal Holland and Holland-Amerika-Line.

I have the honor of informing you that the conditions under which this transaction was made do not permit the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to recognize the property right to these ships by the Dutch companies interested.

¹² Appendix G to HD-82, p. 929

It may be noted that, on the other hand, according to the terms of the Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919,¹³ Germany must hand over all her commercial vessels to the Allies, and that between the signing and the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, no act of Germany could be tolerated which would infringe upon the execution of her obligation to hand over her commercial vessels to the Allied and Associated Powers, according to the provisions of the Treaty.

Under these conditions the Supreme Council has requested me to advise you that the claims of the Dutch companies interested cannot be complied with.

If these interested parties have any claims to enter, they should present them to Germany, whose intervention in this respect is provided for in paragraph 7 of Annex III of Part VIII (Reparations) of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

Appendix F to HD-33

Note for the Supreme Council Relative to the International Danube Conference

According to Article 349 of the German Treaty, the Conference entrusted with elaborating the international regime of the Danube shall be composed of Powers named by the Allied and Associated Powers, that is practically by the Supreme Council.

Whatever the personality which the Danube Commission enjoys, it does not appear that it can be considered as a "Power" by the terms of Article 349.

On the contrary, it cannot be admitted that the regime be discussed outside a commission entrusted for more than 60 years with the international interest of perhaps the most important part of the river, that is from the sea of [to] Galatz.

On the one hand, it does not seem possible, therefore, that the Danube Commission be designated as a Power, member of the Conference; on the other, it appears necessary to establish a close contact between the Commission and the Conference.

These two viewpoints could be easily reconciled, if the Supreme Council, in naming the Powers which are to compose the Conference, give them the following recommendation:

1. Not to come to any decision without first having heard the Danube Commission, and
2. To choose as Secretary General of the Conference a qualified representative of the Commission.

For the Drafting Committee
HENRI FROMAGEOT

NOVEMBER 3, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, November 5, 1919, at 10:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA,
UNITED STATES OF

Hon. F. L. Polk
Secretary
Mr. L. Harrison

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe
Secretary
Mr. H. Norman

FRANCE

M. Pichon
Secretaries
M. Dutasta
M. Berthelot
M. de Saint-Quentin

ITALY

M. de Martino
Secretary
M. Barone Russo

JAPAN

M. Matsui
Secretary
M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF Capt. B. Winthrop
BRITISH EMPIRE Capt. G. Lothian Small
FRANCE M. Massigli
ITALY M. Zanchi

Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

General Bliss

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sackville-West
Commander Lucas, R. N.
Mr. A. Leeper
Mr. E. H. Carr

ITALY

General Cavallero
General Marietti
M. Vannutelli-Rey
Prince Boncompagni

JAPAN

M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk (See Appendix "A").)

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to remark that he proposed to replace paragraph 2 on page 1 by the following paragraph: "The Roumanian troops shall evacuate Hungary completely and shall withdraw to the other side of the fron-

Telegram to
Sir George
Clerk

tier as fixed by the Conference: It is indispensable that they should allow full liberty to the Hungarian elections." In the following paragraph he suggested that the words, "immediately thereafter" should be omitted. He wished to give Sir George Clerk discretion on the question of the time when the Friedrich cabinet should withdraw. If he were to await the complete evacuation by the Roumanian troops, this might be found too long.

M. DE MARTINO asked that a change be made in paragraph 1 of page 2, so as to follow the suggestion made by the Italian representative at Budapest.

(The text was agreed to read as follows: "Another suggestion had been made which charged the Inter-Allied Military Mission with the supervision of the organization . . . etc." (See Appendix "B").)

MR. POLK suggested that the beginning of paragraph 3 on page 2 be changed to read as follows: "The Council would like to know whether, after having consulted the Inter-Allied Mission, and after . . . etc."

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to add to paragraph 3 of page 2, after the words, "by the Hungarian *gendarmérie*" the following words, "which might be placed under the Control, direct or indirect, of the Inter-Allied Military Mission."

(This change was adopted, and it was agreed to put after paragraph 3 of page 2, the paragraph suggested by M. De Martino)

(It was decided:

(1) that Sir Eyre Crowe should send to Sir George Clerk, in the name of the Supreme Council, the telegram as shown in Appendix "B";

(2) that the telegram sent by the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government at its meeting of November 3rd, 1919, should be communicated to Sir George Clerk,)¹

2. M. PICHON inquired whether Mr. Polk had received an answer on the subject from President Wilson.

MR. POLK said that the President would surely issue the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations; the only question was the form of letter which the President should write. This was still open and he expected an answer within a short time.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to state that the British Government had agreed upon Paris as the place of the first meeting of the Council.

M. BERTHELOT stated it had been understood between Sir Eric Drummond, Colonel House and the French Representative that this meeting should only nominate the Commission charged with fixing the

First Meeting
of the Council
of the League
of Nations

¹ See appendix D to HD-82, p. 920.

boundaries of the Sarre district. There still remained the appointment of the Commission for the Government of the Sarre district. As soon as the Treaty was put into force, the German Government might ask, to whom should the sovereignty over this territory be transferred. The difficulty might of course be solved by prolonging the military occupation regime until the Commission for the Government of the Sarre had been appointed; but it was important that the Allies should agree on this intermediary solution. From the French standpoint, however, it was quite certain that it would be wiser to appoint the Government Commission at once and that it was to especially please the American and British Governments that this solution might be accepted.

MR. POLK remarked that he understood that this was the view of his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE feared that the Germans might cause trouble, if this were not fixed; Sir Eric Drummond however having agreed with his French and American colleagues, he (Sir Eyre Crowe) concluded that M. Berthelot's solution was correct.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that of course Germany would be very likely to send notes to the Allies on the subject but as it was only a question of a few weeks at the most, he thought it would be easy to gain the necessary time.

(It was decided:

(1) that Paris should be the place of the first meeting of the Council of League of Nations;

(2) that on the agenda of the first meeting of the Council the only matter taken up would be the appointment of the Commission charged with fixing the boundaries of the Sarre territory;

(3) that the present military occupation of the Sarre territory should continue until the Commission charged with the government of the Sarre district had been appointed.)

3. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation (See Appendix "C").)

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

**Request of the
Provisional
Government of
Memel To Be
Authorized To
Send
Representatives
to Paris**

that Sir Eyre Crowe should notify the Delegates of the provisional Government at Memel that the permission requested could not be granted but that as soon as the Treaty of Peace was put into force the Allied and Associated Powers would welcome the cooperation of the local Officials who are natives of the country.)

4. (The Council had before it instructions to General Niessel, President of the Commission charged with the control of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.) (See Appendix "D".)

Instructions
to the Inter-
Allied Commis-
sion To Examine
Into the
Evacuation of
the Baltic
Provinces

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the last phrase of paragraph 1, Section 5 entitled, "Action of the Allied Navy in the Baltic," beginning with the words, "the Commission will serve as an intermediary" be removed. (This was agreed to.)

SIR EYRE CROWE also wished to remark that as far as transportation was concerned, the British Government would do all in its power, but could not guarantee transportation.

M. BERTHELOT stated that General Niessel had already insisted before the Council on his Commission getting the necessary credits; it had adjourned the examination of this question, but General Niessel called the attention of the Council to a case which needed its immediate decision. From the information at hand, it seemed that Colonel Bermond's troops would probably be dissolved, and it was important to know what would happen to the Russian troops which made up his forces. Of course every effort would be made to have these troops put under General Yudenitch's command, but a certain period might elapse before this could take place, and meanwhile it would be necessary to supply them if one did not want to throw them into the hands of the Bolsheviks. He thought it necessary to allot a certain amount of money to General Niessel which would be shared between the three Allies.

MR. POLK wished to state that, as far as America was concerned, it could provide no funds for that purpose.

SIR EYRE CROWE also remarked that he questioned the likelihood of his Government's participation.

M. BERTHELOT stated that it was already well understood that each power should stand the expenses of its representatives; but there surely were bound to be common expenses, and it seemed impossible to send this mission without a credit: France might decide to advance the sum for this purpose, it being well understood of course that the other Governments would reimburse it later.

MR. POLK remarked that the appropriations of the United States Government were so made that it could only pay the share of expenses for its own mission, and for a determined purpose.

M. BERTHELOT explained that was the reason he suggested a fixed amount. He thought the Council should recognize the importance of the solution.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired why they should not adopt M. Berthelot's solution, which was on the same lines as the procedure in the missions of Sir George Clerk and General Gough, where the British Government paid at first and the expenses were later shared.

M. BERTHELOT agreed that France was ready to follow this procedure, if it was understood that the other Allies would reimburse her for their share.

MR. POLK stated that his Government could not give a penny towards a Mission of a political nature.

SIR EYRE CROWE emphasized that his Government understood the mission to be a reply to the German demand for some body to supervise the German evacuation, and therefore it could not countenance its becoming involved in political activities.

M. BERTHELOT thought the question was a more complex one.

MR. POLK said he was quite sure that General Niessel understood that the American representative had strict instructions not to become involved in questions of a political nature.

M. DE MARTINO thought that it might be very difficult to make a difference between political questions and purely military questions; the one might involve the other; and he thought it important that the Generals should get definite instructions in advance on political questions which might come up, so that the action they took should be covered by a common agreement.

M. PICHON answered that it would be for the General to ask the Council for instructions. He summed up that the Commission would be the best judge of what measures it should take, and should they include or involve questions of a political nature, then the Council should be informed immediately and a decision given.

(It was decided:

(1) that in the section of instructions to General Niessel, entitled "Action of the Inter-Allied Navy in the Baltic" the phrase which read, "The Commission will serve as intermediary between the Supreme Council and the Inter-Allied Military Mission," should be omitted;

(2) that the Commission should keep strictly to the wording of their instructions and should refer to the Supreme Council any questions of a political nature involved in the carrying out of these instructions.

5. (The Council had before it a list of questions prepared by the French Delegation.) (See Appendix).²

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon this list. He wished to remark that on the list submitted, certain questions might not belong to the Supreme Council and could be treated through ordinary diplomatic channels. He suggested that each delegation prepare a revised list on these lines, and the Secretary-General would coordinate all the lists handed in.

(It was decided:

that each Delegation should prepare a list of all questions which still remain to be taken up by the Supreme Council, and that the Secretary-

Recapitulation
of Questions
Still Remaining
To Be Taken Up
by the Supreme
Council

² An appendix containing a list of questions prepared by the French Delegation does not accompany the file copy of HD-84. For such a list, see appendix H to HD-89, vol. ix, p. 118.

General of the Conference should collate these lists for the Council's examination.)

6. MR. POLK stated that the Supreme Council had made a decision on the question of the tank ships on September 27th;³ this decision stood, but he personally had decided without knowledge of the full facts, and wished to have the question raised at a later date when he had all available information. He simply wished this set upon the record.

German Tank
Ships

(The meeting then adjourned.)

HOTEL DE CRILLON, PARIS, November 5, 1919.

Appendix A to HD-84

*Draft of a Telegram From the Supreme Council to Sir George Clerk,
Budapest*

PARIS, November 5, 1919.

The Supreme Council has taken note of your various communications⁴ and is willing to comply with the principle of your suggestions. It is of the opinion that:

1st.—The Rumanian troops must withdraw; it is indispensable that they allow full liberty to the Hungarian elections;

2nd.—The Friedrich cabinet must resign immediately thereafter, and be replaced by a really different Government, comprising Democratic elements, Governments which would hold the elections, and the recognition of which by the Allies you would be now authorized to guarantee.

The Council was presented with a suggestion that, in order to prevent the elections and the Hungarian Government from being influenced by the local police, which is under the authority of Friedrich, and by the small army of Admiral Horthy, whose tendencies are plainly reactionary, the Rumanian military force should be replaced by an Allied military force capable of inspiring confidence in the population and to strengthen the moral authority of the commission of the generals and of the conference itself; the facts seemed to demonstrate that, without being supported by armed force, their decisions ran the risk of remaining unexecuted.

Another suggestion has been made that the control of the Hungarian army of Horthy by the commission of generals should be considered as sufficient.

³ HD-62, minute 1, p. 403.

⁴ For text of the communication of November 1, 1919, see appendix B to HD-83, p. 947.

It must not be forgotten that on one hand the Allies do not wish to hinder the expression of the free will of the Hungarians, but that on the other hand they have decided to prohibit the re-establishment of the fallen dynasty, either in a direct or indirect form.

The Council desires to know whether, after having considered all authorized views, you think that the Rumanian force should be replaced by an Inter-Allied force, or whether the assurances of Admiral Horthy and the guarantee of order represented by the Hungarian *gendarmerie* can be trusted.

The question of sending an Inter-Allied force raises the following difficulties: As the great powers have no force available, they consider sending two divisions of Czecho and Serbian soldiers and subaltern officers, commanded by English, Italian, American and French superior officers, under the command of an energetic general, nominated by the Supreme Council.

The Italian Delegation objects to sending any Jugo-Slavs on account of the state of mind of the Hungarian population. On the other hand, all delegations realize the inconveniences which might result from the presence of contingents from small countries, neighbors of Hungary, and hostile, even under a firm Allied command. The essential question is to know whether the presence of a force at the disposal of the Allies is not necessary.

The Supreme Council, trusting to your judgment and your information on the ground, asks you for precise and prompt advice.

Appendix B to HD-84

Telegram

NOVEMBER 5, 1919.

From: Supreme Council.

To: Sir George Clerk, Budapest.

The Supreme Council has taken note of your various communications⁵ and is ready to adhere, in general, to your suggestions. It esteems that:

1st—The Rumanian troops must completely evacuate Hungary and withdraw beyond the frontiers fixed by the conference; it is indispensable that the Hungarian elections be conducted with full liberty;

2nd—The Friedrich Ministry must withdraw to make room for a really different government comprising the democratic element. This Government would proceed with the elections, and you would be authorized to guarantee its recognition by the Allies.

⁵ For text of the communication of November 1, 1919, see appendix B to HD-83, p. 947.

The Council was presented with a suggestion tending to emphasize the necessity, in order to prevent the elections and the Hungarian Government being subject to the influence of the local police which is in the power of Friedrich, and by the small army of Admiral Horthy whose tendencies are openly reactionary, of replacing the Rumanian military force by an Allied military force capable of inspiring confidence in the population and strengthening the moral authority of the Commission of Generals and of the Conference itself. These facts appear to indicate that without material force their decisions are liable to remain non-executed.

On one hand, the fact that the Allies do not in any wise wish to impede the expression of the free will of the Hungarians must be clearly understood, but on the other hand they have decided to prevent the restoration of the fallen dynasty, in any form, either direct or indirect.

The Council would like to know if after consultation with the Commission of Generals, and having had recourse to all the authorized advice with which you are surrounded, you are convinced that the Rumanian forces ought to be replaced by Inter-Allied forces, or whether the assurances of Admiral Horthy and the guarantee of order represented by the Hungarian *Gendarmerie* can be trusted, which might perhaps be placed under the direct or indirect control of the Commission of Generals.

Another suggestion was made to the effect of entrusting the Commission of Generals with the supervision of the organization of the Hungarian army, and to see that it is not employed for political purposes contrary to the views of the Allies. The Commission of Generals should also see that the occupation of the Capital and of the country be conducted without excesses and without disturbing public order.

The question of sending an Inter-Allied force presents the following difficulties: as the Great Powers have no effectives available, they would be envisaged with the sending of two divisions of Czech and Serbian non-commissioned officers and soldiers, commanded by English, Italian, American and French superior officers under the orders of an energetic General nominated by the Supreme Council.

The Italian Delegation objects to sending any Jugo-Slavs, owing to the state of mind of the Hungarian population. For that matter, all Delegations realize the inconveniences which might result from the presence of contingents from the small neighboring hostile countries of Hungary, even under a firm Allied command. The main question is to ascertain whether the presence of a force at the disposition of the Allies is not necessary.

The Supreme Council, confident in your judgment and your local information, asks you for precise and prompt advice.

Appendix C to HD-84

Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council

The British Delegation has received through the British Mission at Berlin the following telegram :—

“Oberbürgermeister Altenberg and three representatives of the provisional Government of Memel request permission to proceed to Paris from Berlin to lay their case before the Supreme Council. German Foreign Office do not object. May permission be granted?”

The delegation proposes to reply that the permission requested should not be granted but that the Delegates may be assured that, in the execution of the Treaty of Peace at Memel, as elsewhere, the co-operation of local officials who are natives of the country will be welcomed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

4 NOVEMBER, 1919.

Appendix D to HD-84

[Instructions to the Interallied Commission To Examine Into the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces]

1. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL

The persistent violation, on the part of the German Government and the German Generals operating in the Baltic provinces, of the prescriptions of Article 12 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918 (confirmed by Article 433 of the Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919, with Germany) has caused numerous protests from the Supreme Council, and a resolution, under date of October 10th deciding upon the constitution of an Interallied Commission to supervise the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by German troops.⁶

2. COMPOSITION OF THE INTERALLIED COMMISSION

General Niessel is selected to exercise the Presidency of this Commission, which shall comprise the following members:

British Representative:	Brigadier General Turner
American Representative:	Brigadier General S. A. Cheney
Italian Representative:	Brigadier General Marietti
Japanese Representative:	Major G. Takeda, Infantry

⁶ HD-67, minute 4, p. 536.

3. EVACUATION SUPERVISION

The German Government alone is held responsible for the execution of the evacuation.

The Interallied Commission is authorized to exercise, with full liberty of action wherever it may judge necessary, control of the execution of the evacuation measures ordered by the German Government.

To this end, the Commission :

a) shall acquire full knowledge, through the German Government at Berlin, of the measures taken by Germany with a view to establishing the conditions of the evacuation.

b) shall receive communication of the instructions given by the German Command of the Baltic regions concerning the application of these measures.

c) shall, should it judge necessary, after a local examination of the situation, address any proposal to the German Government of a nature to facilitate, insure and hasten the execution of the evacuation.

d) the German Government shall accord to the Commission, as well as to its agents, full authorization to circulate within the territories occupied by German troops.

4. CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE EVACUATION

The execution of the provisions of Article 12 of the Armistice implies not only the retreat of the constituent German units now located in the Baltic Provinces with their staffs and full service, but also the recall of all German military who, after demobilization, individually or in groups, entered the service of the Russian corps organized in the said provinces.

The Diplomats, as well as the German Civilian functionaries shall also leave the Baltic Provinces simultaneously with the troops, with the exception of those who shall be approved by the Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian *de facto* Governments.

The supervision shall cover not only the execution of the evacuation movements, but, as well, the verification of the material accompanying the German troops, in order to prevent the removal of any material or supplies which do not belong to these troops.

5. ACTION OF THE ALLIED NAVY IN THE BALTIC

The Commission shall establish relations with the Interallied Maritime Command in the Baltic, which shall furnish information relative to the naval operations undertaken, either to support the liberation of Petrograd, or to block the provisioning of the Bolshevists by sea, in

conformity with the decisions of the Conference. The Commission will serve as an intermediary between the Supreme Council and the Allied Navy.

The Allied Navy shall furnish the Commission with all necessary means of transportation, and shall assure the transmission of telegrams.

6. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

In order to accomplish its mission, the Allied Commission shall have at its disposition the personnel of the Military Missions of all the Allied and Associated Powers now operating in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action.

The Commission may appeal to the personnel of the French Military Mission in Poland if need be, and in accord with General Henrys.

The Commission, in accord with the Baltic Governments at Reval, Riga and Kowno, shall be assured of the cooperation of the local authorities if such assistance is deemed necessary.

The General, President of the Commission, shall determine the location of his headquarters in the Baltic Provinces. He shall have free use of the telegraphic and radio-telegraphic lines and stations for his communication.

7.

It is further decided that the Commission shall leave as soon as possible and shall commence the labors with which it is entrusted, without awaiting the political instructions which may be sent ultimately after discussion and approval by the Supreme Council.

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¹ This is primarily a subject index; no attempt has been made (except in a few instances) to include names of persons. Directories of the various delegations are printed in vol. III, pp. 1-153.

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
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